

Trump Tariffs: Tracking the Economic Impact of the Trump Trade War

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March 25, 2025

Updated timeline to add new “secondary” tariff threat on imports from Venezuela and countries that purchase oil or gas from Venezuela.

March 21, 2025

Updated timeline for EU retaliation against US Section 232 tariffs.

March 12, 2025

Update: New revenue and economic estimates for changes to IEEPA tariffs and implementation of Section 232 steel and aluminum tariffs.

Key Findings

- President Trump has threatened and imposed a variety of new tariffs for his second term in office, from universal baseline tariffs to country-specific tariffs.
- We estimate that the IEEPA and Section 232 tariffs will reduce US GDP by 0.4 percent and hours worked by 309,000 full-time equivalent jobs, before accounting for foreign retaliation.
- China, Canada, and the European Union have announced or imposed retaliatory tariffs.
- The first Trump administration imposed tariffs on thousands of products valued at approximately \$380 billion in 2018 and 2019. The second Trump administration tariffs now affect more than \$1 trillion of imports, and [Subscribe](#) to duty exemptions for Canada and Mexico expire in April, the tariffs will affect more than \$1.4 trillion of imports.

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- The Biden administration kept most of the Trump administration tariffs in place, and in May 2024, announced tariff hikes on an additional \$18 billion of Chinese goods, including semiconductors and electric vehicles.
- We estimate the 2018-2019 trade war tariffs imposed by Trump and retained by Biden reduce long-run GDP by 0.2 percent, the capital stock by 0.1 percent, and employment by 142,000 full-time equivalent jobs.
- Academic and governmental studies find the Trump-Biden tariffs have raised prices and reduced output and employment, producing a net negative impact on the US economy.

Trump's Tariff War Returns | The Deduction Podcast



2025 Trump Trade War Timeline

President Trump signed an executive order on January 20, 2025, instructing certain cabinet secretaries to develop reports on trade practices and recommendations for tariffs due by April 1, 2025. Since then, several new tariffs and tariff investigations have been threatened, initiated, and/or imposed.

Tracking the Trump Administration's Tariff Policies

Target	Dates	Imports Affected	Applicable Rate	Authority
Canada	Announced Feb 1; scheduled Feb 4 but delayed 30 days; effective Mar 4; 30 day exemptions granted Mar 5 & 6	Up to \$253 billion while exemptions are in effect	25% non-energy; 10% energy and potash	IEEPA
Mexico	Announced Feb 1; scheduled Feb 4 but delayed 30 days; effective Mar 4; 30 day exemptions granted Mar 5 & 6	Up to \$236 billion while exemptions are in effect	25%	IEEPA
China	Announced Feb 1; effective Feb 4; increased Mar 4	\$430 billion	10% initially; increased to 20%	IEEPA
European Union	Announced Feb 26	\$598 billion	25%	Unknown
Steel and Aluminum	Announced Feb 10; effective Mar 12	Ending steel exemptions \$29 billion; ending aluminum exemptions \$12 billion; expanding derivatives \$44 billion under chapters 73 & 76 plus metals content of an additional \$100 billion	25%	Section 232
Autos	Announced Feb 12; effective Apr 2	Motor vehicles \$224 billion; motor vehicle parts \$83 billion	25%	Unknown
Copper	Investigation initiated Feb 25; report due Nov 22	\$17 billion	Unknown	Section 232
Reciprocal	Announced Feb 13; recommendations due April 1	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown

Semiconductors and Pharmaceuticals	Announced Jan 27; rate specified Feb 18; effective date unknown	Unknown (products and categories have not been specified)	25%+	Unknown
Timber, Lumber, Derivatives	Announced Mar 1; report due Nov 26	Wood and wood products \$22.9 billion	Unknown	Section 232
Agricultural Products	Announced Mar 3; effective Apr 2	Unknown (products and categories have not been specified)	Unknown	Unknown

Source: Tax Foundation research.

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Country-Specific Tariffs:

- IIEPA Tariffs:** President Trump signed three executive orders on February 1, 2025, to impose 25 percent tariffs on Canada and Mexico and 10 percent tariffs on China using International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IIEPA) authority, to go into effect on February 4.
 - China:** The 10 percent tariffs on all imports from China took effect on February 4, 2025. On February 27, Trump said the tariffs on China would increase by another 10 percent beginning March 4, which has taken effect. Ending de minimis treatment of imports from China is on pause.
 - Canada:** The tariffs on Canada received a 30-day suspension and took effect March 4. On March 5, the president exempted auto imports from the tariffs until April 2, and on March 6 the president exempted imports covered by the USMCA trade deal (approximately 38 percent of imports from Canada) until April 2 while lowering the tariff on non-USMCA potash (a fertilizer used in farming) to 10 percent. On March 11, the president said the 25 percent rate on steel and aluminum would double to 50 percent in response to Canada's retaliation, but later in the day walked back the doubling.

