

Model United Nations at UCSD presents
On Saturday April 25th, and Sunday April 26th, 2015

Crisis Committee

Executive Committee of the National Security Council



TritonMUN XI



Introduction

Hello delegates!

My name is Carla Diot, and I will be your chair for the American Cabinet of Crisis. I am in my fourth year at UC San Diego, and am majoring in Political Science: International Relations, and minoring in Middle East studies. I have been a member of Model United Nations at UC San Diego for approximately a year, but was heavily involved with the club in high school. When I am not studying, I am cooking, studying new languages, or writing for PROSPECT, UC San Diego's international affairs journal.

I look forward to guiding you through a thrilling committee focusing on one of the most critical events of the Cold War, the Cuban Missile Crisis. I hope that as members of the American Cabinet, you will delve into thoughtful debate and immerse yourself into a fast-paced political environment.

If you have any questions about crisis, please do not hesitate to contact me via email. Furthermore, if you have any other questions involving UC San Diego or college life, do not hesitate to ask. Good luck, delegates!

Sincerely,

Carla Diot

cdiot@ucsd.edu



Topic A: The Cuban Missile Crisis

I. Background

After the devastation left behind by World War II, a new era began to form, an era where the United States and the Soviet Union emerged as global superpowers. Thus began an ideological war, known contemporaneously as the Cold War. There was a sense of determination within the United States to keep the Soviet Union from extending its influence beyond its own borders, leading to various proxy wars fought across Central and Southeast Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East.

While competition had already begun in the midst of the Second World War through espionage during the course of the Manhattan Project, the tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union became more prominent after President Truman took office in April 1945. In March 1947, President Truman appealed to Congress for support in the Greek Civil War against the Greek Communist Party. Truman believed that the Soviet Union was supporting the party, and that if the Communist Party were victorious, they would negatively influence the rest of the region.¹ The assumption was ultimately false, but the lack of British aid towards both Greece and Turkey caused the United States to step in and award \$400,000,000 worth of foreign aid towards the two countries. This would lead to the formulation of the Truman doctrine, resulting in the shift in foreign policy away from isolationism and towards a policy of containment. This was also influenced by a telegram composed in 1946 by a Foreign Service Officer in Moscow named George F. Kennan. In the telegram, Kennan attempted to explain the motives of the Soviet Un-

¹“The Truman Doctrine, 1947.” *Office of the Historian*. U.S. Department of State, n.d. Web.<<https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/truman-doctrine>>.



ion, and called for a policy of containment against Russian expansionism.² Kennan's telegram would play an influential role in formulating the division between the United States and the Soviet Union. The division was further established when the State Department introduced the Marshall Plan, consisting of an aid package to be delivered to Europe. Upon the announcement of the plan, the Minister of Foreign Affairs for the Soviet Union, Vyacheslav Molotov, criticized the policy and accused it of being a form of American imperialism. As a result, the Soviet Union rejected the plan, and forbade Eastern European countries from accepting the Marshall Plan. With this, the borders between the United States and its allies (known at the time as First World) and the Soviet Union and its allies (known at the time as Second World) were established.

After World War II, the Allies called for the division of Germany to ensure stabilization and prevent another catalyst from unleashing a third war. One of the means of achieving this was through the division of Germany into four zones, each belonging to one of the principal allies. Within the Soviet-controlled sector, Berlin was divided into Western-controlled and Soviet-controlled regions. In April 1948, Josef Stalin began taking actions to blockade Berlin. To the dismay of Stalin, the Western allies reacted quickly, dropping supplies through the coordination of an airlift. Stalin would concede and suspend the blockade in May 1949. After the blockade of the German capital, the Western European allies called upon the need for military unification.³ Negotiations had begun in Brussels, and ultimately led to the founding of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in Washington, D.C. in April 1949. One of the main principles behind the creation in NATO lay in the belief that an attack on one country would be considered an attack on the allies as well.

²Gaddis, John Lewis. *The Cold War: A New History*. New York: Penguin, 2005. Print.

