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Close Elections e canais de combate à violência contra a mulher

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Resumo

Estudo sobre o efeito da representação política feminina em políticas de combate à violência doméstica.

Palavras-chave: Close Elections, Prefeitas, Violência Doméstica

1 Introdução

2 Eleições Marginais (Close Elections)

” Normative analysts of elections, quantitative scholars examining election margins and the disappearance of “marginal seats” and scholars of causal inference who examine close elections all rely upon a basic intuition – as the margin separating winner from loser in a two-candidate race gets smaller, the election becomes more “competitive” and its outcome more probabilistic.

[...]

In all cases, the smaller margin denotes greater electoral competition and often embeds notions of “fairness” and “fair chances.” As the election margin gets closer, the incentives induced by competition get larger. And at the limit, it is claimed, observers will witness near-randomness of the eventual outcome as the margin approaches zero. ”

(GRIMMER et al., 2011)

2.1 Regressão Descontínua (RDD)

The idea that close elections embed a random component that pushes a winner “over the top” is made as a useful statistical assumption. But underlying this statistical assumption are several assumptions about the politics of close elections. We begin our analysis of close elections by recounting the model of close elections used explicitly (and implicitly) in regression discontinuity designs (RDD), for two reasons. First, the RDD assumptions now compromise the dominant model used when exploiting close elections. Second, the statistical assumptions in the RDD model have clear empirical implications, which will provide useful insights into our alternative model of how competition occurs in close elections.

The use of regression discontinuity for causal inference requires assumptions about how competition occurs in elections. In a world of two candidates and one office, a really competitive race is one that both

candidates have a shot at winning. Taken to the extreme, this assumption about competition presumes that as the race gets close to equal vote shares, the outcome is determined as if a fair coin were tossed. This randomness creates opportunities for what is commonly called a “natural experiment.” If winning a marginal election is determined by the flip of a coin, then the background characteristics of candidates, parties, and districts that normally confound analyses are rendered orthogonal. This enables a study of a wide-range of consequences from winning office—rents, subsequent election advantages, a portfolio of policy choices, and policy outcomes—that are otherwise deeply confounded.

3 Modelagem Teórica

[analise economica da violencia contra a mulher da FARMER e TIEFENTHALER]
(FARMER; TIEFENTHALER, 1997)

$$y_{t,\mu} = \beta_0 + \gamma D_g + f(Mv_\mu) + x_{t,\mu}^\mu + x_{t,\mu}^p + \varepsilon_{t,\mu} \quad (1)$$

$y_{t,\mu}$: homicídios de mulheres

β_0 : intercepto

γ : efeito causal

D_g : eleição de uma mulher

$f(Mv_\mu)$: margem de vitória entre a prefeitas e prefeito

$x_{t,\mu}^\mu$: conjunto de características municipais

$x_{t,\mu}^p$: conjunto de características dos candidatos

$\varepsilon_{t,\mu}$: coeficiente de erro

4 Modelagem Empírica

5 Resultados

6 Conclusão

7 Anexo

8 TABELAS PRA APRESENTAÇÃO

	Resultado Contemporâneo				Resultado em t-1		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Prefeita	-1,889***	-1,197**	-0,861+	-0,651	-0,536	-0,139	0,04
Média de homicídios	2,02	2,02	2,02	2,02	2,02	2,02	2,02
Largura de banda	0,05	0,1	0,165 (CCT)	0,25	0,05	0,1	0,165
Número de observações	[379 336]	[715 641]	[1080 893]	[1382 1069]	[379 336]	[715 641]	[1069 883]

Tabela 1: Regressão descontínua para diferentes valores de largura de banda