

Tomáš Polešovský 14. 01. 2014 tomas.polesovsky@liferay.com

- Agenda
 - Secure Installation
 - Securing and Hardening Configuration
 - Secure Liferay Development


Installation




- Least Privilege
 - Each layer should see only the next one
 firewalls on the boundaries
 - Going back through proxy can filter out invalid outgoing requests
- Limit attack surface open ports, visible IPs
- Beware of mixing environments
 - Test environment running in the same security boundary as production
 - Other applications running in the same DMZ / Internal network
 - Any compromised server is able to compromise other server in the boundary



- DMZ layer
 - The only visible to the outside
 - DNS port 53
 - DNSSEC
 - Open Resolver, Cache Poisoning, More issues
 - Load Balancers port 80, 443
 - HTTPS endpoints
 - IDS/IPS Security filters that helps firewalls
 - DDoS protection
 - Other open ports should have remote IP check (allow SSH only from whitelisted IPs)



- Internal Network
 - Web Servers
 - Enable only required modules no PHP, SSI, CGI, open proxy, status pages
 - Enable ModSecurity
 - Don't deploy any applications, only serve static content
 - If required, whitelist allowed IP addresses
 - Avoid wildcard / default virtual hosts
 - Prevents Host header attacks



- Internal Network
 - App Servers, DB
 - Undeploy all unnecessary applications
 - Management console should be available only to specific IP addresses outside internal network
 - NAS
 - Should be accessible only from required servers
 - Should contain only data related to the portal

Liferay OS Level Security

- Olaf's Blog post
- Don't use passwords, only public key certificates
- Use separate temp location, preferably inside Liferay installation
- Use own user account for Liferay JVM process
 - The user should not be able to login into OS
 - Should NOT have write access except:
 - · Temp locations
 - /deploy directory ... only temporarily during the deploy
 - Read access only for Liferay installation directory
 - No execution start portal as a service
 - Everything should be owned by a different user
- Run deployment + backup scripts under different account, don't leave the scripts together with Liferay installation to be readable by Liferay user account
- Uninstall any other unnecessary applications, mainly those with open ports

End of Secure Installation

Questions?

Next: Securing and Hardening Configuration

Liferay Configuration

- Many configuration options in portal.properties
- Don't disable global configuration options
 - We mostly provide whitelists
- Roles and permissions
 - Keep them organized, they can easily go complex
 - Don't rely on the built-in roles unless you know what permission they have, delete otherwise
 - No default permissions for User role, everything should be assigned by custom roles
 - Keep least privilege principle
- Public communities and organization pages
 - Limit public access only to minimum necessary portlets and pages, the more portlets are accessible the bigger is the attack surface
- Configure default user policy
 - Keep it usable
 - Account lock-out
 - Can have low values (3 tries each 1/5 minut) with good password rules ... no words, big password space
 - · Without password rules the values must be much more restrictive

Liferay Hardening

- Disable unwanted entry points
 - AtomServlet, AxisServlet, DisplayChartServlet,
 FacebookServlet, GoogleGadgetServlet, NetvibesServlet,
 PollerServlet, RemotingServlet,
 SharepointDocumentWorkspaceServlet, SharepointServlet,
 SharepointWebServicesServlet, SoftwareCatalogServlet,
 WebDAVServlet, WidgetServlet, XmlRpcServlet
 - AuditFilter, CacheFilter, CompoundSessionIdFilter,
 DynamicCSSFilter, ETagFilter, FragmentFilter, GZipFilter,
 HeaderFilter, IgnoreFilter, MonitoringFilter, CASFilter,
 NtlmFilter, NtlmPostFilter, OpenSSOFilter, ThemePreviewFilter,
 ThreadDumpFilter, UrlRewriteFilter, SharepointFilter,