³Ibid.



On August 29th, 1949, the Soviet Union acquired the atomic bomb. The United States had recorded activity in the Soviet Union that indicated nuclear activity, yet failed to acknowledge it. The information was not publicly acknowledged by the United States until September 23rd. Seeking to prepare for the worst, Truman ordered the acceleration of the production of the atomic bomb, and in January 1950, announced the commencement of the “super-bomb” project.⁴ Paranoia continued to mount as the dust of the Chinese revolution began to settle and Mao Zedong announced the birth of the People’s Republic of China. The Soviet Union had gained an ally, and signed a mutual defense pact similar to NATO’s principles.⁵ Back in the United States, Senator Joe McCarthy used the Soviet victories to fuel an era of domestic witch-hunts, accusing any political enemy of harboring communist tendencies. The era, known eponymously as McCarthyism, led to hearings conducted by the House of Un-American Activities Committee full of accusations of treason and espionage. This had a large effect domestically, with political and entertainment sectors being equally targeted and blacklisted. Meanwhile, internal paranoia within the government was alive and well. In April 1950, a top-secret report known as NSC-68 was compiled by the Department of State. The document detailed what officials believed was the true nature of the Soviet Union and outlined its political structure. NSC-68 made claims such as “...Soviet efforts are now directed toward the domination of the Eurasian landmass”.⁶ The doctrine of NSC-68 essentially responded to the Soviet acquisition of the atomic bomb and called for the continual production of U.S. military technology.⁷ While Truman attempted to quell the hysteria of McCarthyism, international conflicts only further solidified the fears of communism.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Ibid.

⁶National Security Council. *United States Objectives and Programs for National Security*. Rep. no. 68. N.p.: n.p., n.d. NSC-68: *U.S. Objectives and Programs for National Security*. National Security Council, 7 Apr. 1950. Web.

⁷“NSC-68, 1950.” *Office of the Historian*. U.S. Department of State, n.d. Web.



In Korea, a conflict similar to the likes of Germany was developing, and would lead to the first of many proxy wars throughout the Cold War. The occupation of North Korea by the Soviets, and the stationing of American troops in South Korea had led to the division of the country along the 38th parallel. While the goal was to create a singular Korean government, it was never able to come to fruition and remains a point of conflict even today. Due to the division along the 38th parallel, two governments claimed legitimacy over the other. South of the 38th parallel was the Republic of Korea, led by democratically elected Syngman Rhee, and backed by the United States. Meanwhile, the northern part of Korea was controlled by Kim il-Sung, and supported by the Soviet Union. In the summer of 1950, after encouragement from the Soviet Union, Kim il-Sung began his campaign of unification, crossing the 38th parallel on June 25th.⁸ The United Nations was quickly involved after the United States called for a Security Council session. A resolution was passed condemning the DPRK's actions. The Korean War was turbulent, with advances being made on both sides. In addition to support from the Soviet Union, North Korea was greeted with direct support from the Chinese.

As president-elect, Eisenhower visited South Korea in the midst of the armistice process. While in the Eastern Hemisphere, the U.S. government began sending messages to the Chinese government suggesting the President was willing to use nuclear forces against them; this prompted the Chinese to reach a settlement quicker. These indirect threats also proved to have an effect on the Soviet Union. In March 1953, after the death of Stalin, new leaders came to power and, fearing the U.S. nuclear threat, moved quickly to end the Korean War. The armistice finally

⁸“The Korean War, 1950 - 1953.” *Office of the Historian*. U.S. Department of State, n.d. Web.



went into effect in July of the same year, with the current borders of the two countries near to the original borders of the 38th parallel.⁹

Like his predecessor, Eisenhower refused to recognize the People's Republic of China as legitimate and instead, continued to support the Nationalist Chinese sector in Taiwan. In September 1954, Congress granted Eisenhower the power to use military power in Taiwan. The President later gave a televised threat that he would use nuclear force as readily as a bullet towards any war in Eastern Asia.¹⁰ In 1955, the new Russian leader, Nikita Khrushchev, claimed he wanted to end East-West tensions and co-exist in the arms race. Eisenhower would not believe him until he showed his intentions, which Khrushchev did later that year when he ended the deadlock on peace negotiations with Austria. Afterwards, Eisenhower agreed to meet with him and other Western powers at the Geneva Conference in Switzerland in July of that year.¹¹

