

## SSE Assignment 2

Ananthanarayanan S



CB.SC.P2CYS23007

### DVTA Setup - DVTA - Part 1 - Setup (parsiya.net)


Use CFF Framework to analyse custom DVTA.exe created above.

To Start with the DVTA, first we need to setup SQL Server 2008







We have to setup support files




Add Database Engine



Now configure server






Add a password as a configuration of Server




Password Should be – 12345678

- We need to add users SQL Server Administrator





- start SQL Server 2008



## Create New Database

Database name:

Owner:

☒ Use full-text indexing


Database files:

| Logical Name | File Type | Filegroup      | Initial Size (MB) | Autogrowth                         |
|--------------|-----------|----------------|-------------------|------------------------------------|
| DVTA         | Rows ...  | PRIMARY        | 2                 | By 1 MB, unrestricted growth       |
| DVTA_log     | Log       | Not Applicable | 1                 | By 10 percent, unrestricted growth |

| Protocol Name | Status   |
|---------------|----------|
| Shared Memory | Enabled  |
| Named Pipes   | Disabled |
| TCP/IP        | Enabled  |
| VIA           | Disabled |





- Restart SQL Server



- Start a Filezilla Server in your computer
- Going to Admin Panel









1) Identify the Application architecture, languages and frameworks used?

- Upon opening the dvta.exe in CFF-explorer, we can identify the following information
- Architecture – 32 bit & 2 tier [Since it communicates with the database.]
- Languages used - .NET Assembly
- Frameworks - .NET framework




2. Decompile and try to retrieve the source code of the application? Also, check if any hardcoded sensitive information is found?

- By decompiling the application using DNSpy or MS Visual studio tools, we can see the source code of the application.



3) Sniff the traffic between client and server. Identify which protocol is being used for communication?

- With Wireshark we can sniff the client and server
- Next inspect the contents of the packets to determine whether the app is using TCP/UDP protocol for communication.
- In the packet inspection window, we can see that the protocol used by the dvta is TCP protocol.



4) Identify if unencrypted communication is happening between client and server?

- In this case we can use either ECHIMIRAGE / Wireshark. We have used Echomirage here.
- From the output we can see that when we login to DVTA, the data is sent as plaintext format to the database.

| Traffic Log                                     | Rules  | Intercept        |
|---|--|------------------|
| <b>Outbound TCP data to 192.168.56.110:1433</b> |  |                  |
| Offset  | Hex  | ASCII            |
| 0x0000  | 01 09 00 B2 00 00 01 00 16 00 00 00 12 00 00 00    | [...].           |
| 0x0010  | 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 73 00 | .....s.          |
| 0x0020  | 65 00 6C 00 65 00 63 00 74 00 20 00 69 00 74 00    | e.l.e.c.t..i.t.  |
| 0x0030  | 65 00 6D 00 2C 00 20 00 70 00 72 00 69 00 63 00    | e.m.,. .p.r.i.c. |
| 0x0040  | 65 00 2C 00 20 00 64 00 61 00 74 00 65 00 2C 00    | e.,. .d.a.t.e.,. |
| 0x0050  | 74 00 69 00 6D 00 65 00 20 00 66 00 72 00 6F 00    | t.i.m.e. .f.r.o. |
| 0x0060  | 6D 00 20 00 65 00 78 00 70 00 65 00 6E 00 73 00    | m. .e.x.p.e.n.s. |
| 0x0070  | 65 00 73 00 20 00 77 00 68 00 65 00 72 00 65 00    | e.s. .w.h.e.r.e. |
| 0x0080  | 20 00 65 00 6D 00 61 00 69 00 6C 00 3D 00 27 00    | .e.m.a.i.l.=.'   |
| 0x0090  | 72 00 61 00 79 00 6D 00 6F 00 6E 00 64 00 40 00    | r.a.y.m.o.n.d.,@ |
| 0x00A0  | 74 00 65 00 73 00 74 00 2E 00 63 00 6F 00 6D 00    | t.e.s.t...c.o.m. |
| 0x00B0  | 27 00  | '.               |

5) Capture and analyse the communication using proxy tools (eg: Burpsuite, Echo mirage).

