

# The Career Costs of Children’s Health Shocks

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## Abstract

We provide novel evidence on the impact of a child’s health shock on parental labor market outcomes. To identify the causal effect, we leverage long panels of high-quality Finnish and Norwegian administrative data and exploit variation in the timing of the health shock. We do this by comparing parents across families in similar parental and child age cohorts whose children experienced a health shock at different ages. We show that these families have very similar characteristics and were following parallel trends before the shock. This allows us to use a simple difference-in-differences model: we construct counterfactuals for treated households with families who experience the same shock a few years later. We find a sharp break in parents’ earnings trajectories that becomes visible just after the shock. The effect is stronger for mothers than for fathers and is driven by health shocks that need persistent care after the event. We also document a strong impact on parents’ mental well-being.

**Keywords:** Children, health, mortality, parents, earnings, labor supply, mental health.

**JEL Codes:** I10, I12.

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# 1 Introduction

Economists have long been interested in understanding the relationship between income and health (Deaton, 2013). The detrimental effect of health shocks on an individual’s own labor market outcomes is well documented.<sup>1</sup> However, we know much less about the potential spillover effects that health shocks have on other family members.

In particular, the illness of a child is a stressful event that can have major implications for the well-being of the whole household. Families can incur substantial costs when deciding how to best cope with these health shocks and their associated long-term burden. Parents may need to increase the time spent caring for their child and decrease their labor supply. However, they may also face direct treatment costs, resulting instead in an increase in their labor supply.

Hospitalization during childhood is faced by a relatively large number of families. For example, the rate of hospital admissions in 2009 in the United States among children aged one to seventeen was 30 per 1,000 children (Wier et al., 2011). In Finland, if we follow one cohort over time, more than 50% of children born in 1990 having at least one stay at the hospital before they turn 18. In addition, around 10% of children from this cohort suffered their first hospitalization after they start school. Luckily, child mortality rates are very low across European countries.<sup>2</sup> Still, the death of a child can lead to significant emotional distress and can have enormous impacts on parents’ well-being and labor market outcomes. However, our knowledge on how children’s health shocks (both non-fatal and fatal) impact the economic well-being of families is surprisingly limited.

This paper contributes to bridging this gap by providing new evidence on the causal impact of a child’s health shock on parental outcomes. We examine the effects of both hospitalizations and fatal health shocks on parents by leveraging long panels of high-quality administrative data from Finland and Norway on families’ health and labor market trajectories. We exploit variation in the timing of health shocks among families whose child had a first health shock after school-starting age. Identification comes from comparisons of parents and children in the same respective age cohorts, but whose children experienced the health shock at different ages. In particular, we use

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<sup>1</sup>This includes, among others, papers by Bound et al. (1999); Cai et al. (2014); Dobkin et al. (2018); García-Gómez (2011); García-Gómez et al. (2013); Jones et al. (2019); Lindeboom et al. (2016); Lenhart (2019); Maczulskij and Böckerman (2019); Meyer and Mok (2019); Trevisan and Zantomio (2016); Wagstaff (2007)

<sup>2</sup>On average, fewer than 1.25 deaths per 1,000 children between ages 5 and 14. United Nations data for 2018, available at: <https://childmortality.org/data>. Accessed September 2019.

a differences-in-differences specification: we construct counterfactuals for treated households with families who experience the same shock a few years later. We show that these families have very similar characteristics and were following very similar trends before the shock. We also complement this approach by estimating a simple event study model with individual fixed effects.

With this data and design, we estimate parents' labor supply responses to children's hospitalization and mortality shocks. We first show that there is no indication that parents' outcomes follow different trends for the treatment and the control group before the health shock of the child. For all outcomes, sharp breaks in the trajectories become visible just after the event. Overall, we find that maternal earnings suffer a substantial and persistent drop after the hospitalization or death of a child. Interestingly, the effect size is strikingly similar for both countries: three years after a hospitalization, maternal earnings are 4.8% lower in Finland and 4.7% lower in Norway, compared to two years before the shock. For fathers, the impact is insignificant, and the estimated coefficients much smaller. We also show that the effect is driven by health shocks that require substantial care, as measured by the number of hospital visits in the year after the shock. For mortality shocks, we find that the mother's earnings drop by almost 20% three years after the shock, while for fathers we again see no significant effect.

We also analyze a critical question in this setting: are families insured against such health shocks hitting their children? We show that although transfers offset part of the negative impact, families are not fully insured against these shocks: the drop in maternal earnings only decreases by about 40% if we analyze income after transfers. Moreover, the insurance effect coming from child benefits fades over time, reducing their protective impact on mother's careers.

The fact that we find almost identical results for all these outcomes in the context of two different countries that share a similar institutional context strengthens the robustness of our approach and the external validity of our findings.

We exploit the richness and complementarities of the data from both countries to explore several potential mechanisms. In Finland, we use occupational data to explore whether mothers adjust their labor supply by switching the type of firm they work for. We do not find evidence that mothers move to more family-friendly firms after the shock. We also do not observe changes in the risk of marital dissolution in either country. However, we do find that children's health shocks affect the mental well-being of parents. The data from the Norwegian registry allows us to investigate

the impact on primary care visits, while for Finland, we use data on specialist visits or hospital admissions. Our results suggest that the impact of a child’s hospitalization on parents’ earnings might result from the combination of the increased time needed to care for the child and the worsening of parents’ mental health.

This paper contributes to several strands of the literature, including that on the effects of adverse health shocks on labor market outcomes. Numerous studies have analyzed the relationship between health shocks and income, though most focus on the impact of health shocks on the individual’s own labor market outcomes (e.g, Bound et al., 1999; Cai et al., 2014; Dobkin et al., 2018; García-Gómez, 2011; García-Gómez et al., 2013; Jones et al., 2019; Lindeboom et al., 2016; Lenhart, 2019; Meyer and Mok, 2019; Trevisan and Zantomio, 2016; Wagstaff, 2007). Using an event study approach, Dobkin et al. (2018) examine the economic consequences of hospitalizations for adults in the US. They find that earnings drop by 20% three years after a hospitalization. Meyer and Mok (2019) use survey data from the US and estimate a similar drop in earnings ten years after the onset of a disability.

Other studies have examined the spillover effects of health shocks, with particular attention paid to how one spouse’s health shock affects the other spouse’s employment and earnings.<sup>3</sup> Fadlon and Nielsen (2017) analyze the impact of a spouse experiencing a fatal or severe non-fatal shock on household labor supply. Using administrative data from Denmark and exploiting event studies together with a dynamic difference-in-differences approach, they find that fatal health shocks lead to an increase in the labor supply of the surviving spouse. In contrast, they do not find any significant response following a non-fatal health shock.<sup>4</sup> García-Gómez et al. (2013) explore the spillover effects of an acute hospitalization using data from the Netherlands. They find gender asymmetries in the response to a spouse’s health shock: while wives are more likely to continue—or even start—working when their husbands fall ill, husbands are more likely to withdraw from the labor force when their wives fall ill. Jeon and Pohl (2017) use administrative data from Canada and observe a significant decline in the employment and earnings of individuals whose spouses are diagnosed with cancer.

Rellstab et al. (2019) instead examine the spillover effects of an older parent’s unexpected

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<sup>3</sup>See, for example, García-Gómez et al. (2013); Fadlon and Nielsen (2017); Jeon and Pohl (2017); Jiménez-Martín et al. (1999).

<sup>4</sup>In their study, heart attacks and strokes comprise severe non-fatal health shocks.

hospitalization<sup>5</sup> on their children’s labor supply. Utilizing a difference-in-differences model and administrative data from the Netherlands, they do not find significant effects on either employment or earnings. Black et al. (2017) exploit a difference-in-differences approach and show that having a sibling with a disability has a negative spillover effect on children’s test scores.

We build on this literature by providing causal evidence of the spillover effects of a child’s health shock on the family’s labor supply and mental well-being. Several previous studies find a negative association between childhood disability or illness and maternal employment (e.g. Wasi et al., 2012; Wolfe and Hill, 1995) (see Stabile and Allin (2012) for a review of these papers). A few papers make use of panel data and try to control for previous employment situation (Baydar et al., 2007; Burton et al., 2017; Kvist et al., 2013; Powers, 2003; van den Berg et al., 2017)<sup>6</sup>. However, children’s health status is unlikely to be randomly distributed across families, meaning that families whose children have poorer health are likely to be different from other families. This makes it difficult to distinguish between the effect of having a child with an illness and that of other confounding characteristics on maternal employment.<sup>7</sup>

This paper advances existing knowledge by using high-quality administrative data combined with a research design that allows us to exploit precisely and objectively identified health shocks and focus on a sample of similar families, differing only in the age at which their child suffered the health shock. Moreover, we provide compelling evidence of the impact of health shocks broadly defined. This allows us to contrast the magnitude of the effect with the literature that has studied the impact of health shocks during adulthood on own labor supply.

This study also speaks to the literature that investigates the impact of parenthood on family labor supply, which shows sizeable effects on mothers’ labor supply and earnings.<sup>8</sup> The most recent studies estimate that women’s earnings decrease considerably following the birth of their first child,

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<sup>5</sup>They exploit diagnoses classified by physical expert opinion as being unexpected hospitalisations, and thus plausibly exogenous.

<sup>6</sup>van den Berg et al. (2017) make use of longitudinal data and match parents whose child died in a non-intentional accident to parents who did not lose a child. They find that mothers’ annual earnings decrease by 12.5%, while fathers’ earnings decrease by 8.8% on average.

<sup>7</sup>An exception in addressing this issue is Eriksen et al. (2021), who focuses on a specific disease (type 1 diabetes) and uses an event study approach.

<sup>8</sup>This includes, among others, papers by Adda et al. (2017); Angrist and Evans (1998); Angelov et al. (2016); Benard et al. (2007); Bertrand et al. (2010); Bronars and Grogger (1994); Bütikofer et al. (2018); Fernández-Kranz et al. (2013); Hotz et al. (2005); Lundberg and Rose (2000); Lundborg et al. (2017); Paull (2008); Miller (2011); Sigle-Rushton and Waldfogel (2007); Waldfogel (1998).

and this effect is persistent. The so-called child penalty<sup>9</sup> amounts to around 20% over the long run in the Nordic countries (Kleven et al., 2019b; Sieppi and Pehkonen, 2019), between 30% and 45% in the United Kingdom and the United States, and as high as 50%-60% in Germany and Austria (Kleven et al., 2019a). In addition, Snaebjorn and Steingrimsdottir (2019) find that the child penalty is larger in families in which a child is born with a disability: affected mothers earn 13% less in the long run, while affected fathers earn 3% less.

We show here that even in two countries usually seen as leaders in gender equality and considered to have some of the most comprehensive gender and family policies in the OECD,<sup>10</sup> health shocks during middle childhood to teenage years still have a disproportionate effect on women’s labor market outcomes compared to men. These findings are policy-relevant and suggest that the costs of children for women’s careers do not end with childbirth.

The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 lays out the empirical strategy. Section 3 provides background information about the institutional context and introduces the data. Section 4 reports the main results. Section 5 presents additional evidence to support the main conclusions. Section 6 explores the types of health shocks that drive the effects. Section 7 explores the mechanisms of the effects. The final section concludes.

## 2 Empirical Strategy

We aim to analyze the impact of a child’s health shock on parents’ labor market outcomes and well-being. Child hospitalizations are unlikely to be randomly distributed, meaning that the characteristics and trajectories of families whose child suffers a health shock may be different from other families. To illustrate this, Figure 1 plots the coefficients of regressing different family and child characteristics on a dummy equal to one if the child suffered a hospitalization. Having a child who was hospitalized predicts almost all characteristics, suggesting that these families are very different from others. Therefore, comparisons between these groups of families are likely to yield biased estimates of the causal impact of children’s health shocks.


In order to overcome the potential endogeneity of children’s health shocks, we leverage variation

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
<sup>9</sup>The earnings child penalty is defined as the percentage by which women fall behind relative to men due to having children.

<sup>10</sup>Information available at: <https://www.oecd.org/els/emp/last-mile-longest-gender-nordic-countries-brief.pdf>.

Figure 1: Differences in Characteristics: Across Families




(a) Finland




(b) Norway

*Notes:* The figure shows the coefficients and 95% CI from separate regressions of each (standardized) variable on an indicator that takes a value of 1 if the child suffered at least one hospitalization from ages 0 to 18. Panel (a) shows the results for Finland, and panel (b) for Norway. All specifications include year-of-birth fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the mother level.

