#### Information Cascades

Machine Learning with Graphs

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#### Lecture Topics



- Information Cascades
- Cascade Principles
- Simple Cascade Model

# Following the Crowd




- Social relations enable people to influence each other's behavior and decisions.
  - opinions they hold,
  - political positions they support,
  - activities they pursue,
  - technologies they use, etc.
- Information cascade
  - behaviors that cascade from one node to another like an epidemic! and produce collective outcomes.
- We aim to reason about why such influence occurs!



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• Restaurant choice!








#### Following the Crowd- Cnt.



#### Local Mind!

- 15 people on a street corner stare up into the sky!!!
- How many passersby stopped and looked up?




#### Following the Crowd- Cnt.



#### Local Mind!

- 15 people on a street corner stare up into the sky!!!
- How many passersby stopped and looked up?
  - More people staring up more passersby stopped!
  - all people looking up 45% of passersby stopped!



# Following the Crowd- Demo!



How to start a movement!







- Information cascade often occurs when people make decisions sequentially, with later people watching the actions of earlier people.
- From these actions people infer something about what the earlier people know!

#### Cascade Framework



- There is a decision to be made
  - E.g., whether to adopt a new technology, wear a new style of clothing, eat in a new restaurant, or support a particular political position.
- People make decisions sequentially.

  People can observe choices made by those who acted earlier.
- Each person has some **private info** that helps to make decision.
  - A person can't directly observe the other's private info, but he/ she can observe what they do.

#### Cascade Example



• Urn with 3 (blue or red) marbles

- A large group of participants
- Each participant:
  - Draws a marble from the urn
  - Looks at the color
  - Places it back without showing others
  - Guesses whether the urn is majority-red or majority-blue.
  - Publicly announces his / her guess to others.
- What's the likelihood of urn being majority-red or majority-blue?

#### Cascade Example



- Urn with 3 (blue or red) marbles
- A large group of participants
- Each participant:
  - Draws a marble from the urn
  - Looks at the color
  - Places it back without showing others
  - Guesses whether the urn is majority-red or majority-blue.
  - Publicly announces his / her guess to others.
- majority-red : 50% chance
- majority-blue: 50% chance



• Participants who has guessed correctly receive rewards!

So they try to optimize their decisions!

What should we expect to happen?







- If it's red marble
  - guess majority red;
- If it's blue marble
  - guess majority-blue.



perfect information about what





The Second Participant

 If (s)he sees the same color that the first participant announced, then

should guess this color as well.

- sees the opposite color,
  - will be indifferent

• Let's assume (s)he breaks the tie by guessing the color she saw.





The Third Participant

If the first two guessed opposite colors, then
• the third should guess the color (s)he sees!

 If the first two guesses have been the same (say both blue)

- If third participant draws blue.
  - Simple!
- If third participant draws red.
  - 3 draws from the urn:
    - blue, blue, red. All perfect information!
  - · Guess that the urn is majority-blue! ignoring his own private information
    - Which, taken by itself, suggested that the urn is majority-red!



• If first two guesses are the same, the third should be the same as well, regardless of which color was drawn.

- An information cascade has begun!
  - The third participant makes the same guess as the first two, regardless of his own private info!





- The Fourth Participant and Onward!
  - Let's consider just the <u>cascade</u> case:
    - First two guesses were the same, say blue.
    - 3<sup>rd</sup> guess has to be blue too.
  - 4th participant, heard

blue, blue, blxe!

- First 2 guesses conveyed perfect info
- 3<sup>rd</sup> guess conveys **no** info.
  - It has to be blue no matter what (s)he saw.
- 4<sup>th</sup> is in exactly the same situation as 3<sup>rd</sup>!
  - should guess blue regardless of what (s)he sees.
- This will continue with all subsequent participants:
  - · If first 2 guesses were blue, then everyone will guess blue!





#### **Summary**

- If participant 1 & 2 make the same decision:
  - All will follow this regardless of his signal.
- 3's decision conveys no info!
- Future participants will all be in the same position as participant 3.
- In this case, a cascade has begun.

#### Lecture Topics



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- Cascade Principles
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#### General Cascades Principles



- 1. Cascades can easily occur, given the right structural conditions!
  - Based on very little information,
  - Pre-cascade information influences the behavior of the population.

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#### General Cascades Principles- Cnt.

