

**NOTE:**

Following William Flynn Martin's briefing of President Reagan, the following National Plan of War was prepared to implement the President's directives to Martin.

It shows the steps of this process:

1. Martin suggests to Poindexter/McFarlane that a study be undertaken as to what can be done to bring stability to the Iran Iraq war. Up until Martin's suggestion the US did not take sides and noted that each of these opponents of the US were destroying each other.
2. Poindexter/McFarlane agreed. Martin established an interagency group and the conclusions were presented to individual Cabinet officers, as well as the Cabinet as a whole.
3. Prior to the briefing of the full cabinet Martin met with Reagan in the office office and presented the summary of the task force (which reported to VP Bush, a Special situations group).
4. Reagan, Bush, Meese, Jim Baker, McFarlane, Colin Powell, McFarlane and Poindexter listened to the Martin brief (which took about 15 minutes).

5. The President approved the recommendations of the Martin group:

1. seek selling arms to Iran and Iraq;
2. build up oil stocks globally..."stocks buy time for diplomacy"
3. build up the capability of friendly Arab states in the Middle East to allow for long term stability in this region of importance to the US.

6. In the afternoon the full Cabinet heard the report.

McFarlane later comments about Martin's performance and the importance of protecting US interests in the Gulf of Hormuz and Middle East.

## ROUTING

No	Name and Address	Date	Initials
1	P. DUR	3/20	
2	D. FORTIER	3/20	
3	G. KEMP	3/20	
4	C. LEHMAN	3/20	
5	B. MARTIN	3/20	
6	S. STEINER	3/20	

  

X	ACTION	FILE
	APPROVAL	INFORMATION
X	COMMENT	PREPARE REPLY
	CONCURRENCE	RECOMMENDATION
	DIRECT REPLY	X RETURN
	DISPATCH	SIGNATURE

REMARKS:  
B. BONK

~~TOP SECRET~~NSC/ICS CONTROL NO. 400273COPY NO. 1 OF 8

HANDLE VIA SYSTEM IV CHANNEL ONLY

# NSC INTELLIGENCE DOCUMENT



Warning Notice  
Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved  
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION  
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF  
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE~~TOP SECRET~~MJD  
7/19/04

~~TOP SECRET~~

0007  
SYSTEM IV  
400273

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~TOP SECRET~~

March 20, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR PERSIAN GULF WORKING GROUP

FROM: RICHARD S. BEAL *RSB*

SUBJECT: National Plan of Action - Iran-Iraq War

Attached, for your review and comments, is a draft National Plan of Action and the State, Defense, and Energy plans which were responsive to the 2 February Crisis Planning Notice.

I would appreciate your comments on the draft Plan by COB Wednesday, 21 March.

To ensure positive control of this sensitive document, we have arranged to have it placed under System IV and issued to you personally. It must be returned to CMC through Ken DeGraffenreid's Office in Room 300, OEOB.

Attachment

Tab I - National Plan of Action, Iran-Iraq War, and 3 attachments.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR MD8-134#55894

BY *RWD* NARA DATE *4-23-10*

~~TOP SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~TOP SECRET~~

(I)

~~TOP SECRET~~

DRAFT/19 March 1984

NATIONAL PLAN OF ACTION  
IRAN-IRAQ WAR

I. PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS

United States policy, objectives, and strategies regarding the Iran-Iraq war rest on assumptions derived from the most recent judgments of the Intelligence Community concerning the probable course of the conflict and consequent threats to U.S. national interests. These judgments are contained in an Interagency Intelligence Assessment dated 12 March 1984 (see Annex A), which updates SNIE 34/36.2-83 of October 1983 on the same subject. The update reaffirms the SNIE's warnings about possible escalation of the Gulf war. Both papers describe an increasing risk of Iraqi escalatory action against Iran, possibly culminating in Iraqi attacks on Iran's Kharg Island oil terminal or associated tanker traffic and Iranian retaliation against Gulf states' oil exports. The 12 March paper judges that Iraq has already passed through many of the intermediate warning steps outlined in the SNIE. It accords special importance to the likelihood of an Iranian response involving the use of terrorism and subversion in Gulf states. It nevertheless sees the potential for oil price increases as limited, so long as Saudi Arabia can use its oil production capacity to continue supporting the current oil price, and it judges a major disruption of Saudi oil exports as unlikely.

II. NATIONAL POLICY

- A. The primary goal of US policy in this situation is to assure the uninterrupted flow of oil from the Persian Gulf Region to US and other Free World markets. The US, in concert with other affected nations wherever possible, will use whatever measures may be necessary, including the use of military force, to keep the Strait of Hormuz open to international shipping and to deter or defend against attacks on or interference with non-belligerent shipping or oil production or transshipment facilities in the region.
- B. The secondary goals of US policy are to prevent the expansion of Soviet influence in the region, encourage termination and deter escalation of the present conflict between Iran and Iraq as soon as possible without US military involvement, improve the security and stability of the Gulf oil-producing states and strengthen their relationship with the US, and gain access to facilities which will facilitate deployment of those forces necessary to defend critical oil shipment facilities and transshipment points.

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

MILR/MO8-134#553875  
KARA DATE 11/2/11  
by RW

- C. Should an international oil crisis result from escalation of this crisis, the US will place maximum emphasis on coordinated intergovernmental cooperation and on reliance on marketplace forces to minimize the effects of this situation on vital oil supplies.

### III. NATIONAL OBJECTIVES

To carry out this policy, the US will:

1. Use its influence to see the conflict end without the use of US military involvement.
2. Work actively to deter an escalation of the present Iran-Iraq conflict.
3. Work actively to contain the conflict should it expand beyond its present dimensions.
4. If an expanded conflict impedes the free flow of oil through the Gulf, intervene militarily with Allied and Gulf state participation to reopen the Gulf to international shipping.
5. Use the crisis to strengthen its relationships with the Gulf states.
6. With little possibility of improving its relations with the present Iranian regime, use the crisis to strengthen US relations with Iraq.
7. Take actions to preclude or combat terrorism in the region, especially Iranian-sponsored terrorism.
8. Prevent Soviet exploitation of this situation.
9. In the event of threatened or actual disruption of shipping or oil production in the Persian Gulf, prevent panic buying and public hysteria at home and abroad, ensure that military energy requirements are adequately met, and provide mechanisms to ease LDC financial pressures caused by an interruption of Persian Gulf oil exports.
10. Arrange for access to facilities to permit the redeployment of military forces to the region.

### IV. NATIONAL STRATEGY

1. To carry out Objective 1 - terminate the conflict - the US will undertake the following actions:

Presidential Initiatives

- a. Publically initiate an offer to mediate the conflict.

Diplomatic Measures

- b. Maintain active US support for a negotiated settlement that will preserve the sovereignty and territorial integrity of both Iran and Iraq. (Action: State)
- c. Work through third parties to urge restraint by Iran and a negotiated settlement. (Action: State)

Economic Measures

- d. Urge third countries to cease arms sales to Iran as a means of confronting Iranian intransigence. (Action: State, Defense)

Military Measures

- e. Maintain continuous and credible military presence in the region. (Action: Defense)
- 2. To carry out Objective 2 - deter escalation - the U.S. will undertake the following actions:

Presidential Initiatives

- a. Send [REDACTED] envoys to dissuade Iran and Iraq from war escalation.
- b. Publically declare a regional peace initiative, enforced by an export boycott of oil from Iran or Iraq.

