

Another nail in the coffin of Mexican exceptionalism

The removal of (most) single-term limits

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Nov. 2nd, 2017

The ever moving Mexican electoral system

Continuous change in electoral institutions (Molinar 1991)

1950s centralization

1964 compensatory PR

1979 lower entry barriers

1994 PR in Senate

1997 independent Election Board

...

Constant: **single-term limit** across the board since 1934

Term limits diminish external checks on politicians

- Severs the electoral connection (Mayhew 1973):
collective reputation only
- Promoting personal vote → incumbent's **name recognition**
(Cain, Ferejohn, Fiorina 1987)

1 Electoral reform

2 Relevance

3 Coahuila 2017

4 Conclusion

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Surprising removal of the consecutive reelection ban

- Fed. deputies can reelect up to 4 consecutive three-year terms
- Senators up to 2 consecutive six-year terms
- Incumbent must be re-nominated by same party
- Kick-off: 2021 mid-term

Costa Rica now alone

Reformers gave states institutional discretion

- For state lawmakers: 2-, 3-, or 4-term limits
- For municipal officers: single- or 2-term limits
- Party clause mandatory
- Inapplicable to reformers themselves


Variable election calendars → incumbents on the ballot
progressively


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
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Gradual adoption in state legislative elections






Term limits for municipal officers




The case of Baja California

- State lawmakers subject to 4-term limits
- Municipal presidents and council members to 2-term limits
- First incumbents on the ballot in 2019

Elected officeholders with extended horizons





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2 Relevance

3 Coahuila 2017

4 Conclusion

Will all this matter?

Possible, but uncertain

High turnover in many democracies allowing reelection (Micozzi)

Argentine Congress, 1983–2001

Terms served	%	
1	85	(progressive ambition)
2	11	
3+	4	(static ambition)

	Incumbents seek	and succeed	reelection return
Brazil	70	60	42
Chile	71	83	59
U.S.	95	91	86

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Some room for optimism (Godoy 2014)

Year	% returning
1917	18
1918	25
1920	15
1922	26
1924	25
1926	30
1928	40
1930	42
1932	27
1934	0

Pessimists see party clause as undermining the electoral connection (Merino 2014)

May be room for maneuver, perhaps a good deal

- Two types of candidates: prize fighters and rest (Zaller)
- Party can arrest first type's ambition at its own peril
- Therefore the game is more complex, dual threats

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First race with incumbents on the ballot since 1932

- 3 deputies re-nominated → static ambition
- 6 sought municipal presidencies → progressive ambition
- 16 retired → none

Moreno: questions on candidate name recognition in May's pre-election survey (Cain, Ferejohn, Fiorina 1987)

Better name recognition among voters

- Due to incumbent's constituency service and responsiveness?
- Or a result of the electoral campaign?

Three approaches:

- 1 compare districts with/without incumbent running
- 2 compare beginning/end of the campaign
- 3 take advantage of **redistricting** to compare voters within constituency


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Using redistricting to separate incumbency effect



	Effect	
	incumbency	campaign
Expectations (name recognition)	1 $p > a$	$p = a$
	2 $p > l$	$p > l$
	3 $p > n$	$p > n$
	4 $l ? a$	$l < a$
	5 $l > n$	$l = n$
	6 $a > n$	$a > n$

The incumbents


	Incumbent	Ambition (cabecera)		margin	<i>l</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>a</i>	<i>n</i>	N
1	Javier-PRI	dist→dist	(Saltillo)	-12	0	56	0	952	1,008
2	Lily-PRI	dist→dist	(Ramos Arispe)	+14	0	56	0	952	1,008
3	Gina-PRI	dist→dist	(Acuña)	-17	0	70	0	938	1,008
4	Analsabel-PRI	dist→mun	(San Pedro)	+3	0	42	0	966	1,008
5	Sonia-PRI	dist→mun	(Piedras Negras)	+12	0	56	0	952	1,008
6	Lencho-PRI	dist→mun	(Frontera)	+8	0	28	0	980	1,008
7	Lariza-PAN	rp→mun	(Piedras Negras)	-12	0	42	0	966	1,008
8	Armando-PAN	rp→mun	(Frontera)	-8	0	42	0	966	1,008
9	Leonel-PPC	rp→mun	(Matamoros)	-7	0	42	0	966	1,008

Results (name recognition in x-axis)


Ambición

estática


Javier Díaz González



Lily Gutiérrez Burciaga




Georgina Cano Torralva




progresiva (MR)


Ana Isabel Durán Piña



Sonia Villarreal Pérez




Lencho Siller




progresiva (RP)


Lariza Montiel Luis



José Armando Pruneda Valdez



Leonel Contreras Pámanes



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- Results substantial & consistent with incumbency effect, but can't rule out campaign
- Flaws guide for a better design in 2018
- Consecutive reelection has great potential to improve representation
- Whether or not the potential fulfilled = very promising research area in Mexican politics

Thank you!

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Thank you!

Nine regressions

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
dconservado	1.813***	2.372***	4.912***	4.491***	3.021***	3.002***	-.220	1.104*	2.928***
dhaHecho	.868***	.764***	1.462***	.309	.926***	.465	.855***	.509	.264
dinteresaPol	.352	1.028***	1.342***	.750**	.524**	.864***	.275	.706**	.571*
dsmartPh	-.266	.371	-.180	-.045	.214	-.496*	.262	-.432	-.425
dpan	.147	-.110	-.034	.717	.015	1.199***	.336	.776*	1.145***
dpri	.351	.151	-.014	.635*	.175	-.180	.194	.432	.155
dmorena	-.104	.589	.257	-15.198	-1.171	.768	-1.006	-.255	.877
Constant	-2.994***	-3.820***	-4.445***	-3.878***	-3.487***	-3.387***	-3.291***	-3.872***	-3.582***
Observations	1,008	1,008	1,008	1,008	1,008	1,008	1,008	1,008	1,008
Log Likelihood	-264	-231	-170	-175	-235	-209	-230	-147	-183
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01								