- **Mexico:** The tariffs on Mexico received a 30-day suspension and took effect on March 4. On March 5, the president exempted auto imports from the tariffs until April 2, and on March 6 the president exempted imports covered by the USMCA trade deal (approximately 49 percent of imports from Mexico) until April 2.
- **Retaliation:** China and Canada have both retaliated against the IEEPA tariffs, while Canada and the European Union have both retaliated against the steel and aluminum tariffs.
 - **China** announced retaliation on about \$13.9 billion worth of US exports at rates of 10 percent and 15 percent, which took effect on February 10. China announced additional retaliation on March 4 to take effect March 10. The retaliation targets \$2.9 billion of US agriculture exports at 15 percent and another \$16.6 billion of US agriculture exports at 10 percent.
 - **Canada** placed 25 percent retaliatory tariffs on \$20.8 billion of US exports on March 4, with 25 percent tariffs on another \$86.7 billion scheduled for March 23 in response to the IEEPA tariffs. Ontario planned to impose a 25 percent tax on electricity exports to the US, but that tax is currently suspended. In response to the Section 232 steel and aluminum tariffs, Canada will target approximately \$20.7 billion of US exports with 25 percent tariffs beginning March 13, including \$8.8 billion of steel exports and \$2.1 billion of aluminum exports.
 - **The European Union** announced retaliatory tariffs against the Section 232 steel and aluminum tariffs on approximately \$28 billion of US exports. The first round was initially scheduled to take effect April 1 on \$8 billion of US exports and the remainder on April 13. On March 20, the EU announced a delay to the first round, so all retaliatory tariffs are scheduled to take effect on April 13. Targeted products include iconic American exports, such as Harley Davidson motorcycles, blue jeans, and bourbon.
- **Reciprocal Tariffs:** President Trump signed a presidential memorandum on February 13, 2025, to develop a plan for increasing US tariffs in response to other countries' tariffs, tax policies, and any other policies including exchange rates and unfair practices. The recommendations are due April 1, 2025 and the president has indicated they will begin taking effect on April 2.

- **Secondary Tariffs:** President Trump posted on March 24, 2025, that Venezuela and any countries that purchase oil and gas from Venezuela would face an additional 25 percent tariff effective April 2.
- **European Union:** President Trump announced plans on February 26, 2025, to impose tariffs of 25 percent on imports from the European Union. The authority to impose these tariffs has not been specified.

Product-Specific Tariffs:

- **Agricultural Products:** President Trump posted on March 3, 2025, that tariffs on “external” agricultural products would begin April 2, 2025.
- **Lumber:** President Trump directed the Commerce Department on March 1, 2025, to begin a Section 232 national security investigation into timber, lumber, and derivative imports; the findings of the report are due by November 26, 2025.
- **Steel and Aluminum:** President Trump signed two proclamations on February 10, 2025, to expand the existing Section 232 tariffs on steel and aluminum. The orders end all existing exemptions for the tariffs, expand the list of derivative articles, and raise the tariff rate on aluminum from 10 percent to 25 percent. The changes are scheduled to take effect March 12, 2025.
- **Autos:** President Trump announced on February 14, 2025, that he plans to impose tariffs on auto imports beginning on April 2, 2025. He said on February 18 the rate on autos would be “in the neighborhood of 25 percent” while the rates on semiconductors and pharmaceuticals would be “25 percent and higher.” The authority to impose these tariffs has not been specified.
- **Copper:** President Trump directed the Commerce Department on February 25, 2025, to begin a Section 232 national security investigation for copper imports; the findings of the report are due by November 22, 2025.
- **Semiconductors and Pharmaceuticals:** President Trump said on January 27, 2025, he would announce new tariffs on computer chips, semiconductors, and pharmaceuticals. On February 18 he announced the rates on semiconductors and pharmaceuticals would be “25 percent and higher.” The authority to impose these tariffs has not been specified.

2025 Trump Tariffs: Economic Effects

President Trump has imposed and threatened a variety of tariffs. We model the following policies:

- **Implemented tariffs**
 - A 20 percent tariff on all imports from China.
 - A 25 percent tariff on all imports from Mexico.
 - Autos and USMCA compliant imports are exempt from tariffs until April 2, which we reflect in our revenue estimates, but we model the full tariffs for our economic estimates.
 - Under the temporary exemptions, the tariffs apply to up to \$236 billion of \$504 billion of imports from Mexico.
 - A 10 percent tariff on energy and potash imports and a 25 percent tariff on all remaining imports from Canada.
 - Autos and USMCA compliant imports are exempt from tariffs until April 2, which we reflect in our revenue estimates, but we model the full tariffs for our economic estimates.
 - Under the temporary exemptions, the tariffs apply to up to \$253 billion of \$413 billion of imports from Canada.
- **Expansions to the Section 232 steel and aluminum tariffs**, including ending country exemptions, lifting the rate on aluminum from 10 percent to 25 percent, and expanding the derivatives list.
 - Ending the country exemptions for the existing steel and steel derivatives tariffs, which increases imports subject to the tariffs from \$5.5 billion to \$34.6 billion (excluding interactions with tariff rate quotas)
 - Ending the country exemptions for the existing aluminum and aluminum derivatives tariffs, which increases imports subject to the tariffs from \$6.1 billion to \$18.5 billion (excluding interactions with tariff rate quotas)
 - Increasing the tariff rate on aluminum and aluminum derivatives from 10 percent to 25 percent

- **Threatened tariffs**

- A 25 percent tariff on autos, which we illustrate by applying the tariff to imports of motor vehicles and motor vehicle parts under HTS codes 8703 (valued at \$224.4 billion in 2024) and 8708 (including, where possible, parts related to 8703 only, valued at \$61.8 billion in 2024).
- A 25 percent tariff on all imports from the European Union.
- Tax Foundation will model additional tariff proposals when more details become available.

We estimate that before accounting for any foreign retaliation, the imposed tariffs on Canada, Mexico, China, and the expansion of the steel and aluminum tariffs would reduce US economic output by 0.4 percent. The threatened tariffs against the EU and on all auto imports would further shrink US GDP by an estimated 0.3 percent.