Diplomatic Measures

- c. Emphasize U.S. intention to defend freedom of navigation in Strait of Hormuz and international waters of the Gulf. (Action: State, Defense)
- d. Continue urging Iran (through third parties) and Iraq to avoid escalation and to seek a peaceful settlement. (Action:

Sec. 3.3(b)(1)  
M.O. 1352U  
As Amended

State)

Military Measures

- e. Obtain agreement from our Allies for joint military operations in a Gulf crisis. (Action: State, Defense)
- f. Seek combined military planning with friendly Gulf States. (Action: State, Defense)
- g. Obtain agreements (preferably formal and public) with Gulf states for military cooperation with us. (Action: State, Defense)

Economic Measures

(None)

- 3. To carry out Objective 3 - contain the conflict if it expands - the U.S. will undertake the following actions:

Presidential Initiatives

- a. Send Special Presidential Envoys to key Allied governments to arrange for concerted action.

Diplomatic Measures

- b. Continue urging Iran (through third parties) and Iraq to avoid further escalation and seek a negotiated settlement. (Action: State)
- c. Continue emphasizing U.S. determination to defend freedom of navigation in Strait of Hormuz and international waters of the Gulf. (Action: State, Defense)
- d. Continue consulting Allies, Gulf states about joint responses to the expanded conflict situation. (Action: State, Defense)

Military Measures

- e. Continue working to obtain agreements with Allies and Gulf states for joint military action, if needed, to preserve freedom of

- navigation in the Gulf. (Action: State, Defense)
- f. Expedite contingency planning for U.S./Allied military action in the Gulf. (Action: Defense)
  - g. Coordinate military defensive and deterrence actions with NATO. (Action: Defense, State)
  - h. Take steps to help Iraq avoid defeat by preserving a strategic balance. (Action: State, Defense)
  - i. Urge Iraq and Iran not to use chemical weapons. (Action: State, Defense)

#### Economic Measures

(None)

- 4. To carry out Objective 4 - intervene militarily if circumstances warrant - the U.S. will undertake the following actions:

#### Presidential Initiatives

- a. Make public statement on the need for military action to maintain freedom of the seas and international access to Persian Gulf oil.

#### Diplomatic Measures

- b. Solicit requests from Gulf states for U.S./Allied military intervention. (Action: State, Defense)
- c. Inform other friendly states of our intention to intervene and seek their support. (Action: State)
- d. Inform Iran our intervention is defensive only and will cease once freedom of navigation in the Gulf is restored. (Action: State)
- e. Take diplomatic steps, coordinated with our energy security and military plans, to restore unimpeded access to the Gulf and prevent further crises. (Action: State)
- f. Manage action in the UN Security Council to protect the U.S. position. (Action:

State)

Military Measures

- g. Alert U.S. military forces. (Action: Defense)
- h. If U.S. or friendly nations' forces or shipping in the Gulf are attacked, pursue and engage the attacking force so long as it poses an imminent threat. (Action: Defense)
- i. Offer protection to vessels of friendly maritime nations. (Action: State, Defense)
- j. Plan implementation of any U.S. policy decision to retaliate for attacks on U.S. forces, friendly forces, or protected commercial vessels. (Action: Defense)
- k. Develop contingency plans to protect U.S. interests in the Gulf in the event of an actual or threatened defeat of Iraq. (Action: Defense, State)

Economic Measures

- l. Explore possibility of multilateral economic sanctions against Iran. (Action: State)
5. To carry out Objective 5 - strengthen ties with Gulf states - the U.S. will undertake the following actions:

Presidential Initiatives

- a. Send Special Presidential Envoys to key Gulf States to assure leaders of US support and seek concerted action.

Diplomatic Measures

- b. In pre-crisis period, step up consultations with Gulf states and look for tangible ways to reassure them of our commitment to their security. (Action: State, Defense)
- c. Encourage Gulf states to consider again and

on an urgent basis the U.S. offer to engage in combined contingency planning. (Action: Defense, State)

- d. Obtain agreements in advance of hostilities for joint U.S./Gulf states military cooperation in a crisis. (Action: State, Defense)
- e. If conflict spreads to the Gulf, solicit requests from Gulf states for U.S./Allied military intervention. (Action: State, Defense)

#### Military Measures

- f. In pre-crisis period, step up military-to-military consultations with Gulf states. (Action: Defense)
- g. Propose training exercises jointly with Saudi Arabian forces. (Action: Defense)
- h. If crisis results in attacks on Gulf states, assist them in defensive military action as directed by NCA. (Action: Defense)

#### Economic Measures

- o (None)
- 6. To carry out Objective 6 - strengthen our relations with Iraq - the U.S. will undertake the following actions:

#### Presidential Initiatives

- a. Send a Special Presidential Envoy to Iraq to explore ways of improving US-Iraqi relations.

#### Diplomatic Measures

- b. Make efforts to persuade third countries to stop selling arms to Iran. (Action: State, Defense)
- c. Make efforts to persuade Iraq to avoid escalation and avoid chemical warfare in order to improve its international standing and limit excuses for Iranian escalation. (Action: State, Defense)

### Military Measures

(None)

### Economic Measures

- d. Support Iraq's efforts to arrange additional oil pipeline routes to export outlets outside the Persian Gulf. (Action: State)
  - e. Authorize case-by-case export to Iraq of non-military items that might have military utility. (Action: State, Commerce)
  - f. Explore other ways to shore up Iraq economically, such as EXIMBANK lending. (Action: State, Treasury)
7. To carry out Objective 7 - preclude or combat terrorism - the U.S. will undertake the following measures:

### Presidential Initiatives

#### Diplomatic Measures

- a. Offer training to Gulf states in management of counter-terrorism programs. (Action: State, Defense, [redacted])
- b. Implement recommendations for combatting terrorism now being prepared by interagency group. (Action: State, Defense, CIA)

#### Military Measures

- c. Provide USN ships in terrorist high-threat areas with point defense surface-to-air missile system to defend against suicide aircraft. (Action: Defense)
- d. Improve SIGINT support to MIDEASTFOR. (Action: Defense)
- e. Improve tactical air cover capability for MIDEASTFOR. (Action: Defense)
- f. Increase readiness of USN forces in Persian Gulf/Strait of Hormuz region. (Action: Defense)

- g. Review and revise procedures for identifying and engaging hostile forces in the region. (Action: Defense)
- h. Increase USCENTCOM monitoring of the terrorist threat in its area of responsibility. (Action: Defense)

#### Economic Measures

(None)

- 8. To carry out Objective 8 - prevent Soviet exploitation of the situation - the U.S. will undertake the following actions:

#### Presidential Initiatives

- a. Make public statement on US policy and the need to work cooperatively with all nations, including the USSR, in resolving this crisis.

