



## 4<sup>th</sup> Anavryta Model Lyceum Model United Nations 2025

**FORUM:** Disarmament and International Security Committee

**TOPIC:** Eliminating the supply of weapons and material support from state actors to terrorist groups

**STUDENT OFFICER:** Anastasia Pyrovolaki, Nancy Stamatopoulou, John Fountoulis

**POSITION:** President, Deputy President, Deputy President

### PERSONAL INTRODUCTION

Honorable delegates,

I warmly welcome you to the fourth AMLMUN conference. My name is Anastasia Pyrovolaki and I have the honour of serving as the president at the Disarmament and International Security Committee. I am sixteen years old and a student at the First High School of Kifisia. In my free time I enjoy spending time with my friends and family, reading and practicing my sport. Lastly, I am really passionate about MUNs, as I have attended plenty of them and I have gained a lot of useful knowledge and experience.

This year's conference revolves around democracy, good governance and civil society. The topics of our committee are urgent matters that trouble humanity and solutions must be found. That's where you come in. You are responsible for finding solutions that agree with your countries' policies on each topic, with, of course, our help throughout the background papers, where you will find all the useful information you may need to complete your resolutions.

I fully understand the stress and anxiety that all of you might have, especially if you are taking your first steps into this magical world, but I am here to guide you and help you all. And just remember that we, now chairs, have been in your position in the past. I look forward to meeting you all and I'm sure that we will have an awesome and fruitful debate. It's my pleasure to be your chair and I'm truly grateful for that opportunity. So, if anyone comes across any problems or has any questions, please don't hesitate to contact me at [anastasiapyrovolaki@gmail.com](mailto:anastasiapyrovolaki@gmail.com).

Kind Regards,

Anastasia Pyrovolaki

Dear delegates,

My name is Giannis Fountoulis and I have the pleasure of being a co-chair in the DISEC committee of this year's AML MUN conference. I am 16 years old and I am a student at Model Lyceum of Anavryta, the host of the conference. This year's topics are important issues which concern all of the globe. That is why we need you, the youth and the future of our world, to cooperate with each other and discover innovative and efficient solutions. Having been a delegate numerous times, I know first-hand how stressful and difficult it seems to be a



## 4<sup>th</sup> Anavryta Model Lyceum Model United Nations 2025

delegate at a conference, especially for first-timers. However we're here to assure you that MUNs are nothing but amazing and enjoyable experiences and you have nothing to be afraid of. In case you have any queries you can always contact me or my fellow student officers. Looking forward to seeing you!

[johnnyfoun09@gmail.com](mailto:johnnyfoun09@gmail.com)

Dear delegates

My name is Nancy stamatopoulou and I'm really honoured to be a part of this year's AML mun as a chair. I'm in the 11th grade in anavryta model high school and for three years I have participated actively in many muns. I'm really looking forward to the conference and I can't wait to meet you all. For any help don't hesitate to contact me by email:

[stamatopoulou.nancy@gmail.com](mailto:stamatopoulou.nancy@gmail.com)

Kind regards,

Nancy stamatopoulou

### TOPIC INTRODUCTION



283 deaths in 59 terror attacks across Africa in January <sup>1</sup>

The threat of terrorism is complex, multifaceted, and evolving. Many factors play a role in exacerbating the nature of this threat, yet one in particular is central to the very modus operandi of terrorism and of critical importance to the international community's response to prevent and combat it, the acquisition of weapons by terrorists. The increasing turnover

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<sup>1</sup> "Somalia Statement 19 Oct 17." *Starr FM*, 19 Oct. 2017, [starrfm.com.gh/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Somalia-statement-19-Oct-17.jpg](http://starrfm.com.gh/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Somalia-statement-19-Oct-17.jpg)



## 4<sup>th</sup> Anavryta Model Lyceum Model United Nations 2025

and diversion of small arms and light weapons (SALW) to terrorists, the rise in prominence in the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in terrorist attacks, and the emerging issue of the use of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) by terrorists have risen great concern and require immediate attention when dealing with the issue of terrorism.

There is a great risk of weapons and supporting technology coming in possession of terrorists because of poorly secured stockpiles and weak border controls. The activities of foreign terrorist fighters further increase the possibility of weapons and ammunition crossing countries' borders. Furthermore, weapons, including their parts, components and ammunition, are available for purchase and trade on a vast amount of platforms, such as Darknet online marketplaces. The diversion of weaponry is an alarming issue as well in many areas of the world. Access to diverted weapons and ammunition contributes to the enhancement of the military capacity of terrorist and other armed groups. Diversion may occur as a result of uncontrolled transfer, unauthorized re-transfer, theft, hand-outs to armed groups, or barter involving natural resources.

In conclusion, eliminating the supply of weapons and material support to terrorist groups requires a multi-faceted approach involving international cooperation, strengthened border controls, enhanced export controls, and measures to counter terrorist financing. This includes preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, disrupting arms trafficking networks, and holding accountable those who provide support to terrorist organizations.