In 1957, Eisenhower wrote and Congress approved the Eisenhower Doctrine. This doctrine stated that any foreign nation under the threat of another could request U.S. economic or military assistance. Most startling about the Eisenhower Doctrine was its direct accusation of Soviet aggression towards other nations. Ultimately, the doctrine called for the protection of the sovereign integrity of independent nations.¹²

Towards the end of Eisenhower's term second term, he sought to reach an arms settlement with Khrushchev. This involved having both sides gather surveillance over the other to see what lay in each military powers' stock, and banned nuclear missile testing in the atmosphere and ocean. Khrushchev rejected both proposals, not to the surprise of Eisenhower. However, these meetings did manage to improve U.S.-Soviet relations and relax hostility. The era of im-

⁹“American President: A Reference Resource.” *Miller Center*. University of Virginia, n.d. Web.

¹⁰*Ibid.*

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹²“The Eisenhower Doctrine. 1957.” *Office of the Historian*. U.S. Department of State, n.d. Web.



provement ended quickly however, when the U.S. sent a U-2 plane twice over the Soviet Union, and was caught before a significant international meeting in Paris. Outraged over the breach of trust, Khrushchev demanded an apology from Eisenhower, who refused.¹³

Throughout President Eisenhower's term, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) developed into well-oiled government tool for covert operations. Eisenhower understood the agency in a way that Truman never could, thus it flourished. By 1953, the agency had grown tremendously in capabilities, budget, and personnel and had become an integral tool for the government in collecting and analyzing various sources of international information, ultimately matching the capability power of the Office of Strategic Services. The CIA director during Eisenhower's two terms, Allen Welsh Dulles, was able to work his way through the government and military effectively enough to prove to be the most efficient director to date by ending the small feuds between the various government sections and allowing cooperation.¹⁴ Eisenhower quickly turned the CIA into the primary government source of information and would only read finalized reports from the CIA offices, as opposed to other government agencies. The President also attended every National Security Council (NSC) meeting, unlike Truman, because he considered that team to be essential to foreign and military policy decision-making by providing all the latest intelligence.¹⁵

Eisenhower did not experience nearly as many domestic issues as he did foreign. The president had to deal with the at-home issues of the Cold War, which included a sometimes-shaky economy and General McCarthy's Red Scare claiming all who opposed him were com-

¹³"American President: A Reference Resource." *Miller Center*. University of Virginia, n.d. Web.

¹⁴Laurie, Clayton D. "A New President, a Better CIA, and an Old War: Eisenhower and Intelligence Reporting on Korea, 1953" *Studies in Intelligence*. 54.4 (2010): 1 - 12. *Center for the Study of Intelligence*. Web.

¹⁵*Ibid*.



munists. But aside from those minor issues, the 1950s American public enjoyed a rather leisurely life and Eisenhower typically made the right choices to maintain high approval ratings.¹⁶

President John Fitzgerald Kennedy was inaugurated in January of 1961 and was thrown into a quickly escalating crisis with the Soviet Union. Prior to Kennedy's inauguration he authorized a mission to send Cuban exiles back to their homeland in order to infiltrate the government and overthrow their leader Castro. This mission, later known as the Bay of Pigs Invasion, took place on April 17th, with 1,400 exiles and ended in immense failure. In June of the same year, Kennedy met with Khrushchev in Vienna, Austria to discuss the ongoing arms race and occupation of Germany. Khrushchev essentially rejected all proposals made by Kennedy, and threatened to cut off the allied powers' access to Berlin. Due to this and the mounted aggression from Khrushchev, Kennedy heavily increased American production of nuclear arms.¹⁷

¹⁶“American President: A Reference Resource.” *Miller Center*. University of Virginia, n.d. Web.

