Dynamics of Disruption: How Security and Constitutional Events Shape Multidimensional Political Extremism

Amir Freund

Contact: Amir Freund, amir61@gmail.com

Abstract

Political and social destabilizing events often correspond with unpredictable shifts in political extremism. This study investigates the patterns of these shifts across varying political orientations, using longitudinal data from six survey waves in Israel. Theoretical gaps in current research on political extremism often stem from fragmented frameworks and one-dimensional methodologies. To address these limitations, this study develops a multidimensional theory of political extremism comprising three distinct dimensions: cognitive, behavioral, and social. This framework enables the implementation of the Political Extremism Gauge (PEG), a context-independent instrument for cross-population comparative analysis. Empirical results demonstrate that identical external events are associated with simultaneous shifts toward political extremism in specific groups and moderation in others. Furthermore, dimensions of political extremism respond independently rather than uniformly during periods of instability. The evidence suggests that political events relate to political extremism primarily through recruitment and demobilization mechanisms rather than through the incremental radicalization of existing extremists. These insights challenge traditional assumptions regarding uniform societal responses to disruption and provide a universal methodology for monitoring political extremism across diverse democratic contexts.

Keywords: Political extremism; Destabilizing events; Political orientation; Multidimensional measurement; Democratic resilience

Effects of Political Destabilizing Events on Political Extremism

Introduction

Political extremism poses a critical threat to democratic countries. Destabilizing events such as economic crises, terrorist attacks, waves of migration, and political scandals drive citizens to seek radical solutions to achieve political change. While substantial research has explored this topic, the field lacks integrated frameworks that connect different dimensions of the problem. Much research examines extremism's cognitive, behavioral, and social dimensions in isolation rather than as interconnected phenomena. This fragmented approach limits our ability to understand how extremism develops across multiple dimensions simultaneously. It specifically obscures how one destabilizing event affects different elements of extremism in various ways. Furthermore, current research overlooks how citizens' political views shape these effects. These factors can lead to opposite patterns of radicalization within the same society.

The research presents a multidimensional conceptualization of political extremism grounded in three core dimensions: Cognitive (extremity and rigidity of political positions), Behavioral (support for violence against the state and outgroups), and Social (political and personal intolerance toward opposing groups). This conceptualization synthesizes the most frequently cited elements in the extremism literature. A novel Political Extremism Gauge simultaneously measures all three dimensions, transforming them into indices of political extremism. This study employs relative indices that measure specific extremism metrics relative to population central tendencies to maintain comparability across different political groups and temporal periods. The framework focuses on assessing levels and trends of political extremism among the more extreme part of the population (rather than across the entire population), to better identify nuanced characteristics and trends of political extremism.

The research applies the new framework to examine how different destabilizing events, including security threats, political transitions, and constitutional crises, correlate with specific dimensions of extremism among Israeli citizens with distinct political orientations (left-wing, center-wing, right-wing). The three primary hypotheses are: (H1) various dimensions of political extremism respond heterogeneously to socio-political events, (H2) political orientation moderates these responses, and (H3) focusing on the more extreme population enables a more nuanced understanding of political extremism and radicalization processes.

The research uses a longitudinal study[1] conducted in Israel between 2021 and 2024, capitalizing on the country's experience with high-intensity threats across multiple socio-political domains. The six-wave analysis spans five major destabilizing events, providing a natural quasi-experimental setting for examining the dynamics of extremism.

The results strongly support the hypotheses, revealing that identical events can simultaneously radicalize some political groups while moderating others, with different extremism dimensions responding independently to external stimuli. These findings advance theoretical understanding of radicalization processes while offering practitioners a comprehensive methodology for monitoring and analyzing political extremism across diverse democratic contexts.

Assessing Political Extremism

Notwithstanding its growing importance, the study of political extremism faces three critical barriers that limit our understanding of this phenomenon. First, political extremism remains undefined in any universally accepted way, creating conceptual

[1] The questionnaires and data used in this paper have been developed and collected by Prof. Sivan Hirsch-Hoefler and Prof. Julia Elad Strenger, based on generous support from the Program on Democratic Resilience and Development (PDRD), and from the institutionalized partnership between the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS) and the Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy and Strategy, Reichman University (IDC Herzliya)

ambiguity (Bötticher, 2017; Eatwell & Goodwin, 2010; Sotlar, 2004; Svetlichny & Khorev, 2022). The term' extremism', rather than 'political extremism', is used even in an apparent political context (Onursal & Kirkpatrick, 2021; Scruton, 2007; UK Parliament, 2024). Absolute and relative approaches coexist within the current academic discourse. Relative definitions position extremists at the edges of the political spectrum, outside the mainstream, taking political ideas to their logical extremes (Coleman & Bartoli, 2015; Mandel, 2010; Scruton, 2007; Wintrobe, 2006). Absolute definitions associate a specific ideological content with political extremism, such as opposing a democratic constitutional state (Jungkunz, 2022; Midlarsky, 2011), monism (Eatwell & Goodwin, 2010), and a disregard for the lives, liberties, and human rights of others (Scruton, 2007). The fragmentation of the term into various subtypes may lead to differing interpretations and conclusions, creating ambiguity (Bjelopera, 2017) and challenging our capability to frame the phenomenon. Further contributing to the lack of clarity is the use of other terms, such as 'radicalism' and 'terrorism,' which overlap in definition (Allchorn & Orofino, 2023). Although much of the current literature emphasizes right-wing and Islamist extremism, the development of a truly universal definition necessitates an inclusive approach that captures additional extremist forms such as left-wing, environmental, and other ideologically motivated variants.

Second, the field tends to fragment extremism into discrete dimensions rather than studying it as an integrated whole. Relying on a single feature or dimension when assessing political extremism can lead to overlooking various forms of it (Schmid, 2014) or to a biased understanding of the phenomenon. The ideological position is evident in almost all definitions of political extremism; however, its conceptualization and measurement vary significantly. Many scholars limit the definition to a left-right political position (van Prooijen & Krouwel, 2019, 2022) using an ideological self-positioning scale

to identify political extremism (Rigoli, 2023; Uba & Bosi, 2022; van Prooijen et al., 2015; van Prooijen & Kuijper, 2020). Other scholars use additional dimensions, including authoritarianism (Mudde, 1995), beliefs in superiority and intolerance towards opposing groups (Doosje et al., 2016; Ozer & Bertelsen, 2018), endorsement of violence (Schmid, 2013; Wintrobe, 2006), anti-democracy (Jungkunz, 2022; Mudde, 1995), actions toward replacing the dominant political system (Jackson, 2019), and the belief in a monopoly on truth (Dono et al., 2018).

