
Cascading Behavior in Networks

Machine Learning with Graphs

Department of Computer Science University of Massachusetts, Lowell Spring 2021

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Lecture Topics



- Modeling Diffusion
- Cascades & Clusters
- Cascade Capacity

Diffusion



- In cascades, people imitate behaviors of others.
- Look at cascade from network structure perspective
 - How are individuals influenced by their immediate neighbors?
 - Compatibility with technology that friends use
 - Friends political views, etc.



"Nodes" adopt a new behavior once a **sufficient proportion of their neighbors** have done so.



- A Networked Coordination Game
 - Nodes choose btw two possible behaviors: A and B.
 - If nodes v and w are linked, then they receive payoff if their behaviors match.
 - v and w both adopt A, each get a payoff of a > 0;
 - v and w both adopt B, each get a payoff of b > o;
 - v and w adopt opposite behaviors, each get payoff of \mathbf{o} .
- Nodes choice of behavior depends on choices made by all of its neighbors, taken together!






- p fraction of v's neighbors choose A
- (1 p) fraction choose B.


• *v* has *d* neighbors

 Which behavior should v adopt?


(1-P/ROXIO




- p fraction of v's neighbors choose A
- (1 p) fraction choose B.



- If v chooses A
 - payoff = $p \times d \times a$
- If v chooses B
 - payoff = $(1 p) \times d \times b$










- Cascading behavior
 - Everyone adopts A,
 - Everyone adopts B,
 - Intermediate state: some adopt A and some adopt B!





- Suppose everyone initially use B as a default behavior.
- A small set of **initial adopters** decide to switch to A.
- Cascade may start:
 - some neighbors of initial adopters may switch to A, then their neighbors, and so forth
- Cascade stops if:
 - Complete cascade: every node switch over to A!
 - We reach a step where no node wants to switch! (coexistence btw A and B)
- That depends on:
 - the network structure,
 - the choice of initial adopters,
 the value of the threshold q




- Payoff a=3 and b=2.
- q = 2/5, nodes switch to A if at least 40% of their neighbors are using A!
- v and w are initial adopters of A!















chain reaction: v and w aren't able to get s and u to switch by themselves, but once they've converted r and t, this provides enough leverage.







- a=3 and b=2.
- q = 2/5
- 7 and 8 are initial adopters of A!





- Takes 3 steps for the cascade to stop!
 - 5 and 10 switch to A, then
 - nodes 4 and 9, then
 - node 6.

• No further nodes will be willing to switch! q = 2/5

Tightly-knit communities in the network can hinder the spread of a behavior.





• What are useful strategies to push adoption of A (assume A and B are competing technologies)?




- Strategies that are useful to push adoption of A
 - Change the payoff

$$q = b/(a+b)$$
.

- Say from a = 3 to a = 4!
- q drops from 2/5 down to 1/3
 - · then all nodes will switch to A in the above example.



- Strategies that are useful to push adoption of A
 - Convince a small number of key nodes in the part of the network using B to switch to A
 - Choose carefully so as to get the cascade going again!
 - Convince 12?
 - Convince 14?



Lecture Topics

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- Modeling Diffusion
- Cascades & Clusters
- Cascade Capacity





• Question: What makes a cascade stop? Or prevents it from breaking into all parts of a network?

Cascades & Clusters




- Question: What makes a cascade stop? Or prevents it from breaking into all parts of a network?
 - A cascade comes to stop when it runs into a dense cluster (tightly-knit communities & homophily),
 - This is the only thing that causes cascades to stop!



Cluster Density


 A cluster with density p is a set of nodes such that each node has at least p fraction of its neighbors in the set.





- Claim: Given initial adopters of A & threshold q:
 - i. If remaining network contains a cluster of density greater than 1 q, then no complete cascade.
 - ii. If there is no complete cascade, the remaining network contains a cluster of density > 1 q.





$$q = 2/5 = 40\%$$

Cluster density = 2/3 = 66%

Cluster density > (1-q) = 60%






i. If remaining network contains a cluster of density greater than 1 - q, then no complete cascade.




