

# CKS Exam Study Reminder Guide

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## Quick Reference for Certified Kubernetes Security Specialist (CKS) Exam

**Exam Duration:** 2 hours | **Questions:** 15-20 | **Passing Score:** 67%

**Format:** Performance-based (hands-on)

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## Exam Aliases - Set These First!

```
alias k=kubectl
alias kn='kubectl config set-context --current --namespace'
export do="--dry-run=client -o yaml"
source <(kubectl completion bash)
complete -o default -F __start_kubectl k
```

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## 1. NetworkPolicy

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## Theory

NetworkPolicy is a Kubernetes resource that controls traffic flow between pods. By default, all pods can communicate with each other. NetworkPolicies implement a **zero-trust network model** by:

- Controlling **ingress** (incoming) traffic
- Controlling **egress** (outgoing) traffic
- Using **label selectors** to target pods
- Specifying allowed **ports** and **protocols**

### Key Concepts:

- Empty **podSelector**: `{}` = selects ALL pods in namespace
  - Empty **policyTypes** array = only ingress if ingress rules exist
  - No ingress/egress rules = blocks that traffic type entirely
  - DNS typically uses port 53 UDP (and TCP)
- 

## Steps: Default Deny All Traffic

**Scenario:** Create a policy that blocks ALL ingress and egress traffic for all pods in a namespace.

### Step 1: Create the namespace

```
kubectl create namespace isolated-ns
```

### Step 2: Create the NetworkPolicy

```
# /opt/course/01/netpol.yaml
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
  name: default-deny-all
  namespace: isolated-ns
spec:
  podSelector: {}           # Applies to ALL pods
  policyTypes:
    - Ingress
    - Egress
  # No ingress/egress rules = deny all
```

### Step 3: Apply and verify

```
kubectl apply -f /opt/course/01/netpol.yaml  
kubectl get netpol -n isolated-ns
```

---

## Steps: Allow Specific Traffic (Multi-tier App)

**Scenario:** Allow frontend → API on port 8080, API → database on port 5432, DNS everywhere.

API Policy (allows ingress from frontend, egress to database)

```
# /opt/course/02/api-netpol.yaml
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
  name: api-policy
  namespace: microservices-ns
spec:
  podSelector:
    matchLabels:
      tier: api
  policyTypes:
    - Ingress
    - Egress
  ingress:
    - from:
        - podSelector:
            matchLabels:
              tier: frontend
        ports:
          - protocol: TCP
            port: 8080
    - from:
        - namespaceSelector:
            matchLabels:
              name: monitoring-ns
        ports:
          - protocol: TCP
            port: 8080
  egress:
    - to:
        - podSelector:
            matchLabels:
              tier: database
        ports:
          - protocol: TCP
            port: 5432
    - ports:                                     # DNS egress
        - protocol: UDP
          port: 53
        - protocol: TCP
          port: 53
```

Database Policy (allows ingress only from API)

```
# /opt/course/02/db-netpol.yaml
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
  name: database-policy
  namespace: microservices-ns
spec:
  podSelector:
    matchLabels:
      tier: database
  policyTypes:
    - Ingress
    - Egress
  ingress:
    - from:
        - podSelector:
            matchLabels:
              tier: api
        ports:
          - protocol: TCP
            port: 5432
  egress:
    - ports: # DNS only
        - protocol: UDP
          port: 53
        - protocol: TCP
          port: 53
```

## Test connectivity

```
# From frontend pod - should fail to reach database directly
kubectl exec -n microservices-ns frontend-pod -- wget -q0- --timeout=2
database:5432

# From API pod - should reach database
kubectl exec -n microservices-ns api-pod -- wget -q0- --timeout=2
database:5432
```

---

## Key Points to Remember

Element	Meaning
<code>podSelector: {}</code>	All pods in namespace
<code>namespaceSelector: {}</code>	All namespaces
<code>policyTypes: [Ingress, Egress]</code>	Control both directions
No rules under ingress/egress	Deny that traffic type
Port 53 UDP/TCP	DNS - almost always needed for egress

## 2. CIS Benchmark & kube-bench

### Theory

The **CIS Kubernetes Benchmark** is a security configuration guide for Kubernetes clusters. **kube-bench** is a tool that checks cluster configuration against CIS benchmarks automatically.

#### Key Areas Checked:

- API Server security settings
- Controller Manager configuration
- Scheduler configuration
- etcd security
- Kubelet configuration
- Worker node settings

### Steps: Run kube-bench and Fix Issues

Step 1: SSH to control plane and run kube-bench

```
ssh controlplane

# Run kube-bench for master components
kube-bench run --targets=master > /opt/course/03/kube-bench-before.txt

# Or run specific checks
kube-bench run --targets=master --check=1.2.1,1.2.2
```

Step 2: Common fixes for API Server

Edit `/etc/kubernetes/manifests/kube-apiserver.yaml`:

```
spec:
  containers:
  - command:
    - kube-apiserver
    # Security fixes - add/modify these:
    - --anonymous-auth=false           # Disable anonymous access
    - --profiling=false                 # Disable profiling
    - --enable-admission-plugins=NodeRestriction,PodSecurity
    - --audit-log-path=/var/log/apiserver/audit.log
    - --audit-log-maxage=30
    - --audit-log-maxbackup=10
    - --audit-log-maxsize=100
    - --authorization-mode=Node,RBAC    # Never use AlwaysAllow
    # REMOVE if present:
    - --insecure-port=8080              # Must be 0 or removed
```

### Step 3: Fix kubelet issues on worker nodes

```
ssh node01

# Edit kubelet config
sudo vim /var/lib/kubelet/config.yaml
```

Common kubelet fixes:

```
# /var/lib/kubelet/config.yaml
authentication:
  anonymous:
    enabled: false           # Disable anonymous auth
  webhook:
    enabled: true
authorization:
  mode: Webhook              # Not AlwaysAllow
readOnlyPort: 0              # Disable read-only port
protectKernelDefaults: true
```

### Step 4: Restart kubelet and verify

```
sudo systemctl restart kubelet
kube-bench run --targets=node > /opt/course/03/kube-bench-after.txt
```

---

## Common kube-bench Failures & Fixes

Check	Issue	Fix
1.2.1	Anonymous auth enabled	<code>--anonymous-auth=false</code>
1.2.18	Profiling enabled	<code>--profiling=false</code>
1.2.6	Insecure port open	Remove <code>--insecure-port</code>
4.2.1	Kubelet anonymous auth	<code>anonymous.enabled: false</code>
4.2.2	Kubelet authorization	<code>authorization.mode: Webhook</code>

## 3. RBAC

### Theory

**Role-Based Access Control (RBAC)** restricts access to Kubernetes resources based on roles assigned to users or service accounts.