#### Diplomatic Measures

- b. In the pre-crisis period, publicly emphasize U.S. preference for a negotiated settlement of the Iran-Iraq dispute, U.S. neutrality, and U.S. determination to defend freedom of navigation in the Gulf and Strait of Hormuz. (Action: State, USIA)

- c. When the crisis begins and before U.S. military involvement, inform the Soviets of our intention to intervene, explain our objectives, and urge caution. (Action: State, Defense)

#### Military Measures

- d. In the pre-crisis period, review and update contingency plans involving military support of Gulf states against Soviet or Soviet-surrogate attack and Soviet direct military action against U.S./Allied defensive military actions in the Gulf. (Action: Defense)

#### Economic Measures

(None)

- 9. To carry out Objective 9 - protect U.S. domestic and international energy and economic equities - the U.S. will undertake the following actions:

### Presidential Initiatives

- a. Make public statement on US policy, stressing international cooperation and the need for public calm.

### Diplomatic Measures

- b. In the pre-crisis period, step up consultations with International Energy Agreement (IEA) participants on stockbuilding, contingency plans. (Action: State, Energy)
- c. In the pre-crisis period, consult with participants in the London Economic Summit on developing a coordinated strategy for countering effects of an interruption in oil shipping in the Gulf. (Action: State, Energy)
- d. If crisis emerges, continue and step up consultations with IEA, other Allies, and friendly Gulf states aimed at mitigating the effects of a stoppage of oil shipping through the Gulf. (Action: State, Energy)

### Military Measures

- e. In pre-crisis period, review impact on U.S. forces' petroleum logistics system of closure of Strait of Hormuz or Persian Gulf for various time periods and explore options to lessen impact. (Action: Defense, Energy)

### Economic Measures

- f. In the pre-crisis period, continue building the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, update data/computer model runs, and work for passage of Section 252 of the Energy Policy and Conservation Act. (Action: Energy)
- g. In the pre-crisis period, develop a domestic and an international public information strategy to minimize likelihood that interruption in Gulf oil shipping will trigger panic, hoarding, dramatic price increases. (Action: Energy, State)
- h. If crisis emerges, implement public information strategy. (Action: Energy, State)
- i. Update market, supply, and price data and computer models once crisis begins. (Action:

Energy)

j. Assemble options on use of Strategic Petroleum Reserve, export of Alaskan oil, and other emergency measures for Presidential review and decision. (Action: Energy, Treasury)

10. To carry out Objective 10 - Arrange for access to facilities permitting the redeployment of military forces to the region, The US will carry out the following actions:

Presidential Initiatives

Diplomatic Measures

a. Negotiate with selected Gulf States for access to military facilities and overflight privileges. (Action: State)

Military Measures

b. Negotiate with military officials of selected Gulf States for use of military facilities, prepositioning of military equipment and supplies, local security, and joint planning and operations (Action: Defense)

Detailed departmental implementing plans are at Annexes A-D.

V. PLANNING GUIDANCE

A. Security

1. National-level contingency planning for US actions in response to the current Persian Gulf crisis shall be closely held by designated individuals. The existance of and access to the Persian Gulf Situation National Plan of Action, the implementing NSDD, and associated national-level policy and planning documents shall be limited to the following officials and members of their immediate staffs. Other individuals may be afforded access only by the express permission of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs:

The President  
The Vice President  
The Special Situation Group  
The Crisis Pre-Planning Group  
The NSC Executive Secretariat  
The Crisis Management Center

2. Dissemination of these documents shall be controlled on a by-name basis by the NSC Executive Secretary. Further reproduction of these documents is not authorized.
3. Information from these documents may be extracted and used in departmental planning documents and operational directives providing that there is no specific reference to a specific NSDD or a National Plan of Action.
4. Public release of information concerning US policies, planning, or operational activity shall be in accordance with the public information guidance contained in Section IVB of this Plan.

#### B. Public Information

Given the extreme sensitivity of the diplomatic, economic and military aspects of this crisis, it is essential that there be no unauthorized public discussion of US policies, intentions, contingency plans, capabilities, or non-public actions related to this crisis situation. Therefore, all statements intended for public release, including background statements on a non-attribution basis, must be cleared with the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs in advance of their release.

#### C. Legal Guidance

Any significant legal issues that may arise in the course of Plan implementation should be addressed promptly to the Attorney General

#### D. Budgetary Guidance

Departments and agencies involved in Plan implementation may prepare appropriate budgetary reprogramming requests for submission to the Director, Office of Management and Budget.

#### E. Congressional Relations

Key Congressional leaders, chairmen of selected Congressional Committees and their staff directors will be briefed on the Crisis situation and the general outlines of the National Plan of Action prior to its implementation by officials designated by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The Senior Director of Legislative Affairs, National Security Council Staff will coordinate these briefings on his behalf. No other discussions with the Congress on this situation are authorized prior to Plan implementation.

## VI. TIMETABLE

On approval of this Plan, the Crisis Pre-Planning Group will issue a coordinated timetable (the Time-Phased Action Chronology - TPAC) for Plan implementation. The Crisis Management Center will support the Crisis Pre-Planning Group in developing and maintaining this timetable. Changes in the timetable will be coordinated by the Crisis Pre-Planning Group.

## VII. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

Each participating department and agency shall provide an electrical report to the Crisis Management Center daily on the situation and the activities of their organization in implementing the National Plan of Action. This report may be required on a more timely basis during particularly active crisis periods. When this is required, revised reporting guidance will be issued by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

The Crisis Management Center shall provide a daily (or more frequently as required) Crisis Status Report to the President, Vice President, and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. This report will summarize significant crisis events, US and Allied activities, National Plan of Action implementation, and identify emerging policy and operational issues. The report may be accompanied by recommendations for Crisis Pre-Planning Group and Special Situation Group consideration of issues for Presidential decision. Any additional dissemination shall be determined by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

## VII.COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

The Crisis Pre-Planning Group shall convene daily during periods of active crisis operations to effect interdepartmental operational coordination of Plan implementation. Recommendations for modification of the National Plan of Action shall be considered by the Crisis Pre-Planning Group and forwarded to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs for Presidential review and approval. Any modification to the Plan will be issued in the form of a Crisis Management Notice.

ANNEXES:      A - STATE DEPARTMENT PLAN  
                  B - DEFENSE DEPARTMENT PLAN  
                  C - ENERGY DEPARTMENT PLAN  
                  D - CIA PLAN (Provided though separate channels)

S/S #8406980  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

~~SECRET~~

MARCH 7, 1984

SYSTEM II  
90092

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Iraq-Iran: Crisis Pre-Planning Guidance - Diplomatic Strategy

As requested in the NSC Tasker dated February 2, 1984, attached is a paper "Iran-Iraq: Elements of U.S. Diplomatic Strategy and Plans" prepared by the Department of State for the Crisis Pre-Planning Guidance meeting tentatively scheduled for Friday, March 9.