- From the below screenshot, we can understand that using wireshark we're able to capture & analyse the requests that are being sent to the database and to the server.


```

206 2004/130/22:11:58.029370 3004-0000-0007-8201-2009-0072-6497-0F5A-TCV 34.443 + 8139 [ACK] Seq=3003 Ack=3545 Win=7000 Len=0
207 2004/130/22:11:58.052470 3004-0000-0007-8201-2009-0072-6497-0F5A-TCV.1 333 Application Data
208 2004/130/22:11:58.054791 3004-0000-0007-8201-2009-0072-6497-0F5A-TCV 34.443 + 8139 [ACK] Seq=2007 Ack=3110 Win=7000 Len=0
209 2004/130/22:11:58.054791 3004-0000-0007-8201-2009-0072-6497-0F5A-TCV 34.443 + 8139 [ACK] Seq=3003 Ack=3545 Win=7000 Len=0
210 2004/130/22:11:58.073490 3004-0000-0007-8201-2009-0072-6497-0F5A-TCV 34.443 + 8139 [ACK] Seq=3011 Ack=3882 Win=6536 Len=0
211 2004/130/22:11:58.096640 2004-0000-0007-8201-2009-0072-6497-0F5A-TCV.1 139 Application Data
212 2004/130/22:11:58.098040 3004-0000-0007-8201-2009-0072-6497-0F5A-TCV.1 185 Application Data
213 2004/130/22:11:58.098040 3004-0000-0007-8201-2009-0072-6497-0F5A-TCV.1 233 Application Data
214 2004/130/22:11:58.098813 3004-0000-0007-8201-2009-0072-6497-0F5A-TCV 34.443 + 8139 [ACK] Seq=3011 Ack=3817 Win=6556 Len=0
215 2004/130/22:11:58.098728 3004-0000-0007-8201-2009-0072-6497-0F5A-TCV.1 133 Application Data
216 2004-0000-0007-8201-2009-0072-6497-0F5A-TCV.1 189 Application Data
217 2004/130/22:11:58.098487 3004-0000-0007-8201-2009-0072-6497-0F5A-TCV 34.443 + 8139 [ACK] Seq=3017 Ack=3887 Win=7000 Len=0
218 2004/130/22:11:58.141918 3004-0000-0007-8201-2009-0072-6497-0F5A-TCV.1 143 Application Data
219 2004/130/22:11:58.141918 3004-0000-0007-8201-2009-0072-6497-0F5A-TCV.1 185 Application Data
220 2004/130/22:11:58.142020 2004-0000-0007-8201-2009-0072-6497-0F5A-TCV.1 78.0173 + 443 [ACK] Seq=3310 Ack=2887 Win=6536 Len=0
221 2004/130/22:11:58.141918 3004-0000-0007-8201-2009-0072-6497-0F5A-TCV.1 1444.0003 + 443 [ACK] Seq=1000 Ack=337 Len=254 Len=170 [TCP segment of a retransmission]
222 2004/130/22:11:58.141918 3004-0000-0007-8201-2009-0072-6497-0F5A-TCV.1 333 Application Data
223 2004/130/22:11:58.141918 3004-0000-0007-8201-2009-0072-6497-0F5A-TCV.1 333 Application Data
224 2004/130/22:11:58.141918 3004-0000-0007-8201-2009-0072-6497-0F5A-TCV 34.443 + 8083 [ACK] Seq=997 Ack=128 Win=600 Len=0
225 2004/130/22:11:58.141918 3004-0000-0007-8201-2009-0072-6497-0F5A-TCV 34.443 + 8082 [ACK] Seq=995 Ack=157 Win=600 Len=0
226 2004/130/22:11:58.141918 3004-0000-0007-8201-2009-0072-6497-0F5A-TCV 34.443 + 8137 [ACK] Seq=3006 Ack=337 Win=7000 Len=0
227 2004/130/22:11:58.141918 3004-0000-0007-8201-2009-0072-6497-0F5A-TCV 34.443 + 8139 [ACK] Seq=3003 Ack=3545 Win=7000 Len=0
228 2004/130/22:11:58.141918 3004-0000-0007-8201-2009-0072-6497-0F5A-TCV 34.443 + 8139 [ACK] Seq=3003 Ack=3545 Win=7000 Len=0
229 2004/130/22:11:58.141918 3004-0000-0007-8201-2009-0072-6497-0F5A-TCV 34.443 + 8139 [ACK] Seq=3003 Ack=3545 Win=7000 Len=0
230 2004/130/22:11:58.141918 3004-0000-0007-8201-2009-0072-6497-0F5A-TCV 34.443 + 8139 [ACK] Seq=3003 Ack=3545 Win=7000 Len=0
231 2004/130/22:11:58.141918 3004-0000-0007-8201-2009-0072-6497-0F5A-TCV 34.443 + 8139 [ACK] Seq=3003 Ack=3545 Win=7000 Len=0
232 2004/130/22:11:58.141918 3004-0000-0007-8201-2009-0072-6497-0F5A-TCV 34.443 + 8139 [ACK] Seq=3003 Ack=3545 Win=7000 Len=0
233 2004/130/22:11:58.141918 3004-0000-0007-8201-2009-0072-6497-0F5A-TCV 34.443 + 8139 [ACK] Seq=3003 Ack=3545 Win=7000 Len=0
234 2004/130/22:11:58.141918 3004-0000-0007-8201-2009-0072-6497-0F5A-TCV 34.443 + 8139 [ACK] Seq=3003 Ack=3545 Win=7000 Len=0
235 2004/130/22:11:58.141918 3004-0000-0007-8201-2009-0072-6497-0F5A-TCV 34.443 + 8139 [ACK] Seq=3003 Ack=3545 Win=7000 Len=0
236 2004/130/22:11:58.141918 3004-0000-0007-8201-2009-0072-6497-0F5A-TCV 34.443 + 8139 [ACK] Seq=3003 Ack=3545 Win=7000 Len=0
237 2004/130/22:11:58.141918 3004-0000-0007-8201-2009-0072-6497-0F5A-TCV 34.443 + 8139 [ACK] Seq=3003 Ack=3545 Win=7000 Len=0
238 2004/130/22:11:58.141918 3004-0000-0007-8201-2009-0072-6497-0F5A-TCV 34.443 + 8139 [ACK] Seq=3003 Ack=3545 Win=7000 Len=0
239 2004/130/22:11:58.141918 3004-0000-0007-8201-2009-0072-6497-0F5A-TCV 34.443 + 8139 [ACK] Seq=3003 Ack=3545 Win=7000 Len=0
240 2004/130/22:11:58.141918 3004-0000-0007-8201-2009-0072-6497-0F5A-TCV 34.443 + 8139 [ACK] Seq=3003 Ack=3545 Win=7000 Len=0
241 2004/130/22:11:58.141918 3004-0000-0007-8201-2009-0072-6497-0F5A-TCV 34.443 + 8139 [ACK] Seq=3003 Ack=3545 Win=7000 Len=0
242 2004/130/22:11:58.141918 3004-0000-0007-8201-2009-0072-6497-0F5A-TCV 34.443 + 8139 [ACK] Seq=3003 Ack=3545 Win=7000 Len=0
243 2004/130/22:11:58.141918 3004-0000-0007-8201-2009-0072-6497-0F5A-TCV 34.443 + 8139 [ACK] Seq=3003 Ack=3545 Win=7000 Len=0
244 2004/130/22:11:58.141918 3004-0000-0007-8201-2009-0072-6497-0F5A-TCV 34.443 + 8139 [ACK] Seq=3003 Ack=3545 Win=7000 Len=0
245 2004/130/22:11:58.141918 3004-0000-0007-8201-2009-0072-6497-0F5A-TCV 34.443 + 8139 [ACK] Seq=3003 Ack=3545 Win=7000 Len=0
246 2004/130/22:11:58.141918 3004-0000-0
```



