# Metaketa I - Chapter 11 - Replication

*May 2, 2019*

## Contents

# 1 Notes on replication script

- This .Rmd file produces all tables, and figures reported in Chapter 11 of *Information, Accountability, and Cumulative Learning: Lessons from Metaketa I* in the order in which they appear in the text.
- The code exports results to folders "tables" and "figures" in this file's directory.
- Replication options include:
  - `prep`: if `TRUE`, generate data from raw files, if `FALSE`, loads cleaned data
  - `n_iter`: number of permutations of treatment assignment used in randomization inference analysis.
  - `load_iter_matrix`: if `FALSE`, generate `n_iter` columns of treatment assignment according to each study's assignment strategy. If `TRUE`, load existing assignment matrix with 2,000 iterations of treatment assignment.
  - `ri_action`: treatment effects and $p$-values from randomization inference can be generated from scratch if set to `"generate"`, loaded from existing file if (`"load"`), or not returned (`"ignore"`) in results. Note that these estimations may take a few hours depending on the value of `n_iter`.
  - `run_bayes`: if `TRUE`, will run Monte Carlo simulations. `run_bayes <- FALSE` will skip the Bayesian analysis.
  - `load_specification_matrices <- FALSE` will estimate, from scratch, treatment effects under all combinations of specification choices. Likewise, `load_mde_data <- FALSE` will re-run the diagnostic process for the minimal detectable effect analysis. Setting these options to `FALSE` will take several hours to run on an average machine.
  - `full_m1`: if `FALSE` turns off imputing `0`s for vote choice for cases with where voter turnout is 0 in the cleaned data.
- For a full clean replication empty the folders `figures` and `tables` and subfolder `data/temp` and set options: `prep <- TRUE`, `ri_action <- "generate"`, `run_bayes <- TRUE`, `load_iter_matrix <- FALSE`, `load_specification_matrices <- FALSE`, `load_mde_data <- FALSE`.
- This code requires installation of Rstan (unless `run_bayes <- FALSE`). See installation instructions here.
- The package `xlsx` requires a 64 bit Java install on PCs; for more detail see https://java.com/en/download/win10.jsp.

```
prep <- FALSE
n_iter <- 2000
load_iter_matrix <- TRUE
ri_action <- "load"
run_bayes <- TRUE
load_specification_matrices <- TRUE
load_mde_data <- TRUE
full_m1 <- TRUE
```

```
if(prep){
  madat <- pool_studies(
    add_vars= c("nij", "Q_alt", "N_alt", "lc5.councillor.party.switch",
                "lc5.chair.party.switch", "lc5.councillor.redistricted2016"))
  if(full_m1){
    madat$m1[is.na(madat$m1) & madat$m3==0] <- 0
    #m3==0 in Burkina Faso means unlikely to vote or definitely not voting.
    madat$m1[madat$m1==1 & madat$m3==0 & madat$ctry == "bf"] <- 0
    madat_raw <- pool_studies(dir = "data/temp")
    madat$m1_against <- ifelse(madat_raw$m1==0 & madat$m3==1, 1, 0)
    madat$m1_against[is.na(madat$m1_against) & madat$m3==0 & madat$ctry != "bf"] <- 0
    madat$m1_against[madat$m1==1 & madat$m3==0 & madat$ctry == "bf"] <- 0
    madat$m1NA <- (is.na(madat$m1) & madat$m3 == 1)

  }
  save(madat, file = "data/temp/madat.Rda")
  write.csv(madat, "madat.csv")
}

load("data/temp/madat.Rda")

# Load previously generated permutation matrices
if(load_iter_matrix){
  load("data/temp/assign_iter.Rda")
}else{
  system.time(assign_iter <- assign_i(madat, n_iter))
  save(assign_iter, file = "data/temp/assign_iter.Rda")
}
  madat_iter <- cbind.data.frame(madat, assign_iter)
  rm(assign_iter)
  save(madat_iter, file = "data/temp/madat_iter.Rda")
```

## 2 Figure 11.1: Treatment Effect of Information on Incumbent Vote Choice

```
  cov <- "m14i+m17i+m18i+m20i+m21i+m22i+m24i+m26i+m27i"

  t1c1 <-  results(dat = madat_iter, ri_p = ri_action, sims = n_iter,
                   file_rite_obj = "data/temp/ri_m1pool_all_g_unadj.Rda",
                   good = TRUE, depvar = "m1", exclude_councilors = FALSE)
  t1c2 <- results(dat = madat_iter, ri_p = ri_action, sims = n_iter,
                   file_rite_obj = "data/temp/ri_m1pool_ben_g_unadj.Rda",
                   depvar = "m1", weights = FALSE, good = TRUE, country = "ben")
  t1c3 <- results(dat = madat_iter, ri_p = ri_action, sims = n_iter,
                   file_rite_obj = "data/temp/ri_m1pool_brz_g_unadj.Rda",
                   depvar = "m1", weights = TRUE,  good = TRUE, country = "brz")
  t1c4 <- results(dat = madat_iter, ri_p = ri_action, sims = n_iter,
                   file_rite_obj = "data/temp/ri_m1pool_bf_g_unadj.Rda",
                   depvar = "m1", weights = FALSE, good = TRUE, country = "bf")
  t1c5 <- results(dat = madat_iter, ri_p = ri_action, sims = n_iter,
                   file_rite_obj = "data/temp/ri_m1pool_mex_g_unadj.Rda",
                   depvar = "m1", weights = FALSE, good = TRUE, country = "mex")
```

```
t1c6 <- results(dat = madat_iter, ri_p = ri_action, sims = n_iter,
                file_rite_obj = "data/temp/ri_m1pool_ug1_g_unadj.Rda",
                depvar = "m1", weights = FALSE, good = TRUE, country = "ug1")
t1c7 <- results(dat = madat_iter, ri_p = ri_action, sims = n_iter,
                file_rite_obj = "data/temp/ri_m1pool_ug2_g_unadj.Rda",
                depvar = "m1", weights = TRUE,  good = TRUE, country = "ug2",
                exclude_councilors =FALSE)

 t2c1 <-  results(dat = madat_iter, ri_p = ri_action, sims = n_iter,
                file_rite_obj = "data/temp/ri_m1pool_all_b_unadj.Rda",
                good = FALSE, depvar = "m1", exclude_councilors =FALSE)
t2c2 <- results(dat = madat_iter, ri_p = ri_action, sims = n_iter,
                file_rite_obj = "data/temp/ri_m1pool_ben_b_unadj.Rda",
                depvar = "m1", weights = FALSE, good = FALSE, country = "ben")
t2c3 <- results(dat = madat_iter, ri_p = ri_action, sims = n_iter,
                file_rite_obj = "data/temp/ri_m1pool_brz_b_unadj.Rda",
                depvar = "m1", weights = TRUE,  good = FALSE, country = "brz")
t2c4 <- results(dat = madat_iter, ri_p = ri_action, sims = n_iter,
                file_rite_obj = "data/temp/ri_m1pool_bf_b_unadj.Rda",
                depvar = "m1", weights = FALSE, good = FALSE, country = "bf")
t2c5 <- results(dat = madat_iter, ri_p = ri_action, sims = n_iter,
                file_rite_obj = "data/temp/ri_m1pool_mex_b_unadj.Rda",
                depvar = "m1", weights = FALSE, good = FALSE, country = "mex")
t2c6 <- results(dat = madat_iter, ri_p = ri_action, sims = n_iter,
                file_rite_obj = "data/temp/ri_m1pool_ug1_b_unadj.Rda",
                depvar = "m1", weights = FALSE, good = FALSE, country = "ug1")
t2c7 <- results(dat = madat_iter, ri_p = ri_action, sims = n_iter,
                file_rite_obj = "data/temp/ri_m1pool_ug2_b_unadj.Rda",
                depvar = "m1", weights = TRUE,  good = FALSE, country = "ug2",
                exclude_councilors =FALSE)
```




