* Who has power to shape urban education?
* Who *should* have power to shape urban education?
* How does one find out who has power?
* Would understanding the distribution of power and influence help us shape better policies and achieve better outcomes?

Polsby:

* critiquing panel method for identifying leaders
* two step process of constructing leadership pools
  + form a leadership pool with all the people fomally connected with decision-making
  + interview with decisionamkers about their leadership, which mostly shortened the list
* non-repetitive leaders
* economic, status, and power elites don’t have a lot of overlap 🡪 no coherent power structure across the issues
* only the mayor overlapped
* not generalizable but instructional
* little overlap in economic and status elites
* small number of economic elites involved in poltical nomination
* elites still probably more engaged than “most depressed groups”
* no hint of the Regional City cited elsewhere

Stone: Systemic power in community decision-making:

* political power, nondecision making, anticipated reactions, opportunity costs
* officials favor upper-strata interests – can be treated in power terms
* core argueent: must take into account contextual forces aka systemic power. Public officials have alliances and arrange resources hierarchiay – operate in stratified society.
* Systemic power has to do with the impact of the larger socioeconomic system on how public officials behave. Get rewarded for helping upper strata folks and punished or not reqarded for lower.
* Power is interpersonal/intergroup, but it is also situational
* Anticipated reactions – want to stay in the good graces of a group for future reactions
* Power is direct and indirect – power to versus power over (power to choose a school versus power over lower income folks)
* Systemic power is the most power to and furthest removed from power over
* Power to leads to opportunity costs
* Triad of power with public officials at the center – officials cooperate with some interests and not others
* Systemic power doesn’t affect the system directly – system affects power relationships in ways that are situational and indirect (opportunity costs)
* Systemic advantage for major revenue procuders
* Political nature of bureaucratic norms
* Community decision makers are operating witihin a common system of stratification
* Coalition formation – political coalitions often has a class characteristic. Even mayors eleted with lower strata support feel constrained to form policy alliances with business interests

Stone – urban regimes

* 1. Pluralism (political culture perspective) vs. regime theory (political economy perspective)
     1. Pluralism = governmental authority is enjoy to promote policy
        1. One explaination how democratic politics works in liberal order
        2. Citizens support basic features of the system, elections, state is self sufficient
        3. Assumption: autonomous state that can give benefits
        4. Lower-income/lower power groups seek to use political equality/politics to persue their goals, affluent people use the private sector
     2. Regime analysis – privately controlled investments are important but politics isn’t subordinate to economics. Relationship between economy and politics is two way – economic forces shape and are shaped by politics
        1. Politics controlled by elected officials, economy is controlled by investment decisions.
        2. Public policies shaped by three factors
           1. Composition of community’s governing coalition
           2. Nature of the relationships among members of the governing coalition
           3. Resources the members bring
     3. If class cleavage rises to the surface infrequently, it is become the dominant class has ideological hegemony – false class consciousness is being imposed by those who claim it, if theres’s consensues it’s likely genuine
        1. Government is responsible for social contraol but can’t do much withoutvoluntary complainace
           1. Pluralist view – because no one has much power, social change is apolitical
           2. Political heterogenetity follows sociocoeconomic heterogenetiy – power and conflict are shaped by but don’t contribute to social change
        2. Urban regime theory contradicts urban pluralism
           1. Many essential activies are nongovernmental and government authority needs cooperation of private actors
           2. Politics is more than voting for and holding public office –
           3. Regime analysis agrees with pluralism that any group probably can’t hold social control, offers a power to model of power, not power over.
           4. Universal sufferage and social differentiation have limited explainatory power – unrqeual distribution of economic, organizational, and cultural resources have a influence on governing coalitions that go against what would be predicted by pluralism
           5. Gegemony in a capitiast order might be more around profit oriented activities than unchallenged core ideas
        3. Pluralism – preferences are exogenous to the power relationship – power predicts whos preferences prevail
        4. Social production – preferences are endogenous to power – if a goal is achievable its attractive
        5. 4 types of regimes
           1. maintaince regime – don’t change much. Few demands, small rewards
           2. development regimes – modify established patterns and link private investment to public action
           3. middle class progressive regimes – coercion, more middle class
           4. theoretical – regimes devoted to lower class opportunity expansion – improve things. How to organize a community so that this can happen

building and maintaining urband regimes is hard – two barriers: difficulty of promoting policy change, coalition formation to be guidenced by incentive

For the reaction paper:

* Who has power to shape urban education?
* Who *should* have power to shape urban education?
* How does one find out who has power?
* Would understanding the distribution of power and influence help us shape better policies and achieve better outcomes?
* Polsby – not much overlap in the leadership across leadership pockets, economic, status, and power elites aren’t all one in the same. Elites more engaged. Perhaps not generalizable because it’s so different than previous findings but interesting case study.
  + Very stable system of elites
* Stone – Systemic power
  + Officials favor upper-strata interests because of contextual forces, stratified society. Rewarded for helping the high strata folks.
  + Direct (over) and indirect (to) power
  + Triad of power with public officials at the center – officials cooperate with some interest groups and not others
  + Systematic advantage for revenue procedes
  + Bureaucratic norms
* Stone – Urban Regimes
  + Urban regime theory – any group can’t hold social control – power to, not power over
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