Replication code of Supplementary Information for 'Voter information campaigns and political accountability: Cumulative findings from a preregistered meta-analysis of coordinated trials'

February 22, 2019

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1 Table 2: Descriptive statistics for sample of good news

Table 1: Descriptive statistics for sample of good news

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Nij	19,400	1.650	1.156	0.000	4.000
Voter turnout	16,037	0.801	0.399	0.000	1.000
Effort	13,237	2.396	0.944	1.000	4.000
Dishonesty	13,756	2.458	1.209	1.000	5.000
Backlash	2,157	0.232	0.309	0.000	1.000
Age	20,020	35.461	12.729	17.000	99.000
Co-ethnicity	17,382	0.665	0.472	0.000	1.000
Education	20,033	7.191	4.108	0.000	20.000
Wealth	19,903	2.772	1.091	−2.317	5.000
Co-Partisanship	16,550	1.155	1.797	0.000	9.000
Voted in past election	20,015	0.827	0.378	0.000	1.000
Secret ballot	19,788	2.098	1.420	1.000	5.000
Free and fair elections	19,303	3.349	1.501	1.000	5.000

Note: * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$.

2 Table 3: Descriptive statistics for sample of bad news

```
cat(readLines('tables/tab_A11.1_sumstats_bad.tex'), sep = '\n')
```

Table 2: Descriptive statistics for sample of bad news

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Nij	19,191	−1.077	1.031	−4.000	0.000
Voter turnout	15,597	0.798	0.401	0.000	1.000
Effort	12,761	2.597	0.938	1.000	4.000
Dishonesty	13,589	2.481	1.239	1.000	5.000
Backlash	2,339	0.147	0.192	0.000	1.000
Age	19,584	37.370	13.345	18.000	92.000
Co-ethnicity	16,749	0.815	0.388	0.000	1.000
Education	19,604	6.657	3.968	0.000	20.000
Wealth	19,260	2.890	1.057	−2.805	5.000
Co-Partisanship	17,002	1.151	1.675	0.000	9.000
Voted in past election	19,568	0.862	0.345	0.000	1.000
Secret ballot	19,281	2.401	1.407	1.000	5.000
Free and fair elections	19,103	3.571	1.437	1.000	5.000

Note: * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$.

3 Table 4: Balance of covariates

Table 3: Balance of covariates

Baseline covariate	Control mean	Treat mean	d-stat	$\hat{\beta}_1$	$\hat{\beta}_2$	N
Prior	1.35	1.38	0.03	0.05	0.02*	20617
	(1.26)	(1.28)		(0.01)	(0.01)	
Good news	0.48	0.48	0	-0.1***	-0.01***	23803
	(0.5)	(0.5)		(0.02)	(0.01)	
Gender	0.43	0.42	-0.02	0.01*	-0.02***	23998
	(0.5)	(0.49)		(0.01)	(0.01)	
Age	39.56	39.62	0	0***	0***	23917
	(14.96)	(14.96)		(0)	(0)	
Co-ethnicity	0.65	0.63	-0.03	0***	-0.03***	19391
	(0.48)	(0.48)		(0.01)	(0.01)	
Education	5.45	5.43	0	0***	0***	23960
	(4.79)	(4.71)		(0)	(0)	
Wealth	2.42	2.41	-0.01	0.02*	0.01*	23693
	(1.44)	(1.42)		(0.01)	(0)	
Co-Partisanship	3.64	3.6	-0.01	0.06	0***	20025
	(2.81)	(2.78)		(0)	(0)	
Voted in past election	0.78	0.77	-0.01	0.07	0.17	23892
	(0.42)	(0.42)		(0.01)	(0.01)	
Voted incumbent past election	0.66	0.66	0	0.22	0.03*	19869
	(0.47)	(0.47)		(0.01)	(0.01)	
Clientelism	1.99	1.96	-0.02	-0.04***	0***	22911
	(1.41)	(1.41)		(0)	(0)	
Salience of information	0.52	0.54	0.03	-0.04***	0***	20143
	(0.5)	(0.5)		(0.01)	(0.01)	
Credibility of information	0.41	0.43	0.05	-0.02***	-0.01***	21415
	(0.49)	(0.5)		(0.01)	(0.01)	
$\Pr(\chi^2)$	0.1					