Figure 1: Meta-Analysis: Country-Specific Effects on Vote Choice. Estimated change in the proportion of voters who support an incumbent after receiving good news (left panel) or bad news (right panel) about the politician, compared to receiving no information. Weighted unadjusted estimates. Horizontal lines show 95% confidence intervals for the estimated change. Entries under each estimate show p-values calculated by randomization inference. In all cases, the differences are close to zero and statistically insignificant.




Figure 2: Meta-Analysis: Country-Specific Effects on Turnout. Estimated change in the proportion of voters who turn out to vote after receiving good news (left panel) or bad news (right panel) about the politician, compared to receiving no information. Weighted unadjusted estimates; substantive results are similar for covariate-adjusted country-specific analysis [see Online Appendix]. Horizontal lines show 95% confidence intervals for the estimated change. Entries under each estimate show p-values calculated by randomization inference.

# 3 Figure 11.2: Treatment Effect of Information on Voter Turnout

## 4 Table 11.1: Effect of Information on Vote Choice and Turnout

```
# Treatment effects with nij and covariates
cov <- "m14i+m17i+m18i+m20i+m21i+m22i+m24i+m26i+m27i"

# vote choice
# good news
t1ncovc2 <- results(dat = madat_iter, sims = n_iter, ri_p = ri_action,
                    file_rite_obj = "data/temp/ri_m1pool_all_g_cov.Rda",
                    cov = cov, good = TRUE, with_N = TRUE, weights = TRUE, depvar = "m1", exclude_counci
# bad news
t2ncovc2 <- results(dat = madat_iter, sims = n_iter, ri_p = ri_action,
                    file_rite_obj = "data/temp/ri_m1pool_all_b_cov.Rda",
                    cov = cov, good = FALSE, with_N = TRUE, weights = TRUE, depvar = "m1", exclude_coun

# turnout
#good news
t3ncovc2 <- results(dat = madat_iter, sims = n_iter, ri_p = ri_action,
                    file_rite_obj = "data/temp/ri_m3pool_all_g_cov.Rda",
                    cov = cov, good = TRUE, with_N = TRUE, weights = TRUE, depvar = "m3", exclude_counci
# bad news
t4ncovc2 <- results(dat = madat_iter, sims = n_iter, ri_p = ri_action,
                    file_rite_obj = "data/temp/ri_m3pool_all_b_cov.Rda",
                    cov = cov, good = FALSE, with_N = TRUE, weights = TRUE, depvar = "m3", exclude_coun

# vote choice overall
t_m1_o <- results(dat = madat_iter, sims = n_iter, ri_p = ri_action, file_rite_obj = "data/temp/ri_m1poo
                  cov = cov, with_N = TRUE, depvar = "m1", exclude_councilors =FALSE)

# turnout overall
t_m3_o <- results(dat = madat_iter, sims = n_iter, ri_p = ri_action, file_rite_obj = "data/temp/ri_m3poo
                  cov = cov, with_N = TRUE, depvar = "m3", exclude_councilors =FALSE)
```

Table 1: Effect of Information on Vote Choice and Turnout

| | Vote Choice | | Turnout | | Vote Choice | Turnout |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Good News | Bad News | Good News | Bad News | Overall | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Treatment | 0.0004 | −0.003 | 0.002 | 0.018 | 0.003 | 0.017* |
| | (0.015) | (0.015) | (0.013) | (0.012) | (0.010) | (0.008) |
| $N_{ij}$ | −0.017 | −0.049*** | −0.0003 | 0.011 | −0.050*** | 0.009 |
| | (0.015) | (0.014) | (0.014) | (0.013) | (0.012) | (0.011) |
| Treatment * $N_{ij}$ | −0.010 | −0.001 | 0.001 | −0.0001 | −0.002 | −0.002 |
| | (0.019) | (0.019) | (0.019) | (0.015) | (0.012) | (0.011) |
| Control mean | 0.356 | 0.398 | 0.843 | 0.835 | 0.369 | 0.837 |
| RI $p$-value | 0.981 | 0.866 | 0.892 | 0.167 | 0.813 | 0.062 |
| Joint RI $p$-value | 0.954 | | 0.29 | | | |
| Covariates | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 13,196 | 12,531 | 14,500 | 13,148 | 25,820 | 27,737 |
| $R^2$ | 0.299 | 0.281 | 0.200 | 0.160 | 0.274 | 0.165 |

*Note:* Columns 1-4 estimate equations (**??**) and (**??**), while columns 5-6 estimate equation (**??**). "Vote choice" indicates support for the incumbent candidate or party. Standard errors are clustered at the level of treatment assignment. Pooled results exclude non-contested seats and include vote choice for LCV councilors as well as chairs in the Uganda 2 study (see Buntaine et al., Chapter 8). This means each respondent in the Uganda 2 study enters twice, and we cluster the standard errors at the individual level. We include randomization block fixed effects and a full set of covariate-treatment interactions. Control mean is the weighted and unadjusted average in the control group. * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

