Brahmin Left versus Merchant Right:
Changing Political Cleavages in 21 Western Democracies, 1948-2020[*]

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July 2021

Abstract

This article sheds new light on the long-run evolution of political cleavages in 21 Western democracies. We exploit a new database on the socioeconomic determinants of the vote, covering over 300 elections held between 1948 and 2020. In the 1950s and 1960s, the vote for social democratic, socialist, and affiliated parties was associated with lower-educated and low-income voters. It has gradually become associated with higher-educated voters, giving rise in the 2010s to a remarkable disconnection between the effects of income and education on the vote: higher-educated voters now vote for the "left," while high-income voters continue to vote for the "right." This transition has been accelerated by the rise of green and anti-immigration movements, whose distinctive feature is to concentrate the votes of the higher-educated and lower-educated electorates. Combining our database with historical data on political parties' programs, we provide evidence that the reversal of the education cleavage is strongly linked to the emergence of a new "sociocultural" axis of political conflict.

I. Introduction

Western democracies have undergone deep transformations in recent years, embodied by political fragmentation, the increasing salience of environmental issues, and the growing success of anti-establishment authoritarian movements (Trump, Brexit, Le Pen, etc.). Yet, much remains to be understood about the nature and origins of these political upheavals. On what dimensions of political conflict (education, income, age, etc.) have such transformations aligned? Is the rise of "populism" the outcome of recent trends (such as the 2007-2008 crisis, immigration waves, or globalization), or can we trace it back to longer-run structural changes? Beyond country-specific factors, can we find evolutions that are common to all Western democracies?

This paper attempts to make progress in answering these questions by exploiting a new dataset on the long-run evolution of electoral behaviors in 21 democracies. Drawing on nearly all electoral surveys ever conducted in these countries since the end of World War II, we assemble microdata on the individual determinants of the vote for over 300 elections held between 1948 and 2020. Together, these surveys provide unique insights into the evolution of voting preferences in Western democracies. The contribution of this paper is to establish a new set of stylized facts on these preferences, as well as to explore some mechanisms underlying their transformation in the past decades.[1]

Comparing the evolution of electoral cleavages requires grouping political parties in such a way that the coalitions considered are as comparable across countries and over time as possible. To do so, we start by making a distinction between two large groups of parties: social democratic, socialist, communist, and green parties ("left-wing" or "social democratic and affiliated"

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[1] This paper is part of a broader collective project dedicated to tracking political cleavages in fifty democracies throughout the world: see Gethin, Martínez-Toledano, and Piketty (forthcoming 2021). Several chapters of this collective volume are dedicated to discussing at greater length the results introduced in this paper in the case of specific countries, in particular Piketty (2021); Kosse & Piketty (2021); Martínez-Toledano & Sodano (2021); Gethin (2021); Bauluz, Gethin, Martínez-Toledano, and Morgan (2021); and Durrer de la Sota, Gethin, and Martínez-Toledano (2021).

parties) on one side, and conservative, Christian democratic, and anti-immigration parties ("right-wing" or "conservative and affiliated" parties) on the other side.[2]

The most striking result that emerges from our analysis is the existence of a gradual and significant process of disconnection between the effects of income and education on the vote. In the 1950s-1960s, the vote for social democratic and affiliated parties in Western democracies was "class-based," in the sense that it was strongly associated with the lower-income and lower-educated electorate. It has gradually become associated with higher-educated voters, giving rise in the 2010s to a remarkable divergence between the influences of income (economic capital) and education (human capital): high-income voters continue to vote for the "right", while high-education voters have shifted to supporting the "left". This separation between a "Merchant right" and a "Brahmin left" is visible in nearly all Western democracies, despite their major political, historical, and institutional differences (e.g., the two-party systems of the United States or Britain versus the highly fragmented multi-party systems of France or Denmark).[3] We also find that the rise of both green and anti-immigration parties since the 1980s-1990s has accelerated this transition—although it can only explain about 15% of the overall shift observed—, as education, not income, most clearly distinguishes support for these two families of parties today.

As a result, many Western democracies now appear to have shifted from "class-based" to "multidimensional" or "multiconflictual" party systems, in which income and education differentially structure support for competing political movements. One might also call these

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[2] We also include parties commonly classified as liberal or social-liberal in this latter group, such as the Liberal Democrats in Britain and the Free Democratic Party in Germany. In Section II.B, we perform several robustness checks to ensure that our classification is consistent both in terms of parties' programmatic supply and voters' own perceptions of the political space.

[3] In India's traditional caste system, upper castes were divided into Brahmins (priests, intellectuals) and Kshatryas/Vaishyas (warriors, merchants, tradesmen), a division that modern political conflicts in Western democracies therefore seem to follow to some extent.

systems "multi-elite" party systems, in which governing coalitions alternating in power tend to reflect the views and interests of a different kind of elite (intellectual versus economic), assuming that elites do have a greater influence on political programs and policies than the rest of the electorate.[4]

To shed light on the factors underlying the divergence of the effects of income and education on the vote, we match our dataset with the Comparative Manifesto Project database, the most comprehensive available data source on the evolution of political parties' programs since the end of World War II. Drawing on two indicators of party ideology from the political science literature (Bakker & Hobolt, 2012), corresponding to parties' relative positions on an "economic-distributive" axis and a "sociocultural" axis, we provide evidence that the separation between these two dimensions of political conflict and the divergence of income and education are tightly related phenomena. Specifically, we document that the correlation between parties' income gradient and their position on the economic-distributive dimension has remained very stable since the 1960s: parties emphasizing "pro-free-market" issues receive disproportionately more votes from high-income voters today, just as they used to sixty years ago. Meanwhile, the correlation between the education gradient and parties' positions on the sociocultural axis has dramatically increased over time, from 0 in the 1960s to nearly 0.5 in the 2010s.

In other words, parties promoting "progressive" policies (green and to a lower extent traditional left-wing parties) have seen their electorate become increasingly restricted to higher-educated voters, while parties upholding more "conservative" views on sociocultural issues (anti-immigration and to a lower extent traditional right-wing parties) have on the contrary concentrated a growing share of the lower-educated electorate. We also find a strong and growing cross-country association between ideological polarization on sociocultural issues and the reversal of the education cleavage. In particular, the two countries in our dataset where this

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[4] A large literature in economics and political science has documented the existence of unequal political representation and the distortion of politicians' and legislators' beliefs toward their most privileged constituencies: see, for instance, Adams and Ezrow (2009); Bartels (2017); Bertrand et al. (2020); Bonica et al. (2013); Cagé (2020); Kuhner (2014); Gilens (2012); Gilens & Page (2014); Pereira (2021).

reversal has not yet occurred, Portugal and Ireland, are also those where partisan divides over these issues remain the weakest today. Taken together, these results suggest that changes in political supply, in particular the increasing emphasis on sociocultural factors among old and new parties, appear to be an important factor behind the progressive disconnection between educational and income divides.

We should stress, however, that the limitations of available information on party manifestos constrain our ability to carry a causal analysis or fully test the hypotheses behind the empirical regularities we uncover. In particular, the sociocultural axis puts together many different items that may also involve various forms of economic conflict over the consequences of environmental, migration, or education policies. The manifesto data do not provide information on the policies actually implemented by governing coalitions either. For instance, social democratic and affiliated parties may continue emphasizing redistributive policies just as they used to in the past, but their credibility in effectively pursuing these policies may have declined since then. Another complementary interpretation of our findings is that left-wing parties have gradually developed a more elitist approach to education policy, in the sense that they have increasingly been viewed by less well-off voters as parties defending primarily the winners of the higher education competition.[5] Unfortunately, the data at our disposal makes it difficult to provide a direct test for these various hypotheses. The fact that turnout has fallen sharply among both the bottom 50% least educated and poorest voters in a number of countries, but not among

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[5] This risk was identified as early as in 1958 by Michael Young in his famous dystopia about "the rise of the meritocracy". In this book, Young expresses doubts about the ability of the British Labour Party (of which he was a member) to keep the support of lower educated classes in case the party fails to combat what he describes as the rise of "meritocratic ideology" (a strong view held by higher education achievers about their own merit, which Young identifies as a major risk for future social cohesion). For a simple theoretical model along these lines, see Piketty (2018, section 5). It is based upon a two-dimensional extension of Piketty (1995)'s model about learning the role of effort and a distinction between education-related effort and business-related effort. The model can account for the simultaneous existence of "Brahmin left" voters (i.e., dynasties believing strongly in the role of education-related effort) and "Merchant right" voters (i.e., dynasties believing strongly in the role of business-related effort).

the top 50%, could be interpreted as a sign that socially disadvantaged voters have felt left aside by the rise of "multi-elite" party systems.[6]

We also investigate to what extent shifts in the composition of education groups in terms of gender, age, or other sociodemographics could account for the reversal of the education cleavage. To do this, we compare the education gradient before and after controlling for all available covariates in our database. We also carry a Kitagawa-Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of the education gradient, which allows us to formally estimate what fraction of the reversal can be accounted for by structural changes in educational achievement. Both methods yield identical results: compositional effects can only predict 16% to 17% of the transformation of educational divides observed since the 1950s.

We do find, however, some heterogeneity in the reversal when further decomposing voters into subgroups by different socioeconomic characteristics. Generational dynamics, in particular, appear to have mattered tremendously in generating the reversal of the education cleavage: while older lower-educated voters continue to vote "along class lines" and thus to support the left, social democratic and green parties have attracted a growing share of the higher-educated electorate among the youth. The reversal in the educational divide has also been highest among non-religious voters and among men, although it has happened within other subgroups too. Overall, the disconnection of income and education cleavages has been a relatively independent and widespread phenomenon, in the sense that it cannot be accounted for by other socioeconomic variables and is not linked to any particular subgroup of voters.

Finally, we also exploit the other variables in our dataset to study cleavages related to age, geography, religion, gender, and other socioeconomic variables. The main conclusion is that there has been no major realignment of voters along these other dimensions, comparable to the

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[6] See Piketty (2018), figures A1-A2. Turnout rates among bottom 50% voters have always been relatively low in the US (at least during the post-World War II period). To some extent the British and French pattern has moved toward the US pattern since the 1970s-1980s. Unfortunately, the surveys at our disposal do not allow us to analyze in a consistent manner the evolution of turnout in our sample of 21 countries, so we do not push any further our analysis of turnout.

one observed in the case of education. Younger voters are more likely to vote for social democratic and affiliated parties, but this was already the case by a comparable magnitude in the 1950s. Similarly, rural-urban and religious cleavages have remained stable or have decreased in most countries in our dataset: rural areas and religious voters continue to be supportive of conservative parties, as they used to in the past. The major exception is gender, the only variable other than education for which we find a clear reversal of electoral divides: in nearly all countries, women used to be more conservative than men and have gradually become more likely to vote for left-wing parties.

This paper directly relates to the growing literature on the sources of political change and the rise of "populism" in Western democracies. Recent studies have emphasized the role of various economic and sociocultural factors, including globalization and trade exposure (Autor et al., 2020; Colantone & Stanig, 2018a, 2018b; Malgouyres, 2017), economic insecurity and unemployment (Algan et al., 2017; Becker et al., 2017; Becker & Fetzer, 2018; Dehdari, 2021; Fetzer, 2019; Funke et al., 2016; Guiso et al., 2020; Liberini et al., 2019), immigration (Becker & Fetzer, 2017; Dustmann et al., 2019; Halla et al., 2017; Tabellini, 2020), and cultural and moral conflicts (Enke, 2020; Gennaioli & Tabellini, 2019; Inglehart & Norris, 2019). We contribute to this body of evidence by adopting a broader, long-run historical perspective on the evolution of political cleavages since the end of World War II. In particular, we find little evidence that the shifts in electoral divides we observe were driven by single, major events such as the end of the Cold War, the increasing salience of immigration since the 2000s, trade shocks, or the 2007-2008 crisis. What seems to have happened instead is a very progressive, continuous reversal of educational divides, which unfolded decades before any of these events took place and has carried on uninterruptedly until today.

We also contribute to the literature on multidimensional political competition and its impact on redistribution and inequality. A key result from this literature is that political support for redistribution should be inversely proportional to the strength of other political cleavages crosscutting class divides (Alesina et al. 1999a, 1999b; Gennaioli & Tabellini, 2019; Roemer, 1998; Roemer et al., 2007). The divergence of the effects of income and education on the vote documented in this paper, two strongly correlated measures of inequality, could in this context

contribute to explaining why the rise of economic disparities in the past decades has not been met by greater redistribution or renewed class conflicts.

Finally, this paper relates to the large political science literature on the determinants of the vote in comparative and historical perspective. Numerous studies have highlighted that Western democracies have undergone a process of growing polarization over a new "sociocultural," "universalistic-particularistic," or "green/alternative/libertarian versus traditional/authoritarian/nationalist" dimension of political conflict in the past decades (see Bornschier, 2010; Dalton, 2018; Evans & De Graaf, 2012; Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson, 2002; Inglehart, 1977; Inglehart & Norris, 2019; Kitschelt, 1994; Kriesi et al., 2008). There is also extensive evidence that education has been playing a major role in restructuring electoral behaviors and collective beliefs along this new dimension in recent decades (see Bovens & Wille, 2012; Bornschier, 2010b; Dolezal, 2010; Duch & Taylor, 1993; Ford & Jennings 2020; Kitschelt & Rehm, 2019; Langsæther & Stubager, 2019; Rydgren, 2013, 2018; Stubager, 2008, 2010, 2013; Van der Waal et al., 2010). We contribute to this literature by gathering the largest dataset ever built on the socioeconomic determinants of the vote in Western democracies[7]; by focusing explicitly on the distinction between income and education, two variables whose effects are rarely studied jointly in comparative studies; and by directly matching this dataset with historical data on party ideology to document the dynamic links between political supply and demand.[8] In doing so, we confirm many of the findings of the existing literature, but we

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[7] Our work directly draws on previous data collection and harmonization efforts. See in particular Bosancianu (2017), Elff (2007), Franklin et al. (1992), Evans & De Graaf (2012), Önudottir et al. (2017), Thomassen (2005), and the remarkable collections of post-electoral surveys compiled by the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (http:///cses.org) and the Comparative National Elections Project (https://u.osu.edu/cnep/).

[8] In matching survey and manifesto data, we follow a number of recent political science studies that have sought to understand how political supply influences class and religious divides. See in particular Elff (2009); Evans & de Graaf (2012); Evans & Tilley (2012, 2017); Jansen, de Graaf, and Need (2011, 2012); Jansen, Evans, and de Graaf (2013); and Rennwald & Evans (2014). In this article, we bring the insights of these studies to an unprecedented

also provide new insights into the transformation of political cleavages in Western democracies. In particular, we gather for the first time cross-country, long-run historical evidence of a complete dissociation of the effects of education and income on the vote.[9] This dissociation appears to have started as early as the 1950s and to have unfolded uninterruptedly since then, and can be related to the growing salience of a large and complex set of policy issues, including the environment, migration, gender, education, and merit, which divide voters along educational but not income lines.

Section II presents the new dataset exploited in this paper. Section III documents the divergence of the income and education effects and discusses the role of green and anti-immigration parties in explaining the reversal of the education cleavage. Section IV matches our survey dataset with manifesto data to study the link between this transformation and the emergence of a new axis of political conflict. Section V explores alternative explanations and heterogeneity in the reversal of the education cleavage, and analyzes the evolution of other determinants of electoral behaviors. Section VI concludes. All the data series, computer codes, and microfiles used in this article can be publicly accessed online as part of the *World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database* (http://wpid.world).

II. Data and Methodology

II.A. A New Dataset on Political Cleavages in Western Democracies, 1948-2020

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historical and comparative scope, and we focus more explicitly on the differential roles of income and education in structuring economic and sociocultural conflicts.

[9] We directly extend the work of Van der Waal et al. (2007), the only study that to the best of our knowledge has explicitly contrasted the impact of these two variables on electoral behaviors in a historical, cross-country perspective. The authors show, drawing on data covering fifteen countries over the 1956-1990 period, that education has had a declining impact on support for right-wing parties, while the opposite is true of income. We push further their analysis by documenting not only a decline, but a complete *reversal* of the effect of education on the vote over the 1948-2020 period.

The dataset we exploit in this paper consists in a unique collection of electoral surveys conducted between 1948 and 2020 in Western democracies. These surveys have one main point in common: they contain information on the electoral behaviors of a sample of voters in the last (or forthcoming) election, together with data on their main sociodemographic characteristics such as income, education, or age. While they suffer from limitations typical to surveys (in particular small sample sizes), they provide an invaluable source for studying the long-run evolution of political preferences in contemporary democracies.

Universe. Our area of study encompasses 21 countries commonly referred to as "Western democracies", for which we can cover a total of about 300 national elections held between 1948 and 2020 (see Table 1). These include 17 Western European countries, the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. For seven countries in our dataset (France, Germany, Italy, Norway, Sweden, the UK, and the US), available surveys allow us to go back as early as the 1950s. The majority of remaining countries have data going back to the 1960s or the early 1970s, with the exception of Spain and Portugal, which did not hold democratic elections between the 1940s and the late 1970s.

The focus of this paper is on national (general or presidential) elections, which determine the composition of government and the head of the State.[10] In the majority of Western democracies, they have been held on a regular basis every four or five years since at least the end of World War II. Depending on their frequency and the availability of electoral surveys, we are able to cover political attitudes in 9 to 21 of these elections in each country.

Data sources. The primary data source used in this paper consists in so-called National Election Studies, most of which have been conducted by a consortium of academic organizations (see Table 1). The vast majority of these surveys are post-electoral surveys: they are fielded shortly after the corresponding national election has been held, with sample sizes generally varying

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[10] We focus on general or legislative elections for all countries in our dataset except the United States, for which we study presidential elections. Our results are strongly robust to considering presidential elections in countries where they are held (e.g. France), as well as to including midterm elections in US series (see Piketty, 2018).

between 2,000 and 4,000 respondents, and they collect detailed and consistent information on voting behaviors and the sociodemographic characteristics of voters.

[Table 1 here]

In all Western democracies except Austria, Ireland, and Luxembourg, we have been able to get access to such high-quality data sources. For these three countries, we rely instead on more general political attitudes surveys, which were not specifically conducted in the context of a given election but did ask respondents to report their previous voting behaviors: the Eurobarometers, the European Social Survey, and the European Election Studies. Furthermore, in a few countries such as Australia or Belgium, where national election studies were not conducted prior to the 1970s or 1980s, we complement them with a number of other political attitudes surveys conducted in earlier decades. While these sources do not allow us to accurately track election-to-election changes, they are sufficient to grasp long-run changes in party affiliations, which is the objective of this paper.[11]

Harmonization. Starting from raw data files, we extract in each survey all sociodemographic characteristics that are sufficiently common and well-measured to be comparable across countries and over time. Based on these criteria, we were able to build a harmonized dataset covering the following variables: income, education, age, gender, religious affiliation, church attendance, race or ethnicity (for a restricted number of countries), rural-urban location, region of residence, employment status, marital status, union membership, sector of employment, home ownership, self-perceived social class, and (in recent years) country of birth.[12]

Income and education, the two variables that form the core part of our analysis in section III, deserve special attention. Indeed, one reason why income and education variables are not often

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[11] A complete list of all data sources used by country can be found in appendix Table A1.

[12] A key variable for understanding political cleavages is wealth, yet data on asset ownership was only available in a handful of countries (and only measured with some detail in France), which is why we do not consider it in this paper.

studied jointly in large-scale comparative studies on electoral behaviors is that they tend to be difficult to harmonize. Education systems and educational attainments vary significantly across countries and over time, and they are not always perfectly comparable across surveys. The same limitations apply to income, which is only collected in discrete brackets in the vast majority of the sources used in this paper.

We address this shortcoming by normalizing these two variables and focusing on specific education and income deciles. Appendix A introduces the method we use to move from discrete categories (education levels or income brackets) to deciles. In broad strokes, our approach consists in allocating individuals to the potentially multiple income or education deciles to which they belong, in such a way that average decile-level vote shares are computed assuming a constant vote share within each education- or income-year cell. This is a conservative assumption, as vote shares for specific parties are likely to also vary within education groups or income brackets. The levels and changes in education and income cleavages documented in this paper should thus be considered as lower bounds of the true effects of education and income on the vote.

Lastly, for consistency and in order to make surveys more representative of election outcomes, we systematically reweigh respondents' answers to match official election results. In the vast majority of cases, given that post-electoral surveys capture relatively well variations in support for the different parties, this correction leaves our results unchanged.

II.B. Party Classification

Our objective is to compare the long-run evolution of electoral cleavages in Western democracies. This requires grouping political parties in such a way that the size of the coalitions considered and their historical affiliations are as comparable and meaningful as possible. To do

so, we make a distinction between two large groups of parties in our main specification (see the coalitions delineated by dashed lines in Figure 4).[13]

On one side of the political spectrum are social democratic, socialist, communist, and green parties, often classified as "left-wing" and that we also refer to as "social democratic and affiliated parties" in what follows. These include the Democratic Party in the US, labor parties in countries such as the UK, Australia, or Norway, as well as various parties affiliated to socialist and social democratic traditions in Western European countries. It also includes environmental parties in their various forms, together with several new left-wing parties that emerged after the 2008 crisis (such as Podemos in Spain, Die Linke in Germany, or La France Insoumise in France).

On the other side are conservative, Christian democratic, and anti-immigration parties, often classified as "right-wing" and that we also refer to as "conservative and affiliated parties." These include the Republican Party in the US and other conservative parties such as those of the UK, Norway, and Spain; Christian democratic parties, which are common in Western European multi-party systems such as those of Austria, Belgium, and Switzerland; and anti-immigration parties such as the French Rassemblement National or the Danish People's Party. We also include parties commonly classified as liberal or social-liberal in this group, such as the Liberal Democrats in Britain, the Free Democratic Party in Germany, and the Liberal Party in Norway, but our results are strongly robust to not doing so.[14]

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[13] See appendix Tables A2 and A3 for more information on the classification of the main parties in each country. Parties not classified in either of these two groups mainly correspond to independent candidates and regional parties (such as the Bloc Québécois in Canada or the Scottish National Party). These parties or candidates have received about 7% of votes since 1945, with no clear trend (see Figure 4).

[14] The exceptions are Austria, Canada, Denmark, and the Netherlands, for which we classify as "left-wing" parties generally considered to be liberal (NEOS in Austria, the Liberal Party in Canada, the Social Liberal Party in Denmark, and D66 in the Netherlands). This choice is motivated by our objective to compare coalitions of significant and comparable size across countries. Liberal parties have received about 10% of the vote in Western democracies since 1945 (see Figure 4), with no clear trend, and have consistently been supported by both high-

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This binary classification has one major advantage: it allows us to directly compare electoral divides in two-party systems, such as the UK or the US, to those observed in highly fragmented party systems such as France or the Netherlands. Aggregating parties into two large groups of comparable size in each country, in particular, is useful to get a first perspective on the long-run evolution of political cleavages that is consistent both over time and across countries. These groups also correspond in many cases to the coalitions of parties that have effectively built political majorities, whether in coalition governments or through direct parliamentary support.

To make sure that this distinction between "left" and "right" is meaningful when it comes to differentiating parties and voters, we contrast two indicators for all parties: the average self-reported left-right position of voters supporting each of these parties, and the score of each of these parties on the left-right ideological index available from the Comparative Manifesto Project database. The first of these indicators is available in the majority of post-electoral surveys used in this paper, which have directly asked respondents to position themselves on a 0 (left) to 10 (right) scale. The second is a measure of parties' left-right positions that theoretically ranges from -100 (right) to 100 (left). It was first computed from manifesto data and validated by factor analysis by Laver and Budge (1992), and it has been widely used in comparative political science research since then (see for instance Evans & De Graaf, 2012).

We find that our categorization of political parties into two groups is very strongly consistent with these two indicators. Every single party that we have classified as "social democratic and affiliated" is supported by voters who declare being more left-wing than the average voter, and is more left-wing than the average party on the CMP left-right ideological index.[15] This is true for social democratic and socialist parties, but also for green parties, which are all ranked as left-

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income and higher-educated voters (see appendix Figures A26 and A28). Our results are thus strongly robust to excluding them or not from the analysis.

[15] See appendix Figures B16 and B17. The one single exception here is Fianna Fáil in Ireland, which we still choose to classify with left-wing parties to study a coalition of sufficient size (if we were to exclude it, the total vote share of the "left" would fall below 30% throughout the period considered).

wing in survey and manifesto data. The same holds in the case of conservative, Christian democratic, and anti-immigration parties, which are nearly all identified as more right-wing than the average party or voter.[16] It is also striking to see that the two indicators of parties' positions on a left-right scale are very consistent with one another (the correlation between the two variables is 0.82). Given this evidence, we are confident that our classification is meaningful both in terms of parties' programmatic supply and in terms of voters' own perceptions of the political space.

That being said, we are not claiming that these two groups are ideologically or programmatically homogeneous in any way, neither internally nor over time. Our objective is, on the contrary, to document how such large families or parties have aggregated diverse and changing coalitions of voters in the past decades. In section III, we thus consider in greater detail how specific subfamilies of parties, in particular green and anti-immigration movements, have contributed to reshaping electoral divides in countries with multi-party systems. In particular, we provide evidence that while green parties appear relatively similar to other left-wing parties on economic issues, they tend to put much greater emphasis on sociocultural concerns. Similarly, anti-immigration parties are on average not very different from the traditional right with respect to economic policies, but they tend to emphasize issues related to law and order or multiculturalism to a much greater extent.

II.C. Empirical Strategy

In the rest of the paper, we present results from simple linear probability models of the form:

$$y_{ict} = \alpha + \beta x_{ict} + C_{ict}\gamma + \varepsilon_{ict} \quad (1)$$

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[16] The few exceptions of parties identified as left-wing in either survey or manifesto data and that we do not classify as left-wing correspond to centrist social-liberal parties, such as Ciudadanos in Spain, the Liberal Democrats in the United Kingdom, or the Liberal Party in Norway. As mentioned above, our results are strongly robust to categorizing them as left-wing or right-wing or to simply excluding them from the analysis.

Where y_{cit} is a binary outcome variable of interest (e.g. voting for left-wing parties) for individual i in country c in election t, x_{ict} is a binary explanatory variable of interest (e.g. belonging to top 10% educated voters), and C_{ict} is a vector of controls.

In the absence of controls, the coefficient β simply equals the difference between the share of top 10% educated voters voting for left-wing parties and the share of other voters (bottom 90% educated voters) voting for left-wing parties:

$$\beta = E(y_{ict} = 1, x_{ict} = 1) - E(y_{ict} = 1, x_{ict} = 0) \quad (2)$$

With controls, the interpretation is also straightforward: all things being equal, belonging to the top 10% of educated voters increases one's propensity to vote for left-wing parties by β percentage points. All control variables in our dataset are specified as dummy variables, so that the model is fully saturated and can be estimated by OLS using heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors.[17]

III. The Disconnection of Education and Income Cleavages in Western Democracies

This section presents our main results on the evolution of electoral divides related to income and education. Section III.A documents the reversal of the education cleavage and the stability of income divides in Western democracies. Section III.B studies how the fragmentation of party systems and the rise of green and anti-immigration parties has contributed to this transformation.

III.A. The Divergence of Income and Education

To document the evolution of the influences of income and education on the vote, we start by relying on a very simple indicator: the difference between the share of the 10 percent most educated voters and the share of the 90 percent least educated voters voting for social democratic, socialist, communist, and green parties (that is, β in equation 1). This difference is

[17] See for instance Wooldridge (2002), chapter 15.

negative when highest-educated voters have a lower likelihood to vote for these parties, and positive when they have a higher likelihood to do so. It is equal to zero if they have exactly the same likelihood to support the left as the rest of the electorate. We use the same indicator for income, defined as the difference between the share of richest 10 percent voters and the share of poorest 90 percent voters voting for social democratic and affiliated parties. These two indicators have the advantage of measuring the evolution of the voting behaviors of two groups of equal size, which makes the estimates more comparable across countries and over time.[18] However, the trends we document are robust to a battery of alternative indicators (see below).

Figure 1 depicts the average quinquennial evolution of these two indicators, after controls, in the twelve Western democracies for which data is available since the 1960s.[19] As shown in the upper line, highest-educated voters were less likely to vote for social democratic parties than lowest-educated voters by 15 percentage points in the 1960s. This gap has shifted very gradually from being negative to becoming positive, from -10 in the 1970s to -5 in the 1980s, 0 in the 1990s, +5 in the 2000s, and finally +10 in 2016-2020. Higher-educated voters have thus moved from being significantly more right-wing than lower-educated voters to significantly more left-wing, leading to a complete reversal in the educational divide.

[Figure 1 here]

In contrast, the evolution has been dramatically different in the case of income. The bottom line shows that top-income voters have always been less likely to vote for social democratic and

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[18] As discussed in section II.A, deciles of education are computed using all educational categories available in surveys, which implies that the composition of "top 10% educated voters" in terms of education levels changes over time. At the beginning of period, this category is mainly composed of university graduates and voters with secondary education; in the 2010s, it gives more weight to individuals with masters or doctorates. See appendix A for more details.

[19] See appendix Figure A2 for the same figure averaged over all 21 democracies (unbalanced panel). The corresponding regression coefficients by country and decade, after controls, are displayed in appendix Tables D1 and D2.

affiliated parties and more likely to vote for conservative and affiliated parties. In the 1960s, the indicator was equal to -15, that is, top-income voters had a probability to vote for social democratic parties lower than that of low-income voters by 15 percentage points. This gap has decreased slightly until reaching about -10 in the past decade, but it remains significantly negative. High-income voters have thus remained closer to conservative parties than low-income voters over the past fifty years.

Combining these two evolutions, a striking long-run evolution in the structure of political cleavages emerges. In the early postwar decades, the party systems of Western democracies were "class-based," in the sense that social democratic and affiliated parties represented both the low-education and the low-income electorate, whereas conservative and affiliated parties represented both high-education and high-income voters. These party systems have gradually evolved towards what we propose to call "multiconflictual" or "multi-elite" party systems: higher-educated voters now vote for the "left," while high-income voters still vote for the "right."

Note that the two indicators shown in the figure control for all available variables at the micro level (education/income, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban location, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status). The evolution of these two indicators without controls displays a stronger decline in the influence of income on the vote, from nearly -20 in the 1960s to about -5 in 2016-2020. The main reason is that higher-educated voters have on average higher incomes, so that the reversal of the educational divide has mechanically led to a reduction in the difference between top-income and low-income voters. Nonetheless, what is important for our analysis is that the transition observed is robust to the inclusion or exclusion of controls.[20]

The divergence of divides related to income and education is common to nearly all Western democracies, but it has happened at different speeds and with different intensities. Figure 2

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[20] See appendix Figure A1. We come back to the influence of other covariates in generating the evolution of the education cleavage in Section V.

shows that support of higher-educated voters for social democratic parties was lowest in Norway, Sweden, and Finland between the 1950s and 1970s, three democracies well known for having stronger historical class-based party systems than most Western democracies. The reversal of the education cleavage has not yet been fully completed in these countries, as social democratic parties have managed to keep a non-negligible fraction of the low-income and lower-educated electorate (Martínez-Toledano and Sodano, 2021).

[Figure 2 here]

This delay is also common to recent democracies such as Spain or Portugal or late industrialized countries such as Ireland, where left-wing parties continue to be more class-based. Portugal and to a lesser extent Ireland represent two major exceptions in our dataset, where we do not observe a clear tendency towards a reversal of the educational divide. Among several factors, this unique trajectory can be explained by the polarization of mainstream parties and the success of new left-wing parties after the onset of the 2008 financial crisis (Bauluz et al., 2021). In contrast, the gap in left votes between higher-educated voters and lower-educated voters is today highest in countries such as the United States, Switzerland, and Netherlands, due largely to the particular salience of identity-based concerns and the strength of anti-immigration and green movements in the latter two countries (Durrer et al., 2021).

Figure 3 shows that top-income voters have also remained significantly more likely than low-income voters to vote for conservative and affiliated parties in nearly all Western democracies, but with significant variations. The influence of income on the vote was strongest in Northern European countries, Britain, Australia, and New Zealand in the 1950s and 1960s, consistently with their histories of early industrialization and strong class polarization. It has declined in these countries since then, although income continues to be strongly negatively associated with support for the left.

[Figure 3 here]

Meanwhile, low-income voters have supported less decisively left-wing parties in countries with weak historical class cleavages and strong crosscutting religious (Italy) or ethnolinguistic (Canada) cleavages (Bauluz et al., 2021; Gethin, 2021). Despite these variations, the tendency

of high-income voters to support the right in contemporary Western democracies has proved remarkably resilient over time, pointing to the persistence of conflicts over economic issues and redistributive policy. The only country where a complete flattening of the income effect could well be underway is the United States (as well as Italy, due to the recent success of the Five Star Movement among the low-income electorate), where in 2016 and 2020 top 10 percent earners became for the first time since World War II not significantly less likely to vote for the Democratic Party.

Our findings on the reversal of educational divides and the stability of the income effect are extremely robust to alternative specifications. The pattern observed is virtually identical whether one considers the top 50% of education and income voters, other discrete categories such as primary-educated voters or university graduates, or continuous measures of education and income, before and after controls.[21] It also holds in absolute values, not only in relative terms: between 1948-1960 and 2016-2020, for instance, the share of least educated 50% voters voting for social democratic and affiliated parties declined from about 50% to 40%, while it rose linearly from 25% to almost 50% among the top 10% educated.[22] We also find that our results hold when considering a continuous measure of left-right voting derived from the Comparative Manifesto Project database instead of a binary dependent variable.[23] Finally, we report in the

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[21] See appendix Figures A5 to A20. Continuous measures of income and education are derived as the rank of individuals in the income and education distributions, defined from all available income brackets and education categories available in each survey. If 25% of voters are primary-educated, 50% are secondary-educated, and 25% are tertiary-educated, for instance, then voters belonging to each of these categories are attributed quantile values of 0, 0.25, and 0.75, respectively.

[22] See appendix Figure A29.

[23] More precisely, we redefine our dependent variable of interest y_{ict} as a continuous variable taking the value of the party voted for by individual i at time t on the left-right ideological index available from the CMP database. The results show that top-income voters have remained significantly less likely to vote for "more left-wing parties," with no clear trend over time, while higher-educated voters have shifted from being less likely to more likely to vote for "more left-wing parties." See appendix Tables D5 to D8.

appendix full regression tables on the determinants of the vote for social democratic and affiliated parties by country, as well as simple descriptive statistics on support for these parties by education level and income group in each country.[24] With the exception of the few cases highlighted above, we find a complete reversal of the education effect and a striking stability of the income effect in nearly all countries, regardless of the indicator considered to measure the influence of these two variables.[25]

III.B. The Fragmentation of Political Cleavage Structures

The emergence of multi-party systems has come together with a significant reshuffling of political forces in most Western democracies.[26] As shown in Figure 4, traditional socialist and social democratic parties have seen their average vote share across Western democracies decline from about 40 percent to 34 percent since the end of World War II, while that received by Christian democratic and conservative parties has decreased from 38 percent to 30 percent. Communist parties, who used to gather 7 percent of the vote in the 1940s, have almost completely disappeared from the political scene. Although immigration issues were already present in political debates in many Western democracies, anti-immigration parties started to grow in the late 1970s and have seen their support increase uninterruptedly since then, reaching

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[24] See appendix E. Regression results by country are reported in appendix Tables E1 to E21, descriptive statistics by education group in appendix Figures EA1 to EA21, and descriptive statistics by income group in appendix Figures EB1 to EB21.

[25] In some cases, the effect of income is non-linear, especially at the beginning of the period: support for left-wing parties is higher among middle-income groups than at the bottom of the distribution. This is mainly due to the fact that farmers and the self-employed, many of which have low incomes, have always been substantially more likely to vote for conservative parties. However, income remains an only imperfect and partial measure of economic resources. In particular, we find in the case of France (the only country with high-quality wealth data) that the effect of wealth on support for the left is much stronger and linear, and has remained much more stable in the past decades (see appendix Figures EC1 and EC2).

[26] The United States and the United Kingdom are two exceptions, where the reversal of the education cleavage has entirely occurred within existing parties.

on average 11 percent of votes in the past decade. Green parties made their entry in the political landscape in the 1970s and 1980s and have also progressed steadily since then, reaching on average 8 percent of votes in the past decade. Support for social-liberal and liberal parties has remained more stable, even though there are important variations across countries.

[Figure 4 here]

Figure 5 displays the evolution of our previous education (Panel A) and income (Panel B) indicators, decomposed for each of these families of parties from 1948 to 2020. In the 1950s-1960s, both top 10% educated voters and top 10% income voters were significantly less likely to vote for social democratic, socialist, communist, and other left-wing parties and more likely to vote for conservative, Christian democratic, and liberal parties than other voters. By 2016-2020, income continues to clearly distinguish these two groups of parties, but their education gradient has completely reversed. Meanwhile, support for anti-immigration and green parties does not differ significantly across income groups (their income gradient is close to zero), but it does vary substantially across educational categories. This has been a constant fact since these parties started taking on a growing importance in the political space in the 1970s and 1980s. In 2016-2020, top 10% educated voters were more likely to vote for green parties by 5 percentage points and less likely to vote for anti-immigration parties by a comparable amount. In other words, the increasing support for green parties on the left and anti-immigration parties on the right has clearly contributed to the reversal of the education cleavage. This finding goes in line with the large political science literature that has shown education to be a significant determinant of support for green and anti-immigration parties in recent years (e.g., Dolezal, 2010; Rydgren, 2013, 2018; Tabou-Chadi and Hix, 2021).