¹⁷“The Cold War” *JFK in History*. John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, n.d. Web.



II. Political Philosophy and Structure

It is important for delegates to consider the political philosophy and climate of the United States when making decisions during committee. Much of U.S. foreign policy was shaped by the attempt to find answers to the “Soviet Question”. The question of what to do in the face of the threat of communism shaped the various strategies of each administration through doctrines. Each administration focused on a differing approach, varying from containment to eventual détente. One of the ideologies that hung over the Cold War was Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). This ideology was brought on by the Soviet acquisition of the atomic bomb and understood that a nuclear attack launched by one country would lead to the retaliation of the other country, and thus lead to total annihilation.¹⁸ The idea of MAD became ingrained significantly in American culture, with the most famous example being demonstrated through government-sponsored videos targeted towards children that taught them how to react in the face of nuclear war.¹⁹

Much of the American mentality during the Cold War was based in fear of the other. This led to movements that sought to restrict the political rights of citizens in the face of the growing Communist threat. This manifested itself through McCarthyism, which blacklisted many government officials as well as artists, as well as through many bills passed through Congress that sought to control the activities of communist sympathizers. In 1950, the McCarran Internal Security Act, which required the registration of communist organizations, was passed. The act was met with opposition from President Truman, who said “In a free country, we punish men for the

¹⁸ Gaddis, John Lewis. *The Cold War: A New History*. New York: Penguin, 2005. Print.

¹⁹ Raymond J. Mauer. "Duck And Cover (1951) Bert The Turtle Civil Defense Film." *YouTube*. YouTube, 1951. Web.



crimes they commit, but never for the opinions they have.”²⁰ This statement showed the dilemma of Cold War Philosophy: the need to suppress the “other”, in this case, the Communists, without threatening the foundational political rights of U.S. citizens.

The inauguration of President Kennedy promised an era where the two sides could work alongside one another to “begin anew the quest for peace, before the dark powers of destruction unleashed by science engulf all humanity in planned or accidental self-destruction.”²¹ However, the actions of the Kennedy administration demonstrated the opposite. Throughout both covert and public operations, the Kennedy administration would seek to isolate Soviet-aligned countries, mainly in Latin America. One diplomatic maneuver was the Alliance for Progress, established by the United States and its Latin American allies in 1961. Kennedy’s address on the organization marginalized Cuba and the Dominican Republic, calling for them to “rejoin the society of free men.”²² Despite attempts to move towards rapprochement, Kennedy’s address would soon be followed by attempts to intervene in communist countries in order to contain the threat of communism.

²⁰“254. Veto of the Internal Security Bill.” *Harry S. Truman: Library & Museum*. Truman Library - Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman, 22 Sept. 1950. Web.

²¹Kennedy, John F. “Inaugural Address of John F. Kennedy” *The Avalon Project*. Yale Law School Lillian Goldman Law Library, 20 January 1961. Web.

²²*Ibid.*



III. Technology and Strategic Abilities

This section seeks to inform delegates of the vast capabilities of the U.S. government at the height of the Cold War. Delegates should note such capabilities when making decisions in committee. The arms race between the Soviet Union and the United States was ignited after the detonation of the atomic bomb on Nagasaki and Hiroshima. The bombs had been developed throughout the course of World War II during the Manhattan Project, which was eventually infiltrated by the Soviet Union. In 1949, the Soviet Union implemented *First Lightning*, their first test of the atomic bomb, shocking the United States.²³ The acquisition of such a destructive power begged the question of what would need to be done with the weapons. Bernard Baruch, a U.S. presidential adviser suggested the dismantling of American weapons and an international ban on the development of further weapons with as lethal potential. His sentiment echoed many American scientists, who lobbied for the control of nuclear energy. However, these sentiments were rejected not only by the U.S., but also the U.S.S.R.²⁴ *First Lightning* increased the panic of the United States, leading to the authorization, under President Truman, of the development of thermonuclear weapons, more commonly known as hydrogen bombs. These bombs had stronger potential than their predecessor, reaching an explosion of ten megatons.²⁵ Come 1953, the Soviet Union again rivaled the United States in power with their acquisition of the hydrogen bomb.