Figure 2: Differences in Characteristics: Within Affected Families



(a) Finland



(b) Norway

*Notes:* The figure shows the coefficients and 95% CI from separate regressions of each (standardized) variable on an indicator that takes a value of 1 if the family is in the treatment group, and 0 for the control group (the child experiences the shock 4 years later). Panel (a) shows the results for Finland, and panel (b) for Norway. All specifications include year-of-birth fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the mother level.

in their timing. Focusing on parents who have been exposed to a child’s health shock at some point, we exploit variation in the age at which the child experienced the shock, conditional on the age of the parents and children. Importantly, we focus on families of relatively healthy children who experience a first shock after school-starting age.<sup>11</sup> With this sample, we use a simple differences-in-differences framework, by constructing counterfactuals for treated households with families who experience the same shock a few years later. This quasi-experimental design exploits the potential randomness of the timing of a shock within a short period of time, a strategy that has been laid out by Fadlon and Nielsen (2017, 2019). The treatment group is composed of families whose child experiences the shock at a given year  $\tau$ . The control group is comprised of households from the same age cohorts<sup>12</sup> whose child experienced the same shock in  $\tau + \Delta$  (4 years later in our main specification).<sup>13</sup> The treatment effect is identified from the change in the difference in outcomes (i.e., the difference-in-differences) across the two groups over time.

The identifying assumption in this setting is that in absence of the shock, these two groups of families would have followed similar trends. We provide several pieces of evidence that support the validity of this assumption. First, Figure 2 compares these two groups of affected families and shows that all differences in observable pre-health shock characteristics cease, in contrast to the previous comparison between affected and unaffected families (Figure 1). The only exception is gender and we control for this in all our specifications.<sup>14</sup> This exercise provides reassuring evidence that families whose children experience a hospitalization at different ages have very similar pre-determined observable characteristics.

We further provide visually clear results of our estimation and show that there is no evidence that the treatment group was following a different trajectory in earnings (or in any other outcomes) before the event (Section 4). In Section 6, we also show that the effect of a health shock on maternal earnings is larger if the child requires substantial and persistent care subsequent to hospitalization,

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<sup>11</sup>School-starting age is 6 and 7 years old in Norway and Finland, respectively.

<sup>12</sup>Families of the treatment and control groups are matched based on the child’s and parents’ years of birth. For control households, we assign a placebo “shock” at the age at which the children in the matched treatment group undergo their respective shocks. Due to our sample size, fatal shocks are only matched on child’s year of birth.

<sup>13</sup>There is a trade-off when choosing  $\Delta$ , since a larger  $\Delta$  increases the horizon over which the effect can be observed. However, a smaller  $\Delta$  is likely to capture more similar households. In our main specification,  $\Delta$  is equal to 4 years, allowing us to identify effects up to three years after the shock. After this period, the control group also undergoes a shock. In Table 4 we show that our results are robust to alternative choices of  $\Delta$ .

<sup>14</sup>Boys and girls differ in the average age at which they experience a hospital admission. Our results are robust to controlling for the child’s gender.



as measured by the number of specialist visits and later hospital admissions. Finally, we explore two plausibly exogenous health shocks that have very different implications in terms of the care burden imposed on parents. We show that parental earnings do not respond to a health shock that, in general, does not require additional treatment (appendicitis), while there is a substantial drop following a hospitalization due to a more serious condition (cancer).

More formally, the estimating equation is a dynamic (period-by-period) difference-in-differences specification that takes the following form:

$$Y_{is} = \alpha + \beta treat_i + \sum_{t \neq -1, t=-5}^{t=3} \gamma_t \times I_t + \sum_{t \neq -1, t=-5}^{t=3} \delta_t \times I_t \times treat_i + \lambda A_{is} + \phi CBY_i + \omega_s + \epsilon_{is} \quad (1)$$

Where  $Y_{is}$  denotes the outcome for parent  $i$  in calendar year  $s$ ,  $treat_i$  is an indicator for whether a family belongs to the treatment group, and  $I_t$  is an indicator variable for the time relative to the assigned treatment year (“event time”). This is the actual treatment year for the treatment group and a placebo treatment year for the control group. The parameters of interest are  $\delta_t$ , which estimate the period  $t$  treatment effects relative to the period  $-2$ . We also include dummies for the age of the parent and the child’s year of birth, as well as calendar-year fixed effects.

In addition, as a complementary estimation, we also use an event study approach. In particular, we estimate the coefficients of indicator variables for years relative to the event (“event time”). We construct a balanced panel of parents with observations dating from five years before and three years after the health shock and we run the following regressions for mothers and fathers separately:

$$Y_{is} = \alpha_i + \sum_{t \neq -1, t=-5}^{t=3} \gamma_t \times I_t + \omega_s + \epsilon_{is} \quad (2)$$

where  $Y_{is}$  is the outcome of interest for individual  $i$  in calendar year  $s$ .  $\alpha_i$  are individual fixed effects, ( $I_t$ ) are the event time dummies, and ( $\omega_s$ ) calendar year dummies. Following Sun and Abraham (2020) we omit two event time dummies to avoid multicollinearity,<sup>15</sup>  $t = -2$  and  $t = -5$ , meaning that the event time coefficients measure the impact of a child’s health shock relative to these two periods. An important consideration is that under treatment effects heterogeneity, the two-way

<sup>15</sup> According to Sun and Abraham (2020) and Borusyak et al. (2021): one multi-collinearity comes from the relative period indicators summing to one for every unit, and the other multi-collinearity comes from the linear relationship between two-way fixed effects and the relative period indicators.

fixed effects regression can result in estimates with uninterpretable weights. To take care of this, we implement the interaction weighted (IW) estimator proposed by Sun and Abraham (2020).<sup>16</sup>

### 3 Institutional Setting and Data

This section describes the institutional context and administrative data for Finland and Norway.

#### 3.1 Institutional Setting

As shown in Table A1, Finland and Norway are similar in size, economic development, and inequality. Both countries also have very similar level of health care expenditure and health indicators (for example, life expectancy, incidence of low-birthweight babies, or child mortality). In terms of the organization of the health care system, Finland and Norway have universal public health coverage. Local authorities provide primary healthcare in health centers. General practitioners provide primary healthcare services, such as consultations, preventive care, and drug prescriptions. Specialized medical care consists of specialist examinations and treatment, and usually requires a physician’s referral. Emergency medical services, which involve treating acute illnesses or injuries, are provided by hospitals. The private healthcare sector in Finland and Norway is relatively small but has gained importance in recent years. There are only a few such hospitals but the private provision of specialist outpatient care is much more common (OECD, 2017).

In terms of institutional support, Table A1 also shows the different subsidies that parents of ill children can receive. First, in both Finland and Norway, parents can be granted the Special Care Allowance during hospital treatment and subsequent care at home. To be granted this benefit, the attending physician must issue a statement confirming the severity of the illness and the need for the parent to participate in the child’s care and treatment. This aid is intended to compensate for lost income while the child is undergoing medical treatment. Second, in Finland, for disabled or chronically ill children parents can be granted a disability allowance. Finally, in both countries, family members can also be granted an informal care allowance by their municipality if they take

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<sup>16</sup>Sun and Abraham (2020) show that in settings with variation in treatment timing across units, the coefficient on a given lead or lag can be contaminated by effects from other periods. They illustrate this and discuss their alternative method via an empirical application that is closely similar to our setting. In particular, they estimate the dynamic effects of a hospitalization following Dobkin et al. (2018).

care of a severely disabled or chronically ill child at home.<sup>17</sup> The entitlement and the amount of the allowances are determined on the basis of the care, attention, and rehabilitation that the child requires. The payment period also depends on how long care is needed due to the illness or disability.

Families who face the death of a child are not entitled to receive any allowance in Finland. Survivors' pension only replaces lost income when a family wage earner dies. More in detail, the payment of child benefits ends with the child's death, and recipients need to return the benefits if they have been paid after one month of the child's death.<sup>18</sup> In Norway, parents are allowed to keep the Special Care Allowance up to 6 weeks after a child dies if they were already receiving this allowance (and up to 3 months if they have received 100% care allowance for more than three years).

The social security system of both countries also provides insurances to their population, such as retirement pension and unemployment insurance, and health-related insurances, such as sick pay and disability insurance.

The Nordic countries have long been portrayed as exemplars of gender equality. As shown in Table A1 three out of four women in these two countries participate in the labor force. However, despite having a generous system of social security transfers and progressive gender views that mitigate the unequal impact of parenthood between genders, the literature has found substantial child penalties of around 25% for Finland and 23% for Norway (Sieppi and Pehkonen, 2019; Andresen and Nix, 2021).

## 3.2 Data

We use rich individual-level administrative data from several sources to link family members, earnings trajectories and health shocks.

In Finland, we merge employer-employee data from the Finnish Longitudinal Survey (FLEED-FOLK) for the period 1988 to 2018, with birth register data to identify families. The FLEED-FOLK records provide information for the entire population (aged between 16 and 70) on year of birth, education level, annual labor earnings, and employment status. For health data, we use two

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<sup>17</sup>Information available at: <https://www.kela.fi/web/en/if-a-child-gets-ill> for Finland. Information for Norway can be accessed here: [https://www.nav.no/en/home/benefits-and-services/relatert informasjon/attendance-benefit](https://www.nav.no/en/home/benefits-and-services/relatert+informasjon/attendance-benefit).

<sup>18</sup>Information available at <https://www.kela.fi/web/en/death-of-a-child>.

different sources. The first is the Finnish Hospital Discharge Register, which contains information on diagnosed medical conditions and the exact date of diagnoses. This register contains all inpatient consultations in Finland from 1988 to 2017. From 1998 onwards, it also includes all outpatient visits to hospitals. In both countries, all diagnoses are recorded using the International Classification of Diseases (ICD) system. The second dataset is the Cause of Death Registry, which includes information on all death dates and causes between 1990 and 2018. The statistics on causes of death are compiled based on the 10th revision of the International Classification of Diseases (ICD-10).

For Norway, data on labor market outcomes comes from the tax register, which contains information on individual labor and capital income as well as welfare benefits from 1993–2014. For health data we use the Norwegian Patient Registry (NPR) from 2008 to 2014. It includes all hospital admissions, both inpatient and outpatient stays. In addition, in Norway we also observe primary health care services use from 2006 to 2014 in the Control and Distribution of Health Reimbursement database (KUHR).<sup>19</sup>

We focus on the first child that suffered a health shock in each family. For hospitalizations, in Finland the sample includes families whose child suffered a first inpatient stay in an acute care hospital between ages seven and eighteen.<sup>20</sup> For fatal shocks, the sample consists of all families whose child died between ages seven and eighteen. In Norway, due to data availability,<sup>21</sup> we focus on the first hospitalization observable in the data after age six. We further restrict the sample to children that did not suffer any hospitalization in the year before the health shock. Figure A1 shows the number of observations for each age between seven and eighteen years. Hospitalizations and fatalities show considerable variation in terms of the age at which they occur.

Tables A2 and A3 show summary statistics for the final samples used in the analysis. The matched sample for the differences-in-differences analysis consists of 66046 children who suffered their first inpatient admission between ages seven and eighteen during the period 1997 to 2014 in Finland (column (1)).<sup>22</sup> We use mortality data from the Finnish administrative register. The final

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<sup>19</sup>For each visit, it provides a report of procedures used and the main diagnosis codified using The International Classification of Primary Care (ICPC). It classifies the patient’s reason for the encounter and the related diagnosis, as well as the procedures done by the primary healthcare service.

<sup>20</sup>We focus on children that are relatively healthy and experience the health shock after school starting age. In Finland, children start school during the calendar year they turn seven years old. In Norway, they start at age six.

<sup>21</sup>In Norway, we only have data on hospitalizations from 2008–2014, we therefore do not have enough cohorts to use the same restriction as in the Finish data. Instead, we exclude children that had a hospital visit at all in the year before the health shock, and all children that had a health shock before age six.

<sup>22</sup>Similarly to Fadlon and Nielsen (2019) the same household may appear both in the treatment and in the control

matched sample for the mortality analysis consists of 2438 children (Column (3) in Table A2). In Norway, the final matched sample are 24316 children’s hospitalizations (Column (1), Table A3). In Figure A2, we show some additional descriptive statistics for a specific cohort in Finland that can be followed until adulthood (children born in 1990). Around 50% of these children suffered a hospitalization from ages 0 to 18. However, most hospitalizations are concentrated during the first years of life. If we focus on ages 7 to 18, more than 10% of children born in 1990 suffered a hospitalization. In Panel (b) of Figure A2 we observe that 1.5% of children born in 1990 suffered a fatal shock from ages 0 to 18. This corresponds to 15 deaths per 1,000 children. For ages 7 to 18, the numbers are 2.4 per 1,000 children, or 0.24% of all children born in 1990.