Third, cross-national comparisons prove challenging because extremism thresholds vary significantly across different political contexts. Cultural and political contexts shape definitions of extremism, leading to identical positions receiving different classifications across nations (Zuell & Scholz, 2019). Citizens of countries suffering from long-standing, deep-seated conflicts may perceive political violence as less extreme than that in countries with established peace and political stability (Canetti et al., 2009). Female extremist politicians in parliament might soften the perception of political extremism (Ben-Shitrit et al., 2022). People associate different political meanings with the terms 'left' and 'right' (Bauer et al., 2017; Jungkunz, 2022). Dolezal (2010) demonstrates that European Green voters can be difficult to categorize on a left-right economic or social scale. However, their environmental positions might be considered "extreme" in mainstream politics. This context-dependent challenge is further exacerbated by the lack of standardized, consistent survey measures or scales to assess political extremism over time and across population groups (Jungkunz, 2022).

New Conceptualization

In response to these challenges, this paper advances a new, multidimensional conception of political extremism grounded in three core dimensions: Cognitive (Ideological positions), Behavioral (Support of violence), and Social (Intolerance toward outgroups)

(see

Figure 1).

Figure 1: Conceptualization of Political Extremism



The Cognitive dimension examines how firmly individuals hold their sociopolitical beliefs and the degree of rigidity characterizing their ideological commitments (Jost et al., 2009). This perspective moves away from categorizing extremism along a left-right spectrum (Schmid, 2013; Sedgwick, 2010) and instead emphasizes the inflexibility and intensity with which people maintain their views (Zmigrod et al., 2019). The Behavioral dimension analyzes the extent to which individuals endorse and justify unconventional political tactics (Backer & Tausch, 2017; Shuman et al., 2016; Schumpe et al., 2020), spanning from unlawful demonstrations to armed confrontation. This aspect concerns the acceptance of forceful means to achieve political goals (Steinhoff & Zwerman, 2008), including attacks on governmental structures intended to redistribute authority and resources (Weber, 1978), as well as violence between social groups (Tilly, 2003). The continuum extends from lawful, peaceful activities to acts of civil disobedience, and then to violent tactics and terrorist operations (Shuman et al., 2021). The Social dimension addresses how individuals exclude others from political participation and personal association, irrespective of those individuals' group memberships. This aspect embodies the denial of pluralistic values

and the erosion of equal rights and freedoms for all members of society (Backes, 2010; Scruton, 2007). It includes unwillingness to extend full civic participation to others (Gibson & Bingham, 1982; Sullivan et al., 1979) alongside interpersonal distancing driven by political or demographic differences (Ben Shitrit et al., 2017; van Prooijen & Krouwel, 2019). This dimension investigates how people delegitimize rival perspectives and communities (Dono et al., 2018; Schmid, 2014; Waddell et al., 2024), independent of the particular ideologies or identities involved.

The theoretical contribution consists of synthesizing the most referenced dimensions[2] within the academic discourse into a comprehensive, multidimensional conceptualization of political extremism, thereby capturing the complex interplay between cognitive, behavioral, and social manifestations of extreme political attitudes and behaviors. Although the research selects specific dimensions, the conceptualization is not constrained by particular ideological orientations, violence categories, or target outgroups. This design enables a comprehensive assessment of different extremist forms within a single methodological framework, while also allowing for direct comparison between them.

Political Extremism Gauge

The political extremism gauge converts the three dimensions into indices used to assess the political extremism of different population groups (Figure 2). The indices fall into two categories: *Absolute* and *Relative*. Absolute indices are directly derived from the gauge's three dimensions and represent the population's central tendency. Relative indices, in contrast, represent divergence from the respective population's central tendency and are calculated as scores normalized to it. The relative indices provide a more

[2] See the Supplementary Information (SI) Appendix for dimensions not included.

valid basis for cross-population or over-time comparative research, as they account for population-specific differences (cultural response styles, understanding of survey items, national political context, etc.).

Figure 2: Operationalization of Political Extremism



The gauge enables two distinct analytical approaches for examining political extremism. The first is the Between-Populations analysis, which targets a macro-level comparison of entire populations, such as different countries. This approach involves comparing both absolute and relative gauge indices for each population. The second strategy is the Within-Population Analysis, which examines levels of extremism across communities within a single population. The relative indices are computed using the overall population's central tendency, rather than that of the specific community. By referencing the overall population, relative indices directly indicate the "contribution" to the entire population's political extremism level, rather than just the internal variation.

Absolute indices include the Normative Points (NP), which represent the population median in each dimension, and the Extremism Points (EP), which serve as a threshold to identify the more extreme population. The calculation of EP represents the most crucial component of the gauge algorithm, as extremism assessment requires identifying the population segment at the distributional tail of the population's extremism spectrum. The EP serves to delineate this tail and distinguish the more extremist segment.

This approach seeks to balance two competing objectives: excluding moderate individuals from the extremist tail while ensuring sufficient sample size and diversity to enable robust statistical analysis. The EP is operationalized by adding 1.5 times the Median Absolute Deviation (MAD) to the established Normative Point[3]. Relative indices include the Extremism Levels (EL) and Extremism Intensity (EIN), which represent the percentage and intensity of the more extremist group (above the extremism point in each dimension) The indices also include three Extremism Ranks (ER1, ER2, ER3), representing the population percentage with at least one, two, or three dimensions above the Extremism Point. Figure 3 below visualizes these gauge indices.

Figure 3: Gauge Indices



The utilization of relative indices resolves critical validity challenges inherent in cross-national or longitudinal comparative research. Comparative analysis frequently encounters obstacles arising from contextual heterogeneity, such as varying national interpretations of the left-right ideological spectrum, culturally or historically dependent thresholds for acceptable violence, and distinct definitions of relevant outgroups. Relative

[3] See the SI appendix for a detailed discussion on the calculation of the EP.

indices mitigate these biases by shifting the analytical focus from raw values to the degree of deviation from a population-specific norm. This standardization neutralizes local idiosyncrasies and isolates the structural phenomenon of extremism, allowing researchers to compare how distinct populations diverge from their respective societies' centers without the confounding influence of context-dependent baselines.