CHARLES HILL  
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Paper: Iran-Iraq War: "Elements of U.S. Diplomatic Strategy and Plans"

DECLASSIFIED  
NLS F1748# 116  
BY HOT, NARA, DATE 8/15/06

~~SECRET~~

IRAN IRAQ WAR: ELEMENTS OF U.S. DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY AND PLANS

U.S. diplomatic strategy toward the Iran-Iraq war is designed to deter escalation that could threaten U.S. interests in impeded access to Gulf oil and the security of the Gulf oil producer states, to deal with a crisis that closes or threatens, imminently, to close the Gulf or cut off access to oil supplies, and to bring the war to an end, eventually. Basic elements of this strategy are outlined below. These elements reflect the conclusions of interagency studies on strategy for Iran and Iraq submitted to the President by the Departments of State and Defense within the framework of our Southwest Asia strategy approved in NSDD-99. They also reflect the terms of reference for diplomatic steps and military planning in connection with the Iran-Iraq war approved pursuant to NSDD-114. A more detailed discussion of each element is contained in the attachment. This paper does not address diplomatic aspects of our energy policy.

I. Pre-crisis Diplomacy: Promote Settlement, Deter Escalation, Seek Military Preparations.

1. Maintain active U.S. support for a negotiated settlement that will preserve the sovereignty and territorial integrity of both Iraq and Iran.
2. Take steps to help Iraq avoid defeat by preserving a strategic balance, while maintaining U.S. neutrality.
3. Strengthen relations with Iraq, urge it to avoid escalation in the Gulf, stop using chemical weapons.
4. Work through third parties to urge restraint by Iran and a negotiated settlement.
5. Urge third countries to cease arms sales to Iran as a means of confronting Iranian intransigence.
6. Emphasize U.S. intention to defend freedom of navigation in Strait of Hormuz and international waters of the Gulf.
7. Obtain agreement from our allies for joint military operations in a Gulf crisis.
8. Strengthen ties with friendly Gulf states and seek combined military planning and U.S./Allied deterrent deployments/exercises.
9. Counter Iranian terrorism against U.S. and Gulf states.

DECLASSIFIED  
NLS F748#17

BY 105 NARA, DATE 8/15/08

B. Diplomatic Steps Following Outbreak of Hostilities

1. Obtain agreements, preferably formal and public, if not already accomplished, for military cooperation with Gulf states.
2. Solicit requests from Gulf states for U.S. and Allied military intervention.
3. Inform other friendly states of our intention to intervene and seek their support.
4. Inform Soviet Union of our intention to intervene, explain our objectives and urge caution.
5. Inform Iran that our intervention is defensive only.
6. Offer protection to vessels of friendly maritime nations.
7. Take diplomatic steps, coordinated with our military and energy security plans, to protect and/or restore unimpeded access to the Gulf and prevent further crises.
8. Manage action in UN Security Council to protect U.S. position.
9. Explore the possibility of multilateral economic sanctions against Iran.

C. Develop contingency plans to protect our interests in the Gulf in the event of a threatened or actual defeat of Iraq.

Although our current assessment is that Iran will not succeed in its current offensive, we need to undertake interagency study and contingency planning on U.S. policies and actions in the event that Iran's offensive succeeds and Iraq is threatened with defeat. Such a study should address the options that would be available to prevent an Iranian victory, taking into account our paramount interests in protecting Gulf oil-producer states against possible hostile Iranian moves in the future, and our overall ability to influence the outcome of the war.

Attachment: Discussion of U.S. Diplomatic Strategy

## IRAN-IRAQ WAR: DISCUSSION OF U.S. DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY AND PLANS

### A. Pre-crisis Diplomacy: Promote Settlement, Deter Escalation, Seek Military Preparations.

The following policies reflect the conclusions of interagency papers on strategy for Iran and Iraq submitted to the President by the Departments of State and Defense under Section V of the Work Program of NSDD-99. They also reflect the terms of reference for diplomatic steps and military planning in connection with the Iran-Iraq war approved pursuant to NSDD-114.

### I. Maintain active U.S. support for a negotiated settlement that will preserve the sovereignty and territorial integrity of both Iraq and Iran.

Since the outbreak of the war in 1980, we have recognized that victory by either side which would result in hegemony or dominant influence over the vanquished would seriously destabilize the Gulf region, lead to further conflict, and threaten our security and energy interests in the region. We have therefore supported a variety of efforts to mediate a settlement that would not seriously undermine the fundamental legitimate interests of either state.

### II. Take steps to help Iraq avoid defeat by preserving a strategic balance, while maintaining U.S. neutrality.

To help Iraq avoid defeat, we are pursuing various means of helping Iraq redress the strategic balance, while preserving U.S. neutrality in the war. We are supporting additional pipeline routes from Iraq to export outlets outside the Persian Gulf, authorizing case by case export of non-military items to Iraq which may have military utility, and exploring other ways to shore up Iraq economically such as EXIMBANK lending. Our efforts to persuade third countries from selling arms to Iran is a major element of this policy. We are not contemplating military support for Iraq for several reasons: Iraq does not need additional arms; U.S. resource constraints and Congressional attitudes would weigh against this; this could weaken our leverage in persuading third countries to avoid arms sales to Iran; it would be seen as a major departure from our neutrality policy and could thus complicate our undertaking to protect non-belligerent shipping and oil facilities; and it could adversely affect U.S. normalization with a post-Khomenei Iran.

3. Strengthen relations with Iraq, urge it to avoid escalation in the Gulf, stop use of chemical weapons.

We should continue to seek ways to strengthen our bilateral relations with Iraq, at whatever pace Iraq finds compatible with its war effort. Our strengthened relations enable us to encourage Iraq's trend toward more moderate positions on a range of issues important to us. It also puts us in a better position to influence Iraqi war strategies which conflict with our interests. Iraq's frustration with Iran's intransigence, heightened by the current Iranian offensive, and its concern over curtailment of its oil exports, are driving Baghdad toward escalating the war in the Gulf by attacking Iranian oil exports, and perhaps, Iran's main oil terminal at Kharg Island. Since a cutoff of Iranian oil exports could provoke Iran to carry out its repeated threats to retaliate by closing the Strait or attacking oil facilities of Gulf states, we are urging Iraq to avoid further illegal use of chemical weapons, and we have condemned this publicly.

4. Work through third parties to urge restraint by Iran and a negotiated settlement.

Iran has shown no interest in compromise or abandoning its goals of military victory and overthrow of the Iraqi regime. However, we expect that - assuming Iran does not prevail militarily - it will eventually seek peace. In the meantime, it may realize that it has an interest in seeking limited accommodations, such as a de facto ceasefire in the Gulf to avoid Iraqi attacks on oil exports or agreement to avoid attacks on civilian targets. We have repeatedly encouraged governments that have good relations with Iran to urge it to seek peace, or at least consent to limited ceasefire arrangements. These approaches to Iran strengthen the credibility of our appeals to Iraq for restraint by enabling us to say we are urging others to ask for similar restraint by Iran. States best placed to make such approaches are Japan, Pakistan, Turkey, and Algeria. We will continue to use these channels to Iran and look for others, including, perhaps, other non-aligned states and trading partners which have good relations with Iran or a major interest in continued access to Gulf oil.

