

# Legitimacy of Inequality in a Highly Unequal Context: Evidence from the Chilean Case

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**Abstract** Economic inequality is usually assumed to be a threat to social cohesion and democracy. Nevertheless, this opposition of inequality and democracy is based on further assumptions such as (a) that people perceive economic inequality accurately, and (b) that, by and large they consider inequality unjust. Research into distributive issues has not found consistent support for neither of these assumptions. Quite the contrary, empirical evidence indicates that economic inequality is widely misperceived and that inequality is to some extent considered legitimate. So far most of the empirical evidence in the area of legitimacy comes from experimental studies in the developed world. The present research aims at widening the scope of legitimacy studies by focusing on Chile as a case country, one of the societies with the highest economic inequality worldwide, guided by the question *to what extent is economic inequality considered legitimate in a context of high economic inequality?* In addressing this question, and based on previous evidence, the article proposes a way to evaluate (a) the legitimacy of inequality at a country level via survey research, and (b) the role of inequality perception and justice ideologies in the justification of economic inequality. The data to be analyzed is the public opinion survey International Social Justice Project (ISJP), implemented in Chile in the year 2007 ( $n = 890$ ). Multivariate analysis results reveal signs of legitimacy of inequality in Chile, opening a series of issues regarding the acceptance and stability of unequal distributions.

**Keywords** Legitimacy · Inequality · Justice ideologies · Inequality perception · Social status

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## Introduction

Economic inequality is a characteristic of all modern societies that has increased dramatically over the last quarter century (Beck, 2007; Beck & Poferl, 2010; Grusky & Kanbur, 2006; Korzeniewicz & Moran, 1997; Morris & Western, 1999). This is a fact confirmed by different indicators from international organizations that have commonly relied on income distribution indexes, such as the Gini, or on the comparison between income quintiles or deciles (UNDP, 2010). Based on this information, it is possible to observe not only that income inequality has increased between and within countries but also that countries from the developing world are constantly leading the rankings of unequal income distribution (Birchfield & Dion, 2007; Morris & Western, 1999). From a rational choice point of view, it would be expected for countries with high inequality to show higher pressure for redistribution; the so-called Meltzer–Richard hypothesis (Borge & Rattsø, 2004; Meltzer & Richard, 1981). Nevertheless, the stability of economic inequality in spite of growing democratization processes in the developing world has led to the search for alternative explanations for the rational median voter arguments, such as the possibility of legitimacy of economic inequality.


The concept of legitimacy has a long history in political sciences and philosophy, but its empirical study is a recent enterprise in social sciences (Jost & Major, 2001a; Zelditch, 2001a). A wide range of research has been carried out over the past 30 years in a variety of fields, as previously described by Hegtvædt & Johnson (2009), Tyler (2006), and Johnson, Dowd, and Ridgeway (2006) who have advanced the work of reviewing and classifying different areas of legitimacy research. Some of these reviews are ordered according to disciplinary perspectives, such as that of Tyler regarding the psychology of legitimacy, whereas Johnson refers to sociological conceptualizations. A comprehensive view is offered by Zelditch (2001a), who proposes that it is possible to identify two broad research areas: the legitimacy of authority and the legitimacy of distribution. Legitimacy of authority, linked to the traditional Weberian conceptualization, broadly refers to the conditions under which actors accept a moral obligation to obey a system of power, and also to comply with the law (Tyler, 1990). This traditional sociological area has found numerous contributions from social psychology, particularly from procedural justice (Hegtvædt & Johnson, 2009; Lind & Tyler, 1988; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tyler, 1988) as well as from social dominance theory (Sidanius, Levin, Federico, & Pratto, 2001; Sidanius, Levin, & Pratto, 1996; Sidanius, Liu, Shaw, & Pratto, 1994; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). On the other hand, legitimacy of distribution is concerned with the allocation of goods and rewards in society and with the relationships of inequality between individuals and groups (Della Fave, 1980; Jost, Pelham, Sheldon, & Sullivan, 2003; Karpiński, 2010; Kelley & Evans, 1993; Kreidl, 2000; Stephenson, 2000).

Most of the research into the legitimacy of distribution comes from social and political psychology, closely linked to the development of system justification theory and the concept of legitimizing ideologies (Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004; Jost, Blount, Pfeffer, & Hunyady, 2003; Jost & Hunyady, 2003, 2005; Jost, Kay, & Thorisdottir, 2009; Jost & Major, 2001b). In contrast, sociological studies in the

area of economic distribution have also made use of the concept of legitimacy in reference to the support to widespread distributive ideologies in society and/or to the acceptance of income differences (Castillo, 2010; Dion, 2010; Evans & Kelley, 2006; Evans, Kelley, & Peoples, 2010; Gijssberts, 1999; Hadler, 2005; Kelley & Evans, 1993; Kenworthy & McCall, 2007; Kunovich & Slomczynski, 2007; Morgan & Kelly, 2010; Osberg & Smeeding, 2006). Such studies differ methodologically from the traditional social psychology perspective in their focus on country cases and on international comparison based on representative survey research. This article builds on this sociological perspective by focusing on a particular country—Chile—which has one of the highest indexes of economic inequality worldwide. Since most of such studies so far have been implemented in societies with comparatively low inequality, the gap that this research aims at bridging by focusing on the Chilean case is *to what extent is economic inequality considered legitimate in a context of high inequality?* The answer to this question requires a conceptualization of the legitimacy of economic inequality that can be operationalized in the context of survey research, for which I propose a model with the justification of earning differences as the main dependent variable.

Given that in a situation of high inequality there is a small minority that profits from the distribution, a self-interest perspective would make us expect a great dissensus among status groups in society regarding economic differences. Building on approaches to legitimacy that emphasize the role of consensus among groups beyond their instrumental interests (Beetham, 1991; Hegtvædt & Johnson, 2000), the main hypothesis of this research counter argues the self-interest view by pointing out that it is possible to find signs of consensus among status groups regarding inequality justification in a highly unequal society as the Chilean one. This implies arguing against the Meltzer–Richard assumptions, proposing that besides rational motives, there are other elements that this hypothesis does not take into account and that play a role in a possible consensus about inequality. Following this logic, two approaches are contrasted: the existential and the utopian (Shepelak & Alwin, 1986). Whereas the existential approach suggests that the actual distribution (what is) influences the extent of inequality justification, the utopian points out the role of justice ideologies in affecting normative justice judgments (what ought to be). The legitimacy model introduced here considers the perception of inequality as representing the existential approach, whereas the utopian approach is represented by the inclusion of the justice ideologies of individualism and egalitarianism.