[Figure 5 here]

We should stress, however, that the rise of new parties cannot explain alone the entirety of the reversal of the education cleavage for at least two reasons. First, this reversal started several decades before most of these parties even existed: as Figure 5 shows, we can date it back to as early as the 1950s. Second, as also shown in Figure 5, there have been major transformations in the structure of the vote for traditional left-wing and right-wing parties too, even in the most recent decades. One way to formally decompose the respective influences of traditional left-

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wing parties and green parties in generating the reversal of the education cleavage is to compare our main indicator of interest including and excluding green parties from the analysis. We find that the gradient has moved from -19.1 to +8.2 between 1948-1960 and 2016-2020 when including green parties, and from -19.1 to +4.3 when excluding them. In other words, the rise of green parties explains about 15% of the reversal observed during this period, and it explains about half of the positive link between education and support for the left in the most recent years. The same holds when it comes to the increase in support for anti-immigration parties in generating the reversal of the link between education and support for the right: it explains about 14% of the overall shift and 55% of the negative gradient in 2016-2020.[27]

Figure 6 provides another perspective on this transformation by representing the income and education gradients of these different families of parties in a two-dimensional space in 1961-1965 (panel A) and 2016-2020 (panel B). In the 1960s, the effects of income and education on the vote were aligned: higher income and higher education were both associated with higher support for conservative and affiliated parties. By 2016-2020, these two variables now have completely opposite effects: higher income is associated with higher support for conservative parties, while higher education is associated with higher support for social democratic parties. Anti-immigration and green parties differ primarily in their tendency to attract voters belonging to different education groups (they are distant on the x-axis but not on the y-axis).

Figure 7 further decomposes this two-dimensional structure of political conflict by country in the last decade, distinguishing between traditional right-wing and left-wing parties in panel A and between anti-immigration and green parties in panel B.[28] Two facts clearly stand out from these figures. First, this two-dimensional split of the electorate can be seen in nearly all countries in our dataset: social democratic and other left-wing parties systematically make better relative scores among low-income voters, conservative and other right-wing parties among high-income

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[27] See appendix Figures A25 (left-wing parties) and A26 (right-wing parties).

[28] The corresponding regression coefficients by country and decade, after controls, are displayed in appendix Tables D3 and D4.

voters, anti-immigration parties among lower-educated voters, and green parties among higher-educated voters.[29]

Secondly, despite these commonalities, there are large differences across countries in these two indicators. In particular, while nearly all green parties make better scores among higher-educated voters than among the lower educated, they differ in their tendency to attract low- or high-income voters. Similarly, anti-immigration parties have attracted a particularly high share of the lower-educated vote in several Western democracies in the past decade, but we also observe significant variations in the income profile of far-right voting. These variations are likely to reflect cross-country differences in political fragmentation and voting systems, which create different incentives for parties of the traditional left and the traditional right to adapt their policy proposals in the face of growing electoral competition from new political movements. To better understand these dynamics and the role of political supply in shaping education and income divides, we now turn to manifesto data.

[Figures 6 and 7 here]

IV. The Origins of the Transformation of Political Cleavages: Evidence from Manifesto Data

This section investigates the relationship between the divergence of income and education cleavages and ideological polarization by matching our survey dataset with manifesto data.

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[29] In two countries, Italy and New Zealand, lower-educated voters are not significantly more or less likely to vote for anti-immigration parties. In Italy, this is driven by the fact that support for *Fratelli d'Italia* (which we classify as an anti-immigration party alongside the *Lega*) was particularly concentrated among higher-educated voters in the 2018 election. If we were to restrict the analysis to the *Lega*, then we would obtain a negative coefficient of about -2 percentage points. In the case of New Zealand, the only significant anti-immigration party, New Zealand First, receives support mainly from the Māori minority and is often considered to be a centrist party (it has formed governments with both the National Party and the Labour Party), which may explain why its position on the income-education quadrant differs from that of other anti-immigration parties in Western democracies (Gethin, 2020).

Section IV.A introduces the Comparative Manifesto Project data and the indicators we consider. Section IV.B presents our results on the link between political supply and demand.

IV.A. Manifesto Project Data and Methodology

Manifesto Data. To make a first step towards understanding the mechanisms underlying the transformation documented in section III, we match our survey dataset with the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP: Volkens et al., 2020), a hand-coded historical database on the programmatic supply of political parties. The CMP is the result of a collective effort to collect and code the manifestos published by parties just before general elections. Each manifesto is first divided into "quasi-sentences" conveying a specific claim or policy proposal. These quasi-sentences are then assigned to broad ideological or policy categories using a common coding scheme. The resulting dataset presents itself in the form of items (such as "social justice" or "law and order"), with scores corresponding to the share of quasi-sentences dedicated to a specific issue in a party's manifesto. The CMP is the largest available database on political programs in contemporary democracies at the time of writing, and the only one covering nearly all elections held in our 21 countries of interest since the end of World War II.[30]

Combination of Manifesto and Survey Data. We proceed by matching one by one every single party reported in both the CMP and our dataset. This was possible for a total of 459 parties, allowing us to cover over 90% of votes cast in nearly all elections contained in the survey data.[31] The remaining correspond either to independent candidates, or to small parties for which data was not available in the CMP. To the best of our knowledge, this represents the

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[30] Other available datasets on political supply, such as the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (https://www.chesdata.eu/), sometimes contain more detailed questions on parties' orientations. However, they unfortunately do not cover the decades preceding the 1990s or the 2000s, which is why we do not exploit them in this paper.

[31] The share of votes covered by the dataset in each country is reported in appendix Figure B1.

most comprehensive mapping between political supply and demand ever built in comparative research.

Indicators of Interest. Following the political science literature, we consider two main indicators of political supply proposed by Bakker & Hobolt (2013). The indicators correspond to parties' positions on two axes of political cleavages: an "economic-distributive" axis representing class-based divides over economic policy and inequality, and a "sociocultural" axis mapping conflicts over issues such as law and order, the environment, multiculturalism, or immigration.[32]

The economic-distributive indicator is equal to the difference between the percentage of "pro-free-market" statements and "pro-redistribution" statements in a given party's manifesto. Pro-redistribution emphases include, among others, proposals to expand social services, nationalize industries, or enhance social justice. Meanwhile, pro-free-market statements encompass references to the limitation of social services, economic incentives, and free enterprise.

Conversely, the sociocultural indicator is defined as the difference between the percentage of "progressive" emphases and "conservative" emphases. Conservative emphases include categories such as political authority, positive evaluations of traditional morality, or negative attitudes towards multiculturalism. Progressive emphases cover issues related to environmentalism, the protection of underprivileged minority groups, or favorable mentions of multiculturalism.

Given that manifesto items sum by definition to 100%, both indicators theoretically range from -1 to 1, with 1 representing a case of a party exclusively emphasizing pro-free-market/conservative values, and -1 that of a party exclusively emphasizing pro-redistribution/progressive values. While these measures of political ideology remain relatively broad and are not exempt from measurement error given the nature of political manifestos, they

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[32] The manifesto items used to derive the economic-distributive and sociocultural indicators are reported in appendix Table B1.

represent the best data at our disposal to study the link between political supply and demand in the long run.

Let us also stress at this stage that by operating this distinction between economic and sociocultural dimensions of political conflict, we are not suggesting in any way that sociocultural divides are purely conflicts over identity or morality that would be fully exempt from material concerns. Immigration, environmental, and cultural policies can have strong distributional implications, for instance by disproportionally affecting low-skilled workers or by mostly benefitting residents of large cities, who tend to concentrate a larger share of the higher-educated electorate. In that respect, the emergence of a secondary dimension of political conflict linked to education should also be understood as incorporating new forms of socioeconomic cleavages.

IV.B. The Evolution of Ideological Polarization

How has the structure of economic and sociocultural conflicts changed in Western democracies since the end of World War II, and to what extent can this account for the growing disconnection between the influences of income and education on the vote? Figure 8 provides a first answer to this question by displaying the evolution of the average economic-distributive and sociocultural scores of specific families of parties between 1945 and 2020.[33] Indices are normalized by the average score by decade so as to better highlight the dynamics of polarization.

[Figure 8 here]

Polarization on economic issues has remained remarkably stable in the past decades. The economic-distributive score of social democratic and socialist parties has remained 9 to 14 points below average, while that of conservative parties has fluctuated between +8 and +11. Green parties, which started gaining electoral significance at the beginning of the 1980s, have

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[33] The underlying figures are reported in appendix Table B2. See appendix Figures B2 to B8 for a complete representation of the political space by decade.

held economic positions that are comparable to that of traditional left-wing parties. Anti-immigration parties have moved closer to the average position of conservative parties, after a period of particularly strong emphasis on pro-free-market policies. This is consistent with qualitative accounts on the ideological transformation of far-right movements in Western Europe, from the Freedom Party of Austria (Durrer de la Sota et al., 2021) to the French Rassemblement National (Piketty, 2018) and the True Finns (Martínez-Toledano & Sodano, 2021), which have increasingly shifted to defending economic redistributive policies in recent years.

Meanwhile, polarization on the sociocultural axis of political conflict has dramatically risen since the 1970s, after a brief period of convergence in the early postwar decades. This polarization has been driven by both old and new parties. Between 1970 and 2020, social democratic and socialist parties increasingly emphasized progressive issues, as their deviation from the mean sociocultural score declined linearly from -0.6 to -5.4, while conservative parties shifted to more conservative positions. Green parties have consistently emphasized progressive issues to much greater extent than other parties since their emergence in the 1980s, with a stable score of about -25. Finally, anti-immigration parties have seen their score on the sociocultural axis surge, from +4 in the 1970s to +20 in the 2010s.

Beyond these two indicators of party ideology, we provide more detailed results on the structure of the manifestos of each of these party families in the appendix.[34] Two key results stand out from these disaggregated figures.[35] First, the conservative turn of both anti-immigration and other right-wing parties has been mainly driven by three items coded in the database: positive emphases of "national way of life" (including appeals to nationalism and patriotism), positive emphases of "law and order" (corresponding to favorable mentions of strict law enforcement

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[34] See appendix Tables B3 to B7.

[35] Complete definitions of each of these items, which are directly used to code the database from the original manifestos, can be found at https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/coding_schemes/mp_v4.

and stricter actions against crime), and negative mentions of multiculturalism.[36] Meanwhile, green and other left-wing parties have dedicated a growing share of their manifestos to environmental issues and to positive emphases of an "anti-growth economy" (including opposition to growth causing environmental damage and calls for a more sustainable development path). Second, we find that left-wing and right-wing parties do continue to differ on many issues on the economic-distributive dimension. In particular, both green and other left-wing parties tend to put greater emphasis on welfare, equality and social justice, and education, while the manifestos of both anti-immigration and other right-wing parties contain a larger share of sentences promoting a free-market economy and welfare state limitation.

In summary, looking at the supply side suggests that the rise of green and anti-immigration parties since the 1970s-1980s has not substantially altered the structure of economic conflict in Western democracies, given that these parties have adopted positions on distributive issues that are comparable to that of the traditional left and the traditional right. It is on the sociocultural axis that polarization has deepened, as green and anti-immigration parties have emphasized sociocultural divides to a much greater extent than preexisting political forces.

IV.C. Ideological Polarization and the Transformation of Electoral Divides

The stability of economic-distributive conflicts and the rise of sociocultural divides resonates well with our finding on the stability of the income gradient and the reversal of the education cleavage. In particular, if the two phenomena are related, one might expect to observe that (1) parties with more progressive positions attract a relatively higher share of higher-educated

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[36] Consistently with the idea that new ethnoreligious minorities perceive conservative and anti-immigration parties as particularly hostile to their integration, we find that immigrants and Muslim voters have been substantially more likely to vote for social democratic and affiliated parties than other voters in the past decade (see appendix Figures CE1 and CE2). This new "nativist" cleavage is stronger in countries where anti-immigration parties receive a larger share of popular votes. We also find deep and persistent divides between voters belonging to different racial or ethnic groups in the three countries for which we have self-reported data on ethnoracial affiliations: New Zealand, the United States, and the United Kingdom (see appendix Tables E14, E20, and E21).

voters, (2) this relation should rise over time as the sociocultural axis of political conflict gained prominence, and (3) countries that are more polarized on sociocultural issues should have higher education gradients, thereby accounting for the cross-country variations documented in section III.

Figure 9 provides strong descriptive evidence that the reversal of the education cleavage and the rise of a second dimension of political conflict are tightly associated. The upper line represents the correlation between the education gradient of a given party and the sociocultural index of this party by decade, computed across all parties available in the database. This correlation was close to zero and not statistically significant in the 1960s. It has risen monotonically since then, from 0.1 in the 1970s to 0.3 in the 1990s and finally 0.46 in the past decade.[37] Meanwhile, as represented in the bottom line, the correlation between the income gradient and the position of a given party on the economic-distributive axis has remained very stable and negative over the entire period.[38] In other words, higher-educated voters have gradually converged in supporting parties with progressive positions, while high-income voters continue to vote for parties with pro-free-market positions just as much as they used to in the immediate postwar era. We show in the appendix that this transformation is robust to controlling for the composition of parties' electorates in terms of other variables (age, gender, etc.), as well as to accounting for country, year, and election fixed effects.[39]

[Figure 9 here]

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[37] The same result holds when considering the composition of parties' electorates in terms of top 50% education and income voters: see appendix Figure B9. See also appendix Figures B10 to B14, which plot the associated scatter plot by decade and decompose specific families of parties.

[38] The economic-distributive is inverted here, so as to better highlight its similarity with Figure 1.

[39] See appendix Table B9, which reports full regression results before and after controls.

We also investigate in greater detail how these correlations vary across all items available in the Comparative Manifesto Project database.[40] We find that the transformation documented above is visible in nearly all subcategories. In the 1960s-1970s, the education gradient was not significantly correlated to any of the items composing the sociocultural index. By 2010-2020, it has become very strongly negatively correlated to positive emphases of "law and order," "national way of life," and "traditional morality," and to negative mentions of "multiculturalism." At the same time, it has become strongly positively correlated to positive emphases of "culture," "anti-growth economy," "freedom and human rights," "environmentalism," and "multiculturalism." These results suggest that the emergence of a new sociocultural axis of political conflict cannot be narrowed down to a single topic of divergence: it involves conflicting visions and priorities over a complex and diverse set of issues.

Figure 10 plots the cross-country relation between a simple measure of ideological polarization, defined as the standard deviation of the sociocultural index across all parties in a given election, and the education gradient in the past decade. The relation between the two indicators is strongly positive: countries in which parties compete more on sociocultural issues also display a greater propensity of higher-educated voters to support social democratic, socialist, green, and affiliated parties. In particular, we see that Portugal and Ireland, which were identified as two exceptions showing no clear trend toward a reversal of the education cleavage, are the two countries where sociocultural polarization is today the lowest.[41] While the small number of countries makes it

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[40] See appendix Table B10, which reports correlation coefficients between all items available in the CMP dataset and our education and income indicators.

[41] Notice that the indicator mechanically "overestimates" polarization in highly fragmented party systems such as that of Denmark, while it underestimates it in countries with fewer parties such as the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and the United States. This may explain why these countries have lower levels of sociocultural polarization than one might expect.

difficult to precisely identify the evolution of this relationship, we also find that it has grown over time, in line with our party-level analysis.[42]

[Figure 10 here]

Results combining data on political supply and demand therefore suggest that the emergence of a new sociocultural axis of political conflict has strongly contributed to the reversal of the education cleavage in Western democracies. As parties have progressively come to compete on sociocultural issues, electoral behaviors have become increasingly clustered by education group. This relation holds at the country level, with the divergence between education and income being more pronounced in democracies where parties compete more fiercely on this new dimension of electoral divides.

V. Electoral Change in Western Democracies: Alternative Explanations and Other Dimensions of Political Conflict

This section builds on our new dataset on political cleavages in Western democracies to study alternative explanations and heterogeneity in the reversal of the education cleavage and analyze other dimensions of political conflict. Section V.A investigates to what extent our finding on the reversal of educational divides can be explained by changes in the composition of education groups. Section V.B explores heterogeneity in this reversal in terms of age, gender, religion, and other variables available in our dataset. Section V.C briefly discusses the evolution of other electoral cleavages in Western democracies, independently from education and income.

V.A. Can Compositional Changes Explain the Reversal of Educational Divides?

In previous sections, we have studied the reversal of the education cleavage across all Western democracies, with little consideration for changes in the link between education and the other

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[42] See appendix Figure B15, which reproduces Figure 8 at the country level.

variables in our dataset. While we have shown that this reversal is robust to accounting for all available controls, it remains unclear to what extent shifts in the composition of education groups over time could still account for some of the transformation. It is well-known, for instance, that women have become both more educated (e.g., Vincent-Lancrin, 2008; Riphahn & Schwientek, 2015; Parro, 2016) and more left-wing than men in the past decades (see section V.C below). The realignment of gender divides could thus have contributed to generating the move of higher-educated voters toward social democratic and affiliated parties. Similarly, the secularization of Western societies and the associated increase in the share of non-religious voters, who tend to be more educated, could have facilitated the transformation of the education cleavage.

To investigate the role of these various factors, we conduct two complementary analyses: a comparison of the education gradient before and after controls, and a Kitagawa-Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of the education cleavage.[43]

We find that the inclusion of control variables only marginally affects the overall change in the link between education and the vote of the past decades.[44] More precisely, top 10% educated voters were less likely to vote for social democratic and affiliated parties by 21.6 percentage points in the 1960s, while they were more likely to do so by 5.3 points in the 2010s. This represents an overall change in the education gradient of 26.9 percentage points. Adding controls does slightly affect the level of the coefficient, but it does not significantly affect the

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[43] To derive meaningful comparisons, we restrict the analysis in this section to countries for which we have data since the 1960s and the richest comparable set of covariates (Australia, Denmark, Finland, France, the Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States).

[44] See appendix Table D9, which reports the evolution of the education gradient before and after controlling for each covariate available in our database.

trend.[45] As a result, we estimate that the education gap after controlling for all available covariates (gender, age, religion, religious practice, rural/urban location, region of residence, employment and marital status, public/private sector of employment, union membership, and home ownership) has moved from about -18.8 to 3.6 over the past six decades, amounting to a shift of 22.4 percentage points. By this measure, changes in the composition of education groups can only account for about 16% of the transformation of educational divides.

Another, more formal way to evaluate what fraction of the reversal is due to changes in the composition of groups is to directly estimate a two-way Kitagawa-Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of the education gradient (Kitagawa, 1955; Blinder, 1973; Oaxaca, 1973). This allows us to decompose the marginal effect of education into two components: one that can be explained by group differences in predictors (that is, differences in the composition of education groups in terms of age, gender, etc.), and one that remains unexplained. As above, we find that other variables largely fail to account for the reversal of educational divides: the actual coefficient shifts from -22.5 to +10.4 between 1961-65 and 2016-20 (corresponding to a 32.9 points change), while the unexplained component increases from -19.6 to +7.6 (corresponding to a 27.2 points change).[46] This implies that these covariates can only predict 17% of the reversal observed over the period considered.

V.B. Heterogeneity in the Reversal of Educational Divides

Although compositional changes only explain between 16 and 17% of the reversal of the educational divide, we find important heterogeneity in the reversal when further decomposing voters into subgroups by different socioeconomic characteristics.

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[45] For instance, controlling for income shifts the gradient upwards, because high-income voters are both more educated and more likely to vote for right-wing parties, but it does so by a comparable magnitude throughout the period.

[46] This decomposition is represented in appendix Figure A51.

Generational dynamics, in particular, appear to have played a major role in generating the reversal of the education cleavage. Figure 11 decomposes the evolution of the education gradient by cohort of voters born at different decades of the twentieth century. Higher-educated voters have been more likely to vote for social democratic and affiliated parties than lower-educated voters within generations born after the 1940s, while the opposite is true among generations born before World War II. New generations have thus become increasingly divided along educational lines, suggesting that the education cleavage could continue rising in the future, as old generations voting along historical class lines gradually disappear from the political landscape. The reversal of the education cleavage has, however, also taken place within recent cohorts, which points to the role of other factors potentially related to political supply or ideological change, as documented in Section IV.

We also extend this analysis to other variables beyond decade of birth by considering the unconditional effect of belonging to top 10% educated voters on the probability to support social democratic and affiliated parties by subgroup of voters.[47] In the 2010s, the educational divide is higher among men than women, among non-religious voters than religious voters, among public sector than private sector employees, and in rural areas than in urban areas. The reversal in the educational divide has also been highest among non-religious voters (from -24 percentage points in the 1940s-1950s to +7.8 in 2010-2020) and among men (from -25.1 percentage points in the 1940s-1950s to +6.9 in 2010-2020). That being said, it has occurred within nearly all groups. Overall, this evidence reveals that although there exist interesting heterogeneities by subgroup of voters, the reversal of the educational divide has been a widespread phenomenon that is not linked to a particular subgroup of voters.

V.C. The Evolution of Other Electoral Cleavages

We conclude this paper by briefly discussing the evolution of other determinants of electoral behaviors. Our main finding is that there has been either a stability or a decline of their impact

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[47] See appendix Table D10.

on vote choices. The major exception is gender, for which we do find a significant reversal, comparable in magnitude to that of the education cleavage.

Generational Cleavages. Young voters have always been more likely to vote for left-wing parties than older cohorts in the majority of Western democracies. However, while there are fluctuations across countries and over time, we do not find any evidence that this cleavage has deepened in recent decades.[48] We also document significant variations in the profile of the vote for anti-immigration parties by age across Western democracies: the share of votes received by these parties increases with age in Denmark, Italy, Norway, New Zealand, Switzerland, and Sweden, but it clearly decreases with age in Austria, Spain, Finland, and France.[49] These findings put into question the strand of the political science literature that has argued that political change in Western democracies would have a strong generational dimension, and that the emergence of populist authoritarian leaders in recent years would have partly represented a "backlash" against social progress among the older generations (see Inglehart, 1977; Inglehart and Norris 2019). As shown in the previous section, educational divides *within* recent cohorts, rather than conflicts between generations, seem to represent a more significant source of electoral realignment in contemporary democracies.

Rural-urban Cleavages. We also find that rural-urban divides have remained remarkably stable in the past seven decades: rural areas continue to be more likely to vote for conservative and affiliated parties by 5 to 15 percentage points in most Western democracies today, just as they used to in the 1950s-1960s.[50] Furthermore, the fragmentation of the political space in multi-

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[48] See appendix Figures CA1 to CA4, which plot the relative support of young and old voters for social democratic and affiliated parties in all Western democracies, before and after controls.

[49] See appendix Figures CA5 to CA7, which represent the age profile of support for green and anti-immigration parties in the last decade.

[50] See appendix Figure CB1, which represents the evolution of the gap in left votes between rural and urban areas in all countries.

party systems has been associated with a reshuffling of rural-urban divides *within* rather than across left-right blocs: support for green parties tends to be concentrated in cities today, just like other left-wing parties, while anti-immigration parties generally fare better in rural areas, as is the case of other conservative parties.[51] The stability of the rural-urban cleavage thus rules out this dimension as the primary driver of electoral change since the end of World War II.[52]

Religious Cleavages. Religious divides do not seem to have undergone any clear reversal in the past decades either. In all countries with available data, religious voters have always been substantially less likely to vote for social democratic and affiliated parties than non-religious voters.[53] This gap has slightly declined in most countries since the 1960s, but it remains decisively negative. Moreover, while green movements often disproportionately attract non-religious individuals, this does not make them very different from other left-wing parties, which have always found greater support among secular voters too. Support for anti-immigration parties appears to vary little across religious groups in most countries, so that their progression in recent decades has contributed to further weakening the religious cleavage.[54]

Gender Cleavages. We also corroborate across all Western democracies a well-known fact (Abendschön & Steinmetz, 2014; Inglehart and Norris, 2000; Edlund & Pande, 2002): women

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[51] The share of votes received by green and anti-immigration parties by rural-urban location is represented in appendix Figures CB2 and CB3, respectively.

[52] Notice, however, that a few Western democracies (in particular Australia, Belgium, Britain, and France) seem to have witnessed a significant transformation of center-periphery cleavages in recent years, as left-wing parties have concentrated a growing share of the vote in capital cities (see appendix Figures CB4 to CB8). We do not push further this analysis, which would require relying on other data sources such as localized election results.

[53] See appendix Figure CC1. As shown in the country-specific regression tables of appendix E, furthermore, religious voters going frequently to church are even more likely to vote for conservative and affiliated parties than those with lower religious practice. This points to the existence of a cleavage between the more or less conservative constituencies of the Catholic and Protestant electorates.

[54] See appendix Figures CC5 (green parties) and CC6 (anti-immigration parties).

used to be significantly more conservative than men and have gradually become more likely to vote for social democratic and affiliated parties.[55] This transition, as in the case of the education cleavage, has been very gradual and is visible as early as the 1950s. In line with the existing literature, we find that much of the negative gradient of the early postwar decades can be explained by the fact that women used to be more religious than men (Blondel, 1970; Goot & Reid, 1984). In particular, this explains why the gender divide was exceptionally large in Italy in the 1950s, where religious cleavages were historically more pronounced than in most Western democracies. However, the reversal does hold even after controlling for all available variables.[56] Along with education, gender is thus one of the only two variables in our dataset for which a complete reversal of electoral divides seems to have taken place.[57]

Other socioeconomic cleavages. Our dataset also makes it possible to study the evolution of the vote by union membership, public-private sector of employment, and home ownership. Union members have always been substantially more likely to vote for social democratic and affiliated parties than non-union members. This gap has slightly declined in most Western

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[55] See appendix Figure CD2, which plots the evolution of the gender cleavage in all Western democracies.

[56] See appendix Figures CD3, which represents the evolution of the gender gap after controlling for religion and church attendance. Appendix Figure CD1 compares the reversal of gender divides before and after controls across all Western democracies.

[57] Several explanations have been given to this reversal. In the US and Western Europe, the decline of marriage, the rise of divorce, and the economic fragility of women have been shown to be important drivers behind the emergence of the modern gender gap (Abendschön & Steinmetz, 2014; Edlund & Pande, 2002). In Northern Europe, the expansion of women's employment in the public sector has also been an important factor behind the increase in the vote for the left among women in recent decades (Knutsen, 2001; we reproduce this result in appendix Figure CD4). Women have also been more attracted by environmental issues, which have spurred women's support for green parties, while anti-immigration parties have generally found greater support among men (Givens, 2004; see appendix Figures CD5 and CD6).

democracies since the 1960s, but it remains positive in all countries.[58] Albeit some exceptions (e.g., Italy, Luxembourg, Belgium), public sector workers have always been substantially more likely to vote for social democratic and affiliated parties.[59] Finally, homeowners have always been much less likely to vote for social democratic and affiliated parties than renters.[60] This gap has mildly decreased in most countries, but it remains negative. Homeowners thus have on average a similar voting profile as high-income earners, which is consistent with the strong correlation that exists between income and wealth.

VI. Conclusion

The new historical database on political cleavages in 21 Western democracies introduced in this article reveals some striking facts. In the early postwar decades, social democratic and affiliated parties represented both the low-education and the low-income electorates, while conservative and affiliated parties represented both high-education and high-income voters. These party systems have gradually evolved towards "multiconflictual" or "multi-elite" party systems in most Western democracies, in which higher-educated voters vote for the "left", whereas high-income voters still vote for the "right."

Results combining our database on political demand with political supply data from the Comparative Manifesto Project suggest that the emergence of a new sociocultural axis of political conflict has been tightly associated with the reversal of the education cleavage in Western democracies. As parties have progressively come to compete on sociocultural issues,

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[58] See appendix Figures CF5 and CF6, which plot the difference between the share of union members and the share of other voters voting for social democratic and affiliated parties, before and after controls.

[59] See appendix Figures CF7 (before controls) and CF8 (after controls). The sectoral cleavage reversed in Italy and Belgium in the 1990s and currently public sector workers are more likely to vote for social democratic and affiliated parties than non-public sector workers, in line with most Western democracies.

[60] See appendix Figures CF9 (before controls) and CF10 (after controls).

electoral behaviors have become increasingly clustered by education group. This transformation has been most pronounced in democracies where parties compete most fiercely on this new dimension of electoral divides.

The remarkable divergence of political conflicts related to income and education documented in this paper, two strongly correlated measures of socioeconomic status, could also contribute to explaining why rising income and wealth disparities have not led to renewed class conflicts. It might also shed light on the reasons why growing inequalities have not been met by greater redistribution in many countries, as political systems could come to increasingly oppose two coalitions embodying the interests of two kinds of elites.

While multiple lessons have emerged from this new database, we acknowledge the analysis remains insufficient and is not exempted from limitations. First, the indicators of political supply used in this paper and more generally the CMP data capture the tendency of parties to *emphasize* specific issues and are therefore unable to perfectly measure their *position* on these issues. Moreover, the policy categories coded in the CMP database unfortunately remain very broad, which precludes us from analyzing in greater detail more specific types of issues such as gender equality, immigration, trade protectionism, or education policy. Addressing these two shortcomings would require going back to the original manifestos and deriving new indicators from text analysis or alternative coding techniques.

Secondly, while our descriptive analysis has provided strong suggestive evidence that the reversal of the education cleavage and the rise of a new sociocultural axis of political conflict were interrelated phenomena, much remains to be understood when it comes to the mechanisms underlying this transformation. In particular, it remains unclear whether the reversal of educational divides was driven by a change in political supply independently from the structure of collective beliefs, or whether changing supply was on the contrary driven by changing social attitudes across education groups. While some studies have suggested that social divides between groups have remained stable on a number of issues in the long run (e.g., Evans & Tilley, 2017; Bertrand & Kamenica, 2020), which would point to the role of shifts in supply, the data at our disposal does not allow us to disentangle these different channels of causality. A promising avenue for future research lies in establishing more directly the causal impact of

political supply on the transformation of political cleavages. This would require identifying quasi-experimental settings in which parties exogenously change position on specific issues or suddenly shift to emphasizing new concerns.

Finally, the electoral surveys exploited in this paper rely on samples of a few thousands of voters available since the end of World War II that are sufficient to reveal major trends at the national level, but prevent us from carrying more refined and long-run analyses. Other sources and methods, such as localized election results linked to census data, could be mobilized to broaden the historical perspective and perform more granular analyses.

All of these issues raise important challenges that we hope will contribute to stimulating new research in these multiple directions.

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Table 1 - A New Dataset on Political Cleavages in Western Democracies, 1948-2020

	Time period	Elections	Main data source	Data quality	Avg. sample size
Australia	1963-2019	18	Australian Election Studies	High	2382
Austria	1971-2017	10	Eurobarometers, European Social Survey	Medium	3831
Belgium	1971-2014	14	Belgian National Election Study	High	4817
Canada	1963-2019	17	Canadian Election Studies	High	3302
Denmark	1960-2015	21	Danish Election Studies	High	2819
Finland	1972-2015	11	Finnish Voter Barometers	High	2452
France	1956-2017	17	French Election Studies	High	3208
Germany	1949-2017	19	German Federal Election Studies	High	2782
Iceland	1978-2017	12	Icelandic National Election Studies	High	1488
Ireland	1973-2020	13	Eurobarometers, European Social Survey	Medium	7115
Italy	1953-2018	14	Italian National Election Studies	High	2147
Luxembourg	1974-2018	9	Eurobarometers, European Election Studies	Low	3890
Netherlands	1967-2017	15	Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies	High	2068
New Zealand	1972-2017	16	New Zealand Election Studies	High	2555
Norway	1957-2017	15	Norwegian Election Studies	High	1964
Portugal	1983-2019	10	Portuguese Election Studies	High	1822
Spain	1979-2019	14	CIS Election Surveys	High	8996
Sweden	1956-2014	19	Swedish National Election Studies	High	3088
Switzerland	1967-2019	14	Swiss Election Studies	High	3328
United Kingdom	1955-2017	16	British Election Studies	High	5262
United States	1948-2020	18	American National Election Studies	High	2179

Source: authors' elaboration.

Note: the table presents, for each country, the time coverage of the dataset, the number of elections covered, the main data source used, the quality of electoral surveys, and the average sample size of these surveys.

Figure 1 - The Disconnection of Income and Education Cleavages in Western democracies

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.

Note: in the 1960s, both higher-educated and high-income voters were less likely to vote for left-wing (social democratic / socialist / communist / green / other left-wing) parties than lower-educated and low-income voters by more than 10 percentage points. The left vote has gradually become associated with higher education voters, giving rising to a complete divergence of the effects of income and education on the vote. Figures correspond to five-year averages for Australia, Britain, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the US. Estimates control for income/education, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).

Figure 2 - The reversal of educational divides in Western democracies
Panel A. English-speaking and Northern European countries

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.

Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of higher-educated (top 10%) and lower-educated (bottom 90%) voters voting for social democratic / socialist / communist / green / other left-wing parties in English-speaking and Northern European countries. In nearly all countries, higher-educated voters used to be significantly more likely to vote for conservative parties and have gradually become more likely to vote for these parties. Estimates control for income, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).

Figure 2 - The reversal of educational divides in Western democracies
Panel B. Continental and Southern European countries

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of higher-educated (top 10%) and lower-educated (bottom 90%) voters voting for social democratic / socialist / communist / green / other left-wing parties in Continental and Southern European countries. In nearly all countries, higher-educated voters used to be significantly more likely to vote for conservative parties and have gradually become more likely to vote for these parties. Estimates control for income, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).

Figure 3 - The stability/decline of income divides in Western democracies
Panel A. English-speaking and Northern European countries

Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of high-income (top 10%) and low-income (bottom 90%) voters voting for social democratic / socialist / communist / green / other left-wing parties in English-speaking and Northern European countries. In all countries, top-income voters have remained significantly less likely to vote for these parties than low-income voters. Estimates control for education, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).

Figure 3 - The stability/decline of income divides in Western democracies
## Panel B. Continental and Southern European countries

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of high-income (top 10%) and low-income (bottom 90%) voters voting for social democratic / socialist / communist / green / other left-wing parties in Continental and Southern European countries. In all countries, top-income voters have remained significantly less likely to vote for these parties than low-income voters. Estimates control for education, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).

Figure 4 - The transformation of Western party systems, 1945-2020

Source: authors' computations using official election results data.

Note: the figure represents the average share of votes received by selected families of political parties in Western democracies between the 1940s and the 2010s. Communist parties saw their average scores collapse from 7% to less than 0.5%, while green and anti-immigration parties rose until reaching average vote shares of 8% and 11%, respectively. Decennial averages over all Western democracies except Spain and Portugal (no democratic elections before 1970s) and the United States and the United Kingdom (two-party systems). The dashed lines delimit the categorization of parties considered in the main specification (social democrats and affiliated, conservatives and affiliated, and other parties).

Figure 5 - Decomposition by party family
Panel A. The reversal of educational divides in Western democracies

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.

Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of top 10% educated voters and the share of bottom 90% educated voters voting for specific families of parties. Figures correspond to five-year averages over all countries available for a given time period (unbalanced panel of all 21 Western democracies). The estimates are presented after controlling for income, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).

Figure 5 - Decomposition by party family
Panel B. The decline/stability of income divides in Western democracies

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of top 10% income voters and the share of bottom 90% income voters voting for specific families of parties. Figures correspond to five-year averages over all countries available for a given time period (unbalanced panel of all 21 Western democracies). The estimates are presented after controlling for education, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).

Figure 6 - The fragmentation of political cleavage structures.
Panel A. 1961-1965

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of high-income (top 10%) and low-income (bottom 90%) voters voting for selected groups of parties on the y-axis, and the same difference between higher-educated (top 10%) and lower-educated (bottom 90%) voters on the x-axis. In the 1960s, social democratic, socialist, and communist parties were supported by both low-income and lower-educated voters, while conservative, Christian, and liberal parties were supported by both high-income and higher-educated voters. Averages over all Western democracies. Estimates control for income/education, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).

Figure 6 - The fragmentation of political cleavage structures.
Panel B. 2016-2020

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of high-income (top 10%) and low-income (bottom 90%) voters voting for selected groups of parties on the y-axis, and the same difference between higher-educated (top 10%) and lower-educated (bottom 90%) voters on the x-axis. Education most clearly distinguishes anti-immigration from green parties, while both income and education most clearly distinguishes conservative and Christian democratic parties from socialist, social democratic, and communist parties. Averages over all Western democracies. Estimates control for income/education, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).

**Figure 7 - Decomposing income and education cleavages
Panel A. Social Democrats / Socialists / Communists vs. Conservatives /
Christian democrats / Liberals**

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of high-income (top 10%) and low-income (bottom 90%) voters voting for selected groups of parties on the y-axis, and the same difference between higher-educated (top 10%) and lower-educated (bottom 90%) voters on the x-axis, in the last election available (between 2014 and 2020). Estimates control for income/education, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).

Figure 7 - Decomposing income and education cleavages
Panel B. Green vs. Anti-immigration parties

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of high-income (top 10%) and low-income (bottom 90%) voters voting for selected groups of parties on the y-axis, and the same difference between higher-educated (top 10%) and lower-educated (bottom 90%) voters on the x-axis, in the last election available (between 2014 and 2020). Estimates control for income/education, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).

Figure 8 - The evolution of ideological polarization in Western democracies, 1945-2020
Panel A. Economic-distributive score by party family

Source: authors' computations using the Comparative Manifesto Project database.

Note: the figure displays the average economic-distributive scores by decade for four families of parties across all Western democracies: social democratic, socialist, communist, and other left-wing parties; conservative, Christian democratic, and liberal parties; anti-immigration parties; and green parties. Negative values on the economic-distributive index correspond to greater proportions of pro-redistribution emphases relatively to pro-free-market emphases. Indices are normalized by the average score by decade so as to better highlight the dynamics of polarization.

Figure 8 - The evolution of ideological polarization in Western democracies, 1945-2020
Panel B. Sociocultural score by party family

Source: authors' computations using the Comparative Manifesto Project database.

Note: the figure displays the average sociocultural scores by decade for four families of parties across all Western democracies: social democratic, socialist, communist, and other left-wing parties; conservative, Christian democratic, and liberal parties; anti-immigration parties; and green parties. Negative values on the sociocultural index correspond to greater proportions of progressive emphases relatively to conservative emphases. Indices are normalized by the average score by decade so as to better highlight the dynamics of polarization.

Figure 9 - Multidimensional political conflict and the divergence of income and education cleavages

Note: the upper lines plots the raw correlation between the education gradient (defined as the share of top 10% educated voters within the electorate of a given party) and the sociocultural index across all parties in the database. The bottom line plots the raw correlation between the income gradient (defined as the share of top 10% income voters within the electorate of a given party) and the economic-distributive index (inverted, so that higher values correspond to greater pro-redistribution emphases). The unit of observation is the political party. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

Figure 10 - Sociocultural polarization and educational divides

Source: authors' computations combining the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database with Manifesto Project data.
Note: the figure represents the relationship between sociocultural polarization (defined as the standard deviation of the sociocultural index across all parties in a given country) and the education cleavage for all 21 Western democracies in the 2010s. Higher-educated voters are significantly more likely to support left-wing parties in countries where polarization on the sociocultural axis is higher.