#### Four RBAC Resources:

Resource	Scope	Binds To
Role	Namespace	RoleBinding
ClusterRole	Cluster-wide	ClusterRoleBinding or RoleBinding
RoleBinding	Namespace	Role or ClusterRole
ClusterRoleBinding	Cluster-wide	ClusterRole

#### Key API Groups:

- `""` (core) = pods, services, secrets, configmaps, namespaces
- `apps` = deployments, daemonsets, replicaset, statefulsets
- `networking.k8s.io` = networkpolicies, ingresses
- `rbac.authorization.k8s.io` = roles, rolebindings

### Steps: Create Role & RoleBinding

#### Step 1: Create ServiceAccount

```
kubectl create namespace cicd-ns
kubectl create serviceaccount deploy-sa -n cicd-ns
```

Or with YAML:



```
# /opt/course/04/sa.yaml
apiVersion: v1
kind: ServiceAccount
metadata:
  name: deploy-sa
  namespace: cicd-ns
```

## Step 2: Create Role

```
# /opt/course/04/role.yaml
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: Role
metadata:
  name: deployment-manager
  namespace: cicd-ns
rules:
  - apiGroups: ["apps"]
    resources: ["deployments"]
    verbs: ["get", "list", "watch", "create", "update", "patch", "delete"]
  - apiGroups: [""]
    resources: ["pods", "pods/log"]
    verbs: ["get", "list", "watch"]
  - apiGroups: [""]
    resources: ["services", "configmaps"]
    verbs: ["get", "list"]
# NOTE: NO secrets access - critical for least privilege
```

## Step 3: Create RoleBinding

```
# /opt/course/04/rolebinding.yaml
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: RoleBinding
metadata:
  name: deploy-sa-binding
  namespace: cicd-ns
subjects:
  - kind: ServiceAccount
    name: deploy-sa
    namespace: cicd-ns
roleRef:
  kind: Role
  name: deployment-manager
  apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
```

## Step 4: Test permissions

```
# Check what the SA can do
kubectl auth can-i create deployments -n cicd-ns --
as=system:serviceaccount:cicd-ns:deploy-sa
# yes

kubectl auth can-i get secrets -n cicd-ns --as=system:serviceaccount:cicd-
ns:deploy-sa
# no
```

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## Steps: Create ClusterRole & ClusterRoleBinding (Cluster-wide Read-Only)

```
# /opt/course/20/clusterrole.yaml
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: ClusterRole
metadata:
  name: cluster-monitor
rules:
  - apiGroups: [""]
    resources: ["pods", "nodes", "namespaces", "endpoints", "services",
"events"]
    verbs: ["get", "list", "watch"]
  - apiGroups: [""]
    resources: ["pods/log"]
    verbs: ["get"]
# NO write verbs, NO secrets, NO exec
```

```
# /opt/course/20/clusterrolebinding.yaml
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: ClusterRoleBinding
metadata:
  name: cluster-monitor-binding
subjects:
  - kind: ServiceAccount
    name: monitor-sa
    namespace: monitoring
roleRef:
  kind: ClusterRole
  name: cluster-monitor
  apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
```

---

## Quick RBAC Commands

```
# Create role imperatively
kubectl create role pod-reader --verb=get,list,watch --resource=pods -n
myns

# Create rolebinding imperatively
kubectl create rolebinding pod-reader-binding --role=pod-reader --
serviceaccount=myns:mysa -n myns

# Create clusterrole
kubectl create clusterrole node-reader --verb=get,list,watch --
resource=nodes

# Create clusterrolebinding
kubectl create clusterrolebinding node-reader-binding --clusterrole=node-
reader --serviceaccount=myns:mysa

# Test permissions
kubectl auth can-i list pods --as=system:serviceaccount:myns:mysa -n myns
kubectl auth can-i --list --as=system:serviceaccount:myns:mysa -n myns
```

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## 4. ServiceAccount Security

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### Theory

ServiceAccounts provide an identity for pods. By default, Kubernetes:

- Creates a **default** ServiceAccount in each namespace
- Automatically mounts a token into pods at  
`/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/`

#### Security Best Practices:

- Set **automountServiceAccountToken: false** on ServiceAccount or Pod
- Use dedicated ServiceAccounts with minimal permissions
- Never use the **default** ServiceAccount for applications

---

### Steps: Secure ServiceAccount Configuration

Step 1: Create ServiceAccount with no auto-mount

```
# /opt/course/05/sa.yaml
apiVersion: v1
kind: ServiceAccount
metadata:
  name: restricted-sa
  namespace: secure-ns
automountServiceAccountToken: false
```

## Step 2: Create minimal Role and RoleBinding

```
# /opt/course/05/role.yaml
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: Role
metadata:
  name: pod-reader
  namespace: secure-ns
rules:
- apiGroups: [""]
  resources: ["pods", "services"]
  verbs: ["get", "list"]
```

```
# /opt/course/05/rolebinding.yaml
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: RoleBinding
metadata:
  name: restricted-sa-binding
  namespace: secure-ns
subjects:
- kind: ServiceAccount
  name: restricted-sa
  namespace: secure-ns
roleRef:
  kind: Role
  name: pod-reader
  apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
```

## Step 3: Update deployment to use restricted SA

```
# /opt/course/05/deployment.yaml
apiVersion: apps/v1
kind: Deployment
metadata:
  name: insecure-app
  namespace: secure-ns
spec:
  replicas: 1
  selector:
    matchLabels:
      app: insecure-app
  template:
    metadata:
      labels:
        app: insecure-app
    spec:
      serviceAccountName: restricted-sa
      automountServiceAccountToken: false # Also set at pod level
      containers:
        - name: app
          image: nginx:alpine
```

#### Step 4: Verify no token mounted

```
kubectl exec -n secure-ns <pod-name> -- ls
/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/
# Should return error - directory doesn't exist
```

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## 5. AppArmor Profiles

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### Theory

**AppArmor** (Application Armor) is a Linux Security Module (LSM) that provides Mandatory Access Control (MAC). It restricts what applications can do, including:

- File access (read/write/execute)
- Network operations
- Capability usage

#### Kubernetes Integration:

- Profiles must be loaded on each node where the pod might run
- Uses annotation (legacy) or securityContext (K8s 1.30+)
- Profiles are node-specific, not cluster-wide

---

## Steps: Apply AppArmor Profile to Pod

### Step 1: Check/load profile on node

```
ssh node01

# Check loaded profiles
sudo aa-status | grep k8s-deny-write

# If not loaded, load it
sudo apparmor_parser -r /etc/apparmor.d/k8s-deny-write

# Verify profile is in enforce mode
sudo aa-status
```

### Step 2: Create pod with AppArmor profile

```
# /opt/course/06/pod.yaml
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
  name: secured-pod
  namespace: apparmor-ns
spec:
  containers:
    - name: secured-container
      image: busybox:1.36
      command: ["sh", "-c", "echo 'AppArmor secured!' && sleep 1h"]
      securityContext:
        appArmorProfile:
          type: Localhost
          localhostProfile: k8s-deny-write
```

### Step 3: Apply and verify

```
kubectl apply -f /opt/course/06/pod.yaml

# Test - should fail to write
kubectl exec -n apparmor-ns secured-pod -- touch /tmp/test
# Permission denied
```

## AppArmor Profile Types

Type	Description
RuntimeDefault	Container runtime's default profile
Localhost	Custom profile loaded on node
Unconfined	No AppArmor restrictions

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## 6. Seccomp Profiles

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### Theory

**Seccomp** (Secure Computing Mode) filters system calls a process can make to the kernel. It reduces the attack surface by:

- Allowing only necessary syscalls
- Blocking dangerous syscalls (e.g., `ptrace`, `mount`)
- Logging blocked syscall attempts

#### Profile Locations:

- Custom profiles: `/var/lib/kubelet/seccomp/`
  - Default: Defined by container runtime
- 

## Steps: Apply Seccomp Profiles

### Step 1: Create pod with RuntimeDefault seccomp

```
# /opt/course/07/runtime-default-pod.yaml
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
  name: runtime-default-pod
  namespace: seccomp-ns
spec:
  securityContext:
    seccompProfile:
      type: RuntimeDefault
  containers:
    - name: nginx
      image: nginx:alpine
```

## Step 2: Create pod with custom Localhost seccomp profile

```
# /opt/course/07/custom-seccomp-pod.yaml
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
  name: custom-seccomp-pod
  namespace: seccomp-ns
spec:
  securityContext:
    seccompProfile:
      type: Localhost
      localhostProfile: audit-log.json # Path relative to
/var/lib/kubelet/seccomp/
  containers:
    - name: nginx
      image: nginx:alpine
```

## Step 3: Verify seccomp is applied

```
kubectl apply -f /opt/course/07/runtime-default-pod.yaml
kubectl apply -f /opt/course/07/custom-seccomp-pod.yaml

# Check pod is running
kubectl get pods -n seccomp-ns

# Verify via crictl on the node
ssh node01
sudo crictl inspect <container-id> | grep -i seccomp
```

---

## Seccomp Profile Types

Type	Description
RuntimeDefault	Runtime's default profile (recommended)
Localhost	Custom profile at <code>/var/lib/kubelet/seccomp/&lt;profile&gt;</code>
Unconfined	No seccomp restrictions

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## 7. Pod Security Admission (PSA)

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### Theory



**Pod Security Admission** enforces Pod Security Standards at the namespace level. It replaced PodSecurityPolicy (deprecated).