# 5 Figure 11.3: Bayesian Meta-Analysis: Vote Choice

```
# Stan code used in Fig 11.5 and 11.6 to sample from posterior distributions

  bmodel <- "
  data {
    int<lower=0> J; // number of countries
    real y[J]; // estimated treatment effects
    real<lower=0> sigma[J]; // s.e. of effect estimates
  }
  parameters {
    real mu;
    real<lower=0> tau;
    real eta[J];
  }
  transformed parameters {
    real theta[J];
    for (j in 1:J)
      theta[j] = mu + tau * eta[j];
  }
  model {
    target += normal_lpdf(eta | 0, 1);
    target += normal_lpdf(y | theta, sigma);
  }
  "
```

```
  # Function to make data from model
  take_results <- function(L) {
    out <- lapply(L, function(i)  coef(summary(i))[1,1:2])
    t(matrix(unlist(out),nrow = 2))
  }

  ### M1: Incumbent vote ###
  good_m1 <- take_results(lapply(list(t1c1, t1c2, t1c3, t1c4, t1c5, t1c6, t1c7), function(i) i$estimate
  bad_m1 <- take_results(lapply(list(t2c1, t2c2, t2c3, t2c4, t2c5, t2c6, t2c7), function(i) i$estimates

  ### M3: Turn out###
  good_m3 <- take_results(lapply(list(t3c1, t3c2, t3c3, t3c4, t3c5, t3c6, t3c7), function(i) i$estimate
  bad_m3 <- take_results(lapply(list(t4c1, t4c2, t4c3, t4c4, t4c5, t4c6, t4c7), function(i) i$estimates
```




Figure 3: Bayesian Meta-analysis: Turnout. The solid dots and lines show the estimates from the Bayesian model; the top row shows the overall meta-estimate of $\mu$ and $\tau$. The white dots show the original frequentist estimates: in many cases shrinkage can be observed, especially in cases that have effects that are more imprecisely estimated.

# 6 Figure 11.4: Bayesian Meta-Analysis: Turnout

```
## Warning in readLines(file, warn = TRUE): incomplete final line
## found on 'C:\Users\bicalho\Documents\Github\metaketa\ch11_meta-
## analysis\3_ma_bayes.stan'
```

```
## Warning: There were 37 divergent transitions after warmup. Increasing adapt_delta above 0.8 may help
## http://mc-stan.org/misc/warnings.html#divergent-transitions-after-warmup
```

```
## Warning: Examine the pairs() plot to diagnose sampling problems
```

```
## Warning in readLines(file, warn = TRUE): incomplete final line
## found on 'C:\Users\bicalho\Documents\Github\metaketa\ch11_meta-
## analysis\3_ma_bayes.stan'
```

```
## Warning: There were 9 divergent transitions after warmup. Increasing adapt_delta above 0.8 may help.
## http://mc-stan.org/misc/warnings.html#divergent-transitions-after-warmup
```

```
## Warning: Examine the pairs() plot to diagnose sampling problems
```




Figure 4: Bayesian Meta-analysis: Turnout. The solid dots and lines show the estimates from the Bayesian model; the top row shows the overall meta-estimate of $\mu$ and $\tau$. The white dots show the original frequentist estimates: in many cases shrinkage can be observed, especially in cases that have effects that are more imprecisely estimated.




Figure 5: Specification Distribution: Vote for Incumbent. Distribution of average treatment effects on vote for incumbent for a given specification choice, varying all other choices. Darkened vertical lines show estimates for which $p < 0.05$. The dashed vertical line indicates average treatment effect reported in Table 11.1.

# 7 Figures 11.5 and 11.6: Specification Distribution: Treatment effects under different specification choices

# 8 Figure 11.7: Power analysis of minimal detectable effects

# 9 Table 11.3: Manipulation check (effect of treatment on correct recollection)

```
# source("1d_prep_manipulation.R")
madat_m30 <- madat %>% subset(!is.na(correct))

m30mc1_o <- estimates(dat = madat_m30, depvar = "correct", exclude_councilors = TRUE)
m30mc2_o <- estimates(dat = madat_m30, depvar = "correct", weights = FALSE, country = "ben")
m30mc3_o <- estimates(dat = madat_m30, depvar = "correct", country = "brz")
m30mc4_o <- estimates(dat = madat_m30, depvar = "correct", weights = FALSE, country = "mex")
m30mc5_o <- estimates(dat = madat_m30, depvar = "correct", weights = FALSE, country = "ug1")
m30mc6_o <- estimates(dat = madat_m30, depvar = "correct", weights = TRUE, country = "ug2", exclude_cou
```




Figure 6: Specification Distribution: Turnout. Distribution of average treatment effects on voter turnout for a given specification choice, varying all other choices. Darkened vertical lines show estimates for which $p < 0.05$. The dashed vertical line indicates average treatment effect reported in Table 11.1.




Figure 7: Minimal detectable effects: Power analysis of minimal detectable effects, computed using Monte Carlo simulation. The horizontal axis varies the conjectured average treatment effect, while the vertical axis shows statistical power: the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis at $\alpha = 0.05$.




Figure 8: Minimal detectable effects: Power analysis of minimal detectable effects, computed using Monte Carlo simulation. The horizontal axis varies the conjectured average treatment effect, while the vertical axis shows statistical power: the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis at $\alpha = 0.05$.




Figure 9: Minimal detectable effects: Power analysis of minimal detectable effects, computed using Monte Carlo simulation. The horizontal axis varies the conjectured average treatment effect, while the vertical axis shows statistical power: the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis at $\alpha = 0.05$.




Figure 10: Minimal detectable effects: Power analysis of minimal detectable effects, computed using Monte Carlo simulation. The horizontal axis varies the conjectured average treatment effect, while the vertical axis shows statistical power: the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis at $\alpha = 0.05$.

Table 2: Manipulation check: Effect of treatment on correct recollection, pooling good and bad news [unregistered analysis]

| | Correct Recollection | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Overall | Benin | Brazil | Mexico | Uganda 1 | Uganda 2 |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Treatment | 0.072*** | 0.050 | 0.038 | 0.149*** | 0.119*** | −0.0001 |
| | (0.015) | (0.059) | (0.021) | (0.015) | (0.035) | (0.008) |
| Covariates | No | No | No | No | No | No |
| Observations | 16,173 | 897 | 1,677 | 2,089 | 750 | 10,760 |
| $R^2$ | 0.320 | 0.276 | 0.378 | 0.137 | 0.035 | 0.205 |

*Notes:* The table reports results on manipulation checks across studies, using recollection or accuracy tests at endline that were specific to the content of each study's interventions (MPAP measure M30). The dependent variable, correct recollection, is dichotomized in each study using the following measures: Benin: whether correctly recalled the relative performance of incumbent in plenary and committee work; Brazil: whether correctly recalled whether municipal account was accepted or rejected; Mexico: identification of content of the flyer; Uganda 1: index consisting of knowledge of MP responsibilities, MP priorities for constituency, and identities of contesting candidates. Individuals with an index equal to or greater than 1.5 on a 0-3 scale were coded as correct recalls; Uganda 2: whether correctly recalled relative financial accountability relative to other districts. We include randomization block fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the level of treatment assignment. *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001.