Towards the end of the Second World War, the United States began investing in the development of missiles, leading to the first intercontinental ballistic missile, the SM-65 Atlas in 1957. The Atlas had the capability to travel across approximately 9,000 miles, and was often

²³Diot, Carla. "Dr. Oppenheimer, Or How I Learned to Keep Worrying and Lobby Against the Bomb: The Scientific Community and Political Activism in the Early Cold War" *University of California, San Diego*, 2011. Print.

²⁴Swift, John. "The Soviet-American Arms Race." *The Soviet-American Arms Race*. History Today, Mar. 2009. Web.

²⁵Ibid.



transported in what was known as a coffin. Alongside the SM-65 Atlas was the PGM-19 Jupiter, a medium-range ballistic missile. The PGM-19 Jupiter had a limited range, being able to only travel between 1,000 and 1,500 miles.²⁶ This implied the strategic placement of the PGM-19 Jupiter in order to achieve political goals. This would lead to the placement of the PGM-19 Jupiter missiles in Turkey and Italy, as they would serve as strategic launching points in the case of an assault against the Soviet Union.²⁷

The Soviet Union used their missiles to launch Sputnik, the world's first artificial satellite in 1957. This had been preceded by a New York Times article that claimed that there was an "invisible crisis", alluding to the shortage of students embarking in scientific fields.²⁸ The launch of Sputnik reinvigorated interests in the sciences. The shock of the Soviet launch led Eisenhower to form the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) in 1958. The intent of NASA was to develop spacecraft for non-military purposes, whilst competing with the Soviet Union. Under NASA, first American was launched in space in 1961, although Yuri Gagarin and the Soviet Union preceded Alan Shepard and the United States by several weeks.²⁹ Despite this, the pressure of the space race continued as President Kennedy promised to send a man to the moon by the end of the decade.³⁰ The United States would achieve this goal, and become the first country to do so in 1969, six years after Kennedy's assassination.

Both countries used other technologies in attempts to track the other's move. The United States had developed a variety of aircraft throughout the Cold War, with approximately 14 dif-

²⁶"Jupiter." *Air Force Space & Missile Museum*. Web.

²⁷"Frequently Asked Questions." *Cuban Missile Crisis*. Harvard Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, n.d. Web.

²⁸Killian Jr., James.R. "The Invisible Crisis' In Science." *The New York Times*. 07 April 1957. *ProQuest*. 26, 32. Web. 10 June 2013.

²⁹"A History of Human Spaceflight." *Image Gallery*. National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 13 April 2011. Web.

³⁰Kennedy, John F. "Rice Stadium Moon Speech." Rice University. Rice Stadium, Houston, TX. 12 September 1962. Speech. NASA. AVI file.



ferent types of planes in their arsenal.³¹ Most notable was the Lockheed U-2 (U-2) aircraft, first flown in 1955. The U-2 was built with the intention of reconnaissance in order to provide the United States with key information about Soviet technology.³² Able to reach altitudes greater than 70,000 feet, and to fly at speeds in excess of 400 miles per hour, the U-2 was instrumental in aerial photography of the Soviet Union and other locations of interest. In addition to the U-2 was the Vought F-8 Crusader (F-8), formally introduced in 1957 and used principally by the U.S. Navy. The F-8 was capable of both low-level reconnaissance and fighting. While it was highly capable in speed, being able to reach a speed of Mach 1.86, it was also noteworthy for its usefulness in low-altitude photography. The Navy and the Air Force also employed the use of the McDonnell Douglas F-4 Phantom II (F-4), introduced in 1960. Unlike the previous two aircraft, the F-4 was principally used as a fighter, and was equipped with a state of the art Pulse-Doppler radar system. A significant part of the F-4's capabilities included its potential to carry up to 16,000 pounds of weaponry, including nuclear weapons.³³ Finally, the U.S. did not limit its means of deterrence simply to the placement of missiles. The U.S. employed the use of the Boeing B-52 Stratofortress (B-52), a type of bomber, in order to demonstrate the readiness to strike at the Soviet Union upon provocation of Mutually Assured Destruction. The B-52 was a much larger plane than any of the others in service, and was able to carry up to 70,000 pounds of bombs and other weaponry.³⁴

³¹"Cuban Missile Crisis Aircraft" *Military Factory*. Global Firepower, 12 December 2014. Web.