Table 1. Estimated Impact of President Trump's Proposed Tariffs

	GDP	Capital Stock	Pre-Tax Wages	Hours Worked Converted to Full-Time Equivalent Jobs
Total Imposed	-0.4%	-0.3%	0.0%	-309,000
China	-0.1%	-0.1%	0.0%	-82,000
Mexico	-0.1%	-0.1%	0.0%	-116,000
Canada	-0.1%	-0.1%	0.0%	-86,000
Section 232	Less than -0.05%	Less than -0.05%	0.0%	-25,000
Total Threatened	-0.3%	-0.2%	0.0%	-236,000
EU (Threatened)	-0.2%	-0.1%	0.0%	-155,000
Motor Vehicles and Motor Vehicle Parts (Threatened)	-0.1%	-0.1%	0.0%	-81,000

	GDP	Capital Stock	Pre-Tax Wages	Hours Worked Converted to Full-Time Equivalent Jobs
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Note: See Tax Foundation's Tariff Tracker for specific descriptions of each policy.

Source: Tax Foundation General Equilibrium Model, February 2025.

If imposed on a permanent basis, the tariffs would increase tax revenue for the federal government. We model the imposed tariffs together, accounting for interactions between the different rounds of tariffs. We model the threatened tariffs in isolation because it remains clear how they will apply; if they are stacked on top of existing tariffs or replace existing tariffs, the revenue would differ.

Revenue is lower on a dynamic basis, a reflection of the negative effect tariffs have on US economic output, which reduces incomes and resulting tax revenues. Revenue would fall more if foreign countries retaliated, as retaliation would cause US output and incomes to shrink further.

We estimate the following 10-year conventional and dynamic revenue effects:

- Imposed tariffs on China, Canada, Mexico, steel, and aluminum: \$1,523.3 billion conventional, \$1,310.1 billion dynamic
- Threatened European Union Tariffs: \$786.3 billion conventional, \$679.2 billion dynamic
- Threatened Motor Vehicle and Parts Tariffs: \$404.7 billion conventional, \$349.8 billion dynamic

Table 2. Revenue Effects of President Trump's Tariffs

	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029	2030	2031	2032	20
China Conventional	\$37.6	\$38.7	\$40.4	\$41.8	\$43.2	\$44.7	\$46.4	\$48.3	\$5
China Dynamic	\$32.4	\$33.3	\$34.8	\$36.0	\$37.2	\$38.4	\$39.9	\$41.5	\$4

	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029	2030	2031	2032	20
Canada Conventional	\$27.6	\$37.7	\$39.3	\$40.7	\$42.0	\$43.5	\$45.2	\$47.0	\$4
Canada Dynamic	\$23.7	\$32.4	\$33.8	\$35.0	\$36.2	\$37.4	\$38.9	\$40.4	\$4
Mexico Conventional	\$36.2	\$49.3	\$51.5	\$53.3	\$55.0	\$56.9	\$59.1	\$61.4	\$6
Mexico Dynamic	\$31.2	\$42.4	\$44.3	\$45.8	\$47.3	\$48.9	\$50.9	\$52.8	\$5
Expanded Steel and Aluminum Conventional	\$6.8	\$9.4	\$9.8	\$10.1	\$10.4	\$10.8	\$11.2	\$11.7	\$1
Expanded Steel and Aluminum Dynamic	\$5.9	\$8.0	\$8.4	\$8.7	\$9.0	\$9.3	\$9.7	\$10.0	\$1
EU Conventional	\$68.2	\$68.4	\$70.7	\$73.5	\$76.4	\$79.3	\$82.5	\$85.8	\$8
EU Dynamic	\$59.1	\$59.0	\$60.7	\$63.1	\$65.8	\$68.6	\$71.4	\$74.3	\$7
Motor Vehicles and Motor Vehicle Parts Conventional	\$35.1	\$35.2	\$36.4	\$37.8	\$39.3	\$40.8	\$42.4	\$44.1	\$4
Motor Vehicles and Motor Vehicle Parts Dynamic	\$30.4	\$30.4	\$31.3	\$32.4	\$33.8	\$35.3	\$36.8	\$38.3	\$3

Note: Conventional revenue estimates reflect an import elasticity of -0.997, a noncompliance rate of 8 percent, and income and payroll tax offsets. Dynamic revenue estimates reflect feedback from the macroeconomic effect of the policy. See Tax Foundation's Tariff Tracker for specific descriptions of each policy. Source: Tax Foundation General Equilibrium Model, October 2024 and February 2025. Congressional Research Service, "China's E-Commerce Exports and U.S. De Minimis Policies." Source: Tax Foundation General Equilibrium Model, February 2025.

The imposed tariffs would reduce after-tax incomes by an average of 1 percent in 2026. The top 1 percent would see the smallest decrease in after-tax income of 0.8 percent.



Table 3. Distributional Effects of President Trump's Tariffs


AGI Percentile	Percent Change in After-Tax Income under Imposed Tariffs, 2026
0% - 20.0%	-1.0%
20.0% - 40.0%	-1.0%
40.0% - 60.0%	-1.0%
60.0% - 80.0%	-1.0%
80.0% - 100%	-1.0%
80.0% - 90.0%	-1.0%
90.0% - 95.0%	-1.0%
95.0% - 99.0%	-1.0%
99.0% - 100%	-0.8%
Total	-1.0%

Source: Tax Foundation General Equilibrium Model, February 2025.

We estimate the average tariff rate on all imports will rise from 2.5 percent in 2024 to 8.4 percent, the highest average rate since 1946.