6) Analyse the application workflow and observe which all files/folders are being used by the application using Process Monitor

- With the help of a tool called Process-Monitor can see that there are several files & folders being retrieved when running the DVTA.exe.




The screenshot shows the Process Monitor window with the following data:

| Time     | Process Name | PID   | Operation     | Path                                 | Result  | Detail                  |
|----------|--------------|-------|---------------|--------------------------------------|---------|-------------------------|
| 22:51:08 | MsMpEng.exe  | 5900  | CloseFile     | C:\Windows\System32\sihost.exe       | SUCCESS |                         |
| 22:51:08 | Code.exe     | 16116 | TCP TCPCopy   | LAPTOP-ABCLFDJP.8543 -> 2a04.4e42... | SUCCESS | Length: 2740, seqn...   |
| 22:51:08 | Code.exe     | 16116 | TCP Receive   | LAPTOP-ABCLFDJP.8543 -> 2a04.4e42... | SUCCESS | Length: 2740, seqn...   |
| 22:51:08 | dumpsp.exe   | 17768 | WriteFile     | C:\Temp\wireshark_Wi-FiX5UQ02.pca... | SUCCESS | Offset: 164500328, L... |
| 22:51:08 | DVTA.exe     | 7572  | Thread Create |                                      | SUCCESS | Thread ID: 17312        |
| 22:51:08 | DVTA.exe     | 7572  | Thread Create |                                      | SUCCESS | Thread ID: 13696        |