³²"B-52 Stratofortress." *Official United States Air Force Website*. U.S. Air Force, 20 September 2005. Web.

³³"McDonnell Douglas F-4D." *National Museum of the US Air Force*. National Museum of the USAF, 2 Nov. 2009. Web.

³⁴"B-52 Stratofortress." *Official United States Air Force Website*. U.S. Air Force, 20 September 2005. Web.



The United States had also developed a ballistic missile system known as Polaris in 1960, which consisted of a nuclear power submarine that was attached with 16 missiles.³⁵ The deployment of submarines during the Cold War was a tense affair. Often, when submarines would be detected, they would be induced to surface and forced to identify themselves.³⁶ Alongside the development of submarines were missiles that were capable of being equipped to submarines. Examples of such includes the SSM-N-8 Regulus and the UGM-27 Polaris. The Regulus was first launched in 1953, and was used for deterrence purposes. The cruise missile capable of traveling 500 nautical miles and could carry up to 3,000 pounds of warheads. The UGM-27 Polaris first came into use in 1961, and was capable of traveling up to 2,500 nautical miles, and was equipped with three W58 thermonuclear warheads. The Navy also possessed a multitude of aircraft carriers, including the USS Enterprise (a Nimitz-class carrier) and carriers belonging to the Essex-class and Forrestal-class. While the carriers were often used for measures of projecting power and aggression, they proved useful in missions involving anti-submarine patrols and implementation of blockades. The carriers were able to carry hundreds of planes and also possessed their own weaponry and radar systems.

³⁵"Submarine Weapons: Ballistic Missiles." *Fast Attacks & Boomers: Submarines in the Cold War*. The National Museum of American History, 2000. Web.

³⁶"The Submarines of October." *The National Security Archive*. National Security Archive, 31 Oct. 2002. Web.



IV. Characters

Ray S. Cline, *Head of CIA's Directorate of Intelligence*

Cline's political career took off in 1946 when he was assigned to the Operations Division of the War Department General Staff. Three years later he became a part of the CIA where he later became Chief of the Office of National Estimates. In 1962, after working for four years in Taiwan, Cline finally reached the position of Head of CIA's Directorate of Intelligence.³⁷ Cline was among the key personnel that discovered and informed President Kennedy of the Soviet Union's shipment of nuclear weapons to Cuba.

McGeorge Bundy, *National Security Advisor*

Prior to Kennedy's election, Bundy played an instrumental role in organizing supporters in the academic and scientific community for him. Bundy was appointed National Security Advisor in 1961.³⁸ Bundy was essential to the Kennedy Cabinet during this crisis, having been the figure who alerted Kennedy to the discovery of the missile site the morning of October 16th, 1962. Throughout the crisis, McGeorge Bundy struggled to maintain a consistent policy, but remained a key figure by Kennedy's side.

Robert Kennedy, *Attorney General*

Robert Kennedy was appointed Attorney General shortly after the election of his brother. As Attorney General, Robert Kennedy spent the duration of his service fighting racism and supporting African American civil rights movements across the United States. Kennedy's role as Attorney General limited his power in ExComm, but Kennedy had already been involved in previous operations involving Cuba, such as Operation Mongoose.³⁹ During the crisis, Robert Kennedy served as his brother's confidant, and was influential in making foreign policy decisions.⁴⁰

³⁷<http://spartacus-educational.com/JFKclineR.htm>

³⁸<http://www.jfklibrary.org/Research/Research-Aids/Ready-Reference/Biographies-and-Profiles/McGeorge-Bundy.aspx>