Trump's Average Tariff Rate Would Be Highest Since 1946

Average Tariff Rate on All Imports, Historical Rates from 1890-2023, Projected Rate for 2024, Estimated Rate for 2025 Under Trump's Imposed Tariffs



Note: Tariff revenue estimate uses an elasticity of -0.997 and a noncompliance rate of 8 percent.

Source: US Census Bureau, *Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970, Part II*; US International Trade Commission, "U.S. imports for consumption, duties collected, and ratio of duties to values, 1891-2023, (Table 1)"; Tax Foundation calculations.

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Trump's 2024 Campaign Proposals

Tariffs featured heavily in the [2024 presidential campaign](#) as candidate [Trump proposed](#) a new 10 percent to 20 percent universal tariff on all imports, a 60 percent tariff on all imports from China, higher tariffs on EVs from China or across the board, 25 percent tariffs on Canada and Mexico, and 10 percent tariffs on China.

We estimate Trump's proposed 20 percent universal tariffs and an additional 50 percent tariff on China to reach 60 percent would reduce long-run economic output by 1.3 percent before any foreign retaliation. They would increase federal tax revenues by \$3.8 trillion (\$3.1 trillion on a dynamic basis before retaliation) from 2025 through 2034.

2018-2019 Trade War: Economic Effects of Imposed and Retaliatory Tariffs

Using the Tax Foundation's General Equilibrium Model, we estimate the Trump-Biden Section 301 and Section 232 tariffs will reduce long-run GDP by 0.2 percent, the capital stock by 0.1 percent, and hours worked by 142,000 full-time equivalent jobs. The reason tariffs have no impact on pre-tax wages in our estimates is that, in the long run, the capital stock shrinks in proportion to the reduction in hours worked, so that the capital-to-labor ratio, and thus the level of wages, remains unchanged. Removing the tariffs would boost GDP and employment, as [Tax Foundation estimates](#) have shown for the Section 232 steel and aluminum tariffs.

Table 4. Estimated Impact of US Imposed Tariffs

	2018-2019 Trade War Tariffs
GDP	-0.2%
Capital Stock	-0.1%
Pre-Tax Wages	0.0%
Full-Time Equivalent (FTE) Jobs	-142,000

Note: 2018-2019 trade war tariffs reflect Section 301 tariffs on imports from China and Section 232 tariffs on certain steel and aluminum imports.

Source: Tax Foundation General Equilibrium Model, June 2024.

We estimate the retaliatory tariffs stemming from Section 232 and Section 301 actions total approximately \$13.2 billion in tariff revenues. Retaliatory tariffs are imposed by foreign governments on their country's importers. While they are not direct taxes on US exports, they raise the after-tax price of US goods in foreign jurisdictions, making them less competitively priced in foreign markets. We estimate the retaliatory tariffs will reduce US GDP and the capital

stock by less than 0.05 percent and reduce full-time employment by 27,000 full-time equivalent jobs. Unlike the tariffs imposed by the United States, which raise federal revenue, tariffs imposed by foreign jurisdictions raise no revenue for the US but result in lower US output.

Table 5. Estimated Impact of US Retaliatory Tariffs

	2018-2019 Retaliation
GDP	Less than -0.05%
Capital Stock	Less than -0.05%
Pre-Tax Wages	0.0%
Full-Time Equivalent (FTE) Jobs	-27,000

Note: 2018-2019 retaliation reflects retaliatory tariffs on \$6 billion of US exports in response to Section 232 tariffs and more than \$106 billion of US exports in response to Section 301 tariffs.

Source: Tax Foundation General Equilibrium Model, June 2024.

Tariff Revenue Collections Under the Trump-Biden Tariffs

As of the end of 2024, the trade war tariffs have generated more than \$264 billion of higher customs duties collected for the US government from US importers. Of that total, \$89 billion, or about 34 percent, was collected during the Trump administration, while the remaining \$175 billion, or about 64 percent, was collected during the Biden administration.

Before accounting for behavioral effects, the \$79 billion in higher tariffs amount to an average annual tax increase on US households of \$625. Based on actual revenue collections data, trade war tariffs have directly increased tax collections by \$200 to \$300 annually per US household, on average. The actual cost to households is higher than both the \$600 estimate before behavioral effects and the \$200 to \$300 after, because neither accounts for lower incomes as tariffs shrink output, nor the loss in consumer choice as people switch to alternatives that do not face tariffs.

Historical Evidence: Tariffs Raise Prices and Reduce Economic Growth

Economists generally agree free trade increases the level of economic output and income, while conversely, trade barriers reduce economic output and income. Historical evidence shows tariffs raise prices and reduce available quantities of goods and services for US businesses and consumers, resulting in lower income, reduced employment, and lower economic output.

Tariffs could reduce US output through a few channels. One possibility is a tariff may be passed on to producers and consumers in the form of higher prices. Tariffs can raise the cost of parts and materials, which would raise the price of goods using those inputs and reduce private sector output. This would result in lower incomes for both owners of capital and workers. Similarly, higher consumer prices due to tariffs would reduce the after-tax value of both labor and capital income. Because higher prices would reduce the return to labor and capital, they would incentivize Americans to work and invest less, leading to lower output.

Alternatively, the US dollar may appreciate in response to tariffs, offsetting the potential price increase for US consumers. The more valuable dollar, however, would make it more difficult for exporters to sell their goods on the global market, resulting in lower revenues for exporters. This would also result in lower US output and incomes for both workers and owners of capital, reducing incentives for work and investment and leading to a smaller economy.