This article is organized in six sections. The first one offers some background information about economic inequality in the Chilean case. The second section focuses on an approach to the study of legitimacy based on public opinion survey items about the justification of earning differences in a society; the third part introduces the perception of inequality and justice ideologies as background to the hypotheses about consensus in inequality justification. Fourth section describes the data, variables, and methods, fifth section presents the results of the analysis. The last section summarizes the main findings, limitations of this study, and proposes ideas for future research.



**Fig. 1** Evolution of poverty rate—Chile 1990–2006

### Economic Inequality in Chile

In macro-economical terms, Chile is a country characterized by a significant economic expansion in recent years, with an average GDP per capita growth of more than 4.1% yearly during 1990–2005 (Schmidt-Hebbel, 2006). At the same time, the economic development—and the consequent destination of greater resources to reforms in the social area—has led the country to a remarkable decrease in the amount of the population living in poverty: from 38.6% of people living under the poverty line<sup>1</sup> in 1990 to 13.7% in 2006 (MIDEPLAN, 2006), as depicted in Fig. 1.

The proportion of people in absolute poverty has steadily decreased in the last two decades (Borzutzky, 2009), locating Chile as the country with the lowest poverty rate in Latin America (CEPAL, 2006). Nevertheless, at the same time the country is characterized by a high and stable economic inequality. A classical standard index of inequality based on household income is the Gini coefficient, which measures the difference between the actual distribution and a perfectly equal distribution in which each person receives exactly the same income.<sup>2</sup> Based on this index, Chile occupies 14th place in the ranking of countries ordered according to unequal distribution of income (UNDP, 2007), a situation that has not significantly varied in the last 20 years (Kremermann, 2004). The particular combination of high income inequality and steady economic growth has produced a remarkable impact

<sup>1</sup> The poverty line is estimated as total per capita income basis on the household. If that income does not reach the value of two basic baskets of goods per capita, that household is considered poor. Among the poor, it is possible to distinguish the indigents, who are people whose income is not enough to reach the value of one basic basket of goods. The basic basket of goods is defined by CEPAL, and it has a minimum caloric requirement to assure individual subsistence, estimated at 2,176 calories per day per person (Escobar, 2003).

<sup>2</sup> The Gini coefficient varies between zero and one, with zero representing perfect equality and one a hypothetical situation in which one individual receives all the income. Alternative measures of inequality are the Atkinson index and the Theil index, but Gini is preferred in this case because of its widespread use in several inequality datasets.

**Table 1** Inequality indexes in Chile 1990–2006

	1990	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000	2003	2006
Index 10/10	30.1	27.9	29.9	32.2	34.5	32.8	34.6	31.3
Index 20/20	14.0	13.2	14.0	14.7	15.5	14.5	14.6	13.1
Index 10/40	3.5	3.3	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.4	3.0
Gini coefficient <sup>a</sup>	0.57	0.56	0.57	0.57	0.58	0.58	0.57	0.54

Source MIDEPLAN (2006), CASEN survey

<sup>a</sup> Calculated based on individuals

on the current stratification structure of the country, characterized by an increase in average salaries accompanied by widening gaps in earnings associated with occupations (Contreras & Gallegos, 2007).

Table 1 shows the evolution of the income distribution in Chile from 1990 to 2006 according to different proportions of income deciles (decile 1 being the poorest 10% and decile 10 the richest 10%), based on the Survey of Socio-Economic Characterization CASEN conducted by the Ministry of Planning and Cooperation (MIDEPLAN, 2006).

The indexes refer to decile ratios, in which the numerator is the highest decile and the denominator the lowest. The value of 30.1 in 1990 establishes that households in the highest decile obtained 30.1 times more income when compared to households in the lowest decile. The index 10/10 tells us that there have been variations in income distribution, but not remarkable differences between the year 1990 and the year 2006. However, the indexes 20/20 and 10/40 show negative variation in the year 2006, which can be interpreted as a reduction of inequality between the richest deciles and the lowest deciles, especially the poorest 40% of the population, but still the gap between the richest and the poorest remains relatively stable. The differences between the indexes 10/10 and 20/20 are related to the extreme concentration of income in the richest decile. Actually, Chile becomes the most egalitarian country of Latin America when taking this decile out of the comparison among income groups (Torche, 2005). The high concentration of income is even more striking when considering that the issue of redistribution has been at the core of the political agenda of the post authoritarian governments since the recovery of democracy in 1990. Such a situation certainly calls for explanations that go beyond the rational interests of the majority, opening the door for considering alternative perspectives that take into account what people think about inequality and to what extent it would be possible to talk about the legitimacy phenomenon in this case.

## Justification of Inequality and Social Justice Research

The legitimacy of economic inequality seems a paradoxical idea. It contradicts a basic rational argument that posits that a high level of economic inequality would be rejected by almost everyone in society since it contradicts the egalitarian ideals from the Enlightenment onwards. Such a rational argument is generally referred to in the

literature as the *Meltzer–Richard hypothesis* (Borge & Rattsø, 2004; Meltzer & Richard, 1981), which predicts pressure for redistribution from the median voter (Milanovic, 2000) in a context of high economic inequality. From this perspective, to point out that economic inequality can be *legitimate* seems counter-intuitive. Nevertheless, it is actually this counter-intuitive character what is at the core of the concept of legitimacy in social sciences from Max Weber onwards. Weber was the first scholar who made reference to a belief in legitimacy or *der Legitimitätsglaube* (Weber, 1947[1922]) to explain submission to external structures of authority. Key to this conceptualization is the idea of *voluntary submission*, the suppression of the individual will due to some external demand. This idea, initially applied to the concept of authority, has been expanded to encompass the distribution of goods and rewards in society (Della Fave, 1980, 1986; Kreidl, 2000; Stephenson, 2000; Wegener, 1992), thus linking beliefs regarding distribution and the legitimacy of economic inequality.