### DEFINITION OF KEY TERMS

#### Extremist

“a person whose opinions, especially about religion or politics, are extreme, and who may do things that are violent or illegal for what they believe”<sup>2</sup>

#### Terrorism

“the unlawful use of violence or threats to intimidate or coerce a civilian population or government, with the goal of furthering political, social, or ideological objectives.”<sup>3</sup>

#### Illicit Arms Trade

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<sup>2</sup> “**Extremist.**” *Oxford Learner's Dictionaries*, Oxford University Press, [www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/definition/english/extremist\\_1](http://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/definition/english/extremist_1)

<sup>3</sup> “**Terrorism.**” *Dictionary.com*, Dictionary.com, LLC, [www.dictionary.com/browse/terrorism](http://www.dictionary.com/browse/terrorism)



## 4<sup>th</sup> Anavryta Model Lyceum Model United Nations 2025

“Weapons trafficking or gunrunning is the illicit trade of contraband small arms, explosives, and ammunition, which constitutes part of a broad range of illegal activities often associated with transnational criminal organizations”.<sup>4</sup>

### Weapons of mass destruction ( WMDs)

“A weapon of mass destruction (WMD) is a biological, chemical, radiological, nuclear, or any other weapon that can kill or significantly harm many people or cause great damage to artificial structures (e.g., buildings), natural structures (e.g., mountains), or the biosphere”.<sup>5</sup>

### Small arms and light weapons (SALW)

“Small arms and light weapons (SALW) are defined in the United Nation’s International Tracing Instrument as any man-portable lethal weapon that expels or launches, is designed to expel or launch, or may be readily converted to expel or launch a shot, bullet or projectile by the action of an explosive”.<sup>6</sup>

### Proliferation

“the sudden increase in the number or amount of something; a large number of a particular thing”<sup>7</sup>

### Sanctions regimes

“Penalties legal or economical imposed on states or individuals for supporting terrorism examples: travel bans, asset freezes and arms embargoes.”<sup>8</sup>

### Counter-Terrorism Financing (CTF)

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<sup>4</sup> “**Arms Trafficking.**” *Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia*, Wikimedia Foundation, [en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arms\\_trafficking](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arms_trafficking) . Accessed 22 Aug. 2025.

<sup>5</sup> *Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia*, Wikimedia Foundation, [en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Weapon\\_of\\_mass\\_destruction](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Weapon_of_mass_destruction) . Accessed 22 Aug. 2025.

<sup>6</sup> *World Customs Organization*, [www.wcoomd.org/en/topics/enforcement-and-compliance/activities-and-programmes/security-programme/small-arms-and-light-weapons.aspx](https://www.wcoomd.org/en/topics/enforcement-and-compliance/activities-and-programmes/security-programme/small-arms-and-light-weapons.aspx)

<sup>7</sup> “**Proliferation.**” *Oxford Learner’s Dictionaries*, Oxford University Press, [www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/definition/english/proliferation](https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/definition/english/proliferation)

<sup>8</sup> **United Nations Security Council. Resolution 1373 (2001).** United Nations, 28 Sept. 2001, <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/repertoire/sanctions-and-other-committees>



## 4<sup>th</sup> Anavryta Model Lyceum Model United Nations 2025

“the set of strategies and actions taken to prevent terrorist organizations from accessing funds and resources by tracking and cutting off the flow of money”<sup>9</sup>

### BACKGROUND INFORMATION

#### Definition and general information

Terrorism is the problem of using violence against innocent civilians in order to achieve political or ideological aims. Terrorism has been practiced by political organizations with both rightist and leftist objectives, by nationalistic and religious groups, by revolutionaries, and even by state institutions such as armies, intelligence services, and police.

The term "terrorism" first emerged in the 1790s during the French Revolution, used to describe the violence revolutionaries inflicted on their enemies. It was notably associated with the Jacobin party, led by Maximilien Robespierre, which orchestrated a period known as the Reign of Terror, marked by mass executions via the guillotine.

Terrorism does not have a universally accepted legal definition, but most legal systems that do define it share key elements. It typically involves the use or threat of violence aimed at creating fear, not only among immediate victims but across a broader audience. What sets terrorism apart from traditional and guerrilla warfare is its heavy reliance on psychological impact. While conventional armies and guerrilla fighters may use fear as a tactic, their main goal is military victory through force. Guerrilla groups, such as the Viet Cong in Vietnam or the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, have at times used terror to support their efforts, but they primarily sought military success.

True terrorism is defined by its strategic use of violence to instill fear and push for political objectives, especially when direct military victory is out of reach. To generate the widespread attention necessary for their cause, terrorists often carry out increasingly dramatic and violent acts. These may include hijackings, kidnappings, hostage situations, mass shootings, car bombings, and suicide attacks. Although these acts may seem random, the chosen targets are usually deliberate—selected for their ability to shock and unsettle the public. Common targets include schools, shopping malls, transportation hubs, restaurants, and nightclubs—places where civilians typically feel safe. The aim is to disrupt this sense of normalcy and security.

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<sup>9</sup> United Nat

[www.unodc.org/unodc/en/terrorism/expertise/combating-terrorist-financing.html](http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/terrorism/expertise/combating-terrorist-financing.html)





## **4<sup>th</sup> Anavryta Model Lyceum Model United Nations 2025**

In some cases, terrorists also target symbolic structures, such as government buildings, embassies, or military sites, to magnify the political impact. Ultimately, terrorism seeks to undermine public confidence and pressure governments into making political concessions by instilling widespread fear.

### **Terrorists' acquisition of firearms and weapon materials**

However in order to achieve their goal terrorists are in need of supplies. There are many ways for modern day terrorists to get access to weapons. One way is by robbing military bases. More recent attacks on isolated military barracks – during which equipment was stolen – shows that violent extremists are getting their weapons from looted military barracks. