

# Secure AWS Multi-Account Baseline

Terraform + Policy-as-Code

Portfolio
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## **Executive Summary**

## **Enterprise AWS Secure Baseline (Terraform + Policy-as-Code)**

"This is not theory. Every slide is a proof I built, validated, and enforced in AWS."

This portfolio demonstrates how I designed and enforced a secure AWS environment at **enterprise scale**, combining preventive, detective, and governance controls. Every component is mapped to **international and regional compliance frameworks** (ISO/IEC 27001, Saudi NCA ECC, Saudi SAMA CSF, UAE NESA IAS), proving awareness of both global standards and local regulatory requirements.

# Multi-account Governance

Multi-account governance with AWS Orgs &SCPs) →

ISO 27001 A.5.1, NCA GOV-02, NESA GOV-01.

# Centralized Logging Encryption

CloudTrail + S3/KMS logs

→
ISO 27001 A.12.4/8.15 |
NCA LGM-02 | NESA

MON-01

## Compliance Mapping

AWS Config
Conformance Packs →

ISO 27001 A.12.1/5.14 | NCA CC-06 | NESA AUD-02

# Threat detection & CSPM

GuardDuty + Security
Hub →


NCA D5.5 | NESA MON-05

# Policy-as-Code (OPA,tfsec,Checkov)

Enforce encryption & IAM boundaries →

ISO 27001 A.14.2/8.28 | NCA D3.2 | NESA DEV-01

## **Architecture Diagram**



Preventive = SCPs • Detective = CloudTrail/Config/GD/SecHub • Foundational = VPC+Encryption+SSM • Governance = Terraform+OPA

## **Step1: State Backend**

## What this proves


- Secure Terraform state management across accounts.
- Encryption (SSE-KMS) protects state confidentiality.
- DynamoDB locking prevents concurrent writes / corruption.

## **Controls**


■ **ISO 27001:** A.8.20, A.8.23, A.8.16 → 2022: 8.24, 5.23, 5.15

#### **Proofs / Screenshots**

#### S3 bucket (SSE-KMS enabled)



#### **DynamoDB state locking**



**Note:** Ensures **tamper-resistant**, **segregated state** → critical for enterprise IaC.

## **Step2: Centralized Logging**

## What this proves

- Enterprise-wide visibility into all AWS activity.
- CloudTrail & AWS Config logs are centralized, encrypted, immutable.
- S3 bucket with KMS CMK + versioning → no accidental/intentional log deletion.

## **Controls**

- **ISO 27001:** A.12.4 → 2022: 8.15
- Saudi NCA: D1 Logging & CC-06 Compliance
- SAMA CSF: LOG (Logging & Monitoring), COM (Compliance)
- UAE NESA: MON-01

## **Proofs / Screenshots**

Amazon S3

Directory buckets

Table buckets

Vector buckets

Access Grants

Access Points (General Purpos Buckets, FSx file systems)

Access Points (Directory Buckets

Object Lambda Access Points

Multi-Region Access Points

IAM Access Analyzer for S3


Block Public Access settings for this

Batch Operations


Storage Lens

Dashboards

## Log bucket encryption (SSE-KMS)



## CloudTrail Logs in S3



Note: Logging is the foundation for monitoring & audit evidence.

## **Step3: AWS Config & Conformance Packs**

## What this proves

- Detects misconfigurations → flags non-compliance in near real-time.
- Conformance Pack with 11 security baseline rules (passwords, MFA, encryption, logs)

## **Controls**

- **ISO 27001:** A.12.1, A.18.2.2 → 2022: 5.14, 5.36
- Saudi NCA ECC: OAM-06 (config mgmt.)
- UAE NESA IAS: Secure baseline, data protection, audit & accountability

## **Proofs / Screenshots**

#### 

Partners 2

Pricing [2]

**Config Rules Evaluations** 

#### **CLI Conformance Pack**

Note: Provides ongoing evidence for audits. Moves from reactive audits → proactive continuous compliance

⚠ Noncompliant

⊘ Compliant

## **Step4: Security Hub & GuardDuty**

## What this proves


- Unified threat detection + compliance aggregation.
- Security Hub consolidates findings (CIS, PCI DSS).
- GuardDuty detects anomalous network and account behavior.