Several empirical studies have made use of the concept of legitimacy to explain support for an unequal distribution in society, particularly from 1990 onward (Evans & Kelley, 2006; Gijsberts, 1999; Hegtvedt & Johnson, 2000; Johnson et al., 2006; Jost & Major, 2001b; Jost, Pelham, et al., 2003; Kelley & Evans, 1993; Kluegel, Mason, & Wegener, 1995; Mason & Kluegel, 2000; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Zelditch, 2001b). Whereas social psychological research in this area is characterized by experimental research about individual and group differences (Jost, 2002; Jost & Hunyady, 2003; Kay et al., 2009; Major & Schmader, 2001; Sidanius et al., 2001), sociological empirical research in the area of legitimacy of economic inequality has been closely related to individual conceptions of how goods and rewards should be distributed within society, a field of study known as empirical social justice research (Berger, Zelditch, Anderson, & Cohen, 1972; Cohen, 1987; Frohlich, Oppenheimer, & Eavey, 1987; Jasso & Wegener, 1997; Kluegel, Mason, et al., 1995; Wegener, 1999). Studies in this area are frequently based on distributive justice and inequality survey studies, such as the International Social Survey Program and the International Social Justice Project (Aalberg, 2003; Evans et al., 2010; Kluegel, Mason, et al., 1995; Mason & Kluegel, 2000; Verwiebe & Wegener, 2000; Wegener, 2000; Wegener & Liebig, 2000). Within this framework, individuals preferences for inequality (what ought to be) are usually contrasted with the current distribution of goods and rewards in society (what is).

The level of income inequality that characterizes a society has become a central variable for the analysis of individual distributive preferences in different contexts. In this line of research, comparative survey evidence has shown that economic inequality is not necessarily evaluated as unjust (Hadler, 2005; Osberg & Smeeding, 2006). However, there are two aspects that so far have barely been tackled in this area and in which this study aims to contribute. First, in conceptual terms most of the time the justification of inequality and the legitimacy of inequality are treated as synonyms. This article points out that each concept is of a different character, whereby a certain level of inequality justification does not in itself account for legitimacy, but rather it requires additional considerations regarding consensus among status groups. Second, most empirical survey studies have not considered societies with high levels of income inequality among the countries that they have analyzed, a research gap that this article aims to bridge by considering the Chilean case.

## Justification of Inequality, Consensus, and Legitimacy

One of the main areas in social justice literature is related to the evaluation of rewards according to occupations, the so-called justice of occupational earnings. The literature on the justice of occupational earnings encompasses relative deprivation theory (Crosby, 1979; Runciman, 1966), equity theory (Adams, 1963), status value theory (Berger et al., 1972; Ridgeway, 1991), and justice evaluation theory (Jasso, 1980), all of which address the individual's experience of justice/injustice as well as the measurement of it. Building on this literature, in this article I use a term called the *just earnings gap* (Castillo, 2009a) as a means for the empirical assessment of the individual justification of inequality. This term is calculated as a proportion of survey items about just earnings for two occupations on the extremes of the status continuum: a manager and a factory line worker. This proportion tells us how much it is considered just for a high status occupation to earn in relation to a low status occupation. With this conceptualization it is possible to address the justification of inequality within large societies via public opinion studies (Castillo, 2010; Evans et al., 2010; Gijssberts, 1999; Hadler, 2005; Osberg & Smeeding, 2006).

Now, what is the relation between the justification of inequality and the legitimacy of inequality? Even though they could be treated as synonyms, their distinction is highly relevant for the sociological study of legitimacy. Justification of inequality in itself is not enough for defining legitimacy since, even if we were able to measure it, we still need a standard for assessing to what extent a certain level of inequality justification can be considered as evidence of legitimacy. A way of assessing legitimacy has been provided by its definition as a collective process instead of mere private consent (Hegtvedt & Johnson, 2000), meaning that the norms are regarded as valid regardless of the personal benefits associated with them (Beetham, 1991; Dornbusch & Scott, 1975; Weber, 1947), which I here call *consensual legitimacy* (Castillo, 2009b). Although this notion has mostly been applied to the study of the legitimacy of authority, it is possible to make the link toward the legitimacy of inequality by thinking of legitimacy as consensus among different status groups in society about the justification of earning differences. A situation of no-legitimacy would be characterized by lack of consensus, which would be a rational consequence given that status groups profit differently from the benefits of an unequal distribution. On the contrary, if beyond instrumental interests (Weber, 1947), groups of different socioeconomic statuses mostly agree on what a just earning distribution should look like, then we will have evidence demonstrating consensual legitimacy.

## Explaining Consensual Legitimacy of Inequality

In addition to an empirical assessment of the justification of inequality, social justice theories provide the theoretical framework for explaining legitimacy in its consensual conceptualization presented above. In this realm, two main determinants of justice standards are highlighted in the literature: the *utopian* and the *existential*

(Kluegel, Csepeti, Kolosi, Orkeny, & Nemenyi, 1995; Shepelak & Alwin, 1986). The *utopian* determination of justice standards finds its roots in the philosophical literature of social justice, which argues for the existence of universal ideals of justice that orient social action, such as the principle of utility (Mill, 1863) the principle of difference (Rawls, 1971), or general distributive principles as justice ideologies (Jost & Hunyady, 2003; Sidanius et al., 2001; Wegener & Liebig, 1993, 1995). The *existential* perspective proposes that individual standards of justice are context dependent since the meanings of “what is just” change over time and space (Walzer, 1983). Authors such as Berger et al. (1972) have suggested that what individuals consider just is generally oriented by the actual distribution of goods in a particular society instead of a general utopian principle of justice. In terms of the justice of earnings, this argument means that the evaluation of occupational earnings is based on the current distribution of earnings within a particular society. Thus, within this existential–utopian framework, consensus in earning differences could have two different sources: on the one hand, the influence of ideologies that support the current status quo, and that both high and low status groups would similarly support, and on the other hand, the impact of the perceived current distribution on the justification of earning differences.