Destabilizing Events and Political Extremism

Destabilizing events directly threaten the stability, legitimacy, or continuity of established political systems. While existing research has typically focused on specific types of events in isolation, usually linking individual events to a single dimension of political extremism (Canetti et al., 2013, 2018; Hirsch-Hoefler et al., 2014; Ozer et al., 2025), there has been a limited systematic examination of how different categories of destabilizing events affect multiple dimensions of extremism in distinct ways. Moreover, various political orientations may respond differently to the same events, where identical stimuli may increase extremism within certain ideological groups while reducing it within others, making separate analysis by political orientation necessary to capture these differential effects. The present study addresses both research gaps by systematically examining how various types of destabilizing events affect multiple dimensions of political extremism across different political orientations.

Various destabilizing events can contribute to the emergence of political extremism. National crises, including wars and economic depressions, consistently correlate with increased extremism domestically, both on the right and the left (Kofman & Garfin, 2020; Rasler, 1986; Stohl, 1975; Vlachos, 2016). Immigration crises and large refugee influxes boost support for radical-right parties (Dinas et al., 2019) while state repression and the rise of the far-right contribute to left-wing extremism (Krüsselmann & Weggemans, 2023). Events perceived as group-based injustices or in-group

disadvantages similarly catalyze political violence (Pauwels & Heylen, 2020; Pretus et al., 2023). The influence of electoral events on extremism appears more complex; although most studies indicate temporary spikes in partisan hostility during elections that subsequently subside (Jungkunz et al., 2024; Michelitch & Utych, 2018). Evidence from the 2022 U.S. elections suggests that these elections have had more persistent effects on partisan animosity and support for political violence (Fasching et al., 2024). Natural disasters and health crises create particularly fertile ground for extremism, with evidence showing that such events enable extremist groups to exploit public anxiety through disinformation and anti-government narratives (Khalil, 2021), as notably demonstrated by the effect of the COVID-19 pandemic on extremist online activity (Davies et al., 2023; Marone, 2022).

Political orientation plays a crucial moderating role in shaping how citizens' levels of extremism change in response to destabilizing events across Western democracies. Individuals with right-wing political orientations demonstrate stronger associations with extremist attitudes compared to their left-wing counterparts, particularly regarding support for political violence and outgroup intolerance(Van Hiel et al., 2020). Studies comparing political violence across ideologies reveal that individuals affiliated with left-wing causes are consistently less likely to engage in violent behavior. At the same time, right-wing extremists show higher propensities for deadly attacks (Jasko et al., 2022). Evidence from Western societies indicates that political violence and hate crimes, two key manifestations of extremism, are overwhelmingly more likely to originate from individuals with right-wing political orientations than those with left-wing orientations (Jost, 2024). Right-wing political orientation correlates strongly with xenophobia, racism, anti-Semitism, and exclusion of ethnic and racial minorities (Jungkunz et al., 2024). However, left-wing political orientation can also lead to extremist

manifestations, including intolerance toward perceived enemies such as capitalists, fascists, and supporters of traditional authority structures, with some left-wing groups promoting systematic persecution of outgroups based on class or political ideology (Guhl, 2025). Cross-national studies indicate that right-wing authoritarianism specifically predicts prejudice against groups perceived as socially threatening. At the same time, both political orientations can foster anti-pluralist attitudes and rejection of democratic norms when combined with extremist ideological positions (Costello et al., 2022).

This study represents the first empirical examination of how various destabilizing events differentially affect levels of political extremism among citizens with different political orientations across multiple dimensions of political extremism. This research tests the hypotheses that (H1) various dimensions of political extremism do not respond uniformly to socio-political events and (H2) the effect of different destabilizing events will be moderated by political orientation. The novel conceptual and methodological framework enables bias-free comparative analysis across multiple dimensions, distinguishing between different political orientations, various destabilizing events, and manifestations of extremism.

The Current Research

Implementing the research in Israel provides distinct methodological advantages: the population experiences genuine, high-intensity security and political threats across multiple domains, avoiding the validity limitations of laboratory simulations; Israel's compact geography enables researchers to study populations facing similar objective threats while exhibiting potentially different subjective characteristics; and Israel's democratic tradition makes the study potentially applicable to other democracies.

The political orientation measure incorporates center-wing orientations alongside traditional left-wing and right-wing perspectives. Following the end of the Second

Intifada (2000-2005), centrist parties established themselves as significant political entities in Israel (Agmon, 2025; Talshir, 2019). Approximately 25-33% of Israeli voters regularly support centrist parties, constituting an expanding bloc of predominantly educated middle-class citizens who remain committed to centrist alternatives rather than shifting between left and right poles (Talshir, 2019).

Materials and Methods

The empirical analysis uses a comprehensive six-wave study conducted among Jewish Israelis between 2021 and 2024. Waves one (12/6/2021-01/13/2022, N=1608), two (05/23/2022-06/24/2022, N=1607), three (10/24/2022-10/31/2022, N=886), five (06/20/2023-06/26/2023, N=1524), and six (04/04/2024-04/30/2024, N=1114), each comprised randomly selected nationally representative samples of Israeli Jews; wave four (01/12/2023-01/25/2023, N=671) respondents were chosen as a subset of the wave three sample, creating a panel pair of waves.

One significantly strong destabilizing event occurred between each pair of consecutive waves, providing a natural quasi-experimental setting. The events within each of the five wave pairs included: (i) Inland terror attacks in key Israeli cities, (ii) The dissolution of the Lapid-Bennett "Unity" government, leading to Israel's fifth election in nearly four years. The Unity government ended 12 years of right-wing governance under Netanyahu, and its dissolution after less than two years signalled the failure to establish an alternative to Netanyahu. (iii) The introduction of judicial Reform by the new Netanyahu government, aiming to erode Israel's fragile democracy. (iv) Netanyahu's dismissal of Defense Minister Gallant over his opposition to judicial reforms sparked immediate demonstrations across Israel. Protesters disrupted major highways and gathered at key political sites, forcing Netanyahu to pause the legislation to prevent "civil war." Continued public pressure ultimately compelled the Prime Minister to reinstate

Gallant two weeks later. (v) The October 7 War is referred to as the deadliest day for jews since the Holocaust, with a timing that is potentially connected to the strong divisions within the Israeli population due to the Judicial Reform.

The calculation of political extremism dimensions by combining multiple related survey measures (questions) into a single variable using Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA)[4]. Each dimension has a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 represents a low level of extremism and seven a high level of extremism. Respondents' self-reported political affiliations, measured on a scale of 1-7 (where 1 represents right-wing and 7 represents left-wing), are converted into three political orientation categories: right (1-3), center (4), and left (5-7). Gender (male, female) and Age Group (18-30, 31-45, 46-60, 60+) are the control variables.