- 2. Cascades can lead to non-optimal (wrong) outcomes!
  - Say the urn is majority-red!
  - Chance of the first two participants *draw* blue marbles is small:
    - and thus all others wrongly guess blue!

# General Cascades Principles- Cnt.



- 3. Some (but not all) cascades can be very fragile!
  - Suppose first 2 guesses are blue
  - Participant x and x+1 draw red and "show" it to others!
  - x+2 has four pieces of **perfect info**:
    - blue (1), blue (2), red (x), red (x+1)!
    - · Decide based on his / her own draw!

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#### Cascade Model



- Consider a group of people (1, 2, ...) who make decisions sequentially
  - decision: accept or reject some option, e.g. adapting a new tech. or voting for a candidate!
- Private signal (info)
  - Each individual gets a *private* signal indicating if accepting is a good or bad idea (not perfect).
- Two States:
  - the option is a good idea (G) with probability p Pr[G]=p
  - it's a bad idea (B) with probability 1-p.
    - Pr[B]=1-p

#### Cascade Model- Cnt.



- Payoffs: individuals receive payoffs based on their decision to accept or reject the option
- □ If reject, payoff = 0.
  - If accept and option is a good idea, payoff=  $v_g > 0$ 
    - If accept and option is a bad idea, payoff=  $v_b$  <0
    - Expected payoff in the absence of other info is o;
  - $v_g p + v_b (1 p) = 0.$ 
    - before getting any additional info, payoff from accepting is the same as the payoff from rejecting.

# Sequential Decision-Making



- Let's consider the perspective of a person.
  - Suppose person N knows that everyone before her has followed their own signal (accept / reject)!



- $\Rightarrow$  If a = r (among people before N), then
  - N will follow her own signal.
    - N's signal will be the tie-breaker



- If |a r| = 1, then
  - N will follow her private signal
    - · either N's private signal will make her indifferent or reinforce the majority signal.
- If |a-r|>=2, then
  - N follow the earlier majority & ignore her own signal.




Figure 16.3: A cascade begins when the difference between the number of acceptances and rejections reaches two.






Figure 16.3: A cascade begins when the difference between the number of acceptances and rejections reaches two.



- It is very hard for (a r) to remain in such a narrow interval (btw -1 and +1)
  - For example, if 3 people in a row get the same signal, a cascade will definitely begin.





• Claim: The probability of finding 3 matching signals in a row converges to 1 as the number of people N goes to infinity.

#### • Hint:

Divide the first N people into blocks of 3 people



#### • Solution:

- Divide the first N people into blocks of 3 people
  - [1, 2, 3]; [4, 5, 6]; and so on
  - People in one block receive same signal with probability  $a^3 + (1-a)^3$ 
    - The probability that none of these blocks consists of identical signals is then
      - $[1-(q^3+(1-q)^3)]^{N/3}$
      - · As N goes to infinity this quantity goes to o.



- Different variations of the same problem:
  - What if people don't see all the decisions made earlier but only some of them?




- What if private signals convey information with different level of certainty?
- What if different people receive different payoffs?

#### Lessons from Cascades



- The aggregate behavior of many people with limited info can produce very accurate results.
  - If many people are guessing independently, then the average of their guesses is often a good estimate
    - Number of jelly beans in a jar!
    - · Weight of a bull at a fair!



#### Lessons from Cascades- Cnt.



- But in cascades, people guess sequentially, and
  - Can observe the earlier guesses of others,
  - being influenced by them,
  - Conform to majority!

#### Lessons from Cascades- Cnt.



- Tension in collaboration
  - Hiring Committee
    - · decide if to make a job offer to candidate A or B
    - cascade may develop quickly:
      - A few people initially favor A, others may conclude that they should favor A, even if they initially preferred B!
- Balancing the tension
  - Ask experts to make partial decisions independently before collaboration phase!

# Lessons from Cascades- Cnt. 🗪



- Marketers use the idea of cascades too!

   To initiate a buying cascade for a new produce.
  - Induce an initial set of people to adopt a new product,
  - Other consumers later on may also adopt the product!

     Even if its worse than competing products!
- Most effective if later consumers are able to observe
  - the adoption decisions (guesses),
  - but not how satisfied the early buyers are (ball color).

# Reading



• Ch.16 Information Cascades [NCM]