

adoption system, to make this a reality for more and more orphans across the world.

I thank Senator BLUNT for his leadership, and we look forward to working on this issue for many years to come.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Missouri.

Mr. BLUNT. Mr. President, I thank Senator KLOBUCHAR. We will continue to work on this. We are glad it is so well-received and these are issues our colleagues pay close attention to. Whether it is domestic or international, we are going to continue to find ways to open the doors to more homes and to get access to more tire swings. I look forward to that work.

Mr. President, as in legislative session, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the consideration of S. Res. 331, submitted earlier today.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the resolution by title.

The bill clerk read as follows:

A resolution (S. Res. 331) expressing support for the goals of National Adoption Day and National Adoption Month by promoting national awareness of adoption and the children awaiting families, celebrating children and families involved in adoption, and encouraging the people of the United States to secure safety, permanency, and well-being for all children.

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the resolution.

Mr. BLUNT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the resolution be agreed to, the preamble be agreed to, and the motions to reconsider be considered made and laid upon the table with no intervening action or debate.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The resolution (S. Res. 331) was agreed to.

The preamble was agreed to.

(The resolution, with its preamble, is printed in today's RECORD under "Submitted Resolutions.")

RECESS

Mr. BLUNT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate stand in recess as under the previous order until 2:15 p.m. today.

There being no objection, the Senate, at 12:19 p.m., recessed until 2:15 p.m. and reassembled when called to order by the Presiding Officer (Mrs. CAPITO).

EXECUTIVE CALENDAR—Continued

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Rhode Island.

Mr. WHITEHOUSE. Madam President, I am here to respond to the nomination of Steven Bradbury for a senior legal position in the U.S. Department of Transportation. I have had some experience with Mr. Bradbury, and in my experience, he is disqualified from serving in a legal government position of trust, such as he has been nominated for.

The Bush administration pursued a policy of detainee mistreatment that since has been acknowledged to include torture of detainees. The process that got the United States of America into a place where it was torturing detainees was a legal process that was full of mistakes and failures by the Office of Legal Counsel at the Department of Justice—by Mr. Bybee, by Mr. Yoo, and, following them, by Mr. Bradbury.

Let's start with just a word on the Office of Legal Counsel. Within the Department of Justice, the Office of Legal Counsel is seen as being the best of the best. The Department of Justice prides itself on attracting, training, and perfecting the skills of the best lawyers in America.

As a U.S. Attorney, I had the privilege of serving with a lot of absolutely spectacularly skilled lawyers and trial advocates just in the small Rhode Island U.S. attorney's office and working with others from the Department of Justice, and I have a very, very high opinion of Department of Justice lawyers and Department of Justice lawyering. But even within the expectation that the Department of Justice lawyering will be first rate, the Office of Legal Counsel is supposed to be a cut above. These are people who go into that office with the possibility that they will become U.S. Supreme Court Justices. These are people who come out of clerkships on the U.S. Supreme Court—one of the highest academic achievements a law student can have—and end up joining the Office of Legal Counsel. The Office of Legal Counsel ought to be held to a very high standard.

What happened when the Office of Legal Counsel was asked to take a look at the CIA torture program in the Bush administration was that it fell down or rolled over in virtually every respect. The factual investigation into what the CIA was actually doing was weak and ineffectual. The legal investigation into the past, into precedents, was—as I said in previous speeches at the time—fire-the-associate quality legal work. It is particularly bad coming from the Office of Legal Counsel because the Office of Legal Counsel is supposed to be the best of the best.

It is hard to say that these guys failed having tried their best. They just weren't smart enough to figure it out. They just weren't working hard enough. They just didn't know enough about legal research or scholarship. So, you know, nice try but you blew it, but no harm in it because we don't expect much of you to begin with.

That is certainly not the case with OLC. The array of memos that the OLC wrote—the Bybee, Yoo, and Bradbury memos—were calamitous failures of historical and legal research. For one thing, they failed to recognize and report that there had been prosecutions of Japanese military officers after World War II for torturing American soldiers. One of the techniques of torture for which those Japanese soldiers

were prosecuted and convicted as torturers, as war criminals, was the use of the waterboard. You may be able to say that there were some different justifications. You may be able to say that there were some different circumstances, but to not even mention that, to not even do the research to find out that had taken place is a pretty bad legal failing.

One of the reasons was that they kept it so close hold that they didn't let military lawyers know what they were doing. One could argue that there is consciousness of guilt there, that they didn't want other lawyers to know what they were doing because they knew that what they were doing was shoddy legal work and they didn't want to be caught out in it. In fact, ultimately, a lot of those opinions were withdrawn.

The fact of the matter is that it was a failure to properly inform the President of the United States about this history of our country actually prosecuting Japanese soldiers for the type of conduct that the Department of Justice was approving that the CIA engage in. It wasn't just prosecutions of Japanese soldiers by American military tribunals. There were also prosecutions of American soldiers in the Philippines by courts-martial for torture. Guess what. The conduct involved was waterboarding.

Again, perhaps you can say that there were some differences, that there were some distinctions, but the fact is, in memo after memo—including the wrapup memo that Bradbury wrote—that was not discussed. It was not disclosed, and it was not discussed.

You may say: Well, you know, it is asking an awful lot of the Office of Legal Counsel to go and look at history, to go and look at the practice of our military in prosecuting adversary officers or in prosecuting our own soldiers. After all, we are just the Department of Justice. That is the Department of Defense. What could we possibly learn from that?

Well, obviously, that would be wrong and, obviously, that would be a mistake, particularly when you look across that boundary to military law and see these examples right on point that they did not bother to discuss or disclose.

Then, it gets better still. The OLC memos failed to disclose prosecutions by the Department of Justice for waterboarding. This is not some case that never got reported someplace, that was just a trial, and you would have to look deep into your own records to try to find out what took place—perhaps, without a reported decision, just a verdict from the jury. This was a case that was extensively documented with writings by the trial court judge, a U.S. district judge in the State of Texas, that went up on appeal to the circuit court of appeals, and the U.S. circuit court of appeals wrote a decision on appeal of the district court's decision.