### Three Modes:

Mode	Action
<code>enforce</code>	Reject violating pods
<code>warn</code>	Allow but warn
<code>audit</code>	Log to audit log

### Three Levels:

Level	Description
<code>privileged</code>	Unrestricted (default)
<code>baseline</code>	Minimally restrictive, prevents known privilege escalations
<code>restricted</code>	Heavily restricted, security best practices

## Steps: Configure PSA Restricted Namespace

### Step 1: Create namespace with PSA labels

```
apiVersion: v1
kind: Namespace
metadata:
  name: psa-restricted
  labels:
    pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce: restricted
    pod-security.kubernetes.io/warn: restricted
    pod-security.kubernetes.io/audit: restricted
```

Or imperatively:

```
kubectl create namespace psa-restricted
kubectl label namespace psa-restricted \
  pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce=restricted \
  pod-security.kubernetes.io/warn=restricted \
  pod-security.kubernetes.io/audit=restricted
```

### Step 2: Create PSA-compliant pod

```
# /opt/course/08/pod.yaml
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
  name: secure-pod
  namespace: psa-restricted
spec:
  securityContext:
    runAsNonRoot: true
    seccompProfile:
      type: RuntimeDefault
  containers:
    - name: nginx
      image: nginx:alpine
      securityContext:
        allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
        readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
        runAsNonRoot: true
        runAsUser: 1000
        capabilities:
          drop:
            - ALL
      volumeMounts:
        - name: tmp
          mountPath: /tmp
        - name: cache
          mountPath: /var/cache/nginx
        - name: run
          mountPath: /var/run
  volumes:
    - name: tmp
      emptyDir: {}
    - name: cache
      emptyDir: {}
    - name: run
      emptyDir: {}
```

### Step 3: Test that non-compliant pods are rejected

```
# This will fail
kubectl run test --image=nginx -n psa-restricted
# Error: violates "restricted" policy

# Save the error message
kubectl run test --image=nginx -n psa-restricted &>
/opt/course/08/rejected-error.txt
```

## PSA Restricted Requirements

A **restricted** pod must:

- Run as non-root (`runAsNonRoot: true`)
- Have seccomp profile (`RuntimeDefault` or `Localhost`)
- Drop all capabilities (`capabilities.drop: ["ALL"]`)
- Disable privilege escalation (`allowPrivilegeEscalation: false`)
- Not use hostNetwork, hostPID, hostIPC
- Not use hostPath volumes
- Not run privileged containers

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## 8. Secrets Encryption at Rest

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### Theory

By default, Kubernetes stores Secrets in etcd as **base64-encoded plaintext**. Encryption at rest protects Secrets by encrypting them before writing to etcd.

#### Encryption Providers:

Provider	Description
<code>identity</code>	No encryption (default)
<code>aescbc</code>	AES-CBC encryption (recommended)
<code>aesgcm</code>	AES-GCM encryption
<code>secretbox</code>	XSalsa20 + Poly1305
<code>kms</code>	External KMS provider

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### Steps: Enable Secrets Encryption

#### Step 1: Generate encryption key

```
# Generate a 32-byte key and base64 encode it
head -c 32 /dev/urandom | base64
```

#### Step 2: Create EncryptionConfiguration

```
# /etc/kubernetes/encryption-config.yaml
apiVersion: apiserver.config.k8s.io/v1
kind: EncryptionConfiguration
resources:
  - resources:
      - secrets
    providers:
      - aescbc:
          keys:
            - name: key1
              secret: <base64-encoded-32-byte-key>
      - identity: {} # Fallback for reading unencrypted secrets
```

#### ⚠ IMPORTANT: Provider Order Matters!

- The **first provider** in the list is used to **encrypt new secrets**
- All providers are tried in order when **decrypting** existing secrets
- If **identity: {}** is listed **first**, new secrets will be stored **unencrypted!**
- Always put your encryption provider (aescbc, aesgcm, secretbox) **before** **identity: {}**
- The **identity: {}** should only be last as a fallback to read pre-existing unencrypted secrets

### Step 3: Configure API server

Edit `/etc/kubernetes/manifests/kube-apiserver.yaml`:

```
spec:
  containers:
    - command:
        - kube-apiserver
        - --encryption-provider-config=/etc/kubernetes/encryption-config.yaml
      # ... other flags
      volumeMounts:
        - name: encryption-config
          mountPath: /etc/kubernetes/encryption-config.yaml
          readOnly: true
      volumes:
        - name: encryption-config
          hostPath:
            path: /etc/kubernetes/encryption-config.yaml
            type: File
```

### Step 4: Wait for API server restart

```
# Watch for API server to restart
watch "crictl ps | grep kube-apiserver"

# Or check pods
kubectl get pods -n kube-system | grep api
```

### Step 5: Re-encrypt existing secrets

```
# Re-encrypt all secrets
kubectl get secrets --all-namespaces -o json | kubectl replace -f -
```

### Step 6: Verify encryption in etcd

```
# Check secret in etcd (should be encrypted, not plaintext)
ETCDCTL_API=3 etcdctl \
  --cacert=/etc/kubernetes/pki/etcd/ca.crt \
  --cert=/etc/kubernetes/pki/etcd/server.crt \
  --key=/etc/kubernetes/pki/etcd/server.key \
  get /registry/secrets/secrets-ns/my-secret | hexdump -C

# Encrypted secrets start with "k8s:enc:aescbc:v1:"
```

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## 9. SecurityContext Hardening

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### Theory

**SecurityContext** defines privilege and access control settings for pods and containers. It's the primary way to harden container security.

#### Pod-level vs Container-level:

- Pod-level: Applies to all containers
- Container-level: Overrides pod-level for specific container

---

### Steps: Create Fully Hardened Pod

```
# /opt/course/10/pod.yaml
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
  name: hardened-pod
  namespace: hardened-ns
spec:
  securityContext:
    runAsNonRoot: true
    runAsUser: 1000
    runAsGroup: 1000
    fsGroup: 1000
    seccompProfile:
      type: RuntimeDefault
  containers:
    - name: nginx
      image: nginx:alpine
      securityContext:
        allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
        readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
        capabilities:
          drop:
            - ALL
        # Add back only what's needed (usually none for nginx)
      volumeMounts:
        - name: tmp
          mountPath: /tmp
        - name: cache
          mountPath: /var/cache/nginx
        - name: run
          mountPath: /var/run
  volumes:
    - name: tmp
      emptyDir: {}
    - name: cache
      emptyDir: {}
    - name: run
      emptyDir: {}
```

---

## SecurityContext Quick Reference

Field	Purpose	Recommended Value
<code>runAsNonRoot</code>	Prevent root execution	<code>true</code>
<code>runAsUser</code>	Specific UID	<code>1000</code> or higher
<code>readOnlyRootFilesystem</code>	Prevent writes	<code>true</code>
<code>allowPrivilegeEscalation</code>	Prevent sudo/setuid	<code>false</code>
<code>capabilities.drop</code>	Remove Linux capabilities	<code>["ALL"]</code>
<code>seccompProfile.type</code>	Syscall filtering	<code>RuntimeDefault</code>
<code>privileged</code>	Full host access	<code>false</code> (or omit)