Note: Results show the control and treatment means for each of the pre-treatment covariates. Means and standard deviations are weighted by block share of non-missing observations. *d*-stat is calculated as the difference between treatment and control means normalized by one standard deviation of the control mean. $\hat{\beta}_1$ ($\hat{\beta}_2$) is the coefficient in a regression of vote choice (turnout) on each covariate separately, in the control sample. As with main specification, we include randomization block fixed effects and standard errors clustered at the level of treatment assignment. We also show the probability of rejecting the null that none of the covariates is predictive of treatment. All regressions include block fixed effects, standard errors clustered at the level of assingment and inverse propensity weights, and all countries are weighted equally. * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$.

4 Figure 6: Power Analysis

5 Table 5: Effect of Information

```
## Loading required package: doParallel

## Loading required package: foreach

##
## Attaching package: 'foreach'

## The following objects are masked from 'package:purrr':
##
##     accumulate, when
```

Table 4: Effect of Information, Conditional on Distance between Information and Priors, on Vote Choice and Turnout

	Vote Choice		Turnout		Vote Choice	Turnout
	Good News	Bad News	Good News	Bad News	Overall	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Treatment	0.0004	−0.003	0.002	0.018	0.003	0.017*
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.008)
N_{ij}	−0.017	−0.049***	−0.0003	0.011	−0.050***	0.009
	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.011)
Treatment * N_{ij}	−0.010	−0.001	0.001	−0.0001	−0.002	−0.002
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.015)	(0.012)	(0.011)
Control mean	0.356	0.398	0.843	0.835	0.369	0.837
RI p-value	0.981	0.866	0.892	0.167	0.813	0.062
Joint RI p-value	0.954		0.29			
Covariates	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	13,196	12,531	14,500	13,148	25,820	27,737
R^2	0.299	0.281	0.200	0.160	0.274	0.165

Note: Columns 1-4 estimate equations (**??**) and (**??**), while columns 5-6 estimate equation (**??**). "Vote choice" indicates support for the incumbent candidate or party. Standard errors are clustered at the level of treatment assignment. Pooled results exclude non-contested seats and include vote choice for LCV councilors as well as chairs in the Uganda 2 study (see Buntaine et al., Chapter 8). This means each respondent in the Uganda 2 study enters twice, and we cluster the standard errors at the individual level. We include randomization block fixed effects and a full set of covariate-treatment interactions. Control mean is the weighted and unadjusted average in the control group. * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

6 Table 7: Differential attrition

Table 5: Differential attrition

	Vote Choice			Voter Turnout		
	Estimate	Std. Error	p-value	Estimate	Std. Error	p-value
Treatment	0.00	(0)	0.57	0.00	(0)	0.71
F-stat		13.78			15.26	
Pr(F)		0.39			0.29	

Note: Table shows the effect size of treatment on data missingness in incumbent vote choice and voter turnout across the entire sample. Pr(F) shows the probability of rejecting the null that none of the covariates is differentally determining attrition across treatment and control conditions. All regressions include block fixed effects, standard errors clustered at the level of assingment and inverse propensity weights, and all countries are weighted equally.* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$.

7 Figure 7: Bayesian Meta-Analysis: Vote Choice

```
# Stan code used in Fig 11.5 and 11.6 to sample from posterior distributions

  bmodel <- "
  data {
    int<lower=0> J; // number of countries
    real y[J]; // estimated treatment effects
    real<lower=0> sigma[J]; // s.e. of effect estimates
  }
  parameters {
    real mu;
    real<lower=0> tau;
    real eta[J];
  }
  transformed parameters {
    real theta[J];
    for (j in 1:J)
      theta[j] = mu + tau * eta[j];
  }
  model {
    target += normal_lpdf(eta | 0, 1);
    target += normal_lpdf(y | theta, sigma);
  }
  "
```