## **Controls**


- **ISO 27001:** A.12.6, A.16.1 → 2022: 8.8, 5.25
- Saudi NCA: D5.5 Threat Detection
- SAMA CSF: TVM (Threat & Vulnerability Management),
   LOG (Logging & Monitoring)

## **Proofs / Screenshots**

#### **Security Hub Summary**



## **Guard Duty Detector ON**



## Note: Provides central view of risk posture across all accounts

## Step5: Policy-as-Code (OPA, tfsec, Checkov)

## What this proves

- Automated governance before provisioning.
- Prevents deployment of insecure resources (unencrypted S3, missing MFA, etc.).
- CI/CD gate → code must pass tfsec, Checkov, OPA rules before apply.

## **Controls**

- **ISO 27001:** A.14.2, A.12.1.2, A.18.2.3 → 2022: 8.28, 5.14, 5.35
- CIS AWS Foundations: enforced via Hub CIS subscription
- SAMA CSF: SSA (Secure Systems & Applications), ACC (Identity & Access Management), COM (Compliance)

#### **Proofs / Screenshots**

## X OPA eval fail (GuardDuty missing)



```
Janes-MacBook-Pro:tf-aws-secure-baseline janeahn$ opa eval -d policies-as-code/opa -i plan-pass.json 'data.terraform.security.result' -f pretty {
    "count": 0,
    "messages": [],
    "passed": true
}
Janes-MacBook-Pro:tf-aws-secure-baseline janeahn$
```

## **✓** OPA unit tests pass

Note: Shifts compliance left → security embedded in development pipeline.

## Step6: Organizations & SCPs

## What this proves

- Preventive guardrails enforced Org-wide.
- SCPs restrict dangerous actions: Deny leaving Org, Protect CloudTrail/Config/SecHub/GD, Restrict regions (only us-east-1), Require MFA for IAM writes, Deny root user access (toggle)


## **Controls**

- ISO 27001: A.5.1.1, A.9.2.3, A.9.2.1 → 2022: 5.1, 5.18, 5.17
- Saudi NCA: GOV-02
- UAE NESA: GOV-01
- SAMA CSF: GOV (Leadership & Governance), ACC (Identity &


Access Management)

## **Proofs / Screenshots**

#### Org OUs (security, infra, workloads, sandbox)



#### **Root with SCPs Attached**



Note: These guardrails prevent violations at source — stronger than detective controls.

## **Compliance Mapping**

#### **Full Compliance Mapping (Audit-Ready Version)**


Step	Implementation Example	ISO/IEC 27001 (2013→2022)	NIST CSF	PCI DSS	CIS AWS Foundations	Saudi NCA ECC	Saudi SAMA CSF	UAE NESA IAS	Qatar NCSA CSF
1 — State Backend	S3 backend SSE-KMS, DynamoDB lock	A.8.20 $\rightarrow$ 8.24 (crypto), A.8.16 $\rightarrow$ 5.15 (access control)	PR.DS-1 (Data- at-rest protected)	Req. 3.5 (Encryption of cardholder data)	2.2 (Log encryption), 2.1.1 (Block public access)	_	Cryptography (CRY), Access Control (ACC)	_	Data Protection
2 — Centralized Logging	CloudTrail, CloudWatch, KMS	A.12.4 $\rightarrow$ 8.15 (logging), A.8.20 $\rightarrow$ 8.24	DE.AE-1 (Anomalous activity detected)	Req. 10 (Logging & monitoring)	2.1 (All regions), 2.2 (Validation), 2.3 (CMKs)	D1/D2 (Logging & monitoring)	Operations & Technology (LOG)	Logging & monitoring	Logging & Monitoring
3 — Config & Conformance	Config rules, Conformance packs	A.12.1 → 5.14, A.18.2.2 → 5.36	ID.RA-1 (Risks identified)	Req. 11.5 (File integrity monitoring)	2.5 (Config enabled), 2.6 (All resources)	CC-06 (Compliance checks)	Risk Mgmt & Compliance (RSK), Compliance (COM)	Compliance & audit governance	Risk Mgmt & Compliance
4 — Security Hub & GuardDuty	Threat detection, incident dashboard	A.12.4 → 8.15, A.12.6 → 8.8, A.16.1 → 5.25	DE.CM-1 (Continuous monitoring)	Req. 12.10 (Incident response)	3.1 (GuardDuty), 3.2 (Security Hub)	D5.5 (Threat detection), CC-06	Operations & Technology (TVM, OPM)	Threat & vulnerability mgmt, monitoring	Threat Detection & Response
5 — OPA Policy- as-Code	Terraform plan eval, CI/CD enforcement	A.12.6 → 8.8, A.18.2.2 → 5.36, A.9.2.3 → 5.18	PR.IP-3 (Secure dev lifecycle)	Req. 6.3 (Secure development practices)	1.1 (MFA), 2.x (Log checks), 3.x (GuardDuty/SecHub)	D3.2 (Secure by design), D5.3 (IAM)	Operations & Technology (SSA), Identity & Access (ACC)	Secure development lifecycle	Secure Development Lifecycle
6 — Organizations & SCPs	DenyLeaveOrg, Protect Security Services, RestrictRegions	A.5.1.1 $\rightarrow$ 5.1, A.12.4 $\rightarrow$ 8.15, A.9.1.2 $\rightarrow$ 5.12, A.9.2.3 $\rightarrow$ 5.18	RS.MI-1 (Mitigation executed)	Req. 7.2 (Restrict access to cardholder data)	1.1 (MFA), 1.5 (IAM), 1.6 (Root disabled), 2.1 (CloudTrail)	D5.2 (IAM), D5.5 (GuardDuty), D1/D2 (Logging), CC-06	Governance & Leadership (GOV), Access Control (ACC)	Governance, access control, monitoring	Governance & Access Control