### Existential Standards, Perceived Inequality, and Consensual Legitimacy

The central aspect of the existential view consists of the influence of the current distribution on the consensus about inequality justification. Since the current distribution comes to the individual through his/her perception of the situation, the perception of economic inequality becomes here the focus of our attention. Even though perception of inequality has been previously related to the study of legitimacy (Gijssberts, 1999; Headey, 1991; Kelley & Zagorski, 2004; Mühleck & Wegener, 2002; Wegener, 1999), the link between both concepts remains by and large sidelined in empirical research. Previous studies have pointed out the *status dependency* of inequality perceptions (Groß, 2003; Wegener, 1987, 1990). The perception of reward hierarchies does not mirror reality adequately, but rather it is relative to the location an observer occupies within these hierarchies: low status observers tend to reduce the status continuum, leveling down perceived earning differences, whereas high status observers tend to polarize them. Explanations of this phenomenon are related to the available information on which the perception is based, the so-called availability heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), since the information about high status salaries in low status environments is scarce and probably leads to a downward bias, whereas high status individuals usually have information about low status salaries. An additional explanation is related to self-perceptual biases (Wegener, 1990), by which people tend to assume that their own earnings are near the average earnings. As a consequence of both available information and perceptual biases, low status observers would perceive high status earnings closer to their own earning, stretching down the status continuum.

Now, if the contextual information is actually expected to generate differences among status groups regarding inequality perception, how could this explain consensus in the justification of inequality? A response to this answer requires




attention to evidence supporting a positive association between perception and justice judgments (Burgoyne, Routh, & Sidorenko-Stephenson, 1999; Castillo, 2009a, b; Gijsberts, 1999; Kelley & Evans, 1993). In general, such a relationship means that a perceived earning is taken as a referential standard for a just earning, along with the existential determination pointed out before. The link between perception and justice judgments has also been associated in the area of social cognition to the *anchoring effect*. An anchor is “an arbitrary value that the subject tends to consider before making a numerical estimate” (Jacowitz & Kahneman, 1995, p. 1161). This means, a piece of information that the respondent takes as a reference for a judgment in situations of indeterminacy. Markovsky (1988) proposes this effect as a possible explanation for the determination of justice judgments, since “a just reward estimate should be biased toward a ‘reward anchor’ when that anchor is on the same scale as a potential just reward response” (Markovsky, 1988, p. 215). Therefore, in the line of consensus, people of low and high status would consider just a similar level of inequality with regard to the amount of inequality they perceive. In other words, the relative distance between just differences and perceived differences should be constant across status groups. As Wegener points out under the concept of the *illusion of distributive justice*, “we believe the distribution of goods to be just because we misperceive the distributions of these goods themselves” (1987, p. 1). Going back to the question at the beginning of this paragraph, we can now postulate the following argument: differences among status groups in inequality justification would be related to differences in inequality perception. This would lead to the hypothesis that, when considering (i.e., controlling) differences in inequality perception, we would find consensus in inequality justification among groups of different socioeconomic status.

### Utopian Standards and Justice Ideologies

The consideration of justice ideologies in the legitimacy model reflect the influence of utopian standards on the just earning differences (Shepelak & Alwin, 1986), serving as a counterpoint to the existential standards. Studies about ideologies have a long tradition in social sciences from Marx onwards (see Larrain, 1992), usually related to forms of domination from a privileged group over less privileged ones. Given that such a situation of domination would have as a consequence the maintenance of the status quo, the term *legitimizing ideology* has become a central concept in psychosocial theories of system justification and social dominance (Jost et al., 2009; Jost & Major, 2001b; Jost, Pelham, et al., 2003; Sidanius et al., 1996; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). On the other hand, sociological empirical literature has used the term *justice ideologies*, which can be defined as normative judgments based on general statements about how goods and rewards should be distributed in society (Castillo, 2006; Lippl, 2003; Mühleck, 2009; Mühleck & Wegener, 2002; Verwiebe & Wegener, 2000; Wegener, 1999; Wegener & Liebig, 2000). In this sense, in conceptual terms justice ideologies are not necessarily assumed to legitimize a given situation, they specifically refer to economic distribution, and in methodological terms they are thought of more as characteristics of societies than of individuals or small groups.

Two justice ideologies that commonly appear in the literature are individualism and egalitarianism. Individualism refers to the distribution according to personal achievement, merit, and abilities, whereas egalitarianism corresponds to the support for a distribution of equal shares, with the state being the main allocator (Kluegel, Mason, et al., 1995; Wegener, 1999). The hypothesis about the influence of ideologies on justification of inequality is that individualism produces consensus among status groups regarding the justification of inequality, whereas egalitarianism enhances the dissensus by having a negative influence. Although this competing influence could neutralize the ideological effect, the argument here is that individualism is expected to have a stronger impact on inequality justification, therefore resulting in a legitimizing effect. The predominant effect of individualism is based on the distinction between primary and secondary ideologies (Wegener, 1999). Primary ideologies are those that predominate in a particular society and are related to cultural values (Wegener, 1999). Assuming that the strong market reforms implemented in Chile have had an impact on preferences for distribution (Escobar, 2003; Marcel & Solimano, 1993), individualism should acquire a predominant character. In contrast, egalitarianism would be of a *secondary* nature, i.e., influenced by the position in the stratification structure, leading low status people to have higher support for this ideology. As pointed out by Kluegel (1989), such a situation could be associated with the phenomenon of *split consciousness* particularly in low status groups who, as well as supporting the justice ideology of egalitarianism, can at the same time endorse the primary ideology of individualism. In this sense, individualism should have a more decisive influence as an explanatory cause of consensual legitimacy (i.e., as a mediator) when compared to egalitarianism. This means that the high expected support for individualism in Chile could explain the consensus across status groups regarding differences in occupational earnings.

Figure 2 summarizes the main arguments and hypothetical associations presented in this section. The consensual legitimacy is represented in the explanatory model as consensus among status groups about inequality justification, this means, a lack of influence of status on the just earning gap. At first sight it seems paradoxical that an individual variable is oriented to measure consensus in a society, but the rationale behind this formulation is to test the degree of consensus despite differences in individual status.



**Fig. 2** Consensual legitimacy model

Perception and ideologies in the model are considered *mediator* variables that represent the existential and utopian determination of consensus, respectively. Mediators are variables that explain the relationship between two and more variables (Baron & Kenny, 1986; Frazier, Tix, & Barron, 2004; Mühleck & Wegener, 2002), and setting the predictors in this position in the model will enable us to test their contribution in explaining consensus in just earnings differences. The question to answer can be formulated as: to what extent is the amount of earning differences considered just explained by existential (perceptions) or utopian (ideologies) standards of justice? Even though the hypotheses suggest that both ideologies and perceptual variables have an influence as based on previous evidence, a relevant point to tackle in the discussion will be which standard has the greater influence, and what are the consequences of this in terms of legitimacy of inequality.