# 10 Table 11.4: Manipulation check (difference between posteriors and priors)

```
madat_m30b <- madat %>% subset(!is.na(post.prior.diff))
madat_m30b$post.prior.diff <- abs(madat_m30b$post.prior.diff)

# overall news
m30mc1_g <- estimates(dat = madat_m30b, good = NULL, depvar = "post.prior.diff", exclude_councilors = TR
m30mc2_g <- estimates(dat = madat_m30b, good = NULL, depvar = "post.prior.diff", weights = FALSE, counti
m30mc3_g <- estimates(dat = madat_m30b, good = NULL, depvar = "post.prior.diff", country = "brz")
# m30mc5_g <- estimates(dat = madat_m30b, good = TRUE, depvar = "post.prior.diff", weights = FALSE, cou
m30mc6_g <- estimates(dat = madat_m30b, good = NULL, depvar = "post.prior.diff", weights = TRUE, country
```

Table 3: Manipulation check: Absolute difference between posterior and prior beliefs for pooled good and bad news [unregistered analysis]

| | Absolute difference between posterior and prior beliefs | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Overall | Benin | Brazil | Uganda 2 |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Treatment | 0.006 | 0.063 | −0.003 | −0.023 |
| | (0.025) | (0.089) | (0.022) | (0.023) |
| Covariates | No | No | No | No |
| Observations | 12,704 | 389 | 1,677 | 10,638 |
| $R^2$ | 0.241 | 0.176 | 0.358 | 0.111 |

*Notes:* The table reports differences between beliefs about politician performance after (MPAP measure M30) and prior to treatment (MPAP measure M9). Posterior beliefs are measured using recollection tests at endline specific to the content of each study's intervention. Burkina Faso is excluded because their recollection measure was collected among treated subjects only. Mexico is excluded from results because the study does not contain pre-treatment measures of subjects beliefs. Uganda 1 is not included because the M30 measure is an aggregate measure of subjects' political knowledge and cannot be directly compared with the scale used for measuring priors. We include randomization block fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the level of treatment assignment. $^{*}p<0.05$; $^{**}p<0.01$; $^{***}p<0.001$.

# 11 Table 11.5: Effect of information on perception of importance of politician effort and honesty

```
# M5 ----
m5gc1 <- results(dat = madat_iter, good = TRUE, depvar = "m5", exclude_councilors = TRUE, sims = n_iter
                 ri_p = ri_action, file_rite_obj = "data/temp/ri_m5pool_g_unadj.Rda")
## good news

m5bc1 <- results(dat = madat_iter, good = FALSE, depvar = "m5", exclude_councilors = TRUE, sims = n_ite
                   ri_p = ri_action, file_rite_obj = "data/temp/ri_m5pool_b_unadj.Rda") ## bad news
# M6 ----
m6gc1 <- results(dat = madat_iter, good = TRUE, depvar = "m6", exclude_councilors = TRUE, sims = n_iter
                   ri_p = ri_action, file_rite_obj = "data/temp/ri_m6pool_g_unadj.Rda")  ## good news

m6bc1 <- results(dat = madat_iter, good = FALSE, depvar = "m6", exclude_councilors = TRUE, sims = n_ite
                   ri_p = ri_action, file_rite_obj = "data/temp/ri_m6pool_b_unadj.Rda") ## bad news
```

Table 4: Effect of information on perception of importance of politician effort and honesty

| | Effort | | Dishonesty | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Good News | Bad News | Good News | Bad News |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Treatment effect | −0.014 | −0.051 | −0.053 | 0.099 |
| | (0.046) | (0.051) | (0.047) | (0.098) |
| Control mean | 2.449 | 2.7 | 2.755 | 2.724 |
| RI $p$-value | 0.788 | 0.474 | 0.356 | 0.754 |
| Joint RI $p$-value | 0.5 | | 0.282 | |
| Covariates | No | No | No | No |
| Observations | 7,039 | 5,963 | 7,278 | 6,755 |
| $R^2$ | 0.253 | 0.294 | 0.300 | 0.231 |

*Note:* The table reports the effect of the treatment on voters' perception of how hard-working (MPAP measure M5) and dishonest (MPAP measure M6) the incumbent politician is. We pool Benin, Burkina Faso, Uganda 1, and Uganda 2 in columns (1) and (2), and Benin, Burkina Faso, Mexico, and Uganda 2 in columns (3) and (4). MPAP measures M5 (effort) and M6 (dishonesty). Regressions include randomization block fixed effects; standard errors are clustered at the level of treatment assignment. $^{*}$ $p < 0.05$; $^{**}$ $p < 0.01$; $^{***}$ $p < 0.001$

## 12 Table 11.6: Effect of information and source credibility on evaluation of politician effort and honesty

```
# Effort
m5_m24c1_g <- results(dat = madat_iter, sims = n_iter,
                      depvar = "m5", interactvar = "m24", good = TRUE,
                      ri_p = ri_action, file_rite_obj = "data/temp/ri_m5pool_m24_all_g_unadj.Rda")  ## g

m5_m24c1_b <- results(dat = madat_iter, sims = n_iter,
                      depvar = "m5", interactvar = "m24", good = FALSE,
                      ri_p = ri_action, file_rite_obj = "data/temp/ri_m5pool_m24_all_b_unadj.Rda") ## ba

# Honesty
m6_m24c1_g <- results(dat = madat_iter, sims = n_iter,
                      depvar = "m6", interactvar = "m24", good = TRUE,
                      ri_p = ri_action, file_rite_obj = "data/temp/ri_m6pool_m24_all_g_unadj.Rda")  ## g

m6_m24c1_b <- results(dat = madat_iter, sims = n_iter,
                      depvar = "m6", interactvar = "m24", good = FALSE,
                      ri_p = ri_action, file_rite_obj = "data/temp/ri_m6pool_m24_all_b_unadj.Rda")  ## b
```