## 10. Trivy Image Scanning

### Theory

**Trivy** is a vulnerability scanner for container images, file systems, and git repositories. It detects:

- OS package vulnerabilities (CVEs)
- Application dependency vulnerabilities
- Misconfigurations
- Secrets in images

**Severity Levels:** CRITICAL, HIGH, MEDIUM, LOW, UNKNOWN

### Steps: Scan and Compare Images

Step 1: Scan images for HIGH and CRITICAL vulnerabilities

```
# Scan nginx images
trivy image --severity HIGH,CRITICAL nginx:1.19 > /opt/course/11/nginx-1.19-scan.txt
trivy image --severity HIGH,CRITICAL nginx:1.25-alpine > /opt/course/11/nginx-1.25-alpine-scan.txt

# Scan python images
trivy image --severity HIGH,CRITICAL python:3.8 > /opt/course/11/python-3.8-scan.txt
trivy image --severity HIGH,CRITICAL python:3.12-alpine > /opt/course/11/python-3.12-alpine-scan.txt
```

Step 2: Count vulnerabilities

```
# Quick count
trivy image --severity HIGH,CRITICAL -q nginx:1.19 | grep "Total:"
```

### Step 3: Document recommendations

```
# /opt/course/11/recommendations.txt
# Recommended nginx: nginx:1.25-alpine (fewer vulns, smaller image)
# Recommended python: python:3.12-alpine (newer version, fewer vulns)
```

### Step 4: Update deployment with safer images

```
kubectl set image deployment/web-app nginx=nginx:1.25-alpine -n trivy-test
```

---

## Trivy Quick Commands

```
# Basic scan
trivy image nginx:latest

# Only HIGH and CRITICAL
trivy image --severity HIGH,CRITICAL nginx:latest

# JSON output
trivy image -f json nginx:latest > scan.json

# Scan and fail if vulns found (for CI/CD)
trivy image --exit-code 1 --severity CRITICAL nginx:latest

# Ignore unfixed vulnerabilities
trivy image --ignore-unfixed nginx:latest
```

---

## 11. Kubesec Static Analysis

### Theory

**Kubesec** analyzes Kubernetes manifests for security risks and provides a score. Higher scores indicate better security posture.



**Score System:**

- Positive points for security features (e.g., `runAsNonRoot`)
  - Critical issues can result in negative scores
  - Target score: 8+ for production workloads
- 

## Steps: Analyze and Fix Deployment

### Step 1: Scan insecure deployment

```
kubesecc scan /opt/course/12/insecure-deploy.yaml > /opt/course/12/kubesecc-report.json
```

```
# Or use the online API
```

```
curl -sSX POST --data-binary @/opt/course/12/insecure-deploy.yaml \
  https://v2.kubesecc.io/scan
```

### Step 2: Review and fix issues

Common fixes to improve score:

```
# /opt/course/12/secure-deploy.yaml
apiVersion: apps/v1
kind: Deployment
metadata:
  name: secure-app
  namespace: kubesecc-ns
spec:
  replicas: 1
  selector:
    matchLabels:
      app: secure-app
  template:
    metadata:
      labels:
        app: secure-app
    spec:
      automountServiceAccountToken: false # +1 point
      containers:
        - name: app
          image: nginx:alpine
          securityContext:
            runAsNonRoot: true # +1 point
            runAsUser: 1000 # +1 point
            readOnlyRootFilesystem: true # +1 point
            allowPrivilegeEscalation: false # +1 point
            capabilities:
              drop:
                - ALL # +1 point
          resources: # +1 point
            limits:
              memory: "128Mi"
              cpu: "500m"
            requests:
              memory: "64Mi"
              cpu: "250m"
```

### Step 3: Verify improved score

```
kubesecc scan /opt/course/12/secure-deploy.yaml > /opt/course/12/kubesecc-
fixed.json
# Score should be >= 8
```

---

## Kubesecc Scoring Items

Feature	Points	Description
<code>runAsNonRoot: true</code>	+1	Non-root user
<code>runAsUser &gt; 10000</code>	+1	High UID
<code>readOnlyRootFilesystem: true</code>	+1	Read-only FS
<code>capabilities.drop: ALL</code>	+1	Drop caps
<code>resources.limits</code>	+1	Resource limits
<code>automountServiceAccountToken: false</code>	+1	No SA token
<code>serviceAccountName</code>	+3	Custom SA
<code>privileged: true</code>	Critical!	<b>Never use</b>

## 12. Falco Runtime Security

### Theory

**Falco** is a runtime security tool that detects anomalous activity in containers and hosts. It uses rules to identify:


- Shell spawned in container
- Sensitive file access
- Unexpected network connections
- Privilege escalation attempts

#### Deployment Options:

Method	Where	CKS Exam
<b>Service (systemd)</b>	Specific node (e.g., <code>node01</code> )	Common - SSH to node, manage with <code>systemctl</code>
<b>DaemonSet (Helm)</b>	All nodes (including control plane)	Rare - interact via <code>kubectl</code>

**CKS Exam Note:** Falco is typically pre-installed as a **service on a worker node** (e.g., `node01`). The question will tell you which node to SSH into. All Falco tasks (rules, logs, restarts) are performed on that specific node.

### Quick Reference - Rule Structure



ORDER MATTERS: Define lists first, then macros, then rules  
All components go in ONE YAML file (in /etc/falco/rules.d/)

---

## Syntax Cheat Sheet

### LIST

```
- list: <name>
  items: [item1, item2, item3]
```

### MACRO

```
- macro: <name>
  condition: <boolean_expression>
```

### RULE (5 required fields)

```
- rule: <name>
  desc: <description>
  condition: <expression_or_macro>
  output: <message with %fields>
  priority: <LEVEL>
```

---

## Common Macros (Memorize These!)

```
# Detect new process execution
- macro: spawned_process
  condition: evt.type in (execve, execveat)

# Detect if event is in a container (not host)
- macro: container
  condition: container.id != host
```

---

## Operators

Type	Operators
Logical	and, or, not
Compare	=, !=, <, >, <=, >=
String	contains, startswith, endswith
List	in, intersects
Other	exists, glob, regex

---

## Output Fields (use % prefix)

Category	Fields
Process	%proc.name, %proc.cmdline, %proc.pid, %proc.pname
User	%user.name, %user.uid
Container	%container.id, %container.name, %container.image
Kubernetes	%k8s.pod.name, %k8s.ns.name
File	%fd.name

---

## Priority Levels (low to high)

```
DEBUG → INFORMATIONAL → NOTICE → WARNING → ERROR → CRITICAL → ALERT →
EMERGENCY
```

---

## File Locations

Path	Purpose
/etc/falco/rules.d/*.yaml	Custom rules (put your rules here!)
/etc/falco/falco.yaml	Main config file
/etc/falco/falco_rules.yaml	Default rules (don't modify)

## Essential Commands

```
# Restart Falco
sudo systemctl restart falco-modern-bpf

# View Falco logs
sudo journalctl -u falco-modern-bpf -f

# Filter for specific rule
sudo journalctl -u falco-modern-bpf | grep "Shell"
```

## Steps: Create Custom Falco Rule

Step 1: SSH to node with Falco

```
ssh node01
```

Step 2: Create custom rule file

```
# /etc/falco/rules.d/shell-detect.yaml

# Macro: spawned_process
- macro: spawned_process
  condition: evt.type in (execve, execveat)

# Macro: container
- macro: container
  condition: container.id != host

# Rule: Shell Spawned in Container
- rule: Shell Spawned in Container
  desc: Detect shell processes spawned inside containers
  condition: >
    spawned_process and
    container and
    proc.name in (bash, sh, ash, dash, zsh)
  output: >
    Shell spawned in container
    (user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline container=%container.name
    pod=%k8s.pod.name ns=%k8s.ns.name)
  priority: WARNING
  tags: [container, shell, mitre_execution]
```