The analysis begins by examining how political affiliations (left-wing, center-wing, right-wing) moderate the impact of various destabilizing events across the dimensions of political extremism. This study uses Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA) on each consecutive pair of Political Extremism Survey waves. For the panel survey waves (3 and 4), the analysis employs a Repeated-Measures MANOVA. Separate analyses explore the entire population and its more extremist segment. In the second part of the analysis, a longitudinal analysis of multiple gauge indices (Extremism Level, Extremism Intensity, and Extremism Rank) examines the dynamics of political extremism. The final part of the analysis provides further insights into the characteristics of the more extremist part of the population. A robustness test validates the gauge's ability to identify the more extreme segment of the population. Latent Profile Analysis (LPA) of the population identifies groups (profiles) with similar levels of extremism using the three

[4] Detailed CFA results for each dimension are provided in the SI appendix

dimensions of political extremism. A strong association between extremist profiles and the extremism ranking indices (ER1, ER2, and ER3) will validate the core of the political extremism gauge.

Results

Does political affiliation moderate the impact of destabilizing events?

The results of the MANOVA analysis across the entire population (Table 1) demonstrate a significant main effect for the event variable ($p < .001$) during the Inland Terror period (Pillai's Trace = 0.018), alongside consistently significant effects for political orientation, gender, and age across all observed intervals. Furthermore, the model reveals considerable interaction effects between the events and political orientation, particularly during the Inland Terror ($p < .001$) and the October 7 war ($p < .05$).

Table 1: MANOVA results across the entire population

Variable	Inland Terror	Bennet Gov. Fall	Judicial Reform §	Gallant Dismissal	Oct. 7th War
Event Main Effect	0.018***	0.002	0.002	0.001	0.001
Political Orientation	0.100***	0.182***	0.155***	0.113***	0.113***
Gender	0.035***	0.046***	0.063***	0.058***	0.048***
Age Group	0.030***	0.041***	0.066***	0.039***	0.032***
Event × Political Orientation	0.013***	0.004	0.007†	0.004	0.005*

Test statistic: Pillai's Trace. *** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05; † p < .10. § Panel analysis

A summary of per-dimension ANOVA results (Table 2) identifies that different dimensions respond with varying sensitivity to external shocks, as evidenced by the high F-statistic for the Ideology dimension during Inland Terror ($F = 17.211$) and a more moderate but significant shift during the October 7 War ($F = 4.575$). Conversely, the Social dimension exhibits remarkable stability, yielding an F-statistic of 0.000 across all

event waves. In contrast, the Violence dimension shows only a significant main effect during the Inland Terror period (F = 5.009).

Table 2: ANOVA results for each dimension (Entire population)[5]

Dimension	Inland Terror	Bennet Gov. Fall	Judicial Reform §	Gallant Dismissal	Oct. 7th War
Ideology	17.211*** (-0.100)	5.141* (+0.233)	0.257 (+0.001)	0.068 (-0.026)	4.575* (+0.233)
Violence	5.009* (+0.033)	1.431 (-0.038)	0.337 (+0.089)	0.565 (+0.014)	2.094 (+0.118)
Intolerance	0.000 (-0.045)	0.000 (-0.005)	0.033 (+0.019)	0.000 (+0.047)	0.000 (+0.001)

Values are F-statistics with significance stars. Mean shifts (Wave 2 - Wave 1) on the 1–7 scale are provided in parentheses for event effects. *** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05; † p < .10.

These combined multivariate and univariate findings provide empirical support for the first two primary hypotheses. The variation in significance levels across the ANOVA dimensions confirms that political extremism dimensions respond heterogeneously to socio-political shocks, as the cognitive and behavioral dimensions fluctuate while social intolerance remains static in the aggregate population. Moreover, the significant interaction terms in the MANOVA validate the second hypothesis, demonstrating that an individual's position on the left-right spectrum actively moderates the impact of these events. This suggests that the general public does not react to national crises as a monolithic entity but rather through the conditioning lens of existing ideological commitments.

The analysis results[6] for the extremist cohort show a greater intensification of event-driven and political orientation-related shifts than in the general population. The

[5] Detailed results of the ANOVA analysis (entire population) are provided in the SI appendix
[6] Detailed results of the MANOVA and ANOVA analyses (extremist population) are provided in the SI appendix

ANOVA analysis results for the Cognitive dimension show a high degree of volatility during the Inland Terror event, yielding an F-statistic of 31.317 ($p < .001$), nearly double the magnitude observed in the aggregate sample. Furthermore, the Social dimension, which remained entirely static in the general population, shows a highly reactive pattern within the extremist subset during the same period ($F = 18.158$, $p < .001$). The Behavioral dimension also shows a heightened response to security threats ($F = 8.505$, $p < .01$). In contrast, shifts during subsequent events, such as the Fall of the Bennett Government, show only marginal significance ($p < .10$).

Table 3: ANOVA results for each dimension (Extremists population)

Dimension	Inland Terror	Bennet Gov. Fall	Judicial Reform §	Gallant Dismissal	Oct. 7th War
Ideology	31.317*** (-0.954)	3.799† (+0.398)	0.655 (-0.381)	0.002 (+0.097)	1.078 (+0.321)
Violence	8.505** (+0.361)	2.702 (-0.427)	0.212 (+0.298)	1.535 (+0.114)	0.236 (+0.088)
Intolerance	18.158*** (+0.557)	1.629 (-0.186)	0.328 (+0.182)	0.183 (-0.067)	0.109 (-0.059)

Values are F-statistics with significance stars. Mean shifts (Wave 2 - Wave 1) on the 1–7 scale are provided in parentheses for event effects. *** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05; † p < .10.

These findings provide compelling evidence for all three hypotheses, particularly the third (H3). The emergence of significant volatility in the Social dimension among extremists—contrasted with the absolute stability of the general public—proves that analyzing the more extreme part of the population reveals radicalization processes that the aggregate mean obscures. This supports the contention that security threats act as a primary catalyst for multidimensional extremism, moving beyond ideology to trigger social intolerance and behavioral support for violence. The amplified F-statistics in the extremist model, despite the smaller sample size, underscore that socio-political events disproportionately affect those already situated at the population's edge, validating the

necessity of a threshold-based framework for a nuanced understanding of political radicalization.

Dynamics of Political Extremism

The following results (Figure 4) show political extremism dynamics across the six waves by examining both the Extremism Level (EL) and Extremism Intensity (EIN) gauge indices for all three political extremism dimensions, as well as the relative size of the highly extreme segment (ER3), characterized by extremity across all dimensions concurrently. Separate analyses explore each political orientation and their respective impact.