Table 5: Effect of information and source credibility on evaluation of politician effort and honesty [unregistered analysis]

| | *Dependent variable:* | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Effort | | Dishonesty | |
| | Good News | Bad News | Good News | Bad News |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Treatment | −0.034 | −0.088 | −0.037 | 0.210 |
| | (0.079) | (0.090) | (0.085) | (0.202) |
| Credible Source | −0.051 | −0.010 | −0.022 | 0.125 |
| | (0.079) | (0.081) | (0.064) | (0.100) |
| Treatment * Credible Source | 0.033 | 0.070 | 0.010 | −0.197 |
| | (0.095) | (0.105) | (0.093) | (0.205) |
| Control mean | 2.451 | 2.703 | 2.75 | 2.679 |
| RI $p$-values | 0.728 | 0.518 | 0.708 | 0.861 |
| Joint RI $p$-value | 0.482 | | 0.614 | |
| Covariates | No | No | No | No |
| Observations | 6,436 | 5,406 | 6,483 | 5,844 |
| $R^2$ | 0.261 | 0.293 | 0.329 | 0.256 |

*Note:* The table reports the effects of information and the credibility of the information source on voter's perception of how hard-working (MPAP measure M5) and dishonest (MPAP measure M6) the incumbent politician is. We pool Benin, Burkina Faso, Uganda 1, and Uganda 2 in columns (1) and (2), and Benin, Burkina Faso, Mexico, and Uganda 2 in columns (3) and (4). Regressions include randomization block fixed effects; standard errors are clustered at the level of treatment assignment. * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

# 13 Table 11.7: Relationship between evaluation of politician effort and honesty with vote choice

```
madat_m1pool_g <- estimates(dat = madat_iter, weights = FALSE, depvar = "m1", return_df = TRUE, good = T

  madat_m1pool_g <- madat_m1pool_g %>%
    group_by(ctry) %>%
    mutate(m5 = m5 - mean(m5, na.rm = T)) %>%
    mutate(m6 = m6 - mean(m6, na.rm = T)) %>%
    ungroup()

m1m5c1g <- felm(m1~m5|fe|0|cl, data = madat_m1pool_g)
m1m6c1g <- felm(m1~m6|fe|0|cl, data = madat_m1pool_g)

madat_m1pool_b <- estimates(dat = madat_iter, weights = FALSE, depvar = "m1", return_df = TRUE, good = F

madat_m1pool_b <- madat_m1pool_b %>%
    group_by(ctry) %>%
    mutate(m5 = m5 - mean(m5, na.rm = T)) %>%
    mutate(m6 = m6 - mean(m6, na.rm = T)) %>%
    ungroup()

m1m5c1b <- felm(m1~m5|fe|0|cl, data = madat_m1pool_b)
m1m6c1b <- felm(m1~m6|fe|0|cl, data = madat_m1pool_b)
```

Table 6: Relationship between evaluation of politician effort and honesty with vote choice [unregistered analysis]

| | Incumbent vote choice | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Good news | | Bad news | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Effort | 0.052*** | | 0.066*** | |
| | (0.006) | | (0.006) | |
| Dishonesty | | −0.054*** | | −0.026*** |
| | | (0.005) | | (0.005) |
| Covariates | No | No | No | No |
| Observations | 11,040 | 11,452 | 10,190 | 10,943 |
| $R^2$ | 0.229 | 0.217 | 0.282 | 0.266 |

*Note:* The table reports the effects of information and the credibility of the information source on voter's perception of how hard-working (MPAP measure M5) and dishonest (MPAP measure M6) the incumbent politician is. We pool Benin, Burkina Faso, Uganda 1, and Uganda 2 in columns (1) and (3), and Benin, Burkina Faso, Mexico, and Uganda 2 in columns (2) and (4). Results exclude non-contested seats and include vote choice for LCV councilors as well as chairs in the Uganda 2 study. Regressions include randomization block fixed effects; standard errors are clustered at the level of treatment assignment. * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

# 14 Table 11.8: Effect of bad news on politician backlash

```
m8bc1 <- results(dat = madat_iter, good = FALSE, depvar = "m8",
                 ri_p = ri_action, file_rite_obj = "data/temp/ri_m8pool_all_b_unadj.Rda", sims = n_iter

m8bc2 <- results(dat = madat_iter, good = FALSE, depvar = "m8", weights = FALSE, country = "ben",
                 ri_p = ri_action, file_rite_obj = "data/temp/ri_m8pool_ben_b_unadj.Rda", sims = n_iter

m8bc3 <- results(dat = madat_iter, good = FALSE, depvar = "m8", weights = FALSE, country = "mex",
                 ri_p = ri_action, file_rite_obj = "data/temp/ri_m8pool_mex_b_unadj.Rda", sims = n_iter
```

Table 7: Effect of bad news on politician backlash

| | Politician response / backlash | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | Overall | Benin | Mexico |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| Treatment effect | 0.069* | 0.068 | 0.070*** |
| | (0.028) | (0.057) | (0.010) |
| Control mean | 0.108 | 0.068 | 0.146 |
| RI $p$-value | 0.082 | 0.435 | 0 |
| Covariates | No | No | No |
| Observations | 2,052 | 702 | 1,350 |
| $R^2$ | 0.623 | 0.504 | 0.848 |

*Note:* The table reports on whether the treatment led to the incumbent party or candidate campaigning on dimensions of the dissemminated information (MPAP measure M8). Backlash was measured for studies with clustered assignment. Regressions include randomization block fixed effects; standard errors are clustered at the level of treatment assignment. * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

