

A. Algorithm 1: Derivation and Convergence Analysis

The derivation and convergence analysis of Algorithm 1 relies (for the most part) on the *customized preconditioned proximal-point (cPPP)* algorithm for generalized aggregative games proposed in [16, Algorithm 6]. The objective of this appendix is to show that the proposed market-clearing game (1), with cost functions and constraints sets defined in (17)–(19), satisfies all the technical conditions in [16, Theorem 2], among which is the existence of a variational GNE, i.e., item (i) of Proposition 1. Therefore, we invoke [16, Theorem 2] to prove convergence of Algorithm 1, i.e., item (ii) of Proposition 1. For a complete convergence analysis of the cPPP algorithm for aggregative games we refer to [16, Appendix C].

*Aggregative cost functions:* First, we show that the cost functions (17) can be cast as in [16, Eqn. (30)], i.e.

$$J_i(u_i, u_{-i}) = g_i(u_i) + (C \text{avg}(u))^T u_i, \quad (21)$$

where  $\text{avg}(u) := \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i \in \mathcal{N}} u_i$  denotes the average strategy. Let  $\mathcal{N}_i = \mathcal{N}$ , for all  $i \in \mathcal{N}$ , without loss of generality<sup>6</sup>. In this case,  $u_i \in \mathbb{R}^{(3+N)H}$ , for all  $i \in \mathcal{N}$ . Moreover, let  $\Xi^{\text{mg}} \in \mathbb{R}^{H \times (3+N)H}$  denote the matrix that selects the  $p_i^{\text{mg}}$ -component from the decision vectors  $u_i$ 's, and define the matrix  $D := N \text{diag}(d_1^{\text{mg}}, \dots, d_H^{\text{mg}})$ , where  $d_h^{\text{mg}}$  is the price coefficient for the main grid power. Then, the cost functions in (17) can be recast as [16, Eqn. (30)], or (21), with

$$g_i(u_i) = f_i^{\text{di}}(p_i^{\text{di}}) + f_i^{\text{st}}(p_i^{\text{st}}) + f_i^{\text{tr}}\left(\{p_{(i,j)}^{\text{tr}}\}_{j \in \mathcal{N}_i}\right) + \frac{1}{N}(Db)^T p_i^{\text{mg}}, \quad (22a)$$

$$C = (\Xi^{\text{mg}})^T D \Xi^{\text{mg}}. \quad (22b)$$

*Technical assumptions:* Next, we show that all the assumptions in [16, Theorem 2] are satisfied.

- (i) For all  $i \in \mathcal{N}^+$ , the cost function  $J_i(u_i, u_{-i})$  in (22a) is convex in  $u_i$ , since all the components of  $g_i$  are convex. Hence, [16, Assumption 1] holds.
- (ii) For all  $i \in \mathcal{N}^+$ , the local set  $\mathcal{U}_i$  in (18) is nonempty, closed and convex. Moreover, Slater's constraint qualification on the global feasible set  $(\prod_{i \in \mathcal{N}^+} \mathcal{U}_i) \cap \mathcal{C}$  holds under an appropriate choice of the parameters. Therefore, [16, Assumption 2] is satisfied.
- (iii) The *pseudo-subdifferential* mapping of the game (1) reads as  $F : u \mapsto \prod_{i \in \mathcal{N}} (\partial_{u_i} J_i(u_i, u_{-i})) \times \mathbf{0}$ , since  $J_{N+1} = 0$ . It follows by [30, Corollary 1], that the first term of  $F$ , i.e.,  $u \mapsto \prod_{i \in \mathcal{N}} \partial_{u_i} J_i(u_i, u_{-i})$ , is maximally monotone, since  $C$  in (22b) is positive semidefinite, i.e.,  $C = (\Xi^{\text{mg}})^T D \Xi^{\text{mg}} \succeq 0$ . Moreover, also the second term of  $F$ , i.e., the zero mapping  $\mathbf{0}$ , is maximally monotone. Therefore, it follows by [23, Proposition 20.23] that their cartesian product  $\prod_{i \in \mathcal{N}} (\partial_{u_i} J_i(u_i, u_{-i})) \times \mathbf{0} = F$  is maximally monotone. Hence, [16, Assumption 6] holds.
- (iv) By [16, Lemma 1 (i)], there exists a variational GNE of the game in (1), since the constraint sets  $\mathcal{U}_i$  in (18) are

bounded, and the pseudo-subdifferential mapping  $F$  is monotone. Hence, [16, Assumption 4] is satisfied. ■