Finally, in Figure A3 we show for our matched sample, the number of observations by the primary diagnosis of the hospitalization (in panel (a) for Finland, and panel (b) for Norway) and by mortality cause (in panel (c)). For hospitalizations, both in Finland and Norway, the main category is injury, poisoning, and other external causes, followed by diseases of the respiratory system and the digestive system and symptoms, signs, and abnormal clinical and laboratory findings. Similarly, for the mortality sample, the largest category in terms of the number of observations is injuries and other external causes, followed by deaths due to neoplasms.

## 4 Results

### 4.1 Hospitalizations

Figure 3 presents the estimates of the impact of a child’s hospital admission on maternal labor market outcomes. There is no indication that maternal earnings follow a different trend for the treatment group compared to the control group before the child’s hospital admission. A sharp break in the trajectory becomes visible just after the event. Strikingly, the magnitude of the effects is very similar for both Finland and Norway: just one year after suffering a child hospitalization, maternal earnings drop by about 2.7 to 2.0% compared to their earnings in  $t - 2$ . The negative effect is persistent and appears to get larger over time.

Table 1 provides further detail about the estimates. One year after the shock, mother’s earnings group for earlier treated units (before they receive the treatment). We note, however, that a household is never used as a control to itself.

have dropped by more than €520 and €620 for Finland and Norway respectively.<sup>23</sup> In Finland, three years after the shock, mothers earn, on average, about €950 less than two years before the event. In Norway, the drop in earnings is €1450.<sup>24</sup> This represents a drop of about 4.8 to 4.7% for Finland and Norway respectively (column (2)). Column (3) shows the results for the probability of employment. For Finland, the drop in the probability of working also becomes visible just after the shock occurs. For Norway, the estimates for one and two years after the shock are negative but not significant. Three years after the shock the probability of working is significantly lower in both countries: about 2 percentage points lower in Finland, and about 1.4 percentage points lower in Norway. This amounts to a 2.5% to 1.6% decrease in a mother’s working probability with respect to the mean level of employment before the event. Similar to the results for labor earnings, there is a snowball effect on employment: the probability of leaving the workforce seems to increase over time.

Table A4 shows the impact of a child’s hospitalization on maternal earnings using the event study approach as a complementary estimation method. In this case, we regress maternal earnings on the event time dummies, including individual and calendar year fixed effects (see equation 2). The results of this exercise are very consistent with the ones obtained using the differences in differences approach. Although the coefficients are slightly smaller, the magnitude of the effects is very similar: we find that three years after a child’s hospitalization, mother labor earnings have decreased by 3.2 to 3.75%. Moreover, for all periods, the confidence intervals for the event study estimation overlap with those from the differences-in-differences. This finding strengthens our interpretation of the results and the validity of both approaches to estimate the impact of children’s health shocks on parent’s labor careers.


The results for fathers are in the second panel of Figure 3. For both countries, we do not observe any visible negative impact immediately after the shock. However, there is some suggestive evidence of a deterioration of the situation over time: the drop in labor earnings is only significant for Finland three years after the hospitalization, with a decrease of about 1.4% (or -€421, see column (1) in Table A5). Notably, for all periods, the point estimates for mothers are larger than

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<sup>23</sup>The estimate for  $t - 1$  in Norway is marginally significant and negative. This is likely to be driven by the less restrictive definition of health shocks for this country. See section 3 for further details.

<sup>24</sup>We convert NOK to EUR using the yearly conversion rate provided by the Norwegian Central Bank (<https://www.norges-bank.no/tema/Statistikk/valutakurser/?tab=currency&id=EUR>).

Figure 3: Hospitalizations: Mother's and Father's Labor Earnings



*Notes:* This figure shows the impact of a child's hospitalization on mother's and father's labor earnings (as a % of their earnings in  $t - 2$ ). We plot the coefficients for the interaction between the event time dummies and the treat dummy in equation 1, with the corresponding 95 percent confidence intervals. Panel (a) plots the results for Finland. Panel (b) plots the results for Norway. All specifications include controls for calendar year, child's year of birth, child's gender, age of the parent, and parent's educational level. Clustered standard errors at the parent level.

Table 1: Hospitalizations: Mother's Labor Outcomes

|                | (1)                      |                           | (2)                  |                      | (3)                  |                      |
|----------------|--------------------------|---------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
|                | Earnings (€)             |                           | Earnings (%)         |                      | Employment           |                      |
|                | Finland                  | Norway                    | Finland              | Norway               | Finland              | Norway               |
| -5             | 30.710<br>(103.990)      | -199.724<br>(237.686)     | 0.156<br>(0.527)     | -0.649<br>(0.774)    | 0.004<br>(0.003)     | 0.001<br>(0.004)     |
| -4             | 124.376<br>(89.216)      | -123.308<br>(216.523)     | 0.630<br>(0.452)     | -0.405<br>(0.705)    | 0.007**<br>(0.003)   | 0.002<br>(0.004)     |
| -3             | -12.324<br>(65.295)      | -229.748<br>(172.738)     | -0.062<br>(0.331)    | -0.748<br>(0.562)    | -0.001<br>(0.002)    | 0.003<br>(0.003)     |
| -1             | -75.055<br>(66.306)      | -307.845*<br>(177.189)    | -0.380<br>(0.336)    | -0.997*<br>(0.557)   | -0.002<br>(0.002)    | 0.005*<br>(0.003)    |
| 0              | -326.434***<br>(91.412)  | -283.370<br>(221.354)     | -1.655***<br>(0.463) | -0.909<br>(0.720)    | -0.006**<br>(0.003)  | 0.002<br>(0.003)     |
| 1              | -526.456***<br>(110.012) | -620.884**<br>(252.637)   | -2.668***<br>(0.558) | -2.017**<br>(0.822)  | -0.011***<br>(0.003) | -0.003<br>(0.004)    |
| 2              | -741.698***<br>(128.143) | -1279.759***<br>(287.903) | -3.759***<br>(0.649) | -4.166***<br>(0.937) | -0.015***<br>(0.003) | -0.006<br>(0.004)    |
| 3              | -951.842***<br>(141.230) | -1450.364***<br>(327.171) | -4.824***<br>(0.716) | -4.718***<br>(1.065) | -0.020***<br>(0.003) | -0.014***<br>(0.004) |
| Observations   | 423342                   | 212688                    | 423342               | 212688               | 423342               | 212688               |
| Controls       | YES                      | YES                       | YES                  | YES                  | YES                  | YES                  |
| Mean $Y_{t-2}$ | 19729.877                | 30722.236                 | 100.000              | 100.00               | 0.818                | 0.878                |

*Notes:* This Table shows the impact of a child's hospitalization on maternal earnings (Euro) (in column (1)), maternal earnings as a % of mean earnings in  $t-2$  (in column (2)), and maternal working probability (in column (3)), for both Finland and Norway. The Table shows the estimated coefficients for the interaction between the event time dummies and the treat dummy in equation 1. All specifications include controls for calendar year, child's year of birth, child's gender, age of the parent, and parent's educational level. Clustered standard errors at the parent level.

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$



for fathers. Therefore, we formally test if the effect on maternal earnings shown in Figure 3 is statistically different from the impact for fathers. For Finland, we confirm that we can confidently reject the null hypothesis that the estimated effects for mothers are the same as those for fathers for all periods after the shock. Reassuringly, for all other pre-shock periods, we cannot reject the null hypothesis.<sup>25</sup> The same pattern is visible in Norway, where we can reject the null for the estimated coefficients of the impact for two and three years after the shock. This evidence suggests that health shocks that occur during middle childhood to teenage years also have a disproportionate effect on women’s labor market outcomes compared to men.

## 4.2 Mortality

Figure 4 presents the results for the impact of a child’s fatal health shock on parents’ labor earnings. In panel (a), we include all fatal shocks, regardless of the cause of death. We again observe a decline in maternal earnings, but there is evidence of an anticipation effect in the case of these shocks. This is likely to be driven by the child’s death being predated by a deterioration in their health. This anticipation effect means that the control group experiences a decrease in earnings the year before the shock, thus potentially downward biasing the estimated treatment effect of the last period. In any case, we observe a huge drop in maternal earnings after the fatal shock occurs. In particular, in the year that the shock occurs, maternal earnings drop by around 13%.


To reduce this anticipation effect, for the rest of the mortality analysis, we concentrate on fatal shocks due to injuries, poisonings, or other consequences of external causes.<sup>26</sup> The results using this sample of mortality shocks are displayed in panel (b) in Figure 4. These shocks are less likely to be pre-dated by a deterioration in the child’s health. Consistent with this, we don’t see any evidence of an anticipation effect when focusing on this mortality sample. Similar to the results using all fatal shocks, we find that a child’s death has an enormous and long-lasting impact on maternal earnings. The effect is much larger than the estimated impact after a hospitalization. In particular, one year after the fatal shock, the mother’s earnings are more than €2,400 lower compared to her earnings two years before the shock (Table 2 column (1)). This represents a decrease of about 14%. Three years after the death of a child, mothers’ earnings follow the same negative trend with a reduction

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<sup>25</sup>Except the period before the shock, where the estimated coefficient is slightly negative for mothers (not significant) and positive for fathers.

<sup>26</sup>Codes S00-T88 from the 10th revision of the International Classification of Diseases (ICD-10).

Figure 4: Impact of a child's fatal shock on mother's and father's labor earnings



*Notes:* This figure shows the impact of a child's fatal shock on mother's and father's labor earnings (as a % of their earnings in  $t - 2$ ). We plot the coefficients for the interaction between the event time dummies and the treat dummy in equation 1, with the corresponding 95 percent confidence intervals. Panel (a) plots the results all mortality shocks, regardless of the cause of death. Panel (b) restricts the sample to fatal shocks due to injuries, poisonings, or other consequences of external causes. All specifications include controls for calendar year, child's year of birth, child's gender, age of the parent, and parent's educational level. We use administrative data from Finland. Clustered standard errors at the parent level.

in labor earnings of almost 20%.<sup>27</sup> Moreover, mothers also have a higher probability of not being employed, with a drop of 5.9 percentage points in their working probability (Table 2 column (3)). This is a 7.8% decrease in their working probability three years after the event.<sup>28</sup>

The lower panel of Figure 4 shows the results for fathers. We do not observe any effect on the father’s labor market outcomes (more details in Table A6). The coefficients are not significant and positive: we can reject adverse effects larger than six percent three years after the shock. In the case of mortality shocks, we can also reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients on maternal labor earnings are equal to the coefficients on father’s labor earnings for all the periods after the shock.

### 4.3 Institutional support

As discussed in Section 3, parents in Finland and Norway are entitled to different types of financial support when facing a child health shock. The critical question is, thus, whether families are fully insured to these shocks through the transfers and benefits from the public system. In the administrative data, we have three pieces of information that can help shed some light on this question. First, we have data on total income for both countries. This is a measure of disposable income consisting of earned income, entrepreneurial income, property income, current transfers, and tax-deductible expenses. Second, for both countries, we also have information on total transfers received.<sup>29</sup> And third, for Finland, we also have information on the combined benefits received by families with underage children. This variable contains information on parental allowances, child home care allowances, child benefits, child’s disability allowance and special care allowance (includes care and rehabilitation allowance for a sick child).

Table 3 shows the results for children’s hospitalization shocks. In column (1) we show the results for mother’s disposable income. The pattern of the estimates is very similar to the results for maternal labor earnings. However, the magnitude of the effects is substantially smaller: three years after the hospitalization of a child, the mother’s disposable income is €-616 and €-1173 lower

<sup>27</sup>Comparing the estimates for the last periods with the Figure that includes all fatal shocks (panel a), we see that the effects are larger. This is likely to be driven by the control group experiencing a decrease in labor earnings before the fatal shock occurs when we don’t restrict the sample of shocks.

<sup>28</sup>Table A7 shows the results using the individual fixed effects model from equation 2. Although for some periods the estimates are smaller than for the differences-in-differences specification, the 95% confidence intervals from these two estimations overlap within each other.

<sup>29</sup>For Finland, this data is only available starting in 1995.