³⁹http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/item/2007/0709/whit/white_rfk.html

⁴⁰<http://www.history.com/topics/robert-f-kennedy>



General Maxwell Taylor, *U.S. Army, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*

General Taylor previously worked for President Eisenhower as his Army Chief of Staff. During Eisenhower's term, he advocated for more reliance on grounded military forces. Taylor fostered a close relationship with both John and Robert Kennedy and was appointed as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in October 1962. As a part of ExComm, Taylor rejected calls for the use of nuclear force, and had in fact been the first member of ExComm to propose the idea of a blockade.⁴¹ Taylor's anti-nuclear position became characteristic both during and after the Cuban Missile Crisis.⁴²

Dean Rusk, *Secretary of State*

Dean Rusk was appointed by Kennedy in 1960 and continued to serve throughout both Kennedy and Johnson's administrations. While Rusk advocated for transparent communication between the United States and the Soviet Union, Rusk also called for military intervention against the threat of communism. Rusk remained reserved about the Bay of Pigs invasion, although he supported the overthrow of Castro. Rusk often disagreed with Kennedy and the two were often at odds with each other, with Kennedy claiming Rusk's inability to prepare for emergency meetings.⁴³ Yet, Rusk was an influential figure in the development of relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, due to his successful negotiation of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1963.⁴⁴

Robert McNamara, *Secretary of Defense*

Robert McNamara carried a prolific career in both public and private spheres of the United States, serving both as the Secretary of Defense and the President of the Ford Motor Company. As Secretary of Defense, McNamara sought "to bring efficiency to a \$40 billion enterprise beset by jealousies and political pressures while maintaining American military superiority."⁴⁵ Similarly to Maxwell Taylor, McNamara advocated for less reliance on nuclear arms than the

⁴¹Dooley, Brian. "The Cuban Missile Crisis - 30 years on." *History Today*, 42.10 (1992). Web.

⁴²"Maxwell Taylor." *Biographical Profiles*. John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, n.d. Web.

⁴³Sorensen, Ted. *Counselor: A Life at the Edge of History*. New York, NY: Harper, 2008. Print.

⁴⁴"Dean Rusk." *Biographical Profiles*. John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, n.d. Web.

⁴⁵"Biographical Profiles: Robert McNamara." *John F. Kennedy: Presidential Library & Museum*. John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, n.d. Web.



Eisenhower Era. McNamara also was influential in publicizing the strategy of Mutually Assured Destruction and second strike capability.

John McCone, *Director of Central Intelligence*

In 1948, President Truman selected McCone as the Deputy to the Secretary of Defense, but he quickly established prominence in the Department of Defense. In 1950, he became Under Secretary to the Air Force. Throughout McCone's various positions within the government, he established government contracts with companies he had financial connections with. During the Eisenhower era, McCone was strongly against a ban of nuclear arms. After the failure of the Bay of Pigs Invasion, Kennedy was pressured by Republicans to fire the former Director of Central Intelligence, Allen Dulles, and appoint McCone. Under McCone, the Central Intelligence Agency sent the U-2 planes that would lead to the discovery of the Soviet presence in Cuba.⁴⁶

U. Alexis Johnson, *Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs*

Johnson was a Foreign Service Officer who assisted Rusk in the coordination of foreign policy. Johnson was well-versed in diplomacy, having served as an ambassador to Czechoslovakia, Thailand, and Japan. Prior to this, Johnson had been involved in the negotiations of an armistice in the midst of the Korean War. As a member of ExComm, Johnson helped prepare the plans for a blockade.⁴⁷

Roswell Gilpatric, *Deputy Secretary of Defense*

Unlike Robert McNamara, Roswell Gilpatric had experience in Washington, serving under the Eisenhower administration in a covert capacity, heading a force to prevent the spread of Communism in Vietnam. Gilpatric was selected by Kennedy alongside McNamara to head the Department of Defense, and was involved in the planning of Operation Mongoose. It was Gilpatric who outlined the importance of discussing the United States' options during the crisis, giving Kennedy the ultimatum between limited and unlimited action.⁴⁸

⁴⁶“ExComm.” *Cuban Missile Crisis*. Harvard Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, n.d. Web.