- i. If remaining network contains a cluster of density greater than 1 q, then no complete cascade.
- Solution
 - Assume there is a node inside the cluster (density > 1-q) that adopts A
 - Let v be the first node that does so.





- i. If remaining network contains a cluster of density greater than 1 q, then no complete cascade.
- Solution
 - The only neighbors of v that were using A at the time it decided to switch were **outside** the cluster.






i. If remaining network contains a cluster of density greater than 1 - q, then no complete cascade.

Solution

- But, more than a 1-q fraction of v's neighbors are inside the cluster,
- Thus less than a q fraction of v's neighbors are outside the cluster.
 - Thus *v* cannot adopt A

clusters block the spread of cascades








ii. If there is no complete cascade, the remaining network contains a cluster of density > 1 - q.




- ii. If there is no complete cascade, the remaining network contains a cluster of density > 1 q.
- Solution
 - Run the process until it stops!
 - there are nodes using B that don't want to switch.
 - let S denote such nodes.





- ii. If there is no complete cascade, the remaining network contains a cluster of density > 1 q.
- Solution
 - Run the process until it stops!
 - consider any node $w \in S$
 - fraction of w's neighbors using A is < q.
 - fraction of w's neighbors using B is > 1 q.
 - This holds for any node $w \in S$
 - S is a cluster of density > 1 q.

Whenever a cascade comes to a stop, there's a cluster that can be used to explain why.



Extensions of Cascade Model




- Heterogeneous thresholds
 - each nodes v has a **node-specific** threshold (q_v) for adopting a behavior!
- v has d neighbors of whom a p fraction have behavior A, and a (1 p) fraction have behavior B:
 - Payoff from choosing A is pda_v
 - □ Payoff from choosing B is $(1-p)db_v$.
- A is better for v if

$$pda_v > (1-p)db_v$$
.

$$p \ge \frac{b_v}{a_v + b_v}.$$

Extensions of Cascade Model- Cnt.





- Without node-specific thresholds, there would no cascade.
- The extremely low threshold of node 3 lead to diffusion.

The power of **influential nodes** is correlated to the extent to which such nodes have access to easily influenceable nodes.

- Clusters are still obstacle to cascades
- A **blocking cluster** is a set of nodes for which each node v has $> 1-q_v$ fraction of its neighbors in the set.
 - Heterogeneous cluster density: node-specific threshold for the fraction of friends to have in cluster.

Lecture Topics


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
- Modeling Diffusion
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• Cascade capacity of a network: The maximum *q* for which some **small** set (*finite set*) of initial adopters can cause a **complete cascade**!






Cascade Capacity



- Cascade capacity of a network: The maximum *q* for which some **small** set (*finite set*) of initial adopters can cause a **complete cascade**!
 - Indicates how different network structures are hospitable to cascades!







- Let S be the small set of early adopters of A.
- What is cascade capacity?
 - the maximum *q* for complete cascade?







- Let S be the small set of early adopters of A.
- What is cascade capacity?
 - the maximum q for complete cascade?




If $q \le 1/2$, complete cascade.

If $q > \frac{1}{2}$, no finite set of initial adopters can get any node to switch to A.

Cascade capacity= 1/2








Cascade Capacity- Cnt.



If $q \le 3/8$, then there is a complete cascade: first to the nodes c, h, i, n; then to nodes b, d, f, g, j, k, m, o; and then to others

If q > 3/8, no node will choose to adopt A.

Cascade Capacity=3/8







 How easy cascades propagate in a network with large cascade capacity?





- How easy cascades propagate in a network with large cascade capacity?
 - Cascades happen more "easily"!
 - they happen even for behaviors A that don't offer much payoff advantage over the default behavior B.





What is the maximum possible value of cascade capacity?



Information diffusion on Twitter

https://snikolov.wordpress.com/2012/11/12/information-diffusion-on-twitter/

Reading



Ch.19 Cascading Behavior in Networks [NCM]