Many economists have evaluated the consequences of the trade war tariffs on the American economy, with results suggesting the tariffs have raised prices and lowered economic output and employment since the start of the trade war in 2018.

- A February 2018 analysis by economists Kadee Russ and Lydia Cox found that steel-consuming jobs outnumber steel-producing jobs 80 to 1, indicating greater job losses from steel tariffs than job gains.
- A March 2018 Chicago Booth survey of 43 economic experts revealed that 0 percent thought a US tariff on steel and aluminum would improve Americans' welfare.

- An August 2018 [analysis](#) from economists at the Federal Reserve Bank of [New York](#) warned the Trump administration's intent to use tariffs to narrow the trade deficit would reduce imports *and* US exports, resulting in little to no change in the trade deficit.
- A March 2019 National Bureau of Economic Research [study](#) conducted by Pablo D. Fajgelbaum and others found that the trade war tariffs did not lower the before-duties import prices of Chinese goods, resulting in US importers taking on the entire burden of import duties in the form of higher after-duty prices.
- An April 2019 [University of Chicago](#) study conducted by Aaron Flaaen, Ali Hortacsu, and Felix Tintelnot found that after the Trump administration imposed tariffs on washing machines, washer prices increased by \$86 per unit and dryer prices increased by \$92 per unit, due to package deals, ultimately resulting in an aggregate increase in consumer costs of over \$1.5 billion.
- An April 2019 [research](#) publication from the International Monetary Fund used a range of general equilibrium models to estimate the effects of a 25 percent increase in tariffs on all trade between China and the US, and each model estimated that the higher tariffs would bring both countries significant economic losses.
- An October 2019 [study](#) by Alberto Cavallo and coauthors found tariffs on imports from China were almost fully passed through to US import prices but only partially to retail consumers, implying some businesses absorbed the higher tariffs, reducing retail margins, instead of passing them on to retail consumers.
- In December 2019, Federal Reserve economists Aaron Flaaen and Justin Pierce [found](#) a net decrease in manufacturing employment due to the tariffs, suggesting that the benefit of increased production in protected industries was outweighed by the consequences of rising input costs and retaliatory tariffs.
- A February 2020 [paper](#) from economists Kyle Handley, Fariha Kamal, and Ryan Monarch estimated the 2018–2019 import tariffs were equivalent to a 2 percent tariff on all US exports.
- A December 2021 [review](#) of the data and methods used to estimate the trade war effects through 2021, by Pablo Fajgelbaum and Amit Khandelwal, concluded that “US consumers of imported goods have borne the brunt of the tariffs through higher prices, and that the

trade war has lowered aggregate real income in both the US and China, although not by large magnitudes relative to GDP.”

- A January 2022 study from the US Department of Agriculture estimated the direct export losses from the retaliatory tariffs totaled \$27 billion from 2018 through the end of 2019.
- A May 2023 United States International Trade Commission report from Peter Herman and others found evidence for near complete pass-through of the steel, aluminum, and Chinese tariffs to US prices. It also found an estimated \$2.8 billion production increase in industries protected by the steel and aluminum tariffs was met with a \$3.4 billion production decrease in downstream industries affected by higher input prices.
- A January 2024 International Monetary Fund paper found that unexpected tariff shocks tend to reduce imports more than exports, leading to slight decreases in the trade deficit at the expense of persistent gross domestic product losses—for example, the study estimates reversing the 2018–2019 tariffs would increase US output by 4 percent over three years.
- A January 2024 study by David Autor and others concludes that the 2018–2019 tariffs failed to provide economic help to the heartland: import tariffs had “neither a sizable nor significant effect on US employment in regions with newly-protected sectors” and foreign retaliation “by contrast had clear negative employment impacts, particularly in agriculture.”

2018-2019 Trade War Timeline

The Trump administration imposed several rounds of tariffs on steel, aluminum, washing machines, solar panels, and goods from China, affecting more than \$380 billion worth of trade at the time of implementation and amounting to a tax increase of nearly \$80 billion. The Biden administration maintained most tariffs, except for the suspension of certain tariffs on imports from the European Union, the replacement of tariffs with tariff-rate quotas (TRQs) on steel and aluminum from the European Union and United Kingdom and imports of steel from Japan, and the expiration of the tariffs on washing machines after a two-year extension. In May 2024, the Biden administration announced additional tariffs on \$18 billion of Chinese goods for a tax increase of \$3.6 billion.

Altogether, the **trade war policies currently in place add up to \$79 billion in tariffs** based on trade levels at the time of tariff implementation. Note the total revenue generated will be less than our static estimate because tariffs reduce the volume of imports and are subject to evasion and avoidance (which directly lowers tariff revenues) and they reduce real income (which lowers other tax revenues).

Section 232, Steel and Aluminum

In March 2018, President Trump announced the administration would impose a 25 percent tariff on imported steel and a 10 percent tariff on imported aluminum. The value of imported steel totaled \$29.4 billion, and the value of imported aluminum totaled \$17.6 billion in 2018. Based on 2018 levels, the steel tariffs would have amounted to \$9 billion and the aluminum tariffs to \$1.8 billion. Several countries, however, have been excluded from the tariffs.

In early 2018, the US reached agreements to permanently exclude Australia from steel and aluminum tariffs, use quotas for steel imports from Brazil and South Korea, and use quotas for steel and aluminum imports from Argentina.

In May 2019, President Trump announced that the US was lifting tariffs on steel and aluminum from Canada and Mexico.

In 2020, President Trump expanded the scope of steel and aluminum tariffs to cover certain derivative products, totaling approximately \$0.8 billion based on 2018 import levels.