## 15 Table 11.10: Effect of moderators on incumbent vote choice

```
# Coethnicity
## Good news - Mean centred
madat_m1_coethnic_mc_g <- prepdat_coethnic(madat_m1pool_g, madat_m1pool_g$m1, 0)
m1_m15mc_g1 <- results(dat = madat_m1_coethnic_mc_g, ri_p = ri_action,
                       file_rite_obj = "data/temp/ri_m1pool_m15_g_unadj.Rda",
                       depvar = "m1", interactvar = "m15", sims = n_iter, exclude_councilors = FALSE)

# Bad news - Mean centred
madat_m1_coethnic_mc_b <- prepdat_coethnic(madat_m1pool_b, madat_m1pool_b$m1, 0)
m1_m15mc_b1 <- results(dat = madat_m1_coethnic_mc_b, ri_p = ri_action,
                       file_rite_obj = "data/temp/ri_m1pool_m15_b_unadj.Rda",
                       depvar = "m1", interactvar = "m15", sims = n_iter, exclude_councilors = FALSE)
```

```
# Copartisan
## Good news - dichotomous
madat_m1_copart_bin_g <- prepdat_copartisan(madat_m1pool_g, madat_m1pool_g$m1, 1)
m1_m19bin_g1 <- results(dat = madat_m1_copart_bin_g, ri_p = ri_action,
                       file_rite_obj = "data/temp/ri_m1pool_m19_g_unadj.Rda",
                       depvar = "m1", interactvar = "m19", sims = n_iter, exclude_councilors = FALSE)
```

```
## Bad news - dichotomous
madat_m1_copart_bin_b <- prepdat_copartisan(madat_m1pool_b, madat_m1pool_b$m1, 1)
m1_m19bin_b1 <- results(dat = madat_m1_copart_bin_b, ri_p = ri_action,
                        file_rite_obj = "data/temp/ri_m1pool_m19_b_unadj.Rda",
                       depvar = "m1", interactvar = "m19", sims = n_iter, exclude_councilors = FALSE)
```

```
# Clientelism
## Good news - Mean centred
madat_m1_client_mc_g <- prepdat_client(madat_m1pool_g, madat_m1pool_g$m1, 0)
m1_m22mc_g1 <- results(dat = madat_m1_client_mc_g, ri_p = ri_action,
                       file_rite_obj = "data/temp/ri_m1pool_m22_g_unadj.Rda",
                       depvar = "m1", interactvar = "m22", sims = n_iter, exclude_councilors = FALSE)
```

```
## Bad news - Mean centred
madat_m1_client_mc_b <- prepdat_client(madat_m1pool_b, madat_m1pool_b$m1, 0)
m1_m22mc_b1 <- results(dat = madat_m1_client_mc_b, ri_p = ri_action,
                       file_rite_obj = "data/temp/ri_m1pool_m22_b_unadj.Rda",
                       depvar = "m1", interactvar = "m22", sims = n_iter, exclude_councilors = FALSE)
```

Table 8: Effect of moderators on incumbent vote choice

| | Incumbent vote choice | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Good news | Bad news | Good news | Bad news | Good news | Bad news |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Treatment | 0.018 | 0.0004 | −0.0001 | 0.013 | 0.001 | 0.004 |
| | (0.015) | (0.022) | (0.025) | (0.021) | (0.014) | (0.016) |
| Coethnicity | −0.022 | 0.0003 | | | | |
| | (0.029) | (0.041) | | | | |
| Treatment * Coethnicity | 0.058 | −0.042 | | | | |
| | (0.033) | (0.049) | | | | |
| Copartisanship | | | 0.216*** | 0.289*** | | |
| | | | (0.032) | (0.028) | | |
| Treatment * Copartisanship | | | 0.001 | 0.004 | | |
| | | | (0.038) | (0.036) | | |
| Clientelism | | | | | −0.041*** | −0.044*** |
| | | | | | (0.009) | (0.011) |
| Treatment * Clientelism | | | | | 0.013 | 0.006 |
| | | | | | (0.012) | (0.015) |
| Control mean | 0.365 | 0.442 | 0.36 | 0.397 | 0.359 | 0.383 |
| RI $p$-values | 0.276 | 0.988 | 0.998 | 0.564 | 0.936 | 0.84 |
| Joint RI $p$-value | 0.618 | | 0.829 | | 0.876 | |
| Covariates | No | No | No | No | No | No |
| Observations | 11,502 | 10,320 | 11,688 | 10,999 | 13,246 | 12,288 |
| $R^2$ | 0.268 | 0.230 | 0.276 | 0.289 | 0.279 | 0.259 |

*Note:* The table reports results of the treatment on three pre-specified moderators—coethnicity (MPAP measure M15), copartisanship (MPAP measure M19) and indulging in clienetelistic practices (MPAP measure M22)—on incumbent vote choice. The following cases are included in each regression: Co-ethnicity—Benin, Brazil, Uganda 1, Uganda 2; Co-partisanship—Benin, Brazil, Mexico, Uganda 1, Uganda 2; Clientelism—Benin, Burkina Faso, Brazil, Mexico, Uganda 1, Uganda 2. Pooled results exclude non-contested seats and include vote choice for LCV councilors as well as chairs in the Uganda 2 study. Regressions include randomization block fixed effects; standard errors are clustered at the level of treatment assignment. * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

## 16 Table 11.11: Effect of information and context heterogenity on incumbent vote choice

```
# M11 - certainty
m1_m11c1_g <- results(dat = madat_iter, sims = n_iter,
                     depvar = "m1", interactvar = "m11", good = TRUE, exclude_councilors =FALSE,
                     ri_p = ri_action, file_rite_obj = "data/temp/ri_m1pool_m11_all_g.Rda")  # good ne

m1_m11c1_b <- results(dat = madat_iter, sims = n_iter,
                     depvar = "m1", interactvar = "m11", good = FALSE, exclude_councilors =FALSE,
                     ri_p = ri_action, file_rite_obj = "data/temp/ri_m1pool_m11_all_b.Rda") # bad news
```

```
# M26 - secret ballot
m1_m26c1_g <- results(dat = madat_iter, sims = n_iter,
                     depvar = "m1", interactvar = "m26", good = TRUE, exclude_councilors =FALSE,
                     ri_p = ri_action, file_rite_obj = "data/temp/ri_m1pool_m26_all_g.Rda")  # good ne
```

```
m1_m26c1_b <- results(dat = madat_iter, sims = n_iter,
                     depvar = "m1", interactvar = "m26", good = FALSE, exclude_councilors =FALSE,
                     ri_p = ri_action, file_rite_obj = "data/temp/ri_m1pool_m26_all_b.Rda") # bad news
```

```
# M27 - free and fair election
m1_m27c1_g <- results(dat = madat_iter, sims = n_iter,
                     depvar = "m1", interactvar = "m27", good = TRUE, exclude_councilors =FALSE,
                     ri_p = ri_action, file_rite_obj = "data/temp/ri_m1pool_m27_all_g.Rda")  # good ne
```

```
m1_m27c1_b <- results(dat = madat_iter, sims = n_iter,
                     depvar = "m1", interactvar = "m27", good = FALSE, exclude_councilors =FALSE,
                     ri_p = ri_action, file_rite_obj = "data/temp/ri_m1pool_m27_all_b.Rda") # bad news
```