Figure 11 - Generational dynamics and educational divides
The education cleavage by birth cohort

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of higher-educated (top 10%) and lower-educated (bottom 90%) voters voting for social democratic / socialist / communist / green parties within specific cohorts of voters. Between the 1960s and the 1990s, lower-educated voters born in the early decades of the twentieth century remained significantly more likely to vote for these parties than higher-educated voters born during the same period. In the last decade, on the contrary, young lower-educated voters were significantly less likely to vote for these parties than young higher-educated voters. Figures correspond to ten-year averages for Australia, Britain, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the US.

Brahmin Left versus Merchant Right: Changing Political Cleavages in 21 Western Democracies, 1948-2020[∗]

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July 2021

APPENDIX

This appendix supplements our paper "Brahmin Left versus Merchant Right: Changing Political Cleavages in 21 Western Democracies, 1948-2020". It contains additional methodological details, as well as supplementary figures and tables.

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This appendix supplements our paper "Brahmin Left versus Merchant Right: Changing Political Cleavages in Western Democracies, 1948-2020". Appendix A presents the methodology used to derive quantile groups from discrete categories. Appendix B contains supplementary figures and tables.

Appendix A. Estimation of quantile groups from discrete categories

One of the contributions of this paper is to provide data on the vote share received by specific parties and coalitions by income and education groups, decomposing for instance the population into its poorest or least educated half (the bottom 50%), the next 40% (the middle 40%), and the highest decile (the top 10%). Such groups are key to track political cleavages over time and compare them across countries. The problem is that existing surveys do not provide continuous values for income or education: these variables are most often coded in discrete categories (educational levels in the case of education, income brackets in the case of income).

To partially overcome this issue, we introduce a simple reweighing method, which exploits the distribution of individuals in each bracket or category to approximate quantiles. Consider for example the 2015 Canadian Election Study, which contains an income variable coded in eighteen brackets (see table 1). One is interested in computing the proportion of individuals belonging to the lowest income decile voting for the New Democratic Party $\bar{y}_{\{d=1\}}$, where y is a binary variable taking 1 is the respondent voted for the NDP and 0 otherwise, and where d refers to the income decile to which the respondents belong. Unfortunately, this is not directly possible with this income variable since only 5% of individuals belong to the first income bracket ($b = 1$), and 15.5% of them belong to the lowest two brackets ($b \in [1,2]$). If support for the NDP decreases linearly with income, then $\bar{y}_{\{b=1\}}$ will strongly overestimate $\bar{y}_{\{d=1\}}$, while $\bar{y}_{\{b=2\}}$ will strongly underestimate it since we are looking at individuals who are on average too poor in the first case and too rich in the second. However, it is easy to see that since individuals within the second bracket range from quantiles 0.05 to 0.155, this means that $\frac{0.05}{0.155-0.05} \approx 48\%$ of them belong to the bottom 10%, while 52% of them belong to the rest of the population, assuming for simplicity that individuals within brackets are uniformly distributed.

Table 1 - Reweighing categories to approximate quantiles: example for income brackets in Canada, 2015

Bracket number	Frequency range	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
		Decile-specific reweighting factor									
1	0.000 - 0.050	1									
2	0.050 - 0.155	.48	.52								
3	0.155 - 0.201		.97	.03							
4	0.201 - 0.253			1							
5	0.253 - 0.309			.84	.16						
6	0.309 - 0.355				1						
7	0.355 - 0.478				.36	.64					
8	0.478 - 0.529					.43	.57				
9	0.529 - 0.554						1				
10	0.554 - 0.599						1				
11	0.599 - 0.652						.02	.98			
12	0.652 - 0.734							.59	.41		
13	0.734 - 0.767								1		
14	0.767 - 0.807								.82	.18	
15	0.807 - 0.876									1	
16	0.876 - 0.902									.92	.08
17	0.902 - 0.973										1
18	0.973 - 1.000										1

Note: author's computations based on the 2015 Canadian Election Study. *Interpretation*: individuals belonging to the second income bracket represent 10% of the population and are located above the 5% poorest individuals, but within the 15.5% poorest. Assuming that individuals' incomes are uniformly distributed within this income bracket, this implies that 48% of them belong to bottom 10% earners and 52% of them are in the second income decile. To approximate the mean of a variable y for individuals within the first decile of income, one can therefore give a weight of 1 to those in the first bracket, a weight of 0.48 to those in the second bracket, and compute the weighed mean of y over these individuals.

Therefore, a reasonable approximation of the vote share received by the NDP among bottom 10% earners is a weighed average of vote shares in the two brackets:

$$\bar{y}_{\{d=1\}} = \frac{1 \times \bar{y}_{\{b=1\}} + 0.48 \times \bar{y}_{\{b=2\}}}{1 + 0.48}$$

This estimator is consistent, assuming that the average value taken by the dependent variable is constant within brackets. In practice, however, it does make sense to believe that the vote shares vary also within brackets in the same direction as observed between them. Therefore, this approximation should be considered as a lower bound of the true effect. Still, this method

clearly does much better than computing deciles or quintiles directly from brackets – which could in fact not be quantile groups given that frequencies would necessarily be imbalanced.

Figure 1 - From brackets to deciles: vote for the New Democratic Party by income group in Canada, 2015

Figure 1 shows the results obtained when computing vote shares for the New Democratic Party in the 2015 Canadian national election. Unsurprisingly, the two pictures look very similar, since computing vote shares by decile amounts to computing weighed averages across income brackets.

Another interesting aspect of this method is that it enables us to control for structural changes not only in income, but also in other ordered variables such as education, wealth or even rural-urban scales. If university graduates were originally 5% in the 1960s and increased up to 30% in the 2010s, for instance, then one can exploit detailed educational categories to approximate "top 10% educated voters". In the 1960s, this category is composed of both university graduates and some secondary educated voters; in the 2010s, it gives more weight to individuals with masters or PhDs. This is what we do throughout the paper.

Finally, one issue is that 'splitting' brackets into deciles implies that a single individual may belong to different quantile groups: in the example above, individuals in bracket 2 belong both to the first and the second deciles. While this is not problematic when computing averages, it makes regression models impossible to solve: without changing the dataset, one cannot compare the vote shares of the first and second decile with control variables.

To solve this problem, we expand the entire dataset as many times as the number of quantile groups required. In the case of deciles, for instance, the procedure consists in duplicating all observations ten times. Then, one simply needs to attribute the corresponding weights to duplicated individuals: individuals belonging to bracket 2 see their sample weight multiplied by 0.48 in their first observation, 0.52 in the second time they appear in the dataset, and 0 in all other instances. Since this process only reweighs individuals, it leaves the effect of other explanatory variables perfectly unchanged. Finally, to account for correlation of the outcome variable of interest across duplicated observations, we cluster standard errors by individual.

Appendix B. Supplementary figures and tables

Table A1 - Data sources

Country	Election	Source
Australia	1966	International Social Mobility and Politics File (Franklin et al. 1992)
Australia	1972	International Social Mobility and Politics File (Franklin et al. 1992)
Australia	1977	International Social Mobility and Politics File (Franklin et al. 1992)
Australia	1983	International Social Mobility and Politics File (Franklin et al. 1992)
Australia	1984	International Social Mobility and Politics File (Franklin et al. 1992)
Australia	1987	Australian Election Study
Australia	1990	Australian Election Study
Australia	1993	Australian Election Study
Australia	1996	Australian Election Study
Australia	1998	Australian Election Study
Australia	2001	Australian Election Study
Australia	2004	Australian Election Study
Australia	2007	Australian Election Study
Australia	2010	Australian Election Study
Australia	2013	Australian Election Study
Australia	2016	Australian Election Study
Australia	2019	Australian Election Study
Austria	1971	International Social Mobility and Politics File (Franklin et al. 1992)
Austria	1983	International Social Mobility and Politics File (Franklin et al. 1992)
Austria	1986	International Social Mobility and Politics File (Franklin et al. 1992)
Austria	1994	Eurobarometers
Austria	1995	Eurobarometers
Austria	1999	Eurobarometers
Austria	2002	European Social Survey
Austria	2006	European Social Survey
Austria	2013	Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES)
Austria	2017	Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES)
Belgium	1971	Eurobarometers
Belgium	1974	Eurobarometers
Belgium	1977	Eurobarometers
Belgium	1978	Eurobarometers
Belgium	1981	Eurobarometers
Belgium	1985	Eurobarometers
Belgium	1987	Eurobarometers
Belgium	1991	Belgium General Election Study
Belgium	1995	Belgium General Election Study
Belgium	1999	Belgium General Election Study
Belgium	2003	European Social Survey
Belgium	2007	European Social Survey
Belgium	2010	European Social Survey
Belgium	2014	European Social Survey
Canada	1963	Canadian Election Studies
Canada	1965	Canadian Election Studies
Canada	1968	Canadian Election Studies
Canada	1974	Canadian Election Studies

Canada	1979	Canadian Election Studies
Canada	1980	Canadian Election Studies
Canada	1984	Canadian Election Studies
Canada	1988	Canadian Election Studies
Canada	1993	Canadian Election Studies
Canada	1997	Canadian Election Studies
Canada	2000	Canadian Election Studies
Canada	2004	Canadian Election Studies
Canada	2006	Canadian Election Studies
Canada	2008	Canadian Election Studies
Canada	2011	Canadian Election Studies
Canada	2015	Canadian Election Studies
Canada	2019	Canadian Election Studies
Denmark	1960	Danish Election Study
Denmark	1964	Danish Election Study
Denmark	1966	Danish Election Study
Denmark	1968	Danish Election Study
Denmark	1971	Danish Election Study
Denmark	1973	Danish Election Study
Denmark	1975	Danish Election Study
Denmark	1977	Danish Election Study
Denmark	1979	Danish Election Study
Denmark	1981	Danish Election Study
Denmark	1984	Danish Election Study
Denmark	1987	Danish Election Study
Denmark	1988	Danish Election Study
Denmark	1990	Danish Election Study
Denmark	1994	Danish Election Study
Denmark	1998	Danish Election Study
Denmark	2001	Danish Election Study
Denmark	2005	Danish Election Study
Denmark	2007	Danish Election Study
Denmark	2011	Danish Election Study
Denmark	2015	Danish Election Study
Finland	1972	Finnish Voter Barometers
Finland	1975	Finnish Voter Barometers
Finland	1979	Finnish Voter Barometers
Finland	1983	Finnish Voter Barometers
Finland	1987	Finnish Voter Barometers
Finland	1995	Finnish Voter Barometers
Finland	1999	Finnish Voter Barometers
Finland	2003	Finnish Voter Barometers
Finland	2007	Finnish National Election Studies
Finland	2011	Finnish National Election Studies
Finland	2015	Finnish National Election Studies
France	1956	French Election Studies
France	1958	French Election Studies
France	1962	French Election Studies
France	1965	French Election Studies
France	1967	French Election Studies

France	1973	French Election Studies
France	1974	French Election Studies
France	1978	French Election Studies
France	1986	French Election Studies
France	1988	French Election Studies
France	1993	French Election Studies
France	1995	French Election Studies
France	1997	French Election Studies
France	2002	French Election Studies
France	2007	French Election Studies
France	2012	French Election Studies
France	2017	French election studies
Germany	1949	German Federal Election Studies
Germany	1953	German Federal Election Studies
Germany	1957	German Federal Election Studies
Germany	1961	German Federal Election Studies
Germany	1965	German Federal Election Studies
Germany	1969	German Federal Election Studies
Germany	1972	German Federal Election Studies
Germany	1976	German Federal Election Studies
Germany	1980	German Federal Election Studies
Germany	1983	German Federal Election Studies
Germany	1987	German Federal Election Studies
Germany	1990	German Federal Election Studies
Germany	1994	German Federal Election Studies
Germany	1998	German Federal Election Studies
Germany	2002	German Federal Election Studies
Germany	2005	German Federal Election Studies
Germany	2009	German Federal Election Studies
Germany	2013	German Federal Election Studies
Germany	2017	German Federal Election Studies
Iceland	1978	Icelandic National Election Studies
Iceland	1983	Icelandic National Election Studies
Iceland	1987	Icelandic National Election Studies
Iceland	1991	Icelandic National Election Studies
Iceland	1995	Icelandic National Election Studies
Iceland	1999	Icelandic National Election Studies
Iceland	2003	Icelandic National Election Studies
Iceland	2007	Icelandic National Election Studies
Iceland	2009	Icelandic National Election Studies
Iceland	2013	Icelandic National Election Studies
Iceland	2016	Icelandic National Election Studies
Iceland	2017	Icelandic National Election Studies
Ireland	1973	Eurobarometers
Ireland	1977	Eurobarometers
Ireland	1981	Eurobarometers
Ireland	1982	Eurobarometers
Ireland	1987	Eurobarometers
Ireland	1989	Eurobarometers
Ireland	1992	Eurobarometers

Ireland	1997	Eurobarometers
Ireland	2002	European Social Survey
Ireland	2007	European Social Survey
Ireland	2011	European Social Survey
Ireland	2016	European Social Survey
Ireland	2020	UCD Online Election Poll
Italy	1953	Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR)
Italy	1958	Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR)
Italy	1968	Italian National Election Studies
Italy	1972	Italian National Election Studies
Italy	1983	Italian National Election Studies
Italy	1987	Italian National Election Studies
Italy	1992	Italian National Election Studies
Italy	1994	Italian National Election Studies
Italy	1996	Italian National Election Studies
Italy	2001	Italian National Election Studies
Italy	2006	Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES)
Italy	2008	Italian National Election Studies
Italy	2013	Italian National Election Studies
Italy	2018	Italian National Election Studies
Luxembourg	1974	Eurobarometers
Luxembourg	1979	Eurobarometers
Luxembourg	1984	Eurobarometers
Luxembourg	1989	Eurobarometers
Luxembourg	1994	Eurobarometers
Luxembourg	1999	Eurobarometers
Luxembourg	2004	European Social Survey
Luxembourg	2013	European Election Studies (EES)
Luxembourg	2018	European Election Studies (EES)
Netherlands	1967	Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies
Netherlands	1971	Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies
Netherlands	1972	Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies
Netherlands	1977	Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies
Netherlands	1981	Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies
Netherlands	1982	Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies
Netherlands	1986	Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies
Netherlands	1989	Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies
Netherlands	1994	Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies
Netherlands	1998	Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies
Netherlands	2002	Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies
Netherlands	2006	Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies
Netherlands	2010	Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies
Netherlands	2012	Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies
Netherlands	2017	Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies
New Zealand	1972	New Zealand Election Studies
New Zealand	1975	New Zealand Election Studies
New Zealand	1978	New Zealand Election Studies
New Zealand	1981	New Zealand Election Studies
New Zealand	1984	New Zealand Election Studies
New Zealand	1987	New Zealand Election Studies

New Zealand	1990	New Zealand Election Studies
New Zealand	1993	New Zealand Election Studies
New Zealand	1996	New Zealand Election Studies
New Zealand	1999	New Zealand Election Studies
New Zealand	2002	New Zealand Election Studies
New Zealand	2005	New Zealand Election Studies
New Zealand	2008	New Zealand Election Studies
New Zealand	2011	New Zealand Election Studies
New Zealand	2014	New Zealand Election Studies
New Zealand	2017	New Zealand Election Studies
Norway	1957	Norwegian National Election Studies
Norway	1965	Norwegian National Election Studies
Norway	1969	Norwegian National Election Studies
Norway	1973	Norwegian National Election Studies
Norway	1977	Norwegian National Election Studies
Norway	1981	Norwegian National Election Studies
Norway	1985	Norwegian National Election Studies
Norway	1989	Norwegian National Election Studies
Norway	1993	Norwegian National Election Studies
Norway	1997	Norwegian National Election Studies
Norway	2001	Norwegian National Election Studies
Norway	2005	Norwegian National Election Studies
Norway	2009	Norwegian National Election Studies
Norway	2013	Norwegian National Election Studies
Norway	2017	Norwegian National Election Studies
Portugal	1983	ESEO
Portugal	1985	ESEO
Portugal	1987	ESEO
Portugal	1991	ESEO
Portugal	1995	European Election Studies (EES)
Portugal	2002	Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES)
Portugal	2005	Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES)
Portugal	2009	Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES)
Portugal	2015	Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES)
Portugal	2019	Portuguese Election Study
Spain	1982	Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas
Spain	1986	Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas
Spain	1989	Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas
Spain	1993	Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas
Spain	1996	Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas
Spain	2000	Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas
Spain	2004	Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas
Spain	2008	Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas
Spain	2011	Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas
Spain	2015	Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas
Spain	2016	Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas
Spain	2019	Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas
Spain	2020	Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas
Sweden	1956	Swedish National Election Studies
Sweden	1958	Swedish National Election Studies

Sweden	1960	Swedish National Election Studies
Sweden	1964	Swedish National Election Studies
Sweden	1968	Swedish National Election Studies
Sweden	1970	Swedish National Election Studies
Sweden	1973	Swedish National Election Studies
Sweden	1976	Swedish National Election Studies
Sweden	1979	Swedish National Election Studies
Sweden	1982	Swedish National Election Studies
Sweden	1985	Swedish National Election Studies
Sweden	1988	Swedish National Election Studies
Sweden	1991	Swedish National Election Studies
Sweden	1994	Swedish National Election Studies
Sweden	1998	Swedish National Election Studies
Sweden	2002	Swedish National Election Studies
Sweden	2006	Swedish National Election Studies
Sweden	2010	Swedish National Election Studies
Sweden	2014	Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES)
Switzerland	1967	Swiss National Election Studies
Switzerland	1971	Swiss National Election Studies
Switzerland	1975	Swiss National Election Studies
Switzerland	1979	Swiss National Election Studies
Switzerland	1983	Swiss National Election Studies
Switzerland	1987	Swiss National Election Studies
Switzerland	1991	Swiss National Election Studies
Switzerland	1995	Swiss National Election Studies
Switzerland	1999	Swiss National Election Studies
Switzerland	2003	Swiss National Election Studies
Switzerland	2007	Swiss National Election Studies
Switzerland	2011	Swiss National Election Studies
Switzerland	2015	Swiss National Election Studies
Switzerland	2019	Swiss National Election Studies
UK	1955	British Election Studies
UK	1959	British Election Studies
UK	1964	British Election Studies
UK	1966	British Election Studies
UK	1970	British Election Studies
UK	1974	British Election Studies
UK	1979	British Election Studies
UK	1983	British Election Studies
UK	1987	British Election Studies
UK	1992	British Election Studies
UK	1997	British Election Studies
UK	2001	British Election Studies
UK	2005	British Election Studies
UK	2010	British Election Studies
UK	2015	British Election Studies
UK	2017	British Election Studies
US	1948	American National Election Studies
US	1952	American National Election Studies
US	1956	American National Election Studies

US	1960	American National Election Studies
US	1964	American National Election Studies
US	1968	American National Election Studies
US	1972	American National Election Studies
US	1976	American National Election Studies
US	1980	American National Election Studies
US	1984	American National Election Studies
US	1988	American National Election Studies
US	1992	American National Election Studies
US	1996	American National Election Studies
US	2000	American National Election Studies
US	2004	American National Election Studies
US	2008	American National Election Studies
US	2012	American National Election Studies
US	2016	American National Election Studies
US	2020	American National Election Studies

Source: authors' elaboration.

Table A2 - Main classification of political parties	
	Social Democratic / Socialist / Communist / Green / Other left-wing parties
Australia	Labor Party, Greens
Austria	Social Democratic Party, KPÖ, Greens, NEOS, Other left
Belgium	Socialist Party, Socialist Party Differently, Ecolo, Groen, PTB
Canada	Liberal Party, Green Party, New Democratic Party
Denmark	Social Democrats, Socialist People's Party, Social Liberal Party, Red-Green Alliance
Finland	Social Democratic Party, Green League, Left Alliance, Other left
France	Socialist Party, Communist Party, Other left
Germany	Social Democratic Party, Alliance 90/The Greens, Die Linke
Iceland	Left-Green Movement, Social Democratic Alliance, People's Party
Ireland	Fianna Fáil, Sinn Féin, Labour Party, Green Party, Other left
Italy	Democratic Party, Free and Equal, Other left
Luxembourg	Socialist Workers' Party, Greens, Other left
Netherlands	Labour Party, Socialist Party, D66, Greens, Other left
New Zealand	Labour Party, Greens, Other left
Norway	Labour Party, Green Party, Socialist Left Party
Portugal	Socialist Party, Left Bloc, Unitary Democratic Coalition
Spain	Socialist Workers' Party, Podemos, United Left, Other left
Sweden	Social Democratic Party, Left Party, Green Party
Switzerland	Social Democrats, Party of Labour, Green Party, Green Liberal Party
United Kingdom	Labour Party
United States	Democratic Party
Source: authors' elaboration.	

Country	Party	Family	Left-right score (voters)	Left-right score (manifestos)
		Table A3 - Detailed classification of political parties		
Australia	Labor Party	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left	-0,7	-17,0
Australia	Liberal Party	Conservatives / Christian Democrats	0,8	18,2
Australia	Australian Greens	Greens	-1,5	-30,5
Australia	National Party	Conservatives / Christian Democrats	0,8	16,6
Australia	Australian Democrats	Conservatives / Christian Democrats	-0,6	-17,1
Australia	Palmer United Party	Anti-immigration		7,4
Australia	One Nation Party	Anti-immigration	0,5	
Austria	Social Democratic Party of Austria (SPÖ)	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left	-0,6	-15,8
Austria	Austrian People's Party (ÖVP)	Conservatives / Christian Democrats	0,4	12,2
Austria	Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ)	Anti-immigration	1,0	4,2
Austria	Greens	Greens	-1,1	-11,2
Austria	NEOS / Liberal Forum	Liberals / Social-liberals	-0,1	9,0
Belgium	Christian People's Party (CVP)	Conservatives / Christian Democrats	0,7	5,5
Belgium	Belgian Socialist Party (PSB)	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left	-1,8	-15,2
Belgium	Socialist Party (PS)	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left	-1,3	-16,0
Belgium	New Flemish Alliance (N-VA)	Other	0,9	9,6
Belgium	Party for Freedom and Progress (PLP/PVV)	Liberals / Social-liberals	0,4	21,1
Belgium	Open Flemish Liberals and Democrats (VLD)	Liberals / Social-liberals	0,5	7,8
Belgium	Socialist Party (SP / sp.a)	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left	-1,3	-12,8
Belgium	Reformist movement (MR)	Liberals / Social-liberals	1,1	-12,9
Belgium	Christian Democratic and Flemish (CD&V)	Conservatives / Christian Democrats	0,5	9,8
Belgium	PL	Liberals / Social-liberals		21,9
Belgium	Christian Social Party (PSC)	Conservatives / Christian Democrats	0,5	-2,9
Belgium	Liberal Reformist Party (PRL)	Liberals / Social-liberals	0,3	7,1
Belgium	Volksunie (VU)	Other	0,3	3,3
Belgium	Vlaams Blok	Anti-immigration	1,1	8,7
Belgium	Workers' Party of Belgium (PTB)	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left	-2,1	-29,3

Belgium	Communist Party (PCB)	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left	-2,7	
Canada	Liberal Party	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left	-0,1	-1,1
Canada	Conservative Party	Conservatives / Christian Democrats	0,7	10,5
Canada	Canadian Alliance	Conservatives / Christian Democrats		18,8
Canada	Reform Party	Conservatives / Christian Democrats	0,6	29,2
Canada	New Democratic Party	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left	-0,9	-26,9
Canada	Bloc Québécois	Other	-0,7	-5,9
Canada	Social Credit Party	Conservatives / Christian Democrats	-0,5	7,5
Denmark	Social Democratic Party	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left	-1,0	-15,5
Denmark	Liberal Party of Denmark (Venstre)	Liberals / Social-liberals	1,5	17,0
Denmark	Conservative People's Party	Conservatives / Christian Democrats	1,8	23,9
Denmark	Danish People's Party	Anti-immigration	1,3	27,9
Denmark	Progress Party	Anti-immigration	1,5	25,5
Denmark	Socialist People's Party	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left	-2,2	-34,9
Denmark	Danish Social-Liberal Party (Radikale Venstre)	Liberals / Social-liberals	-0,6	-7,8
Finland	Social Democratic Party	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left	-1,1	-4,2
Finland	Agrarian Union	Other		8,9
Finland	Centre Party	Other	0,6	2,2
Finland	Finnish People's Democratic League	Communists	-2,1	-22,4
Finland	National Coalition Party	Conservatives / Christian Democrats	1,5	10,4
Finland	True Finns	Anti-immigration	-0,2	7,4
Finland	Left Alliance	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left	-2,2	-27,1
Finland	Greens	Greens	-0,8	-17,2
Finland	Finnish People's Party	Liberals / Social-liberals		27,0
Finland	Finnish Rural Party	Conservatives / Christian Democrats	-0,1	26,3
Finland	Swedish People's Party	Other	0,9	0,7
France	UDR/UNR	Conservatives / Christian Democrats		25,6
France	La République En Marche! (LRM)	Liberals / Social-liberals	-0,4	4,8
France	UDF/MoDem	Conservatives / Christian Democrats	0,1	14,8
France	LR/UMP/RPR	Conservatives / Christian Democrats	1,5	9,7
France	PS/SFIO	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left	-1,7	-23,0
France	Communist Party (PCF)	Communists		-24,4
France	MRP/CD	Conservatives / Christian Democrats		10,3
France	Reforming Movement (MR, 1973)	Conservatives / Christian Democrats		3,8

France	Republican Party of Liberty - Conservatives	Conservatives / Christian Democrats		1,5
France	National Front (FN)	Anti-immigration	1,5	32,2
France	Progress and Modern Democracy	Other		1,2
France	Rally for the French People - Gaullists	Conservatives / Christian Democrats		12,0
France	La France Insoumise (FI) / Front de gauche (FDG)	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left	-2,2	-27,6
France	National Centre of Independents and Peasants (CNIP)	Conservatives / Christian Democrats		23,1
France	Radical Party	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left		-6,3
Germany	CDU/CSU	Conservatives / Christian Democrats		12,6
Germany	Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD)	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left		-13,0
Germany	Die Linke	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left		-29,1
Germany	Free Democratic Party (FDP)	Liberals / Social-liberals		4,5
Germany	Alternative for Germany (AfD)	Anti-immigration		15,9
Germany	Greens	Greens		-17,2
Germany	All-German Bloc (GB/BHE)	Conservatives / Christian Democrats		-1,3
Iceland	Independence Party	Conservatives / Christian Democrats	1,6	15,4
Iceland	Social Democratic Alliance	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left	-1,3	-12,2
Iceland	Progressive Party	Conservatives / Christian Democrats	0,0	6,5
Iceland	United Socialist Party	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left		-13,4
Iceland	People's Alliance	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left	-1,9	-26,3
Iceland	Social Democratic Party	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left	-0,2	-24,3
Iceland	Left-Green Movement	Greens	-2,2	-15,6
Iceland	Centre Party	Conservatives / Christian Democrats	0,9	
Iceland	Pirate Party	Other	-1,0	-15,3
Iceland	Reform Party	Liberals / Social-liberals	0,7	5,7
Iceland	Women's Alliance	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left	-1,1	-33,5
Iceland	People's Party	Other		-18,0
Iceland	Liberal Party	Conservatives / Christian Democrats	-0,1	13,9
Iceland	National Preservation Party	Other		-38,5
Iceland	Bright Future	Liberals / Social-liberals	-0,7	2,2
Ireland	Fianna Fáil	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left	0,4	2,8
Ireland	Fine Gael	Conservatives / Christian Democrats	0,3	6,7
Ireland	Labour Party	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left	-1,1	-21,9
Ireland	Sinn Féin	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left	-1,3	-9,4
Ireland	Progressive Democrats	Conservatives / Christian Democrats	0,3	11,1

Country	Party	Group		
Italy	Christian Democracy (DC)	Conservatives / Christian Democrats	1,3	6,6
Italy	Olive Tree	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left	-2,1	-32,9
Italy	People of Freedom (PDL)	Conservatives / Christian Democrats	2,5	14,7
Italy	Five Star Movement (M5S)	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left	-0,6	-20,5
Italy	Italian Communist Party (PCI)	Communists	-2,2	-10,2
Italy	Democratic Party (PD)	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left	-2,1	-3,2
Italy	Forza Italia (FI)	Conservatives / Christian Democrats	2,2	25,4
Italy	Democratic Party of the Left (PDS)	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left	-2,9	-2,8
Italy	Democrats of the Left (DS) / Margherita / Ulivo	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left	-1,8	-12,8
Italy	Italian Socialist Party of Proletarian Unity (PSIUP)	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left	-1,3	-1,5
Italy	National Alliance (AN)	Conservatives / Christian Democrats	3,1	6,5
Italy	Populars for Italy (PPI)	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left	0,1	-2,2
Italy	Italian Socialist Party (PSI)	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left	-0,4	-9,9
Italy	Civic Choice	Conservatives / Christian Democrats	0,3	15,3
Italy	Lega	Anti-immigration	1,8	7,0
Italy	Socialist Party of Italian Workers	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left		-34,7
Italy	Communist Refoundation Party (PRC)	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left	-3,1	-32,9
Italy	Italian Social Movement (MSI, MSI-DN)	Anti-immigration	3,6	16,0
Luxembourg	Christian Social People's Party	Conservatives / Christian Democrats	1,1	8,4
Luxembourg	Luxembourg Socialist Workers' Party	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left	-1,3	-13,9
Luxembourg	Democratic Party	Liberals / Social-liberals	0,2	11,8
Luxembourg	Democratic Group	Liberals / Social-liberals		1,5
Luxembourg	Patriotic and Democratic Group	Liberals / Social-liberals		9,5
Luxembourg	Action Committee	Conservatives / Christian Democrats	0,2	7,7
Luxembourg	The Greens	Greens	-1,4	-11,1
Luxembourg	Communist Party of Luxembourg	Communists	-2,0	-25,3
Luxembourg	Green List Ecological Initiative	Greens	-1,2	-10,1
Luxembourg	Alternative Democratic Reform Party	Anti-immigration		14,9
Netherlands	Catholic People's Party (KVP)	Conservatives / Christian Democrats		5,0
Netherlands	Labour Party (PvdA)	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left	-1,8	-15,1
Netherlands	Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA)	Conservatives / Christian Democrats	1,2	1,2
Netherlands	People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD)	Liberals / Social-liberals	1,4	19,6
Netherlands	Pim Fortuyn List (LPF)	Anti-immigration	1,0	4,2
Netherlands	Party for Freedom (PVV)	Anti-immigration	1,3	17,2

Netherlands	Anti-Revolutionary Party (ARP)	Conservatives / Christian Democrats		11,9
Netherlands	Christian Historical Union (CHU)	Conservatives / Christian Democrats		15,8
Netherlands	Socialist Party (SP)	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left	-1,4	-20,3
Netherlands	Democrats 66 (D66)	Liberals / Social-liberals	-0,7	-6,5
Netherlands	Communist Party of the Netherlands	Communists		-29,3
Netherlands	PvdV	Conservatives / Christian Democrats		20,7
Netherlands	GroenLinks (GL)	Greens	-2,3	-9,6
New Zealand	National Party	Conservatives / Christian Democrats	1,2	15,1
New Zealand	Labour Party	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left	-1,1	-15,0
New Zealand	Alliance	Greens	-1,5	-14,1
New Zealand	Social Credit Party	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left	-0,9	-8,7
New Zealand	New Zealand First	Anti-immigration	0,0	0,9
New Zealand	Green Party of Aotearoa	Greens	-2,0	-2,9
Norway	Labour Party	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left	-1,2	-15,4
Norway	Conservative Party	Conservatives / Christian Democrats	1,8	17,1
Norway	Progress Party	Anti-immigration	1,8	35,2
Norway	Christian Democratic Party	Conservatives / Christian Democrats	0,6	10,3
Norway	Centre Party	Conservatives / Christian Democrats	-0,3	6,1
Norway	Socialist Left Party / Socialist Electoral League	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left	-2,4	-20,4
Norway	Liberal Party	Liberals / Social-liberals	-0,3	-3,3
Portugal	Socialist Party (PS)	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left	-0,9	-6,4
Portugal	PPD/PSD	Conservatives / Christian Democrats	1,6	5,2
Portugal	United People Alliance (APU)	Greens	-2,7	9,8
Portugal	PCTP/MRPP	Communists		-7,0
Portugal	CDS / People's Party (PP)	Conservatives / Christian Democrats	1,8	9,7
Portugal	Unitary Democratic Coalition (CDU, PCP-PEV)	Greens	-3,1	-8,1
Portugal	Left Bloc (BE)	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left	-2,4	-23,1
Spain	Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE)	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left	-1,1	-8,2
Spain	People's Party (PP)	Conservatives / Christian Democrats	1,9	13,2
Spain	Union of the Democratic Centre (UCD)	Other	-1,3	2,6
Spain	AP-PDP	Conservatives / Christian Democrats	2,2	16,9
Spain	VOX	Anti-immigration	2,5	45,9
Spain	Ciudadanos	Liberals / Social-liberals	0,8	-1,2
Spain	Podemos	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left	-1,9	-20,8

Spain	Communist Party of Spain (PCE)	Communists	-2,0	-17,1
Spain	United Left (IU)	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left	-2,1	-20,0
Spain	Democratic and Social Centre (CDS)	Other	0,5	-3,9
Sweden	Swedish Social Democratic Party	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left	-1,4	-15,6
Sweden	Moderate/Right Party	Conservatives / Christian Democrats	2,1	39,1
Sweden	Liberal People's Party	Liberals / Social-liberals	1,1	6,0
Sweden	Centre Party	Liberals / Social-liberals	0,9	7,4
Sweden	Sweden Democrats	Anti-immigration	0,5	15,0
Sweden	Left Party	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left	-2,4	-29,6
Sweden	Christian Democrats	Conservatives / Christian Democrats	1,1	5,9
Sweden	New Democracy	Anti-immigration	1,0	34,4
Sweden	Green Party	Greens	-0,9	-14,2
Sweden	Left Party/Communists	Communists	-2,7	-28,6
Switzerland	Social Democratic Party of Switzerland (SPS/PSS)	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left	-2,0	-30,0
Switzerland	Free Democratic Party of Switzerland (FDP/PLR)	Liberals / Social-liberals	0,8	16,1
Switzerland	CVP/PDC	Conservatives / Christian Democrats	0,6	5,0
Switzerland	Swiss People's Party (SVP/UDC)	Anti-immigration	1,3	13,9
Switzerland	Green Party of Switzerland (GPS/PES)	Greens	-2,0	-26,3
Switzerland	Green Liberal Party of Switzerland (GLP/PVL)	Greens	-1,0	-5,2
USA	Democratic Party	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left	-0,9	-13,3
USA	Republican Party	Conservatives / Christian Democrats	1,0	14,6
UK	Conservative Party	Conservatives / Christian Democrats	1,2	15,5
UK	Labour Party	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left	-0,9	-14,7
UK	Liberal Democrats	Liberals / Social-liberals	-0,4	-0,8
UK	Social Democratic Party	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left		-10,4
UK	UK Independence Party (UKIP)	Anti-immigration	0,3	16,5

Source: authors' elaboration.

Note: the table provides information on the categorization of political parties by family in the survey dataset (see Figure 4 on election results). Parties are sorted by decreasing order of their average vote share in all elections to which they participated. Excludes small parties (average vote share lower than 5% across elections in which the party participated). The left-right score (voters) corresponds to the difference between the average self-placement on a left-right scale (0 to 10) of voters of the corresponding party and the overall average of this variable across all voters. Negative values mean that voters supporting the party are on average more left-wing than the rest of the electorate. The left-right score (manifestos) corresponds to the difference between the average left-right ideological index of the corresponding party in the Comparative Manifesto Project database (-100 to 100) and the overall average of this variable across all parties. Averages over the entire dataset.

Figure A1 - The disconnection of income and education cleavages in Western democracies (before and after controls)

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.

Note: in the 1960s, both higher-educated and high-income voters were less likely to vote for left-wing (social democratic / socialist / communist / green / other left-wing) parties than lower-educated and low-income voters by more than 10 percentage points. The left vote has gradually become associated with higher education voters, giving rising to a remarkable divergence of the effects of income and education on the vote. Figures correspond to five-year averages for Australia, Britain, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the US. The estimates are presented before and after controlling for income/education, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).

Figure A2 - The disconnection of income and education in Western democracies, unbalanced panel

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.

Note: in the 1960s, both higher-educated and high-income voters were less likely to vote for left-wing (social democratic / socialist / communist / green / other left-wing) parties than lower-educated and low-income voters by more than 10 percentage points. The left vote has gradually become associated with higher education voters, giving rising to a remarkable divergence of the effects of income and education on the vote. Figures correspond to five-year averages over all countries available for a given time period (unbalanced panel of all 21 Western democracies). The estimates are presented before and after controlling for income/education, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).

Figure A3 - The disconnection of income and education cleavages in Western democracies (top 50% vs. bottom 50%)

Legend:
- Difference between (% of top 50% educated voting left) and (% of bottom 50% educated voting left)
- After controls
- Difference between (% of top 50% earners voting left) and (% of bottom 50% earners voting left)
- After controls

X-axis: 1961-65, 1966-70, 1971-75, 1976-80, 1981-85, 1986-90, 1991-95, 1996-00, 2001-05, 2006-10, 2011-15, 2016-20

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: in the 1960s, both higher-educated and high-income voters were less likely to vote for left-wing (social democratic / socialist / communist / green / other left-wing) parties than lower-educated and low-income voters. The left vote has gradually become associated with higher education voters, giving rising to a remarkable divergence of the effects of income and education on the vote. Figures correspond to five-year averages for Australia, Britain, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the US. The estimates are presented before and after controlling for income/education, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).