## Data, Variables, and Methods

### Data

The *International Social Justice Project* (ISJP) is a collaborative research project based on public opinion surveys with a special focus on distributive issues and cross country comparisons. It includes specific research topics such as the preference for different justice ideologies, justice evaluations of one's own income and also others' incomes, perception of social inequality, and attributions of poverty and wealth. The project started in 1991 with 12 countries agreeing to fill in a common questionnaire in national representative samples (Alwin & Wegener, 1995). The most recent survey (ISJP 2006) was conducted in five countries: Germany, Chile, Czech Republic, Hungary, and Israel, and was carried out via face-to-face-interviews concentrating on citizens living in private households (Legewie, Gerlitz, Mühleck, Scheller, & Schrenker, 2006).

The fieldwork in Chile was performed in July–September 2007. The survey covered people over 18 and it was representative of 75% of the population. For practical reasons (costs and deadline for obtaining the data) some regions of the country were excluded, such as two administrative regions in the south (regions XI and XII), as well as Easter Island and the Juan Fernández Islands. The survey was stratified and multi-staged according to Probabilities Proportionate to Size (PPS), and applied in a face-to-face interview. The completion rate was 41.2%, and the final number of questionnaires for the analysis was 890.

### Variables

#### *Dependent Variable*

The *just earnings gap* is an approach to measuring the justification of economic inequality based on earning differences considered just between high and low status occupations. Building on principles of the justice evaluation theory (Jasso, 1980;

Jasso & Wegener, 1997), as well as on previous research in international comparison, the just earnings gap can be operationalized as the logarithmic ratio between the just salary for a high status occupation and a low status occupation:

$$\text{Just earnings gap} = \ln \left( \frac{\text{just earning}_{\text{high status occupation}}}{\text{just earning}_{\text{low status occupation}}} \right) \quad (1)$$

This operationalization attempts to reflect the differences in earnings considered just for a high and a low status occupation, i.e., a measure of the justification of economic inequality. Concretely, the differences are expressed as a ratio of the earning considered just for a high status occupation, divided by the earning considered just for a low status occupation. A situation of absolute equality is represented in the ratio as 0 (logarithm of 1), positive values indicate that the high status occupation should earn more than the low status one, and negative values the opposite. The higher the value, the higher the salary of the high status occupation should be in relation to the salary of the low status occupation, and hence the more the earning inequality is considered just. Besides, the use of a ratio permits abstraction away from currency units, focusing directly on the relative income hierarchy (Gijssberts, 1999; Kelley & Zagorski, 2004). The natural logarithm applied to the term follows the elaborations of Jasso regarding income magnitudes, since the difference in income in the upper extreme of the income continuum have a lower weight than those at the lower end. It is assumed that people think more in terms of percentages or proportions than in absolute differences (Kelley & Evans, 1993), i.e., an increase of \$10 for someone who earns \$100 means much more than for someone who earns \$10,000,000.

The items of the ISJP questionnaire regarding occupational earnings are presented in Table 2.

### *Independent Variables*

Independent variables are classified into exogenous and endogenous predictors. Exogenous predictors are presented in Table 3. A main indicator of status is the *individual income*, which in modern societies is related to the acquisition of goods and status symbols, which influences the position in the stratification structure (Warner & Hoffmeyer-Zlotnik, 2003). Income variables are considered in the context of the household size to obtain a closer approach to the status situation. ISJP includes information from several sources of family income which, divided by the number of people in the household, constitute the *household equivalent net income*.

**Table 2** Questions about just occupational earnings in ISJP

Items	
High status occupation	[Now] tell me what you think a just and fair average monthly income for a chairman or managing director of a large corporation would be?
Low status occupation	[Now] tell me what you think a just and fair average monthly income would be for an unskilled worker, such as a factory line worker?

**Table 3** Exogenous predictors

Type	Variable name	Operationalization
Status	Net equivalent income	Total family monthly income/number of people in the household
	Educational level	(1) Primary incomplete (2) Primary complete (3) Secondary education (4) Technical superior education (5) University education
	Subjective standing	Self attributed social position on a scale from 1 (low social standing) to 10 (high social standing)
Socio-demographic controls	Sex	Female = 1, ref. male = 0
	Age	In years
	Employment status	Unemployment = 1, ref. other employment situation = 0
	Religion	Catholic = 1, ref. other religions/no religion = 0
	Ethnic group	Yes = 1, ref. no = 0

A second variable related to status is the *educational level*, whereas a third variable in this group corresponds to the *subjective self position*, which consists of a rating scale usually from one to ten in which the respondent positions himself from low to high status.<sup>3</sup> Finally, some individual variables such as age, sex, employment status, and religion are usually considered in sociological research as controls, i.e., their possible influence is assessed even though there are not specific hypotheses regarding these.

*Perception of inequality* and *justice ideologies* are the two predictors in the legitimacy model that are considered endogenous. Many of the hypotheses regarding these two concepts assume this endogenous character, since according to the model they act as *mediators* between the effect of other (exogenous) variables and the dependent variable.

### Perception of Inequality

Questions regarding perception of occupational earnings were presented before the questions about just earnings in the survey. This variable is operationalized in a similar way as the just earnings gap, but instead of just earnings it considers questions regarding perceived occupational earnings. The corresponding items are described in Table 4.

Based on these questions it is possible to build a function reflecting the perceived earnings inequality, called the *perceived earnings gap*:

<sup>3</sup> It can be argued that this status predictor is not exogenous since it is an attitudinal variable. Taking this into consideration, in the model parameter estimation this variable is considered as endogenous, but was located exceptionally in this section to simplify the description of the legitimacy model with only two types of endogenous predictors (perception and ideologies).

**Table 4** Questions about perceived occupational earnings

	Items
High status occupation	What do you think a chairman or a managing director of a large corporation earns per month on average?
Low status occupation	And how about an unskilled manual worker, such as a factory line worker? What do you think an unskilled worker earns per month on average?

$$\text{Perceived earnings gap} = \ln \left( \frac{\text{perceived earning}_{\text{high status occupation}}}{\text{perceived earning}_{\text{low status occupation}}} \right) \quad (2)$$

Properties of the ratio and the logarithm have the same characteristics as in the just earnings gap. The higher the value of the term, the higher the perception of earnings inequalities between occupations in the extremes of the status continuum.