Table 2: Mortality: Mother's Labor Outcomes

|                | (1)<br>Earnings (€)       | (2)<br>Earnings (%)   | (3)<br>Employment   |
|----------------|---------------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|
| -5             | -6.875<br>(661.152)       | -0.039<br>(3.757)     | -0.027<br>(0.024)   |
| -4             | 17.273<br>(565.445)       | 0.098<br>(3.213)      | 0.013<br>(0.021)    |
| -3             | 375.119<br>(406.902)      | 2.132<br>(2.312)      | 0.009<br>(0.017)    |
| -1             | -52.795<br>(507.916)      | -0.300<br>(2.887)     | 0.012<br>(0.016)    |
| 0              | -1905.969***<br>(647.384) | -10.832***<br>(3.679) | -0.006<br>(0.018)   |
| 1              | -2463.164***<br>(740.062) | -13.998***<br>(4.206) | -0.034<br>(0.022)   |
| 2              | -2913.320***<br>(851.370) | -16.557***<br>(4.838) | -0.036<br>(0.024)   |
| 3              | -3422.826***<br>(865.981) | -19.452***<br>(4.921) | -0.059**<br>(0.023) |
| Observations   | 9892                      | 9892                  | 9892                |
| Controls       | YES                       | YES                   | YES                 |
| Mean $Y_{t-2}$ | 17595.939                 | 100.000               | 0.757               |

*Notes:* This table shows the impact of a child's fatal shock on maternal earnings (Euro) (in column (1)), maternal earnings as a % of mean earnings in  $t - 2$  (in column (2)), and maternal working probability (in column (3)). The table shows the estimated coefficients for the interaction between the event time dummies and the treat dummy in equation 1. We use administrative data from Finland and the sample includes all fatal shocks due to injuries, poisonings, or other consequences of external causes. All specifications include controls for calendar year, child's year of birth, child's gender, age of the parent, and parent's educational level. Clustered standard errors at the parent level.

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

relative to two years before the shock, in Finland and Norway, respectively. This is a decrease of about 3% in both countries. This reveals that the impact of a shock on labor earnings is partly offset through transfers. In fact, the drop in disposable income is around 37.5% lower (for both countries) compared to the decrease in maternal labor earnings. This further highlights that the institutional support provided to these families in both countries is very similar, as discussed in Section 3.

In column (2), we analyze the impact on total transfers and observe an increase in the transfers received. However, for Norway, the effect is only marginally significant three years after the shock. During this period, families in Finland receive 1,9% more transfers and 3% more in Norway. It's important to note that this variable includes unemployment benefits, and thus, not surprisingly, the temporal pattern mirrors the results found on employment.

Finally, in column (3), we explore the impact on family allowances. Similarly, we find that families receive more child benefits after their child suffers a hospitalization. However, the effect is concentrated on the first two years: one year after the shock, mother's receive 3% more benefits to take care of their children. This means that 20% of the drop on maternal earnings is insured only through targeted child benefits and allowances. The relative magnitude of these benefits decreases over time, leaving mothers less protected and taking a greater toll by adjusting their labor supply.

Similar to the analysis for labor earnings, the impact of children's hospitalizations on father's disposable income is negligible (see results on Table A8 in the Appendix). We also don't observe any significant increase in the transfers or the child allowances received by fathers.

Overall, this analysis manifests that although transfers and other tax-deductively expenses offset part of the shock, families are not fully insured to these shocks: the drop in mothers' disposable income is still significant and persistent over time. Moreover, the insurance effect of the child benefits fades over time, reducing the protective impact on the mother's labor outcomes.

In Table A9, we do the same exercise but for mortality shocks. Again, we find that the drop in the mother's total income is smaller than the impact on labor earnings but follows the same pattern: three years after a child's death, the mother's disposable income is approximately €-2380 lower than her earnings two years before the shock. This represents an 11% reduction in maternal labor earnings that is not compensated through transfers. The drop in maternal disposable income is only 40% smaller than the drop in maternal labor earnings. We don't observe any significant

increase in the transfers received, although all the coefficients are positive. We also don't observe any increase in child benefits.<sup>30</sup> These results are consistent with the lack of special bereavement support for families who lose a child.

Table 3: Hospitalizations: Mother's Institutional Support

|                | (1)                     |                          | (2)                  |                      | (3)                    |
|----------------|-------------------------|--------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|------------------------|
|                | Total Income (€)        |                          | Transfers (€)        |                      | Allowance (€)          |
|                | Finland                 | Norway                   | Finland              | Norway               | Finland                |
| -5             | 25.658<br>(64.208)      | -304.463<br>-226.201     | -39.303<br>(46.719)  | -65.245<br>-105.393  | -51.478<br>(35.928)    |
| -4             | 59.555<br>(56.550)      | -200.922<br>-209.714     | -39.808<br>(40.549)  | -28.762<br>-90.754   | -37.390<br>(30.341)    |
| -3             | 12.718<br>(46.625)      | -301.775*<br>-174.216    | -33.573<br>(30.392)  | -19.306<br>-69.662   | -20.880<br>(22.755)    |
| -1             | -61.906<br>(48.210)     | -176.059<br>-178.192     | 26.255<br>(30.536)   | 88.548<br>-69.37     | -9.505<br>(21.192)     |
| 0              | -194.121***<br>(60.198) | -114.822<br>-213.227     | 52.484<br>(39.358)   | 149.765<br>-92.728   | 27.231<br>(25.923)     |
| 1              | -312.762***<br>(72.682) | -406.394*<br>-237.771    | 75.972*<br>(44.954)  | 170.53<br>-110.84    | 109.478***<br>(28.564) |
| 2              | -424.349***<br>(84.648) | -1080.690***<br>-265.948 | 98.912**<br>(50.399) | 189.983<br>-126.686  | 78.519**<br>(31.080)   |
| 3              | -616.608***<br>(94.430) | -1173.405***<br>-299.189 | 93.367*<br>(52.911)  | 235.845*<br>-141.208 | 44.922<br>(30.775)     |
| Observations   | 399421                  | 212688                   | 399421               | 212688               | 415379                 |
| Controls       | YES                     | YES                      | YES                  | YES                  | YES                    |
| Mean $Y_{t-2}$ | 20346.293               | 38228.001                | 4972.717             | 7884.261             | 3508.684               |

*Notes:* This table shows the impact of a child's hospitalization on maternal total income (in column (1)), transfers received by the mother (in column (2)), and child allowances (in column (3)) for both Finland and Norway respectively. The table shows the estimated coefficients for the interaction between the event time dummies and the treat dummy in equation 1. All specifications include controls for calendar year, child's year of birth, child's gender, age of the parent, and parent's educational level. Clustered standard errors at the parent level.

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

## 5 Robustness Checks

In this section we perform a number of robustness checks to support the validity of the methodology and the required identification assumptions.

<sup>30</sup>We only observe a marginally increase in the period  $t - 1$ , potentially coming from anticipated child deaths, whose families were receiving child benefits to help with the child sickness.

## 5.1 Delta selection

In our main specification,  $\Delta$  is equal to 4 years, allowing us to identify effects up to three years after the shock. After this period, the control group also undergoes a shock. Thus, there is a clear trade-off when choosing the control group: a bigger  $\Delta$  increases the horizon over which the effect can be observed, but a smaller  $\Delta$  is likely to capture more similar households. In Table 4 we explore the robustness of our results to different selections of the control group. In particular, we run the regression in equation 1 again, and we define the control group as families whose children suffered a hospitalization two years after the treated group (column (1) in Table 4) and three years after (in column (2)). For comparison, column (3) shows the results of our main specification.

The results demonstrate that the coefficients are fairly similar across specifications. For example, if we focus on the results for Finland one year after the shock, and we select as a control group families who experience the shock two years later, mother’s earnings drop by €472 during the first year. For the same time period, the drop is €454 for  $\Delta$  equal to three years, and €527 in our main specification. Furthermore, all the estimates are contained within the confidence interval of each other.

The same holds for the mortality sample. One year after the fatal shock, the mother’s earnings dropped by €2464 in our main specification ( $\Delta = 4$ ). This drop is €2525 for  $\Delta = 2$  and €2278 for  $\Delta = 3$ . This evidence demonstrates that our results are very robust to different choices of the control group.

## 5.2 Mutual Shocks

One potential threat to the identification strategy could be simultaneous mutual shocks to both the parent and child. This could potentially explain both the observed drop in maternal earnings and the child’s health shock. Therefore, we re-estimate our main equation for both hospitalizations and fatal shocks, excluding first, child shocks where any of the parents were hospitalized one week before or one week after the child suffered the shock and second, hospitalizations with a mutual shock one month before or after the child’s shock.

Table 5 shows the results of this exercise for hospitalizations (Table A11 shows the same estimation for the mortality sample). The coefficients of the interactions between the event time dummies

Table 4: Hospitalizations: Choice of Delta

|                | (1)                     |                          | (2)                      |                           | (3)                      |                           |
|----------------|-------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------|
|                | Delta = 2               |                          | Delta = 3                |                           | Delta = 4                |                           |
|                | Finland                 | Norway                   | Finland                  | Norway                    | Finland                  | Norway                    |
| -5             | 76.853<br>(90.976)      | 123.874<br>(186.282)     | 201.926*<br>(104.478)    | 210.560<br>(196.043)      | 30.710<br>(103.990)      | -199.724<br>(237.686)     |
| -4             | 60.999<br>(88.642)      | 96.413<br>(163.416)      | 145.053<br>(88.906)      | 75.014<br>(174.754)       | 124.376<br>(89.216)      | -123.308<br>(216.523)     |
| -3             | -16.313<br>(64.437)     | 12.901<br>(127.862)      | 0.552<br>(64.452)        | 79.000<br>(141.799)       | -12.324<br>(65.295)      | -229.748<br>(172.738)     |
| -1             | -17.992<br>(66.706)     | -311.909**<br>(128.051)  | -43.069<br>(66.128)      | -278.272*<br>(147.504)    | -75.055<br>(66.306)      | -307.845*<br>(177.189)    |
| 0              | -339.175***<br>(91.718) | -317.334*<br>(171.040)   | -254.698***<br>(92.420)  | -375.721**<br>(184.823)   | -326.434***<br>(91.412)  | -283.370<br>(221.354)     |
| 1              | -471.821***<br>(98.416) | -583.371***<br>(204.921) | -454.260***<br>(111.172) | -829.064***<br>(216.215)  | -526.456***<br>(110.012) | -620.884**<br>(252.637)   |
| 2              |                         |                          | -545.573***<br>(119.808) | -1157.167***<br>(248.281) | -741.698***<br>(128.143) | -1279.759***<br>(287.903) |
| 3              |                         |                          |                          |                           | -951.842***<br>(141.230) | -1450.364***<br>(327.171) |
| Observations   | 369128                  | 266679                   | 403682                   | 257816                    | 423342                   | 212688                    |
| Controls       | YES                     | YES                      | YES                      | YES                       | YES                      | YES                       |
| Mean $Y_{t-2}$ | 20354.589               | 32867.623                | 20196.671                | 31580.188                 | 19729.877                | 30722.236                 |

*Notes:* This table shows the impact of a child's hospitalization on maternal labor earnings for different choices of control group. In column (1) we show the estimation results when the control group consists of families who experienced the child's hospitalization two years later, in column (2) three years later, and four years later in column (3) (our main specification). The table shows the estimated coefficients for the interaction between the event time dummies and the treat dummy in equation 1. All specifications include controls for calendar year, child's year of birth, child's gender, age of the parent, and parent's educational level. Clustered standard errors at the parent level.

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$



Table 5: Robustness: Mutual Shocks

|               | (1)                      |                           | (2)                      |                           |
|---------------|--------------------------|---------------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------|
|               | + \ - One Week           |                           | + \ - One Month          |                           |
|               | Finland                  | Norway                    | Finland                  | Norway                    |
| -5            | 10.322<br>(105.660)      | -135.496<br>(253.912)     | 4.717<br>(106.016)       | 68.472<br>(279.975)       |
| -4            | 121.197<br>(90.552)      | -73.681<br>(229.186)      | 115.820<br>(90.920)      | 85.144<br>(254.027)       |
| -3            | -13.156<br>(66.402)      | -188.744<br>(186.834)     | -12.493<br>(66.592)      | -42.156<br>(207.989)      |
| -1            | -73.155<br>(67.385)      | -342.518*<br>(191.927)    | -72.537<br>(67.589)      | -395.901*<br>(214.007)    |
| 0             | -308.528***<br>(92.835)  | -229.829<br>(238.694)     | -307.297***<br>(93.031)  | -279.612<br>(261.920)     |
| 1             | -481.785***<br>(111.734) | -488.859*<br>(270.702)    | -473.063***<br>(111.892) | -501.815*<br>(293.500)    |
| 2             | -674.076***<br>(130.186) | -1061.256***<br>(307.118) | -667.264***<br>(130.365) | -1027.623***<br>(337.627) |
| 3             | -877.389***<br>(143.570) | -1106.534***<br>(346.150) | -878.063***<br>(143.794) | -1167.537***<br>(379.817) |
| Observations  | 410987                   | 190467                    | 408616                   | 163215                    |
| Controls      | YES                      | YES                       | YES                      | YES                       |
| Mean $Yt - 2$ | 19745.990                | 31033.661                 | 19791.276                | 31432.983                 |

*Notes:* This table shows the impact of a child's hospitalization on maternal earnings (Euro) for both Finland and Norway. In columns (1), we exclude child hospitalizations where parents were hospitalized or visited a specialist one week before or after the child's shock. In columns (2), we do the same but for mutual shocks one month before or after the child's shock. The table shows the estimated coefficients for the interaction between the event time dummies and the treat dummy in equation 1. All specifications include controls for calendar year, child's year of birth, child's gender, parent's age, and parent's educational level. Clustered standard errors at the parent level.