5. Urge third countries to cease arms sales to Iran as a means of confronting Iranian intransigence.

Beginning in December, 1983, we have conducted an extensive diplomatic effort to reduce the flow of arms to Iran with a view to make its pursuit of the war more difficult and thereby to induce it to agree to seek peace. Our embassies in every non-communist country suspected of supplying arms to Iran made high-level demarches to host governments, arguing that the continued flow of arms to Iran was prolonging the war and reinforcing Iran's intransigence. Responses have been positive. Almost all countries claim they do not authorize sale of arms to

Iran. However, several, including the U.K. and Switzerland, stated that they permit the export to Iran of non-lethal military equipment. (The U.K. interprets "non lethal" liberally, permitting export of tank engines.)

Despite these assurances, we continue to receive reports of arms transfers to Iran from countries that have assured us they would not permit this. We are monitoring the situation closely and following-up with countries we suspect of permitting arms sales to Iran. While we have not stopped all arms transfers to Iran from Free World countries, we have reduced the flow. We believe our continuing efforts will further diminish the supply of arms to Iran.

5. Emphasize U.S. intention to defend freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz and the international waters of the Gulf.

Since Iran first threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz in response to Iraqi threats against Iranian oil exports, we have reiterated our determination to protect access to the Gulf against hostile attacks. The President's widely publicized affirmation of this has been especially effective in drawing attention to our firm policy. Iran has reacted to our warning by qualifying its original broad threat of retaliating against any Iraqi attack. Subsequent Iranian statements have indicated that Iran would not act to close the Strait unless it were prevented from exporting its oil.

7. Obtain agreement from allies for combined joint military operations in a Gulf crisis.

Our military contingency plans for deterring or defending against an Iranian attack on freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz or against neutral Gulf states assume some degree of military support from our allies. The U.K. is keenly interested in working with us and military-to-military talks on this are progressing. The French have agreed to continued discussion in military-to-military channels. We should accelerate our efforts to reach agreement on combined planning with our allies and on our respective responsibilities, in advance of a crisis. We should also urge the U.K. and France to improve their readiness to respond to a Gulf crisis by deploying additional assets to the region, such as minesweepers. And we should consult with countries enroute to the Gulf who may be asked to facilitate deployments.

3. Strengthen ties with friendly Gulf states, seek combined military planning and US/Allied deterrent deployments/exercises.

As a result of previous politico-military and military-to-military talks, Gulf state officials understand the need for U.S. assistance to defend against Iranian threats and what local support would be required to facilitate effective deployment of U.S. forces. At a recent meeting, the GCC Defense

Ministers did not decide on recommanding to their governments acceptance of U.S. proposals for combined military planning. We are therefore again encouraging the Gulf states to consider on an urgent basis the U.S. offer to engage in combined contingency planning. In the case of Saudi Arabia, we will also propose training exercises designed to protect our naval assets when operating in the Gulf.

Despite our urgings, we think the pace of progress on further military planning with the Gulf states will continue to be slow. Given the impact of the MNF withdrawal from Lebanon on attitudes toward the US, we should look for tangible ways to reassure the Gulf states of our commitment to their security and to enhance the prospects for favorable decisions on combined planning. In this regard, we should examine the question of additional U.S. naval deployments to the region, with or without Allied participation.

### 3. Counter Iranian terrorism against the U.S. and Gulf states.

Comprehensive recommendations for combatting terrorism are being prepared by an interagency group led by the Deparytment of State in response to a request from the NSC. These recommendations are to be submitted shortly. Meanwhile, we are offering training to the Gulf states in management of counter-terrorism programs.

### 3. Diplomatic Steps Following Outbreak of Hostilities

If Iran uses forc to close or restrict access to the Strait of Hormuz or attacks friendly Gulf states, or if such use of force appears imminent, we should undertake various diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis. These measures should be coordinated carefully with the planning and implementation of our military deployments. The timing and nature of these diplomatic steps will depend on the crisis, just as the timing and nature of our military deployments will depend on the nature on the nature of the crisis and the extent of the threat. We anticipate the need for the following kinds of diplomatic actions.

#### 1. Obtain agreements, preferably formal and public, if not already accomplished, for military cooperation with Gulf states.

We hope to obtain agreement in advance of hostilities for joint coopertion in a crisis, and we are pursuing this. However, it is likely that at least some of the Gulf states will resist any agreement until a crisis occurs. If so, our first step in a crisis will be to urgently request cooperation in accordance with the roposals we have already made to the Gulf states in our military-to-military talks.

#### 2. Solicit requests from Gulf states for U.S. and Allied military intervention.

Obtaining public requests from the Gulf states for U.S. military intervention will be important to strengthen support for our actions and to provide a legal basis for assisting in the defense of Gulf oil installations. Such requests would have a substantial impact on the prospects for and the nature of Allied cooperation. Presumably such requests would be a feature of any agreement we have obtained for military cooperation with Gulf states. If we have not obtained such agreements we should still seek such requests, although in extremis, we will be prepared to act unilaterally.

3. Inform other friendly states of our intention to intervene and seek their support.

We should seek the widest possible expression of international support for our intervention at the outset by informing friendly governments of the purposes of our intervention, its limited nature, and its beneficial effect on all nations who rely on oil imports. Such support will be important in countering the inevitable political campaign the Soviets and their friends will mount against our intervention.

4. Inform Soviet Union of our intention to intervene, explain our objectives and urge caution.

The Soviets share our interest in keeping the Gulf open, but they will oppose the use of U.S. or combined U.S./allied forces to do this, and will be concerned about the enhanced presence of Western forces closer to their borders. To minimize the threat of a U.S.-Soviet military confrontation, we should inform Moscow that our actions are limited to protecting neutral shipping in international waters, that our presence does not threaten either Iran or the USSR, and that we do not seek hostilities with either. We understand the U.K. is considering similar notification of the Soviet Union.

5. Inform Iran that our intervention is defensive only.

Iran will claim, and may believe, that our military intervention is designed to attack Iran and assist Iraq. To minimize the danger of Iranian military responses against our forces and, perhaps, terrorist attacks, we should inform Iran through a third party that our intent is defensive and limited to preserving free navigation, that we have no desire for military confrontation with Iran, and that we are not taking sides with Iraq. We will also need to remind Iraq that our intervention is not designed to assist its war effort.

6. Take diplomatic steps, coordinated with our military operations and energy security plans, to protect and/or restore unimpeded access to the Gulf and prevent further crises.

At the moment of a crisis, we should attempt to mobilize all governments which could be helpful in urging Iranian and Iraqi

restraint. It may be necessary to launch some kind of mediation or good offices effort. Since the UN Secretary General retains the respect of both sides, we should explore with him the possibility of his intervention under the authority of the UN Security Council mandate he already has. As alternatives, we should explore mediation by third countries such as Japan, Algeria, Pakistan or Turkey. We should also encourage helpful statements or diplomatic action by the Non-Aligned Movement or the Organization of the Islamic Conference.