### Justice Ideologies

The ISJP survey includes a series of questions about general normative orientations regarding the distribution of goods and rewards in society. With such questions it is possible to tap different underlying dimensions that represent the justice ideologies, which in the case of this research are classified into two: individualism and egalitarianism. Underlying or latent dimensions means that these two variables (individualism and egalitarianism) are not measured directly from a single question, but they represent an aspect that is common to different questions in the surveys (in statistical terms, they correspond to a factor). The items corresponding to the factors are shown in Table 5.

### Methods

Given the presence of latent variables and mediator/endogenous variables, the analysis is mostly performed with structural equation models (Bollen, 1989; Jöreskog, 1970; Muthén, 2004).

**Table 5** Items corresponding to justice ideologies in ISJP

	Items
Individualism	People who work hard deserve to earn more than those who do not The responsibility held by the employee on the job should influence pay The employee's individual effort should influence pay
Egalitarianism	The government should place an upper limit on the amount of money any person can make The fairest way of distributing wealth and income would be to give everyone equal shares The government should redistribute income from the better-off to those who are less well-off

Items are rated on a scale from 1 (strongly agree) to 5 (strongly disagree). They are reverse coded prior to the factor analysis

## Analysis

Starting with descriptive results, Table 6 shows the means of the just gap by the independent variables. This table takes the just gap without the logarithmic term, so that the coefficients can be easily interpreted as a proportion of how much a high status occupation should earn with regard to a low status occupation.

As a reference for Table 6, the mean value of the just gap is 11.29,  $SD(18.63)$ . This means, on average, it is considered just for a manager to receive a salary that is about 11.3 times more than the salary of a factory line worker. The values low, medium, and high of some variables are calculated as 3-quantiles (terciles) of the corresponding variable.

The justification of earning differences significantly increases with income ( $F_{(4,715)} = 5.01$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ) and educational levels ( $F_{(4,792)} = 4.72$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ). Such associations are actually in accordance with a rational perspective, since it is expected that higher status individuals who profit more from an unequal distribution are more willing to justify larger earning differences. This means, a lack of *direct* consensus among status groups that in principle do not give support to a consensual hypothesis. The adjective of *direct* here emphasizes that we are still analyzing one-

**Table 6** Mean and standard deviation of the just gap by independent variables

Variables	Values	Mean just gap	SD just gap
Income	1st quintile	9.90	23.63
	2nd quintile	9.49	13.75
	3rd quintile	10.39	12.83
	4th quintile	12.07	12.36
	5th quintile	13.70	25.10
Education	Primary incomplete	7.83	9.17
	Primary complete	11.05	16.98
	Secondary education	11.40	20.84
	Technical superior education	11.57	12.04
	University educ.	16.21	18.37
Subjective standing	Low	9.24	15.20
	Medium	12.85	21.47
	High	8.65	10.57
Perceived gap	Low	4.41	3.29
	Medium	8.73	5.92
	High	20.46	29.01
Individualism	Low	8.95	9.58
	Medium	10.90	21.12
	High	11.46	17.68
Egalitarianism	Low	17.51	14.77
	Medium	10.95	17.38
	High	10.86	20.73

to-one associations and that, according to the model proposed here, consensus could be mediated via perceptual or ideological variables. Actually, we observe important changes in the just gap means regarding perceptual and ideological variables in the expected direction, although individualism is not significant (perceived gap:  $F_{(2,792)} = 141.20, p < 0.001$ ; individualism:  $F_{(2,793)} = 1.38, p = 0.25$ ; egalitarianism  $F_{(2,794)} = 10.09, p < 0.001$ ). Having this background information in mind, the following step is to test whether the influence of status variables on inequality justification holds under the presence of perception and ideologies as mediator variables, for which we first need to consider the factor structure of the justice ideologies. Table 7 shows the results of the confirmatory factor analysis for the ideologies of individualism and egalitarianism.

The two-factor model fits the data well as reflected in the non-significant  $\chi^2$  and the RMSEA value lower than 0.05 (Kline, 2005). Two loadings were allowed to vary freely in the non-intended ideology since this contributed to a better fit and the loadings were rather low ( $<0.3$ ). The two ideologies extracted as latent variables present a low correlation, leading to the conclusion that they are independent constructs, a finding in line with justice research which proposes that the support for one ideology does not necessarily imply rejection of the other, even though their contents seem to be logical opposites (Kluegel, 1989).

Figure 3 illustrates the interrelationships among variables to be later tested in a structural equation model.

The path diagram represents the influence of the status and control variables on the perceived gap, justice ideologies, and the just gap. Additionally, it includes the prediction of the just earnings gap on the perceived gap and justice ideologies as mediator variables. Social standing appears as predicted by income, education, and control since it is considered an endogenous status variable.

**Table 7** Confirmatory factor analysis for justice ideologies in ISJP Chilean data

Items	Egalitarianism	Individualism	u2
The government should place an upper limit on the amount of money any person can make	0.52	0.20	0.67
The fairest way of distributing wealth and income would be to give everyone equal shares	0.54	–	0.71
The government should redistribute income from the better-off to those who are less well-off	0.65	–	0.58
People who work hard deserve to earn more than those who do not	0.17	0.39	0.81
The responsibility held by the employee on the job should influence pay	–	0.71	0.50
The employee's individual effort should influence pay	–	0.77	0.40
Model fit			
$\chi^2$ : 5.55, $df(5)$ , $P$ value = 0.33. CFI: 0.99, RMSEA: 0.01			
Correlation between factors: 0.07			


WLSMV estimation. Standardized coefficients. Obs: 864. Non-depicted factor loadings fixed to zero  
All coefficients are significant at  $p < 0.001$



Table 8 illustrates a summary of the results of the structural equation models. Model 1 depicts the influence of status variables on the perceived gap. In general, the results deliver information about the positive relation between status variables and perception of inequality, i.e., regarding the hypothesis of the status dependency of inequality perception. Subjective social standing does not appear as significant either here or in the following models. Based on the descriptive associations between standing and the just gap in Table 6, a possible quadratic association was tested, without improving the results ( $\beta = -0.001$ ,  $t = 0.546$ ,  $p = 0.585$ ).

