

# **Account Jumping, Post infection persistency & Lateral Movement in AWS**

**Dor Knafo**  
**Security Research Leader**

**Dan Amiga**  
**Co-Founder and CTO**



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
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
# Agenda

- Infection
- Staying Undetected
- Lateral Movement
- Persistency
- Solutions

# AWS Infection Potential




# AWS CloudTrail





# INFECTION



# User Fault Infection



Phishing



AWS S3

Source Repo



Bitbucket

# Infection through 3<sup>rd</sup> party services


- AWS ECS task definition
  - API Calls to task definition are recorded via CloudTrail
  - Contains sensitive information (e.g. environment variables - keys)

# Infection through AWS

- Cloud Metadata
  - Not only AWS
- Poisoned AMI
- Account leftovers – “Account Jumping”



# SURVIVAL



# Surviving key rotation or deletion

- AWS Session Token Services
  - You cannot call any IAM APIs unless MFA authentication information is included in the request.
  - You cannot call any STS API *except* AssumeRole.


## Actions

The following actions are supported:

- [AssumeRole](#)
- [AssumeRoleWithSAML](#)
- [AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity](#)
- [DecodeAuthorizationMessage](#)
- [GetCallerIdentity](#)
- [GetFederationToken](#)
- [GetSessionToken](#)




# DEMO





# HIDE



# Staying Undetected

- The obvious way to do it
  - Delete the trails

```
$ aws cloudtrail delete-trail --name [trail-name]
```

- Stop the trails

```
$ aws cloudtrail stop-logging --name [trail-name]
```

# Staying Undetected

- Disable Multi region logging
  - On the same time disable global services logging (IAM)

```
$ aws cloudtrail update-trail --name [trail-name]  
--no-is-multi-region --no-include-global-services
```

# Staying Undetected

- Move your efforts to S3
  - Delete the bucket



S3 bucket not found

Create a new S3 bucket or specify an existing bucket.

```
$ aws s3 rb --force [bucket-name]
```

- Revoke CloudTrails access



Problem with bucket policy

After you fix the policy ([learn more](#)), click and then click **Save**.

```
$ aws s3api put-bucket-policy --bucket [buck-name]  
--policy [file://modified-policy.json]
```

# Staying Undetected

- Move your efforts to S3
  - AWS Lambda
  - Trigger on every new file in the bucket
  - Wins (almost) every race


## Free Tier

The Lambda free tier includes 1M free requests per month and 400,000 GB-seconds of compute time per month.

- 1 Month, 44640 minutes, 8928 Lambda invocations in total.
- Less than 0.01% of the free tier


# Staying Undetected

- AWS Key Management Service
  - Integrated with CloudTrail
  - S3's Server Side Encryption (SSE)






# DEMO





# MATERIAL MOVEMENT




# Explore the infected environment

- Direct Connect
- IAM
- Amazon support tickets
- S3



# PERSISTENCY



# Persistency

- Create new users (typosquatting for extra stealth)

```
$ aws iam create-user --user-name [username]
```

```
$ aws iam create-access-key --user-name [username]
```

- In response you'll receive an access key ID and a secret access key
- Up to two access tokens per user

# Persistency

- Creating a second access key is risky
- AWS Lambda, again!
- Create a second access key on newly created users, and post it back to you

# Persistency


- Backdoor with new roles
- Use your new low privilege tokens to assume the new roles.
- Create a lambda that responds to role creation and adds a backdoor
- Register to UpdateAssumeRolePolicy to reintroduce backdoors that are removed.

# Persistency

## Synopsis

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
```
delete-function
--function-name <value>
[--qualifier <value>]
[--cli-input-json <value>]
[--generate-
```



# Persistency


- Virtual Private Cloud
- Security Group
- Use a public endpoint and AWS Lambda to bypass the security group
- SQS, AWS Gateway API, AWS S3 (with VPC endpoint)

# Persistency






# DEMO





# SOLUTIONS




# Solutions

- Awareness & Develop unique skillset for your environment
- Stateless Architecture with focus on data protection
- Leverage strong account separation (dev, production1, production2)
- CASB solutions will mature into dedicated PaaS/IaaS offering
- Automation via code, CloudFormation, Dockers, etc. for environment recreated from scratch



# Q&A



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