



CSE 543

Information Assurance and Security



*IA Applications of
Formal Methods*

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IA Applications of Formal Methods

■ *Objective:*

More precisely determine the requirements, and analyze the information system so that *security incidents can be prevented or at least identified.*

Step 1: System Specification:
Abstraction and modeling with
a well-defined syntactic and
semantic structure for system to
operate.

Step 2: Requirement

Specification: Security modeling (e.g., BLP model) to represent the security requirements **unambiguously.**



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Step 3: Validation: Formally validate the system with respect to its requirements.

- ***Model checking*** (by searching the satisfiability of the given characteristics of the system in the possible models)
- ***Theorem proving*** (by inference of given system characteristics using syntactical inference rules in theory proving)



Formal Methods – Modeling

- Abstract representations of a system using mathematical entities and concepts
- **Modeling:** *Capture essential system characteristics and ignore irrelevant details*
- Model can be used for mathematical reasoning to prove system properties or predict new behavior
- Two types of models: continuous and discrete



Formal Methods – Modeling

Advantages of using formal specification:

- Clarify *requirements and design*
- Articulate *implicit assumptions*
- Identify *undocumented or unexpected assumptions*
- Expose *defects*
- Identify *exceptions*
- Evaluate *test coverage*



Formal Methods – Generating Formal Specifications

- Need *to translate non-mathematical description* (diagrams, table, natural language) *to a formal specification language*
- The specification is a *concise and precise description of high-level behavior and properties of a system*
- Well-defined language *semantics* are needed to support formal deduction of specification



Formal Methods – Generating Formal Specifications (cont.)

- Types of formal specifications,
 - **Model oriented**: Based on a model of the system behavior in terms of mathematical objects, like sets, sequences, etc.
 - Statecharts, SCR (Software Cost Reduction), VDM (Vienna Development Method)
 - Petri nets, automata theoretic models



Formal Methods – Generating Formal Specifications (cont.)

- Types of formal specifications (cont.)
 - **Property oriented**: Based on a set of properties sufficient to describe system behavior in terms of axioms, rules, etc.
 - Algebraic semantics
 - Temporal logic



Formal Method – Role in System Design and Engineering

- Motivated by the expectation that performing appropriate mathematical analysis can contribute to the reliability and robustness of an information system design

* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Formal_methods



Formal Method – Role in System Design and Engineering (cont.)

- Formal specification of an information system may be used as a guide while the system is being developed.
 - If the formal specification is in *operational semantics* (executable), the observed behavior of the system can be compared with the behavior of the specification.
 - If the formal specification is in *axiomatic semantics*, the pre-conditions and post-conditions of the specification may become assertions in the executable code.*

* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Formal_methods



Formal Methods – Bell-LaPadula (BLP) Model

- For *enforcing access control* in information systems and built on the concept of a *state machine with allowable states in a computer system*.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bell%E2%80%93LaPadula_model



Formal Methods –

Bell-LaPadula (BLP) Model (cont.)

- The model defines *two MAC rules and one DAC rule with three security properties:*
 - Simple Security Property - a subject at a given security level *may not read* an object at a higher security level (**no read-up**)



Formal Methods –

Bell-LaPadula (BLP) Model (cont.)

- ★-property ("star"-property) - a subject at a given security level *must not write* to any object at a lower security level (**no write-down**)
- Discretionary Security Property - use of an access matrix to specify the discretionary access control. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bell%E2%80%93LaPadula_model



Limitations of Formal Methods

- Requires sound mathematical knowledge of the developer
- Different aspects of a design may be represented by different formal specification methods
- Useful for *consistency checks*, but cannot guarantee the *completeness* of a specifications