Model 2 shows that status variables do not have a significant effect on individualism, supporting the idea that this ideology has a *primary* nature (Wegener, 1995) since it appears as consensual among different status groups. In the case of egalitarianism, we see in Model 3 that in general people of higher income exhibit lower support for this ideology. This means that this ideology acquires a *secondary* nature (Wegener, 1995), determined by demands associated with social position—especially in relation to income. Still, the explanatory power of status and control variables in each case is rather low.

Model 4 represents all previous pieces of information together in a single model: status variables, perception of inequality, justice ideologies, and the just earnings gap as the ultimate dependent variable. A graphical and simplified version of this model is depicted in Fig. 4, based on the on the model previously presented in Fig. 2. The main finding from this model is that status variables do not have a significant influence on the justification of earning differences, contrary to what we observed in the descriptive results of Table 6. This lack of association now supports the consensual legitimacy hypothesis: status groups do not appear to differ in the extent of inequality justification, which is probably due to the inclusion of perceptual and ideological variables, an assumption to be tested later by separating direct from indirect effects. Regarding the influence of ideologies, we observe in



**Fig. 3** Structural equation model of consensual legitimacy


**Table 8** SEM of just gap on perceived gap, justice ideologies and status variables

	Perceived gap (1)	Individualism (2)	Egalitarianism (3)	Just gap (4)
Educational level (ref. = primary incomp.)				
Primary complete	0.30 (1.48)	0.02 (0.28)	0.05 (0.49)	−0.04 (−0.26)
Secondary complete	0.18 (1.06)	0.00 (−0.06)	0.06 (0.74)	−0.03 (−0.26)
Technical superior	0.61** (2.81)	0.16 (1.65)	−0.04 (−0.31)	−0.05 (−0.32)
University	0.55* (2.29)	0.05 (0.54)	−0.22 (−1.48)	0.03 (0.18)
Household income	0.18** (3.55)	−0.04 (−1.42)	−0.08* (−2.47)	0.04 (1.10)
Subjective standing	0.00 (−0.04)	0.01 (0.67)	−0.01 (−0.56)	0.00 (−0.14)
Perceived gap				0.45** (18.15)
Individualism				0.25* (2.39)
Egalitarianism				−0.33** (−3.84)
Observations	669	669	669	669
R <sup>2</sup>	0.06	0.04	0.05	0.34

Model fit

 $\chi^2$ : 58.65,  $df(44)$ ,  $p$  value: 0.06. CFI: 0.97, RMSEA: 0.02

WLSMV estimator, unstandardized coefficients,  $z$  statistics in parentheses. Weighted data. Non-displayed control variables: sex, age, employment status, religion, ethnic group. Social standing, perceived gap, individualism, and egalitarianism are set as endogenous variables in Model 4

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ **Fig. 4** Results for the consensual legitimacy model

Model 4 that both show evidence of a significant influence on the just gap in the expected sense: individualism has a positive impact and egalitarianism a negative one. According to these results, preferences for general utopian standards about distribution would have an influence on preferences for the distribution of occupational earnings, confirming previous evidence (Gijsberts, 1999; Mühleck & Wegener, 2002; Verwiebe & Wegener, 2000). At the same time, in Model 4 the influence of the perceived gap on the just gap appears as highly significant. Making

reference to the consensual legitimacy model, this means that both utopian standards (ideologies) and existential standards (perception of inequality) play a role in explaining the just earnings gap. Nevertheless, the magnitude of influences (as expressed in the  $z$  values of the coefficients) suggests that perception is the most relevant determinant in the model regarding what people consider a just distribution of earnings. An additional element to consider is that the association of perception of inequality was not significant with either individualism ( $b = 0.30$ ,  $z = 1.66$ ,  $p = 0.096$ ) or with egalitarianism ( $b = 0.047$ ,  $z = -1.795$ ,  $p = 0.073$ ), therefore both variables appear to have independent effects on the justification of inequality.

Taking into account the differentials in the sizes of influence of perceptual and ideological variables, a further step in the analysis consists of determining to what extent perception and ideologies *explain* consensual legitimacy, i.e., act as *mediators* between the status variables and the just earnings gap. In order to test the differential contribution of perception and ideologies, the model presented in Table 9 reports direct and indirect effects. The independent variables selected for this analysis were income and university educational level, since they were the only two that reported a significant total effect that allowed mediation by other variables.

Referring to the first model in Table 9, we observe that income does have a positive total effect on the just earning gap without the presence of other variables. The indirect effects are the part of the total effect that is accounted for with mediator variables, in this case perception of inequality and justice ideologies. As we can see, perception of inequality denotes a highly significant effect when compared to the ideologies (in this case only egalitarianism), which is interpreted as a predominance of existential over utopian standards regarding preferences for inequality. The second model gives further support to these results, since the positive effect of having university education on the justification of inequality again is mediated by the perception of inequality. As a final result of the models, the direct effect of income and university education on the just gap is not significant, in accordance with the hypothesis of consensual legitimacy for the Chilean case. Nevertheless, the consensus does not appear as an *absolute consensus* but rather a *relative consensus*, since the effect of status variables on the just earnings gap appears as positive in principle, but this is later accounted for by and large by perceptual variables. This does not mean that individuals justify larger inequality than the inequality they perceived, which is actually not the case. Rather, it means that judgments about inequality appear as framed or anchored in perception, which serves as orientation or a standard for justice judgments.<sup>4</sup> In other words, even though the just income gap is always *something less* than the perceived inequality, this something less is not random but quite consistently dependent on perception as reflected by the notorious increase in the variance explained by Model 4 in Table 8 ( $R^2 = 34\%$ ). Therefore, the consensus among status groups regarding justification of inequality appears to be mostly explained by existential standards of justice, this means, “what is” (as indicated here by perception) has an impact on “what ought to be.”

<sup>4</sup> This is named by Markovsky (1988) as assimilation effect, which occurs when a judgment is biased towards an anchor.