8 Figure 8: Bayesian Meta-Analysis: Turnout

9 Table 11.3: Manipulation check (effect of treatment on correct recollection)

Table 6: Manipulation check: Effect of treatment on correct recollection, pooling good and bad news [unregistered analysis]

	Correct Recollection					
	Overall	Benin	Brazil	Mexico	Uganda 1	Uganda 2
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Treatment	0.072***	0.050	0.038	0.149***	0.119***	−0.0001
	(0.015)	(0.059)	(0.021)	(0.015)	(0.035)	(0.008)
Covariates	No	No	No	No	No	No
Observations	16,173	897	1,677	2,089	750	10,760
R^2	0.320	0.276	0.378	0.137	0.035	0.205

Notes: The table reports results on manipulation checks across studies, using recollection or accuracy tests at endline that were specific to the content of each study's interventions (MPAP measure M30). The dependent variable, correct recollection, is dichotomized in each study using the following measures: Benin: whether correctly recalled the relative performance of incumbent in plenary and committee work; Brazil: whether correctly recalled whether municipal account was accepted or rejected; Mexico: identification of content of the flyer; Uganda 1: index consisting of knowledge of MP responsibilities, MP priorities for constituency, and identities of contesting candidates. Individuals with an index equal to or greater than 1.5 on a 0-3 scale were coded as correct recalls; Uganda 2: whether correctly recalled relative financial accountability relative to other districts. We include randomization block fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the level of treatment assignment. $^{*}p<0.05$; $^{**}p<0.01$; $^{***}p<0.001$.

10 Table 11.4: Manipulation check (difference between posteriors and priors)

Table 7: Manipulation check: Absolute difference between posterior and prior beliefs for pooled good and bad news [unregistered analysis]

	Absolute difference between posterior and prior beliefs			
	Overall	Benin	Brazil	Uganda 2
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment	0.006	0.063	−0.003	−0.023
	(0.025)	(0.089)	(0.022)	(0.023)
Covariates	No	No	No	No
Observations	12,704	389	1,677	10,638
R^2	0.241	0.176	0.358	0.111

Notes: The table reports differences between beliefs about politician performance after (MPAP measure M30) and prior to treatment (MPAP measure M9). Posterior beliefs are measured using recollection tests at endline specific to the content of each study's intervention. Burkina Faso is excluded because their recollection measure was collected among treated subjects only. Mexico is excluded from results because the study does not contain pre-treatment measures of subjects beliefs. Uganda 1 is not included because the M30 measure is an aggregate measure of subjects' political knowledge and cannot be directly compared with the scale used for measuring priors. We include randomization block fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the level of treatment assignment. $^{*}p<0.05$; $^{**}p<0.01$; $^{***}p<0.001$.

11 Table 11.5: Effect of information on perception of importance of politician effort and honesty

Table 8: Effect of information on perception of importance of politician effort and honesty

	Effort		Dishonesty	
	Good News	Bad News	Good News	Bad News
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment effect	−0.014	−0.051	−0.053	0.099
	(0.046)	(0.051)	(0.047)	(0.098)
Control mean	2.449	2.7	2.755	2.724
RI p-value	0.788	0.474	0.356	0.754
Joint RI p-value	0.5		0.282	
Covariates	No	No	No	No
Observations	7,039	5,963	7,278	6,755
R^2	0.253	0.294	0.300	0.231

Note: The table reports the effect of the treatment on voters' perception of how hard-working (MPAP measure M5) and dishonest (MPAP measure M6) the incumbent politician is. We pool Benin, Burkina Faso, Uganda 1, and Uganda 2 in columns (1) and (2), and Benin, Burkina Faso, Mexico, and Uganda 2 in columns (3) and (4). MPAP measures M5 (effort) and M6 (dishonesty). Regressions include randomization block fixed effects; standard errors are clustered at the level of treatment assignment. * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

12 Table 11.6: Effect of information and source credibility on evaluation of politician effort and honesty

Table 9: Effect of information and source credibility on evaluation of politician effort and honesty [unregistered analysis]