⁴⁷Ibid.

⁴⁸Ibid.



Paul Nitze, Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs

Paul Nitze was a prolific figure of the Cold War, having drafted the famous NSC-68 doctrine in 1950. Thus, for Nitze, nuclear deterrence was a significant concept, and he believed the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba caused an imbalance of nuclear power.⁴⁹ Nitze pushed for the idea of direct action against Cuba, including airstrikes in the case of failure of the blockade.⁵⁰

Curtis Lemay, Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force

Curtis Lemay was highly influential in the field of military action, having orchestrated many of the campaigns in the Pacific Theater during World War II. His tenure as Chief of Staff of the Air Force was characterized by ideas of strong air campaigns, with Lemay claiming that “if you are going to use military force, then you ought to use overwhelming military force. Use too much and deliberately use too much.”⁵¹ Lemay’s resolve was demonstrated during the Cuban Missile Crisis as Lemay criticized the idea of a blockade, calling it a weak response.⁵²

Kenneth O’Donnell, Appointments Secretary

Kenneth O’Donnell was close to the Kennedy family, having befriended Robert Kennedy during their time at Harvard University. This brought O’Donnell many political opportunities, including as John Kennedy’s political campaign manager, and eventually as Appointments Secretary.⁵³ As Appointments Secretary, O’Donnell did not have much influence over the rest of ExComm, but was still an influential unofficial advisor to Kennedy during the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Dean Acheson, Former Secretary of State

Dean Acheson served as the Secretary of State throughout the Truman Administration. After his time as Secretary of State, Acheson retired from public service and moved back into private law practice. However, the Cuban Missile Crisis signaled Acheson’s return to the government, as he was sent by Kennedy to meet with French President Charles de Gaulle and West

⁴⁹“ExComm.” *Cuban Missile Crisis*. Harvard Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, n.d. Web.

⁵⁰Thompson, Nicholas. ““We Will All Fry”.” *The New Yorker*. The New Yorker, 15 Oct. 2012. Web.

⁵¹“General Curtis E. LeMay (1906 - 1990).” *American Experience*. Public Broadcasting Service. Web.

⁵²“LeMay and Kennedy Argue Over Cuban Missile Crisis.” *History*. A&E Networks, n.d. Web.

⁵³“Kenneth P. O’Donnell.” *Biographical Profiles*. John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, n.d. Web.



Germany's Chancellor Konrad Adenauer in order to garner support for the U.S.' actions in Cuba.⁵⁴

⁵⁴"Other U.S. Players." *Harvard Kennedy School: Cuban Missile Crisis*. Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, n.d. Web.



V. Questions to Consider

1. The Cold War was defined by various doctrines that defined the relationship between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. What are the U.S.'s long-term and short-term goals and how should they guide interaction with the Soviet Union?
2. The concept of Mutually Assured Destruction was often used as a means of intimidation and deterrence. What is the significance of this theory and how should it be applied to the U.S. government's actions towards Cuba, if at all?
3. What can be done by the United States in the face of crisis to project its power in its best interest?
4. Diplomatic relations between the United States and Cuba were severed in 1961, and the Bay of Pigs invasion only further harmed them. Does the U.S. have any interest in relations with Cuba and how may that affect U.S. actions during the crisis?



VI. Suggested Sites

<http://microsites.jfklibrary.org/cmc/> - John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum Cuban Missile Crisis Site

<http://www.cubanmissilecrisis.org/> -Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center Cuban Missile Crisis Guide

http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/ -George Washington University National Security Archive

<http://www.wilsoncenter.org/program/cold-war-international-history-project> -Wilson Center Cold War International History Project

<http://video.pbs.org/video/2365316892/> -PBS Documentary “Three Men Go To War”



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