7) Exploit DLL Hijacking vulnerability (You can use a simple legitimate “Hello World” printing dll.


- In order to hijack a DLL, we need to find which DLL's that are being loaded when DVTA.exe runs is not found.
- For this we need to open Procmon & set the following 3 filters .




The screenshot shows a File Explorer window with the following data:

| Name                     | Date modified    | Type                  | Size     |
|--------------------------|------------------|-----------------------|----------|
| DBAccess.dll             | 03-09-2023 14:49 | Application extens... | 8 KB     |
| DBAccess.pdb             | 03-09-2023 14:49 | PDB File              | 16 KB    |
| DVTA.exe                 | 03-09-2023 14:49 | Application           | 218 KB   |
| DVTA.exe.Config          | 03-09-2023 14:50 | Configuration Sou...  | 3 KB     |
| DVTA.pdb                 | 03-09-2023 14:49 | PDB File              | 54 KB    |
| DVTA.vshost.exe          | 03-09-2023 14:49 | Application           | 23 KB    |
| DVTA.vshost.exe.config   | 03-09-2023 14:49 | Configuration Sou...  | 2 KB     |
| DVTA.vshost.exe.manifest | 03-09-2023 14:49 | MANIFEST File         | 1 KB     |
| EntityFramework.dll      | 03-09-2023 14:49 | Application extens... | 1,091 KB |
| EntityFramework.xml      | 03-09-2023 14:49 | XML File              | 1,094 KB |
| ExcelLibrary.dll         | 03-09-2023 14:49 | Application extens... | 116 KB   |
| hello-world-x64.dll      | 25-05-2024 22:54 | Application extens... | 11 KB    |

- We will Start Process Monitor Filter




- When click DVTA.exe automatically Hello world pop up will appear with opening of DVTA Login Page



- As we can see now when the DVTA.exe runs, it loads our calc.dll along with the application. Thus we have hijacked the DLL.

## 8) Check for sensitive information in the configuration files of the thick client application?

- In the folder of DVTA, we have few files . One of the files is App.config. It contains the following sensitive information.
- We have to open Visual Studio and analyse DVTA.exe.config.



```

1  <?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
2  <configuration>
3    <configSections>
4      <!-- For more information on Entity Framework configuration, visit http://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?linkID=237468 -->
5      <section name="entityFramework" type="System.Data.Entity.Internal.ConfigFile.EntityFrameworkSection, EntityFramework" />
6    </configSections>
7    <startup>
8      <supportedRuntime version="v4.0" sku=".NETFramework,Version=v4.5" />
9    </startup>
10   <appSettings>
11     <add key="DBSERVER" value="127.0.0.1\SQLEXPRESS" />
12     <add key="DBNAME" value="DVTA" />
13     <add key="DBUSERNAME" value="sa" />
14     <add key="DBPASSWORD" value="CTsvjZ0jQghXYbSRcPxpQ=" />
15     <add key="AESKEY" value="J8gtXc454oStWZHEF7HahcXPufj9vsk8" />
16     <add key="IV" value="fq20T0gWxa6g014" />
17     <add key="ClientSettingsProvider.ServiceUrl" value="" />
18     <add key="FTPSERVER" value="127.0.0.1" />
19   </appSettings>
20   <entityFramework>
21     <defaultConnectionFactory type="System.Data.Entity.Infrastructure.LocalDbConnectionFactory, EntityFramework">
22       <parameters>
23         <parameter value="v11.0" />
24       </parameters>

```

## 9) Identify sensitive information found in memory?

- From the source code which we got from DNSpy, we got to know that it stores the username & password in HKCU/dvta registry file.
- We can visit the registry to find the sensitive information which is stored in the memory.
- We have to open registry editor to analyse dvta username and password.