### Step 3: Restart Falco

```
sudo systemctl restart falco-modern-bpf
```

### Step 4: Trigger the rule

```
# From control plane, exec into a pod
kubectl exec -it <pod-name> -- /bin/sh
```

### Step 5: Check Falco logs

```
# On node01
sudo journalctl -u falco-modern-bpf | grep "Shell"

# Or tail the log
sudo journalctl -u falco-modern-bpf -f
```

### Step 6: Get container ID

```
# Use crictl to find container
sudo crictl ps | grep <pod-name>

# Save container ID
echo "<container-id>" > /opt/course/13/container-id.txt
```

# 13. Kubernetes Audit Logs

## Theory

**Audit logging** records all requests to the Kubernetes API server. It captures:

- Who made the request (user, service account)
- What was requested (verb, resource)
- When it happened (timestamp)
- Whether it succeeded

**Audit Levels:**

Level	Data Recorded
None	Don't log
Metadata	Request metadata only
Request	Metadata + request body
RequestResponse	Metadata + request + response body

## Steps: Configure Audit Logging

Step 1: Create audit policy



```
# /etc/kubernetes/audit-policy.yaml
apiVersion: audit.k8s.io/v1
kind: Policy
rules:
  # Log all secrets at RequestResponse level
  - level: RequestResponse
    resources:
      - group: ""
        resources: ["secrets"]

  # Log pod operations at Metadata level
  - level: Metadata
    resources:
      - group: ""
        resources: ["pods", "pods/log"]

  # Don't log specific configmaps
  - level: None
    resources:
      - group: ""
        resources: ["configmaps"]
        resourceNames: ["controller-leader"]

  # Don't log kube-proxy watch requests
  - level: None
    users: ["system:kube-proxy"]
    verbs: ["watch"]
    resources:
      - group: ""
        resources: ["endpoints", "services"]

  # Log kube-system configmap/secret changes
  - level: Request
    namespaces: ["kube-system"]
    resources:
      - group: ""
        resources: ["configmaps", "secrets"]
    verbs: ["create", "update", "patch", "delete"]

  # Catch-all: log everything else at Metadata
  - level: Metadata
    omitStages:
      - RequestReceived
```

## Step 2: Configure API server

Edit `/etc/kubernetes/manifests/kube-apiserver.yaml`:

```
spec:
  containers:
  - command:
    - kube-apiserver
    - --audit-policy-file=/etc/kubernetes/audit-policy.yaml
    - --audit-log-path=/var/log/kubernetes/audit/audit.log
    - --audit-log-maxage=8
    - --audit-log-maxbackup=3
    - --audit-log-maxsize=9
    # ... other flags
  volumeMounts:
  - name: audit-policy
    mountPath: /etc/kubernetes/audit-policy.yaml
    readOnly: true
  - name: audit-log
    mountPath: /var/log/kubernetes/audit
  volumes:
  - name: audit-policy
    hostPath:
      path: /etc/kubernetes/audit-policy.yaml
      type: File
  - name: audit-log
    hostPath:
      path: /var/log/kubernetes/audit
      type: DirectoryOrCreate
```

### Step 3: Create directory and wait for restart

```
mkdir -p /var/log/kubernetes/audit

# Wait for API server to restart
watch "crictl ps | grep kube-apiserver"
```

### Step 4: Test and find audit entry

```
# Create a secret
kubectl create namespace audit-test
kubectl create secret generic test-secret --from-literal=key=value -n
audit-test

# Find the audit log entry
grep "test-secret" /var/log/kubernetes/audit/audit.log | tail -1 >
/opt/course/14/secret-audit.log
```

## Audit Policy Tips

- **Order matters:** First matching rule wins
  - Use `omitStages: ["RequestReceived"]` to reduce noise
  - `None` level for high-frequency, low-value events
  - `RequestResponse` for secrets (to see what was accessed)
  - Always have a catch-all rule at the end
- 

## 14. RuntimeClass & gVisor Sandbox

---

### Theory

**RuntimeClass** allows different container runtimes for different workloads. **gVisor** is a container sandbox that provides an additional layer of isolation by intercepting system calls.

#### When to use gVisor:

- Untrusted workloads
  - Multi-tenant environments
  - Defense in depth for sensitive applications
- 

### Steps: Use gVisor RuntimeClass

#### Step 1: Verify RuntimeClass exists

```
kubectl get runtimeclass gvisor
```

#### Step 2: Create pod with gVisor runtime

```
# /opt/course/15/pod.yaml
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
  name: sandboxed-pod
  namespace: sandbox-ns
spec:
  runtimeClassName: gvisor      # Use gVisor runtime
  containers:
    - name: nginx
      image: nginx
```

### Step 3: Apply and verify

```
kubectl apply -f /opt/course/15/pod.yaml

# Verify pod is running
kubectl get pod sandboxed-pod -n sandbox-ns

# Check runtime class is applied
kubectl get pod sandboxed-pod -n sandbox-ns -o
jsonpath='{.spec.runtimeClassName}'
```

### Step 4: Verify gVisor is working

```
# Exec into pod and check kernel (should be gVisor, not host)
kubectl exec -n sandbox-ns sandboxed-pod -- dmesg | head
# Should show gVisor kernel, not Linux
```

---

## RuntimeClass YAML

```
apiVersion: node.k8s.io/v1
kind: RuntimeClass
metadata:
  name: gvisor
handler: runsc      # The CRI handler name
```

---

# 15. ImagePolicyWebhook

## Theory

**ImagePolicyWebhook** is an admission controller that validates images against an external webhook service before allowing pod creation. Used to enforce:

- Allowed registries (e.g., only internal registry)
- Image signing verification
- Vulnerability scan requirements

---

## Steps: Configure ImagePolicyWebhook

## Step 1: Create webhook kubeconfig

```
# /etc/kubernetes/admission/image-policy-kubeconfig.yaml
apiVersion: v1
kind: Config
clusters:
  - name: image-policy-webhook
    cluster:
      certificate-authority: /etc/kubernetes/pki/image-policy/ca.crt
      server: https://image-policy-webhook.image-policy.svc:443
contexts:
  - name: image-policy-webhook
    context:
      cluster: image-policy-webhook
      user: image-policy-webhook
current-context: image-policy-webhook
users:
  - name: image-policy-webhook
    user: {}
```

## Step 2: Create admission configuration

```
# /etc/kubernetes/admission/admission-config.yaml
apiVersion: apiserver.config.k8s.io/v1
kind: AdmissionConfiguration
plugins:
  - name: ImagePolicyWebhook
    configuration:
      imagePolicy:
        kubeConfigFile: /etc/kubernetes/admission/image-policy-
kubeconfig.yaml
        allowTTL: 50
        denyTTL: 50
        retryBackoff: 500
        defaultAllow: false    # DENY if webhook unavailable
```

## Step 3: Configure API server

Edit `/etc/kubernetes/manifests/kube-apiserver.yaml`:

```
spec:
  containers:
  - command:
    - kube-apiserver
    - --enable-admission-plugins=NodeRestriction,ImagePolicyWebhook
    - --admission-control-config-file=/etc/kubernetes/admission/admission-
config.yaml
    # ... other flags
    volumeMounts:
    - name: admission-config
      mountPath: /etc/kubernetes/admission
      readOnly: true
    - name: image-policy-certs
      mountPath: /etc/kubernetes/pki/image-policy
      readOnly: true
  volumes:
  - name: admission-config
    hostPath:
      path: /etc/kubernetes/admission
      type: Directory
  - name: image-policy-certs
    hostPath:
      path: /etc/kubernetes/pki/image-policy
      type: Directory
```

#### Step 4: Test the webhook

```
# Wait for API server to restart
watch "crictl ps | grep kube-apiserver"

# Test allowed image (depends on webhook policy)
kubectl run test --image=myregistry.io/nginx

# Test denied image
kubectl run test2 --image=docker.io/nginx
# Should be denied by webhook
```

---

## 16. Binary Verification

---

### Theory

**Binary verification** ensures Kubernetes binaries haven't been tampered with. Verify by comparing SHA512 checksums of installed binaries against official release checksums.

