RELEASE IN PART B6

**B6** 

From:

H < hrod17@clintonemail.com>

Sent:

Friday, April 1, 2011 11:20 AM

To:

'jkeane

Subject:

Re: Libya

Jack--

So sorry to be so tardy in responding to your very helpful email. I have a lot to discuss w you and wanted to know your schedule. Are you in DC next week for first a call and then a visit?

All the best, H

---- Original Message -----

From: Jack Keane [mailto

Sent: Wednesday, March 23, 2011 11:48 AM

To: H

Subject: Libya

Hillary,

I agree with you that we had to respond, particularly, after the Arab League asked for our intervention.

The NFZ mission, in a sense, misrepresents what we are actually doing. Yes, we established a NFZ by destroying Q's air defenses and air forces. But Q's decisive force are his ground forces, particularly, his 2 armor brigades. As such, this should be our focus and 1973, as you know, provides the authority to do just that when it states "use all measures".... "to protect the population". We should not limit our military task to just Q's committed forces(those who are engaging the rebels or the population) but his entire military capability. It is his "Army" that is doing the killing and we should take down the full capability(command and control, uncommitted forces, even those in garrison, logistical infrastructure etc). We don't just destroy the "point" of the spear but the whole spear.

Another issue lies with Q's committed forces:

- --- Those forces that are outside cities and are not engaging rebels are easy to destroy in the open terrain because ID is simplified.
- --- However, those committed forces that are engaging the people or the rebels present a challenge because of their proximity to "friendlies" and the danger of friendly fire casualties. This is a challenge we deal with routinely. We call the mission, close air support(CAS). It features specially trained pilots, unique munitions and an air/ground support team (JTACS). The air/ground team are positioned with the ground force in this case the "rebels" to facilitate communication with the CAS aircraft so they can deliver their ordnance accurately on the target. Sometimes, just providing grid coordinates directly to the aircraft digitally or using lasers to identify the target or in some cases using lasers to guide the bombs are some of the techniques used. You may recall we did this very successfully in AFG in 2001 when our SF teams were on the ground with the Northern Alliance and devastated the Taliban ground forces. We use CAS everyday in AFG to facilitate our ground operations as we did in Iraq.

While the US has the most extensive JTACS capability, our coalition partners also have it. Putting these teams on the ground from either the US, the coalition or both are essential for successful air operations in proximity to "friendlies". If we do not provide this capability Q's ground forces will advantage themselves by staying close to the population and, tragically, continuing to kill them at will.

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Sorry for "101" lecture on air/ground ops but want you to understand.

Additionally, if we destroy Q's military capability, other than his personal security forces, it is where his primary strength is derived. As such, there will be a major erosion of support for him by his inner circle and enhance a possible deal to remove him or it permits the rebels to return to Tripoli unimpeded by Q's Army and force Q's removal.

If you want to chat, am not on travel. Wish you well dear friend.

All the best, Jack Sent via BlackBerry by AT&T