**Table 9** Direct and indirect effects of income and university education on the just gap

	Income → just gap	Univ. education → just gap
Total effect	0.14 (3.49)**	0.39 (2.17)*
Indirect effects	0.10 (3.41)**	0.31 (2.66)**
By		
Perceived gap	0.08 (3.46)**	2.25 (2.24)*
Individualism	−0.01 (−1.24)	0.02 (0.74)
Egalitarianism	0.03 (2.08)*	0.07 (1.43)
Direct effect	0.04 (1.10)	0.09 (0.57)

Model fit

 $\chi^2$ : 58.65,  $df(44)$ ,  $p$  value: 0.06. CFI: 0.97, RMSEA: 0.02

WLSMV estimator, unstandardized coefficients,  $z$  statistics in parentheses. Weighted data. Non-displayed control variables: sex, age, employment status, religion, ethnic group

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$

## Summary and Discussion

This research was aimed to be an empirical study of the legitimacy of economic inequality with a focus on Chile as a case study, guided by the question: *To what extent is economic inequality considered legitimate in a context of high economic inequality?* The central hypothesis adopted an alternative perspective to traditional views that typically predict a crisis in legitimacy in contexts of high inequality. Instead, this research was oriented by the proposal that individual perceptions and beliefs play a chief role in legitimacy processes while simultaneously being strongly influenced by context characteristics. The focus on the impact of a high level of inequality on legitimacy is the reason for the examination of the case of Chile, as it is one of the countries with the highest indexes of income inequality worldwide. After conducting empirical analysis, it is possible to highlight two main findings. The first one is that perception and ideologies influence the amount of inequality considered just: individualism is related to a larger justice gap, egalitarianism to a smaller one, and the perception of larger inequality is positively associated with the justification of larger earnings gaps. Even though ideologies do influence the just earnings gap, analysis of the explanatory power showed that the perception of inequality plays a stronger role. The second conclusion relates to the evidence in accordance with the hypothesis of legitimacy as consensus, whereby status groups did not differ in the amount of inequality considered just. Assuming that status variables are proxies for rational interests, their lack of significance as predictors of the just earning gap was interpreted as a sign of consensus. This consensus is not considered absolute, since status groups actually vary in their preferences for income differences, but rather is a *consensus relative to perception of inequality*: differences between what is perceived and what is just do not significantly vary across status groups. In other words, what is perceived influences what ought to be, and since the perceived inequality also increases with status, the differences in just earnings become consensual among status groups. The predominant character of

inequality perceptions in explaining consensual legitimacy is considered as evidence of the existential determination of justice judgments, which is a key argument for explaining the legitimacy of inequality in societies with high inequality such as Chile.

The existential determination of justice constitutes the core aspect of the argument regarding the legitimacy of inequality in contexts of high inequality. In other words, context matters as a reference standard for normative judgments. That context matters is something taken for granted in current social research, but still the relevant question in this regard is whether the context or *what is* keeps determining beliefs about *what ought to be* even in situations where the current distribution could lead to challenging utopian justice principles. This means, even accepting that context matters, it could be expected that utopian standards of equality begin to play a stronger role than existential standards in extreme situations of inequality. This debate is expressed in empirical terms in the juxtaposition between justice ideologies (utopian standards) and the perception of inequality (existential standards). From this empirical implementation of the utopian–existential debate, the answer given by this study is that although utopian standards play a relevant role, even in contexts of high levels of inequality such as Chile, standards of justice regarding distribution are predominantly existential: *what is* remains a central referent for *what ought to be*.

The evidence of consensual legitimacy in one of the most unequal societies as Chile is undoubtedly a provocative finding. It raises a series of questions regarding traditional approaches used in legitimacy studies that highlight ideological domination and false consciousness phenomena as the main explanatory concepts. As a counterpoint to traditional approaches, legitimacy here is mostly explained by perceptual phenomena. Therefore, low status individuals need not be indoctrinated into supporting a high level of inequality; they simply do not perceive much inequality and these perceptual biases would have consequences in terms of legitimation.

Given the key role of inequality perception in these findings, we can raise the question: Are perceptual differences an explanation of consensus or just a methodological artifact? Strictly speaking, the incorporation of perceived inequality does not explain consensus among status groups in inequality justification, but actually generates it since consensus appears only when incorporating perception. In methodological terms this effect can be merely attributed to the high correlation of perception and justification of inequality, and the positive association of both variables with status. But in substantive terms, it is possible to make the case for the necessary incorporation of perception when analyzing justification, since what is justified acquires sense only in relation to what is perceived. Concretely, it certainly is different to justify a gap of 10 when I perceive a gap of 20 as opposed to when I perceive a gap of 10. Therefore, differences in inequality justification should not be analyzed in a social vacuum (Finch, 1987) but under consideration of standards such as perceived inequality.

The consideration of standards for justice judgments brings to the fore some of the limitations of this study. In this article, the concept of *existential* was linked to perceptual variables, and perception does not necessarily mirror the current level of inequality. Therefore, a missing element in the analysis is the influence of the

current level of inequality in individual's justice conceptions. This would mean, besides perception, including contextual standards of inequality such as the Gini index or other indicators. If societies with a larger level of inequality evidence a larger inequality justification and high levels of consensus, this would certainly give stronger evidence in legitimacy research. For analyzing the impact of country indicators we would not only need a large country survey database in topics of inequality but also the participation of countries with high inequality. Unfortunately, this is unlikely to occur in the near future given the association between inequality and poverty, as poorer countries are usually not included in international collaborative research projects.

A further limitation of this study is the issue of the consequences of legitimacy or illegitimacy. The consensual dimension of legitimacy is closely related to the notion of consent proposed by Beetham (1991). Nevertheless, by *consent* Beetham mostly means *actions* that denote endorsement of the rules, not precisely an *overall consensus* as it was conceived in this research. The proposal of consensus as consent was related to some methodological limitations, since there are difficulties in assessing concrete actions reflecting endorsement in public opinion research. But, on the other hand, although it would have been possible to consider variables such as political participation or voting behavior as indicating consent, this would have meant changing the focus of the research to a different dependent variable. Therefore, I opted to concentrate on the consensus on justice of earnings as the main object of study, leaving open for future research the consideration of consent as actions denoting endorsement.

A final aspect to be tackled in future studies is the existential determination of consensual legitimacy. Such an argument seems to give economic inequality a deterministic character, making it appear as a self-reproducing and static process with no possibility of modification. This static character has been influenced by the analysis of cross-sectional data that offered neither the opportunity to examine time variations in legitimacy nor the possible influence of other factors such as the decrease in the poverty rate in Chile in the legitimation of earning differences. With the availability of the ISSP 2009 international dataset (in 2011), which will include replication on countries with high levels of inequality such as Brazil and Chile, an opportunity will be provided to advance in understanding the dynamics of legitimacy by implementing time-series-cross-sectional analysis.

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