Figure A4 - The disconnection of income and education in Western democracies, unbalanced panel (top 50% vs. bottom 50%)

Legend:
- Difference between (% of top 50% educated voting left) and (% of bottom 50% educated voting left)
- After controls
- Difference between (% of top 50% earners voting left) and (% of bottom 50% earners voting left)
- After controls

X-axis: 1948-60 1961-65 1966-70 1971-75 1976-80 1981-85 1986-90 1991-95 1996-00 2001-05 2006-10 2011-15 2016-20

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: in the 1960s, both higher-educated and high-income voters were less likely to vote for left-wing (social democratic / socialist / communist / green / other left-wing) parties than lower-educated and low-income voters. The left vote has gradually become associated with higher education voters, giving rising to a remarkable divergence of the effects of income and education on the vote. Figures correspond to five-year averages over all countries available for a given time period (unbalanced panel of all 21 Western democracies). The estimates are presented before and after controlling for income/education, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).

Figure A5 - The reversal of educational divides in Western democracies (top 10%)

Legend: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Britain, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United States, Average

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of higher-educated (top 10%) and lower-educated (bottom 90%) voters voting for left-wing (socialist, social democratic, communist, and green) parties in Western countries. In nearly all countries, higher-educated voters used to be significantly more likely to vote for right-wing parties and have gradually become more likely to vote for left-wing parties.

Figure A6 - The reversal of educational divides in Western democracies (top 10%), after controls

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of higher-educated (top 10%) and lower-educated (bottom 90%) voters voting for left-wing (socialist, social democratic, communist, and green) parties in Western countries, after controlling for income, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available). In nearly all countries, higher-educated voters used to be significantly more likely to vote for right-wing parties and have gradually become more likely to vote for left-wing parties.

Figure A7 - The reversal of educational divides in Western democracies (university graduates)

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of university graduates and the share of non-university graduates voting for left-wing (socialist, social democratic, communist, and green) parties in Western countries. In nearly all countries, higher-educated voters used to be significantly more likely to vote for right-wing parties and have gradually become more likely to vote for left-wing parties.

Figure A8 - The reversal of educational divides in Western democracies (university graduates), after controls

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.

Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of university graduates and the share of non-university graduates voting for left-wing (socialist, social democratic, communist, and green) parties in Western countries, after controlling for income, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available). In nearly all countries, higher-educated voters used to be significantly more likely to vote for right-wing parties and have gradually become more likely to vote for left-wing parties.

Figure A9 - The reversal of educational divides in Western democracies (bottom 50%)

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of lower-educated (bottom 50%) and higher-educated (top 50%) voters voting for left-wing (socialist, social democratic, communist, and green) parties in Western countries. In nearly all countries, higher-educated voters used to be significantly more likely to vote for right-wing parties and have gradually become more likely to vote for left-wing parties.

Figure A10 - The reversal of educational divides in Western democracies (bottom 50%), after controls

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of lower-educated (bottom 50%) and higher-educated (top 50%) voters voting for left-wing (socialist, social democratic, communist, and green) parties in Western countries, after controlling for income, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available). In nearly all countries, higher-educated voters used to be significantly more likely to vote for right-wing parties and have gradually become more likely to vote for left-wing parties.

Figure A11 - The reversal of educational divides in Western democracies (primary-educated voters)

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of primary-educated voters and the share of other voters voting for left-wing (socialist, social democratic, communist, and green) parties in Western countries. In nearly all countries, higher-educated voters used to be significantly more likely to vote for right-wing parties and have gradually become more likely to vote for left-wing parties.

Figure A12 - The reversal of educational divides in Western democracies (primary-educated voters), after controls

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of primary-educated voters and the share of other voters voting for left-wing (socialist, social democratic, communist, and green) parties in Western countries, after controlling for income, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available). In nearly all countries, higher-educated voters used to be significantly more likely to vote for right-wing parties and have gradually become more likely to vote for left-wing parties.

Figure A13 - The reversal of educational divides in Western democracies (continuous variable)

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure represents the marginal effect of the education rank (quantile) of voters on support for left-wing (socialist, social democratic, communist, and green) parties in Western countries. In nearly all countries, higher-educated voters used to be significantly more likely to vote for right-wing parties and have gradually become more likely to vote for left-wing parties.

Figure A14 - The reversal of educational divides in Western democracies (continuous variable), after controls

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure represents the marginal effect of the education rank (quantile) of voters on support for left-wing (socialist, social democratic, communist, and green) parties in Western countries, after controlling for income, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available). In nearly all countries, higher-educated voters used to be significantly more likely to vote for right-wing parties and have gradually become more likely to vote for left-wing parties.

Figure A15 - The decline/stability of income divides in Western democracies (top 10%)

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of high-income (top 10%) and low-income (bottom 90%) voters voting for left-wing (socialist, social democratic, communist, and green) parties in Western countries. In nearly all countries, top-income voters have remained significantly less likely to vote for left-wing parties than low-income voters.

Figure A16 - The decline/stability of income divides in Western democracies (top 10%), after controls

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of high-income (top 10%) and low-income (bottom 90%) voters voting for left-wing (socialist, social democratic, communist, and green) parties in Western countries. In nearly all countries, top-income voters have remained significantly less likely to vote for left-wing parties than low-income voters. Estimates control for education, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).

Figure A17 - The decline/stability of income divides in Western democracies (bottom 50%)

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of low-income (bottom 50%) and top-income (top 50%) voters voting for left-wing (socialist, social democratic, communist, and green) parties in Western countries. In nearly all countries, top-income voters have remained significantly less likely to vote for left-wing parties than low-income voters.

Figure A18 - The decline/stability of income divides in Western democracies (bottom 50%), after controls

Legend: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Britain, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United States, Average

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of low-income (bottom 50%) and top-income (top 50%) voters voting for left-wing (socialist, social democratic, communist, and green) parties in Western countries. In nearly all countries, top-income voters have remained significantly less likely to vote for left-wing parties than low-income voters. Estimates control for education, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).

Figure A19 - The decline/stability of income divides in Western democracies (continuous variable)

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure represents the marginal effect of the income rank (quantile) of voters on support for left-wing (socialist, social democratic, communist, and green) parties in Western countries. In nearly all countries, top-income voters have remained significantly less likely to vote for left-wing parties than low-income voters.

Figure A20 - The decline/stability of income divides in Western democracies (continuous variable), after controls

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure represents the marginal effect of the income rank (quantile) of voters on support for left-wing (socialist, social democratic, communist, and green) parties in Western countries. In nearly all countries, top-income voters have remained significantly less likely to vote for left-wing parties than low-income voters. Estimates control for education, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).

Figure A21 - The disconnection of income and education in Western democracies (including/excluding green parties)

Legend:
- Difference between (% of top 10% educated voting left) and (% of bottom 90% educated voting left)
- Excluding green parties
- Difference between (% of top 10% earners voting left) and (% of bottom 90% earners voting left)
- Excluding green parties

X-axis: 1961-65, 1966-70, 1971-75, 1976-80, 1981-85, 1986-90, 1991-95, 1996-00, 2001-05, 2006-10, 2011-15, 2016-20

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: in the 1960s, both higher-educated and high-income voters were less likely to vote for left-wing (social democratic / socialist / communist / green / other left-wing) parties than lower-educated and low-income voters by more than 10 percentage points. The left vote has gradually become associated with higher education voters, giving rising to a remarkable divergence of the effects of income and education on the vote. Figures correspond to five-year averages for Australia, Britain, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the US. The estimates are presented after controlling for income/education, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).

Figure A22 - The disconnection of income and education cleavages in Western democracies (incl./excl. green parties), unbalanced panel

- **Difference between (% of top 10% educated voting left) and (% of bottom 90% educated voting left)** (solid red, filled circles)
- **Excluding green parties** (dashed red, open circles)
- **Difference between (% of top 10% earners voting left) and (% of bottom 90% earners voting left)** (solid blue, filled squares)
- **Excluding green parties** (dashed blue, open squares)

x-axis: 1948-60, 1961-65, 1966-70, 1971-75, 1976-80, 1981-85, 1986-90, 1991-95, 1996-00, 2001-05, 2006-10, 2011-15, 2016-20

y-axis: -20 to 20

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.

Note: in the 1960s, both higher-educated and high-income voters were less likely to vote for left-wing (social democratic / socialist / communist / green / other left-wing) parties than lower-educated and low-income voters by more than 10 percentage points. The left vote has gradually become associated with higher education voters, giving rising to a remarkable divergence of the effects of income and education on the vote. Figures correspond to five-year averages over all countries available for a given time period (unbalanced panel of all 21 Western democracies). The estimates are presented before and after controlling for income/education, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).

Figure A23 - Support for left-wing parties (excluding Greens) among top 10% educated voters, after controls

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of higher-educated (top 10%) and lower-educated (bottom 90%) voters voting for left-wing parties (excluding Greens) in Western countries, after controlling for income, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available). In nearly all countries, higher-educated voters used to be significantly more likely to vote for right-wing parties and have gradually become more likely to vote for left-wing parties.

Figure A24 - Support for left-wing parties (excluding Greens) among top 10% income voters, after controls

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of high-income (top 10%) and low-income (bottom 90%) voters voting for left-wing parties (excluding Greens) in Western countries. In nearly all countries, top-income voters have remained significantly less likely to vote for left-wing parties than low-income voters. Estimates control for education, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).

Figure A25 - The reversal of educational divides in Western democracies: decomposition by party family (left-wing parties)

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.

Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of top 10% educated voters and the share of bottom 90% educated voters voting for specific families of parties. Figures correspond to five-year averages over all countries available for a given time period (unbalanced panel of all 21 Western democracies). The estimates are presented after controlling for income, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).

Figure A26 - The reversal of educational divides in Western democracies: decomposition by party family (right-wing parties)

Legend:
- Conservative / Christian Democratic / Liberal / Anti-immigration parties
- Conservative / Christian Democratic / Liberal parties
- Liberal parties
- Anti-immigration parties

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of top 10% educated voters and the share of bottom 90% educated voters voting for specific families of parties. Figures correspond to five-year averages over all countries available for a given time period (unbalanced panel of all 21 Western democracies). The estimates are presented after controlling for income, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).

Figure A27 - The decline/stability of income divides in Western democracies: decomposition by party family (left-wing parties)

Legend:
- Social Democratic / Socialist / Communist / Green / Other left-wing parties
- Social Democratic / Socialist / Communist / Other left-wing parties
- Green parties

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of top 10% income voters and the share of bottom 90% income voters voting for specific families of parties. Figures correspond to five-year averages over all countries available for a given time period (unbalanced panel of all 21 Western democracies). The estimates are presented after controlling for education, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).

Figure A28 - The decline/stability of income divides in Western democracies: decomposition by party family (left-wing parties)

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.

Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of top 10% income voters and the share of bottom 90% income voters voting for specific families of parties. Figures correspond to five-year averages over all countries available for a given time period (unbalanced panel of all 21 Western democracies). The estimates are presented after controlling for education, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).

Figure A29 - Vote for left-wing parties by education group: decomposition by party family

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by each family of parties by education group between 1955 and 2020. Average over all Western democracies.

Figure A30 - Vote for right-wing parties by education group: decomposition by party family

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by each family of parties by education group between 1955 and 2020. Average over all Western democracies.

Figure A31 - Vote for left-wing parties by income group: decomposition by party family

Legend:
- Social Democratic / Socialist parties (red)
- Communist parties (dark red)
- Green parties (green)

Y-axis: 0% to 70%

X-axis income groups per period: Bottom 50%, Middle 40%, Top 10%

Periods: 1948-60, 1961-65, 1966-70, 1971-75, 1976-80, 1981-85, 1986-90, 1991-95, 1996-00, 2001-05, 2006-10, 2011-15, 2016-20

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by each family of parties by income group between 1955 and 2020. Average over all Western democracies.

Figure A32 - Vote for right-wing parties by income group: decomposition by party family

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by each family of parties by income group between 1955 and 2020. Average over all Western democracies.

Figure A33 - Vote for Green parties by education group

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Green parties in Western democracies in the last election available by education group.

Figure A34 - Vote for Green parties by income group

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Green parties in Western democracies in the last election available by income group.

Figure A35 - Vote for anti-immigration parties by education group

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by anti-immigration parties in Western democracies in the last election available by education group.

Figure A36 - Vote for anti-immigration parties by income group

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by anti-immigration parties in Western democracies in the last election available by income group.

Figure A37 - Composition of parties voted for by top 10% educated voters

Source: authors' computations using electoral surveys.
Note: the figure represents the average share of votes received by selected families of political parties in Western democracies between the 1940s and the 2010s within the top 10% group of highest educated voters. Decennial averages over all Western democracies. The dashed lines delimit the categorization of parties considered in the main specification (social democrats and affiliated, conservatives and affiliated, and other parties).

Figure A38 - Composition of parties voted for by top 10% income voters

Source: authors' computations using electoral surveys.
Note: the figure represents the average share of votes received by selected families of political parties in Western democracies between the 1940s and the 2010s within the top 10% group of highest income voters. Decennial averages over all Western democracies. The dashed lines delimit the categorization of parties considered in the main specification (social democrats and affiliated, conservatives and affiliated, and other parties).

Figure A39 - The fragmentation of political cleavage structures.
Panel A. 1960s-1980s

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of high-income (top 10%) and low-income (bottom 90%) voters voting for selected groups of parties on the y-axis, and the same difference between higher-educated (top 10%) and lower-educated (bottom 90%) voters on the x-axis. In the 1960s, social democratic, socialist, and communist parties were supported by both low-income and lower-educated voters, while conservative, Christian, and liberal parties were supported by both high-income and higher-educated voters. Averages over all Western democracies. Estimates control for income/education, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).

Figure A40 - The fragmentation of political cleavage structures.
Panel B. 2000-2020

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of high-income (top 10%) and low-income (bottom 90%) voters voting for selected groups of parties on the y-axis, and the same difference between higher-educated (top 10%) and lower-educated (bottom 90%) voters on the x-axis. In 2000-2020, education most clearly distinguishes anti-immigration from green parties, while income most clearly distinguishes conservative and Christian parties from social democratic, socialist, and communist parties. Averages over all Western democracies. Estimates control for income/education, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).

Figure A41 - Educational and income divides: Detailed party families

High income
Low education

All right-wing

Conservatives /
Christian Democrats /
Liberals

Liberals /
Social-liberals

High income
High education

Greens

Anti-immigration

Socialists / Social democrats /
Communists / Other left

All left-wing

Low income
Low education

Low income
High education

Relative support among top-income voters

Relative support among higher-educated voters

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of high-income (top 10%) and low-income (bottom 90%) voters voting for selected groups of parties on the y-axis, and the same difference between higher-educated (top 10%) and lower-educated (bottom 90%) voters on the x-axis. Education most clearly distinguishes anti-immigration from green parties, while income distinguishes most clearly conservative and Christian parties from socialist, social democratic and communist parties. Averages over all Western democracies over the 2000-2020 period. Estimates control for income/education, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).

Figure A42 - The disconnection of income and education cleavages in Western democracies (quadrant representation), all countries

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of high-income (top 10%) and low-income (bottom 90%) voters voting for selected groups of parties on the y-axis, and the same difference between higher-educated (top 10%) and lower-educated (bottom 90%) voters on the x-axis. Estimates control for income/education, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available). Figures correspond to ten-year averages for Australia, Britain, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the US.

Figure A43 - Income and educational divides in Western democracies, 1950s

- Left-wing parties
- Right-wing parties

Figure A44 - Income and educational divides in Western democracies, 1960s

Figure A45 - Income and educational divides in Western democracies, 1970s

Relative support among high-income voters (y-axis, from -30 to 30)

Relative support among higher-educated voters (x-axis, from -25 to 25)

Blue points (upper right quadrant):
- Australia
- New Zealand
- Netherlands
- UK
- France
- Austria
- Sweden
- Norway
- Denmark
- US
- Switzerland
- Germany
- Finland
- Canada
- Belgium
- Ireland
- Luxembourg
- Italy

Red points (lower left quadrant):
- Italy
- Luxembourg
- Ireland
- Canada
- Belgium
- Germany
- Finland
- France
- US
- Norway
- Sweden
- UK
- Switzerland
- Denmark
- Austria
- Netherlands
- New Zealand
- Australia

● Left-wing parties   ● Right-wing parties

Figure A46 - Income and educational divides in Western democracies, 1980s

Left-wing parties ● Right-wing parties ●

Figure A47 - Income and educational divides in Western democracies, 1990s

Left-wing parties   Right-wing parties

Figure A48 - Income and educational divides in Western democracies, 2000s

Y-axis: Relative support among high-income voters

X-axis: Relative support among higher-educated voters

Legend: ● Left-wing parties ● Right-wing parties

Figure A49 - Income and educational divides in Western democracies, 2010s

Y-axis: Relative support among high-income voters

X-axis: Relative support among higher-educated voters

Legend: ● Left-wing parties ● Right-wing parties

Figure A50 - Correlation between income and education

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure represents the correlation between income and education in post-electoral surveys in all Western democracies. Income is defined as the rank (quantile group) to which individuals belong, computed directly from raw income brackets. Education is defined as education deciles, computed from available educational categories (see methodology).

Figure A51 - Kitagawa-Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of the education cleavage

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure represents a two-way Kitagawa-Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of the educational cleavage by five-year interval, separating it into a component explained by group differences in predictors (that is, differences in the composition of educational groups in terms of income, gender, age, religion, religious practice, rural/urban location, region, employment and marital status, private/public sector of employment, union membership, and home ownership) and an unexplained component. The unexplained component is very close to the actual indicator, revealing that the reversal of educational divides cannot be accounted for by changes in the composition of education groups. The decomposition is computed after pooling surveys covering the following countries: Australia, Denmark, Finland, France, the Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. All estimates include election (country-year) fixed effects.

Table B1 - Bakker-Hobolt modified Comparative Manifesto Project measures

A. Economic-distributive dimension

Pro-free-market emphases	Pro-redistribution emphases
Free entreprise	Regulate capitalism
Economic incentives	Economic planning
Anti-protectionism	Pro-protectionism
Social services limitation	Social services expansion
Education limitation	Education expansion
Productivity: positive	Nationalization
Economic orthodoxy: positive	Controlled economy
Labour groups: negative	Labour groups: positive
	Corporatism: positive
	Keynesian demand management: positive
	Marxist analysis: positive
	Social justice

B. Sociocultural dimension

Conservative emphases	Progressive emphases
Political authority	Environmental protection
National way of life: positive	National way of life: negative
Traditional morality: positive	Traditional morality: negative
Law and order	Culture
Multiculturalism: negative	Multiculturalism: positive
Social harmony	Anti-growth
	Underprivileged minority groups
	Non-economic demographic groups: positive
	Freedom-human rights
	Democracy

Source: adapted from R. Bakker and S. B. Hobolt, "Measuring Party Positions," in G. Evans and N. D. de Graaf (ed.), *Political Choice Matters: Explaining the Strength of Class and Religious Cleavages in Cross-National Perspective*, Oxford University Press, 2013, 38. For more detail on the content of each category and the Manifesto Project methodology, see https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/.

	Economic-distributive index				Sociocultural index			
	Social Democrats	Conservatives	Anti-immigration	Greens	Social Democrats	Conservatives	Anti-immigration	Greens
1945-59	-12,3	11,2			-2,2	2,2		
1960-69	-9,1	9,2			-1,1	0,9		
1970-79	-9,3	8,8	17,6		-0,6	0,6	3,9	
1980-89	-10,9	10,9	15,8	-8,5	-1,9	2,5	3,4	-24,1
1990-99	-9,9	8,2	11,6	-11,5	-3,6	5,2	7,1	-25,4
2000-09	-9,4	8,1	10,4	-6,8	-4,9	6,3	11,2	-24,8
2010-20	-13,5	11,2	8,7	-11,2	-5,4	4,4	20,4	-25,1

Table B2 - Ideological polarization in Western democracies, 1945-2020

Source: authors' computations using the Comparative Manifesto Project database.

Note: the table displays the average economic-distributive and sociocultural scores by decade for four families of parties across all Western democracies: social democratic, socialist and other left-wing parties; conservative, Christian democratic, and liberal parties; anti-immigration parties; and green parties. Negative values on the economic-distributive index correspond to greater proportions of pro-redistribution emphases relatively to pro-free-market emphases in party manifestos. Negative values on the sociocultural index correspond to greater proportions of progressive emphases relatively to conservative emphases. Indices are normalized by the average score by decade so as to better highlight the dynamics of polarization.

	Greens	Social Democrats	Conservatives	Anti-immigration
Sociocultural dimension				
<u>Conservative emphases</u>				
Law and order +	1,4	3,0	5,2	8,5
Political authority	1,4	2,9	2,9	3,1
Civic mindedness +	1,2	1,3	1,7	0,8
National way of life +	0,8	1,1	2,4	9,0
Traditional morality +	0,3	0,5	1,4	2,4
Multiculturalism -	0,2	0,3	1,0	5,0
<u>Progressive emphases</u>				
Environmentalism +	13,4	5,8	4,3	3,0
Democracy	3,2	3,2	2,0	4,4
Anti-growth economy +	6,9	2,8	1,9	0,8
Culture +	2,5	2,4	2,1	1,6
Freedom & human rights	3,7	1,8	2,4	2,2
Non-economic demographic groups	1,1	1,4	1,3	1,1
Multiculturalism +	1,5	1,1	0,8	0,3
Minority groups	0,7	0,7	0,5	0,4
Traditional morality -	0,9	0,6	0,3	0,1
National way of life -	1,1	0,4	0,5	0,1
Economic-distributive dimension				
<u>Pro-free-market emphases</u>				
Incentives	1,2	2,1	3,7	2,0
Economic growth +	0,6	1,8	3,0	0,6
Economic orthodoxy	0,6	1,2	2,9	1,1
Protectionism -	0,1	0,3	0,6	0,2
Free market economy	0,5	0,3	2,7	2,5
Welfare -	0,2	0,2	1,5	1,7
Labour groups -	0,0	0,0	0,4	0,2
Education -	0,0	0,0	0,2	0,3
<u>Pro-redistribution emphases</u>				
Welfare +	11,1	12,8	9,0	8,4
Equality +	9,6	8,8	4,4	3,1
Education +	6,1	6,5	5,4	3,9
Labour groups +	4,5	5,8	3,0	2,3
Market regulation	3,4	4,9	3,0	2,8
Controlled economy	0,9	1,0	0,3	0,5
Nationalisation	0,7	0,8	0,2	0,3
Keynesian demand management	0,2	0,6	0,2	0,2
Economic planning	0,3	0,4	0,5	0,2
Corporatism/mixed economy	0,3	0,3	0,3	0,1
Protectionism +	0,3	0,3	0,3	0,7
Other categories				
Technology & infrastructure	6,0	6,9	7,6	4,2
Gov-admin efficiency	1,5	2,8	4,7	3,3
Internationalism +	2,5	2,6	2,3	1,4
Decentralisation	1,3	1,5	1,8	1,3
Europe +	1,1	1,3	1,6	0,2

Table B3 - Sources of ideological polarization in Western democracies in the 2010s

Agriculture +	1,2	1,2	2,0	2,2
Military +	0,2	1,1	2,1	2,5
Economic goals	0,5	1,1	1,2	0,6
Political corruption	0,8	0,8	0,5	0,5
Military -	0,9	0,5	0,1	0,2
Peace	0,4	0,4	0,2	0,0
Europe -	0,4	0,3	0,6	6,3
Foreign special +	0,1	0,3	0,3	0,0
Constitution -	0,2	0,3	0,2	0,2
Middle class and prof. groups	0,1	0,2	0,4	0,2
Constitution +	0,2	0,2	0,4	0,1
Internationalism -	0,1	0,1	0,2	1,5
Anti-imperalism	0,1	0,1	0,0	0,1
Marxist analysis +	0,0	0,1	0,0	0,0
Centralisation	0,3	0,1	0,3	0,4
Foreign special -	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0

Note: The table reports the scores of green parties, social democratic / socialist / communist / other left-wing parties, conservative / Christian democratic / liberal parties, and anti-immigration parties on all the items available in the Comparative Manifesto Project database over the 2010-2020 period. Values correspond to the share of "quasi-sentences" dedicated to emphasizing each category of issues in parties' manifestos. Vote-share-weighted average over all parties with available data in the corresponding decade.

Table B4 - Manifesto scores of anti-immigration parties

	1970s	1980s	1990s	2000s	2010s
Sociocultural dimension					
Conservative emphases					
National way of life +	0,6	2,0	4,2	4,7	9,0
Law and order +	1,2	3,3	5,4	7,5	8,5
Multiculturalism -	0,0	0,9	0,9	4,0	5,0
Political authority	2,7	2,8	4,7	3,9	3,1
Traditional morality +	1,7	2,6	3,5	2,3	2,4
Civic mindedness +	1,0	0,7	1,2	1,3	0,8
Progressive emphases					
Democracy	2,6	2,6	3,2	2,2	4,4
Environmentalism +	3,8	4,6	4,3	4,2	3,0
Freedom & human rights	2,5	2,8	4,8	2,7	2,2
Culture +	0,9	2,3	2,1	2,1	1,6
Non-economic demographic groups	3,5	5,0	2,3	1,9	1,1
Anti-growth economy +	0,0	0,0	0,1	0,3	0,8
Minority groups	0,7	1,4	0,7	0,8	0,4
Multiculturalism +	0,1	0,2	0,8	0,2	0,3
Traditional morality -	0,4	0,1	0,0	0,2	0,1
National way of life -	0,0	0,2	0,0	0,0	0,1
Economic-distributive dimension					
Pro-free-market emphases					
Free market economy	5,7	6,3	5,2	3,9	2,5
Incentives	1,4	2,5	3,1	2,9	2,0
Welfare -	1,2	2,8	2,1	1,6	1,7
Economic orthodoxy	5,2	4,9	2,8	2,4	1,1
Economic growth +	1,6	1,0	1,1	1,1	0,6
Education -	0,8	0,2	0,1	0,1	0,3
Protectionism -	0,1	0,6	0,1	0,5	0,2
Labour groups -	0,1	0,5	0,2	0,2	0,2
Pro-redistribution emphases					
Welfare +	4,0	3,1	4,5	6,9	8,4
Education +	2,1	3,0	3,3	4,3	3,9
Equality +	3,6	1,2	2,3	3,3	3,1
Market regulation	0,8	1,8	1,8	1,1	2,8
Labour groups +	1,0	1,0	1,3	1,9	2,3
Protectionism +	0,1	0,4	0,5	0,9	0,7
Controlled economy	0,4	0,7	0,2	0,5	0,5
Nationalisation	0,1	0,0	0,1	0,2	0,3
Keynesian demand management	0,1	0,0	0,0	0,2	0,2
Economic planning	0,4	0,2	0,2	0,1	0,2
Corporatism/mixed economy	0,7	0,5	0,0	0,0	0,1
Other categories					
Europe -	0,1	0,3	1,1	2,7	6,3
Technology & infrastructure	2,5	3,0	3,5	5,7	4,2
Gov-admin efficiency	5,7	4,9	6,7	4,5	3,3
Military +	1,1	2,7	2,4	2,7	2,5
Agriculture +	2,3	2,0	2,7	2,1	2,2

Internationalism -	1,3	1,4	0,7	1,6	1,5
Internationalism +	2,5	1,8	1,8	1,1	1,4
Decentralisation	0,8	1,7	2,5	2,5	1,3
Economic goals	2,7	2,6	1,6	1,0	0,6
Political corruption	0,2	2,0	3,2	0,8	0,5
Centralisation	0,6	0,5	0,1	0,1	0,4
Middle class and prof. groups	0,6	0,3	0,5	0,4	0,2
Constitution -	0,6	0,2	0,2	0,1	0,2
Military -	0,3	0,1	0,2	0,1	0,2
Europe +	0,5	0,7	0,9	0,6	0,2
Constitution +	1,3	0,3	1,0	0,3	0,1
Anti-imperalism	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,1
Peace	0,0	0,3	0,2	0,1	0,0
Foreign special +	0,1	0,2	0,2	0,3	0,0
Marxist analysis +	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
Foreign special -	0,1	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0

Note: The table reports the scores of anti-immigration parties on all the items available in the Comparative Manifesto Project database. Values correspond to the share of "quasi-sentences" dedicated to emphasizing each category of issues in parties' manifestos. Vote-share-weighted average over all parties with available data in the corresponding decade. Figure are ranked in decreasing order of their magnitude in the 2010s.

Table B5 - Manifesto scores of green parties

	1980s	1990s	2000s	2010s
Sociocultural dimension				
<u>Conservative emphases</u>				
Law and order +	1,1	1,1	2,0	1,4
Political authority	18,6	4,1	2,7	1,4
Civic mindedness +	1,0	1,4	1,4	1,2
National way of life +	0,1	0,7	0,6	0,8
Traditional morality +	0,3	0,4	0,3	0,3
Multiculturalism -	0,1	0,1	0,2	0,2
<u>Progressive emphases</u>				
Environmentalism +	12,2	16,7	13,3	13,4
Anti-growth economy +	2,9	2,7	3,9	6,9
Freedom & human rights	2,3	2,1	2,5	3,7
Democracy	6,7	6,2	4,0	3,2
Culture +	1,8	2,2	2,6	2,5
Multiculturalism +	0,3	0,8	1,2	1,5
Non-economic demographic groups	3,3	4,4	2,7	1,1
National way of life -	0,1	0,3	0,1	1,1
Traditional morality -	0,4	0,7	0,8	0,9
Minority groups	1,7	2,4	2,0	0,7
Economic-distributive dimension				
<u>Pro-free-market emphases</u>				
Incentives	0,7	0,7	2,4	1,2
Economic growth +	1,2	0,9	2,2	0,6
Economic orthodoxy	0,5	1,0	0,5	0,6
Free market economy	0,2	0,2	0,2	0,5
Welfare -	0,0	0,0	0,1	0,2
Protectionism -	0,0	0,1	0,1	0,1
Education -	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
Labour groups -	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
<u>Pro-redistribution emphases</u>				
Welfare +	5,3	8,1	8,1	11,1
Equality +	2,7	7,7	9,7	9,6
Education +	1,5	3,2	4,5	6,1
Labour groups +	4,2	2,6	3,4	4,5
Market regulation	1,2	2,4	2,4	3,4
Controlled economy	0,3	0,6	0,7	0,9
Nationalisation	0,4	0,6	0,8	0,7
Protectionism +	0,2	0,3	0,2	0,3
Corporatism/mixed economy	0,0	0,1	0,2	0,3
Economic planning	0,3	0,4	0,1	0,3
Keynesian demand management	0,1	0,0	0,2	0,2
Other categories				
Technology & infrastructure	2,3	3,7	4,8	6,0
Internationalism +	3,4	3,6	3,2	2,5
Gov-admin efficiency	2,0	2,7	2,3	1,5
Decentralisation	2,2	1,3	1,3	1,3
Agriculture +	1,4	1,7	2,1	1,2

Europe +	0,5	1,2	1,5	1,1
Military -	3,0	1,6	1,5	0,9
Political corruption	1,9	0,5	0,8	0,8
Economic goals	1,8	2,7	1,5	0,5
Europe -	0,7	1,1	0,7	0,4
Peace	1,7	0,6	0,8	0,4
Centralisation	0,0	0,0	0,2	0,3
Constitution -	0,1	0,2	0,0	0,2
Military +	0,4	0,2	0,2	0,2
Constitution +	1,4	0,4	0,2	0,2
Middle class and prof. groups	0,3	0,3	0,5	0,1
Internationalism -	0,1	0,2	0,4	0,1
Foreign special +	0,4	0,1	0,1	0,1
Anti-imperalism	0,7	0,1	0,1	0,1
Marxist analysis +	0,7	0,0	0,2	0,0
Foreign special -	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0

Note: The table reports the scores of green parties on all the items available in the Comparative Manifesto Project database. Values correspond to the share of "quasi-sentences" dedicated to emphasizing each category of issues in parties' manifestos. Vote-share-weighted average over all parties with available data in the corresponding decade. Figure are ranked in decreasing order of their magnitude in the 2010s.

Table B6 - Manifesto scores of Social Democratic / Socialist / Other left-wing parties

	1950s	1960s	1970s	1980s	1990s	2000s	2010s
Sociocultural dimension							
Conservative emphases							
Law and order +	0,2	0,6	1,4	1,9	2,7	4,2	3,0
Political authority	3,5	2,3	3,4	2,9	4,3	4,0	2,9
Civic mindedness +	2,3	1,6	1,7	2,1	2,1	1,6	1,3
National way of life +	0,8	0,9	0,4	0,6	0,8	1,5	1,1
Traditional morality +	0,4	0,3	0,3	0,4	1,0	0,7	0,5
Multiculturalism -	0,6	0,3	0,3	0,1	0,1	0,4	0,3
Progressive emphases							
Environmentalism +	0,4	1,1	3,0	4,7	5,9	5,6	5,8
Democracy	2,8	2,2	5,9	3,0	2,9	2,5	3,2
Anti-growth economy +	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,2	0,5	1,0	2,8
Culture +	1,2	2,2	1,8	2,9	2,6	3,0	2,4
Freedom & human rights	2,2	1,5	2,0	2,1	1,6	1,2	1,8
Non-economic demographic groups	4,4	5,1	4,4	5,4	4,4	3,2	1,4
Multiculturalism +	0,4	0,5	0,5	0,5	0,6	0,9	1,1
Minority groups	0,6	0,9	1,0	1,4	1,4	1,7	0,7
Traditional morality -	0,1	0,1	0,2	0,2	0,3	0,3	0,6
National way of life -	0,2	0,2	0,2	0,1	0,1	0,1	0,4
Economic-distributive dimension							
Pro-free-market emphases							
Incentives	1,7	2,3	2,0	2,4	2,9	2,2	2,1
Economic growth +	3,6	4,0	2,3	2,7	2,2	2,2	1,8
Economic orthodoxy	1,2	1,2	1,7	1,8	2,3	1,3	1,2
Protectionism -	0,3	0,4	0,1	0,1	0,3	0,4	0,3
Free market economy	1,0	0,6	0,4	0,6	0,8	0,7	0,3
Welfare -	0,0	0,1	0,1	0,1	0,3	0,1	0,2
Labour groups -	0,0	0,0	0,1	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
Education -	0,0	0,3	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
Pro-redistribution emphases							
Welfare +	8,2	9,6	7,2	8,3	9,3	11,6	12,8
Equality +	4,7	3,9	6,3	5,7	7,1	6,4	8,8
Education +	3,4	4,9	3,9	3,9	5,0	7,2	6,5
Labour groups +	5,0	4,0	4,1	3,8	3,8	3,3	5,8
Market regulation	2,7	2,3	2,6	1,9	2,1	2,5	4,9
Controlled economy	1,9	1,5	1,9	1,1	0,7	0,6	1,0
Nationalisation	1,3	0,8	1,1	0,8	0,5	0,5	0,8
Keynesian demand management	0,4	0,4	0,3	0,5	0,3	0,2	0,6
Economic planning	2,6	2,4	2,9	1,3	0,5	0,7	0,4
Corporatism/mixed economy	0,2	0,4	0,4	0,4	0,5	0,4	0,3
Protectionism +	0,5	0,4	0,6	0,3	0,2	0,1	0,3
Other categories							
Technology & infrastructure	4,2	5,0	4,6	5,5	6,1	6,9	6,9
Gov-admin efficiency	1,3	1,8	2,0	3,1	4,2	3,9	2,8
Internationalism +	2,3	2,7	2,4	2,8	3,2	3,7	2,6
Decentralisation	1,0	1,7	1,7	1,8	1,9	1,8	1,5
Europe +	0,4	1,0	0,7	1,2	2,0	1,7	1,3

Agriculture +	5,9	4,9	2,8	2,8	2,0	1,4	1,2
Military +	1,2	1,9	0,9	0,9	0,6	1,2	1,1
Economic goals	3,7	2,8	4,8	3,3	2,7	1,8	1,1
Political corruption	0,5	0,3	0,4	0,5	0,6	0,4	0,8
Military -	1,6	1,5	0,8	1,4	0,6	0,6	0,5
Peace	2,1	1,7	1,2	2,2	0,5	0,7	0,4
Europe -	0,0	0,2	0,4	0,2	0,3	0,2	0,3
Foreign special +	1,7	1,3	0,9	1,0	0,4	0,6	0,3
Constitution -	0,7	0,6	0,2	0,3	0,0	0,0	0,3
Middle class and prof. groups	1,5	1,1	0,7	0,7	0,2	0,5	0,2
Constitution +	1,0	0,5	0,6	0,7	0,4	0,4	0,2
Internationalism -	0,5	0,4	0,4	0,1	0,1	0,2	0,1
Anti-imperalism	0,4	0,4	0,6	0,3	0,1	0,1	0,1
Marxist analysis +	0,1	0,0	0,2	0,1	0,1	0,1	0,1
Centralisation	0,2	0,5	0,5	0,1	0,1	0,2	0,1
Foreign special -	0,7	0,5	0,4	0,3	0,0	0,1	0,0

Note: The table reports the scores of social democratic, socialist, and other left-wing parties (excluding Greens) on all the items available in the Comparative Manifesto Project database. Values correspond to the share of "quasi-sentences" dedicated to emphasizing each category of issues in parties' manifestos. Vote-share-weighted average over all parties with available data in the corresponding decade. Figure are ranked in decreasing order of their magnitude in the 2010s.