Table 9: Effect of information and context heterogenity on incumbent vote choice

| | Incumbent vote choice | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Good news | Bad news | Good news | Bad news | Good news | Bad news |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Treatment | −0.062 | −0.011 | 0.015 | −0.005 | −0.034 | 0.021 |
| | (0.055) | (0.054) | (0.024) | (0.030) | (0.035) | (0.033) |
| Certainty | −0.015 | 0.021 | | | | |
| | (0.017) | (0.018) | | | | |
| Treatment * Certainty | 0.032 | −0.003 | | | | |
| | (0.024) | (0.024) | | | | |
| Secret ballot | | | −0.001 | 0.010 | | |
| | | | (0.008) | (0.010) | | |
| Treatment * Secret ballot | | | −0.005 | 0.005 | | |
| | | | (0.010) | (0.011) | | |
| Free, fair election | | | | | −0.003 | 0.009 |
| | | | | | (0.009) | (0.010) |
| Treatment * Free, fair election | | | | | 0.013 | −0.005 |
| | | | | | (0.011) | (0.011) |
| Control mean | 0.362 | 0.412 | 0.383 | 0.357 | 0.351 | 0.386 |
| RI $p$-values | 0.296 | 0.856 | 0.559 | 0.889 | 0.348 | 0.524 |
| Joint RI $p$-value | 0.417 | | 0.688 | | 0.26 | |
| Covariates | No | No | No | No | No | No |
| Observations | 10,993 | 9,622 | 13,419 | 12,589 | 13,199 | 12,490 |
| $R^2$ | 0.328 | 0.267 | 0.258 | 0.235 | 0.256 | 0.240 |

*Note:* The table reports results of whether the treatment had different effects depending on voters' certainty about their priors (MPAP measure M11), and their perceptions about the secrecy of their ballot (MPAP measure M26) and how free and fair the election was (MPAP measure M27). Pooled results exclude non-contested seats and include vote choice for LCV councilors as well as chairs in the Uganda 2 study. Regressions include randomization block fixed effects; standard errors are clustered at the level of treatment assignment. $^{*}$ $p < 0.05$; $^{**}$ $p < 0.01$; $^{***}$ $p < 0.001$

# 17 Table 11.12: Effect of information and electoral competition on vote choice

```
# low competition ----
# good news
madat_m1_m25lpool_g <- madat_m1pool_g %>%
    drop_na(m25) %>%
    filter(!ctry %in% c("bf","ug2")) %>%
    group_by(ctry) %>%
    filter(m25 <= median(m25)) %>%
    ungroup()

m1_m25lc1_g <- results(dat = madat_m1_m25lpool_g, sims = n_iter,
                       ri_p = ri_action, file_rite_obj = "data/temp/r1_m1pool_m25l_g.Rda",
                       good = TRUE, depvar = "m1")
rm(madat_m1_m25lpool_g)
```

```
# bad news
madat_m1_m25lpool_b <- madat_m1pool_b %>%
    drop_na(m25) %>%
    filter(!ctry %in% c("bf","ug2")) %>%
    group_by(ctry) %>%
    filter(m25 <= median(m25)) %>%
    ungroup()

m1_m25lc1_b <- results(dat = madat_m1_m25lpool_b, sims = n_iter,
                       ri_p = ri_action, file_rite_obj = "data/temp/r1_m1pool_m25l_b.Rda",
                       good = FALSE, depvar = "m1")
rm(madat_m1_m25lpool_b)
```

```
# high competition ----
# good news
madat_m1_m25hpool_g <- madat_m1pool_g %>%
    drop_na(m25) %>%
    filter(!ctry %in% c("bf","ug2")) %>%
    group_by(ctry) %>%
    filter(m25 > median(m25)) %>%
    ungroup()

m1_m25hc1_g <- results(dat = madat_m1_m25hpool_g, sims = n_iter,
                       ri_p = ri_action, file_rite_obj = "data/temp/r1_m1pool_m25h_g.Rda",
                       good = TRUE, depvar = "m1", skip_prep = TRUE)
rm(madat_m1_m25hpool_g)
```

```
# bad news regressions
madat_m1_m25hpool_b <- madat_m1pool_b %>%
    drop_na(m25) %>%
    filter(ctry!="bf"&ctry!="ug2") %>%
    group_by(ctry) %>%
    filter(m25 > median(m25)) %>%
    ungroup()


m1_m25hc1_b <- results(dat = madat_m1_m25hpool_b, sims = n_iter,
```

```
                        ri_p = ri_action, file_rite_obj = "data/temp/r1_m1pool_m25h_b.Rda",
                        good = FALSE, depvar = "m1", skip_prep = TRUE)
rm(madat_m1_m25hpool_b)
```

Table 10: Effect of information and electoral competition on vote choice

| | Incumbent vote choice | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Low competition | | High competition | |
| | Good news | Bad news | Good news | Bad news |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Treatment | 0.009 | −0.043 | 0.004 | 0.015 |
| | (0.022) | (0.031) | (0.030) | (0.037) |
| Control mean | 0.342 | 0.414 | 0.392 | 0.294 |
| RI $p$-values | 0.692 | 0.272 | 0.912 | 0.757 |
| Covariates | No | No | No | No |
| Observations | 1,450 | 1,433 | 1,113 | 1,307 |
| $R^2$ | 0.221 | 0.231 | 0.240 | 0.128 |

*Note:* The table reports results of whether the treatment had different effects in constituencies with low or high levels of electoral competition (MPAP measure M25). We pool Benin, Brazil, Mexico, and Uganda 1. Regressions include randomization block fixed effects; standard errors are clustered at the level of treatment assignment. $^{*}$ $p < 0.05$; $^{**}$ $p < 0.01$; $^{***}$ $p < 0.001$

## 18 Table 11.13: Effect of information and intervention-specific heterogenity on vote choice

```
t1nc1_g <- results(dat = madat_iter, sims = n_iter, depvar = "m1", good = TRUE, with_N = TRUE, exclude_
                   ri_p = ri_action, file_rite_obj = "data/temp/ri_m1pool_N_all_g.Rda")   #good news, n

t1nc1_b <- results(dat = madat_iter, sims = n_iter, depvar = "m1", good = FALSE, with_N = TRUE, exclude_
                   ri_p = ri_action, file_rite_obj = "data/temp/ri_m1pool_N_all_b.Rda")  #bad news, nij
```

```
# M24 - credibliity
m1_m24c1_g <- results(dat = madat_iter, sims = n_iter, depvar = "m1", interactvar = "m24", good = TRUE,
                      ri_p = ri_action, file_rite_obj = "data/temp/ri_m1pool_m24_all_g.Rda") #good news

m1_m24c1_b <- results(dat = madat_iter, sims = n_iter, depvar = "m1", interactvar = "m24", good = FALSE
                      ri_p = ri_action, file_rite_obj = "data/temp/ri_m1pool_m24_all_b.Rda") #bad news
```

```
# m23 - salience
m1_m23c1_g <- results(dat = madat_iter, sims = n_iter, depvar = "m1", interactvar = "m23", good = TRUE,
                      ri_p = ri_action, file_rite_obj = "data/temp/ri_m1pool_m23_all_g.Rda")  #good new

m1_m23c1_b <- results(dat = madat_iter, sims = n_iter, depvar = "m1", interactvar = "m23", good = FALSE
                      ri_p = ri_action, file_rite_obj = "data/temp/ri_m1pool_m23_all_b.Rda") #bad news
```