8. Manage action in UN Security Council to protect our position.

The Soviets and other unfriendly states may try to convoke the Security Council to condemn or attempt to block U.S. or allied intervention in the Gulf, or to create UN diplomatic initiatives designed to delay U.S. or allied military operations. Some friendly Gulf states have said they would prefer a fresh UNSC resolution to "legitimize" international action. We would prefer no USNC involvement because of the risks. Since UNSC consideration may be inevitable, however, the UK is considering introducing a preemptive resolution that would not be incompatible with military intervention without UN sanction. We should work closely with the UK and other allies in the Council to counter hostile initiatives, and to the extent possible, shape any action to our advantage. It would be appropriate, in any case, for us to submit the justifications for our military actions to the President of the UNSC, and also to the Secretary General.

9. Explore the possibility of multilateral economic sanctions against Iran.

Iranian attacks on non-belligerent shipping or on neutral Gulf states would have a major economic impact on the rest of the world as well as on the other Gulf states. Economic counter sanctions intended to convince Iran to cease such interference therefore would be more justified and may receive greater support from our allies than past efforts to apply sanctions, which were primarily politically motivated. Iran depends almost completely on oil exports through the Gulf for foreign exchange earnings, and is heavily dependent on imports of food, equipment and weapons, primarily through the Gulf, and to a lesser extent through Pakistan, Turkey and the U.S.S.R.

10. Develop Contingency Plans to Protect Our Interests in the Gulf in the Event of a Threatened or Actual Defeat of Iraq

While it is too early to predict the outcome of the current Iranian offensive, we need to undertake contingency planning for what steps we might take if Iranian forces break through to the Tigris, Iraqi defenses crumble, and Saddam Hussein's regime comes under heavy pressure. There should be interagency examination of such options as: encouraging and supporting other Arab states to assist Iraq militarily; dropping our neutrality in the war and

indirectly assisting Iraq militarily taking into account our overall ability to influence the outcome in light of available means and resources; or adapting to Iraq's defeat, limiting the damage and finding ways to prevent or minimize further Iranian political or military threats to the region. Contingency planning should include practical political and military measures we might take to deter Iran from directly threatening the Gulf states and to preserve Gulf state confidence in and cooperation with the U.S. We must assume the Kuwait and probably other Gulf states would take steps to distance themselves from Iraq and perhaps from the U.S. in order to conciliate a victorious Iran.

.  
:  
.:

SYSTEM II  
90092 ADD-ON

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

27 FEB 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR  
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: Crisis Planning Notice--Persian Gulf Situation (TS)

(TS) In response to your memorandum of February 2, I am forwarding the Joint Chiefs of Staff assessment of our military strategy, plans, and options to deter and respond to a crisis in the Persian Gulf. In understand this strategy will be integrated into a National Plan of Action (NPA), along with plans from State, Energy, Treasury, and the CIA.

(TS) Following integration of the plans, a CPPG will be convened to approve the NPA after the inter-agency (IG) community has completed its review. An IG review of the NPA is important to ensure that responsive and appropriate recommendations are presented to CPPG principals for approval, as well as to highlight residual issues that require CPPG attention and resolution.

Attachment

Classified by: SECDEF  
Declassify on: OADR

Copy 1 of 6 copies.

SECDEF Cont Nr. X29429

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F1748#118

BY 101, NARA, DATE 8/15/06

~~TOP SECRET~~

CRISIS PLANNING

PERSIAN GULF SITUATION (TS)

1. (C) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have operation plans to counter Persian Gulf contingencies. In addition, contingency plans are developed to address specific situations, such as that presented by the threat of an escalation of the Iran-Iraq conflict. A review of the appropriate Persian Gulf plans in light of changes in the situation in the Persian Gulf, National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 114, and the additional guidance provided by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs,\* has been completed. The plans are adequate to achieve U.S. military objectives for the Persian Gulf and the plans comply with the guidance of NSDD-114, as amplified.
2. (TS) The military plans pertaining to the Persian Gulf are reactive in nature; i.e. to be implemented, when directed, in response to a developing crisis. The military has taken, and continues to take, actions that address the ten specific concerns contained in the referenced memorandum.\* The following synopsis of actions taken or planned are keyed to these concerns.

- a. CONCERN. The U.S. interest in the Iran-Iraq War is to see the conflict end as soon as possible and without U.S. military

~~TOP SECRET~~

1

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F1748#119

BY LDT, NARA, DATE 8/15/06

~~SECRET~~

nvolvement.

ACTION BEING TAKEN. There are no prudent military initiatives that the U.S. can take that would contribute to an early cessation of hostilities while maintaining the Arab-Iranian balance in the Persian Gulf.

. CONCERNs. U.S. policy should be to work to deter an escalation of the war and contain the disruptions if deterrence fails, and, U.S. policy should prevent, to the degree possible, Soviet exploitation of the situation.

ACTIONS BEING TAKEN. The military policy is to deter the antagonists from expanding the war to other Persian Gulf states; deter interruptions to non-belligerent access to Persian Gulf oil through direct attacks on shipping or distribution points, or by terrorist attacks; and to deter Soviet exploitation of the current unstable environment in the region. In executing this military policy of deterrence, and to protect our interests if deterrence fails, U.S. military strategy is to maintain continuous and credible military presence in the region and to strengthen the military readiness of the regional nations. Additionally, periodic deployments to the region will demonstrate U.S. response

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

capability and bolster the confidence of friendly regional states.

If these efforts to deter escalation of the Iran-Iraq War fail, the U.S. military policy is to initiate appropriate action, in concert with friends and allies where available, to prevent coercion of the U.S., its allies, and friends; to maintain access to petroleum supplies and other critical resources; and to protect U.S. interests and U.S. citizens abroad. To be able to execute this policy, it is essential that we gain the cooperation of our Allies and friendly nations; improve overflight, landing, and bunkering rights for U.S. forces; as well as gain access to bases and facilities, both enroute and in the region. Additionally, with the use of these regional bases and facilities, we are seeking agreements for combined military planning and combined exercises to demonstrate a united front to deter escalatory acts by the belligerents.

c. CONCERN. Regardless of how the Iran-Iraq War develops, the U.S. should use the crisis to strengthen its relationships with the Gulf states.

ACTIONS BEING TAKEN. The practical result of the military-to-military talks conducted with Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member states between 11 December and 14 January is that the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) had the opportunity to present its view of the threat and a concept for responding to an escalation of the Iran-Iraq war. Development of the military relationship will continue through periodic intelligence updates, follow-on military planning team talks, and through routine security assistance initiatives.

d. CONCERN. With little possibility of improving relations with the current Iranian regime, the U.S. should use this opportunity to improve relations with Iraq.