In August 2020, President Trump announced that the US was reimposing tariffs on aluminum imports from Canada. The US imported approximately \$2.5 billion worth of non-alloyed unwrought aluminum, resulting in a \$0.25 billion tax increase. About a month later, the US eliminated the 10 percent tariff on Canadian aluminum that had just been reimposed.

In 2021 and 2022, the Biden administration reached deals to replace certain steel and aluminum tariffs with tariff rate quota systems, whereby certain levels of imports will not face tariffs, but imports above the thresholds will. TRQs for the European Union took effect on January 1, 2022; TRQs for Japan took effect on April 1, 2022; and TRQs for the UK took effect

on June 1, 2022. Though the agreements on steel and aluminum tariffs will reduce the cost of tariffs paid by some US businesses, a quota system similarly leads to higher prices, and further, retaining tariffs at the margin continues the negative economic impact of the previous tariff policy.

Tariffs on steel, aluminum, and derivative goods currently **account for \$2.7 billion of the \$79 billion in tariffs**, based on initial import values. Current retaliation against Section 232 steel and aluminum tariffs targets more than \$6 billion worth of American products for an estimated total tax of approximately \$1.6 billion.

Section 301, Chinese Products

Under the Trump administration, the United States Trade Representative began an investigation of China in August 2017, which culminated in a March 2018 report that found China was conducting unfair trade practices.

In March 2018, President Trump announced tariffs on up to \$60 billion of imports from China. The administration soon published a list of about \$50 billion worth of Chinese products to be subject to a new 25 percent tariff. The first tariffs began July 6, 2018, on \$34 billion worth of Chinese imports, while tariffs on the remaining \$16 billion went into effect August 23, 2018. These tariffs amount to a \$12.5 billion tax increase.

In September 2018, the Trump administration imposed another round of Section 301 tariffs—10 percent on \$200 billion worth of goods from China, amounting to a \$20 billion tax increase.

In May 2019, the 10 percent tariffs increased to 25 percent, amounting to a \$30 billion increase. That increase had been scheduled to take effect beginning in January 2019, but was delayed.

In August 2019, the Trump administration announced plans to impose a 10 percent tariff on approximately \$300 billion worth of additional Chinese goods beginning on September 1, 2019, but soon followed with an announcement of schedule changes and certain exemptions.

In August 2019, the Trump administration decided that 4a tariffs would be 15 percent rather than the previously announced 10 percent, a \$5.6 billion tax increase.

In September 2019, the Trump administration imposed “List 4a,” a 15 percent tariff on \$112 billion of imports, an \$11 billion tax increase. They announced plans for tariffs on the remaining \$160 billion to take effect on December 15, 2019.

In December 2019, the administration reached a “Phase One” trade deal with China and agreed to postpone indefinitely the stage 4b tariffs of 15 percent on approximately \$160 billion worth of goods that were scheduled to take effect December 15 and to reduce the stage 4a tariffs from 15 percent to 7.5 percent in January 2020, reducing tariff revenues by \$8.4 billion.

In May 2024, the Biden administration published its required statutory review of the Section 301 tariffs, deciding to retain them and impose higher rates on \$18 billion worth of goods. The new tariff rates range from 25 to 100 percent on semiconductors, steel and aluminum products, electric vehicles, batteries and battery parts, natural graphite and other critical materials, medical goods, magnets, cranes, and solar cells. Some of the tariff increases go into effect immediately, while others are scheduled for 2025 or 2026. Based on 2023 import values, the increases will add \$3.6 billion in new taxes.

Section 301 tariffs on China currently **account for \$77 billion of the \$79 billion in tariffs**, based on initial import values. China has responded to the United States’ Section 301 tariffs with several rounds of tariffs on more than \$106 billion worth of US goods, for an estimated tax of nearly \$11.6 billion.

WTO Dispute, European Union

In October 2019, the United States won a nearly 15-year-long World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute against the European Union. The WTO ruling authorized the United States to impose tariffs of up to 100 percent on \$7.5 billion worth of EU goods. Beginning October 18, 2019,

tariffs of 10 percent were to be applied on aircraft and 25 percent on agricultural and other products.

In summer 2021, the Biden administration reached an agreement to suspend the tariffs on the European Union for five years.

Section 201, Solar Panels and Washing Machines

In January 2018, the Trump administration announced it would begin imposing tariffs on washing machine imports for three years and solar cell and module imports for four years as the result of a Section 201 investigation.

In 2021, the Trump administration extended the washing machine tariffs for two years through February 2023, and they have now expired.

In 2022, the Biden administration extended the solar panel tariffs for four years, though later provided temporary two-year exemptions for imports from four Southeast Asian nations beginning in 2022, which account for a significant share of solar panel imports.

In 2024, the Biden administration removed separate exemptions for bifacial solar panels from the Section 201 tariffs. Additionally, the temporary two-year exemptions expired and the Biden administration is further investigating solar panel imports from the four Southeast Asian nations for additional tariffs.

We estimate the solar cell and module tariffs amounted to a \$0.2 billion tax increase based on 2018 import values and quantities, while the washing machine tariffs amounted to a \$0.4 billion tax increase based on 2018 import values and quantities.

We exclude the tariffs from our tariff totals given the broad exemptions and small magnitudes.