---

## Steps: Verify Kubernetes Binaries

### Step 1: Identify cluster version

```
kubectl version
# or for just server version
kubectl version -o json | jq -r '.serverVersion.gitVersion'
# or
kubectl get nodes -o wide
```

### Step 2: Download official checksums

```
VERSION=$(kubectl version -o json | jq -r '.serverVersion.gitVersion')

# Download official checksum file
curl -LO "https://dl.k8s.io/${VERSION}/bin/linux/amd64/kubectl.sha256"
# or SHA512
curl -LO
"https://dl.k8s.io/release/${VERSION}/bin/linux/amd64/kubectl.sha512"
```

### Step 3: Calculate local binary checksum

```
# Calculate SHA512 of local kubectl
sha512sum $(which kubectl) > /opt/course/17/kubectl-local.sha512

# Compare with official
cat kubectl.sha512
cat /opt/course/17/kubectl-local.sha512
```

### Step 4: Verify suspicious binary

```
# Calculate checksum of suspicious binary
sha512sum /tmp/kubelet-suspicious > /opt/course/17/kubelet-
suspicious.sha512

# Download official kubelet checksum
curl -LO
"https://dl.k8s.io/release/${VERSION}/bin/linux/amd64/kubelet.sha512"

# Compare
cat kubelet.sha512
cat /opt/course/17/kubelet-suspicious.sha512
```

## Step 5: Document conclusion

```
# If checksums match
echo "GENUINE" > /opt/course/17/conclusion.txt

# If checksums don't match
echo "TAMPERED" > /opt/course/17/conclusion.txt
```

---

## Quick Verification Commands

```
# SHA512 checksum
sha512sum /usr/bin/kubectl

# SHA256 checksum
sha256sum /usr/bin/kubectl

# Verify in one command
echo "$ (cat kubectl.sha512) /usr/bin/kubectl" | sha512sum -c
# kubectl: OK
```

---

# 17. Node Metadata Protection

---

## Theory

Cloud providers expose instance metadata at **169.254.169.254**. This endpoint can leak sensitive information:

- Instance credentials (AWS IAM, GCP service accounts)
- Instance identity tokens
- User data scripts (may contain secrets)

**Protection:** Block pod access to metadata endpoint using NetworkPolicy.

---

## Steps: Block Metadata Endpoint

### Step 1: Create namespace

```
kubectl create namespace protected-ns
```



## Step 2: Create NetworkPolicy to block metadata

```
# /opt/course/18/metadata-netpol.yaml
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
  name: block-metadata
  namespace: protected-ns
spec:
  podSelector: {}          # Apply to all pods
  policyTypes:
    - Egress
  egress:
    # Allow all egress EXCEPT metadata endpoint
    - to:
        - ipBlock:
            cidr: 0.0.0.0/0
            except:
              - 169.254.169.254/32
    # Allow DNS
    - ports:
        - protocol: UDP
          port: 53
        - protocol: TCP
          port: 53
```

## Step 3: Apply and test

```
kubectl apply -f /opt/course/18/metadata-netpol.yaml

# Create test pod
kubectl run test -n protected-ns --image=busybox --command -- sleep 3600

# Test metadata access (should timeout/fail)
kubectl exec -n protected-ns test -- wget -q0- --timeout=2
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/
# Connection timed out

# Test other egress (should work)
kubectl exec -n protected-ns test -- wget -q0- --timeout=2
http://google.com
# Works
```

---

# 18. Ingress TLS Configuration

---

## Theory

**Ingress TLS** terminates HTTPS at the ingress controller, encrypting traffic between clients and the cluster.

Requires:

- TLS certificate and private key
  - Kubernetes Secret of type `kubernetes.io/tls`
  - Ingress resource with `tls` configuration
- 

## Steps: Configure TLS Ingress

### Step 1: Generate self-signed certificate

```
openssl req -x509 -nodes -days 365 -newkey rsa:2048 \  
-keyout tls.key \  
-out tls.crt \  
-subj "/CN=secure.example.com/O=my-org"
```

### Step 2: Create TLS Secret

```
kubectl create secret tls web-tls-secret \  
--cert=tls.crt \  
--key=tls.key \  
-n web-ns  
  
# Save command for reference  
echo "kubectl create secret tls web-tls-secret --cert=tls.crt --  
key=tls.key -n web-ns" > /opt/course/19/secret-create.txt
```

### Step 3: Create Ingress with TLS

```
# /opt/course/19/ingress.yaml
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: Ingress
metadata:
  name: secure-ingress
  namespace: web-ns
spec:
  tls:
    - hosts:
        - secure.example.com
      secretName: web-tls-secret
  rules:
    - host: secure.example.com
      http:
        paths:
          - path: /
            pathType: Prefix
            backend:
              service:
                name: web-svc
                port:
                  number: 80
```

#### Step 4: Apply and verify

```
kubectl apply -f /opt/course/19/ingress.yaml

# Verify TLS is configured
kubectl get ingress secure-ingress -n web-ns -o yaml | grep -A5 tls

# Test TLS (if ingress controller has external IP)
curl -k https://secure.example.com
```

---

## TLS Secret YAML

```
apiVersion: v1
kind: Secret
metadata:
  name: web-tls-secret
  namespace: web-ns
type: kubernetes.io/tls
data:
  tls.crt: <base64-encoded-cert>
  tls.key: <base64-encoded-key>
```

---

# Quick Reference Tables

---

## API Groups

Group	Resources
<code>""</code> (core)	pods, services, secrets, configmaps, namespaces, nodes, persistentvolumeclaims
<code>apps</code>	deployments, daemonsets, replicaset, statefulsets
<code>networking.k8s.io</code>	networkpolicies, ingresses
<code>rbac.authorization.k8s.io</code>	roles, rolebindings, clusterroles, clusterrolebindings
<code>policy</code>	poddisruptionbudgets
<code>node.k8s.io</code>	runtimeclasses

---

## Important File Paths

File	Purpose
<code>/etc/kubernetes/manifests/kube-apiserver.yaml</code>	API server static pod
<code>/etc/kubernetes/manifests/kube-controller-manager.yaml</code>	Controller manager
<code>/etc/kubernetes/manifests/kube-scheduler.yaml</code>	Scheduler
<code>/etc/kubernetes/manifests/etcd.yaml</code>	etcd
<code>/var/lib/kubelet/config.yaml</code>	Kubelet configuration
<code>/etc/kubernetes/pki/</code>	Cluster PKI certificates
<code>/var/lib/kubelet/seccomp/</code>	Seccomp profiles
<code>/etc/apparmor.d/</code>	AppArmor profiles
<code>/etc/falco/</code>	Falco configuration
<code>/etc/falco/rules.d/</code>	Custom Falco rules