ACTIONS BEING TAKEN. Although the objectives of improving U.S. relations with Iraq is supported, there are no initiatives to improve U.S.-Iraqi relations, within the purview of the military, that are considered appropriate at this time.

e. CONCERN. U.S. contingency plans should identify the political, military, and economic costs of the various options proposed to the President.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

ACTION BEING TAKEN. The various plans for the region address contingencies both with and without Soviet involvement; and they cover a range of options from providing assistance to friendly governments at their request, to actual employment of U.S. ground forces to attain U.S. policy objectives. Additionally, contingency plans to support all friendly countries on the Persian Gulf littoral against Soviet or Soviet surrogate threats, with particular emphasis on defense of seaports and lines of communications, are being developed. The military costs of implementing any of these developed or future contingency plans will vary according to the size of U.S. forces employed, the world-wide politico-military situation at the time, regional and allied support provided, and the duration and extent of the threat to U.S. interests. Basically, an intra-regional threat would require no reserve call-up and use only forces in-place or rapidly available for employment, with little or no impact on other theaters (Europe or Pacific) containing U.S. vital interests. At the opposite end of the spectrum of contingency plans, defending the Persian Gulf against a Soviet invasion, the military costs would be extreme. Upon initial indications that the Soviets are massing invasion forces against Iran, the 100,000 Selective Reserve call-up would have to be made; if military posturing actions by the U.S. did not deter the Soviet invasion, full

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

mobilization would be required to sustain operations. Moreover, if the Soviets chose to exploit the U.S. commitment of troops to the Persian Gulf by an opportunistic act in another theater, U.S. reinforcement of both theaters could be significantly degraded. The proposed notional forces required to contain an escalation of the current Iran-Iraq conflict are at TAB A. The notional forces required to counter a high-intensity intra-regional threat are at TAB B, and the notional forces required to counter a Soviet drive to the Persian Gulf through Iran are at TAB C. The notional forces included in the lists at TABs A, B and C could be reduced if forces are provided by Allied and friendly nations. In this regard, a principal objective of the combined military planning discussions that we anticipate will be conducted is to achieve a commitment on the part of participating nations that is reasonably proportional to each nation's interests and capability to contribute to mutual objectives. The ultimate military cost, in the worst case situation, is the possibility of over-extension and piecemeal defeat. In this connection, it should be noted that because of a lack of pre-positioned equipment, ammunition, petroleum, oil, and lubricants, etc. as well as a very demanding strategic mobility scenario, our capability to logisitically sustain a major effort in the region is limited at this time.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

f. CONCERN. Events in the region require that U.S. actions be taken to combat terrorism, espceially Iranian-sponsored terrorism.

ACTION BEING TAKEN. Steps to enhance security of U.S. naval forces in Northern Arabian Sea/Gulf of Oman/Strait of Hormuz/Persian Gulf (NAS/GOO/SOH/PG) have been approved. These security enhancements include:

1. U.S. Navy ships in terrorist high-threat areas, such as the PG, are being provided with a point defense surface-to-air missile system to enhance their capability to defend against attack by suicide aircraft. Efforts are being made to improve the signal intelligence support being provided the Middle East Force (MIDEASTFOR).
2. The capability to provide tactical air cover to the MIDEASTFOR is being improved by exercising air-to-air refueling of U.S. Navy carrier-based aircraft from the NAS carrier battle group (CVBG) by U.S. Air Force tanker aircraft.
3. United States Air Force E-3A (AWACS) aircraft work regularly with MIDEASTFOR ships in providing radar coverage of the PG.
4. The naval forces in the NAS/GOO/SOH/PG have been placed at increased conditions of readiness.
5. Procedures for the identification and engagement of hostile

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

forces have been reviewed and revised. To preclude the inadvertent engagement of innocent surface or air contacts, appropriate international notices to mariners and airmen have been issued warning that U.S. naval vessels in the NAS/GOO/SOH/PG are taking additional precautions due to the increased terrorist threat. The notices request all vessels and aircraft that will closely approach U.S. Navy vessels to establish communications with the U.S. naval vessel(s) on recognized international radio-telephone communications channels, so as to identify themselves and provide their intentions..

6. USCENTCOM is closely monitoring the terrorist threat in its area of responsibility.

7. A political-military simulation war game of the Iran-Iraq crisis, sponsored by Joint Chiefs of Staff, in which participants were required to counter terrorist attacks, has been conducted. A second simulation is being considered.

DECISION REQUIRED. The distance from probable staging bases of Iranian and/or Iranian controlled attack forces to U.S. forces, friendly forces and/or protected commercial vessels, if any, allows for little advance warning. Due to overriding political and international legal considerations, a preemptive attack on these Iranian and/or Iranian controlled forces at

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

their staging bases is, however, not recommended.

If attacked, U.S. forces in the NAS/GOO/SOH/PG will pursue and continue to engage an attacking hostile force so long as the hostile force continues to pose an imminent threat. A policy decision on the scope of any retaliatory attack responding to a first strike or to a terrorist attack on U.S. forces, friendly forces, and/or any protected commercial vessels is, however, needed. This decision is required to allow development of appropriate post-attack strike plans.

g. CONCERN. In the event of threatened or actual disruptions of shipping or oil production in the Persian Gulf, U.S. policy should be designed to prevent panic buying and public hysteria at home and abroad and to ensure that military energy requirements are adequately met.

ACTION BEING TAKEN. Closure of the Strait of Hormuz (SOH) would have an impact on the petroleum logistics system supporting U.S. forces in all overseas theaters. Of the 132,000 barrel per day (b/d) total Department of Defense (DOD) overseas peacetime refined petroleum requirement, 79,000 b/d comes from sources dependent on Persian Gulf crude. Closure of the SOH would result in an immediate loss of 32,000 b/d

~~TOP SECRET~~

from sources located inside the SOH. From one to six months later, it is estimated the remaining 47,000 b/d would be lost because overseas refiners that rely on Persian Gulf crude would have to seek new crude supplies. As the total DOD overseas petroleum requirement (132,000 b/d) equates to approximately one percent (1%) of current U.S. domestic production, that portion of the DOD overseas fuel requirement which could not be met from overseas sources could be obtained from domestic production. The delivery of petroleum products from the U.S. to U.S. military forces overseas would heavily tax the U.S. tanker fleet, however, and will significantly increase the demand for bunker fuels. Additionally, U.S. domestic distribution would suffer some disruption. No additional DOD action is considered necessary.

h. CONCERN. The planning process should provide mechanisms to take into account the independently-taken actions and commitments of other affected nations.

ACTIONS BEING TAKEN. The planning process will take into consideration present and future accommodations that result from the military-to-military talks held with the Persian Gulf states and U.S. Allies. While it is preferred for the U.S. to respond to a request from one or more GCC countries, and under

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

the mantle of a multi-national effort, U.S. planning takes into account the possibility that the U.S. might have to respond unilaterally and that other nations, responding bilaterally to a GCC state, might not be willing to plan for or participate in combined operations with the U.S.

j. CONCERN. U.S. policy should provide mechanisms to ease LDC financial pressures caused by an interruption of Persian Gulf oil exports.

ACTIONS BEING TAKEN. None. The Department of Defense areas of responsibility do not include providing financial assistance to friendly nations.

Reference:

- \* National Security Council Memorandum, 2 February 1984, "Crisis Planning Notice -- Persian Gulf Situation (~~NS~~)."