The empirical findings provide robust support for all three hypotheses. Evidence for H1 is particularly striking in the differential dimensional responses within political groups. For instance, following the fall of the Bennett Government (Wave 2 to Wave 3), left-wing respondents exhibited a massive surge in cognitive extremism from 46.53% to 61.81%. In comparison, behavioral extremism showed a much smaller increase from 20.00% to 23.61%. During the October 7 crisis (Wave 6), left-wing behavioral extremism peaked at 39.11% with a notable intensity escalation from 2.31 to 2.90. In contrast, cognitive increases were more moderate, rising from 43.15% to 49.72% with a stable intensity. The social dimension followed the most distinct trajectory, remaining consistently low among left-wing respondents and even reaching 0.00% during the Judicial Reform period (Wave 4), contrasting sharply with right-wing social extremism, which remained above 22.7% throughout all waves.

Support for H2 emerges through systematically different responses across political orientations to identical events. The Judicial Reform (Wave 3 to Wave 4) drove center-wing cognitive extremism from 14.07% to 19.10%, while right-wing cognitive extremism remained nearly stable, moving only from 13.64% to 14.05%. Similarly, the

Gallant Dismissal (Wave 4 to Wave 5) triggered a dramatic collapse in left-wing cognitive extremism from 60.45% to 43.15%, while right-wing behavioral extremism increased from 27.86% to 29.93%.

Figure 4: Longitudinal analysis of political extremism indices



The ER2 multidimensional extremism trajectories provide the most compelling evidence for H3. This index reveals a significant divergence in how extremism consolidates across the political spectrum. Right-wing ER2 levels show a steady decline throughout the research period, dropping from a high of 20.43% in the second wave to 11.49% in the final wave. In contrast, left-wing and center-wing groups experienced a peak in multidimensional extremism during the Gallant Dismissal (Wave 5), reaching 18.55% and 8.38% respectively. This suggests that while right-wing extremism gradually de-consolidates, left-wing and center-wing extremism are increasingly likely to manifest in at least two dimensions simultaneously when triggered by specific political crises.

The extremism intensity (EIN) analysis reveals that while political events dramatically influence the proportion of citizens embracing extremist positions (the extensive margin), they have a much smaller impact on the severity of beliefs among those already radicalized (the intensive margin). Across most dimensions, intensity variations remain remarkably compressed. Cognitive intensity ranged from roughly 0.6 to 0.9 points despite large fluctuations in extremism levels. Social intensity variations were even more minor, staying within a narrow band of approximately 0.2 to 0.4 points. This indicates that extremism operates primarily through recruitment and demobilization—pulling people across the threshold—rather than the progressive intensification of beliefs for those already there.

The notable exception is left-wing behavioral intensity, which increased from 2.31 to 2.90 following October 7. This suggests that while most extremism dimensions function through binary activation processes, external security threats may uniquely deepen violence-oriented inclinations among progressive extremists. Overall, these patterns demonstrate that the dramatic changes in extremism levels reflect shifts in the size of the extremist group rather than changes in the depth of radicalization. Political

events mobilize latent attitudes rather than progressively radicalizing moderate positions, which has important implications for how crises expand extremist movements.

Characteristics of the Extremist Population

The research examined the characteristics (political orientation, outgroup, gender, and age) of the more extremist population group, which had at least two dimensions with scores above the extremism threshold (EP).

The most striking trend is the shift in the political identity of ER2 extremists. In the first three waves, the right-wing heavily dominates this group, peaking at **82.27%** in the second wave. However, starting with the Judicial Reform (Wave 4), this dominance drops sharply to **58.42%** and stays below 60% thereafter. Simultaneously, the left-wing presence in the ER2 group nearly doubles, rising from **10.45%** to a peak of **22.89%** by the fifth wave. This suggests that constitutional crises "recruit" individuals from the left and center into multidimensional extremism, making the extreme tail more politically diverse over time.

Intolerance toward Israeli Arabs within the ER2 population shows a clear reactive pattern to security vs. political threats. In the second wave (Inland Terror), over half of the ER2 population (**52.27%**) identified Israeli Arabs as their least-liked group, compared to only **33.62%** of the general population. This figure dropped significantly during the Judicial Reform and Gallant Dismissal (Waves 4 and 5) as political outgroups became more salient. However, it surged back to **37.88%** following the October 7 war. This highlights how security threats refocus extremist hostility toward ethnic outgroups, while political crises temporarily diffuse that focus.

There is a profound gap between support for violence against the state and the outgroup. While the ER2 population shows relatively low support for attacking state institutions (peaking at **1.93**), their support for violence against their outgroup is extreme,

reaching **6.86** in the second wave. Even at its lowest point in the fifth wave (**4.46**), it remains significantly higher than any other violence metric. This indicates that multidimensional extremism in this context is primarily "horizontal" (targeting different social groups) rather than "vertical" (targeting the state regime).

The gender distribution within the ER2 group remains consistently skewed toward men when compared to the general population. While the overall population is split evenly at approximately 50%, the ER2 group is heavily male-dominated, reaching 66.04% in the third wave. Even as the political orientation of this group shifted and the total number of extremists fluctuated, the male majority remained robust, never falling below 56%.

Finally, the age of the ER2 population reveals a significant shift in the demographic profile of multidimensional extremists as destabilizing events progressed. In the initial waves, the extreme tail was younger than the general population, with a median age of 36.00 in the first wave. However, the median age increased steadily during the later periods, jumping from 37.50 during the fall of the government to 43.00 during the Judicial Reform. This demographic aging peaked after the October 7th War, where the median age of ER2 extremists reached 49.00, surpassing the general population median of 47.00. These findings suggest that while initial extremism may have been more prevalent among younger individuals, later constitutional crises and existential security threats radicalized older populations.

Robustness Analysis

The robustness tests evaluate the gauge's ability to identify the more extreme group and whether differences in demographic composition might confound the main results. A Latent Profile Analysis (LPA) revealed five distinct profiles along the dimensions of political extremism, achieving a strong classification quality with an entropy value of

0.754. Table 4 summarizes these findings,[7] showing the average extremism scores for each profile dimension in the Cognitive, Behavioral, and Social columns. Profile 3 emerged as the most extremist group, followed by Profile 1 as the second-most extremist, based on their dimension means. The ER1, ER2, and ER3 columns indicate what percentage of each profile's members fall into extremist-ranked categories according to these three indices.