	Dependent variable:			
	Effort		Dishonesty	
	Good News	Bad News	Good News	Bad News
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment	−0.034	−0.088	−0.037	0.210
	(0.079)	(0.090)	(0.085)	(0.202)
Credible Source	−0.051	−0.010	−0.022	0.125
	(0.079)	(0.081)	(0.064)	(0.100)
Treatment * Credible Source	0.033	0.070	0.010	−0.197
	(0.095)	(0.105)	(0.093)	(0.205)
Control mean	2.451	2.703	2.75	2.679
RI p-values	0.728	0.518	0.708	0.861
Joint RI p-value	0.482		0.614	
Covariates	No	No	No	No
Observations	6,436	5,406	6,483	5,844
R^2	0.261	0.293	0.329	0.256

Note: The table reports the effects of information and the credibility of the information source on voter's perception of how hard-working (MPAP measure M5) and dishonest (MPAP measure M6) the incumbent politician is. We pool Benin, Burkina Faso, Uganda 1, and Uganda 2 in columns (1) and (2), and Benin, Burkina Faso, Mexico, and Uganda 2 in columns (3) and (4). Regressions include randomization block fixed effects; standard errors are clustered at the level of treatment assignment. * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

13 Table 11.7: Relationship between evaluation of politician effort and honesty with vote choice

Table 10: Relationship between evaluation of politician effort and honesty with vote choice [unregistered analysis]

	Incumbent vote choice			
	Good news		Bad news	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Effort	0.052***		0.066***	
	(0.006)		(0.006)	
Dishonesty		−0.054***		−0.026***
		(0.005)		(0.005)
Covariates	No	No	No	No
Observations	11,040	11,452	10,190	10,943
R^2	0.229	0.217	0.282	0.266

Note: The table reports the effects of information and the credibility of the information source on voter's perception of how hard-working (MPAP measure M5) and dishonest (MPAP measure M6) the incumbent politician is. We pool Benin, Burkina Faso, Uganda 1, and Uganda 2 in columns (1) and (3), and Benin, Burkina Faso, Mexico, and Uganda 2 in columns (2) and (4). Results exclude non-contested seats and include vote choice for LCV councilors as well as chairs in the Uganda 2 study. Regressions include randomization block fixed effects; standard errors are clustered at the level of treatment assignment. * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

14 Table 11.8: Effect of bad news on politician backlash

Table 11: Effect of bad news on politician backlash

	Politician response / backlash		
	Overall	Benin	Mexico
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Treatment effect	0.069*	0.068	0.070***
	(0.028)	(0.057)	(0.010)
Control mean	0.108	0.068	0.146
RI p-value	0.082	0.435	0
Covariates	No	No	No
Observations	2,052	702	1,350
R^2	0.623	0.504	0.848

Note: The table reports on whether the treatment led to the incumbent party or candidate campaigning on dimensions of the dissemminated information (MPAP measure M8). Backlash was measured for studies with clustered assignment. Regressions include randomization block fixed effects; standard errors are clustered at the level of treatment assignment. * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

15 Table 15: Effect of moderators on incumbent vote choice

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Table 12: Effect of moderators on incumbent vote choice

	Incumbent vote choice					
	Good news	Bad news	Good news	Bad news	Good news	Bad news
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Treatment	0.018	0.0004	−0.0001	0.013	0.001	0.004
	(0.015)	(0.022)	(0.025)	(0.021)	(0.014)	(0.016)
Coethnicity	−0.022	0.0003				
	(0.029)	(0.041)				
Treatment * Coethnicity	0.058	−0.042				
	(0.033)	(0.049)				
Copartisanship			0.216***	0.289***		
			(0.032)	(0.028)		
Treatment * Copartisanship			0.001	0.004		
			(0.038)	(0.036)		
Clientelism					−0.041***	−0.044***
					(0.009)	(0.011)
Treatment * Clientelism					0.013	0.006
					(0.012)	(0.015)
Control mean	0.365	0.442	0.36	0.397	0.359	0.383
RI p-values	0.276	0.988	0.998	0.564	0.936	0.84
Joint RI p-value	0.618		0.829		0.876	
Covariates	No	No	No	No	No	No
Observations	11,502	10,320	11,688	10,999	13,246	12,288
R^2	0.268	0.230	0.276	0.289	0.279	0.259