Table B7 - Manifesto scores of Conservative / Christian Democratic / Liberal parties

	1950s	1960s	1970s	1980s	1990s	2000s	2010s
Sociocultural dimension							
Conservative emphases							
Law and order +	0,7	0,9	1,9	2,4	4,7	6,4	5,2
Political authority	4,4	3,2	3,4	3,4	5,4	6,0	2,9
National way of life +	2,0	1,0	0,8	0,9	1,4	2,3	2,4
Civic mindedness +	3,1	1,4	1,5	1,5	1,7	1,8	1,7
Traditional morality +	3,1	1,6	1,8	2,3	3,1	2,5	1,4
Multiculturalism -	0,2	0,3	0,2	0,1	0,4	1,0	1,0
Progressive emphases							
Environmentalism +	0,4	1,5	3,8	4,5	5,1	4,2	4,3
Freedom & human rights	3,3	2,0	3,0	3,0	2,3	2,2	2,4
Culture +	1,0	2,2	2,8	2,5	2,0	2,0	2,1
Democracy	2,8	2,4	3,8	2,1	2,3	2,0	2,0
Anti-growth economy +	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,1	0,3	0,5	1,9
Non-economic demographic groups	3,9	4,9	4,9	4,0	3,4	2,9	1,3
Multiculturalism +	1,2	0,8	0,6	0,7	0,5	0,7	0,8
Minority groups	0,5	0,7	1,1	1,1	1,1	1,3	0,5
National way of life -	0,1	0,1	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,5
Traditional morality -	0,1	0,0	0,1	0,1	0,1	0,2	0,3
Economic-distributive dimension							
Pro-free-market emphases							
Incentives	3,0	3,7	3,9	3,9	4,1	3,9	3,7
Economic growth +	3,1	3,9	2,3	3,0	2,2	2,4	3,0
Economic orthodoxy	5,0	3,9	4,3	5,4	4,4	2,5	2,9
Free market economy	5,0	3,8	3,1	4,4	3,5	2,8	2,7
Welfare -	0,4	0,3	0,6	0,8	1,1	0,8	1,5
Protectionism -	0,4	0,5	0,2	0,6	0,3	0,4	0,6
Labour groups -	0,4	0,2	0,5	0,5	0,3	0,1	0,4
Education -	0,0	0,0	0,2	0,0	0,1	0,1	0,2
Pro-redistribution emphases							
Welfare +	4,9	6,0	6,6	5,6	6,1	8,5	9,0
Education +	2,2	4,6	4,0	3,4	4,8	5,7	5,4
Equality +	3,1	3,1	3,9	2,9	3,5	3,1	4,4
Labour groups +	2,4	2,0	1,9	1,7	1,2	2,0	3,0
Market regulation	1,4	1,0	1,5	1,4	2,0	2,0	3,0
Economic planning	0,9	1,5	1,1	0,4	0,3	0,4	0,5
Protectionism +	0,5	0,5	0,5	0,2	0,2	0,2	0,3
Controlled economy	0,3	0,4	0,9	0,4	0,4	0,3	0,3
Corporatism/mixed economy	0,6	0,2	0,3	0,3	0,3	0,1	0,3
Keynesian demand management	0,3	0,3	0,6	0,3	0,1	0,1	0,2
Nationalisation	0,2	0,0	0,1	0,0	0,0	0,1	0,2
Other categories							
Technology & infrastructure	3,2	5,8	4,2	5,5	5,2	6,3	7,6
Gov-admin efficiency	1,6	2,5	2,7	4,8	5,2	5,8	4,7
Internationalism +	1,6	2,6	1,8	2,2	3,0	2,4	2,3
Military +	2,1	2,6	1,7	2,6	1,4	1,7	2,1
Agriculture +	5,3	4,5	3,4	4,2	2,7	1,9	2,0

Decentralisation	2,0	2,2	3,2	2,1	1,9	1,9	1,8
Europe +	0,6	1,4	1,3	1,8	2,7	1,7	1,6
Economic goals	2,4	2,2	3,6	3,2	2,5	2,5	1,2
Europe -	0,1	0,1	0,0	0,1	0,5	0,4	0,6
Political corruption	0,4	0,3	0,4	0,3	0,6	0,6	0,5
Middle class and prof. groups	2,3	1,4	1,1	0,7	0,4	0,6	0,4
Constitution +	1,1	0,9	0,7	0,5	0,4	0,3	0,4
Centralisation	0,3	0,3	0,3	0,2	0,1	0,2	0,3
Foreign special +	2,1	1,8	0,9	1,1	0,6	0,7	0,3
Internationalism -	0,4	0,8	0,4	0,2	0,2	0,2	0,2
Constitution -	0,4	0,3	0,2	0,2	0,1	0,0	0,2
Peace	0,9	1,2	0,7	0,9	0,4	0,3	0,2
Military -	0,3	0,3	0,2	0,5	0,2	0,1	0,1
Foreign special -	0,4	0,3	0,1	0,3	0,0	0,1	0,0
Anti-imperalism	0,4	0,5	0,2	0,2	0,0	0,0	0,0
Marxist analysis +	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0

Note: The table reports the scores of conservative, Christian democratic, and liberal parties on all the items available in the Comparative Manifesto Project database. Values correspond to the share of "quasi-sentences" dedicated to emphasizing each category of issues in parties' manifestos. Vote-share-weighted average over all parties with available data in the corresponding decade. Figure are ranked in decreasing order of their magnitude in the 2010s.

Table B8 - Sociocultural polarization and educational divides: regression results

	Raw coefficient	After controls and country/year fixed effects	After controls and election fixed effects
1948-1979	-0.13*	0.12	0.11
1980-1999	-0.68***	-0.13	-0.21
2000-2020	-1.21***	-0.65***	-0.73***

Source: authors' computations combining the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Datatabase with Manifesto Project data.

Note: the table reports the coefficient associated to a regression of the sociocultural index on the education gradient (the share of top 10% educated voters within a given party's electorate) at the party level, decomposing the dataset into three time periods: 1948-1979, 1980-1999, and 2000-2020. The first column reports the raw coefficient (without controls). The second column reports the coefficient after controlling for country and year fixed effects and for the composition of the electorate of each party in terms of income, age, gender, rural-urban location, and religion. The third column reports the same coefficient after controlling for the same variables and for election fixed effects (that is, interacting country and year fixed effects). * $p<0.10$, ** $p<0.05$, *** $p<0.01$.

Interpretation: in 1948-1979, the link between a party's position on the sociocultural axis and the composition of its electorate in terms of education was small and not statistically significant; in 2000-2020, it has become strongly negative and statistically significant at the 1% level, so that parties strongly emphasizing progressive issues in their manifestos receive much greater support from higher-educated voters.

	Raw coefficient			After controls and country/year fixed effects			After controls and election fixed effects		
	1948-1979	1980-1999	2000-2020	1948-1979	1980-1999	2000-2020	1948-1979	1980-1999	2000-2020
Share of top 10% educated voters in party's electorate	-0.134* (0.079)	-0.681*** (0.103)	-1.208*** (0.118)	0.122 (0.174)	-0.133 (0.200)	-0.651*** (0.205)	0.114 (0.176)	-0.208 (0.193)	-0.733*** (0.207)
R-squared	0.01	0.06	0.14	0.59	0.52	0.43	0.61	0.59	0.47
Observations	444	661	640	159	266	341	159	266	341

Table B9 - Sociocultural polarization and educational divides: complete regression results

Source: authors' computations combining the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Datatabase with Manifesto Project data.

Note: the table reports the results of a regression of the sociocultural index on the education gradient (the share of top 10% educated voters within a given party's electorate) at the party level, decomposing the dataset into three time periods: 1948-1979, 1980-1999, and 2000-2020. The first panel reports the raw coefficient (without controls). The second panel reports the coefficient after controlling for country and year fixed effects and for the composition of the electorate of each party in terms of income, age, gender, rural-urban location, and religion. The third panel reports the same coefficient after controlling for the same variables and for election fixed effects (that is, interacting country and year fixed effects). * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Interpretation: in 1948-1979, the link between a party's position on the sociocultural axis and the composition of its electorate in terms of education was small and not statistically significant; in 2000-2020, it has become strongly negative and statistically significant at the 1% level, so that parties strongly emphasizing progressive issues in their manifestos receive much greater support from higher-educated voters.

Table B10 - Correlation between income and education gradients and all Manifesto items, 1960s-2010s											
	Relative support among top 10% educated voters						Relative support among top 10% income voters					
	1960s	1970s	1980s	1990s	2000s	2010s	1960s	1970s	1980s	1990s	2000s	2010s
Sociocultural dimension												
Conservative emphases												
Law and order +	0.11	0.11*	-0.08	-0.09*	-0.07	-0.27***	-0.03	0.12*	0.13**	0.25***	0.14**	-0.07
National way of life +	-0.05	-0.11*	-0.05	-0.24***	-0.20***	-0.28***	-0.07	0.04	0.06	-0.15**	-0.10*	-0.09*
Multiculturalism -	-0.09	-0.03	-0.12**	-0.14***	-0.19***	-0.30***	-0.13	-0.01	-0.07	-0.07	-0.08	-0.09*
Traditional morality +	-0.02	-0.04	-0.04	-0.14**	-0.18***	-0.11**	-0.06	-0.02	-0.07	-0.10	-0.19***	-0.11**
Political authority	-0.05	-0.09	0.02	0.04	-0.04	-0.08	-0.08	-0.01	-0.09	0.06	0.07	0.03
Civic mindedness +	0.02	-0.07	-0.11**	-0.04	0.01	0.02	-0.08	0.05	-0.07	-0.02	-0.07	0.07
Progressive emphases												
Culture +	-0.11	-0.09	-0.11**	0.02	-0.03	0.15***	-0.06	-0.04	-0.09	-0.08	0.04	0.10*
Freedom & human rights	0.09	0.11*	0.11**	0.13**	0.16***	0.23***	0.14	0.17***	0.24***	0.19***	0.12**	0.17***
Anti-growth economy +	-0.08	-0.00	0.13**	0.23***	0.22***	0.23***	-0.07	0.02	0.02	-0.00	0.06	-0.06
Environmentalism +	0.02	0.15**	0.28***	0.23***	0.20***	0.27***	-0.10	0.01	-0.02	-0.12*	-0.05	-0.02
Traditional morality -	0.07	0.06	0.09	0.13**	0.21***	0.27***	0.00	0.16**	0.02	0.02	0.04	0.14**
Multiculturalism +	-0.06	0.01	0.07	0.13**	0.13**	0.11**	-0.09	0.12*	0.01	-0.02	0.01	0.03
National way of life -	-0.10	-0.07	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.11**	-0.13	-0.08	-0.03	-0.07	-0.12**	0.02
Non-economic demographic groups	-0.09	-0.07	0.01	0.04	0.01	-0.06	-0.15*	-0.11	-0.06	-0.06	-0.01	-0.05
Minority groups	0.06	0.01	0.03	0.18***	0.16***	0.02	0.01	-0.11*	-0.02	0.05	0.08	-0.04
Democracy	-0.03	0.10	0.06	0.16***	0.08	0.05	-0.08	0.02	-0.15**	-0.06	-0.10*	-0.08
Economic-distributive dimension												
Pro-free-market emphases												
Incentives	-0.05	0.05	-0.11**	-0.11**	-0.08	-0.18***	-0.10	0.17***	0.24***	0.12*	0.17***	0.08
Economic growth +	0.01	-0.12*	-0.08	-0.04	-0.13**	-0.09*	-0.12	-0.09	0.10	0.09	-0.00	0.16***
Economic orthodoxy	0.38***	-0.01	-0.06	-0.06	0.01	-0.10*	0.42***	0.22***	0.30***	0.19***	0.14**	0.09*
Labour groups -	0.08	0.03	-0.01	-0.07	-0.08	-0.00	0.09	0.10	0.12*	0.05	0.08	0.13**
Education -	0.01	0.08	-0.09	-0.07	-0.00	-0.01	-0.07	0.08	0.05	0.03	0.04	0.11**
Protectionism -	0.15*	0.04	-0.02	0.00	0.00	-0.03	-0.10	0.08	0.05	0.06	0.08	0.20***
Welfare -	0.19**	-0.05	-0.11*	-0.04	-0.02	-0.05	0.39***	0.06	0.08	0.09	0.15***	0.15***
Free market economy	0.30***	0.05	-0.04	0.01	-0.09*	-0.07	0.25***	0.25***	0.32***	0.28***	0.20***	0.30***
Pro-redistribution emphases												
Equality +	-0.02	-0.12*	-0.04	0.07	0.12**	0.21***	-0.05	-0.16**	-0.29***	-0.18***	-0.17***	-0.05
Keynesian demand management	0.02	-0.10	-0.01	-0.04	-0.03	-0.11**	-0.11	-0.04	0.04	-0.01	-0.10*	-0.07
Labour groups +	-0.16*	0.15**	0.01	0.06	0.09	0.13**	-0.11	-0.19***	-0.25***	-0.13**	-0.12**	-0.06

Protectionism +	-0.17*	-0.09	-0.03	-0.18***	-0.10*	-0.10*	-0.17*	-0.14**	-0.07	-0.10*	-0.11*	-0.18***
Education +	-0.01	-0.06	-0.12**	0.01	0.03	0.11*	0.01	-0.01	-0.01	0.13**	-0.01	0.03
Welfare +	-0.22**	-0.09	-0.10*	-0.15***	0.00	-0.05	-0.22**	-0.06	-0.20***	-0.24***	-0.11*	-0.16***
Economic planning	-0.15*	-0.17***	-0.13**	-0.01	-0.09	-0.06	-0.19**	-0.05	-0.15**	-0.09	-0.08	0.02
Corporatism/mixed economy	-0.00	0.09	-0.11*	-0.05	-0.11*	-0.08	-0.03	0.06	-0.02	0.01	-0.11*	-0.08
Controlled economy	-0.15*	-0.14**	-0.00	-0.07	0.04	0.00	-0.05	-0.11*	-0.22***	-0.11*	-0.01	-0.18***
Market regulation	-0.11	-0.00	0.01	0.01	0.08	0.01	-0.19**	-0.12*	-0.02	-0.02	0.02	-0.09
Nationalisation	-0.05	0.08	0.06	-0.09	-0.03	0.01	-0.03	-0.21***	-0.26***	-0.16***	-0.23***	-0.22***
Other categories												
Agriculture +	-0.06	-0.14**	-0.15***	-0.11**	-0.20***	-0.17***	-0.02	-0.03	0.01	-0.06	0.01	-0.04
Military +	0.11	0.02	-0.00	-0.10*	-0.10*	-0.18***	0.06	0.21***	0.20***	0.15**	0.12**	0.05
Europe -	0.00	0.05	0.05	0.01	-0.07	-0.27***	0.02	-0.04	-0.11*	-0.15**	-0.18***	-0.16***
Political corruption	0.02	0.04	0.05	-0.05	-0.05	0.18***	-0.01	0.06	-0.03	0.02	-0.02	0.08
Europe +	0.04	-0.01	-0.05	0.04	0.11**	0.19***	0.03	0.06	0.10*	0.17***	0.22***	0.23***
Military -	-0.11	0.13**	0.21***	0.26***	0.25***	0.20***	-0.05	-0.17***	-0.15**	-0.10*	-0.13**	-0.17***
Internationalism -	-0.07	0.00	-0.13**	-0.11**	-0.17***	-0.13**	-0.07	-0.03	-0.02	-0.18***	-0.17***	-0.10*
Internationalism +	0.04	0.10	0.13**	0.09	0.28***	0.12**	-0.12	0.08	-0.04	-0.03	-0.01	0.03
Centralisation	-0.09	-0.07	-0.04	-0.03	0.05	0.10*	-0.14	-0.12*	0.05	-0.01	0.05	0.09
Constitution +	0.08	-0.05	0.05	-0.02	-0.00	-0.00	0.16*	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.05	0.09
Gov-admin efficiency	0.18**	-0.03	-0.02	-0.08	-0.01	-0.04	0.17*	0.10	0.22***	0.16***	0.19***	0.16***
Constitution -	-0.04	0.10	0.02	-0.06	-0.06	-0.04	-0.08	-0.04	0.10*	-0.04	-0.04	0.00
Decentralisation	-0.06	-0.11*	-0.06	-0.04	-0.08	-0.06	-0.17*	-0.06	-0.04	0.03	0.02	-0.00
Middle class and prof. groups	-0.03	0.01	0.10*	-0.08	0.03	-0.06	-0.02	0.03	0.10*	0.07	0.04	0.06
Technology & infrastructure	-0.04	-0.10	-0.12**	-0.12**	-0.14**	-0.08	-0.09	-0.11*	-0.01	-0.04	0.05	0.04
Foreign special +	0.13	-0.03	-0.05	-0.03	0.12**	-0.08	0.08	0.02	-0.03	0.06	0.12**	0.00
Economic goals	0.06	-0.09	-0.06	0.03	-0.09	-0.09	0.05	-0.06	0.01	-0.02	0.09	0.00
Foreign special -	-0.13	-0.08	0.11*	-0.03	0.20***	0.03	0.08	-0.06	-0.06	0.02	0.09	0.05
Anti-imperalism	0.04	-0.03	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.06	-0.03	-0.09	-0.03	-0.17***	-0.08	-0.14**
Marxist analysis +	.	-0.07	0.01	0.13**	-0.03	0.07	.	-0.07	-0.12**	-0.13**	-0.04	-0.12**
Peace	-0.22**	-0.12*	0.14***	0.13**	0.17***	0.07	-0.13	-0.18***	-0.21***	-0.01	0.02	-0.05

Note: The table reports the correlation coefficient between all items available in the Comparative Manifesto Project database and (1) the education gradient (defined as the share of top 10% educated voters within the electorate of the corresponding party) and (2) the income gradient (defined as the share of top 10% income voters within the electorate of the corresponding party). The unit of observation is the political party. Manifesto items correspond to the share of "quasi-sentences" dedicated to emphasizing each category of issues in parties' manifestos. * $p<0.10$, ** $p<0.05$, *** $p<0.01$.

Figure B1 - Share of votes covered by the survey-manifesto dataset

Source: authors' computations combining the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database and Manifesto Project data.
Note: the figure represents the total share of votes captured by the merged survey-manifesto dataset by country for all elections available between 1945 and 2020.

Figure B2 - Ideological polarization in Western democracies, 1950s

Figure B3 - Ideological polarization in Western democracies, 1960s

Figure B4 - Ideological polarization in Western democracies, 1970s

Figure B5 - Ideological polarization in Western democracies, 1980s

Figure B6 - Ideological polarization in Western democracies, 1990s

Figure B7 - Ideological polarization in Western democracies, 2000s

Figure B8 - Ideological polarization in Western democracies, 2010s

Source: authors' computations using the Comparative Manifesto Project database.
Note: the figure displays the average score of all parties available in the CMP dataset in the 2010s on the economic-distributive index (y-axis) and the sociocultural index (x-axis). Parties are categorized into conservative, Christian democratic, and liberal parties; social democratic, socialist, communist, and other left-wing parties, anti-immigration parties; and green parties.

Figure B9 - Multidimensional political conflict and the divergence of income and education (bottom 50%)

Figure B10 - Sociocultural polarization and educational divides, 1970s

Figure B11 - Sociocultural polarization and educational divides, 1980s

Source: authors' computations combining the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database and Manifesto Project data.
Note: parties are categorized into conservative and Christian democratic parties; liberal and social-liberal parties; social democratic, socialist, communist and other left-wing parties, anti-immigration parties; green parties; and other unclassifiable parties.

Figure B12 - Sociocultural polarization and educational divides, 1990s

Source: authors' computations combining the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database and Manifesto Project data.
Note: parties are categorized into conservative and Christian democratic parties; liberal and social-liberal parties; social democratic, socialist, communist and other left-wing parties, anti-immigration parties; green parties; and other unclassifiable parties.

Figure B13 - Sociocultural polarization and educational divides, 2000s

Source: authors' computations combining the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database and Manifesto Project data.
Note: parties are categorized into conservative and Christian democratic parties; liberal and social-liberal parties; social democratic, socialist, communist and other left-wing parties, anti-immigration parties; green parties; and other unclassifiable parties.

Figure B14 - Sociocultural polarization and educational divides, 2010s

Figure B15 - Multidimensional political conflict and the divergence of income and education (country-level analysis)

Source: authors' computations combining the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database and Manifesto Project data.
Note: the upper lines plots the raw correlation between the education gradient (defined as the difference between the share of top 10% educated voters and the share of bottom 90% educated voters voting for left-wing parties) and sociocultural polarization (defined as the standard deviation of the sociocultural index across all parties in a given country). Conversely, the bottom line plots the raw correlation between the income gradient and economic-distributive polarization (inverted, so that higher values correspond to greater pro-redistribution emphases). Both polarization indices are normalized to the average standard deviation to highlight relative evolutions. The unit of observation is the country.

Figure B16 - Average left-right positions of political parties in Western democracies, 2000-2020: survey data vs. manifesto data

Legend:
- Social Democrats / Socialists / Communists
- Conservatives / Christian Democrats / Liberals
- Greens
- Anti-immigration

Y-axis: Left-right ideological index in CMP dataset

X-axis: Average left-right position of voters (0-10 scale)

Source: authors' computations combining the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database and the CMP database.
Note: the figure displays the average score of parties on the left-right ideological index in the Comparative Manifesto Project database (y-axis) and the average self-reported left-right placement of voters supporting these parties, as reported in survey data (x-axis). Average over the 2000-2020 period. Excludes parties that received less than 5% of the vote in a given election. Parties are categorized into conservative, Christian democratic, and liberal parties; social democratic, socialist, communist and other left-wing parties, anti-immigration parties; and green parties. The size of bubbles is proportional to the square root of the average vote share of each party.

Figure B17 - Average left-right positions of political parties in Western democracies, 2000-2020: survey data vs. manifesto data (normalized)

Source: authors' computations combining the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database and the CMP database.

Note: the figure displays the average score of parties on the left-right ideological index in the Comparative Manifesto Project database (y-axis) and the average self-reported left-right placement of voters supporting these parties, as reported in survey data (x-axis). Both variables are normalized by taking the difference between the party's value and the vote-share-weighted average value in a given country-year. Average over the 2000-2020 period. Excludes parties that received less than 5% of the vote in a given election. Parties are categorized into conservative, Christian democratic, and liberal parties; social democratic, socialist, communist and other left-wing parties, anti-immigration parties; and green parties. The size of bubbles is proportional to the square root of the average vote share of each party.

Figure B18 - Average self-declared left-right position of voters supporting Conservative / Christian Democratic / Liberal parties


Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.

Note: the figure represents the difference between the average self-declared left-right position of voters supporting Conservative, Christian Democratic, and Liberal parties and the average self-declared left-right position of all voters over the 2000-2020 period by country.

Interpretation: In all countries, voters supporting Conservative / Christian Democratic / Liberal parties are significantly more likely to declare being more right-wing than other voters.

Figure B19 - Average self-declared left-right position of voters supporting anti-immigration parties

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure represents the difference between the average self-declared left-right position of voters supporting anti-immigration parties and the average self-declared left-right position of all voters over the 2000-2020 period by country.
Interpretation: In nearly all countries, voters supporting anti-immigration parties are significantly more likely to declare being more right-wing than other voters.

Figure B20 - Average self-declared left-right position of voters supporting Social Democratic / Socialist / Communist / Other left-wing parties (excl. Greens)

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure represents the difference between the average self-declared left-right position of voters supporting Social Democratic, Socialist, communist and other left-wing parties (excluding Greens) and the average self-declared left-right position of all voters over the 2000-2020 period by country.
Interpretation: In all countries, voters supporting Social Democratic / Socialist / Communist / Other left-wing parties are significantly more likely to declare being more left-wing than other voters.

Figure B21 - Average self-declared left-right position of voters supporting green parties

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure represents the difference between the average self-declared left-right position of voters supporting green parties and the average self-declared left-right position of all voters over the 2000-2020 period by country.
Interpretation: In all countries, voters supporting green parties are significantly more likely to declare being more left-wing than other voters.

Figure B22 - Average CMP left-right ideological index of Conservative / Christian Democratic / Liberal parties in Manifesto Project Database


Source: authors' computations using the Comparative Manifesto Project Database.
Note: the figure represents the difference between the left-right ideological index of Conservative, Christian Democratic, and Liberal parties and the overall vote-share-weighted average of the same index (by country and election) over the 2000-2020 period by country.
Interpretation: In all countries, Conservative / Christian Democratic / Liberal parties have a left-right ideological index that is higher (that is, more right-wing) than that of other parties.

Figure B23 - Average CMP left-right ideological index of anti-immigration parties

Source: authors' computations using the Comparative Manifesto Project Database.
Note: the figure represents the difference between the left-right ideological index of anti-immigration parties and the vote-share-weighted average of the same index (by country and election) over the 2000-2020 period by country.
Interpretation: In nearly all countries, anti-immigration parties have a left-right ideological index that is higher (that is, more right-wing) than that of other parties.

Figure B24 - Average CMP left-right ideological index of Social Democratic / Socialist / Communist / Other left-wing parties (excl. Greens)

Source: authors' computations using the Comparative Manifesto Project Database.
Note: the figure represents the difference between the left-right ideological index of Social Democratic, Socialist, Communist and other left-wing parties (excluding Greens) and the vote-share-weighted average of the same index (by country and election) over the 2000-2020 period by country.
Interpretation: In all countries, Social Democratic / Socialist / Communist / Other left-wing parties parties have a left-right ideological index that is lower (that is, more left-wing) than that of other parties.

Figure B25 - Average CMP left-right ideological index of green parties

Source: authors' computations using the Comparative Manifesto Project Database.
Note: the figure represents the difference between the left-right ideological index of green parties and the vote-share-weighted average of the same index (by country and election) over the 2000-2020 period by country.
Interpretation: In all countries, green parties have a left-right ideological index that is lower (that is, more left-wing) than that of other parties.

Figure CA1 - Vote for left-wing parties among young voters in Western democracies

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of voters younger than 25 and the share of voters aged 25 or above voting for left-wing parties in Western democracies.

Figure CA2 - Vote for left-wing parties among old voters in Western democracies

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of the 10% oldest voters and the share of the youngest 90% voters voting for left-wing parties in Western democracies.

Figure CA3 - Vote for left-wing parties among young voters in Western democracies, after controls

Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of voters younger than 25 and the share of voters aged 25 or above voting for left-wing parties in Western democracies, after controlling for income, education, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status.

Figure CA4 - Vote for left-wing parties among old voters in Western democracies, after controls

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.

Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of the 10% oldest voters and the share of the youngest 90% voters voting for left-wing parties in Western democracies, after controlling for income, education, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status.

Figure CA5 - Generational cleavages and party system fragmentation

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.

Note: the figure represents the share of votes received by selected groups of parties in Western democracies by age in the last election available. Green parties and "New left" parties (Die Linke, Podemos, France Insoumise, Bloco de Esquerda, Norwegian Socialist Left Party) make much higher scores among the youth than among older generations. By contrast, there is no clear age profile in the case of far-right or anti-immigration parties. 20 correponds to voters aged 20 or younger; 70 corresponds to voters 70 or older.

# Figure CA6 - Vote for Green parties by age group

Figure CA7 - Vote for anti-immigration parties by age group

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by anti-immigration parties in Western democracies in the last election available by age group.

Figure CB1 - The rural-urban divide

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure displays the difference between the share of rural areas and the share of urban areas voting for social democratic / socialist / communist / green parties. In all countries, rural areas have remained significantly less likely to vote for these parties than cities, with no clear trend over time. Estimates control for income, education, age, gender, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).

Figure CB2 - Vote for Green parties by rural-urban location in Western democracies

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Green parties by rural-urban location in Western democracies.

Figure CB3 - Vote for anti-immigration parties by rural-urban location in Western democracies

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by anti-immigration parties by rural-urban location in Western democracies.

Figure CB4 - Vote for left-wing parties by center-periphery location in Western democracies

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by center-periphery location in Western democracies. Centers correspond to the Australian Capital Territory (Australia), Vienna (Austria), Brussels (Belgium), Copenhagen (Denmark), Paris (France), Reykjavík (Iceland), Dublin (Ireland), Auckland and Wellington (New Zealand), Lisbon (Portugal), Madrid (Spain), and London (United Kingdom).

Figure CB5 - Vote for Green parties by center-periphery location in Western democracies

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Green parties by center-periphery location in Western democracies. Centers correspond to the Australian Capital Territory (Australia), Vienna (Austria), Brussels (Belgium), Copenhagen (Denmark), Paris (France), Reykjavík (Iceland), Dublin (Ireland), Auckland and Wellington (New Zealand), Lisbon (Portugal), Madrid (Spain), and London (United Kingdom).

Figure CB6 - Vote for anti-immigration parties by center-periphery location in Western democracies

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by anti-immigration parties by center-periphery location in Western democracies. Centers correspond to the Australian Capital Territory (Australia), Vienna (Austria), Brussels (Belgium), Copenhagen (Denmark), Paris (France), Reykjavík (Iceland), Dublin (Ireland), Auckland and Wellington (New Zealand), Lisbon (Portugal), Madrid (Spain), and London (United Kingdom).

Figure CB7 - Vote for left-wing parties among capital cities in Western democracies

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.

Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of voters living in the capital city and the share of other voters voting for left-wing parties in Western democracies. Centers correspond to the Australian Capital Territory (Australia), Vienna (Austria), Brussels (Belgium), Copenhagen (Denmark), Paris (France), Reykjavík (Iceland), Dublin (Ireland), Auckland and Wellington (New Zealand), Lisbon (Portugal), Madrid (Spain), and London (United Kingdom).

Figure CB8 - Vote for left-wing parties among capital cities in Western democracies, after controls

Figure CC1 - The religious divide

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure displays the difference between the share of Catholics (or Catholics and Protestants in mixed countries) declaring going to church at least once a year and the share of other voters voting for social democratic / socialist / communist / green parties. In all countries, religious voters have remained significantly less likely to vote for these parties than other voters.

Figure CC2 - Vote for left-wing parties by religion in Western democracies, 1970s

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by religion in the 1970s in Western democracies.

Figure CC3 - Vote for left-wing parties by religion in Western democracies, 2010s

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by religion in the 2010s in Western democracies.

Figure CC4 - Vote for left-wing parties among voters with no religion in Western democracies

Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of voters belonging to no religion and the share of other voters voting for left-wing parties in Western democracies. Non-religious voters have remained significantly more left-wing than the rest of the electorate since the 1950s.

Figure CC5 - Vote for Green parties by religion, 2010s

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Green parties by religious affiliation.

Figure CC6 - Vote for anti-immigration parties by religion, 2010s

Legend: Catholic, Other Christian, None, Other

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by anti-immigration parties by religious affiliation.

Figure CD1 - The reversal of the gender cleavage in Western democracies (before and after controls)

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.

Note: the figure displays the difference between the share of women and the share of men voting for left-wing (social democratic, socialist, communist, and green) parties in Western democracies, before and after controlling for other covariates (for country-years in which these variables are available). Women have gradually shifted from being significantly more right-wing to being significantly more left-wing than men, both before and after controls. Average over all Western democracies.

Figure CD2 - The reversal of the gender cleavage

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure displays the difference between the share of women and the share of men voting for social democratic / socialist / communist / green parties in Western democracies. In the majority of countries, women have gradually shifted from being significantly more conservative than men in the 1950s-1960s to being significantly more left-wing in the 2000s-2010s.

Figure CD3 - Vote for left-wing parties among women in Western democracies (after controlling for religion)

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure displays the difference between the share of women and the share of men voting for left-wing (socialist, social democratic, communist, and green) parties in Western democracies, after controlling for religion and church attendance. In the majority of countries, women have gradually shifted from being significantly more right-wing to being significantly more left-wing than men.

Figure CD4 - Gender cleavages and sectoral specialization in Western democracies

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of women and the share of men voting for left-wing parties in Western democracies in the last election available, before and after controlling for occupation (employment status + private/public sector of employment).

Figure CD5 - Vote for green parties by gender in Western democracies

Figure CD6 - Vote for anti-immigration parties by gender in Western democracies

Women ■   Men ■

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by anti-immigration parties by gender in Western democracies in the last election available.

Figure CE1 - The nativist cleavage
The native-immigrant cleavage

Denmark: immigrants more likely to vote for social democratic / socialist / green parties by 39 percentage points

Iceland, Finland, Portugal, Australia: immigrants not voting for different parties than natives

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database and the European Social Survey for Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.
Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of voters born in non-Western countries (all countries excluding Europe, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the United States) and the share of natives (voters born in the country considered) voting for social democratic / socialist / communist / green parties over the 2010-2020 period. In nearly all Western countries, immigrants are much more likely to vote for these parties than natives. US and Iceland figures include voters born in Western countries given lack of data on exact country of origin. Excludes Fianna Fáil in Ireland.

Figure CE2 - The nativist cleavage
The Muslim vote

Muslim voters more likely to vote for social democratic / socialist / green parties by over 40 percentage points

Countries (left to right): Italy, Spain, Germany, Australia, Ireland, US, Canada, Finland, Netherlands, Belgium, New Zealand, Norway, France, Switzerland, Austria, Denmark, Sweden, UK

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database and the European Social Survey for Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.
Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of Muslim voters and the share of non-Muslims voting for social democratic / socialist / communist / green parties over the 2010-2020 period. In all Western countries, Muslims are substantially more likely to vote for these parties than non-Muslims. This cleavage is stronger in countries with strong far-right parties (e.g. Sweden, Denmark, Austria, Switzerland, France). Excludes Fianna Fáil in Ireland.

Figure CE3 - Vote for left-wing parties by country of birth in Western democracies, 2010s

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by country of birth in Western democracies in the 2010s. Excludes Fianna Fáil in Ireland. Covers 2007 and 2012 elections in France (no data in 2017).

Figure CF1 - The decline of self-perceived class cleavages in Western democracies (before controls)

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of voters self-identifying as belonging to the "working class" or the "lower class" and the share of voters identifying with the "middle class", the "upper class" or "no class" voting for left-wing (socialist, social democratic, communist, and green) parties.

Figure CF2 - The decline of self-perceived class cleavages in Western democracies (after controls)

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.

Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of voters self-identifying as belonging to the "working class" or the "lower class" and the share of voters identifying with the "middle class", the "upper class" or "no class" voting for social democratic / socialist / communist / green parties. Self-perceived class cleavages have declined significantly over the past decades. Estimates control for income, education, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).

Figure CF3 - Vote for green parties by self-perceived class

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
**Note**: the figure shows the share of votes received by Green parties in Western democracies in the last election available by self-perceived social class.

Figure CF4 - Vote for anti-immigration parties by self-perceived class

■ Lower / Working class ■ Middle class / Upper class / No class

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by anti-immigration parties in Western democracies in the last election available by self-perceived social class.

Figure CF5 - Vote for left-wing parties among union members in Western democracies

Figure CF6 - Vote for left-wing parties among union members in Western democracies, after controls

Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of union members and the share of non-union members voting for social democratic, socialist, communist, and green parties in Western democracies. Estimates control for education, income, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).

Figure CF7 - Vote for left-wing parties among public sector workers in Western democracies

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of public sector workers and the share of private sector workers voting for social democratic, socialist, communist, and green parties in Western democracies.

Figure CF8 - Vote for left-wing parties among public sector workers in Western democracies, after controls

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of public sector workers and the share of private sector workers voting for social democratic, socialist, communist, and green parties in Western democracies. Estimates control for education, income, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).

Figure CF9 - Vote for left-wing parties among homeowners in Western democracies

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of homeowners and the share of renters voting for social democratic, socialist, communist, and green parties in Western democracies.

Figure CF10 - Vote for left-wing parties among homeowners in Western democracies, after controls

Table D1 - Marginal effect of belonging to top 10% educated voters on support for social democratic and affiliated parties by country and decade, after controls

|	1948-59	1960-69	1970-79	1980-89	1990-99	2000-09	2010-2020
Australia		-13.3***	-4.8	-3.2	-3.0*	10.6***	5.9***
		(2.4)	(3.3)	(2.3)	(1.7)	(2.3)	(1.4)
Austria			-15.5***	-10.4***	-2.4	-2.4	12.8***
			(4.3)	(3.3)	(2.6)	(2.7)	(3.3)
Belgium			-10.6***	-8.2***	0.4	1.2	2.1*
			(1.5)	(1.5)	(1.5)	(1.1)	(1.3)
Canada		3.1	-2.0	-0.7	5.8***	6.9***	7.7***
		(3.0)	(2.9)	(1.9)	(2.0)	(1.9)	(1.7)
Denmark		-15.3***	-7.9***	-1.2	-0.8	5.0***	4.1***
		(3.5)	(2.0)	(1.7)	(1.2)	(0.9)	(1.5)
Finland			-19.0***	-14.6***	-8.4***	-5.6***	-2.6*
			(2.2)	(2.1)	(1.8)	(1.6)	(1.4)
France	-18.2***	-2.5	-4.8***	-0.0	8.1***	4.8***	10.2***
	(3.5)	(2.2)	(1.4)	(1.7)	(1.6)	(1.6)	(1.6)
Germany	-15.1***	-12.9***	-18.4***	-6.8*	3.1	4.2*	10.3***
	(2.2)	(2.7)	(3.8)	(3.5)	(2.4)	(2.4)	(2.7)
Iceland			6.7	-0.1	9.7***	5.6***	4.4***
			(5.7)	(3.1)	(2.4)	(1.5)	(1.0)
Ireland			-13.3***	-11.4***	-6.6***	-3.1*	-5.2***
			(2.3)	(1.4)	(2.0)	(1.7)	(1.4)
Italy	-9.9**	-0.9	-4.5	3.2	2.0	4.8**	5.2*
	(4.9)	(2.4)	(2.9)	(2.4)	(1.8)	(2.3)	(2.8)
Luxembourg			-16.0***	-5.1**	-0.6	7.4	5.5
			(3.1)	(2.5)	(1.8)	(4.9)	(5.0)
Netherlands		-1.8	-7.3***	1.9	11.5***	10.8***	10.7***
		(3.4)	(2.1)	(1.6)	(2.0)	(2.1)	(1.4)
New Zealand			0.6	-5.8*	2.3	12.7***	14.1***
			(2.3)	(3.3)	(1.5)	(1.8)	(1.7)
Norway	-30.7***	-33.1***	-16.8***	-12.0***	-3.6**	3.2***	2.7***

	(3.3)	(2.6)	(2.2)	(1.5)	(1.5)	(1.0)	(1.0)
Portugal				-8.9	-5.9	-8.1***	-16.4***
				(5.4)	(5.2)	(2.5)	(3.8)
Spain				-9.9***	-12.5***	-6.1***	-1.8**
				(1.4)	(1.9)	(1.3)	(0.7)
Sweden	-35.5***	-33.2***	-23.4***	-17.0***	-9.4***	-7.3***	-0.9
	(2.5)	(1.6)	(1.6)	(1.4)	(1.2)	(1.1)	(3.2)
Switzerland		-15.0***	-4.5*	-4.5	4.6**	10.1***	14.1***
		(5.3)	(2.7)	(4.4)	(2.3)	(2.0)	(1.2)
United Kingdom	-16.6***	-12.2***	-10.5***	-4.7***	-3.2**	-5.4***	2.1
	(2.6)	(2.2)	(1.0)	(1.1)	(1.4)	(1.5)	(1.6)
United States	-15.1***	-10.4***	-2.5	2.0	-3.1	4.6**	17.6***
	(2.0)	(2.3)	(2.1)	(1.8)	(2.1)	(1.9)	(1.1)

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.