---

## Essential Commands

```
# RBAC Testing
kubectl auth can-i create pods --as=system:serviceaccount:ns:sa
kubectl auth can-i --list --as=user

# Get resources in all namespaces
kubectl get pods -A
kubectl get secrets -A
kubectl get networkpolicies -A

# Debug pods
kubectl describe pod <pod> -n <ns>
kubectl logs <pod> -n <ns>
kubectl exec -it <pod> -n <ns> -- /bin/sh

# Check API server
kubectl get pods -n kube-system | grep api
crictl ps | grep kube-apiserver

# etcd operations
ETCDCTL_API=3 etcdctl --endpoints=https://127.0.0.1:2379 \
  --cacert=/etc/kubernetes/pki/etcd/ca.crt \
  --cert=/etc/kubernetes/pki/etcd/server.crt \
  --key=/etc/kubernetes/pki/etcd/server.key \
  get /registry/secrets/<namespace>/<secret-name>

# Falco logs
journalctl -u falco
tail -f /var/log/falco.log

# AppArmor
aa-status
apparmor_parser -r /etc/apparmor.d/<profile>

# Container inspection
crictl ps
crictl inspect <container-id>
```

---

## Exam Day Checklist

1. **Set aliases first** - `alias k=kubectl`, enable completion
  2. **Read questions carefully** - note namespace, resource names, output paths
  3. **Use imperative commands** when possible - faster than YAML
  4. **Verify after each step** - don't assume it worked
  5. **Flag and skip** hard questions - come back later
  6. **Check output paths** - exact paths matter for scoring
  7. **Watch for restarts** - API server changes need restart time
-

## Domain Weights

Domain	Weight	Focus Areas
Cluster Setup	15%	NetworkPolicy, CIS Benchmark, TLS
Cluster Hardening	15%	RBAC, ServiceAccount, Metadata Protection
System Hardening	10%	AppArmor, Seccomp, RuntimeClass
Microservice Vulnerabilities	20%	PSA, Secrets Encryption, SecurityContext
Supply Chain Security	20%	Trivy, Kubesec, ImagePolicyWebhook
Monitoring & Runtime	20%	Falco, Audit Logs

## Common Exam Mistakes to Avoid

Mistake	Solution
Forgetting namespace	Always use <code>-n &lt;namespace&gt;</code>
Not waiting for API server restart	Watch <code>crictl ps</code> after manifest changes
Wrong output file paths	Double-check paths in question
Using <code>--dry-run</code> alone	Use <code>--dry-run=client -o yaml</code>
Forgetting DNS in NetworkPolicy	Add port 53 UDP/TCP egress
Missing seccomp for PSA restricted	Add <code>seccompProfile.type: RuntimeDefault</code>
Forgetting <code>capabilities.drop: ALL</code>	Required for PSA restricted
Not verifying changes	Always <code>kubectl get</code> or <code>describe</code> after apply

## Additional CKS Topics

The following topics are also part of the CKS curriculum and may appear on the exam.

# 19. Kubernetes Version Upgrades (Security Focus)

### Theory

Keeping Kubernetes up-to-date is critical for security. New versions patch CVEs and security vulnerabilities.

**Note:** Detailed upgrade procedures are primarily tested on CKA. CKS focuses on understanding WHY upgrades matter for security.

**Security Rationale:**

- Each Kubernetes release patches known CVEs
- Outdated clusters are vulnerable to published exploits
- Kubernetes supports only the **3 most recent minor versions**
- Components must be within one minor version of each other

**Upgrade Order (for reference):**

1. Control plane nodes (one at a time)
2. Worker nodes (drain → upgrade → uncordon)

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## Quick Reference Commands

```
# Check current versions
kubectl get nodes
kubectl version

# View available upgrades and CVE fixes
kubeadm upgrade plan

# Key upgrade commands (control plane)
kubeadm upgrade apply v1.31.0

# Key upgrade commands (worker nodes)
kubeadm upgrade node
```

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## Security Considerations

Aspect	Security Impact
Outdated API server	Exposed to known CVEs
Version skew	Compatibility issues, potential security gaps
Delayed patching	Longer exposure window to exploits
Upgrade testing	Prevents security misconfigurations

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# 20. Host OS Hardening

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## Theory

Minimizing the host OS attack surface reduces risk. Remove unnecessary packages, disable unused services, and restrict access.

### Key Principles:

- Remove unnecessary packages and services
  - Disable unused kernel modules
  - Use minimal base OS (e.g., Container-Optimized OS, Flatcar)
  - Restrict SSH access
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## Steps: Harden Worker Node

### Step 1: Remove unnecessary packages

```
ssh node01

# List installed packages
dpkg -l | grep -E "(telnet|ftp|rsh)"

# Remove unnecessary packages
apt-get remove --purge telnet ftp rsh-client
apt-get autoremove
```

### Step 2: Disable unnecessary services

```
# List running services
systemctl list-units --type=service --state=running

# Disable unnecessary services
systemctl disable --now snapd
systemctl disable --now avahi-daemon
```

### Step 3: Restrict kernel modules



```
# Blacklist unnecessary modules
cat << EOF > /etc/modprobe.d/k8s-security.conf
blacklist dccp
blacklist sctp
blacklist rds
blacklist tipc
EOF

# Apply changes
update-initramfs -u
```

Step 4: Verify with kube-bench

```
kube-bench run --targets=node
```

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## 21. Pod-to-Pod Encryption (mTLS)

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### Theory

By default, pod-to-pod traffic is unencrypted. **Mutual TLS (mTLS)** encrypts traffic between services using service mesh solutions like **Istio** or **Cilium**.

#### Benefits:

- Encrypts all pod-to-pod communication
- Provides identity verification
- Zero-trust network model

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### Steps: Enable mTLS with Istio

Step 1: Verify Istio is installed

```
kubectl get pods -n istio-system
istioctl version
```

Step 2: Enable strict mTLS for namespace

```
# /opt/course/21/peer-auth.yaml
apiVersion: security.istio.io/v1beta1
kind: PeerAuthentication
metadata:
  name: default
  namespace: secure-ns
spec:
  mtls:
    mode: STRICT    # Enforce mTLS for all traffic
```

### Step 3: Apply and verify

```
kubectl apply -f /opt/course/21/peer-auth.yaml

# Verify mTLS is enforced
istioctl x authz check <pod-name> -n secure-ns
```

### Step 4: Cluster-wide mTLS (optional)

```
# /opt/course/21/cluster-mtls.yaml
apiVersion: security.istio.io/v1beta1
kind: PeerAuthentication
metadata:
  name: default
  namespace: istio-system    # Applies cluster-wide
spec:
  mtls:
    mode: STRICT
```

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## mTLS Modes

Mode	Description
STRICT	Only mTLS traffic allowed
PERMISSIVE	Accept both mTLS and plaintext
DISABLE	No mTLS

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## 22. Base Image Security

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## Theory

Container images should be minimal to reduce attack surface. Smaller images have fewer vulnerabilities and faster pull times.

### Best Practices:

- Use distroless or scratch base images
  - Use multi-stage builds
  - Pin image versions (never use `latest`)
  - Scan images before deployment
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## Steps: Create Minimal Images

### Multi-stage Dockerfile example

```
# /opt/course/22/Dockerfile
# Build stage
FROM golang:1.21 AS builder
WORKDIR /app
COPY . .
RUN CGO_ENABLED=0 GOOS=linux go build -o myapp

# Final stage - minimal image
FROM gcr.io/distroless/static:nonroot
COPY --from=builder /app/myapp /
USER nonroot:nonroot
ENTRYPOINT ["/myapp"]
```

### Compare image sizes

```
# Build and compare
docker build -t myapp:distroless -f Dockerfile.distroless .
docker build -t myapp:alpine -f Dockerfile.alpine .
docker build -t myapp:ubuntu -f Dockerfile.ubuntu .

# Check sizes
docker images | grep myapp
# myapp:distroless      ~5MB
# myapp:alpine          ~15MB
# myapp:ubuntu          ~150MB
```

### Scan for vulnerabilities

```
trivy image --severity HIGH,CRITICAL myapp:distroless
trivy image --severity HIGH,CRITICAL myapp:ubuntu
# Distroless will have far fewer vulnerabilities
```

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## Base Image Comparison

Base Image	Size	Use Case
scratch	0 MB	Static binaries only
gcr.io/distroless/static	~2 MB	Static binaries, no shell
gcr.io/distroless/base	~20 MB	Dynamic binaries
alpine	~5 MB	Need shell/package manager
ubuntu	~70 MB	Full OS (avoid in production)

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## 23. SBOM (Software Bill of Materials)

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### Theory

An **SBOM** is a complete inventory of software components in an image. It helps track dependencies and identify vulnerabilities.