Note: The table reports results of the treatment on three pre-specified moderators—coethnicity (MPAP measure M15), copartisanship (MPAP measure M19) and indulging in clienetelistic practices (MPAP measure M22)—on incumbent vote choice. The following cases are included in each regression: Co-ethnicity—Benin, Brazil, Uganda 1, Uganda 2; Co-partisanship—Benin, Brazil, Mexico, Uganda 1, Uganda 2; Clientelism—Benin, Burkina Faso, Brazil, Mexico, Uganda 1, Uganda 2. Pooled results exclude non-contested seats and include vote choice for LCV councilors as well as chairs in the Uganda 2 study. Regressions include randomization block fixed effects; standard errors are clustered at the level of treatment assignment. * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

16 Table 16: Effect of information and context heterogenity on incumbent vote choice

Table 13: Effect of information and context heterogenity on incumbent vote choice

	Incumbent vote choice					
	Good news	Bad news	Good news	Bad news	Good news	Bad news
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Treatment	−0.062	−0.011	0.015	−0.005	−0.034	0.021
	(0.055)	(0.054)	(0.024)	(0.030)	(0.035)	(0.033)
Certainty	−0.015	0.021				
	(0.017)	(0.018)				
Treatment * Certainty	0.032	−0.003				
	(0.024)	(0.024)				
Secret ballot			−0.001	0.010		
			(0.008)	(0.010)		
Treatment * Secret ballot			−0.005	0.005		
			(0.010)	(0.011)		
Free, fair election					−0.003	0.009
					(0.009)	(0.010)
Treatment * Free, fair election					0.013	−0.005
					(0.011)	(0.011)
Control mean	0.362	0.412	0.383	0.357	0.351	0.386
RI p-values	0.296	0.856	0.559	0.889	0.348	0.524
Joint RI p-value	0.417		0.688		0.26	
Covariates	No	No	No	No	No	No
Observations	10,993	9,622	13,419	12,589	13,199	12,490
R^2	0.328	0.267	0.258	0.235	0.256	0.240

Note: The table reports results of whether the treatment had different effects depending on voters' certainty about their priors (MPAP measure M11), and their perceptions about the secrecy of their ballot (MPAP measure M26) and how free and fair the election was (MPAP measure M27). Pooled results exclude non-contested seats and include vote choice for LCV councilors as well as chairs in the Uganda 2 study. Regressions include randomization block fixed effects; standard errors are clustered at the level of treatment assignment. * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

17 Table 17: Effect of information and electoral competition on vote choice

Table 14: Effect of information and electoral competition on vote choice

	Incumbent vote choice			
	Low competition		High competition	
	Good news	Bad news	Good news	Bad news
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment	0.009	−0.043	0.004	0.015
	(0.022)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.037)
Control mean	0.342	0.414	0.392	0.294
RI p-values	0.692	0.272	0.912	0.757
Covariates	No	No	No	No
Observations	1,450	1,433	1,113	1,307
R^2	0.221	0.231	0.240	0.128

Note: The table reports results of whether the treatment had different effects in constituencies with low or high levels of electoral competition (MPAP measure M25). We pool Benin, Brazil, Mexico, and Uganda 1. Regressions include randomization block fixed effects; standard errors are clustered at the level of treatment assignment. * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

18 Table 18: Effect of information and intervention-specific heterogenity on vote choice

Table 15: Effect of information and intervention-specific heterogenity on vote choice