Note: the table reports the marginal effect of belonging to top 10% educated voters on the probability to support Social Democratic / Socialist / Green / Communist / Other left-wing parties, after controlling for income, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available). The original survey dataset is duplicated for each education category to approximate education deciles (see methodology). Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level. Coefficient standard errors in parenthesis. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table D2 - Marginal effect of belonging to top 10% income voters on support for social democratic and affiliated parties by country and decade, after controls

	1948-59	1960-69	1970-79	1980-89	1990-99	2000-09	2010-2020
Australia		-24.2***	-20.6***	-12.2***	-13.4***	-10.5***	-10.5***
		(2.7)	(3.8)	(3.7)	(2.0)	(2.2)	(1.8)
Austria			-17.9***	-7.4**	-2.4	-8.4*	-8.5**
			(4.0)	(3.6)	(3.0)	(4.9)	(3.4)
Belgium			-5.7***	-9.8***	-9.3***	-6.2***	-7.8***
			(1.6)	(1.6)	(1.5)	(1.7)	(1.7)
Canada		5.3*	-8.6***	-7.0***	-3.1	-5.4***	-7.0***
		(2.9)	(2.5)	(2.1)	(2.7)	(2.0)	(1.8)
Denmark		-12.6***	-14.9***	-22.2***	-19.8***	-14.5***	-14.6***
		(4.7)	(2.3)	(1.9)	(2.0)	(1.9)	(2.8)
Finland			-12.0***	-15.0***	-7.3***	-4.1*	-6.7***
			(2.4)	(2.1)	(2.1)	(2.2)	(1.9)
France	-0.8	-11.2***	-14.7***	-12.0***	-10.4***	-6.1***	-8.8***
	(5.7)	(2.8)	(1.6)	(1.8)	(1.8)	(1.5)	(2.6)
Germany	-11.4***	-17.7***	-12.1***		-11.8***	-10.1***	-13.8***
	(2.0)	(2.4)	(3.9)		(4.2)	(2.8)	(3.4)
Iceland				-4.0	-0.7	-6.2***	-7.1***
				(3.1)	(1.9)	(1.9)	(1.6)
Ireland			-6.7***	-8.1***	-10.6***	-1.3	-7.0***
			(2.5)	(1.3)	(2.7)	(3.1)	(2.4)
Italy	2.2	-6.6**	-1.4	-1.5		-3.0	4.6***
	(8.7)	(3.3)	(4.4)	(3.8)		(5.6)	(1.5)
Luxembourg			-7.8***	-7.6***	-5.0***	-18.2***	
			(2.9)	(2.4)	(1.6)	(6.1)	
Netherlands		-18.0***	-17.6***	-16.0***	-13.8***	-15.2***	-8.7***
		(3.5)	(2.8)	(2.0)	(2.4)	(2.4)	(1.9)
New Zealand			-19.9***	-6.4**	-11.8***	-11.3***	-12.2***
			(2.8)	(3.2)	(1.8)	(2.5)	(2.4)
Norway	-22.6***	-20.5***	-15.9***	-22.0***	-12.9***	-13.4***	-15.6***

	(4.1)	(2.6)	(2.0)	(2.0)	(2.8)	(2.2)	(2.5)
Portugal				-14.6*	-11.6*	-11.0***	-7.7
				(7.6)	(6.0)	(2.6)	(5.6)
Spain				-15.6***		-8.6***	-5.9***
				(3.2)		(1.5)	(1.4)
Sweden	-16.3***	-8.4***	-17.2***	-8.2***	-12.0***	-15.7***	-17.4***
	(3.7)	(1.6)	(1.9)	(1.3)	(1.9)	(1.8)	(2.3)
Switzerland				-11.9***	-7.2***	-11.7***	-5.6***
				(4.1)	(2.3)	(2.1)	(1.5)
United Kingdom	-23.7***	-31.3***	-15.6***	-15.3***	-10.0***	-6.8***	-7.6***
	(2.9)	(2.1)	(1.2)	(1.2)	(1.6)	(1.8)	(1.9)
United States	-9.6***	-8.2***	-12.8***	-13.1***	-7.7***	-11.1***	-0.0
	(2.2)	(2.4)	(2.2)	(2.1)	(2.7)	(2.8)	(1.9)

Note: the table reports the marginal effect of belonging to top 10% income voters on the probability to support Social Democratic / Socialist / Communist / Green / Other left-wing parties, after controlling for education, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available). The original survey dataset is duplicated for each income bracket to approximate income deciles (see methodology). Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level. Coefficient standard errors in parenthesis. * $p<0.10$, ** $p<0.05$, *** $p<0.01$.

Table D3 - Marginal effect of belonging to top 10% educated voters on support for specific families of parties by country, 2010-2020, after controls

	Social Democratic / Socialist / Communist / Other left	Conservative / Christian Democratic / Liberal	Green	Anti-immmigration
Australia	1.1	-7.0***	4.8***	-0.2**
	(1.4)	(1.4)	(1.1)	(0.1)
Austria	3.2	3.8	9.6***	-16.4***
	(3.1)	(3.2)	(2.4)	(2.4)
Belgium	-4.3***	0.1	6.3***	-2.0***
	(1.1)	(1.3)	(0.9)	(0.4)
Canada	6.1***	-8.2***	1.7**	
	(1.7)	(1.6)	(0.7)	
Denmark	3.5**	1.0	0.6	-5.0***
	(1.4)	(1.4)	(0.8)	(0.9)
Finland	-6.3***	9.7***	3.7***	-7.9***
	(1.3)	(1.5)	(0.9)	(1.2)
France	9.0***	-2.0	1.2**	-11.7***
	(1.6)	(1.5)	(0.5)	(1.3)
Germany	-0.6	-7.7***	11.1***	-1.6
	(2.4)	(2.6)	(2.2)	(1.1)
Iceland	2.0**	-5.1***	2.4***	
	(0.8)	(1.0)	(0.7)	
Ireland	-6.0***	4.0***	0.8	
	(1.5)	(1.4)	(0.6)	
Italy	5.2*	-4.9*		
	(2.8)	(2.9)		(2.1)
Luxembourg	-0.7	-4.0	6.1	-1.3
	(5.0)	(5.0)	(4.7)	(1.7)
Netherlands	6.6***	-2.3*	4.1***	-8.0***
	(1.4)	(1.4)	(0.8)	(0.7)
New Zealand	6.0***	-14.7***	8.1***	-1.2

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	(1.6)	(1.7)	(1.1)	(0.7)
Norway	1.8*	-0.8	0.9**	-3.6***
	(1.0)	(1.0)	(0.4)	(0.7)
Portugal	-14.1***	16.4***	-2.2	
	(3.6)	(3.8)	(1.7)	
Spain	-2.1***	4.8***	0.3***	-2.6***
	(0.7)	(0.7)	(0.1)	(0.4)
Sweden	-7.5**	5.2	6.6***	-4.3***
	(3.1)	(3.3)	(2.2)	(1.2)
Switzerland	6.2***	-0.6	7.9***	-13.0***
	(1.0)	(1.2)	(1.0)	(1.0)
United Kingdom	2.1	-10.2***		-2.3***
	(1.6)	(1.6)		(0.4)
United States	17.6***	-17.6***		
	(1.1)	(1.1)		

Note: the table reports the marginal effect of belonging to top 10% educated voters on the probability to support specific families of parties in the 2010-2020 period, after controlling for income, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available). The original survey dataset is duplicated for each education category to approximate education deciles (see methodology). Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level. Coefficient standard errors in parenthesis.
* $p<0.10$, ** $p<0.05$, *** $p<0.01$.

Table D4 - Marginal effect of belonging to top 10% income voters on support for specific families of parties by country, 2010-2020, after controls

	Social Democratic / Socialist / Communist / Other left	Conservative / Christian Democratic / Liberal	Green	Anti-immmigration
Australia	-7.5***	13.1***	-3.0**	-0.2
	(1.7)	(1.8)	(1.2)	(0.1)
Austria	-7.3**	12.9***	-1.2	-4.4
	(3.2)	(3.4)	(2.7)	(2.8)
Belgium	-5.9***	8.6***	-2.0*	-0.1
	(1.4)	(1.9)	(1.2)	(0.7)
Canada	-5.4***	7.6***	-1.6***	
	(1.8)	(1.7)	(0.6)	
Denmark	-9.3***	20.7***	-5.3***	-6.0***
	(2.8)	(2.9)	(1.1)	(1.6)
Finland	-7.0***	9.0***	0.3	-1.2
	(1.7)	(1.9)	(1.1)	(1.5)
France	-8.2***	13.5***	-0.5	-5.1**
	(2.6)	(2.9)	(0.6)	(2.1)
Germany	-12.0***	15.5***	-0.3	-0.2
	(3.0)	(3.5)	(2.7)	(1.8)
Iceland	-2.4*	10.5***	-4.7***	
	(1.3)	(1.8)	(1.3)	
Ireland	-7.9***	8.1***	0.9	
	(2.4)	(2.4)	(0.9)	
Italy	4.6***	0.9		-2.4*
	(1.5)	(1.6)		(1.3)
Netherlands	-7.1***	12.2***	-1.6*	-1.8*
	(1.8)	(1.9)	(0.9)	(1.0)
New Zealand	-9.9***	16.6***	-2.3*	-1.8*
	(2.3)	(2.5)	(1.2)	(1.1)
Norway	-13.0***	13.8***	-2.6***	1.0

	(2.5)	(2.9)	(0.7)	(2.0)
Portugal	-4.3	7.7	-3.5	
	(5.5)	(5.6)	(2.4)	
Spain	-6.0***	5.3***	0.1	1.5*
	(1.4)	(1.3)	(0.1)	(0.8)
Sweden	-13.4***	19.2***	-4.0***	-1.8
	(2.2)	(2.4)	(1.2)	(1.3)
Switzerland	-8.1***	9.6***	2.5**	-3.2**
	(1.3)	(1.7)	(1.2)	(1.4)
United Kingdom	-7.6***	15.0***		-1.9***
	(1.9)	(2.1)		(0.6)
United States	-0.0	0.0		
	(1.9)	(1.9)		

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.

Note: the table reports the marginal effect of belonging to top 10% income voters on the probability to support specific families of parties in the 2010-2020 period, after controlling for education, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available). The original survey dataset is duplicated for each income bracket to approximate income deciles (see methodology). Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level. Coefficient standard errors in parenthesis. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

	(1) 1948-1959	(2) 1960-69	(3) 1970-79	(4) 1980-89	(5) 1990-99	(6) 2000-09	(7) 2010-20
Table D5 - Effect of income and education on support for more left-wing parties (dummy income and education variables, continuous left-right ideological index)							
Income: Top 10%	-5.700***	-4.505***	-5.066***	-4.213***	-3.809***	-3.255***	-3.829***
	(0.673)	(0.430)	(0.327)	(0.267)	(0.207)	(0.191)	(0.200)
Education: University graduate	-10.880***	-6.278***	-2.158***	-1.060***	1.055***	2.212***	2.264***
	(1.211)	(0.614)	(0.388)	(0.251)	(0.195)	(0.174)	(0.165)
R-squared	0.35	0.24	0.24	0.23	0.34	0.27	0.17
Observations	35196	82331	158203	210450	170789	212937	208247

Note: The table reports the effect of income and education on support for more left-wing parties by decade across all Western democracies with available data. All estimates include election fixed effects. The dependent variable is the (inverted) left-right ideological index available from the Comparative Manifesto Project database, which theoretically ranges from -100 (most right-wing) to 100 (most left-wing). *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.

Interpretation: in 1948-1959, higher income and higher education were both associated with support for more right-wing parties. By 2010-2020, higher income is still associated with support for more right-wing parties, but higher education is now associated with higher support for more left-wing parties.

Table D6 - Effect of income and education on support for more left-wing parties, after controls
(dummy income and education variables, continuous left-right ideological index)

	(1) 1948-1959	(2) 1960-69	(3) 1970-79	(4) 1980-89	(5) 1990-99	(6) 2000-09	(7) 2010-20
Income: Top 10%	-6.445***	-5.398***	-5.618***	-4.370***	-3.523***	-3.135***	-3.462***
	(0.673)	(0.420)	(0.331)	(0.255)	(0.208)	(0.189)	(0.197)
Education: University graduate	-11.640***	-7.119***	-2.830***	-1.558***	0.700***	1.734***	1.667***
	(1.230)	(0.614)	(0.391)	(0.250)	(0.195)	(0.174)	(0.169)
R-squared	0.37	0.26	0.26	0.25	0.36	0.32	0.22
Observations	35196	82331	158203	210450	170789	212937	208247

Note: The table reports the effect of income and education on support for more left-wing parties by decade across all Western democracies with available data. The dependent variable is the (inverted) left-right ideological index available from the Comparative Manifesto Project database, theoretically ranging from -100 (most right-wing) to 100 (most left-wing). All estimates include election fixed effects and control for the following variables (in country-years for which they are available): age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.

Interpretation: in 1948-1959, higher income and higher education were both associated with support for more right-wing parties. By 2010-2020, higher income is still associated with support for more right-wing parties, but higher education is now associated with higher support for more left-wing parties.

Table D7 - Effect of income and education on support for more left-wing parties
(continuous income and education variables, continuous left-right ideological index)

	(1) 1948-1959	(2) 1960-69	(3) 1970-79	(4) 1980-89	(5) 1990-99	(6) 2000-09	(7) 2010-20
Income rank	0.422	1.957***	-1.569***	-3.589***	-4.882***	-4.909***	-5.688***
	(0.722)	(0.408)	(0.387)	(0.294)	(0.269)	(0.262)	(0.287)
Education rank	-10.214***	-9.269***	-5.295***	-2.413***	1.142***	3.993***	4.649***
	(0.590)	(0.382)	(0.351)	(0.266)	(0.261)	(0.255)	(0.281)
R-squared	0.35	0.24	0.24	0.23	0.34	0.27	0.18
Observations	13025	34028	70328	91076	86594	97681	100116

Note: The table reports the effect of income and education on support for more left-wing parties by decade across all Western democracies with available data. All estimates include election fixed effects. Income and education ranks/quantiles (ranging from 0 to 1) are defined discretely based on all income and education categories available in each survey. The dependent variable is the (inverted) left right ideological index available from the Comparative Manifesto Project database, which theoretically ranges from -100 (most right-wing) to 100 (most left-wing). *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.

Interpretation: in 1948-1969, higher income and higher education were both associated with support for more right-wing parties. By 2010 2020, higher income is still associated with support for more right-wing parties, but higher education is now associated with higher support for more left-wing parties.

Table D8 - Effect of income and education on support for more left-wing parties, after controls
(continuous income and education variables, continuous left-right ideological index)

	(1) 1948-1959	(2) 1960-69	(3) 1970-79	(4) 1980-89	(5) 1990-99	(6) 2000-09	(7) 2010-20
Income rank	-2.719***	-0.766*	-3.918***	-4.838***	-5.025***	-5.312***	-5.139***
	(0.775)	(0.437)	(0.440)	(0.315)	(0.299)	(0.290)	(0.312)
Education rank	-10.066***	-10.112***	-6.448***	-3.841***	0.291	3.099***	3.119***
	(0.607)	(0.389)	(0.360)	(0.272)	(0.271)	(0.264)	(0.293)
R-squared	0.37	0.27	0.27	0.25	0.36	0.32	0.22
Observations	13025	34028	70328	91076	86594	97681	100116

Note: The table reports the effect of income and education on support for more left-wing parties by decade across all Western democracies with available data. Income and education ranks/quantiles (ranging from 0 to 1) are defined discretely based on all income and education categories available in each survey. The dependent variable is the (inverted) left-right ideological index available from the Comparative Manifesto Project database, theoretically ranging from -100 (most right-wing) to 100 (most left-wing). All estimates include election fixed effects and control for the following variables (in country-years for which they are available): age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.

Interpretation: in 1948-1959, higher income and higher education were both associated with support for more right-wing parties. By 2010-2020, higher income is still associated with support for more right-wing parties, but higher education is now associated with higher support for more left-wing parties.

Table D9 - The reversal of educational divides, 1960-2020: before and after controls

	1960-69	1970-79	1980-89	1990-99	2000-09	2010-20	Difference 2010s-1960s
Raw coefficient	-21.6***	-11.8***	-7.3***	-2.7***	3.4***	5.3***	26,9
	(1.0)	(0.7)	(0.7)	(0.6)	(0.6)	(0.6)	
After controlling for income	-18.0***	-9.8***	-4.9***	-0.8	5.1***	6.6***	24,6
	(1.0)	(0.7)	(0.7)	(0.6)	(0.6)	(0.6)	
After controlling for the above and: Gender	-18.3***	-10.1***	-4.9***	-0.8	5.0***	6.5***	24,8
	(1.0)	(0.7)	(0.7)	(0.6)	(0.6)	(0.6)	
After controlling for the above and: Age	-18.9***	-11.0***	-5.9***	-1.5**	4.6***	5.7***	24,6
	(1.0)	(0.7)	(0.7)	(0.6)	(0.6)	(0.5)	
After controlling for the above and: Religion	-19.1***	-11.4***	-6.5***	-2.3***	4.1***	4.9***	24,0
	(1.0)	(0.7)	(0.7)	(0.6)	(0.6)	(0.5)	
After controlling for the above and: Religious practice	-18.5***	-10.9***	-5.9***	-1.8***	4.3***	5.1***	23,6
	(1.0)	(0.7)	(0.7)	(0.6)	(0.6)	(0.5)	
After controlling for the above and: Rural/urban	-19.2***	-11.6***	-6.5***	-2.2***	3.8***	4.6***	23,8
	(1.0)	(0.7)	(0.7)	(0.6)	(0.6)	(0.5)	
After controlling for the above and: Region	-19.9***	-11.9***	-6.6***	-2.2***	3.6***	4.5***	24,4
	(1.0)	(0.7)	(0.7)	(0.6)	(0.6)	(0.5)	
After controlling for the above and: Employment/marital status	-19.4***	-11.7***	-6.5***	-2.3***	3.6***	4.6***	24,0
	(1.0)	(0.7)	(0.7)	(0.6)	(0.6)	(0.5)	
After controlling for the above and: Sector of employment	-19.7***	-12.5***	-7.7***	-3.7***	2.1***	3.6***	23,3
	(1.0)	(0.7)	(0.7)	(0.6)	(0.6)	(0.5)	
After controlling for the above and: Union membership	-19.4***	-12.5***	-7.9***	-3.7***	1.7***	3.3***	22,7
	(1.0)	(0.7)	(0.7)	(0.6)	(0.6)	(0.5)	
After controlling for the above and: Home ownership	-18.8***	-12.1***	-7.7***	-3.7***	1.9***	3.6***	22,4
	(1.0)	(0.7)	(0.7)	(0.6)	(0.6)	(0.5)	

Note: The table reports the marginal effect of belonging to top 10% educated voters on the probability to support Social Democratic / Socialist / Communist / Green / Other left-wing parties, before and after controlling for a set of covariates. The regressions are run on the restricted number of countries for which these covariates are available in most decades: Australia, Denmark, Finland, France, the Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. All estimates include election (country-year) fixed effects.

	1948-59	1960-69	1970-79	1980-89	1990-99	2000-09	2010-20	2010s - 1950s
Table D10 - The reversal of educational divides by subgroup								
Gender								
Men	-25.1***	-17.0***	-7.8***	-3.8***	3.8***	5.0***	6.9***	32,0
	(1.6)	(1.4)	(1.0)	(0.9)	(0.7)	(0.7)	(0.7)	
Women	-24.9***	-16.7***	-13.2***	-7.4***	-3.3***	0.8	2.0***	26,9
	(1.9)	(1.1)	(0.8)	(0.7)	(0.7)	(0.7)	(0.7)	
Location								
Urban areas	-25.2***	-16.2***	-11.9***	-8.6***	-2.5***	1.7***	3.3***	28,5
	(2.6)	(1.2)	(1.0)	(0.8)	(0.8)	(0.6)	(0.6)	
Rural areas	-18.1***	-13.4***	-2.9*	-3.7***	3.5**	5.9***	9.7***	27,8
	(3.2)	(1.9)	(1.7)	(1.4)	(1.7)	(1.4)	(1.6)	
Religion								
No religion	-24.0***	-24.0***	-6.1***	-0.6	4.6***	5.2***	7.8***	31,8
	(8.9)	(3.0)	(1.5)	(1.4)	(1.2)	(1.1)	(0.9)	
Christian / Other	-18.1***	-13.6***	-11.6***	-8.1***	-3.0***	-0.2	1.3**	19,4
	(2.4)	(1.1)	(0.9)	(0.9)	(0.7)	(0.7)	(0.7)	
Sector of employment								
Private sector	-25.2***	-20.7***	-14.9***	-8.1***	-4.2***	-0.9	1.5**	26,7
	(3.5)	(3.0)	(1.6)	(1.2)	(0.8)	(0.9)	(0.7)	
Public sector	-12.3**	-22.4***	-3.4*	-3.1***	1.1	5.4***	5.8***	18,1
	(6.0)	(4.7)	(1.8)	(1.2)	(0.9)	(0.9)	(0.8)	
Subjective social class								
Working/Lower class	-13.4***	-6.7***	0.8	-3.7*	-1.7	2.6	4.9*	18,3
	(4.3)	(2.6)	(2.0)	(2.0)	(2.2)	(2.4)	(2.8)	
Middle/Upper class	-11.0***	-6.0***	0.2	0.9	3.2***	5.3***	7.3***	18,3
	(2.4)	(1.2)	(1.2)	(1.0)	(0.7)	(0.8)	(1.0)	

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.

Note: the table reports the unconditional effect of belonging to top 10% educated voters on the probability to support Social Democratic / Socialist / Green / Other left-wing parties, decomposed by subgroup of voters. Within nearly all groups, most educated voters used to be significantly less likely to vote for these parties in the 1950s and 1960s. By the 2010s, they had become significantly more likely to do so. Figures correspond to regression results on all countries with available data for each decade. All estimates include election fixed effects. The original survey dataset is duplicated for each education category to approximate education deciles (see methodology). Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level. Coefficient standard errors in parenthesis. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table E1 - Determinants of support for Labor / Greens in Australia

	(1) 1960-69	(2) 1970-79	(3) 1980-89	(4) 1990-99	(5) 2000-09	(6) 2010-20
Education: None/Primary	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Education: Secondary	-0.118***	-0.054**	-0.045***	-0.040***	-0.019	-0.010
	(0.018)	(0.024)	(0.015)	(0.012)	(0.017)	(0.013)
Education: University	-0.238***	-0.047	-0.046*	-0.070***	0.086***	0.061***
	(0.031)	(0.040)	(0.025)	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.017)
Education: Postgraduate			-0.125	-0.021	0.128***	0.077***
			(0.082)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.017)
Income group: Bottom 50%	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Income group: Middle 40%	-0.165***	-0.071***	-0.012	-0.038***	-0.104***	-0.034***
	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.023)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.013)
Income group: Top 10%	-0.333***	-0.275***	-0.110***	-0.149***	-0.179***	-0.126***
	(0.029)	(0.024)	(0.037)	(0.021)	(0.024)	(0.020)
Age: 20-39	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Age: 40-59	0.020	0.009	-0.033**	-0.067***	0.028	-0.001
	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.017)	(0.015)
Age: 60+	-0.067**	-0.059***	-0.074***	-0.098***	-0.071***	-0.112***
	(0.028)	(0.022)	(0.020)	(0.016)	(0.021)	(0.016)
Gender: Woman	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Gender: Man	0.068***	0.087***	0.048***	0.039***	-0.012	-0.073***
	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.011)
Religion: None			(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
			(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Religion: Catholic			0.084**	0.064***	-0.049**	-0.090***
			(0.041)	(0.022)	(0.024)	(0.018)
Religion: Other Christian			-0.024	-0.059***	-0.146***	-0.165***
			(0.037)	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.015)
Religion: Other			0.099	-0.029	0.040	-0.043
			(0.113)	(0.027)	(0.044)	(0.033)
Religion: Muslim				0.274*	0.307***	0.193***
				(0.152)	(0.069)	(0.058)
Religious practice: Never	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Religious practice: Less than monthly	-0.083***	-0.034	-0.094***	-0.068***	-0.026	-0.053***
	(0.025)	(0.034)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.015)
Religious practice: Monthly or more	-0.095***	-0.096***	-0.210***	-0.136***	-0.092***	-0.124***
	(0.026)	(0.035)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.021)	(0.017)
Location: Urban	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Location: Rural	-0.132***	-0.105***	-0.130***	-0.090***	-0.093***	-0.063***
	(0.018)	(0.023)	(0.015)	(0.020)	(0.017)	(0.013)
Employment status: Employed	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Employment status: Unemployed/Inactive	-0.017	0.018	0.045***	0.036**	0.026	0.013
	(0.039)	(0.019)	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.013)

	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
Marital status: Single	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Marital status: Married/With partner	0.018	-0.014	-0.023	-0.039***	-0.029*	-0.037***
	(0.024)	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.012)
Region: Australian Capital Territory			(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
			(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Region: New South Wales			-0.044	0.009	-0.142***	-0.177***
			(0.094)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.032)
Region: Northern Territory			-0.085	0.093	-0.285***	-0.130*
			(0.202)	(0.082)	(0.101)	(0.069)
Region: Queensland			-0.018	-0.050	-0.181***	-0.234***
			(0.097)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.033)
Region: South Australia			-0.091	-0.074	-0.188***	-0.198***
			(0.098)	(0.045)	(0.049)	(0.035)
Region: Tasmania			-0.000	0.067	-0.051	-0.145***
			(0.113)	(0.049)	(0.058)	(0.043)
Region: Victoria			-0.081	0.015	-0.122***	-0.164***
			(0.095)	(0.044)	(0.045)	(0.032)
Region: Western Australia			-0.062	-0.032	-0.137***	-0.232***
			(0.100)	(0.046)	(0.047)	(0.034)
Constant	0.728***	0.510***	0.705***	0.623***	0.804***	0.886***
	(0.038)	(0.036)	(0.100)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.035)
R-squared	0.10	0.07	0.05	0.05	0.07	0.09
Observations	9787	10182	7064	12457	8151	14875
Clusters	2039	4066	2934	2997	2001	3932

Note: The table reports the effect of a set of individual characteristics on the probability to vote for Labor / Greens by decade in Australia. The original survey dataset is duplicated for each income bracket to approximate income deciles (see methodology). The number of clusters corresponds to the number of surveyed individuals in each decade. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level.

Table E2 - Determinants of support for SPÖ / KPÖ / Greens / NEOS in Austria

	(1) 1970-79	(2) 1980-89	(3) 1990-99	(4) 2000-09	(5) 2010-20
Education: None/Primary	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Education: Secondary	-0.056**	-0.033	0.001	0.001	0.001
	(0.028)	(0.024)	(0.019)	(0.025)	(0.035)
Education: University	-0.197***	-0.133***	-0.029	-0.028	0.170***
	(0.050)	(0.036)	(0.029)	(0.037)	(0.044)
Income group: Bottom 50%	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Income group: Middle 40%	-0.039	-0.085***	-0.022	-0.021	0.005
	(0.031)	(0.023)	(0.016)	(0.024)	(0.025)
Income group: Top 10%	-0.201***	-0.123***	-0.024	-0.101*	-0.076*
	(0.045)	(0.038)	(0.027)	(0.053)	(0.039)
Age: 20-39	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Age: 40-59	0.010	-0.010	-0.031*	0.067**	-0.053*
	(0.029)	(0.027)	(0.016)	(0.027)	(0.030)
Age: 60+	0.058	-0.075**	-0.072***	0.009	-0.125***
	(0.036)	(0.032)	(0.021)	(0.032)	(0.039)
Gender: Woman	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Gender: Man	0.029	-0.007	-0.043***	-0.057***	-0.081***
	(0.028)	(0.022)	(0.014)	(0.021)	(0.023)
Religion: None	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Religion: Catholic	0.002	-0.196***	-0.086*	-0.009	-0.135***
	(0.058)	(0.032)	(0.050)	(0.042)	(0.042)
Religion: Other Christian	-0.119	-0.205***	0.013	0.245***	-0.021
	(0.087)	(0.055)	(0.073)	(0.064)	(0.074)
Religion: Other	0.131	0.032	0.124	0.180	0.150*
	(0.172)	(0.102)	(0.129)	(0.132)	(0.087)
Religion: Muslim			-0.643***	0.275**	0.290***
			(0.055)	(0.128)	(0.108)
Religious practice: Never	(baseline)	(baseline)		(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)		(.)	(.)
Religious practice: Less than monthly	-0.045	-0.148***		-0.212***	-0.056
	(0.037)	(0.030)		(0.038)	(0.037)
Religious practice: Monthly or more	-0.469***	-0.388***		-0.436***	-0.116***
	(0.036)	(0.028)		(0.042)	(0.041)
Location: Urban	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Location: Rural	-0.055*	-0.092***	-0.073***	-0.102**	-0.071**
	(0.029)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.042)	(0.028)
Employment status: Employed	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Employment status: Unemployed/Inactive	0.068**	0.032	0.004	0.032	0.107***
	(0.030)	(0.026)	(0.016)	(0.024)	(0.034)
Marital status: Single	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)

Marital status: Married/With partner	-0.042	0.011	-0.013	-0.010	-0.029
	(0.028)	(0.022)	(0.015)	(0.023)	(0.027)
Region: Burgenland				(baseline)	(baseline)
				(.)	(.)
Region: Carinthia				-0.110	-0.255**
				(0.067)	(0.105)
Region: Lower Austria				-0.228***	-0.245***
				(0.053)	(0.094)
Region: Salzburg				-0.210***	-0.349***
				(0.066)	(0.105)
Region: Styria				-0.213***	-0.193*
				(0.057)	(0.100)
Region: Tyrol				-0.218***	-0.334***
				(0.059)	(0.099)
Region: Upper Austria				-0.193***	-0.211**
				(0.054)	(0.099)
Region: Vienna				-0.153***	-0.168*
				(0.055)	(0.098)
Region: Vorarlberg				-0.221***	-0.065
				(0.065)	(0.117)
Constant	0.861***	1.003***	0.647***	1.008***	0.881***
	(0.069)	(0.042)	(0.053)	(0.268)	(0.105)
R-squared	0.23	0.20	0.02	0.12	0.12
Observations	2137	4158	11336	8514	3559
Clusters	1336	2688	6468	2731	1162

Note: The table reports the effect of a set of individual characteristics on the probability to vote for SPÖ / KPÖ / Greens / NEOS by decade in Austria. The original survey dataset is duplicated for each income bracket to approximate income deciles (see methodology). The number of clusters corresponds to the number of surveyed individuals in each decade. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level.

Table E3 - Determinants of support for Socialists / Greens in Belgium

	(1) 1970-79	(2) 1980-89	(3) 1990-99	(4) 2000-09	(5) 2010-20
Education: None/Primary	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Education: Secondary	-0.114***	-0.090***	-0.057***	-0.049**	-0.053***
	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.023)	(0.020)
Education: University	-0.196***	-0.143***	-0.051***	-0.035	-0.028
	(0.021)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.026)	(0.022)
Income group: Bottom 50%	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Income group: Middle 40%	-0.032***	-0.063***	-0.004	-0.022	-0.012
	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.014)
Income group: Top 10%	-0.102***	-0.144***	-0.093***	-0.076***	-0.083***
	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Age: 20-39	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Age: 40-59	0.046***	-0.086***	0.006	0.024	0.012
	(0.016)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Age: 60+	-0.001	-0.197***	-0.059***	-0.043*	-0.032
	(0.020)	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.023)	(0.021)
Gender: Woman	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Gender: Man	0.017	0.025**	-0.037***	-0.035***	-0.044***
	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.012)
Religion: None	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Religion: Catholic	-0.308***	-0.212***	-0.148***	-0.126***	-0.126***
	(0.028)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.019)
Religion: Other Christian	-0.087	-0.143**	0.046	-0.087	0.014
	(0.083)	(0.064)	(0.058)	(0.069)	(0.054)
Religion: Other	-0.179*	0.088	0.033	(baseline)	-0.005
	(0.092)	(0.063)	(0.043)	(0.080)	(0.073)
Religion: Muslim				0.364***	0.320***
				(0.064)	(0.042)
Religious practice: Never	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Religious practice: Less than monthly	-0.114***	-0.054**	-0.054***	-0.039*	-0.027
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.019)	(0.023)	(0.021)
Religious practice: Monthly or more	-0.342***	-0.258***	-0.198***	-0.150***	-0.061**
	(0.021)	(0.025)	(0.019)	(0.027)	(0.028)
Location: Urban	(baseline)	(baseline)			
	(.)	(.)			
Location: Rural	-0.073***	-0.051***			
	(0.016)	(0.010)			
Employment status: Employed	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Employment status: Unemployed/Inactive	-0.021	0.007	0.020	0.044**	0.042**
	(0.017)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.019)	(0.017)
Marital status: Single	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)

Marital status: Married/With partner	0.022	-0.002	0.015	-0.003	-0.034**
	(0.016)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.014)
Race/ethnicity/language: Dutch	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Race/ethnicity/language: French	0.079***	0.055***	0.135***	-0.053*	-0.010
	(0.023)	(0.020)	(0.035)	(0.029)	(0.032)
Race/ethnicity/language: Other				-0.023	0.105
				(0.076)	(0.070)
Region: Brussels	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Region: Flanders	0.101***	-0.048***	0.068**	-0.214***	-0.187***
	(0.029)	(0.018)	(0.029)	(0.038)	(0.030)
Region: Wallonia	0.240***	0.161***	0.124***	0.054*	0.090***
	(0.028)	(0.018)	(0.023)	(0.033)	(0.030)
Constant	0.622***	0.813***	0.468***	0.588***	0.557***
	(0.044)	(0.032)	(0.036)	(0.049)	(0.042)
R-squared	0.15	0.13	0.12	0.12	0.14
Observations	22962	25787	11737	10767	10034
Clusters	11054	12947	4411	1777	1825

Note: The table reports the effect of a set of individual characteristics on the probability to vote for Socialists / Greens by decade in Belgium. The original survey dataset is duplicated for each income bracket to approximate income deciles (see methodology). The number of clusters corresponds to the number of surveyed individuals in each decade. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level.

Table E4 - Determinants of support for Liberal / NDP / Green in Canada

	(1) 1960-69	(2) 1970-79	(3) 1980-89	(4) 1990-99	(5) 2000-09	(6) 2010-20
Education: None/Primary	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Education: Secondary	0.011	-0.016	-0.057***	-0.001	0.001	0.051**
	(0.021)	(0.025)	(0.017)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Education: University	0.044	0.013	-0.055**	0.046*	0.081***	0.117***
	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.024)	(0.027)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Education: Postgraduate				0.080**	0.103***	0.145***
				(0.037)	(0.029)	(0.027)
Income group: Bottom 50%	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Income group: Middle 40%	0.072***	-0.022	-0.034**	0.002	-0.009	-0.022*
	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.015)	(0.012)
Income group: Top 10%	0.097***	-0.096***	-0.088***	-0.031	-0.053**	-0.082***
	(0.032)	(0.030)	(0.024)	(0.030)	(0.023)	(0.020)
Age: 20-39	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Age: 40-59	-0.003	-0.039	-0.003	0.041**	0.015	-0.034**
	(0.018)	(0.025)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.014)
Age: 60+	-0.032	-0.073**	-0.021	0.073***	0.005	-0.051***
	(0.025)	(0.032)	(0.022)	(0.026)	(0.020)	(0.016)
Gender: Woman	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Gender: Man	-0.011	-0.036	-0.069***	-0.060***	-0.062***	-0.071***
	(0.017)	(0.023)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.011)
Religion: None	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Religion: Catholic	0.142**	0.139**	0.114***	0.046	-0.065***	-0.067***
	(0.061)	(0.058)	(0.036)	(0.033)	(0.025)	(0.017)
Religion: Other Christian	-0.158***	-0.105*	-0.057*	-0.085***	-0.213***	-0.151***
	(0.059)	(0.056)	(0.034)	(0.032)	(0.024)	(0.018)
Religion: Other	0.042	0.011	0.087*	0.070	-0.007	-0.030
	(0.066)	(0.063)	(0.046)	(0.048)	(0.035)	(0.027)
Religion: Muslim					0.312***	0.283***
					(0.040)	(0.047)
Religious practice: Never	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Religious practice: Less than monthly	-0.032	-0.061*	-0.056**	0.025	0.015	-0.016
	(0.039)	(0.032)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.019)	(0.016)
Religious practice: Monthly or more	-0.112***	-0.088***	-0.067***	0.033	-0.036*	-0.101***
	(0.039)	(0.034)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.021)	(0.018)
Location: Urban	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)		(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)		(.)	(.)
Location: Rural	-0.105***	-0.091***	-0.045**		-0.042	-0.078***
	(0.020)	(0.027)	(0.021)		(0.028)	(0.017)
Employment status: Employed	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Employment status: Unemployed/Inactive	0.005	-0.021	0.001	-0.000	0.026	0.028**
	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.016)	(0.013)

Marital status: Single	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Marital status: Married/With partner	0.010	0.025	-0.058***	-0.050***	-0.056***	-0.047***
	(0.022)	(0.024)	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.012)
Race/ethnicity/language: English	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Race/ethnicity/language: French	-0.078**	-0.118***	-0.023	-0.164***	-0.241***	-0.100***
	(0.033)	(0.045)	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.021)
Race/ethnicity/language: Other	0.026	0.054	0.053*	0.188***	0.041	-0.041*
	(0.042)	(0.041)	(0.030)	(0.045)	(0.027)	(0.022)
Region: Eastern	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Region: Ontario	0.054*	0.007	0.012	-0.050*	-0.095***	-0.086***
	(0.029)	(0.034)	(0.023)	(0.029)	(0.025)	(0.020)
Region: Quebec	0.017	0.098**	-0.060*	-0.268***	-0.198***	-0.095***
	(0.037)	(0.044)	(0.032)	(0.035)	(0.034)	(0.024)
Region: Western	-0.018	-0.107***	-0.076***	-0.200***	-0.235***	-0.214***
	(0.031)	(0.035)	(0.024)	(0.028)	(0.025)	(0.020)
Constant	0.666***	0.741***	0.764***	0.674***	0.860***	0.838***
	(0.059)	(0.062)	(0.040)	(0.043)	(0.039)	(0.031)
R-squared	0.09	0.10	0.05	0.09	0.11	0.08
Observations	11112	7188	13319	7025	11959	20018
Clusters	2642	2381	3368	3646	5872	12260

Note: The table reports the effect of a set of individual characteristics on the probability to vote for Liberal / NDP / Green by decade in Canada. The original survey dataset is duplicated for each income bracket to approximate income deciles (see methodology). The number of clusters corresponds to the number of surveyed individuals in each decade. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level.