Trade Volumes Since Tariffs Were Imposed

Since the tariffs were imposed, imports of affected goods have fallen, even before the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. Some of the biggest drops are the result of decreased trade with China, as affected imports decreased significantly after the tariffs and still remain below their pre-trade war levels. Even though trade with China fell after the imposition of tariffs, it did not fundamentally alter the overall balance of trade, as the reduction in trade with China was diverted to increased trade with other countries.

Table 6. Imports Affected by US Tariffs

Tariff and Effective Date	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	Rate
Section 232 Steel (March 2018)	\$15.90	\$15.50	\$11.40	\$7.10	\$13.50	\$9.50	\$5.50	25%
Section 232 Aluminum (March 2018)	\$9.00	\$9.60	\$8.40	\$5.20	\$7.50	\$9.80	\$5.60	10%
Section 232 Derivative Steel Articles (February 2020)	\$0.40	\$0.50	\$0.50	\$0.40	\$0.50	\$0.60	\$0.30	25%
Section 232 Derivative Aluminum Articles (February 2020)	\$0.20	\$0.30	\$0.20	\$0.20	\$0.30	\$0.30	\$0.30	10%

Tariff and Effective Date	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	Rate
Section 301, List 1 (July 2018)	\$31.90	\$30.30	\$22.00	\$20.10	\$24.10	\$26.10	\$23.60	25%
Section 301, List 2 (August 2018)	\$13.80	\$14.80	\$8.50	\$9.60	\$10.30	\$10.70	\$8.20	25%
Section 301, List 3 (September 2018, increased May 2019)	\$159.20	\$181.30	\$120.00	\$107.10	\$119.60	\$111.80	\$86.50	10% in 2019, then 25%
Section 301, List 4A (September 2019, lowered January 2020)	\$101.90	\$112.20	\$113.90	\$101.40	\$104.70	\$102.00	\$84.90	15% in 2019; then 7.5%
Biden Admin Section 301 Expansion (2024 to 2026)	\$7.50	\$8.00	\$5.60	\$8.90	\$9.00	\$15.70	\$18.00	25% to 100%

Note: Steel totals exclude imports from Argentina, Australia, Brazil, South Korea, Canada, and Mexico. Aluminum totals exclude imports from Argentina, Australia, Canada, and Mexico. Beginning in 2022, steel totals also exclude imports from Japan, the EU, and the UK, and aluminum totals also exclude imports from the EU and the UK as respective imports are now subject to tariff-rate quotas (TRQs). Excluding all imports for TRQs overstates the savings from TRQs because tariffs still apply when imports exceed historical levels.

Source: Federal Register notices; Tom Lee and Jacqueline Varas, "The Total Cost of U.S. Tariffs," American Action Forum, Mar. 24, 2022, <https://www.americanactionforum.org/research/the-total-cost-of-tariffs/>; data retrieved from USITC DataWeb.



Timeline of Activity

- March 25, 2025**
Updated timeline to add new “secondary” tariff threat on imports from Venezuela and countries that purchase oil or gas from Venezuela.
- March 21, 2025**
Updated timeline for EU retaliation against US Section 232 tariffs.
- March 12, 2025**
Update: New revenue and economic estimates for changes to IEEPA tariffs and implementation of Section 232 steel and aluminum tariffs.
- March 7, 2025**
Updates timeline for Canada, Mexico, and China tariffs. Tax Foundation is in the process of updating economic and revenue estimates for these developments.
- March 4, 2025**

President Trump imposed new tariffs on three of the country's largest trading partners: Canada, Mexico, and China.

March 3, 2025

Added threatened lumber and agricultural tariffs to timeline.

February 27, 2025

New estimates for the proposed 25 percent tariff on EU imports and the increase in tariff rates on China. The update also incorporates the latest version of Tax Foundation's General Equilibrium Model and updates to our tariff modeling to reflect the latest tax and economic data and a refinement to our tariff noncompliance assumption.

February 19, 2025

Updated to include details around the 2025 trade war timeline and provide analysis of Trump's auto, steel, and aluminum tariffs.

February 13, 2025

Updated to include analysis of Trump's expanded steel and aluminum tariffs.

February 11, 2025

Updated to include new revenue collection data for the Trump-Biden tariffs.

February 10, 2025

Update: We rearranged the tracker and added an estimate of the value of US exports targeted by China's retaliatory tariffs.

February 6, 2025

Updated to include the revenue effects of ending duty-free de minimis treatment of imports from China.

February 4, 2025

Updated to include additional distributional and historical analysis.

February 1, 2025

Updated to include the 10 percent tariff on Canadian energy resources.

January 31, 2025

Updated to include additional analysis of the proposed 25 percent tariffs on Canada and Mexico that could begin February 1, 2025.

January 23, 2025

Updated to separate out 25 percent tariffs on Canada and Mexico given recent threats that these tariffs could begin February 1, 2025.

November 26, 2024

The update contains modeling of President-elect Trump's proposed 25 percent tariffs on Canada and Mexico and 10 percent tariff on China.

June 26, 2024

The update adds import data through 2023, new data on tariff collections, and updated model results for imposed, retaliatory, and proposed tariffs. The modeling updates reflect President Biden's tariff increases and former President Trump's tariff proposals. Nicolo Pastrone assisted with the research for this update.

September 19, 2023

The update adds a new column to the "Imports Affected by U.S. Tariffs" table, reflecting import data for calendar year 2022, data updates for prior years, and tariff-rate quotas that took effect in 2022 for certain steel and aluminum imports.

July 7, 2023

Tariffs on washing machines expired in February 2023 after an initial three-year period and a two-year extension. The Biden administration provided a two-year suspension of solar panel tariffs for four Southeast Asian nations beginning in 2022. The update adjusts the revenue and economic results for imposed tariffs.