Table 4: Association of latent profiles with the more extremist population

		Profile Means			Proportions of Binary Characteristics[1]		
Profile[2]	**N**	**Cognitive**	**Behavioral**	**Social**	**ER1**	**ER2**	**ER3**
1	1362	4.046	1.540	4.447	88.2%	26.1%	3.6%
2	3347	4.058	1.041	3.477	31.5%	3.8%	0.0%
3	1256	3.310	3.240	4.399	100.0%	32.1%	6.4%
4	459	4.954	1.184	2.171	42.3%	6.5%	0.0%
5	1012	1.790	1.160	4.205	28.8%	0.9%	0.0%

[1] Percentage of individuals within each profile associated with the extremist group
[2] Most extreme profiles (overall) are colored in light blue

The analysis demonstrates a robust relationship between profile membership and extremist classification. Notably, all members of Profile 3 and over 80% of Profile 1 members qualify for the ER1 extremist category, substantially higher than the other three profiles (31.5%, 42.3%, and 28.8% respectively). This distinction becomes even more pronounced for ER2 classification: Profile 3 contains 32% extremists, while Profile 1 contains 26.1%. The remaining profiles show much lower rates (3.8%, 6.5%, and 0.9%). For the most restrictive ER3 category, only Profiles 3 and 1 have any members qualifying (6.4% and 3.6% respectively), with zero representation from the other three profiles.

[7] Detailed results of the latent profile analysis are provided in the SI appendix

The analysis of wave-related demographic differences reveals that effect sizes are consistently small, indicating that compositional changes are unlikely to substantially confound the main findings that political orientation moderates destabilizing event impacts on political extremism levels.

Limitations

The study suffers from several limitations. First, the research relies on a quasi-experimental design leveraging naturally occurring destabilizing events, which, while providing stronger validity, precludes definitive causal inferences due to potential confounding factors, such as concurrent societal changes or media influences, that the analysis does not fully account for. Additionally, the data are derived exclusively from self-reported survey measures among Jewish Israelis, introducing risks of social desirability bias, particularly in responses to sensitive items related to political violence and intolerance. The novel Political Extremism Gauge, although validated through latent profile analysis, remains context-specific to Israel's political landscape and requires further testing in other democratic settings to establish broader applicability. Finally, the study's focus on short-term effects across six waves spanning 2021 to 2024 may overlook longer-term extremism trajectories or cumulative impacts of the events.

The ideological measure comprises three items that present respondents with extreme political stances on the left or right of the political spectrum[8]. The measure assesses political extremity by measuring participants' degree of agreement with these statements. Notably, the positions presented fall short of representing the most radical viewpoints found within Israeli society. This design choice prevents us from distinguishing between those who are extreme and those who are exceptionally extreme. Had the survey included more radical positions, few if any respondents would have

[8] The list of questions (measures) for each dimension are provided in the SI appendix

expressed strong agreement or disagreement. Such an approach would have compressed the effective measurement range from 1-7 to approximately 2-5, reducing the capacity to separate extreme respondents from moderate ones. Looking forward, subsequent surveys should adopt expanded scales (0-10) to achieve finer resolution when measuring political extremism.

Discussion & Conclusions

The first part of the analysis demonstrates the importance of a multidimensional conceptualization and a focus on the more extreme cohort of the population. This was followed by an analysis of the dynamics of political extremism using the gauge indices. One approach that explains the findings in this section relates to threat perceptions. Destabilizing events drive political extremism by acting as psychological catalysts that heighten threat perception. Intergroup threat theory suggests that individuals react to perceived dangers, whether realistic threats to physical safety or symbolic threats to cultural values, by adopting extreme positions to protect group interests (Stephan & Stephan, 2000). In a polarized environment like Israel, the same event may represent a threat to one constituency and a victory to another. Events that threaten the core values or security of a specific political group increase extremism within that group. Conversely, extremism may stabilize or decrease among groups that perceive a diminished threat. This mechanism shows that radicalization is a reactive process rather than a constant one. The cognitive, behavioral, and social dimensions of extremism fluctuate in response to the specific threat posed by socio-political shifts (Canetti-Nisim et al., 2009).

The empirical findings provide strong support for this threat-based mechanism. Security-related events, like the October 7 war, posed a universal threat. This event triggered a peak in left-wing behavioral extremism at 39.11% and increased intensity from 2.31 to 2.90. This change reflects a radicalized shift toward violence in response to

existential danger (Canetti et al., 2017). Political and constitutional events functioned as group-specific threats. The Judicial Reform period threatened democratic institutions and drove left-wing cognitive extremism to its highest point of 61.81%. It also increased center-wing cognitive levels to 19.10%. The Gallant Dismissal, framed as a threat to national security, led to a notable peak in multidimensional extremism (ER2) for the left wing at 18.55% and for the center at 8.38%. These patterns demonstrate that the size of the extreme constituency (ER2) and individual extremism levels (EL) rise when a group perceives its safety or values are under attack. This confirms that political orientation moderates the impact of destabilizing events based on the nature of the perceived threat.

This study has concentrated on illustrating the application of the political extremism gauge's primary indices. Nevertheless, additional testing is required to determine whether the relative indices can minimize bias when conducting comparative research across different countries or extended time frames. A planned follow-up research will address this challenge. Understanding what drives political extremism dynamics also requires further investigation to establish causal relationships between threat perceptions and the destabilizing effects of events on political extremism.

References

Agmon, S. (2025, March 25). Israel's complicit center. *Boston Review*. https://www.bostonreview.net/articles/israels-complicit-center/

Allchorn, W., & Orofino, E. (2023). *Routledge handbook of non-violent extremism: Groups, perspectives and new debates* (1st ed.). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003032793

Backes, U. (2010). *Political extremes: A conceptual history from antiquity to the present* (1st ed.). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203867259

Bauer, P. C., Barberá, P., Ackermann, K., & Venetz, A. (2017). Is the left-right scale a valid measure of ideology? *Political Behavior*, *39*(3), 553–583. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-016-9368-2

Ben-Shitrit, L., Elad-Strenger, J., & Hirsch-Hoefler, S. (2022). 'Pinkwashing' the radical-right: Gender and the mainstreaming of radical-right policies and actions. *European Journal of Political Research*, *61*(1), 86–110. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12442

Bjelopera, J. P. (2017). *Domestic terrorism: An overview* (R44921). Congressional Research Service. https://sgp.fas.org/crs/terror/R44921.pdf

Bötticher, A. (2017). Towards academic consensus definitions of radicalism and extremism. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, *11*(4). [*Note: Page numbers needed for complete reference*]

