



Protocol Audit Report

Version 1.0

NarwhalGuard

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 - * [H-2] The `PasswordStore::setPassword` function is susceptible to misuse, allowing any user to alter the password, contrary to the intended functionality specified in the natspec documentation.

- Low
 - * [L-1] The `PasswordStore` contract exhibits an initialization timeframe vulnerability, which means that there is a period between contract deployment and the explicit call to `PasswordStore::setPassword` during which the password remains in its default state.
- Informational
 - * [I-1] The `PasswordStore::getPassword` function lacks the `newPassword` parameter, even though it is mentioned in the natspec documentation.

Protocol Summary

A smart contract applicatoin for storing a password. Users should be able to store a password and then retrieve it later. Others should not be able to access the password.

Disclaimer

The NarwhalGuard team makes all effort to find as many vulnerabilities in the code in the given time period, but holds no responsibilities for the findings provided in this document. A security audit by the team is not an endorsement of the underlying business or product. The audit was time-boxed and the review of the code was solely on the security aspects of the Solidity implementation of the contracts.

Risk Classification

		Impact		
		High	Medium	Low
Likelihood	High	H	H/M	M
	Medium	H/M	M	M/L
	Low	M	M/L	L

We use the CodeHawks severity matrix to determine severity. See the documentation for more details.

Audit Details

Repository for the audit:

<https://github.com/Cyfrin/3-passwordstore-audit>

Commit Hash:

```
1 2e8f81e263b3a9d18fab4fb5c46805ffc10a9990
```

Scope

```
1 ./src/  
2 ---PasswordStore.sol
```

Roles

- Owner: The user who can set the password and read the password.

For this contract, only the owner should be able to interact with the contract.

Executive Summary

Issues found

Severity	Number of issues found
High	2
Medium	0
Low	1
Info	1
Gas Optimizations	0
Total	0

[H-2] The PasswordStore::setPassword function is susceptible to misuse, allowing any user to alter the password, contrary to the intended functionality specified in the natspec documentation.

Description: The PasswordStore::setPassword function is susceptible to misuse, allowing any user to alter the password, contrary to the intended functionality specified in the natspec documentation.

Function:

```
1 function setPassword(string memory newPassword) external {
2   @> // there is no access control here
3     s_password = newPassword;
4     emit SetNetPassword();
5 }
```

Impact: All users possess the ability to repeatedly modify the password without adhering to the intended ownership restriction.

Proof of Concept:

```
1 function test_non_owner_can_set_password() public {
2   // Owner set the password
3   vm.startPrank(owner);
4   string memory prevPassword = "myPrevPassword";
5   passwordStore.setPassword(prevPassword);
6   vm.stopPrank();
7
8   // The other set up the new password
9   address nonOwner = makeAddr("user");
10  vm.startPrank(nonOwner);
11  string memory newPassword = "myNewPassword";
12  passwordStore.setPassword(newPassword);
13  vm.stopPrank();
14
15  // The owner checks if the current password is the same as the
16  // previous one
17  vm.startPrank(owner);
18  string memory newActualPassword = passwordStore.getPassword();
19  assertNotEq(newActualPassword, prevPassword);
20  assertEq(newActualPassword, newPassword);
21  vm.stopPrank();
22 }
```

Recommended Mitigation: To address this issue, two effective mitigation methods are proposed:

1. Access control from OpenZeppelin library:
Integrate the Ownable contract from the OpenZeppelin library into the PasswordStore con-

tract. This approach establishes a robust access control mechanism, allowing precise determination of users authorized to execute the `PasswordStore::setPassword` function. For further details on access control, refer to the OpenZeppelin documentation.

Example code

```
1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
2 pragma solidity ^0.8.18;
3
4 import {Ownable} from "@openzeppelin/contracts/access/Ownable.sol"
5 ;
6 contract PasswordStore is Ownable {
7     constructor() Ownable(initialOwner) {
8         initialOwner = msg.sender;
9     }
10
11     function setPassword() public onlyOwner {
12         // only the owner can call specialThing()!
13         ...
14     }
15 }
```

<br/

2. Use validation for the owner:

Implement a validation step within the `PasswordStore::setPassword` function to verify whether the caller is the designated owner of the contract. By incorporating this validation, the function will only permit password changes initiated by the owner, aligning with the ownership-based access control stipulated in the natspec documentation.

```
1     function setPassword(string memory newPassword) external {
2 +         if (msg.sender != s_owner) {
3 +             revert PasswordStore__NotOwner();
4 +         }
5         s_password = newPassword;
6         emit SetNetPassword();
7     }
```

Low

[L-1] The PasswordStore contract exhibits an initialization timeframe vulnerability, which means that there is a period between contract deployment and the explicit call to PasswordStore::setPassword during which the password remains in its default state.

Description: The contract does not set the password during its construction (in the constructor). As a result, when the contract is initially deployed, the password remains uninitialized, taking on the default value for a string, which is an empty string.

During this initialization timeframe, the contract's password is effectively empty and can be considered a security gap.

Impact: The impact of this vulnerability is that during the initialization timeframe, the contract's password is left empty, potentially exposing the contract to unauthorized access or unintended behavior.

Recommended Mitigation: To mitigate the initialization timeframe vulnerability, consider setting a password value during the contract's deployment (in the constructor). This initial value can be passed in the constructor parameters.

Informational

[I-1] The PasswordStore::getPassword function lacks the newPassword parameter, even though it is mentioned in the natspec documentation.

Description: The PasswordStore::getPassword function lacks newPassword as an input parameter, contrary to the indication in the natspec documentation.

Function:

```
1      /*
2      * @notice This allows only the owner to retrieve the password.
3      * @param newPassword The new password to set.
4      */
5      function getPassword() external view returns (string memory) {
6          if (msg.sender != s_owner) {
7              revert PasswordStore__NotOwner();
8          }
9          return s_password;
10     }
```

Recommended Mitigation: Revise the natspec documentation to accurately reflect the absence of the newPassword parameter in the PasswordStore::getPassword function. This adjustment will prevent confusion among developers and ensure accurate understanding of the function's signature.