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

and the treat dummy remain unchanged across these specifications, suggesting that mutual shocks don't play any relevant role in explaining the drop in maternal earnings. In section 6, we further show evidence in favor of this interpretation. In particular, we explore cancer and appendicitis hospitalization shocks. These two diagnoses cannot result from joint health shocks or be driven by a previous deterioration of parent's labor earnings.

## 6 Heterogeneity Analysis

In this section, we conduct different heterogeneity analyses to shed light on the type of hospital admissions driving the impact on parental earnings. In addition, we provide further evidence to support the main results discussed in Section 4.

### 6.1 Burden of Care

If the reduction in labor earnings is partly due to the child's need for care, we would expect to find that the effect is stronger for hospitalizations that impose a substantial and persistent burden of care on family members. To investigate this question, we empirically estimate a child's need for care one year after the shock, as measured by inpatient and outpatient visits to the hospital. This measure can also be interpreted as capturing the severity of the health shock.

Figure A4 plots the average number of hospital admissions or specialist visits between five and three years after a child's hospitalization. The number of visits jumps to six visits in the year directly following the shock. We thus define high burden of care hospitalizations as those requiring a number of visits one year after the shock that is greater than the average over the entire sample. Hospital admissions that require fewer visits one year after the event are defined as low burden of care hospitalizations. We run equation 1 separately for these two different samples.

Table 6 in columns (1) presents the results for maternal earnings. As expected, we find that health shocks that are more severe or have a higher burden of care have a larger negative impact on mother's labor earnings. Indeed, we can confidently reject the null hypothesis that the effects of high burden and low burden of care hospitalizations are equal to each other one year after the shock. This result suggests that the reduction in maternal labor earnings is partly due to the child's need for care and/or driven by severe conditions.

Table 6: Hospitalizations: Heterogeneity Analysis

|                | (1)               |             | (2)          |              |
|----------------|-------------------|-------------|--------------|--------------|
|                | By Burden of Care |             | By Diagnosis |              |
|                | High              | Low         | Cancer       | Appendicitis |
| -5             | 282.879*          | 20.892      |              |              |
|                | (166.469)         | (105.612)   |              |              |
| -4             | 467.877***        | 34.539      | -442.094*    | 43.388       |
|                | (140.939)         | (91.261)    | (246.3)      | (112.648)    |
| -3             | 147.548           | -11.144     | -235.297     | 52.469       |
|                | (104.008)         | (67.122)    | (246.648)    | (107.073)    |
| -1             | -66.992           | -105.688    | 425.347      | 159.595      |
|                | (106.518)         | (68.573)    | (326.56)     | (126.462)    |
| 0              | -658.097***       | -247.307*** | -943.234**   | 158.848      |
|                | (148.032)         | (92.470)    | (435.822)    | (178.252)    |
| 1              | -1084.732***      | -351.028*** | -2082.443*** | 88.548       |
|                | (178.053)         | (108.993)   | (533.855)    | (233.529)    |
| 2              | -1281.363***      | -638.829*** | -893.239*    | -20.101      |
|                | (208.045)         | (124.948)   | (517.135)    | (250.057)    |
| 3              | -1397.159***      | -897.497*** | -721.834     | -236.731     |
|                | (221.603)         | (134.875)   | (526.869)    | (241.95)     |
| Observations   | 168448            | 383592      | 6375         | 30961        |
| Controls       | YES               | YES         | YES          | YES          |
| Mean $Y_{t-2}$ | 18355.245         | 18682.927   | 22014.908    | 20632.785    |

*Notes:* This table shows the impact of a child's hospitalization on maternal earnings (Euro) for different subsamples of hospitalizations. In columns (1), we split the sample by burden of care, as measured with the number of visits and hospitalizations after the main shock. In columns (2), we analyze cancer and acute appendicitis hospitalizations. The table shows the estimated coefficients for the interaction between the event time dummies and the treat dummy in equation 1 for columns (1), and the estimated coefficients for the event time dummies in equation 2 for columns (2). All specifications include controls for calendar year, child's year of birth, child's gender, parent's age, and parent's educational level. Clustered standard errors at the parent level.

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

## 6.2 Appendicitis vs. Cancer

Another potential approach to exploring conditions with a different burden of care and severity implications is to exploit the exact diagnosis made by the physicians during the hospitalization. In particular, we explore the impact of cancer and appendicitis diagnoses.<sup>31</sup> These two conditions are interesting to study for two main reasons. First, the implications in terms of care are very different. While appendicitis is expected to generate a need for timely care, cancer is a condition with a much more complicated prognosis. According to the medical literature, in the case of cancer, the involvement of family caregivers is very relevant to ensure compliance with treatments, continuity of care, and social support (Glajchen, 2004). Second, another interesting feature is that these two health shocks cannot result from a simultaneous shock to the mother’s earnings and the child’s health. Cancer diagnoses have previously been used in the literature as exogenous health shocks (Gupta et al., 2017; Jeon and Pohl, 2017). Meanwhile, the causes and the epidemiology of appendicitis remain largely unknown (Bhangu et al., 2015; Gauderer et al., 2001).

Table 6 columns (2) show the results for hospitalizations due to cancer or acute appendicitis. Due to sample limitations, we focus this part of the analysis on Finland and run the event study specification in equation 2. As expected, mothers’ earnings suffer a significant drop following a child’s cancer diagnosis. In particular, one year after the hospitalization, the mother’s earnings are more than 2,400€ lower. However, we don’t observe such a decline when focusing on hospitalizations caused by acute appendicitis.<sup>32</sup> Again, we can reject the null hypothesis that the effects of hospitalizations due to cancer are equal to those of acute appendicitis one year after the shock. This evidence further suggests that the impact on maternal earnings is driven by severe and persistent conditions that require substantial care and support from caregivers. Moreover, the results of this exercise also show that our main findings are unlikely to be explained by mutual shocks or child hospitalizations brought about due to a deterioration in maternal earnings.

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<sup>31</sup>We use the following ICD10 diagnoses codes: C00-D49 Neoplasms, and K35 Acute appendicitis.

<sup>32</sup>There is considerable heterogeneity within diagnosis code. Although most cases of acute appendicitis are non-severe, morbidity in children is relatively high, with an overall frequency of appendix perforation of 12.5–30% (Caruso et al., 2017). This can explain the (non-significant) negative coefficients.

## 7 Mechanisms

This section investigates potential mechanisms underpinning the observed impact of children’s health shocks on maternal earnings. We exploit the same variation as before, following the estimation of Equation 1.

### 7.1 Mental Health

Some studies find that parents of children with poor health or disabilities report higher stress levels and worse sleep quality. In particular, some of these papers have documented that maternal self-reported health is negatively associated with parenting a child with a severe disability or a chronic condition (Burton et al., 2008; Stabile and Allin, 2012). In contrast, they don’t find that the same association is visible for fathers. Burton et al. (2008) hypothesize that the division of responsibilities according to traditional gender roles might be a factor behind this differential gender effect.

At the same time, mental health has also been found to impact labor market outcomes. In particular, Biasi et al. (2018) use data from Denmark and find that there is a large drop in labor earnings after a depression diagnosis, and earnings never recover to pre-diagnosis levels. Two years after the diagnosis, people with depression earn 29 percent less compared with 2 years before the diagnosis. Salokangas (2021) also studies this relationship using Finnish administrative data and finds a similar sized association: relative to the healthy controls, those who are treated for any psychiatric reason earn 37 percent less during lifetime.

We explore this potential mechanism by looking at the number of contacts with the health care system due to mental health conditions. We only observe visits to specialists or inpatient hospital admissions for Finland, thus capturing the most severe cases. In Norway, however, we observe diagnoses in primary care, which should include more mild cases.<sup>33</sup>

Table 7 shows the results. After the child’s health shock, there is a substantial deterioration in the parent’s mental well-being. Relative to two years before the shock, mothers visit specialists or hospitals at a higher rate for issues related to mental health conditions. For Finland, one year after the shock, we observe an increase of about 0.073 visits. This is more than a 70% increase. For Norway, the coefficient is very similar; the number of visits increases by 0,068 visits. However,

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<sup>33</sup>Note that for Norway, we only have health data from 2006 to 2014, and thus we can’t estimate all the event time dummies. For this reason, we exclude  $t = -5$  from the estimation.

Table 7: Hospitalizations: Parent's Number of Visits Mental Health

|                | (1)                 |                     | (2)                 |                   |
|----------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|-------------------|
|                | Mother              |                     | Father              |                   |
|                | Finland             | Norway              | Finland             | Norway            |
| -5             | -0.019<br>(0.018)   |                     | -0.035*<br>(0.021)  |                   |
| -4             | -0.033*<br>(0.017)  | 0.000<br>(0.041)    | -0.016<br>(0.015)   | -0.034<br>(0.060) |
| -3             | -0.014<br>(0.014)   | 0.031<br>(0.027)    | -0.015<br>(0.012)   | -0.015<br>(0.028) |
| -1             | 0.005<br>(0.017)    | -0.005<br>(0.022)   | 0.012<br>(0.010)    | 0.012<br>(0.020)  |
| 0              | 0.058***<br>(0.019) | 0.079***<br>(0.026) | 0.044***<br>(0.013) | 0.031<br>(0.025)  |
| 1              | 0.073***<br>(0.022) | 0.068**<br>(0.027)  | 0.024<br>(0.015)    | 0.013<br>(0.025)  |
| 2              | 0.057**<br>(0.023)  | 0.010<br>(0.029)    | 0.024<br>(0.016)    | 0.016<br>(0.028)  |
| 3              | 0.036<br>(0.023)    | 0.014<br>(0.029)    | 0.040**<br>(0.016)  | 0.020<br>(0.027)  |
| Observations   | 408840              | 162922              | 402124              | 162922            |
| Controls       | YES                 | YES                 | YES                 | YES               |
| Mean $Y_{t-2}$ | 0.098               | 0.487               | 0.071               | 0.289             |


*Notes:* This table shows the impact of a child's hospitalization on the mother's (columns 1) and the father's mental health (columns 2) for both Finland and Norway. We measure the number of visits to the hospital or specialist (in Finland) or the primary care physician (in Norway) with a mental health diagnosis. The table shows the estimated coefficients for the interaction between the event time dummies and the treat dummy in equation 1. All specifications include controls for calendar year, child's year of birth, child's gender, parent's age, and parent's educational level. Clustered standard errors at the parent level.

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

since we analyze visits to primary care physicians, the effect size is smaller (an increase of around 13% in the number of visits). For fathers, we also observe a significant increase in their number of visits (significant one and three years after the shock for Finland). The coefficient for Norway is also positive but non-significant.<sup>34</sup> Overall, our results suggest that this stressful event leaves parents, and especially mothers, in a vulnerable position in terms of mental health.

## 7.2 Family Stability

Figure 5: Hospitalizations: Probability of Divorce



*Notes:* This figure shows the impact of a child’s hospitalization on the probability of relationship dissolution. We plot the coefficients for the interaction between the event time dummies and the treat dummy in equation 1, with the corresponding 95 percent confidence intervals. Panel (a) plots the results for Finland. Panel (b) plots the results for Norway. All specifications include controls for calendar year, child’s year of birth, child’s gender, age of the parent, and parent’s educational level. Clustered standard errors at the parent level.

Previous papers find that having a child with a disability is associated with a higher probability of relationship dissolution (Stabile and Allin, 2012). While marital dissolution is an outcome in itself, it may also affect parents’ labor supply decisions (e.g, Ananat and Michaels, 2008; Bargain et al., 2012; Leopold, 2018; Page and Stevens, 2004).

We have information on marital status for both countries. We define divorce as a dummy equal to one if an individual is divorced or divorced from a registered partnership. Figure 5 shows the results (in panel (a) for Finland and panel (b) for Norway). We do not find evidence of an increased risk of divorce after the child’s hospitalization. This suggests that these types of shocks do not

<sup>34</sup>We can reject the null hypothesis that the estimated effects for mothers one year after the shock are the same as those for fathers.


have a significant impact on family stability.