Table E5 - Determinants of support for Social Democratic Party / Socialist People's Party / Social Liberal Party / Red-Green Alliance in Denmark

	(1) 1960-69	(2) 1970-79	(3) 1980-89	(4) 1990-99	(5) 2000-09	(6) 2010-20
Education: None/Primary	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Education: Secondary	-0.200***	-0.163***	0.004	-0.063***	-0.002	0.057***
	(0.043)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.022)
Education: University	-0.249***	-0.115***	-0.018	-0.037**	0.070***	0.095***
	(0.072)	(0.024)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.025)
Income group: Bottom 50%	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Income group: Middle 40%	0.084**	0.005	-0.003	-0.031**	-0.083***	-0.029
	(0.039)	(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.020)
Income group: Top 10%	-0.041	-0.150***	-0.223***	-0.216***	-0.201***	-0.161***
	(0.058)	(0.025)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.031)
Age: 20-39	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Age: 40-59	-0.007	-0.061***	-0.113***	0.064***	0.099***	0.046**
	(0.033)	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.019)
Age: 60+	-0.034	-0.086***	-0.156***	-0.093***	-0.001	-0.014
	(0.043)	(0.021)	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.025)
Gender: Woman	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Gender: Man	0.005	0.006	0.010	-0.034**	-0.068***	-0.087***
	(0.037)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.016)
Religious practice: Never	(baseline)	(baseline)		(baseline)	(baseline)	
	(.)	(.)		(.)	(.)	
Religious practice: Less than monthly	-0.016	-0.031		-0.065***	-0.073***	
	(0.057)	(0.048)		(0.024)	(0.018)	
Religious practice: Monthly or more	-0.154**	-0.143**		-0.151***	-0.175***	
	(0.067)	(0.060)		(0.050)	(0.035)	
Location: Urban		(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
		(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Location: Rural		-0.213***	-0.111***	-0.069***	-0.077***	-0.098***
		(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.017)
Employment status: Employed	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Employment status: Unemployed/Inactive	0.057	-0.049***	-0.005	-0.008	-0.020	0.067***
	(0.040)	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.025)
Marital status: Single	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Marital status: Married/With partner	-0.039	-0.078***	-0.002	-0.023	-0.043***	0.013
	(0.038)	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.017)
Region: Capital	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Region: Central Jutland	-0.139***	-0.076***	-0.088***	-0.050**	-0.071***	-0.047
	(0.041)	(0.024)	(0.016)	(0.022)	(0.018)	(0.031)
Region: Northern Jutland	-0.130***	-0.103***	-0.080***	-0.036	-0.010	0.005
	(0.049)	(0.031)	(0.022)	(0.030)	(0.024)	(0.045)
Region: Southern Denmark	-0.036	-0.067***	-0.034	-0.106***	-0.068***	-0.059*
	(0.048)	(0.024)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.018)	(0.032)

Region: Zealand	-0.037	-0.019	-0.017	-0.041*	-0.061***	-0.038
	(0.044)	(0.026)	(0.021)	(0.024)	(0.021)	(0.038)
Constant	0.752***	1.072***	0.754***	0.742***	0.612***	0.556***
	(0.078)	(0.055)	(0.021)	(0.030)	(0.026)	(0.038)
R-squared	0.10	0.09	0.07	0.05	0.05	0.04
Observations	11059	22837	24186	23048	20258	7069
Clusters	1137	1923	3809	2028	3987	2174

Note: The table reports the effect of a set of individual characteristics on the probability to vote for Social Democratic Party / Socialist People's Party / Social Liberal Party / Red-Green Alliance by decade in Denmark. The original survey dataset is duplicated for each income bracket to approximate income deciles (see methodology). The number of clusters corresponds to the number of surveyed individuals in each decade. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level.

	(1) 1970-79	(2) 1980-89	(3) 1990-99	(4) 2000-09	(5) 2010-20
Table E6 - Determinants of support for Social Democratic Party / Finnish People's Democratic League / Left Alliance / Green League in Finland					
Education: None/Primary	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Education: Secondary	-0.187***	-0.159***	-0.113***	-0.070***	-0.041
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.025)	(0.038)
Education: University	-0.337***	-0.261***	-0.188***	-0.131***	-0.086**
	(0.032)	(0.026)	(0.021)	(0.029)	(0.041)
Income group: Bottom 50%	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Income group: Middle 40%	0.022	-0.067***	-0.006	-0.057**	-0.021
	(0.021)	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.022)	(0.023)
Income group: Top 10%	-0.115***	-0.193***	-0.089***	-0.087***	-0.077***
	(0.028)	(0.024)	(0.021)	(0.028)	(0.027)
Age: 20-39	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Age: 40-59	-0.050***	-0.044***	0.052***	0.027	-0.046*
	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.021)	(0.027)
Age: 60+	-0.081***	-0.086***	-0.079***	-0.055**	-0.092***
	(0.025)	(0.022)	(0.019)	(0.026)	(0.026)
Gender: Woman	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Gender: Man	0.071***	0.016	-0.049***	0.003	-0.042**
	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.012)	(0.018)	(0.021)
Location: Urban			(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
			(.)	(.)	(.)
Location: Rural			-0.141***	-0.121***	-0.086***
			(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.023)
Employment status: Employed		(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
		(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Employment status: Unemployed/Inactive		-0.049***	0.020	-0.004	0.043*
		(0.019)	(0.015)	(0.021)	(0.024)
Marital status: Single	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Marital status: Married/With partner	0.039	0.023	-0.005	-0.017	-0.023
	(0.037)	(0.019)	(0.015)	(0.022)	(0.023)
Region: Central Finland	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Region: Northern Finland	-0.036	0.001	0.055***	-0.078**	-0.038
	(0.027)	(0.029)	(0.020)	(0.031)	(0.042)
Region: Southern Finland	0.094***	0.078***	0.145***	0.059***	0.062*
	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.019)	(0.032)
Constant	0.501***	0.534***	0.517***	0.553***	0.502***
	(0.046)	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.035)	(0.049)
R-squared	0.07	0.05	0.06	0.04	0.03
Observations	7403	9839	11737	7665	5175
Clusters	1358	1196	2480	1562	1442

Note: The table reports the effect of a set of individual characteristics on the probability to vote for left-wing parties by decade in Finland. The original survey dataset is duplicated for each income bracket to approximate income deciles (see methodology). The number of clusters corresponds to the number of surveyed individuals in each decade. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level.

Table E7 - Determinants of support for PS / PCF / Radicaux / Other left in France

	(1) 1950-59	(2) 1960-69	(3) 1970-79	(4) 1980-89	(5) 1990-99	(6) 2000-09	(7) 2010-20
Education: None/Primary	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Education: Secondary	-0.089***	-0.054***	-0.048***	-0.017	-0.009	0.002	0.046*
	(0.026)	(0.018)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.025)
Education: University	-0.238***	-0.078**	-0.094***	-0.031	0.081***	0.062***	0.177***
	(0.055)	(0.037)	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.030)
Income group: Bottom 50%	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Income group: Middle 40%	-0.030	-0.022	-0.014	-0.071***	-0.007	-0.011	-0.015
	(0.030)	(0.016)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.011)	(0.019)
Income group: Top 10%	-0.015	-0.133***	-0.153***	-0.160***	-0.090***	-0.065***	-0.098***
	(0.056)	(0.031)	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.017)	(0.030)
Age: 20-39	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Age: 40-59	-0.033	-0.029	-0.083***	-0.064***	0.022	0.036***	0.058***
	(0.025)	(0.018)	(0.011)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.021)
Age: 60+	-0.092***	-0.069***	-0.157***	-0.068***	-0.012	0.002	0.020
	(0.033)	(0.023)	(0.014)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.028)
Gender: Woman	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Gender: Man	0.168***	0.070***	0.014	-0.040***	-0.019*	-0.013	-0.016
	(0.026)	(0.017)	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.017)
Religion: None		(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
		(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Religion: Catholic		-0.227***	-0.299***	-0.305***	-0.243***	-0.207***	-0.189***
		(0.041)	(0.012)	(0.019)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.020)
Religion: Other Christian		-0.033	-0.323***	-0.357***	-0.320***	-0.308***	-0.214***
		(0.073)	(0.033)	(0.046)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.062)
Religion: Other			-0.273***	-0.143***	-0.121**	-0.096**	-0.026
			(0.044)	(0.055)	(0.051)	(0.046)	(0.059)
Religion: Muslim				-0.135	0.261***	0.207***	0.281***
				(0.111)	(0.052)	(0.043)	(0.037)
Location: Urban	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)		(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)		(.)	(.)	(.)
Location: Rural	0.012	-0.024	-0.052***		-0.024	-0.052***	-0.095***
	(0.025)	(0.017)	(0.011)		(0.025)	(0.012)	(0.019)
Employment status: Employed	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Employment status: Unemployed/Inactive	0.035	-0.009	-0.003	-0.008	-0.013	0.003	0.034
	(0.029)	(0.020)	(0.011)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.022)
Marital status: Single	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Marital status: Married/With partner	0.102***	-0.001	0.033***	0.002	0.011	-0.028**	-0.038*
	(0.034)	(0.022)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.019)
Region: Auvergne-Rhone-Alpes	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Region: Bourgogne-Franche-Comte	0.054	-0.006	-0.073***	0.031	0.051*	-0.003	-0.028
	(0.066)	(0.037)	(0.027)	(0.031)	(0.028)	(0.049)	(0.078)
Region: Bretagne	-0.058	-0.062*	-0.058**	0.129***	0.046	0.041	0.009
	(0.058)	(0.037)	(0.026)	(0.033)	(0.029)	(0.048)	(0.062)
Region: Centre-Val de Loire	-0.057	-0.007	-0.103***	-0.032	0.017	-0.072	-0.022
	(0.060)	(0.047)	(0.024)	(0.034)	(0.032)	(0.052)	(0.076)
Region: Grand Est	-0.162***	-0.133***	-0.035*	-0.010	0.023	0.008	-0.154***
	(0.052)	(0.036)	(0.020)	(0.028)	(0.022)	(0.039)	(0.058)
Region: Hauts-de-France	0.035	0.014	-0.043**	0.060**	0.036*	-0.042	-0.135**
	(0.045)	(0.034)	(0.020)	(0.027)	(0.022)	(0.038)	(0.056)

Region: Ile-de-France	0.051	0.003	0.021	-0.022	-0.016	-0.020	-0.063
	(0.068)	(0.038)	(0.018)	(0.025)	(0.021)	(0.037)	(0.052)
Region: Normandie	-0.138**	-0.147***	-0.050**	-0.041	0.044*	-0.033	0.007
	(0.055)	(0.038)	(0.021)	(0.032)	(0.025)	(0.047)	(0.074)
Region: Nouvelle-Aquitaine	0.046	0.058	0.025	0.066**	0.018	-0.039	-0.037
	(0.047)	(0.036)	(0.020)	(0.028)	(0.023)	(0.040)	(0.059)
Region: Occitanie	0.155***	0.149***	0.112***	0.034	0.015	-0.011	0.036
	(0.052)	(0.039)	(0.021)	(0.027)	(0.023)	(0.040)	(0.056)
Region: PACA	0.148**	0.064	0.014	-0.060**	-0.094***	-0.081*	-0.170***
	(0.064)	(0.045)	(0.023)	(0.029)	(0.025)	(0.042)	(0.063)
Region: Paris	0.071	0.060	-0.007	-0.028	-0.084**	0.100	-0.066
	(0.051)	(0.040)	(0.024)	(0.037)	(0.034)	(0.062)	(0.093)
Region: Pays de la Loire	-0.152***	-0.181***	-0.045*	0.001	0.003	0.076*	-0.039
	(0.056)	(0.039)	(0.024)	(0.029)	(0.025)	(0.044)	(0.064)
Constant	0.550***	0.732***	0.948***	0.874***	0.793***	0.645***	0.646***
	(0.072)	(0.053)	(0.022)	(0.031)	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.051)
R-squared	0.09	0.12	0.18	0.11	0.09	0.11	0.12
Observations	3650	9522	20668	15563	17578	18054	7122
Clusters	1339	1936	4474	3819	3964	3953	2457

Note: The table reports the effect of a set of individual characteristics on the probability to vote for left-wing parties (PS, PCF, Radicaux, etc.) by decade in France. The original survey dataset is duplicated for each income bracket to approximate income deciles (see methodology). The number of clusters corresponds to the number of surveyed individuals in each decade. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level.

Table E8 - Determinants of support for SPD / Die Grünen / Die Linke in Germany

	(1) 1950-59	(2) 1960-69	(3) 1970-79	(4) 1980-89	(5) 1990-99	(6) 2000-09	(7) 2010-20
Education: None/Primary	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Education: Secondary	-0.155***	-0.139***	-0.166***	-0.066**	-0.043*	-0.090***	-0.008
	(0.021)	(0.025)	(0.028)	(0.026)	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.028)
Education: University	-0.172***	-0.189***	-0.263***	-0.090**	0.032	-0.005	0.072**
	(0.031)	(0.038)	(0.042)	(0.039)	(0.028)	(0.024)	(0.033)
Education: Postgraduate						-0.056	0.115***
						(0.042)	(0.034)
Income group: Bottom 50%	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)		(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)		(.)	(.)	(.)
Income group: Middle 40%	-0.009	-0.013	-0.026		-0.061**	-0.032*	-0.045*
	(0.014)	(0.019)	(0.023)		(0.025)	(0.018)	(0.023)
Income group: Top 10%	-0.119***	-0.187***	-0.136***		-0.143***	-0.118***	-0.167***
	(0.022)	(0.027)	(0.042)		(0.044)	(0.030)	(0.037)
Age: 20-39	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Age: 40-59	-0.013	-0.030	-0.059**	-0.066***	-0.044*	0.031	0.041
	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.029)
Age: 60+	-0.071***	-0.096***	-0.088***	-0.097***	-0.132***	-0.064***	0.015
	(0.022)	(0.025)	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.023)	(0.030)
Gender: Woman	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Gender: Man	0.122***	0.077***	0.003	-0.041*	-0.053***	-0.013	-0.029
	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.017)	(0.021)
Religion: None	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Religion: Catholic	-0.298***	-0.116	-0.191***	-0.170***	-0.131***	-0.207***	-0.091***
	(0.044)	(0.139)	(0.053)	(0.052)	(0.035)	(0.030)	(0.034)
Religion: Other Christian	-0.196***	0.063	-0.016	-0.077	-0.053*	-0.047*	-0.022
	(0.043)	(0.139)	(0.052)	(0.050)	(0.031)	(0.026)	(0.030)
Religion: Other	-0.157*	-0.443***	-0.166	0.024	0.103	0.106*	0.129
	(0.083)	(0.139)	(0.107)	(0.128)	(0.100)	(0.062)	(0.080)
Religious practice: Never	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Religious practice: Less than monthly	-0.138***	-0.155***	-0.201***	-0.092***	-0.130***	-0.087***	-0.052*
	(0.022)	(0.036)	(0.038)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.022)	(0.029)
Religious practice: Monthly or more	-0.301***	-0.270***	-0.381***	-0.288***	-0.301***	-0.201***	-0.190***
	(0.021)	(0.037)	(0.042)	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.037)
Region: East					(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
					(.)	(.)	(.)
Region: West					0.093***	-0.008	0.045*
					(0.025)	(0.022)	(0.024)
Constant	0.738***	0.605***	0.851***	0.788***	0.777***	0.728***	0.514***
	(0.045)	(0.143)	(0.054)	(0.051)	(0.032)	(0.029)	(0.039)
R-squared	0.13	0.11	0.16	0.08	0.10	0.08	0.04
Observations	15983	5837	4993	3034	5849	9169	6293
Clusters	4705	2958	2155	3034	3937	4726	3131

Note: The table reports the effect of a set of individual characteristics on the probability to vote for SPD / Die Grünen / Die Linke by decade in Germany. The original survey dataset is duplicated for each income bracket to approximate income deciles (see methodology). The number of clusters corresponds to the number of surveyed individuals in each decade. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level.

Table E9 - Determinants of support for Social Democratic Alliance / Left-Green movement in Iceland

	(1) 1970-79	(2) 1980-89	(3) 1990-99	(4) 2000-09	(5) 2010-20
Education: None/Primary	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Education: Secondary	0.084*	0.028	0.022	-0.022	0.029
	(0.048)	(0.024)	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.019)
Education: University	0.125*	0.014	0.111***	0.075***	0.084***
	(0.073)	(0.043)	(0.027)	(0.024)	(0.020)
Income group: Bottom 50%		(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
		(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Income group: Middle 40%		-0.045*	-0.040**	-0.091***	-0.042**
		(0.027)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.016)
Income group: Top 10%		-0.087**	-0.035	-0.122***	-0.097***
		(0.039)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.022)
Age: 20-39	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Age: 40-59	-0.107**	-0.075***	-0.021	0.013	0.010
	(0.043)	(0.024)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.017)
Age: 60+	-0.105**	-0.142***	0.011	-0.002	0.074***
	(0.053)	(0.029)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.019)
Gender: Woman	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Gender: Man	-0.041	-0.067***	-0.110***	-0.112***	-0.083***
	(0.044)	(0.022)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.016)
Location: Urban	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Location: Rural	0.007	-0.014	0.003	-0.140***	-0.059**
	(0.065)	(0.036)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.027)
Employment status: Employed	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Employment status: Unemployed/Inactive	-0.020	-0.109***	-0.090***	-0.082***	-0.125***
	(0.047)	(0.026)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.019)
Marital status: Single	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Marital status: Married/With partner	0.085*	-0.024	-0.041**	0.008	-0.053***
	(0.048)	(0.026)	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.018)
Region: Capital area	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Region: East	-0.148	-0.081	-0.018	-0.043	0.012
	(0.105)	(0.056)	(0.045)	(0.046)	(0.047)
Region: Northeast	-0.030	-0.053	-0.007	0.108***	0.079**
	(0.082)	(0.046)	(0.034)	(0.036)	(0.034)
Region: Northwest	-0.236**	-0.232***	-0.142***	-0.021	-0.017
	(0.108)	(0.057)	(0.045)	(0.050)	(0.049)
Region: South	-0.207**	-0.171***	-0.059	0.026	0.005
	(0.085)	(0.044)	(0.036)	(0.039)	(0.033)
Region: Sudurnes	-0.007	-0.145***	0.036	0.043	-0.027
	(0.098)	(0.053)	(0.042)	(0.046)	(0.038)
Region: West	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)

Constant	0.505***	0.688***	0.568***	0.683***	0.474***
	(0.066)	(0.038)	(0.026)	(0.028)	(0.026)
R-squared	0.06	0.06	0.05	0.06	0.05
Observations	716	4498	9618	9245	9516
Clusters	716	1598	1688	1550	1981

Note: The table reports the effect of a set of individual characteristics on the probability to vote for Social Democratic Alliance / Left-Green movement by decade in Iceland. The original survey dataset is duplicated for each income bracket to approximate income deciles (see methodology). The number of clusters corresponds to the number of surveyed individuals in each decade. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level.

Table E10 - Determinants of support for Fianna Fáil / Sinn Féin / Other left-wing parties in Ireland

	(1) 1970-79	(2) 1980-89	(3) 1990-99	(4) 2000-09	(5) 2010-20
Education: None/Primary	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Education: Secondary	-0.099***	-0.073***	-0.050***	-0.064***	-0.095***
	(0.015)	(0.010)	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.026)
Education: University	-0.188***	-0.205***	-0.120***	-0.128***	-0.151***
	(0.035)	(0.020)	(0.026)	(0.022)	(0.028)
Income group: Bottom 50%	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Income group: Middle 40%	-0.004	-0.061***	-0.044***	-0.029	-0.048***
	(0.015)	(0.010)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Income group: Top 10%	-0.069***	-0.118***	-0.125***	-0.041	-0.095***
	(0.025)	(0.015)	(0.026)	(0.032)	(0.026)
Age: 20-39	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Age: 40-59	-0.085***	-0.056***	-0.042***	-0.043***	-0.034*
	(0.016)	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.017)	(0.018)
Age: 60+	-0.092***	-0.071***	-0.074***	-0.090***	-0.056***
	(0.019)	(0.012)	(0.016)	(0.020)	(0.021)
Gender: Woman	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Gender: Man	0.027*	0.056***	0.027**	0.036***	0.004
	(0.015)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Religion: None	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Religion: Catholic	-0.102	0.063	0.061	0.010	-0.046*
	(0.099)	(0.048)	(0.046)	(0.042)	(0.027)
Religion: Other Christian	-0.416***	-0.269***	-0.301***	-0.185***	-0.203***
	(0.105)	(0.056)	(0.057)	(0.055)	(0.045)
Religion: Other	-0.346***	-0.147*	0.066	0.217**	0.008
	(0.133)	(0.083)	(0.086)	(0.101)	(0.057)
Religion: Muslim				0.131	0.048
				(0.124)	(0.168)
Religious practice: Never	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Religious practice: Less than monthly	-0.011	-0.064	-0.065*	-0.047	-0.045
	(0.089)	(0.043)	(0.037)	(0.040)	(0.028)
Religious practice: Monthly or more	-0.013	-0.046	-0.112***	-0.061	-0.073***
	(0.085)	(0.039)	(0.034)	(0.040)	(0.028)
Location: Urban	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)		
	(.)	(.)	(.)		
Location: Rural	-0.103***	-0.058***	-0.043***		
	(0.014)	(0.008)	(0.013)		
Employment status: Employed	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Employment status: Unemployed/Inactive	0.010	0.048***	0.061***	0.025	0.036**
	(0.017)	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.016)
Marital status: Single	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)

Marital status: Married/With partner	-0.006	0.008	-0.007	-0.013	-0.033**
	(0.014)	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.016)
Region: Border				(baseline)	(baseline)
				(.)	(.)
Region: Dublin				0.062**	-0.038
				(0.029)	(0.026)
Region: Mid-East				-0.023	-0.046
				(0.036)	(0.030)
Region: Mid-West				-0.049	-0.069**
				(0.035)	(0.032)
Region: Midlands				-0.020	-0.081**
				(0.040)	(0.036)
Region: South-East				-0.001	-0.049
				(0.035)	(0.030)
Region: South-West				0.002	-0.026
				(0.031)	(0.028)
Region: West				-0.129***	-0.151***
				(0.034)	(0.030)
Constant	0.959***	0.730***	0.783***	0.776***	0.849***
	(0.058)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.039)	(0.040)
R-squared	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.06
Observations	17708	31395	18108	12435	16099
Clusters	8254	18359	12790	2384	2678

Note: The table reports the effect of a set of individual characteristics on the probability to vote for Fianna Fáil / Sinn Féin / Labour / Other left by decade in Ireland. The original survey dataset is duplicated for each income bracket to approximate income deciles (see methodology). The number of clusters corresponds to the number of surveyed individuals in each decade. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level.

Table E11 - Determinants of support for Social Democrats / Socialists / Communists / Greens in Italy

	(1) 1950-59	(2) 1960-69	(3) 1970-79	(4) 1980-89	(5) 1990-99	(6) 2000-09	(7) 2010-20
Education: None/Primary	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Education: Secondary	-0.123**	-0.050**	-0.034	-0.026	-0.014	-0.011	0.070**
	(0.048)	(0.024)	(0.034)	(0.030)	(0.028)	(0.023)	(0.032)
Education: University	-0.243**	-0.030	-0.135**	0.012	0.043	0.041	0.137***
	(0.098)	(0.050)	(0.064)	(0.042)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.036)
Income group: Bottom 50%	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)		(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)		(.)	(.)
Income group: Middle 40%	0.075*	-0.040**	0.016	0.013		-0.059	0.089***
	(0.044)	(0.017)	(0.028)	(0.024)		(0.057)	(0.018)
Income group: Top 10%	0.063	-0.096***	-0.008	0.012		-0.076	0.097***
	(0.091)	(0.035)	(0.049)	(0.042)		(0.070)	(0.020)
Age: 20-39	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Age: 40-59	-0.124**	-0.036*	-0.011	-0.026	0.020	0.018	0.047**
	(0.050)	(0.022)	(0.032)	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Age: 60+	-0.080	-0.112***	-0.079**	-0.055	-0.023	0.017	0.150***
	(0.065)	(0.027)	(0.038)	(0.036)	(0.038)	(0.025)	(0.026)
Gender: Woman	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Gender: Man	0.293***	0.104***	0.023	0.014	0.014	0.010	-0.025
	(0.052)	(0.023)	(0.032)	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.017)	(0.018)
Religion: None	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Religion: Catholic	0.047	-0.161***	-0.159***	-0.106*	-0.165***	-0.178***	-0.222***
	(0.179)	(0.045)	(0.055)	(0.065)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.065)
Religion: Other	-0.186			0.071	-0.061	-0.081	-0.419***
	(0.197)			(0.060)	(0.045)	(0.073)	(0.106)
Religious practice: Never	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Religious practice: Less than monthly	-0.027	-0.067	-0.073	-0.130***	-0.137***	-0.140***	-0.053**
	(0.082)	(0.042)	(0.049)	(0.040)	(0.035)	(0.026)	(0.022)
Religious practice: Monthly or more	-0.425***	-0.377***	-0.424***	-0.433***	-0.208***	-0.183***	-0.107***
	(0.074)	(0.042)	(0.048)	(0.039)	(0.033)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Location: Urban	(baseline)	(baseline)			(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)			(.)	(.)	(.)
Location: Rural	-0.141***	-0.029			0.006	-0.007	-0.024
	(0.046)	(0.023)			(0.040)	(0.021)	(0.042)
Employment status: Employed	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Employment status: Unemployed/Inactive	0.109**	-0.062***	-0.069**	0.014	-0.021	0.004	-0.013
	(0.050)	(0.024)	(0.033)	(0.025)	(0.022)	(0.019)	(0.020)
Marital status: Single	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Marital status: Married/With partner	-0.016	0.053**	0.007	0.016	0.010	0.020	-0.001
	(0.050)	(0.022)	(0.030)	(0.032)	(0.027)	(0.018)	(0.021)
Region: Center	(baseline)	(baseline)		(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)		(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Region: Islands	-0.270***	-0.139***		-0.315***	-0.066	-0.091**	0.005
	(0.082)	(0.035)		(0.073)	(0.043)	(0.040)	(0.034)
Region: North	0.021	-0.031		-0.044	-0.114***	-0.049*	0.021
	(0.059)	(0.026)		(0.046)	(0.031)	(0.029)	(0.025)
Region: South	-0.219***	-0.136***		-0.180***	-0.072**	-0.031	0.004
	(0.065)	(0.029)		(0.054)	(0.035)	(0.033)	(0.029)
Constant	0.696***	0.985***	0.948***	0.954***	0.838***	0.799***	0.478***
	(0.179)	(0.042)	(0.052)	(0.068)	(0.058)	(0.074)	(0.074)

R-squared	0.34	0.21	0.21	0.18	0.07	0.04	0.08
Observations	2197	7780	3333	5608	4243	5268	12033
Clusters	523	2422	1238	1602	2406	2867	2045

Note: The table reports the effect of a set of individual characteristics on the probability to vote for Social Democrats / Socialists / Communists / Greens by decade in Italy. The original survey dataset is duplicated for each income bracket to approximate income deciles (see methodology). The number of clusters corresponds to the number of surveyed individuals in each decade. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level.

Table E12 - Determinants of support for LSAP / Greens / Other left in Luxembourg

	(1) 1970-79	(2) 1980-89	(3) 1990-99	(4) 2000-09	(5) 2010-20
Education: None/Primary	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Education: Secondary	-0.103***	-0.135***	-0.077***	0.099	-0.007
	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.064)	(0.071)
Education: University	-0.228***	-0.190***	-0.061**	0.082	0.050
	(0.040)	(0.033)	(0.031)	(0.062)	(0.070)
Income group: Bottom 50%	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	
Income group: Middle 40%	-0.051**	-0.076***	-0.060***	-0.028	
	(0.022)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.047)	
Income group: Top 10%	-0.122***	-0.103***	-0.079***	-0.185***	
	(0.033)	(0.026)	(0.021)	(0.067)	
Age: 20-39	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Age: 40-59	-0.031	-0.117***	-0.095***	0.104*	0.010
	(0.024)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.055)	(0.058)
Age: 60+	-0.110***	-0.228***	-0.202***	-0.019	-0.067
	(0.035)	(0.025)	(0.020)	(0.073)	(0.066)
Gender: Woman	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Gender: Man	0.089***	0.044***	-0.014	0.003	0.049
	(0.023)	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.042)	(0.043)
Religion: None	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Religion: Catholic	-0.077	-0.181***	-0.204***	-0.032	-0.124
	(0.055)	(0.044)	(0.041)	(0.074)	(0.078)
Religion: Other Christian	0.102	0.019	0.038	0.091	0.113
	(0.137)	(0.147)	(0.107)	(0.085)	(0.130)
Religion: Other	-0.015	0.087	-0.121	0.377***	-0.072
	(0.204)	(0.109)	(0.101)	(0.086)	(0.134)
Religious practice: Never	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Religious practice: Less than monthly	-0.168***	-0.112***	-0.115***	-0.239***	-0.133*
	(0.040)	(0.032)	(0.034)	(0.067)	(0.071)
Religious practice: Monthly or more	-0.379***	-0.353***	-0.286***	-0.333***	-0.200**
	(0.040)	(0.033)	(0.035)	(0.078)	(0.080)
Location: Urban	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)		(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)		(.)
Location: Rural	-0.114***	-0.081***	-0.034*		-0.066
	(0.019)	(0.015)	(0.018)		(0.047)
Employment status: Employed	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Employment status: Unemployed/Inactive	0.044*	0.027	0.014	0.019	-0.028
	(0.026)	(0.020)	(0.017)	(0.059)	(0.068)
Marital status: Single	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Marital status: Married/With partner	0.006	0.011	0.038**	0.052	0.065
	(0.023)	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.046)	(0.074)

Region: Centre					(baseline)
					(.)
Region: East					0.134*
					(0.075)
Region: North					0.104
					(0.073)
Region: South					0.091*
					(0.051)
Constant	0.821***	0.996***	0.847***	0.411***	0.518***
	(0.059)	(0.049)	(0.047)	(0.086)	(0.095)
R-squared	0.10	0.10	0.07	0.12	0.10
Observations	7744	8821	10633	1705	692
Clusters	3561	4761	6229	761	466

Note: The table reports the effect of a set of individual characteristics on the probability to vote for LSAP / Greens / Other left in Luxembourg. The original survey dataset is duplicated for each income bracket to approximate income deciles (see methodology). The number of clusters corresponds to the number of surveyed individuals in each decade. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level.

Table E13 - Determinants of support for PvdA / D66 / Greens / Other left in the Netherlands

	(1) 1960-69	(2) 1970-79	(3) 1980-89	(4) 1990-99	(5) 2000-09	(6) 2010-20
Education: None/Primary	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Education: Secondary	-0.088***	-0.093***	-0.136***	-0.136***	0.058***	-0.004
	(0.022)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.026)	(0.018)	(0.020)
Education: University	-0.077*	-0.127***	-0.099***	-0.008	0.154***	0.100***
	(0.042)	(0.026)	(0.021)	(0.031)	(0.024)	(0.022)
Education: Postgraduate					0.194***	0.165***
					(0.042)	(0.037)
Income group: Bottom 50%	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Income group: Middle 40%	-0.014	-0.068***	-0.110***	-0.071***	-0.028*	-0.028*
	(0.024)	(0.018)	(0.014)	(0.020)	(0.017)	(0.014)
Income group: Top 10%	-0.204***	-0.226***	-0.234***	-0.184***	-0.168***	-0.103***
	(0.037)	(0.029)	(0.023)	(0.028)	(0.026)	(0.020)
Age: 20-39	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Age: 40-59	-0.055**	-0.023	-0.047***	0.020	0.102***	0.065***
	(0.023)	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.017)
Age: 60+	-0.064**	-0.077***	-0.101***	-0.131***	0.028	0.014
	(0.030)	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.021)
Gender: Woman	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Gender: Man	0.021	-0.032*	0.007	-0.087***	-0.061***	-0.068***
	(0.026)	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.013)
Religion: None	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Religion: Catholic	-0.229***	-0.131***	-0.133***	-0.131***	-0.154***	-0.108***
	(0.046)	(0.031)	(0.023)	(0.032)	(0.026)	(0.021)
Religion: Other Christian	-0.128***	-0.129***	-0.138***	-0.195***	-0.194***	-0.182***
	(0.042)	(0.027)	(0.022)	(0.030)	(0.025)	(0.023)
Religion: Other	0.008	-0.076	0.002	0.026	-0.050	-0.031
	(0.073)	(0.055)	(0.034)	(0.049)	(0.042)	(0.035)
Religion: Muslim					0.537***	0.364***
					(0.056)	(0.062)
Religious practice: Never	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Religious practice: Less than monthly	-0.087*	-0.168***	-0.158***	-0.071**	-0.076**	0.011
	(0.052)	(0.034)	(0.025)	(0.035)	(0.030)	(0.029)
Religious practice: Monthly or more	-0.388***	-0.440***	-0.345***	-0.242***	-0.206***	-0.150***
	(0.039)	(0.026)	(0.019)	(0.028)	(0.023)	(0.022)
Location: Urban	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Location: Rural	-0.023	-0.053***	-0.041***	-0.034*	-0.022	-0.060***
	(0.021)	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.015)
Employment status: Employed	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Employment status: Unemployed/Inactive	-0.002	-0.022	0.010	0.027	0.011	0.044**
	(0.028)	(0.019)	(0.016)	(0.022)	(0.020)	(0.017)

Marital status: Single	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Marital status: Married/With partner	0.009	-0.004	0.023	-0.024	-0.073***	-0.059***
	(0.028)	(0.023)	(0.014)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.014)
Region: East	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Region: North	-0.044	0.017	0.033	0.073*	0.078***	0.077***
	(0.034)	(0.025)	(0.021)	(0.040)	(0.027)	(0.024)
Region: South	0.018	0.048**	0.024	0.043	0.012	0.012
	(0.029)	(0.023)	(0.019)	(0.035)	(0.023)	(0.020)
Region: West	-0.027	-0.019	-0.024	-0.038	-0.033*	-0.007
	(0.028)	(0.019)	(0.016)	(0.031)	(0.019)	(0.017)
Constant	0.818***	0.947***	0.846***	0.858***	0.526***	0.529***
	(0.053)	(0.033)	(0.025)	(0.040)	(0.029)	(0.028)
R-squared	0.31	0.29	0.21	0.17	0.16	0.09
Observations	3025	7479	10041	5401	6139	9884
Clusters	1753	2186	2110	1956	2590	3215

Note: The table reports the effect of a set of individual characteristics on the probability to vote for PvdA / D66 / Greens / Other left by decade in the Netherlands. The original survey dataset is duplicated for each income bracket to approximate income deciles (see methodology). The number of clusters corresponds to the number of surveyed individuals in each decade. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level.

Table E14 - Determinants of support for Labour / Greens / Other left in New Zealand

	(1) 1970-79	(2) 1980-89	(3) 1990-99	(4) 2000-09	(5) 2010-20
Education: None/Primary	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Education: Secondary	-0.096***	-0.080***	-0.029***	-0.020	-0.032*
	(0.021)	(0.025)	(0.011)	(0.016)	(0.018)
Education: University	-0.073**	-0.119***	-0.019	0.031	0.072***
	(0.030)	(0.039)	(0.017)	(0.022)	(0.023)
Education: Postgraduate				0.151***	0.159***
				(0.028)	(0.029)
Income group: Bottom 50%	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Income group: Middle 40%	-0.015	-0.012	-0.043***	-0.124***	-0.098***
	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.017)
Income group: Top 10%	-0.208***	-0.072**	-0.132***	-0.169***	-0.183***
	(0.032)	(0.035)	(0.019)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Age: 20-39	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Age: 40-59	0.002	-0.067***	0.038***	0.013	-0.008
	(0.021)	(0.025)	(0.012)	(0.017)	(0.021)
Age: 60+	-0.016	-0.101***	0.029*	-0.010	-0.105***
	(0.027)	(0.032)	(0.015)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Gender: Woman	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Gender: Man	0.056***	0.001	-0.051***	-0.086***	-0.043***
	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.010)	(0.014)	(0.015)
Religion: None	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Religion: Catholic	0.051	-0.024	-0.010	-0.038	-0.062**
	(0.038)	(0.060)	(0.019)	(0.027)	(0.029)
Religion: Other Christian	-0.090***	-0.082*	-0.105***	-0.111***	-0.101***
	(0.031)	(0.049)	(0.014)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Religion: Other	-0.055	0.173*	-0.014	0.007	0.034
	(0.049)	(0.091)	(0.029)	(0.035)	(0.036)
Religion: Muslim				0.154	0.305***
				(0.199)	(0.082)
Religious practice: Never	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Religious practice: Less than monthly	-0.059*	-0.025	-0.042***	-0.002	0.008
	(0.032)	(0.048)	(0.013)	(0.019)	(0.021)
Religious practice: Monthly or more	-0.079**	-0.048	-0.123***	-0.128***	-0.016
	(0.032)	(0.049)	(0.014)	(0.020)	(0.022)
Location: Urban			(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
			(.)	(.)	(.)
Location: Rural			-0.089***	-0.098***	-0.077***
			(0.012)	(0.017)	(0.022)
Employment status: Employed	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Employment status: Unemployed/Inactive	-0.007	0.007	0.064***	0.030*	0.060***
	(0.023)	(0.026)	(0.013)	(0.017)	(0.017)

Marital status: Single	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Marital status: Married/With partner	0.020	0.029	-0.073***	-0.037**	-0.037**
	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.011)	(0.017)	(0.019)
Race/ethnicity/language: European	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Race/ethnicity/language: Maori	0.293***	0.277***	0.173***	0.364***	0.339***
	(0.057)	(0.052)	(0.019)	(0.023)	(0.021)
Race/ethnicity/language: Other	0.214***	0.116	0.177***	0.212***	0.046
	(0.079)	(0.088)	(0.025)	(0.038)	(0.034)
Region: Auckland		(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
		(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Region: Other		0.042	0.118***	0.093***	0.032*
		(0.033)	(0.024)	(0.019)	(0.017)
Region: Wellington		0.068	0.077**	0.117***	0.104***
		(0.048)	(0.032)	(0.028)	(0.024)
Constant	0.670***	0.688***	0.659***	0.550***	0.516***
	(0.035)	(0.132)	(0.025)	(0.029)	(0.031)
R-squared	0.05	0.04	0.06	0.11	0.10
Observations	6539	8027	26066	17102	17512
Clusters	1581	1482	5815	3680	3419

Note: The table reports the effect of a set of individual characteristics on the probability to vote for Labour / Greens / Other left by decade in New Zealand. The original survey dataset is duplicated for each income bracket to approximate income deciles (see methodology). The number of clusters corresponds to the number of surveyed individuals in each decade. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level.