Liferay Hardening

- Disable URLs accessible from internet:
 - Access to administration interface (Control Panel)
 - Access to JSON WS API listing (/api/jsonws) and unused services
 - Use different domain/origin for local static files (CSS, JS, Flash, ..., documents?)
 - Prevents XSS by exploiting local files vulnerabilities
 - Disallow access to these files from the portal domain, be careful with "//", "../" and path parameters /path;param=value/path;param=value/ when creating the URL whitelist
- Disable unused authentication / SSO
- Disable new user accounts at all, if possible
 - Don't forget these are created also by SSOs
- Disable user private pages where users can use own portlets
- Use remote staging
 - You can disable or delete omni-admin account in the live DB
 - You don't need any high-privileged accounts in production
- Deploy AntiSamy plugin to prevent XSS by content creator accounts

Liferay Monitoring

- Use IDS to monitor attack attempts
- Use Liferay Auditing framework + EE plugin
- Hopefully, in the near future, use Liferay Cloud Services for monitoring
- Correctly rotate logs so that exception stack traces don't overwrite important log events
- Create scripts to review logs
 - Filter out common exceptions
 - Filter out false positives
- Be prepared to act responsibly when you spot something strange
 - Can be a bug, can be an attack
 - Be prepared, you need to know what to do, who to contact
 - Disaster Recovery plan can help

Securing Liferay

End of Securing and Hardening Configuration

Questions?

Next: Securing Development

Secure Liferay Development

- Liferay provides many classes for securing most of the common vulnerabilities, use them
- HtmlUtil to prevent XSS in different contexts
- HtmlUtil#escapeXPath* prevent XPath injection
- AuthTokenUtil#checkCSRFToken
- FileUtil#createTempFile* prevent file system related issues
- PortalUtil#escapeRedirect prevent open redirects
- StringUtil#random* insecure but random enough strings
- PwdGenerator#getPassword, SecureRandomUtil cryptographically strong pseudorandom output, optimized for performance
- PasswordEncryptorUtil verification and creation of strong password hashes, currently configured to use PBKDF2PasswordEncryptor
- EncryptorUtil en/decryption, currently configured to use AES-ECB (not suitable for plaintexts > 16 bytes ... block size)
- DigesterUtil SHA-1 hashes, good for file checksums

Common Liferay Security Vulnerabilities & Countermeasures

XSS

- Escape all user originated output in portlets
- HtmlUtil, <aui-input>, <search-container-row escapeModel=true>

Authorization

- Use *LocalService only for entities you won't display / manipulate with
- In remote services implementation don't forget to check all related permissions

Authentication

Don't use Servlets unless you secure them

CSRF

- Add CSRF token check when serveResource modifies state/entities
- Render phase is only for display, updates should be done in action phase

Common Liferay Security Vulnerabilities & Countermeasures

File Uploads

- Check file name Validator.isFileName, Validator.isFileExtension
- Temporary files create using FileUtil.createTempFile or FileUtil.createTempFileName
- Use FileUtil.createTempFolder when you need directories
- Limit file size, Limit number of stored files, unless you implement Megaupload

File Downloads

- Use HTTP Header Content-Disposition: attachment
- Only in specific cases (images) use Content-Disposition: inline
 - Check magic bytes to be sure you don't offer flash files

Common Liferay Security Vulnerabilities & Countermeasures

- Open Redirect
 - Sanitize redirects with PortalUtil.escapeRedirect
- Arbitrary/Remote Code Execution
 - Don't use Runtime.exec() and ScriptingUtil
 - Use only when (1) input is originated from administrator or (2) you are really really, I
 mean really sure it is safe
- Storing Credentials
 - Use PBKDF2 or BCrypt Use PasswordEncryptorUtil
 - Don't echo back credentials into HTML forms, redirect on validation errors
- Log wisely
 - configure each new log to use INFO
 - log what you can with DEBUG
 - Consider auditing framework AuditRouterUtil.route(auditMessage);

That's all for now.

Thank you.

Questions?