	Incumbent vote choice					
	Good news	Bad news	Good news	Bad news	Good news	Bad news
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Treatment	0.001	−0.010	0.025	−0.022	−0.017	−0.013
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.024)	(0.036)	(0.021)	(0.023)
N_{ij}	−0.027	−0.053***				
	(0.016)	(0.014)				
Treatment * N_{ij}	−0.006	−0.006				
	(0.020)	(0.019)				
Information salient			−0.016	−0.041		
			(0.029)	(0.035)		
Treatment * Information salient			−0.015	0.053		
			(0.034)	(0.042)		
Credible source					−0.007	0.005
					(0.028)	(0.027)
Treatment * Credible source					0.036	0.020
					(0.030)	(0.031)
Control mean	0.356	0.398	0.355	0.435	0.363	0.385
RI p-values	0.955	0.596	0.314	0.62	0.438	0.646
Joint RI p-value	0.783		0.235		0.352	
Covariates	No	No	No	No	No	No
Observations	13,274	12,563	12,343	10,587	12,354	11,407
R^2	0.275	0.249	0.265	0.221	0.260	0.240

Note: The table reports results of the effect of information and (a) the gap between priors and information (MPAP measure N_{ij}), (b) salience of information (MPAP measure M23) and (c) credibility of information source on voters' decision to vote for the incumbent. Columns 1, 3, 4 and 6 pool observations from all studies while Columns 2 and 5 pool Benin, Brazil, Uganda 1 and Uganda 2. Results exclude non-contested seats and include vote choice for LCV councilors as well as chairs in the Uganda 2 study. Regressions include randomization block fixed effects; standard errors are clustered at the level of treatment assignment. * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

19 Table 19: Interaction analysis: Effect of good news on incumbent vote choice

Table 16: Interaction analysis: Effect of good news on incumbent vote choice

	Incumbent vote choice, good news						
	ALL	BEN	BRZ	BF	MEX	UG 1	UG 2
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Treatment	0.0004	−0.005	0.007	0.004	−0.036	0.048	0.009
	(0.015)	(0.066)	(0.030)	(0.049)	(0.031)	(0.033)	(0.012)
N_{ij}	−0.017	−0.009		−0.016		−0.052**	−0.010
	(0.015)	(0.058)	(0.000)	(0.039)	(0.000)	(0.018)	(0.009)
Treatment * N_{ij}	0.00004	0.115	−0.026	−0.028	0.034	−0.025	−0.003
	(0.008)	(0.082)	(0.023)	(0.056)	(0.018)	(0.013)	(0.006)
Age	−0.0005	−0.008	0.001	0.002	−0.003	0.003*	0.002**
	(0.001)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Treatment * Age	−0.007	−0.070	−0.060*	−0.083*	0.054**	−0.009	0.004
	(0.009)	(0.056)	(0.024)	(0.037)	(0.020)	(0.015)	(0.006)
Education	−0.002	−0.007	0.010	0.002	−0.003	−0.011	−0.002
	(0.003)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.020)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.003)
Treatment * Education	−0.010	−0.030		−0.018		0.035	−0.013
	(0.019)	(0.062)	(0.000)	(0.050)	(0.000)	(0.027)	(0.012)
Wealth	0.024	0.071	0.061	−0.007	0.033	0.041	0.016
	(0.013)	(0.051)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.034)	(0.027)	(0.009)
Treatment * Wealth	0.001	0.013	−0.004	0.001	0.004	−0.005*	0.0004
	(0.001)	(0.007)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Voted previously	0.052	−0.037	0.073	0.096	0.185***	−0.157**	0.057*
	(0.027)	(0.066)	(0.079)	(0.085)	(0.048)	(0.057)	(0.025)
Treatment * Voted previously	0.007	0.022	−0.010	−0.033	0.009	0.019*	−0.003
	(0.004)	(0.016)	(0.008)	(0.026)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.003)
Supported incumbent	0.196***	0.013	0.293***	0.242	0.308***	0.178**	0.111***
	(0.029)	(0.105)	(0.058)	(0.147)	(0.049)	(0.055)	(0.024)
Treatment * Supported incumbent	−0.042*	−0.156	0.030	0.036	−0.079	−0.129**	0.003
	(0.018)	(0.084)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.046)	(0.041)	(0.012)
Clientelism	−0.039***	−0.073	−0.073***	0.007	−0.054*	−0.019	−0.006
	(0.010)	(0.067)	(0.021)	(0.086)	(0.026)	(0.018)	(0.006)
Treatment * Clientelism	−0.030	0.110	0.085	−0.053	−0.156*	0.026	0.041
	(0.039)	(0.127)	(0.110)	(0.125)	(0.071)	(0.086)	(0.034)
Credible source	−0.022	−0.142	0.025	−0.089	−0.008	−0.052	−0.0001
	(0.033)	(0.169)	(0.112)	(0.081)	(0.065)	(0.049)	(0.032)
Treatment * Credible source	−0.034	−0.141	0.092	−0.006	0.112	−0.109	−0.002
	(0.041)	(0.109)	(0.073)	(0.197)	(0.093)	(0.075)	(0.033)
Secret ballot	0.015	0.116	−0.016	0.100	0.042	0.009	0.007
	(0.013)	(0.100)	(0.027)	(0.123)	(0.035)	(0.023)	(0.009)
Treatment * Secret ballot	0.058	0.296	−0.042	0.052	0.120	0.074	0.011
	(0.044)	(0.244)	(0.137)	(0.124)	(0.086)	(0.068)	(0.043)
Free, fair election	−0.002	−0.099	0.012	0.003	−0.036	0.040*	−0.004
	(0.011)	(0.090)	(0.031)	(0.076)	(0.028)	(0.019)	(0.008)
Treatment * free, fair election	0.022	0.045	0.020	0.117*	−0.016	0.030	0.008
	(0.012)	(0.067)	(0.026)	(0.050)	(0.032)	(0.022)	(0.008)
Covariates	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	13,196	220	859	389	725	456	10,547
R^2	0.299	0.348	0.484	0.392	0.224	0.177	0.240