B. Alternating Projection for Operational Feasibility

In this appendix, we propose an efficient algorithm to compute the projection onto the set  $\mathcal{U}_{N+1}$  (line 30 in Algorithm 1). First, let us recall the structure of  $u_{N+1}$ , i.e.,

$$u_{N+1} = \text{col} \left( \{\theta_y, v_y, p_y^{\text{tg}}, \{p_{(y,z)}^{\ell}, q_{(y,z)}^{\ell}\}_{z \in \mathcal{B}_y}\}_{y \in \mathcal{B}} \right),$$

and let us define the sets

$$\mathcal{S}_1 := \{u_{N+1} \mid (15) \text{ and } (16a) \text{ hold}\}, \quad (23)$$

$$\mathcal{S}_2 := \{u_{N+1} \mid (14a) \text{ and } (14b) \text{ hold}\}, \quad (24)$$

such that  $\mathcal{U}_{N+1} = \mathcal{S}_1 \cap \mathcal{S}_2$ . The proposed method, summarized in Algorithm 2, is essentially a *Douglas–Rachford splitting* (DRS) [23, § 26.3] applied to the *best approximation problem*  $\text{argmin}_{\xi \in \mathcal{S}_1 \cap \mathcal{S}_2} \|\xi - u_{N+1}\| = \text{proj}_{\mathcal{S}_1 \cap \mathcal{S}_2}(u_{N+1})$ , see e.g. [33, § 4.3] for a formal derivation of the algorithm.

Unlike  $\mathcal{U}_{N+1}$ , the projections onto  $\mathcal{S}_1$  and  $\mathcal{S}_2$  have closed-form expressions, hence Algorithm 2 only involves elementary operations. Specifically,  $\text{proj}_{\mathcal{S}_1}(u_{N+1}) = u_{N+1}^+$ , where

$$\theta_y^+ = \begin{cases} \underline{\theta}_y, & \text{if } \theta_y < \underline{\theta}_y \\ \bar{\theta}_y, & \text{if } \theta_y > \bar{\theta}_y \\ \theta_y, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}, \quad v_y^+ = \begin{cases} \underline{v}_y, & \text{if } v_y < \underline{v}_y \\ \bar{v}_y, & \text{if } v_y > \bar{v}_y \\ v_y, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases},$$

$$p_y^{\text{tg}+} = \begin{cases} p_y^{\text{tg}}, & \text{if } y \in \mathcal{B}^{\text{mg}} \\ 0, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases},$$

and for all  $y \in \mathcal{B}$ ,  $z \in \mathcal{B}_z$ , and  $h \in \mathcal{H}$

$$L_{(y,z),h} = \max \left\{ \|\text{col}(p_{(y,z),h}^{\ell}, q_{(y,z),h}^{\ell})\|, \bar{s}_{(y,z)} \right\},$$

$$(p_{(y,z),h}^{\ell})^+ = \frac{\bar{s}_{(y,z)}}{L_{(y,z),h}} p_{(y,z),h}^{\ell},$$

$$(q_{(y,z),h}^{\ell})^+ = \frac{\bar{s}_{(y,z)}}{L_{(y,z),h}} q_{(y,z),h}^{\ell}.$$

Whereas, since  $\mathcal{S}_2$  is an affine set, a closed-form expression for  $\text{proj}_{\mathcal{S}_2}$  is given in [23, Example 29.17(ii)].

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Algorithm 2: DRS for computing  $\text{proj}_{\mathcal{U}_{N+1}}(u_{N+1})$

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- 1: Initialize  $\xi(0) \in \mathbb{R}^{n_{N+1}}$ , and set  $\eta \in (0, 2)$
  - 2: **While convergence is not achieved do:**
  - 3:      $z(k) = \text{proj}_{\mathcal{S}_1}(\frac{1}{2}\xi(k) + \frac{1}{2}u_{N+1})$
  - 4:      $\xi(k+1) = \xi(k) + \eta (\text{proj}_{\mathcal{S}_2}(2z(k) - \xi(k)) - z(k))$
  - 5: **end while**
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<sup>6</sup>For example, by defining, for all  $i \in \mathcal{N}$ , the “dummy variables”  $\{p_{(i,j)}^{\text{tr}}\}_{j \in \mathcal{N} \setminus \mathcal{N}_i}$  for all the prosumers that do not trade with  $i$ .