#### Legend

- ISO/IEC 27001: Mapping includes 2013 Annex A → 2022 control renumbering.
- NIST CSF: ID = Identify | PR = Protect | DE = Detect | RS = Respond | RC = Recover.
- PCI DSS: Req. = Requirement (PCI DSS v4.0).
- CIS AWS Foundations: v1.4.0 baseline.
- SAMA: GOV = Leadership & Governance | RSK = Risk Mgmt | COM = Compliance | CRY = Cryptography | LOG = Logging | TVM = Threat & Vulnerability Mgmt | SSA = Secure Systems & Applications | ACC = Identity & Access Mgmt.
- NCA, NESA, NCSA: Domains aligned to national cybersecurity frameworks.

## **SAMA CSF Mapping Highlights**

## Mapping Portfolio Steps to SAMA Cyber Security Framework Domains



#### \*SAMA CSF Acronyms (Legend):

## CI/CD Enforcement with Policy-as-Code

## What this proves

- GitHub Actions pipeline runs security checks automatically.
- Every pull request triggers tfsec, Checkov, OPA before merge.
- Pipeline ensures "no code is applied without passing security gates."

## **Controls**

- ISO 27001: A.14.2 Secure coding, A.12.1.2 Change management, A.18.2.3 Technical compliance review → 2022: 8.28, 5.14, 5.35
- NCA: DEV-01 Secure Dev, CC-06 Compliance checks
- SAMA CSF: SSA (Secure Systems & Applications),
   ACC (Identity & Access Management), COM (Compliance)

## **Proofs / Screenshots**

#### **GitHub Actions YAML workflow**

#### **CI Badge Green**

terraform-security-checks passing

## Enterprise AWS Secure Baseline (Terraform + PaC)

This project demonstrates how to design and enforce a secure AWS environment at enterprise scale. It includes:

- Multi-account setup with AWS Organizations & Service Control Policies
- Centralized logging (CloudTrail, CloudWatch, S3 + KMS)
- AWS Config Conformance Packs for compliance monitoring
- Security Hub & GuardDuty as Cloud Security Posture Management (CSPM) tools
- · Policy-as-Code (OPA/Rego) to enforce encryption, IAM boundaries, and security service activation

Tompliance Mapping: ISO/IEC 27001 Annex A (2013 & 2022), Saudi NCA ECC, UAE NESA IAS

ISO/IEC 27001 Annex A — Control Mapping (2013 → 2022)

Key takeaway: IaC merges are blocked unless security & compliance tests pass → demonstrates real DevSecOps maturity and ability to operationalize cloud security pipelines.

## Conclusion

## "Every slide is a proof I built, validated, and enforced in AWS."

- ✓ Compliance → ISO 27001, NCA ECC, NESA IAS
- ✓ Security → SCPs, Logging, GuardDuty, Security Hub
- ✓ DevSecOps → Policy-as-Code in CI/CD pipelines

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