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- In fact, they send **arbitrary messages** to other generals.
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  - Every loyal general must obtain the same information v(1), v(2)..., v(n)
  - ② The value sent by a loyal general should be used by all loyal generals

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A commanding general must send an order to his n-1 lieutenant generals s.t.:

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\* Also note that, E.g. when General n sends v(n) lieutenant n-1 retrieves a message from n-2 generals and then apply a function  $Majority(v(1), v(2), \ldots, v(n-2))$  and adds v(n) to the list  $V_1$ 

Lamport gave a recursive algorithm based on **majority function** for the mentioned problem in case of having **oral messages** whose content is solely managed by the sender.

- **1** It is expensive  $\rightarrow O(n!)$
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In order to deal with problem 2, he proposed an algorithm based on **unforgeable messages.**