TAB

- A. Notional Forces for a Limited Threat (~~N~~)
- B. Notional Forces for an Inter-Regional Threat (not involving the USSR) (~~N~~)
- C. Notional Forces to Deter or Counter a Soviet Invasion of Iran (~~S~~)

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

TAB A

Proposed Notional Forces for a Limited Intra-Regional Threat (U)

Key Assumptions:

1. (S) U.S. Forces would commence movement/execute deployment on the day directed.

2. (S) Basing would be provided by one or more of the following GCC countries:

Saudi Arabia  
Bahrain  
U.A.E.  
Oman

3. (S) The Soviet Union will not actively support Iran or Iraq.

4. (S) Required overflight, landing rights, and refueling assets will be available.

J.S. Forces:

1. (S) Structured to provide a minimum risk path through Strait of Hormuz and Persian Gulf for international shipping.

2. (S) U.S. Force size will be limited to minimize necessary to accomplish mission.

(S) U.S. Forces:

2 CVBG's  
8 Picket/Patrol  
1 LPH/LHA  
1 HELMINRON  
9 MPA  
6 SMCM  
1 USCG Buoy Tender  
1 TFS (F-15)  
1 TFS (F-16)  
E-3A AWACS Aircraft  
KC-10/KC-135 Tanker Aircraft  
RC-135 Surveillance Aircraft

(S) Note: U.S. forces would be reduced based on availability and offer of allied or regional combat and support forces.

~~SECRET~~

TAB B

Notional Forces for a High-Intensity Inter-Regional Threat  
(not involving the USSR) (N)

Key Assumptions:

1. (S) Lack of adequate strategic warning may require U.S. Forces to deploy the same day hostilities commence.
2. (S) Initial entry of forces would be at the request of the host country.
3. (S) The President would exercise selective reserve call-up authority.
4. (S) Required overflight, landing rights, and refueling assets will be available.

U.S. Forces:

1. (S) The successful execution of this plan depends, in large measure, on military cooperation from host nation(s) and allied forces.
2. (S) Closure-time for U.S. forces would be from D+1 or 2 for the first major ground force unit to D+14 for the last.

(S) U.S. Forces:

- 1 1/3 Army Divisions with appropriate air defense units.
- 2 2/3 Tactical Fighter Wings
- 2 CVBGs
- 1 Surface Action Group (SAG)
- 2 MABs
- 1 Special Forces Group

(S) Note: U.S. force list does not include appropriate reserve units "on-call" for deployment to the area.

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

TAB C

Notional Forces to Deter or Counter a  
Soviet Invasion of Iran (S)

Key Assumptions:

1. (TS) Upon clear indications the Soviets were massing invasion forces, a national emergency would be declared and partial mobilization would be directed.
2. (TS) Forces would be deployed prior to a full-scaled Soviet invasion.
3. (S) The U.S. would not be engaged in other military operations or in general war.
4. (S) The present government of Iran will not request U.S. assistance prior to a Soviet invasion and, even after the Soviets invade Iran, may marshal forces to oppose the introduction of U.S. forces.
5. (S) Limited basing and overflight rights will be available prior to a Soviet invasion; greater rights and access to bases would be available after the Soviets invade Iran.

U.S. Forces:

1. (S) Critical decisions ned to be made early to deploy credible forces in a timely manner in order to make deterrence succeed, i.e., deployment decision, declaration of national emergency and mobilization, requisition of mobility assets, etc.
2. (TS) The forces listed below will be increased if programs in current POM's remain as approved. The increase will be to five army divisions (vice three now), seven TFWs (vice four now), and 2 MAF's (vice one and 1/3 now).

(S) U.S. Forces:

- 3 1/3 Army Divisions
- 4 TFWs
- 2 B-52 Squadrons
- 3 CVBGs
- 1 SAG
- 1 1/3 MAFs
- 1(+) Special Forces Group

B  
ANX

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~SYSTEM II  
90092 add-onTHE SECRETARY OF ENERGY  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20585

FEB 8 P 3:44

MEMORANDUM FOR: Robert C. McFarlane  
Assistant to the President  
for National Security AffairsFROM: Donald Paul Hodel *Donald Paul Hodel*

DATE: February 8, 1984

SUBJECT: Certain Energy Emergency Preparedness Matters

This memorandum is in response to your February 2, 1984 request for certain information concerning energy emergency preparedness activities of the Department of Energy.

I. Department of Energy Plans

The Department of Energy is continuing its efforts to be as prepared as possible to deal with a substantial interruption of Persian Gulf oil. Energy related matters requiring Presidential decision making or coordination with other departments and agencies are described in Part II hereof.

Preparation by the Department is guided by the following principles:

- o The marketplace, unhampered by federal regulation (such as by price or allocation controls), will be the most fair and efficient allocation mechanism in the event of an oil supply interruption.
- o Nevertheless, the federal government will have an important role to play in assisting the domestic marketplace to work and in ameliorating the adverse economic impacts which may result from a serious oil supply disruption.
- o The U.S. government must be prepared to meet its energy emergency commitments to other nations, as set forth in the International Energy Program and in bilateral agreements.
- o Policies, programs and public communications of the Administration concerning an oil supply disruption must be coordinated carefully between the affected federal departments and agencies.

Consistent with the foregoing principles, the Department's planning in regard to energy supply emergencies centers on:

- o Utilizing, in conjunction with the intelligence community, mechanisms to gather and to assess in timely fashion intelligence and other information required to evaluate the nature and extent of an oil supply disruption.

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F1748#120~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BY LET, NARA, DATE 8/15/06

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2.

- o Providing the President and the Cabinet, in conjunction with other parts of the Executive Branch, with projections of the likely ranges of impact of an oil supply disruption upon petroleum product availability and prices and upon gross national product, inflation, and unemployment so as to assist the President in selecting among various domestic and international policy response options.
- o Continuing to fill the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) in accordance with the President's budget, as approved by the Congress; maintaining the drawdown capability of the SPR; and having in place procedures and documentation to effect the early drawdown and sale of SPR oil.
- o Providing the public timely and accurate information concerning an oil supply disruption so as to dampen panic buying prompted by uninformed speculation as to the nature of the disruption.
- o Providing the Congress and other levels of government timely and accurate information and analysis concerning an oil supply disruption and informing them of Administration policies and programs.
- o Encouraging prudent voluntary energy conservation by the private sector and, subject to military requirements, mandating emergency energy conservation measures by the federal sector.
- o Removing or modifying regulatory barriers to fuel switching and urging cost-effective fuel switching by the private sector.
- o To the extent possible under existing law, utilizing the National Defense Executive Reserves to assist the Department in identifying and dealing with particular oil supply problems.
- o Encouraging U.S. oil companies to be conscious of the fact that their conduct in an oil supply disruption will be under close scrutiny by the Congress and the media and that actual or perceived petroleum product shortages or substantial price rises may aid those advocating price and allocation controls.
- o In conjunction with the State Department, engaging in efforts to assure appropriate functioning of the International Energy Agency (IEA).
- o In the event of activation of the IEA's emergency oil sharing system and/or bilateral agreements concerning U.S. supply of oil to allies, urging U.S. oil companies to make voluntary offers of supplies to meet U.S. obligations under the International Energy Program and such bilateral agreements.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~