20 Table 20: Interaction analysis: Effect of bad news on incumbent vote choice

Table 17: Interaction analysis: Effect of bad news on incumbent vote choice

	Incumbent vote choice, bad news						
	ALL	BEN	BRZ	BF	MEX	UG 1	UG 2
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Treatment	−0.003	−0.080	−0.022	0.037	−0.013	0.010	−0.006
	(0.015)	(0.087)	(0.030)	(0.028)	(0.018)	(0.053)	(0.012)
N_{ij}	−0.049***	−0.090	−0.100***	−0.005		−0.036	−0.002
	(0.014)	(0.046)	(0.028)	(0.026)	(0.000)	(0.036)	(0.009)
Treatment * N_{ij}	−0.001	−0.139	−0.004	0.018	0.047***	−0.015	−0.002
	(0.011)	(0.090)	(0.021)	(0.033)	(0.013)	(0.028)	(0.006)
Age	0.0004	−0.004	0.00003	0.002	0.0003	0.002	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.001)
Treatment * Age	0.008	0.052	0.001	−0.030	0.012	0.019	−0.003
	(0.016)	(0.085)	(0.026)	(0.020)	(0.013)	(0.032)	(0.007)
Education	−0.003	−0.006	−0.001	−0.006	−0.010*	0.0004	−0.003
	(0.003)	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.012)	(0.003)
Treatment * Education	−0.001	0.118	−0.063	−0.004		−0.002	−0.003
	(0.019)	(0.079)	(0.034)	(0.031)	(0.000)	(0.053)	(0.012)
Wealth	0.036*	0.020	0.012	0.001	0.037	0.089	0.013
	(0.015)	(0.084)	(0.041)	(0.023)	(0.020)	(0.045)	(0.009)
Treatment * Wealth	−0.00005	0.004	−0.001	0.001	0.0002	−0.001	−0.001
	(0.001)	(0.007)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.001)
Voted previously	0.036	0.044	−0.053	0.083	0.123**	−0.138	0.075*
	(0.037)	(0.282)	(0.089)	(0.047)	(0.038)	(0.103)	(0.029)
Treatment * Voted previously	0.001	−0.009	0.006	0.006	−0.005	−0.003	0.002
	(0.005)	(0.017)	(0.007)	(0.012)	(0.006)	(0.017)	(0.004)
Supported incumbent	0.190***	−0.013	0.282***	0.249***	0.465***	0.204*	0.065*
	(0.046)	(0.146)	(0.049)	(0.067)	(0.035)	(0.090)	(0.030)
Treatment * Supported incumbent	−0.025	0.009	0.027	−0.018	0.015	−0.105	−0.024
	(0.019)	(0.099)	(0.054)	(0.031)	(0.033)	(0.061)	(0.012)
Clientelism	−0.032**	−0.017	−0.086***	0.019	−0.012	−0.020	0.005
	(0.010)	(0.133)	(0.019)	(0.055)	(0.016)	(0.026)	(0.007)
Treatment * Clientelism	−0.023	−0.256	0.186	−0.042	0.030	−0.094	0.027
	(0.046)	(0.314)	(0.105)	(0.066)	(0.052)	(0.145)	(0.041)
Credible source	−0.013	−0.047	0.015	−0.042	0.027	−0.025	0.002
	(0.034)	(0.207)	(0.075)	(0.051)	(0.040)	(0.083)	(0.036)
Treatment * Credible source	0.016	−0.052	−0.052	0.133	−0.090	0.073	0.011
	(0.054)	(0.244)	(0.068)	(0.086)	(0.058)	(0.116)	(0.042)
Secret ballot	−0.007	−0.034	0.026	0.027	−0.056*	−0.013	−0.007
	(0.014)	(0.139)	(0.025)	(0.076)	(0.023)	(0.037)	(0.009)
Treatment * Secret ballot	0.050	0.300	0.029	0.095	0.012	−0.015	0.056
	(0.047)	(0.484)	(0.114)	(0.081)	(0.056)	(0.115)	(0.051)
Free, fair election	0.016	0.054	0.043	0.013	−0.033	0.033	−0.003
	(0.014)	(0.173)	(0.027)	(0.043)	(0.018)	(0.037)	(0.009)
Treatment * free, fair election	−0.008	0.071	−0.018	0.003	−0.015	−0.039	0.010
	(0.018)	(0.116)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.024)	(0.045)	(0.010)
Covariates	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	12,531	181	818	911	1,215	294	9,112
R^2	0.281	0.312	0.420	0.311	0.296	0.208	0.278