Table E15 - Determinants of support for Labour Party / Socialist Left Party / Other left in Norway

	(1) 1950-59	(2) 1960-69	(3) 1970-79	(4) 1980-89	(5) 1990-99	(6) 2000-09	(7) 2010-20
Education: None/Primary	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Education: Secondary	-0.373***	-0.344***	-0.261***	-0.216***	-0.110***	-0.018	-0.014
	(0.035)	(0.025)	(0.019)	(0.014)	(0.023)	(0.018)	(0.033)
Education: University	-0.457***	-0.409***	-0.310***	-0.218***	-0.146***	0.029	0.051
	(0.053)	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.019)	(0.035)
Income group: Bottom 50%	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Income group: Middle 40%	0.005	-0.001	-0.013	-0.045***	0.030	-0.035**	0.009
	(0.031)	(0.021)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.021)	(0.017)	(0.023)
Income group: Top 10%	-0.239***	-0.194***	-0.168***	-0.239***	-0.100***	-0.146***	-0.151***
	(0.045)	(0.029)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.031)	(0.024)	(0.030)
Age: 20-39	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Age: 40-59	-0.091***	-0.048**	-0.030	0.046***	-0.022	0.014	-0.034
	(0.030)	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.016)	(0.022)
Age: 60+	-0.226***	-0.122***	-0.129***	-0.018	-0.099***	-0.058***	-0.051**
	(0.043)	(0.025)	(0.022)	(0.017)	(0.023)	(0.020)	(0.025)
Gender: Woman	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Gender: Man	0.013	0.059***	0.035*	-0.022*	-0.037**	-0.105***	-0.080***
	(0.039)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.017)
Location: Urban	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Location: Rural	-0.113***	-0.128***	-0.095***	-0.142***	-0.129***	-0.063***	-0.113***
	(0.029)	(0.021)	(0.027)	(0.016)	(0.028)	(0.015)	(0.020)
Employment status: Employed	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)			(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)			(.)	(.)
Employment status: Unemployed/Inactive	-0.034	0.059	0.016			0.015	-0.002
	(0.043)	(0.039)	(0.024)			(0.018)	(0.023)
Marital status: Single	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Marital status: Married/With partner	0.119***	0.104***	0.041*	0.093***	-0.016	-0.010	-0.031
	(0.037)	(0.024)	(0.021)	(0.017)	(0.022)	(0.017)	(0.021)
Region: East				(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
				(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Region: North				-0.053*	-0.048	-0.004	-0.003
				(0.027)	(0.033)	(0.027)	(0.036)
Region: South and Oslo				-0.136***	-0.079***	-0.065***	-0.082***
				(0.020)	(0.025)	(0.020)	(0.028)
Region: Trondelag				-0.026	-0.003	-0.011	-0.014
				(0.027)	(0.034)	(0.027)	(0.038)
Region: West				-0.212***	-0.160***	-0.148***	-0.146***
				(0.021)	(0.025)	(0.020)	(0.029)
Constant	0.705***	0.533***	0.630***	0.678***	0.738***	0.594***	0.585***
	(0.047)	(0.039)	(0.028)	(0.024)	(0.035)	(0.028)	(0.047)
R-squared	0.18	0.15	0.09	0.11	0.04	0.04	0.05
Observations	2404	5125	8931	12608	5085	7359	4433
Clusters	1170	1598	2393	2184	2119	2082	1887

Note: The table reports the effect of a set of individual characteristics on the probability to vote for Labour Party / Socialist Left Party / Other left by decade in Norway. The original survey dataset is duplicated for each income bracket to approximate income deciles (see methodology). The number of clusters corresponds to the number of surveyed individuals in each decade. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level.

Table E16 - Determinants of support for Socialists / Communists / Greens / Left bloc in Portugal

	(1) 1980-89	(2) 1990-99	(3) 2000-09	(4) 2010-20
Education: None/Primary	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Education: Secondary	-0.108**	-0.038	-0.028	-0.023
	(0.048)	(0.046)	(0.022)	(0.037)
Education: University	-0.172***	-0.090	-0.120***	-0.175***
	(0.065)	(0.068)	(0.030)	(0.055)
Income group: Bottom 50%	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Income group: Middle 40%	0.002	-0.069*	-0.023	-0.042
	(0.037)	(0.040)	(0.018)	(0.035)
Income group: Top 10%	-0.140*	-0.150**	-0.130***	-0.124**
	(0.079)	(0.066)	(0.029)	(0.059)
Age: 20-39	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Age: 40-59	-0.006	-0.001	0.011	-0.007
	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.023)	(0.042)
Age: 60+	-0.103**	-0.020	-0.103***	-0.024
	(0.049)	(0.048)	(0.028)	(0.050)
Gender: Woman	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Gender: Man	0.055	0.018	-0.019	-0.015
	(0.037)	(0.035)	(0.019)	(0.029)
Religion: None	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Religion: Catholic	-0.147	-0.093	-0.117	-0.116**
	(0.107)	(0.098)	(0.081)	(0.058)
Religion: Other	0.003	-0.029	-0.143	-0.030
	(0.161)	(0.159)	(0.098)	(0.099)
Religious practice: Never	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Religious practice: Less than monthly	-0.043	-0.156**	0.001	-0.062
	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.030)	(0.047)
Religious practice: Monthly or more	-0.168***	-0.221***	-0.108***	-0.192***
	(0.065)	(0.068)	(0.030)	(0.049)
Location: Urban	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Location: Rural	-0.105***	0.021	-0.054***	-0.043
	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.018)	(0.034)
Employment status: Employed	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Employment status: Unemployed/Inactive	-0.063	-0.101**	0.021	0.060*
	(0.041)	(0.040)	(0.020)	(0.035)
Marital status: Single	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Marital status: Married/With partner	0.031	0.095***	-0.008	-0.004
	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.021)	(0.033)
Region: Alentejo	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)

Region: Algarve	-0.511***	-0.566***	-0.188***	-0.200**
	(0.061)	(0.063)	(0.054)	(0.096)
Region: Center	-0.242***	-0.283***	-0.234***	-0.367***
	(0.062)	(0.065)	(0.038)	(0.069)
Region: Lisbon	-0.206***	-0.227***	-0.094**	-0.156**
	(0.053)	(0.056)	(0.037)	(0.071)
Region: North	-0.334***	-0.404***	-0.167***	-0.229***
	(0.054)	(0.052)	(0.035)	(0.067)
Constant	1.109***	0.980***	0.978***	1.074***
	(0.111)	(0.106)	(0.091)	(0.099)
R-squared	0.14	0.11	0.07	0.11
Observations	7986	3442	12259	3759
Clusters	1223	1407	2459	1105

Note: The table reports the effect of a set of individual characteristics on the probability to vote for Socialists / Communists / Greens / Left bloc by decade. The original survey dataset is duplicated for each income bracket to approximate income deciles (see methodology). The number of clusters corresponds to the number of surveyed individuals in each decade. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level.

Table E17 - Determinants of support for PSOE / Podemos / IU / Other left in Spain

	(1) 1980-89	(2) 1990-99	(3) 2000-09	(4) 2010-20
Education: None/Primary	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Education: Secondary	-0.101***	-0.081***	-0.045***	-0.065***
	(0.013)	(0.017)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Education: University	-0.172***	-0.178***	-0.074***	-0.073***
	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.014)	(0.013)
Education: Postgraduate	-0.375***	-0.297**	-0.124***	-0.080**
	(0.144)	(0.134)	(0.042)	(0.035)
Income group: Bottom 50%	(baseline)		(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)		(.)	(.)
Income group: Middle 40%	-0.029		-0.055***	-0.034***
	(0.018)		(0.010)	(0.009)
Income group: Top 10%	-0.144***		-0.123***	-0.080***
	(0.032)		(0.016)	(0.015)
Age: 20-39	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Age: 40-59	-0.148***	-0.093***	0.022**	0.034***
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Age: 60+	-0.169***	-0.121***	-0.038***	0.027**
	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.013)	(0.012)
Gender: Woman	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Gender: Man	0.045***	0.024*	-0.067***	-0.048***
	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.008)	(0.007)
Religion: None	(baseline)		(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)		(.)	(.)
Religion: Catholic	-0.303***		-0.220***	-0.280***
	(0.025)		(0.012)	(0.011)
Religion: Other	0.021		-0.047	-0.009
	(0.084)		(0.047)	(0.029)
Religious practice: Never	(baseline)		(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)		(.)	(.)
Religious practice: Less than monthly	-0.139***		-0.132***	-0.136***
	(0.024)		(0.012)	(0.011)
Religious practice: Monthly or more	-0.398***		-0.259***	-0.267***
	(0.021)		(0.011)	(0.010)
Location: Urban	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Location: Rural	-0.093***	-0.096***	-0.036**	-0.008
	(0.018)	(0.028)	(0.015)	(0.014)
Employment status: Employed	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Employment status: Unemployed/Inactive	0.010	0.013	0.001	0.023**
	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Marital status: Single	(baseline)		(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)		(.)	(.)
Marital status: Married/With partner	0.019		-0.008	-0.007
	(0.018)		(0.010)	(0.008)

Region: Andalucia	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Region: Aragon	-0.101***	-0.185***	-0.014	-0.011
	(0.032)	(0.036)	(0.024)	(0.022)
Region: Asturias	-0.083**	-0.092**	(baseline)	0.009
	(0.034)	(0.038)	(0.026)	(0.021)
Region: Baleares	-0.230***	-0.239***	-0.187***	-0.043*
	(0.041)	(0.045)	(0.028)	(0.024)
Region: Basque Country	-0.107***	-0.173***	-0.185***	0.041*
	(0.028)	(0.033)	(0.022)	(0.021)
Region: Canarias	-0.203***	-0.269***	-0.251***	-0.042**
	(0.032)	(0.035)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Region: Cantabria	-0.189***	-0.076	-0.060*	0.140***
	(0.047)	(0.059)	(0.033)	(0.030)
Region: Castilla La Mancha	-0.233***	-0.230***	-0.079***	-0.067***
	(0.029)	(0.031)	(0.020)	(0.019)
Region: Castilla y Leon	-0.239***	-0.211***	-0.107***	-0.090***
	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.017)	(0.018)
Region: Catalonia	-0.209***	-0.147***	-0.063***	0.017
	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Region: Extremadura	-0.141***	(baseline)	0.014	-0.010
	(0.035)	(0.038)	(0.024)	(0.020)
Region: Galicia	-0.249***	-0.177***	-0.035**	(baseline)
	(0.020)	(0.028)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Region: Madrid	-0.110***	-0.154***	-0.120***	-0.081***
	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.016)	(0.014)
Region: Murcia	-0.103***	-0.237***	-0.224***	-0.091***
	(0.037)	(0.039)	(0.023)	(0.019)
Region: Navarra	0.016	-0.025	0.023	0.108***
	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.036)	(0.030)
Region: Rioja	-0.171**	-0.289***	-0.138**	-0.044
	(0.070)	(0.062)	(0.057)	(0.034)
Region: Valencia	-0.109***	-0.203***	-0.185***	-0.022
	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.015)	(0.014)
Region: Ceuta				-0.278***
				(0.040)
Region: Melilla				-0.227***
				(0.063)
Constant	1.447***	0.749***	0.982***	0.836***
	(0.093)	(0.024)	(0.019)	(0.019)
R-squared	0.13	0.05	0.13	0.14
Observations	20532	11048	45305	74833
Clusters	4358	4925	6005	6216

Note: The table reports the effect of a set of individual characteristics on the probability to vote for PSOE / Podemos / IU / Other left by decade in Spain. The original survey dataset is duplicated for each income bracket to approximate income deciles (see methodology). The number of clusters corresponds to the number of surveyed individuals in each decade. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level.

Table E18 - Determinants of support for Social Democratic Party / Left Party / Green Party in Sweden

	(1) 1950-59	(2) 1960-69	(3) 1970-79	(4) 1980-89	(5) 1990-99	(6) 2000-09	(7) 2010-20
Education: None/Primary	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Education: Secondary	-0.312***	-0.244***	-0.218***	-0.199***	-0.163***	-0.108***	-0.036
	(0.025)	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.023)	(0.033)
Education: University	-0.513***	-0.472***	-0.302***	-0.323***	-0.255***	-0.212***	-0.029
	(0.034)	(0.020)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.024)	(0.037)
Income group: Bottom 50%	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Income group: Middle 40%	0.121***	0.051***	0.026**	0.050***	0.010	-0.024**	-0.085***
	(0.027)	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.022)
Income group: Top 10%	-0.048	-0.052***	-0.136***	-0.053***	-0.121***	-0.189***	-0.225***
	(0.039)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.029)
Age: 20-39	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Age: 40-59	-0.071***	-0.061***	-0.024**	-0.062***	0.017	0.050***	-0.016
	(0.024)	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.029)
Age: 60+	-0.135***	-0.079***	-0.061***	-0.086***	-0.061***	-0.096***	-0.012
	(0.030)	(0.017)	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.022)	(0.032)
Gender: Woman	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Gender: Man	0.027	0.018	0.021**	-0.040***	-0.036***	-0.031**	-0.030
	(0.021)	(0.014)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.023)
Religious practice: Never	(baseline)	(baseline)		(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)		(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Religious practice: Less than monthly	-0.190***	-0.270***		-0.229***	-0.193***	-0.169***	-0.113**
	(0.039)	(0.017)		(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.028)	(0.047)
Religious practice: Monthly or more	0.119***	0.128***		0.137***	0.106***	0.093***	0.046*
	(0.037)	(0.019)		(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.027)
Location: Urban	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Location: Rural	-0.097***	-0.122***	-0.214***	-0.167***	-0.133***	-0.090***	-0.072**
	(0.022)	(0.013)	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.020)	(0.030)
Employment status: Employed				(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
				(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Employment status: Unemployed/Inactive				0.024	0.030*	0.032	0.019
				(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.020)	(0.028)
Marital status: Single	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Marital status: Married/With partner	0.028	0.046***	-0.004	0.017	0.019	-0.019	-0.001
	(0.024)	(0.014)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.029)
Region: Gotland					(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
					(.)	(.)	(.)
Region: Norrland					0.139***	0.110***	0.186***
					(0.017)	(0.021)	(0.037)
Region: Svealand					-0.002	-0.011	0.032
					(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.024)
Constant	0.855***	0.688***	0.634***	0.718***	0.690***	0.663***	0.536***
	(0.147)	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.019)	(0.023)	(0.031)	(0.046)
R-squared	0.16	0.15	0.06	0.09	0.09	0.07	0.05
Observations	4441	18082	24545	22345	15299	14440	9405
Clusters	1414	3234	4536	3745	3450	3370	2684

Note: The table reports the effect of a set of individual characteristics on the probability to vote for Social Democratic Party / Left Party / Green Party by decade in Sweden. The original survey dataset is duplicated for each income bracket to approximate income deciles (see methodology). The number of clusters corresponds to the number of surveyed individuals in each decade. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level.

Table E19 - Determinants of support for Social Democrats / Greens / Other left in Switzerland

	(1) 1960-69	(2) 1970-79	(3) 1980-89	(4) 1990-99	(5) 2000-09	(6) 2010-20
Education: None/Primary	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Education: Secondary	-0.053	-0.059**	0.045	(baseline)	0.032	0.036*
	(0.068)	(0.024)	(0.043)	(0.026)	(0.021)	(0.020)
Education: University	-0.217***	-0.069	-0.033	0.062*	0.147***	0.193***
	(0.065)	(0.043)	(0.070)	(0.037)	(0.029)	(0.023)
Income group: Bottom 50%		(baseline)		(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
		(.)		(.)	(.)	(.)
Income group: Middle 40%		-0.022		0.018	0.003	0.012
		(0.031)		(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.011)
Income group: Top 10%		-0.114***		-0.050*	-0.111***	-0.049***
		(0.044)		(0.026)	(0.023)	(0.017)
Age: 20-39	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Age: 40-59	0.020	0.024	-0.105**	-0.051**	0.007	-0.006
	(0.055)	(0.023)	(0.046)	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.015)
Age: 60+	-0.042	-0.024	-0.122**	-0.117***	-0.082***	-0.056***
	(0.070)	(0.028)	(0.054)	(0.026)	(0.021)	(0.016)
Gender: Woman		(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
		(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Gender: Man		0.017	-0.007	-0.054***	-0.066***	-0.082***
		(0.025)	(0.040)	(0.018)	(0.014)	(0.011)
Religion: None	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Religion: Catholic	-0.383***	-0.203***	-0.376***	-0.136***	-0.136***	-0.090***
	(0.139)	(0.077)	(0.079)	(0.048)	(0.034)	(0.028)
Religion: Other Christian	-0.255*	-0.123	-0.245***	-0.047	-0.060*	-0.050*
	(0.132)	(0.075)	(0.080)	(0.047)	(0.034)	(0.028)
Religion: Other	-0.149	-0.044	-0.114	-0.019	-0.084**	-0.107***
	(0.328)	(0.136)	(0.148)	(0.068)	(0.042)	(0.036)
Religious practice: Never	(baseline)	(baseline)		(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)		(.)	(.)	(.)
Religious practice: Less than monthly	-0.137*	-0.081**		-0.100***	-0.073**	-0.093***
	(0.078)	(0.036)		(0.035)	(0.029)	(0.026)
Religious practice: Monthly or more	-0.312***	-0.270***		-0.221***	-0.183***	-0.218***
	(0.087)	(0.039)		(0.038)	(0.032)	(0.028)
Location: Urban	(baseline)	(baseline)		(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)		(.)	(.)	(.)
Location: Rural	-0.162***	-0.120***		-0.080***	-0.118***	-0.118***
	(0.050)	(0.025)		(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.011)
Employment status: Employed	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Employment status: Unemployed/Inactive	0.028	-0.015	0.094**	-0.000	-0.042**	0.001
	(0.081)	(0.027)	(0.048)	(0.023)	(0.018)	(0.014)
Marital status: Single	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Marital status: Married/With partner	-0.053	-0.016	-0.045	-0.049***	-0.018	-0.061***
	(0.056)	(0.025)	(0.043)	(0.019)	(0.014)	(0.012)

Region: French	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Region: German	-0.017	-0.016	-0.148***	-0.041*	-0.049***	-0.054***
	(0.060)	(0.029)	(0.055)	(0.021)	(0.017)	(0.014)
Region: Italian	-0.087	-0.019	-0.299***	-0.123***	-0.039*	-0.111***
	(0.105)	(0.063)	(0.070)	(0.030)	(0.023)	(0.017)
Constant	1.038***	0.831***	0.779***	0.675***	0.641***	0.644***
	(0.123)	(0.084)	(0.099)	(0.046)	(0.033)	(0.028)
R-squared	0.17	0.10	0.11	0.07	0.10	0.11
Observations	456	3294	900	11775	11681	18865
Clusters	456	2182	582	6599	6567	11127

Note: The table reports the effect of a set of individual characteristics on the probability to vote for Social Democrats / Greens / Other left by decade in Switzerland. The original survey dataset is duplicated for each income bracket to approximate income deciles (see methodology). The number of clusters corresponds to the number of surveyed individuals in each decade. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level.

	(1) 1950-59	(2) 1960-69	(3) 1970-79	(4) 1980-89	(5) 1990-99	(6) 2000-09	(7) 2010-20

Table E20 - Determinants of support for the Labour Party in the United Kingdom

	(1) 1950-59	(2) 1960-69	(3) 1970-79	(4) 1980-89	(5) 1990-99	(6) 2000-09	(7) 2010-20
Education: None/Primary	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Education: Secondary	-0.214***	-0.190***	-0.177***	-0.130***	-0.129***	-0.072***	-0.022*
	(0.025)	(0.021)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Education: University	-0.213***	-0.212***	-0.207***	-0.114***	-0.090***	-0.131***	-0.034**
	(0.065)	(0.053)	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.017)
Education: Postgraduate					0.033	-0.057**	0.010
					(0.050)	(0.026)	(0.021)
Income group: Bottom 50%	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Income group: Middle 40%	-0.165***	-0.084***	-0.039***	-0.167***	-0.142***	-0.078***	-0.047***
	(0.022)	(0.019)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Income group: Top 10%	-0.346***	-0.371***	-0.180***	-0.259***	-0.222***	-0.131***	-0.106***
	(0.030)	(0.023)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.021)
Age: 20-39	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Age: 40-59	-0.039*	-0.048***	-0.012	-0.046***	-0.034***	-0.062***	-0.052***
	(0.023)	(0.018)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.016)
Age: 60+	-0.165***	-0.089***	-0.067***	-0.075***	-0.060***	-0.100***	-0.132***
	(0.028)	(0.022)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.019)
Gender: Woman	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Gender: Man	0.102***	0.053***	0.026***	0.033***	0.021**	0.004	-0.020*
	(0.024)	(0.020)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Religion: None	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Religion: Catholic	-0.131*	0.068	0.074***	0.096***	0.095***	0.110***	0.084***
	(0.070)	(0.055)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.021)	(0.022)
Religion: Other Christian	-0.241***	-0.131***	-0.093***	-0.093***	-0.091***	-0.056***	-0.068***
	(0.060)	(0.048)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.012)
Religion: Other	-0.290**	-0.134	0.096***	-0.090**	-0.069*	-0.093***	-0.026
	(0.116)	(0.084)	(0.036)	(0.041)	(0.036)	(0.026)	(0.044)
Religion: Muslim				0.043	-0.028	-0.058	0.220***
				(0.062)	(0.076)	(0.074)	(0.050)
Employment status: Employed	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Employment status: Unemployed/Inactive	0.007	0.037*	0.024**	0.002	-0.019	-0.012	0.023
	(0.026)	(0.022)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.015)
Marital status: Single	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Marital status: Married/With partner	0.072***	0.059***	0.029***	-0.004	0.013	0.004	-0.046***
	(0.025)	(0.020)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Race/ethnicity: African / Caribbean			(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
			(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Race/ethnicity: Indian / Pak. / Bang.			0.101	0.141***	-0.077	-0.028	-0.146**
			(0.134)	(0.054)	(0.064)	(0.082)	(0.061)
Race/ethnicity: Other			-0.310	-0.408***	-0.176**	-0.260***	-0.295***
			(0.231)	(0.069)	(0.076)	(0.074)	(0.060)
Race/ethnicity: White			-0.326***	-0.242***	-0.329***	-0.337***	-0.371***
			(0.081)	(0.039)	(0.036)	(0.055)	(0.043)
Constant	0.782***	0.647***	0.888***	0.751***	0.893***	0.886***	0.840***
	(0.067)	(0.053)	(0.082)	(0.040)	(0.038)	(0.057)	(0.046)
R-squared	0.12	0.10	0.06	0.09	0.08	0.05	0.09
Observations	5122	6732	26522	18740	17793	14053	15439
Clusters	2025	2377	8082	7409	6770	5957	5760

Note: The table reports the effect of a set of individual characteristics on the probability to vote for the Labour Party by decade in Britain. The original survey dataset is duplicated for each income bracket to approximate income deciles (see methodology). The number of clusters corresponds to the number of surveyed individuals in each decade. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level.

Table E21 - Determinants of support for the Democratic Party in the United States

	(1) 1948-59	(2) 1960-69	(3) 1970-79	(4) 1980-89	(5) 1990-99	(6) 2000-09	(7) 2010-20
Education: None/Primary	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Education: Secondary	-0.115***	-0.106***	-0.026	-0.126***	-0.098***	-0.100***	-0.031
	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.024)	(0.035)	(0.037)	(0.026)
Education: University	-0.149***	-0.164***	-0.057*	-0.137***	-0.166***	-0.071*	0.077***
	(0.035)	(0.036)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.041)	(0.042)	(0.028)
Education: Postgraduate		-0.178***	0.041	0.020	-0.105**	0.005	0.217***
		(0.051)	(0.045)	(0.037)	(0.046)	(0.047)	(0.028)
Income group: Bottom 50%	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Income group: Middle 40%	-0.037*	0.004	-0.072***	-0.051**	-0.080***	-0.047**	-0.006
	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.013)
Income group: Top 10%	-0.124***	-0.078**	-0.177***	-0.173***	-0.134***	-0.140***	-0.002
	(0.028)	(0.031)	(0.028)	(0.026)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.022)
Age: 20-39	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Age: 40-59	-0.049**	-0.026	-0.031	0.029	0.084***	-0.011	-0.040***
	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.018)	(0.024)	(0.022)	(0.014)
Age: 60+	-0.118***	-0.107***	-0.051*	0.009	0.045	-0.011	-0.033**
	(0.028)	(0.030)	(0.026)	(0.024)	(0.030)	(0.027)	(0.015)
Gender: Woman	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Gender: Man	0.035*	-0.013	-0.046**	-0.070***	-0.100***	-0.081***	-0.062***
	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.021)	(0.018)	(0.011)
Religion: Catholic	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Religion: Other Christian	-0.191***	-0.403***	-0.136***	-0.122***	-0.141***	-0.102***	-0.102***
	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.027)	(0.025)	(0.015)
Religion: Other	-0.112*	-0.229***	0.068	0.018	-0.035	-0.012	0.034*
	(0.064)	(0.074)	(0.047)	(0.039)	(0.038)	(0.032)	(0.019)
Religious practice: Never	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Religious practice: Less than monthly	-0.038	-0.021	-0.043	-0.009	-0.079**	0.018	-0.030
	(0.045)	(0.046)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.035)	(0.034)	(0.020)
Religious practice: Monthly or more	-0.082*	-0.113**	-0.092***	-0.042	-0.212***	-0.125***	-0.136***
	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.025)	(0.016)
Location: Urban	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	
Location: Rural	-0.012	0.050**	-0.018	-0.017	-0.003	-0.030	
	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.023)	(0.047)	
Employment status: Employed			(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
			(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Employment status: Unemployed/Inactive			-0.026	-0.012	-0.060**	0.017	0.020
			(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.026)	(0.023)	(0.013)
Marital status: Single	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Marital status: Married/With partner	0.003	0.032	-0.021	-0.009	-0.036	-0.064***	-0.080***
	(0.034)	(0.026)	(0.021)	(0.017)	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.013)
Race/ethnicity/language: Black	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Race/ethnicity/language: White	-0.248***	-0.458***	-0.521***	-0.543***	-0.507***	-0.575***	-0.497***
	(0.049)	(0.036)	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.025)	(0.022)	(0.019)
Race/ethnicity/language: Other		-0.792***	-0.318***	-0.376***	-0.348***	-0.411***	-0.289***
		(0.210)	(0.065)	(0.038)	(0.040)	(0.032)	(0.024)
Region: North Central	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)

Region: Northeast	-0.111***	-0.073***	-0.016	-0.043*	0.040	-0.022	-0.015
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.023)
Region: South	0.129***	0.036	-0.046**	-0.021	-0.009	-0.094***	-0.079***
	(0.029)	(0.027)	(0.023)	(0.020)	(0.026)	(0.024)	(0.018)
Region: West	0.001	0.009	-0.040	0.017	0.001	0.031	0.003
	(0.033)	(0.029)	(0.027)	(0.023)	(0.031)	(0.029)	(0.021)
Constant	0.997***	1.415***	1.244***	1.211***	1.407***	1.375***	1.131***
	(0.077)	(0.064)	(0.046)	(0.044)	(0.053)	(0.055)	(0.038)
R-squared	0.12	0.19	0.15	0.18	0.21	0.21	0.20
Observations	6532	5513	4498	4892	3491	5301	19023
Clusters	1718	1486	2138	1986	1821	2043	7765

Note: The table reports the effect of a set of individual characteristics on the probability to vote for the Democratic Party by decade in the United States. The original survey dataset is duplicated for each income bracket to approximate income deciles (see methodology). The number of clusters corresponds to the number of surveyed individuals in each decade. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level.

Figure EA1 - Vote for Labor / Greens by education level in Australia

Source: authors' computations using Australian political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Labor / Greens by education level.

# Figure EA2 - Vote for SPÖ / KPÖ / Greens / NEOS by education level in Austria

Source: authors' computations using Austrian political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by SPÖ / KPÖ / Greens / NEOS by education level.

Figure EA3 - Vote for Socialists / Greens by education level in Belgium

Source: authors' computations using Belgian political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by socialist and green parties by education level.

Figure EA4 - Vote for Liberal / NDP / Green by education level in Canada

Source: authors' computations using Canadian election studies.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Liberal / NDP / Green parties by education level.

Figure EA5 - Vote for Social Democratic Party / Socialist People's Party / Social Liberal Party / Red-Green Alliance by education level in Denmark

Source: authors' computations using Danish post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Social Democratic Party / Socialist People's Party / Social Liberal Party / Red-Green Alliance by education level.

Figure EA6 - Vote for Social Democratic Party / Finnish People's Democratic League / Left Alliance / Green League by education level in Finland

Source: authors' computations using Finnish electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Social Democratic Party / Finnish People's Democratic League / Left Alliance / Green League by education level.

Figure EA7 - Vote for PS / PCF / Radicaux / Other left by education level in France

Source: authors' computations using French electoral surveys.
**Note**: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties (PS, PCF, Radicaux, etc.) by education level.

Figure EA8 - Vote for SPD / Die Grünen / Die Linke by education level in Germany

Source: authors' computations using German election studies.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by SPD / Die Grünen / Die Linke by education level.

Figure EA9 - Vote for Social Democratic Alliance / Left-Green movement by education level in Iceland

Source: authors' computations using Icelandic post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Social Democratic Alliance / Left-Green movement by education level.

Figure EA10 - Vote for Fianna Fáil / Sinn Féin / Labour / Other left by education level in Ireland

Figure EA11 - Vote for Social Democrats / Socialists / Communists / Greens by education level in Italy

Figure EA12 - Vote for LSAP / Greens / Other left by education level in Luxembourg

Figure EA13 - Vote for PvdA / D66 / Greens / Other left by education level in the Netherlands

Source: authors' computations using Dutch political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by PvdA / D66 / Greens / Other left by education level.

Figure EA14 - Vote for Labour / Greens / Other left by education level in New Zealand

Figure EA15 - Vote for Labour Party / Socialist Left Party / Other left by education level in Norway

Source: authors' computations using Norwegian post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Labour Party / Socialist Left Party / Other left by education level.

Figure EA16 - Vote for Socialists / Communists / Greens / Left bloc by education level in Portugal

Source: authors' computations using Portuguese political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by education level.

Figure EA17 - Vote for PSOE / Podemos / IU / Other left by education level in Spain

Legend: Primary (blue), Secondary (red), Tertiary (green), Postgraduate (yellow)

Source: authors' computations using Spanish political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by education level.

Figure EA18 - Vote for Social Democratic Party / Left Party / Green Party by education level in Sweden

Source: authors' computations using Swedish electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by education level.

Figure EA19 - Vote for Social Democrats / Greens / Other left by education level in Switzerland

Source: authors' computations using Swiss political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by center-left / left-wing parties by education level.

Figure EA20 - Vote for the Labour Party by education level in the United Kingdom

Figure EA21 - Vote for the Democratic Party by education level in the United States

Source: authors' computations using American National Election Studies.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Democratic Party by education level.

Figure EB1 - Vote for Labor / Greens by income group in Australia

Source: authors' computations using Australian political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received Labor / Greens by income group.

Figure EB2 - Vote SPÖ / KPÖ / Greens / NEOS by income group in Austria

Source: authors' computations using Austrian political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by SPÖ / KPÖ / Greens / NEOS by income group.

Figure EB3 - Vote for Socialists / Greens by income group in Belgium

Legend: ■ Bottom 50% ■ Middle 40% ■ Top 10%

Source: authors' computations using Belgian political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by socialist and green parties by income group.

Figure EB4 - Vote for Liberal / NDP / Green by income group in Canada

Source: authors' computations using Canadian election studies.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Liberal / NDP / Green parties by income group.

Figure EB5 - Vote for Social Democratic Party / Socialist People's Party / Social Liberal Party / Red-Green Alliance by income group in Denmark

Source: authors' computations using Danish post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Social Democratic Party / Socialist People's Party / Social Liberal Party / Red-Green Alliance by income group.

Figure EB6 - Vote for Social Democratic Party / Finnish People's Democratic League / Left Alliance / Green League by income group in Finland

Figure EB7 - Vote for PS / PCF / Radicaux / Other left by income group in France

Source: authors' computations using French post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the PS / PCF / Radicaux / Other left by income group.

Figure EB8 - Vote for SPD / Die Grünen / Die Linke by income group in Germany

Legend: Bottom 50% | Middle 40% | Top 10%

X-axis categories: 1948-59, 1960-69, 1970-79, 1990-99, 2000-09, 2010-20

Source: authors' computations using German post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the SPD / Die Grünen / Die Linke by income group.

Figure EB9 - Vote for Social Democratic Alliance / Left-Green movement by income group in Iceland

Legend: Bottom 50% (blue), Middle 40% (red), Top 10% (green)

Source: authors' computations using Icelandic post-electoral surveys.
**Note**: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by income group.

Figure EB10 - Vote for Fianna Fáil / Sinn Féin / Labour / Other left by income group in Ireland

Source: authors' computations using Irish political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Fianna Fáil and left-wing parties by income group.

Figure EB11 - Vote for Social Democrats / Socialists / Communists / Greens by income group in Italy

Legend: ■ Bottom 50% ■ Middle 40% ■ Top 10%

Source: authors' computations using Italian political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by income group.

Figure EB12 - Vote for LSAP / Greens / Other left by income group in Luxembourg

Source: authors' computations using Luxembourg political attitudes surveys.
**Note**: the figure shows the share of votes received by LSAP / Greens / Other left by income group.

Figure EB13 - Vote for PvdA / D66 / Greens / Other left by income group in the Netherlands

Source: authors' computations using Dutch political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by PvdA / D66 / Greens / Other left by income group.

Figure EB14 - Vote for Labour / Greens / Other left by income group in New Zealand

Source: authors' computations using New Zealand political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by income group.

Figure EB15 - Vote for Labour Party / Socialist Left Party / Other left by income group in Norway

Source: authors' computations using Norwegian post-electoral surveys.
**Note**: the figure shows the share of votes received by Labour Party / Socialist Left Party / Other left by income group.

Figure EB16 - Vote for Socialists / Communists / Greens / Left bloc by income group in Portugal

Figure EB17 - Vote for PSOE / Podemos / IU / Other left by income group in Spain

Source: authors' computations using Spanish political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by income group. In the 1993-2000 decade, income is only available in 2000.

Figure EB18 - Vote for Social Democratic Party / Left Party / Green Party by income group in Sweden

Bottom 50%   Middle 40%   Top 10%

| | 1948-59 | 1960-69 | 1970-79 | 1980-89 | 1990-99 | 2000-09 | 2010-20 |

Source: authors' computations using Swedish electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by income group.

Figure EB19 - Vote for Social Democrats / Greens / Other left by income group in Switzerland

Source: authors' computations using Swiss political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by center-left / left-wing parties by income group.

Figure EB20 - Vote for the Labour Party by income group in the United Kingdom

Legend: Bottom 50% | Middle 40% | Top 10%

Categories: 1948-59, 1960-69, 1970-79, 1980-89, 1990-99, 2000-09, 2010-20

Source: authors' computations using British post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Labour Party by income group.

Figure EB21 - Vote for the Democratic Party by income group in the United States

Legend: ■ Bottom 50% ■ Middle 40% ■ Top 10%

X-axis categories: 1948-59, 1960-69, 1970-79, 1980-89, 1990-99, 2000-09, 2010-20

Source: authors' computations using US electoral surveys.
**Note**: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Democratic Party by income group.

Figure EC1 - Vote for PS / PCF / Radicaux / Other left by income decile in France

Source: authors' computations using French post-electoral surveys 1958-2012.
Note: in 1978, left-wing parties (PS, PCF, Radicaux, etc.) obtained 46% of the vote among voters with bottom 10% income, 23% of the vote among top 10% income voters, and 17% among the top 1%. Generally speaking, the profile of left-wing vote by income percentile is relatively flat within the bottom 90%, and strongly declining for the top 10%, especially at the beginning of the period.

Figure EC2 - Vote for PS / PCF / Radicaux / Other left by wealth decile in France

Legend: 1974, 1978, 1986, 1988, 1995, 2007, 2012

Source: authors' computations using French post-electoral surveys 1974-2012.
Note: in 1978, left-wing parties (PS, PCF, Radicaux, etc.) obtained 69% of the vote among voters with bottom 10% wealth, 23% of the vote among voters with top 10% wealth, and 13% among top 1% wealth holders. Generally speaking, the profile of left-wing vote by wealth percentile is strongly declining, all along the distribution, especially at the begining of the period.