

Incumbency advantage upon removal of single-term limits: Mexican municipal elections

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Abstract

En route

1 Introduction

En route

2 A hypothesis perhaps

Hypothesis 1: Presidents are more likely to fast-track bills when the committee chair with jurisdiction over the bill belongs to the president's party than otherwise.

Figure 1: The president rules game





Table 1

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	PAN	Residual PRI	Left
	(1)	(2)	(3)
vote share (lagged)	−0.187*** (0.011)	−0.035*** (0.013)	−0.339*** (0.013)
party incumbent	0.224*** (0.013)	0.171*** (0.014)	0.165*** (0.018)
other-party incumbent	−0.021** (0.010)	−0.011 (0.009)	0.005 (0.010)
party open seat	0.162*** (0.004)	0.124*** (0.004)	0.130*** (0.005)
governor	−0.009* (0.005)	0.028*** (0.004)	0.008 (0.006)
population (10k)	0.002 (0.001)	0.002** (0.001)	0.006*** (0.001)
elevation (pop. weighed)	−0.003 (0.003)	−0.00005 (0.003)	−0.031*** (0.003)
sd.elev	−0.143*** (0.034)	−0.038 (0.031)	−0.080** (0.035)
post reform	0.085*** (0.005)	−0.156*** (0.005)	0.047*** (0.006)
elev x sd.elev	0.105*** (0.024)	−0.017 (0.022)	0.085*** (0.025)
Intercept	−0.041*** (0.005)	−0.036*** (0.007)	−0.062*** (0.004)
Observations	8,314	8,314	8,314
R ²	0.213	0.293	0.183
Residual Std. Error (df = 8303)	0.163	0.152	0.169
F Statistic (df = 10; 8303)	225.2***	344.3***	185.6***

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Figure 2: Population-weighted altitude deviations in municipalities



3 Regression model

4 Discussion

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References