### 7.3 Choice of Work Environment

Other studies have indicated that women prefer jobs that are more “family friendly” after childbirth (e.g, Goldin and Katz, 2016; Lundborg et al., 2017). In particular, Pertold-Gebicka et al. (2016) and Kleven et al. (2019b) find that mothers have a higher probability of moving to an occupation in the public sector following parenthood, which is known to have more flexible working conditions.

Similarly, after a hospitalization of a child, mothers may also seek a more family-friendly job in order to take care of their child. We take advantage of the availability of rich occupational data in Finland to explore this margin of adjustment. In panel (a) in Figure 6, we examine whether mothers have a higher probability of working in the public sector after their child undergoes a health shock. We do not find that this is the case, suggesting that mothers do not adjust their labor supply in this manner. More generally, panel (b) in Figure 6 looks at whether mothers have a higher probability of moving to a different job after a child’s health shock. For each year, we define an indicator variable equal to one if the mother is not working in the same enterprise as in the previous period. Again, we do not find evidence that mothers have a higher probability of switching to a different job after the health shock.

Figure 6: Hospitalizations: Choice of Work Environment



*Notes:* This figure shows the impact of a child’s hospitalization on the probability of working in the public sector (panel (a)), and the probability of switching jobs (panel (b)). We plot the coefficients for the interaction between the event time dummies and the treat dummy in equation 1, with the corresponding 95 percent confidence intervals. We use administrative data from Finland. All specifications include controls for calendar year, child’s year of birth, child’s gender, age of the parent, and parent’s educational level. Clustered standard errors at the parent level.



## 8 Conclusions

This paper provides new evidence on the impact of children’s health shocks on parental labor market outcomes. To identify the causal effect, we compare families whose children are exposed to health shocks at varying ages, conditional on the parents’ and children’s ages. This allows us to focus on a sample of very similar families and abstract from differences across households who suffer the illness or death of a child and those who do not.

In particular, we use long panels of high-quality administrative data from two different countries, Finland and Norway, on family income and health trajectories, and we construct counterfactuals for treated households through families who experience the same shock a few years later. We analyze both the impact of hospitalizations and fatal health shocks.

The results show that children’s health shocks have a persistent negative impact on mothers’ careers. We find that mothers’ earnings are 4.7 to 4.8% lower three years after a hospitalization, while we don’t find evidence of an effect for fathers. Additionally, we show that the impact is stronger for severe hospitalizations or health shocks that require substantial and persistent care after the event. To put the magnitude of the effects into context, the effect on maternal earnings is approximately one-fourth of the estimated impact of a health shock on an individual’s own labor earnings (Dobkin et al., 2018; Meyer and Mok, 2019; Fadlon and Nielsen, 2017), and around 20% the estimated drop in maternal earnings 3 years after childbirth in Finland (Sieppi and Pehkonen, 2019), and 23% in Norway (Andresen and Nix, 2021). Our estimates are strikingly similar for Finland and Norway. These two Nordic countries share many characteristics in terms of institutional context, culture, and gender norms. The fact that we find almost identical results strengthens the robustness of our approach and the external validity of our findings.

In addition, we use data from Finland to study fatal shocks. The impact of losing a child on maternal labor earnings is much larger than for hospitalizations: three years after the death of a child mothers’ earnings are about 20% lower. For fathers, we don’t find evidence of any significant impact.

We study if these families are insured through transfers and benefits linked to these shocks. We show that although transfers and other tax-deductively expenses offset part of the negative impact, families are not fully insured against these shocks. Moreover, the insurance effect of child benefits

fades over time, reducing the protective effects on the mother’s labor outcomes.

Children’s health shocks also hurt parents’ mental well-being, which we document using data on hospital and specialist diagnoses (from Finland), and data on primary care (from Norway). Overall, our results point to the importance of assisting families whose child experiences a health shock, especially providing mental health support. Moreover, these results also have important implications with regard to gender equality. Our evidence shows that the disproportionate costs of children for women’s labor market careers compared to that of men do not end with childbirth. We demonstrate that in two countries usually portrayed as exemplars of gender equality, and with very generous family policies, health shocks that occur during middle childhood to teenage years also have a disproportionate effect on women’s labor market outcomes compared to men’s.

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
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
## Appendix

Figure A1: Number of Observations by Child's Age at Event Time



*Notes:* This figure shows the number of observations by the age of the child at hospital admission, in panel (a) for Finland, and panel (b) for Norway, and the number of observations by age of the child at the time of the fatal shock for Finland, panel (c). The sample includes all children who suffered their first health shock between ages seven and eighteen in Finland. In Norway, we focus on the first hospitalization observable in data after age six, restricting the sample to children that did not suffer any hospitalization in the year before the health shock.


Figure A2: Descriptive: children born in 1990




*Notes:* This figure provides different descriptive graphs for the sample of children born in 1990 in Finland. Panel (a) shows the percentage of children that suffered a hospitalization from ages 0 to 18, and the percentage of children that suffered their first hospitalization from ages 0 to 6, or from ages 7 to 18. Panel (b) plots the same information for mortality.

Figure A3: Hospitalizations and Mortality Shocks by Main Diagnosis Group


(a) Finland: hospitalizations



(b) Norway: hospitalizations




(c) Finland: mortality



*Notes:* This figure shows the number of children who suffered a hospitalization by main diagnosis group (ICD-10 Chapters) for Finland (panel (a)) and for Norway (panel (b)). Panel (c) splits fatal shocks by cause of death. Categories include: Certain infectious and parasitic diseases, Neoplasms, Diseases of the blood and blood-forming organs and certain disorders involving the immune mechanism, Endocrine, nutritional and metabolic diseases, Mental and behavioural disorders, Diseases of the nervous system, Diseases of the eye and adnexa, Diseases of the ear and mastoid process, Diseases of the circulatory system, Diseases of the respiratory system, Diseases of the digestive system, Diseases of the skin and subcutaneous tissue, Diseases of the musculoskeletal system and connective tissue, Diseases of the genitourinary system, Congenital malformations, Symptoms, signs and abnormal clinical and laboratory findings, not elsewhere classified, Injury, poisoning and certain other consequences of external causes, and Factors influencing health status and contact with health services. All categories contain at least five observations.

Figure A4: Hospitalizations: Children's Number of Visits



*Notes:* This figure shows the average children's number of outpatient and inpatient visits by event time (years before and after their first hospitalization). We use administrative data from Finland.

Table A1: Institutional Characteristics

|  | (1)<br>Finland | (2)<br>Norway |
|--|----------------|---------------|
| <i>A. Countries Characteristics</i>  |                |               |
| Population   | 5521606        | 5347896       |
| GDP per Capita   | \$51556.526    | \$68345.069   |
| GINI Index   | 27.3           | 27.6          |
| Health Care Expenditure (% GDP)  | 9.037          | 10.049        |
| Life Expectancy at Birth   | 81.785         | 82.907        |
| Physicians (per 1,000 people)  | 3.812          | 2.698         |
| Low-birthweight babies (% of births)   | 4.122          | 4.488         |
| Mortality rate, under-5 (per 1,000 live births)  | 2.4            | 2.4           |
| <i>B. Institutional Support Characteristics</i>  |                |               |
| Universal Public Health  | Yes            | Yes           |
| Special Care Allowance   | Yes            | Yes           |
| Disability Allowance   | Yes            | No            |
| Informal Care Allowance  | Yes            | Yes           |
| Survivor Pension for Parents   | No             | No            |
| <i>C. Gender Norms</i>   |                |               |
| Labor force participation rate, female (%)   | 76.6           | 75.61         |
| Child Penalty  | 25             | 23            |
| “A job is alright but what most women really want is a home and children” (% Agree)          | 32.1           | 22.9          |
| “A man’s job is to earn money; a woman’s job is to look after the home and family” (% Agree) | 11.9           | 9.18          |
| “All in all, family life suffers when the woman has a full-time job” (% Agree)               | 16.3           | 15.9          |

*Notes:* The Statistics in Panel A come from the World Bank website. All statistics reported correspond to 2019 data, or the latest data available. The labor force participation rate, female is calculated as the % of female population ages 15-64. The numbers for the child penalty come from Sieppi and Pehkonen (2019) and Andresen and Nix (2021), respectively. Statistics in Panel C on gender norms views come from own calculations using the European Value Study 2017. We report the percentage of respondents who agree or strongly agree with a given statement. For comparison, the same numbers for Germany are 28.1, 13.5, 44.9 respectively, and 32.2, 16.9, 33.1 for the UK.

Table A2: Finland- Summary Statistics

|   | Hospitalizations |           |             |           | Mortality |           |             |           |
|---|------------------|-----------|-------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-------------|-----------|
|   | (1)              |           | (2)         |           | (3)       |           | (4)         |           |
|   | DiD              |           | Event Study |           | DiD       |           | Event Study |           |
|   | mean             | sd        | mean        | sd        | mean      | sd        | mean        | sd        |
| <i>Child Characteristics</i>                  |                  |           |             |           |           |           |             |           |
| Age at event time                             | 13.306           | 3.813     | 11.862      | 3.213     | 15.434    | 4.082     | 12.833      | 3.444     |
| Male  | 0.516            | 0.500     | 0.525       | 0.499     | 0.653     | 0.476     | 0.608       | 0.488     |
| Gestational weeks                             | 39.950           | 1.387     | 39.935      | 1.404     | 39.574    | 1.925     | 39.495      | 2.052     |
| Birthweight                                   | 3609.324         | 500.602   | 3590.371    | 503.551   | 3521.246  | 632.167   | 3500.085    | 650.430   |
| <i>Mother Characteristics</i>                 |                  |           |             |           |           |           |             |           |
| Mother's age                                  | 29.093           | 4.277     | 29.307      | 5.375     | 28.406    | 5.302     | 28.698      | 5.377     |
| Age mother at admission                       | 42.902           | 5.833     | 41.653      | 6.350     | 44.360    | 6.506     | 41.995      | 6.319     |
| Finnish                                       | 0.983            | 0.128     | 0.977       | 0.151     | 0.982     | 0.134     | 0.975       | 0.156     |
| Single  | 0.011            | 0.106     | 0.034       | 0.181     | 0.026     | 0.158     | 0.031       | 0.173     |
| Married                                       | 0.233            | 0.423     | 0.301       | 0.459     | 0.291     | 0.454     | 0.295       | 0.456     |
| Upper secondary                               | 0.473            | 0.499     | 0.489       | 0.500     | 0.557     | 0.497     | 0.523       | 0.500     |
| Post-secondary                                | 0.007            | 0.084     | 0.008       | 0.088     | 0.012     | 0.110     | 0.008       | 0.088     |
| Tertiary                                      | 0.299            | 0.458     | 0.273       | 0.446     | 0.256     | 0.437     | 0.267       | 0.443     |
| Bachelor's                                    | 0.088            | 0.283     | 0.097       | 0.295     | 0.080     | 0.271     | 0.091       | 0.287     |
| Master's                                      | 0.123            | 0.329     | 0.124       | 0.330     | 0.089     | 0.284     | 0.104       | 0.305     |
| Doctoral                                      | 0.009            | 0.095     | 0.009       | 0.096     | 0.006     | 0.078     | 0.008       | 0.088     |
| High-skilled white collar                     | 0.154            | 0.361     | 0.150       | 0.357     | 0.115     | 0.319     | 0.126       | 0.332     |
| Low-skilled white collar                      | 0.500            | 0.500     | 0.469       | 0.499     | 0.459     | 0.498     | 0.448       | 0.498     |
| Manual workers                                | 0.198            | 0.399     | 0.209       | 0.406     | 0.250     | 0.433     | 0.231       | 0.422     |
| Self-employed                                 | 0.015            | 0.120     | 0.014       | 0.117     | 0.013     | 0.113     | 0.014       | 0.116     |
| Earnings mother t=-2                          | 19729.877        | 14638.790 | 19985.273   | 15697.057 | 16501.331 | 14269.269 | 17647.238   | 15663.281 |
| Prob. working mother t=-2                     | 0.818            | 0.386     | 0.795       | 0.404     | 0.739     | 0.439     | 0.744       | 0.437     |
| Prob. unemployed mother t=-2                  | 0.000            | 0.004     | 0.000       | 0.006     | 0.000     | 0.000     | 0.000       | 0.000     |
| Total income mother t=-2                      | 19741.489        | 9463.019  | 20493.525   | 10228.423 | 19314.813 | 9158.022  | 20992.566   | 10633.933 |
| Prob. mental health visit mother t-2          | 0.012            | 0.107     | 0.023       | 0.150     | 0.031     | 0.173     | 0.044       | 0.206     |
| Prob. working in the public sector mother t-2 | 0.376            | 0.484     | 0.362       | 0.481     | 0.377     | 0.485     | 0.383       | 0.486     |
| Prob. changing job mother t-2                 | 0.105            | 0.307     | 0.117       | 0.322     | 0.114     | 0.318     | 0.139       | 0.347     |
| Prob. divorced t-2                            | 0.128            | 0.334     | 0.147       | 0.354     | 0.183     | 0.386     | 0.177       | 0.382     |
| <i>Father Characteristics</i>                 |                  |           |             |           |           |           |             |           |
| Age father at admission                       | 43.088           | 5.747     | 44.162      | 6.850     | 44.556    | 6.455     | 44.711      | 6.638     |
| Upper secondary                               | 0.562            | 0.496     | 0.570       | 0.495     | 0.641     | 0.480     | 0.617       | 0.486     |
| Post-secondary                                | 0.009            | 0.092     | 0.010       | 0.100     | 0.010     | 0.099     | 0.014       | 0.119     |
| Tertiary                                      | 0.189            | 0.392     | 0.180       | 0.384     | 0.157     | 0.364     | 0.156       | 0.363     |
| Bachelor's                                    | 0.100            | 0.301     | 0.102       | 0.303     | 0.088     | 0.284     | 0.094       | 0.293     |
| Master's                                      | 0.124            | 0.330     | 0.121       | 0.326     | 0.084     | 0.277     | 0.094       | 0.293     |
| Doctoral                                      | 0.016            | 0.124     | 0.017       | 0.131     | 0.020     | 0.139     | 0.024       | 0.152     |
| Earnings father t=-2                          | 30268.000        | 21405.981 | 30340.937   | 22746.385 | 26953.570 | 21184.773 | 28563.055   | 22527.692 |
| Prob. working father t=-2                     | 0.850            | 0.357     | 0.757       | 0.429     | 0.783     | 0.412     | 0.715       | 0.452     |
| Prob. unemployed father t=-2                  | 0.000            | 0.007     | 0.001       | 0.029     | 0.002     | 0.043     | 0.001       | 0.032     |
| Total income father t=-2                      | 24410.819        | 14879.590 | 25232.958   | 15749.834 | 23247.707 | 14411.933 | 25316.717   | 16327.657 |
| Prob. mental health visit father t-2          | 0.011            | 0.106     | 0.020       | 0.140     | 0.015     | 0.122     | 0.018       | 0.134     |
| Prob. working in the public sector father t-2 | 0.176            | 0.381     | 0.170       | 0.376     | 0.158     | 0.365     | 0.153       | 0.360     |
| Prob. changing job father t-2                 | 0.133            | 0.339     | 0.133       | 0.340     | 0.125     | 0.331     | 0.123       | 0.328     |
| Observations                                  | 66046            |           | 57395       |           | 2438      |           | 1104        |           |