21 Table 21: Private vs Public Information: Effect of good news on incumbent vote choice

Table 18: Private vs Public Information: Effect of good news on incumbent vote choice

	Incumbent vote choice, good news			
	Overall	Benin	Mexico	Uganda 1
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Private information	−0.008	0.012	−0.029	0.008
	(0.023)	(0.044)	(0.043)	(0.027)
Public information	0.055*	0.146**	−0.002	0.019
	(0.022)	(0.047)	(0.041)	(0.023)
Control mean	0.356	0.439	0.498	0.186
F-test p-value	0.018	0.006	0.598	0.708
Covariates	No	No	No	No
Observations	2,962	776	784	1,402
R^2	0.192	0.189	0.088	0.068

Note: The table reports results of the effect of good news about the incumbent on vote choice, depending on whether voters received this information in private or public settings. We pool Benin, Mexico, and Uganda 1. Regressions include randomization block fixed effects and standard errors are clustered at the level of treatment assignment. * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

22 Table 22: Private vs Public Information: Effect of bad news on incumbent vote choice

Table 19: Private vs Public Information: Effect of bad news on incumbent vote choice

	Incumbent vote choice, bad news			
	Overall	Benin	Mexico	Uganda 1
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Private information	−0.027	−0.012	−0.036	−0.035
	(0.030)	(0.074)	(0.030)	(0.042)
Public information	0.009	0.006	0.015	0.009
	(0.026)	(0.069)	(0.032)	(0.032)
Control mean	0.441	0.535	0.383	0.426
F-test p-value	0.018	0.006	0.598	0.708
Covariates	No	No	No	No
Observations	2,909	601	1,309	999
R^2	0.178	0.241	0.102	0.153

Note: The table reports results of the effect of bad news about the incumbent on vote choice, depending on whether voters received this information in private or public settings. We pool Benin, Mexico, and Uganda 1. Regressions include randomization block fixed effects and standard errors are clustered at the level of treatment assignment. * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$