Table 11: Effect of information and intervention-specific heterogenity on vote choice

| | Incumbent vote choice | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Good news | Bad news | Good news | Bad news | Good news | Bad news |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Treatment | 0.001 | −0.010 | 0.025 | −0.022 | −0.017 | −0.013 |
| | (0.016) | (0.016) | (0.024) | (0.036) | (0.021) | (0.023) |
| $N_{ij}$ | −0.027 | −0.053*** | | | | |
| | (0.016) | (0.014) | | | | |
| Treatment * $N_{ij}$ | −0.006 | −0.006 | | | | |
| | (0.020) | (0.019) | | | | |
| Information salient | | | −0.016 | −0.041 | | |
| | | | (0.029) | (0.035) | | |
| Treatment * Information salient | | | −0.015 | 0.053 | | |
| | | | (0.034) | (0.042) | | |
| Credible source | | | | | −0.007 | 0.005 |
| | | | | | (0.028) | (0.027) |
| Treatment * Credible source | | | | | 0.036 | 0.020 |
| | | | | | (0.030) | (0.031) |
| Control mean | 0.356 | 0.398 | 0.355 | 0.435 | 0.363 | 0.385 |
| RI $p$-values | 0.955 | 0.596 | 0.314 | 0.62 | 0.438 | 0.646 |
| Joint RI $p$-value | 0.783 | | 0.235 | | 0.352 | |
| Covariates | No | No | No | No | No | No |
| Observations | 13,274 | 12,563 | 12,343 | 10,587 | 12,354 | 11,407 |
| $R^2$ | 0.275 | 0.249 | 0.265 | 0.221 | 0.260 | 0.240 |

*Note:* The table reports results of the effect of information and (a) the gap between priors and information (MPAP measure $N_{ij}$), (b) salience of information (MPAP measure M23) and (c) credibility of information source on voters' decision to vote for the incumbent. Columns 1, 3, 4 and 6 pool observations from all studies while Columns 2 and 5 pool Benin, Brazil, Uganda 1 and Uganda 2. Results exclude non-contested seats and include vote choice for LCV councilors as well as chairs in the Uganda 2 study. Regressions include randomization block fixed effects; standard errors are clustered at the level of treatment assignment. * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

# 19 Table 11.14: Private vs public information: effect of good news on incumbent vote choice

```
# Load and append data
files <- list.files("data/temp/pubpvt", pattern = "pp_covinter", full.names = TRUE)
for (f in files) {
  load(f)
}

madat <- rbind.fill(ben, mexsur, ug1)
madat$inv_wts <- NA
madat$inv_wts2 <- NA

m1c1_g <- results(ri_p = "ignore", depvar = "m1", treat1and2 = TRUE, good = TRUE)
m1c2_g <- results(ri_p = "ignore", depvar = "m1", treat1and2 = TRUE, good = TRUE,
                  country = "ben", weights = FALSE)
m1c3_g <- results(ri_p = "ignore", depvar = "m1", treat1and2 = TRUE, good = TRUE,
                  country = "mex", weights = FALSE)
m1c4_g <- results(ri_p = "ignore", depvar = "m1", treat1and2 = TRUE, good = TRUE,
                  country = "ug1", weights = FALSE)
f_g <- f_equalcoeff(estimates(depvar = "m1", treat1and2 = TRUE, good = TRUE, return_df = TRUE), "m1")

m1c1_b <- results(ri_p = "ignore", depvar = "m1", treat1and2 = TRUE, good = FALSE)
m1c2_b <- results(ri_p = "ignore", depvar = "m1", treat1and2 = TRUE, good = FALSE,
                  country = "ben", weights = FALSE)
m1c3_b <- results(ri_p = "ignore", depvar = "m1", treat1and2 = TRUE, good = FALSE,
                  country = "mex", weights = FALSE)
m1c4_b <- results(ri_p = "ignore", depvar = "m1", treat1and2 = TRUE, good = FALSE,
                  country = "ug1", weights = FALSE)
f_b <- f_equalcoeff(estimates(depvar = "m1", treat1and2 = TRUE, good = TRUE, return_df = TRUE), "m1")
```

Table 12: Private vs Public Information: Effect of good news on incumbent vote choice

| | Incumbent vote choice, good news | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Overall | Benin | Mexico | Uganda 1 |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Private information | −0.008 | 0.012 | −0.029 | 0.008 |
| | (0.023) | (0.044) | (0.043) | (0.027) |
| Public information | 0.055* | 0.146** | −0.002 | 0.019 |
| | (0.022) | (0.047) | (0.041) | (0.023) |
| Control mean | 0.356 | 0.439 | 0.498 | 0.186 |
| F-test $p$-value | 0.018 | 0.006 | 0.598 | 0.708 |
| Covariates | No | No | No | No |
| Observations | 2,962 | 776 | 784 | 1,402 |
| $R^2$ | 0.192 | 0.189 | 0.088 | 0.068 |

*Note:* The table reports results of the effect of good news about the incumbent on vote choice, depending on whether voters received this information in private or public settings. We pool Benin, Mexico, and Uganda 1. Regressions include randomization block fixed effects and standard errors are clustered at the level of treatment assignment. * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

# 20 Table 11.15: Private vs Public Information: Effect of bad news on incumbent vote choice

Table 13: Private vs Public Information: Effect of bad news on incumbent vote choice

| | Incumbent vote choice, bad news | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Overall | Benin | Mexico | Uganda 1 |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Private information | −0.027 | −0.012 | −0.036 | −0.035 |
| | (0.030) | (0.074) | (0.030) | (0.042) |
| Public information | 0.009 | 0.006 | 0.015 | 0.009 |
| | (0.026) | (0.069) | (0.032) | (0.032) |
| Control mean | 0.441 | 0.535 | 0.383 | 0.426 |
| F-test $p$-value | 0.018 | 0.006 | 0.598 | 0.708 |
| Covariates | No | No | No | No |
| Observations | 2,909 | 601 | 1,309 | 999 |
| $R^2$ | 0.178 | 0.241 | 0.102 | 0.153 |

*Note:* The table reports results of the effect of bad news about the incumbent on vote choice, depending on whether voters received this information in private or public settings. We pool Benin, Mexico, and Uganda 1. Regressions include randomization block fixed effects and standard errors are clustered at the level of treatment assignment. $^{*}$ $p < 0.05$; $^{**}$ $p < 0.01$; $^{***}$ $p < 0.001$