*Notes:* This table reports the mean and the standard deviation for the variables exploited in the analysis using the Finnish administrative data. The first two columns are for hospitalization shocks: the sample used in the diff-in-diff analysis is shown in column (1) and the sample used in the event study in column (2). The last two columns provide the same information for mortality shocks: for the diff-in-diff sample in column (3), and the event study sample in column (4).

Table A3: Norway– Summary Statistics

|   | (1)<br>DiD |           | (2)<br>Event Study |           |
|---|------------|-----------|--------------------|-----------|
|   | mean       | sd        | mean               | sd        |
| <i>Child Characteristics</i>              |            |           |                    |           |
| Age at event time                         | 12.414     | 3.374     | 12.754             | 3.828     |
| Male                                      | 0.548      | 0.498     | 0.541              | 0.498     |
| <i>Mother Characteristics</i>             |            |           |                    |           |
| Mother's age at birth                     | 28.810     | 4.437     | 28.690             | 5.260     |
| Age mother at admission                   | 41.224     | 5.320     | 41.444             | 6.079     |
| Norwegian                                 | 0.849      | 0.358     | 0.830              | 0.375     |
| Married                                   | 0.632      | 0.482     | 0.610              | 0.488     |
| No education mother                       | 0.003      | 0.051     | 0.005              | 0.072     |
| Primary school mother                     | 0.004      | 0.066     | 0.008              | 0.086     |
| Lower secondary mother                    | 0.172      | 0.377     | 0.208              | 0.406     |
| Upper secondary, basic educ. level mother | 0.077      | 0.266     | 0.089              | 0.285     |
| Upper secondary, final year mother        | 0.294      | 0.456     | 0.278              | 0.448     |
| Post secondary non-tertiary mother        | 0.023      | 0.149     | 0.024              | 0.154     |
| Bachelor's or equivalent level mother     | 0.344      | 0.475     | 0.307              | 0.461     |
| Master's or equivalent level mother       | 0.062      | 0.241     | 0.056              | 0.231     |
| Doctoral or equivalent level mother       | 0.005      | 0.074     | 0.005              | 0.069     |
| Earnings mother t=-2                      | 30722.236  | 24692.319 | 30599.858          | 24568.802 |
| Prob. working mother t=-2                 | 0.803      | 0.397     | 0.788              | 0.409     |
| Total income mother t=-2                  | 38228.001  | 22934.563 | 40085.750          | 21440.789 |
| Total transfers mother t=-2               | 7884.261   | 8860.316  | 8437.732           | 9723.704  |
| Prob. mental health visit mother t=-2     | 0.153      | 0.360     | 0.170              | 0.376     |
| Prob. temporary DI mother t=-2            | 0.060      | 0.238     | 0.071              | 0.256     |
| Prob. permanent DI mother t=-2            | 0.001      | 0.036     | 0.002              | 0.043     |
| Prob. divorce mother t=-2                 | 0.012      | 0.111     | 0.014              | 0.116     |
| <i>Father Characteristics</i>             |            |           |                    |           |
| Age father at admission                   | 43.708     | 5.642     | 44.465             | 6.830     |
| No education father                       | 0.001      | 0.038     | 0.003              | 0.050     |
| Primary school father                     | 0.004      | 0.064     | 0.005              | 0.070     |
| Lower secondary father                    | 0.181      | 0.385     | 0.199              | 0.399     |
| Upper secondary, basic educ. level father | 0.070      | 0.255     | 0.086              | 0.281     |
| Upper secondary, final year father        | 0.361      | 0.480     | 0.332              | 0.471     |
| Post secondary non-tertiary father        | 0.055      | 0.227     | 0.054              | 0.226     |
| Bachelor's or equivalent level father     | 0.214      | 0.410     | 0.192              | 0.394     |
| Master's or equivalent level father       | 0.087      | 0.282     | 0.078              | 0.268     |
| Doctoral or equivalent level father       | 0.012      | 0.107     | 0.010              | 0.099     |
| Earnings father t=-2                      | 56370.670  | 47831.542 | 54576.941          | 46669.518 |
| Prob. working father t=-2                 | 0.897      | 0.304     | 0.872              | 0.334     |
| Total income father t=-2                  | 58315.070  | 46728.648 | 60295.908          | 44909.814 |
| Total transfers father t=-2               | 2513.083   | 7618.839  | 3370.206           | 8917.984  |
| Prob. mental health visit father t=-2     | 0.090      | 0.286     | 0.098              | 0.297     |
| Prob. temporary DI father t=-2            | 0.032      | 0.176     | 0.038              | 0.191     |
| Prob. permanent DI father t=-2            | 0.002      | 0.041     | 0.003              | 0.055     |
| Prob. divorce father t=-2                 | 0.012      | 0.109     | 0.013              | 0.113     |
| Observations                              | 24316      |           | 36125              |           |

*Notes:* This table reports the mean and the standard deviation for the variables exploited in the analysis using the Norwegian administrative data. The first two columns are for hospitalization shocks: the sample used in the diff-in-diff analysis is shown in column (1) and the sample used in the event study in column (2).

Table A4: Hospitalizations: Event Study with Individual Fixed Effects

|                | (1)                      |                           | (2)                     |                           |
|----------------|--------------------------|---------------------------|-------------------------|---------------------------|
|                | Earnings DiD (€)         |                           | Earnings FE (€)         |                           |
|                | Finland                  | Norway                    | Finland                 | Norway                    |
| -5             | 30.710<br>(103.990)      | -199.724<br>(237.686)     |                         |                           |
| -4             | 124.376<br>(89.216)      | -123.308<br>(216.523)     | -29.638<br>(29.753)     | 64.428<br>(85.818)        |
| -3             | -12.324<br>(65.295)      | -229.748<br>(172.738)     | 45.241<br>(28.807)      | -42.250<br>(107.914)      |
| -1             | -75.055<br>(66.306)      | -307.845*<br>(177.189)    | 69.032*<br>(35.159)     | -278.010***<br>(95.733)   |
| 0              | -326.434***<br>(91.412)  | -283.370<br>(221.354)     | -123.126***<br>(46.755) | -404.276***<br>(148.209)  |
| 1              | -526.456***<br>(110.012) | -620.884**<br>(252.637)   | -334.172***<br>(56.505) | -612.802***<br>(194.995)  |
| 2              | -741.698***<br>(128.143) | -1279.759***<br>(287.903) | -411.220***<br>(59.895) | -990.905***<br>(240.168)  |
| 3              | -951.842***<br>(141.230) | -1450.364***<br>(327.171) | -640.388***<br>(60.396) | -1150.603***<br>(272.752) |
| Observations   | 423342                   | 212688                    | 465247                  | 325125                    |
| Controls       | YES                      | YES                       | YES                     | YES                       |
| Mean $Y_{t-2}$ | 19729.877                | 30722.236                 | 19985.273               | 30599.858                 |

*Notes:* This table shows the impact of a child's hospitalization on maternal earnings (Euro) using the differences-in-differences specification in equation 1 (in column (1)), and using the event study approach with individual fixed effects laid out in equation (2) (in column (2)), for both Finland and Norway. For the event study, we implement the IW estimator proposed by Sun and Abraham (2020). All specifications include controls for calendar year, child's year of birth, child's gender, age of the parent, and parent's educational level. Clustered standard errors at the parent level.

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$



Table A5: Hospitalizations: Father's Labor Market Outcomes

|                | (1)                     |                       | (2)                 |                   | (3)                  |                      |
|----------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|-------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
|                | Earnings (€)            |                       | Earnings (%)        |                   | Employment           |                      |
|                | Finland                 | Norway                | Finland             | Norway            | Finland              | Norway               |
| -5             | -103.326<br>(134.506)   | 377.702<br>(481.219)  | -0.003<br>(0.004)   | 0.007<br>(0.009)  | -0.002<br>(0.002)    | 0.007**<br>(0.003)   |
| -4             | -64.320<br>(115.289)    | 621.514<br>(477.208)  | -0.002<br>(0.004)   | 0.011<br>(0.008)  | 0.000<br>(0.002)     | 0.004<br>(0.003)     |
| -3             | 106.544<br>(86.711)     | 85.978<br>(389.012)   | 0.004<br>(0.003)    | 0.002<br>(0.007)  | -0.001<br>(0.002)    | 0.003<br>(0.002)     |
| -1             | 226.537**<br>(91.192)   | -333.297<br>(426.918) | 0.007**<br>(0.003)  | -0.006<br>(0.008) | -0.004**<br>(0.002)  | -0.000<br>(0.002)    |
| 0              | 78.201<br>(123.792)     | 471.037<br>(548.662)  | 0.003<br>(0.004)    | 0.008<br>(0.010)  | -0.004**<br>(0.002)  | -0.001<br>(0.003)    |
| 1              | 44.130<br>(153.641)     | -197.917<br>(497.685) | 0.001<br>(0.005)    | -0.004<br>(0.009) | -0.004*<br>(0.002)   | -0.005<br>(0.003)    |
| 2              | -153.650<br>(186.216)   | -237.545<br>(681.629) | -0.005<br>(0.006)   | -0.004<br>(0.012) | -0.006*<br>(0.003)   | -0.007**<br>(0.003)  |
| 3              | -421.455**<br>(212.269) | -944.994<br>(759.326) | -0.014**<br>(0.007) | -0.017<br>(0.013) | -0.009***<br>(0.003) | -0.015***<br>(0.004) |
| Observations   | 416964                  | 212688                | 416964              | 212688            | 416964               | 212688               |
| Controls       | YES                     | YES                   | YES                 | YES               | YES                  | YES                  |
| Mean $Y_{t-2}$ | 30268.000               | 56384.200             | 1.000               | 1.000             | 0.850                | 0.924                |

*Notes:* This table shows the impact of a child's hospitalization on father's earnings (Euro) (in column (1)), earnings as a % of mean earnings in  $t - 2$  (in column (2)), and working probability (in column (3)). The table shows the estimated coefficients for the interaction between the event time dummies and the treat dummy in equation 1. All specifications include controls for calendar year, child's year of birth, child's gender, age of the parent, and parent's educational level. Clustered standard errors at the parent level.