Canetti, D., Hall, B. J., Rapaport, C., & Wayne, C. (2013). Exposure to political violence and political extremism. *European Psychologist*, *18*(4), 263–272. https://doi.org/10.1027/1016-9040/a000158

Canetti, D., Halperin, E., Hobfoll, S. E., Shapira, O., & Hirsch-Hoefler, S. (2009). Authoritarianism, perceived threat and exclusionism on the eve of the disengagement: Evidence from Gaza. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, *33*(6), 463–474. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijintrel.2008.12.007

Canetti, D., Hirschberger, G., Rapaport, C., Elad-Strenger, J., Ein-Dor, T., Rosenzveig, S., Pyszczynski, T., & Hobfoll, S. E. (2018). Collective trauma from the lab to the real world: The effects of the Holocaust on contemporary Israeli political cognitions. *Political Psychology*, *39*(1), 3–21. https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12384

Christodoulou, E., & Nesterova, Y. (2020). Violent extremism: Types, implications, and responses. In W. Leal Filho, A. M. Azul, L. Brandli, P. G. Özuyar, & T. Wall (Eds.), *Peace, justice and strong institutions* (pp. 1–14). Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71066-2_60-1

Coleman, P. T., & Bartoli, A. (2015). *Addressing extremism*. The International Center for Cooperation and Conflict Resolution (ICCCR). https://resolvenet.org/research/publications/addressing-extremism

Costello, T. H., Bowes, S. M., Stevens, S. T., Waldman, I. D., Tasimi, A., & Lilienfeld, S. O. (2022). Clarifying the structure and nature of left-wing authoritarianism. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *122*(1), 135–170. https://doi.org/10.1037/pspp0000341

Davies, G., Wu, E., & Frank, R. (2023). A witch's brew of grievances: The potential effects of COVID-19 on radicalization to violent extremism. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, *46*(11), 2327–2350. https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2021.1923188

Dinas, E., Matakos, K., Xefteris, D., & Hangartner, D. (2019). Waking up the Golden Dawn: Does exposure to the refugee crisis increase support for extreme-right parties? *Political Analysis*, *27*(2), 244–254. https://doi.org/10.1017/pan.2018.48

Dolezal, M. (2010). Exploring the stabilization of a political force: The social and attitudinal basis of Green parties in the age of globalization. *West European Politics*, *33*(3), 534–552. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402381003654569

Dono, M., Alzate, M., & Seoane, G. (2018). Development and validation of the Monopoly on Truth Scale: A measure of political extremism. *Psicothema*, *30*(3), 330–336. https://doi.org/10.7334/psicothema2017.423

Doosje, B., Moghaddam, F. M., Kruglanski, A. W., de Wolf, A., Mann, L., & Feddes, A. R. (2016). Terrorism, radicalization and de-radicalization. *Current Opinion in Psychology*, *11*, 79–84. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.copsyc.2016.06.008

Eatwell, E. R., & Goodwin, M. (2010). *The new extremism in 21st century Britain*. Routledge.

Enders, A. M., & Lupton, R. N. (2021). Value extremity contributes to affective polarization in the U.S. *Political Science Research and Methods*, *9*(4), 857–866. https://doi.org/10.1017/psrm.2020.27

Fasching, N., Iyengar, S., Lelkes, Y., & Westwood, S. J. (2024). Persistent polarization: The unexpected durability of political animosity around U.S. elections. *Science Advances*, *10*(36), eadm9198. https://doi.org/10.1126/sciadv.adm9198

Gibson, J., & Bingham, R. (1982). On the conceptualization and measurement of political tolerance. *The American Political Science Review*, *76*, 603–620. https://doi.org/10.2307/1963734

Guhl, J. (2025). *Left wing extremism*. Institute for Strategic Dialog (ISD). https://www.isdglobal.org/explainers/left-wing-extremism/

Hirsch-Hoefler, S., Canetti, D., Rapaport, C., & Hobfoll, S. E. (2014). Conflict will harden your heart: Exposure to violence, psychological distress, and peace barriers in Israel and Palestine. *British Journal of Political Science*, *46*(4), 845–859. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123414000374

Jackson, S. (2019). Non-normative political extremism: Reclaiming a concept's analytical utility. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, *31*(2), 244–259. https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2016.1212599

Jasko, K., LaFree, G., Piazza, J., & Becker, M. H. (2022). A comparison of political violence by left-wing, right-wing, and Islamist extremists in the United States and the world. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, *119*(30), e2122593119. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2122593119

Jost, J. T. (2024). Both-sideology endangers democracy and social science. *Journal of Social Issues*, *80*(3), 1138–1203. https://doi.org/10.1111/josi.12633

Jost, J. T., Federico, C. M., & Napier, J. L. (2009). Political ideology: Its structure, functions, and elective affinities. *Annual Review of Psychology*, *60*(1), 307–337. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.60.110707.163600

Jungkunz, S. (2019). Towards a measurement of extreme left-wing attitudes. *German Politics*, *28*(1), 101–122. https://doi.org/10.1080/09644008.2018.1484906

Jungkunz, S. (2022). *The nature and origins of political extremism in Germany and beyond*. Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-83336-7

Jungkunz, S., Helbling, M., & Osenbrügge, N. (2024). Measuring political radicalism and extremism in surveys: Three new scales. *PLOS ONE*, *19*(5), e0300661. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0300661

Khalil, L. (2021). *The impact of natural disasters on violent extremism*. Australian Strategic Policy Institute. https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep31258.24

Kofman, Y., & Garfin, D. R. (2020). Home is not always a haven: The domestic violence crisis amid the COVID-19 pandemic. *Psychological Trauma: Theory, Research, Practice and Policy*, *12*(Suppl 1), S199–S201. https://doi.org/10.1037/tra0000866

Krüsselmann, K., & Weggemans, D. (2023). Radicalization and left-wing extremism. In J. P. Zúquete (Ed.), *The Palgrave handbook of left-wing extremism, Volume 1* (pp. 55–68). Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30897-0_3

Mandel, D. (2010). Radicalization: What does it mean? In T. Pick & A. Speckhard (Eds.), *Indigenous terrorism: Understanding and addressing the root causes of radicalisation among groups with an immigrant heritage in Europe* (pp. 101–113). IOS Press.

Marone, F. (2022). Hate in the time of coronavirus: Exploring the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on violent extremism and terrorism in the West. *Security Journal*, *35*(1), 205–225. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41284-020-00274-y

Michelitch, K., & Utych, S. (2018). Electoral cycle fluctuations in partisanship: Global evidence from eighty-six countries. *The Journal of Politics*, *80*(2), 412–427. https://doi.org/10.1086/695775

Midlarsky, M. I. (2011). *Origins of political extremism: Mass violence in the twentieth century and beyond*. Cambridge University Press.