April 1, 2022

The Biden administration has reached deals to replace steel and aluminum tariffs with tariff rate quotas for the European Union and United Kingdom and steel tariffs with tariff-rate quotas for Japan. The deals also eliminate tariffs on derivative goods from the same jurisdictions and will bring an end to related retaliatory tariffs. The update adjusts revenue and economic estimates for imposed and retaliatory tariffs and adds a new table illustrating how import levels of affected goods have changed since 2017.

October 19, 2021

Under President Biden, the U.S. will suspend tariffs on aircrafts and other goods from the E.U. under a five-year pause in the ongoing Boeing-Airbus dispute. We have reorganized the layout of the tracker.

September 18, 2020

U.S. to eliminate tariffs on \$2.5 billion worth of Canadian aluminum that had been imposed on August 16, 2020, to avoid Canadian retaliatory tariffs.

August 13, 2020

U.S. to reimpose tariffs on \$2.5 billion worth of Canadian aluminum on August 16, 2020, and Canada to impose retaliatory tariffs.

February 14, 2020

U.S. reduces tariffs on \$120 billion of Chinese goods by half to 7.5% and China reduces tariffs on approximately \$75 billion of US goods in half to 2.5% and 5%.

December 16, 2019

U.S. postpones indefinitely the scheduled tariff of 15% on \$160 billion worth of goods from China and announces plans to decrease the 15% tariff on \$120 billion worth of goods from China to 7.5% (date unknown, will be included in the model when the decrease takes effect). China took corresponding measures and canceled their schedule tariff increase.

December 5, 2019

U.S. concludes Section 301 investigation into France's Digital Services Tax, threatens tariffs on \$2.4 billion French products. Our analysis now includes tariffs on solar panels and washing machines.

October 18, 2019

U.S. imposes 10% and 25% tariffs on \$7.5 billion European Union goods under WTO ruling.

October 15, 2019

U.S. postpones scheduled tariff hike from 25% to 30% on \$250 billion worth of goods from China.

October 3, 2019

U.S. announces 10% and 25% tariffs on \$7.5 billion European Union goods under WTO ruling, with the authority to raise the tariffs to 100%.

September 12, 2019

U.S. delays tariff increase from 25% to 30% on \$250 billion worth of Chinese goods from Oct. 1 until Oct. 15.

August 26, 2019

U.S. announces the 25% tariff on \$250 billion of Chinese goods would increase to 30 percent, effective Oct. 1, after a comment period.

August 23, 2019

China announces additional tariffs on \$75 billion of U.S. imports, from 5-10%, and will resume tariffs on U.S. cars and car parts suspended earlier in 2019. Tariffs to begin Sept. 1 and end Dec. 15. U.S. announces 10% tariff on \$300 billion of Chinese goods to increase to 15%, some beginning Sept. 1, others on Dec. 15.

August 13, 2019

U.S. announces 10% tariff on \$300 billion of Chinese goods would be delayed from Sept. 1 until Dec. 15.

August 1, 2019

U.S. announces 10% tariff on \$300 billion Chinese goods, to be levied on Sept. 1, lowered from the previously announced 25% on \$325 billion.

July 20, 2019

U.S. confirms announced July 5 plans to impose tariffs on all Chinese imports, roughly \$500 billion of goods, modeled as a 10% tariff.

July 5, 2019

U.S. again threatens additional tariffs on Chinese imports if China further retaliates, increasing threats from levies on \$200 billion and another \$200 billion to \$200 billion and \$300 billion.

June 10, 2019

U.S. “indefinitely suspended” previously announced tariffs against Mexican products, set to begin at a 5% rate in June and gradually rise to 25%.

May 31, 2019

U.S. threatens 5% tariff beginning June 10 on \$346.5 billion of imports from Mexico until illegal immigration across the southern border stops. It would rise to 10% on July 1; 15% on Aug. 1; 20% on Sept. 1; and 25% on Oct. 1.

- May 22, 2019**
U.S. announces it will lift steel and aluminum tariffs on Canada and Mexico, and those nations will lift their retaliatory tariffs.
- May 10, 2019**
U.S. announces it will raise tariffs on \$200 billion of imports from China from 10% to 25%, with threats to impose an additional 25% on \$325 billion of goods.
- August 29, 2018**
Tax Foundation separated our automobile tariff estimate to show auto imports from Canada, and made slight estimate adjustments to correct for rounding.
- August 16, 2018**
U.S. doubles the tariffs on steel and aluminum imports from Turkey, which responds by doubling its tariffs on 22 U.S. products.
- August 8, 2018**
U.S. threatens a 10% tariff on \$200 billion of Chinese goods if China retaliates for the previous 10% tariff, and that would extend to an additional \$200 billion of goods. This would amount to a \$40 billion tax increase.
- August 1, 2018**
U.S. considers increasing the proposed 10% tariff to 25% on \$200 billion of Chinese imports. That would be a \$30 billion tax increase.
- July 20, 2018**
U.S. reaffirms plans to impose tariffs on all Chinese imports (roughly \$500 billion).
- July 13, 2018**
Russia will begin placing tariffs on U.S. goods, worth about \$87.6 million. (Slight adjustments were made to our estimates to correct for rounding.)
- July 6, 2018**
U.S. announces readiness to target an additional \$200 billion in Chinese imports, and an additional \$300 billion after that—an increase of \$100 billion from previous threats.
- June 28, 2018**
Turkey will begin placing tariffs on U.S. goods, worth about \$266.5 million.