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Table A6: Mortality: Father's Labor Outcomes

|                | (1)                    | (2)               | (3)               |
|----------------|------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
|                | Earnings (€)           | Earnings (%)      | Employment        |
| -5             | 690.272<br>(999.205)   | 2.636<br>(3.816)  | -0.011<br>(0.020) |
| -4             | 514.744<br>(840.703)   | 1.966<br>(3.210)  | 0.009<br>(0.019)  |
| -3             | -464.755<br>(619.078)  | -1.775<br>(2.364) | -0.022<br>(0.015) |
| -1             | 327.273<br>(702.918)   | 1.250<br>(2.684)  | 0.008<br>(0.016)  |
| 0              | -675.397<br>(1005.022) | -2.579<br>(3.838) | 0.000<br>(0.017)  |
| 1              | 479.987<br>(1215.818)  | 1.833<br>(4.643)  | 0.005<br>(0.021)  |
| 2              | 1981.829<br>(1368.189) | 7.568<br>(5.225)  | 0.007<br>(0.024)  |
| 3              | 1237.733<br>(1430.165) | 4.727<br>(5.462)  | 0.001<br>(0.027)  |
| Observations   | 7798                   | 7798              | 7798              |
| Controls       | YES                    | YES               | YES               |
| Mean $Y_{t-2}$ | 26186.189              | 100.000           | 0.780             |

*Notes:* This table shows the impact of a child's fatal shock on father's earnings (Euro) (in column (1)), earnings as a % of mean earnings in  $t - 2$  (in column (2)), and working probability (in column (3)). We use administrative data from Finland and the sample includes all fatal shocks due to injuries, poisonings, or other consequences of external causes. The table shows the estimated coefficients for the interaction between the event time dummies and the treat dummy in equation 1. All specifications include controls for calendar year, child's year of birth, child's gender, age of the parent, and parent's educational level. Clustered standard errors at the parent level.

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Table A7: Mortality: Event Study with Individual Fixed Effects

|                | (1)                        | (2)                        |
|----------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|
|                | Earnings DiD (€)           | Earnings FE (€)            |
| -5             | -6.875<br>(-661.152)       |                            |
| -4             | 17.273<br>(-565.445)       | -345.333<br>(-402.918)     |
| -3             | 375.119<br>(-406.902)      | 364.283<br>(-410.216)      |
| -1             | -52.795<br>(-507.916)      | 1120.782**<br>(-463.448)   |
| 0              | -1905.969***<br>(-647.384) | -1267.613**<br>(-549.25)   |
| 1              | -2463.164***<br>(-740.062) | -2068.994***<br>(-574.09)  |
| 2              | -2913.320***<br>(-851.37)  | -1756.816***<br>(-675.296) |
| 3              | -3422.826***<br>(-865.981) | -1345.493**<br>(-618.956)  |
| Observations   | 9892                       | 4190                       |
| Controls       | YES                        | YES                        |
| Mean $Y_{t-2}$ | 17595.939                  | 19927.976                  |

*Notes:* This table shows the impact of a child's death on maternal earnings (Euro) using the differences-in-differences specification in equation 1 (in column (1)), and using the event study approach with individual fixed effects laid out in equation (2) (in column (2)). For the event study, we implement the IW estimator proposed by Sun and Abraham (2020). We use administrative data from Finland and the sample includes all fatal shocks due to injuries, poisonings, or other consequences of external causes. Clustered Standard errors at the parent level.

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Table A8: Hospitalizations: Father's Institutional Support

|                | (1)                    |                      | (2)                     |                       | (3)                 |
|----------------|------------------------|----------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|
|                | Total Income (€)       |                      | Transfers (€)           |                       | Allowance (€)       |
|                | Finland                | Norway               | Finland                 | Norway                | Finland             |
| -5             | -95.183<br>(99.398)    | 349.714<br>-482.345  | -106.073***<br>(37.838) | -98.248<br>-90.336    | -34.968<br>(38.371) |
| -4             | -30.518<br>(90.211)    | 399.402<br>-481.477  | -41.351<br>(33.671)     | -145.783*<br>-77.892  | -39.288<br>(32.710) |
| -3             | 39.915<br>(77.239)     | -28.156<br>-401.289  | -47.119*<br>(26.096)    | -129.122**<br>-61.935 | -12.128<br>(24.647) |
| -1             | 5.706<br>(79.686)      | -374.205<br>-434.385 | -7.477<br>(26.900)      | -42.749<br>-65.957    | -25.674<br>(23.366) |
| 0              | -198.189**<br>(96.536) | 419.878<br>-550.008  | -13.724<br>(36.333)     | -76.723<br>-83.593    | -35.424<br>(28.582) |
| 1              | -90.130<br>(113.820)   | -145.111<br>-492.318 | -4.561<br>(43.883)      | -50.502<br>-107.94    | 49.558<br>(30.958)  |
| 2              | -64.538<br>(138.962)   | -295.944<br>-662.701 | 4.309<br>(52.025)       | -52.663<br>-129.524   | 21.870<br>(34.147)  |
| 3              | -67.654<br>(150.920)   | -712.017<br>-756.929 | -6.691<br>(57.310)      | 106.282<br>-134.262   | 16.659<br>(34.230)  |
| Observations   | 391596                 | 212688               | 391596                  | 212688                | 407055              |
| Controls       | YES                    | YES                  | YES                     | YES                   | YES                 |
| Mean $Y_{t-2}$ | 25593.951              | 58327.767            | 1630.722                | 2511.704              | 3123.127            |

*Notes:* This table shows the impact of a child's hospitalization on father's total income (in column (1)), transfers (in column (2)), and child allowances received by the father (in column (3)) for both Finland and Norway respectively. The table shows the estimated coefficients for the interaction between the event time dummies and the treat dummy in equation 1. All specifications include controls for calendar year, child's year of birth, child's gender, age of the parent, and parent's educational level. Clustered standard errors at the parent level.

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Table A9: Mortality– Both Parents Institutional Support

|                | (1)                       |                        | (2)                  |                         | (3)                      |                       |
|----------------|---------------------------|------------------------|----------------------|-------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------|
|                | Total Income(€)           |                        | Transfers(€)         |                         | Allowance(€)             |                       |
|                | Mother                    | Father                 | Mother               | Father                  | Mother                   | Father                |
| -5             | -62.378<br>(435.368)      | -477.632<br>(952.993)  | 31.457<br>(324.866)  | 133.071<br>(365.093)    | 328.929<br>(209.783)     | -3.759<br>(293.307)   |
| -4             | -30.246<br>(376.892)      | 291.223<br>(879.964)   | 51.039<br>(291.024)  | 235.463<br>(333.236)    | 146.889<br>(162.686)     | 209.942<br>(265.231)  |
| -3             | 188.884<br>(314.841)      | -1138.330<br>(824.994) | -79.060<br>(222.659) | 250.821<br>(258.547)    | 31.213<br>(126.533)      | -45.478<br>(197.189)  |
| -1             | 426.831<br>(358.254)      | 349.414<br>(887.660)   | 135.396<br>(248.878) | -394.759<br>(253.769)   | 264.420*<br>(137.251)    | -108.932<br>(193.472) |
| 0              | -1058.459***<br>(388.206) | 567.734<br>(1159.709)  | 457.364<br>(328.592) | 524.566<br>(422.042)    | -335.754<br>(206.154)    | -404.518<br>(311.831) |
| 1              | -2120.509***<br>(498.741) | 203.363<br>(1066.866)  | 370.585<br>(392.072) | 524.086<br>(469.058)    | -791.420***<br>(227.085) | -283.534<br>(368.983) |
| 2              | -2163.603***<br>(568.464) | 1588.400<br>(1368.214) | 704.182<br>(437.219) | 723.476<br>(578.780)    | -369.330<br>(250.131)    | -288.811<br>(303.898) |
| 3              | -2376.531***<br>(600.222) | -184.062<br>(1292.416) | 444.559<br>(439.946) | 1509.946**<br>(584.477) | -123.212<br>(231.801)    | -212.349<br>(276.651) |
| Observations   | 9656                      | 5652                   | 9656                 | 5652                    | 9798                     | 5717                  |
| Controls       | YES                       | YES                    | YES                  | YES                     | YES                      | YES                   |
| Mean $Y_{t-2}$ | 20372.474                 | 23487.030              | 6487.136             | 2568.810                | 3978.027                 | 3076.714              |

*Notes:* This table shows the impact of a child's hospitalization on total income (in column (1)), and transfers received (in column (2)), for both mothers and fathers respectively. The table shows the estimated coefficients for the interaction between the event time dummies and the treat dummy in equation 1. We use administrative data from Finland and the sample includes all fatal shocks due to injuries, poisonings, or other consequences of external causes. All specifications include controls for calendar year, child's year of birth, child's gender, age of the parent, and parent's educational level. Clustered standard errors at the parent level.

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Table A10: Mortality: Choice of Delta

|                | (1)                       | (2)                       | (3)                       |
|----------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|
|                | Delta = 2                 | Delta = 3                 | Delta = 4                 |
| -5             | 247.162<br>(595.238)      | 745.849<br>(678.018)      | -6.875<br>(661.152)       |
| -4             | -231.317<br>(557.986)     | 155.722<br>(591.286)      | 17.273<br>(565.445)       |
| -3             | 216.209<br>(398.933)      | 466.080<br>(396.736)      | 375.119<br>(406.902)      |
| -1             | 202.392<br>(509.347)      | 140.234<br>(484.703)      | -52.795<br>(507.916)      |
| 0              | -1293.803**<br>(631.104)  | -1294.182**<br>(617.701)  | -1905.969***<br>(647.384) |
| 1              | -2525.412***<br>(606.513) | -2277.592***<br>(719.857) | -2463.164***<br>(740.062) |
| 2              |                           | -2650.784***<br>(742.539) | -2913.320***<br>(851.370) |
| 3              |                           |                           | -3422.826***<br>(865.981) |
| Observations   | 7500                      | 8617                      | 9892                      |
| Controls       | YES                       | YES                       | YES                       |
| Mean $Y_{t-2}$ | 18727.979                 | 18014.032                 | 17595.939                 |

*Notes:* This table shows the impact of a child's fatal shock on maternal labor earnings for different choices of control group. In column (1) we show the estimation results when the control group consists of families who experienced the child's fatal shock two years later, in column (2) three years later, and four years later in column (3) (our main specification). The table shows the estimated coefficients for the interaction between the event time dummies and the treat dummy in 1. We use administrative data from Finland and the sample includes all fatal shocks due to injuries, poisonings, or other consequences of external causes. All specifications include controls for calendar year, child's year of birth, child's gender, age of the parent, and parent's education level. Clustered standard errors at the parent level.

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Table A11: Mortality: Mutual Shocks

|                | (1)<br>+\- One Week       | (2)<br>+\- One Month      |
|----------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|
| -5             | -291.854<br>(693.573)     | -469.105<br>(706.549)     |
| -4             | -121.693<br>(592.302)     | -127.531<br>(606.236)     |
| -3             | 369.369<br>(428.316)      | 372.715<br>(441.732)      |
| -1             | -193.967<br>(533.642)     | -189.086<br>(548.243)     |
| 0              | -2022.883***<br>(692.621) | -2027.797***<br>(709.706) |
| 1              | -2487.724***<br>(764.767) | -2431.416***<br>(783.169) |
| 2              | -3006.683***<br>(880.807) | -2775.667***<br>(892.524) |
| 3              | -3440.505***<br>(890.691) | -3343.976***<br>(901.655) |
| Observations   | 9310                      | 9003                      |
| Controls       | YES                       | YES                       |
| Mean $Y_{t-2}$ | 17501.325                 | 17572.962                 |

*Notes:* This table shows the impact of a child's fatal shock on maternal labor earnings. In column (1), we exclude fatal shocks where parents were hospitalized or visited a specialist one week before or after the child's shock. In column (2), we do the same but for mutual shocks one month before or after the child's shock. The table shows the estimated coefficients for the interaction between the event time dummies and the treat dummy in equation 1. We use administrative data from Finland and the sample includes all fatal shocks due to injuries, poisonings, or other consequences of external causes. All specifications include controls for calendar year, child's year of birth, child's gender, age of the parent, and parent's education level. Clustered standard errors at the parent level.

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$