#### Tools:

- **Syft** - Generate SBOMs
  - **Grype** - Scan SBOMs for vulnerabilities
  - **Trivy** - Can also generate SBOMs
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### Steps: Generate and Analyze SBOM

#### Step 1: Generate SBOM with Syft

```
# Generate SBOM in SPDX format
syft nginx:alpine -o spdx-json > /opt/course/23/nginx-sbom.json

# Generate SBOM in CycloneDX format
syft nginx:alpine -o cyclonedx-json > /opt/course/23/nginx-sbom-cdx.json
```

## Step 2: Scan SBOM for vulnerabilities

```
# Use Grype to scan the SBOM
grype sbom:/opt/course/23/nginx-sbom.json

# Or scan with severity filter
grype sbom:/opt/course/23/nginx-sbom.json --only-fixed --fail-on high
```

## Step 3: Generate SBOM with Trivy

```
trivy image --format spdx-json -o /opt/course/23/trivy-sbom.json
nginx:alpine
```

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## SBOM Formats

Format	Description
SPDX	Linux Foundation standard
CycloneDX	OWASP standard
Syft JSON	Anchore native format

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# 24. Image Signing & Verification (Cosign)

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## Theory

**Image signing** ensures images haven't been tampered with. **Cosign** (part of Sigstore) is the standard tool for signing and verifying container images.

### Why Sign Images:

- Verify image authenticity
  - Ensure supply chain integrity
  - Meet compliance requirements
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## Steps: Sign and Verify Images

### Step 1: Generate key pair

```
cosign generate-key-pair

# Creates:
# - cosign.key (private key - keep secret!)
# - cosign.pub (public key - distribute)
```

## Step 2: Sign an image

```
# Sign image with private key
cosign sign --key cosign.key myregistry.io/myapp:v1.0

# Sign with annotations
cosign sign --key cosign.key \
  -a "author=security-team" \
  -a "commit=$(git rev-parse HEAD)" \
  myregistry.io/myapp:v1.0
```

## Step 3: Verify signature

```
# Verify with public key
cosign verify --key cosign.pub myregistry.io/myapp:v1.0

# Verify and show annotations
cosign verify --key cosign.pub myregistry.io/myapp:v1.0 | jq .
```

## Step 4: Keyless signing (recommended)

```
# Sign without managing keys (uses OIDC identity)
COSIGN_EXPERIMENTAL=1 cosign sign myregistry.io/myapp:v1.0

# Verify keyless signature
COSIGN_EXPERIMENTAL=1 cosign verify myregistry.io/myapp:v1.0
```

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## Enforce Signed Images with Policy

```
# Use with Kyverno or OPA/Gatekeeper to enforce signed images
apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1
kind: ClusterPolicy
metadata:
  name: verify-image-signature
spec:
  validationFailureAction: enforce
  rules:
    - name: verify-signature
      match:
        resources:
          kinds:
            - Pod
      verifyImages:
        - image: "myregistry.io/*"
          key: |-
            -----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
            <your-cosign-public-key>
            -----END PUBLIC KEY-----
```

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## 25. KubeLinter Static Analysis

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### Theory

**KubeLinter** is a static analysis tool that checks Kubernetes manifests for security misconfigurations and best practices. It complements Kubesec with additional checks.

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### Steps: Scan with KubeLinter

#### Step 1: Scan manifests

```
# Scan a single file
kube-linter lint /opt/course/25/deployment.yaml

# Scan a directory
kube-linter lint /opt/course/25/manifests/

# Scan with specific checks
kube-linter lint --include "no-read-only-root-fs,run-as-non-root"
deployment.yaml
```

#### Step 2: Common security checks

```
# List all available checks
kube-linter checks list

# Key security checks:
# - no-read-only-root-fs
# - run-as-non-root
# - privilege-escalation-container
# - sensitive-host-mounts
# - writable-host-mount
```

### Step 3: Fix issues and rescan

```
# /opt/course/25/secure-deployment.yaml
apiVersion: apps/v1
kind: Deployment
metadata:
  name: secure-app
spec:
  template:
    spec:
      containers:
        - name: app
          image: nginx:alpine
          securityContext:
            runAsNonRoot: true
            readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
            allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
          resources:
            limits:
              memory: "128Mi"
              cpu: "500m"
```

### Step 4: Verify no issues

```
kube-linter lint /opt/course/25/secure-deployment.yaml
# No lint errors found!
```

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## KubeLinter vs Kubesec

Tool	Focus	Output
Kubesec	Security scoring	Numeric score
KubeLinter	Best practices	Pass/fail checks



Use both for comprehensive analysis.

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## 26. OPA Gatekeeper (Policy Enforcement)

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### Theory

**OPA Gatekeeper** enforces custom policies on Kubernetes resources. It uses the Open Policy Agent (OPA) to validate admission requests.

#### Use Cases:

- Enforce allowed registries
  - Require labels on resources
  - Block privileged containers
  - Enforce resource limits
- 

### Steps: Enforce Allowed Registries

Step 1: Verify Gatekeeper is installed

```
kubectl get pods -n gatekeeper-system
```

Step 2: Create ConstraintTemplate

```
# /opt/course/26/allowed-repos-template.yaml
apiVersion: templates.gatekeeper.sh/v1
kind: ConstraintTemplate
metadata:
  name: k8sallowedrepos
spec:
  crd:
    spec:
      names:
        kind: K8sAllowedRepos
      validation:
        openAPIV3Schema:
          type: object
          properties:
            repos:
              type: array
              items:
                type: string
  targets:
    - target: admission.k8s.gatekeeper.sh
      rego: |
        package k8sallowedrepos
        violation[{"msg": msg}] {
          container := input.review.object.spec.containers[_]
          not startswith(container.image, input.parameters.repos[_])
          msg := sprintf("container <%v> image <%v> not from allowed
registry", [container.name, container.image])
        }
```

### Step 3: Create Constraint

```
# /opt/course/26/allowed-repos-constraint.yaml
apiVersion: constraints.gatekeeper.sh/v1beta1
kind: K8sAllowedRepos
metadata:
  name: require-internal-registry
spec:
  match:
    kinds:
      - apiGroups: [""]
        kinds: ["Pod"]
      namespaces: ["production"]
  parameters:
    repos:
      - "myregistry.io/"
      - "gcr.io/my-project/"
```

### Step 4: Apply and test

```
kubectl apply -f /opt/course/26/allowed-repos-template.yaml
kubectl apply -f /opt/course/26/allowed-repos-constraint.yaml

# Test - should be denied
kubectl run test --image=docker.io/nginx -n production
# Error: container <test> image <docker.io/nginx> not from allowed
registry

# Test - should be allowed
kubectl run test --image=myregistry.io/nginx -n production
# pod/test created
```

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## Common Gatekeeper Policies

Policy	Purpose
Allowed Repos	Restrict image registries
Required Labels	Enforce labeling standards
Block Privileged	Prevent privileged containers
Resource Limits	Require CPU/memory limits
Block NodePort	Prevent NodePort services

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**Good luck on your CKS exam!**