Mudde, C. (1995). Right-wing extremism analyzed. *European Journal of Political Research*, *27*(2), 203–224. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.1995.tb00636.x

Onursal, R., & Kirkpatrick, D. (2021). Is extremism the 'new' terrorism? The convergence of 'extremism' and 'terrorism' in British parliamentary discourse. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, *33*(5), 1094–1116. https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2019.1598391

Ozer, S., & Bertelsen, P. (2018). Capturing violent radicalization: Developing and validating scales measuring central aspects of radicalization. *Scandinavian Journal of Psychology*, *59*(6), 653–660. https://doi.org/10.1111/sjop.12484

Ozer, S., Obaidi, M., & Bergh, R. (2025). The impact of globalized conflicts: Examining attitudes toward Jews among Britons in the political context of the

war in Gaza. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, *107*, 102184. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijintrel.2025.102184

Pauwels, L. J. R., & Heylen, B. (2020). Perceived group threat, perceived injustice, and self-reported right-wing violence: An integrative approach to the explanation of right-wing violence. *Journal of Interpersonal Violence*, *35*(21–22), 4276–4302. https://doi.org/10.1177/0886260517713711

Pretus, C., Sheikh, H., Hamid, N., & Atran, S. (2023). Predicting radicalism after perceived injustice: The role of separatist identity, sacred values, and police violence. *Journal of Social and Political Psychology*, *11*(2), Article 2. https://doi.org/10.5964/jspp.11255

Rasler, K. (1986). War, accommodation, and violence in the United States, 1890-1970. *The American Political Science Review*, *80*(3), 921–945. https://doi.org/10.2307/1960545

Rigoli, F. (2023). Political extremism in a global perspective. *Journal of Global Awareness*, *4*(1), 1–16. https://doi.org/10.24073/jga/4/01/03

Schmid, A. (2013). Radicalisation, de-radicalisation, counter-radicalisation: A conceptual discussion and literature review. *Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism Studies*. https://doi.org/10.19165/2013.1.02

Schmid, A. (2014). Violent and non-violent extremism: Two sides of the same coin? *Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism Studies*. https://doi.org/10.19165/2014.1.05

Scruton, R. (2007). *The Palgrave Macmillan dictionary of political thought* (3rd ed.). Palgrave Macmillan.

Sedgwick, M. (2010). The concept of radicalization as a source of confusion. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, *22*(4), 479–494. https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2010.491009

Shiller, V. V. (2019). Monitoring extremist sentiments as a diagnostic and preventive toolkit of anti-extremist activities (experience in the Kemerovo region). 584–589. https://doi.org/10.2991/icsdcbr-19.2019.118

Shuman, E., Saguy, T., Van Zomeren, M., & Halperin, E. (2021). Disrupting the system constructively: Testing the effectiveness of non-normative non-violent collective action. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *121*(4), 819–841. https://doi.org/10.1037/pspi0000333

Sotlar, A. (2004). *Some problems with definition and perception of extremism within society* (208033). U.S. Department of Justice. https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/Mesko/208033.pdf

Steinhoff, P., & Zwerman, G. (2008). Introduction to the special issue on political violence. *Qualitative Sociology*, *31*(3), 213–220. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11133-008-9111-3

Stohl, M. (1975). War and domestic political violence: The case of the United States 1890–1970. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *19*(3), 379–416. https://doi.org/10.1177/002200277501900301

Sullivan, J. L., Piereson, J., & Marcus, G. E. (1979). An alternative conceptualization of political tolerance: Illusory increases 1950s-1970s. *The American Political Science Review*, *73*(3), 781–794. https://doi.org/10.2307/1955404

Svetlichny, A., & Khorev, M. (2022). On the need to develop a unified terminological approach to the concept of 'extremism': 004. *Dela Press Conference Series: Humanities and Social Sciences*, *01*, Article 01.

Talshir, G. (2019). *Center parties and power change in Israeli politics*. Heinrich Böll Stiftung. https://il.boell.org/en/2019/04/03/center-parties-and-power-change-israeli-politics

Uba, K., & Bosi, L. (2022). Explaining youth radicalism as a positioning of the self at opposite extremes. *Politics*, *42*(1), 128–145. https://doi.org/10.1177/0263395721990539

UK Parliament. (2024). *Extremism definition and community engagement*. UK Parliament. https://hansard.parliament.uk/Lords/2024-03-19/debates/0641C02D-BD26-47DB-900A-2916104490CB/ExtremismDefinitionAndCommunityEngagement

Van Hiel, A., Onraet, E., Bostyn, D. H., Stadeus, J., Haesevoets, T., Van Assche, J., & Roets, A. (2020). A meta-analytic integration of research on the relationship between right-wing ideological attitudes and aggressive tendencies. *European Review of Social Psychology*, *31*(1), 183–221. https://doi.org/10.1080/10463283.2020.1778324

van Prooijen, J.-W., & Krouwel, A. P. M. (2019). Psychological features of extreme political ideologies. *Current Directions in Psychological Science*, *28*(2), 111–217. https://doi.org/10.1177/0963721418817755

van Prooijen, J.-W., & Krouwel, A. P. M. (2022). Political extremism. In C. G. Sibley & D. Osborne (Eds.), *The Cambridge handbook of political psychology* (pp. 414–428). Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779104.029

van Prooijen, J.-W., Krouwel, A. P. M., & Pollet, T. V. (2015). Political extremism predicts belief in conspiracy theories. *Social Psychological and Personality Science*, *6*(5), 570–578. https://doi.org/10.1177/1948550614567356

van Prooijen, J.-W., & Kuijper, S. M. H. C. (2020). A comparison of extreme religious and political ideologies: Similar worldviews but different grievances. *Personality and Individual Differences*, *159*, 109888. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2020.109888

Vlachos, S. (2016). *The legacy of war exposure on political radicalization*. Department of Economics (DEEP), University of Lausanne. https://serval.unil.ch/resource/serval:BIB_99F83F0E52A3.P001/REF.pdf

Wintrobe, R. (2006). *Rational extremism: The political economy of radicalism*. Cambridge University Press.

Zuell, C., & Scholz, E. (2019). Construct equivalence of left-right scale placement in a cross-national perspective. *International Journal of Sociology*, *49*(1), 77–95. https://doi.org/10.1080/00207659.2018.1560982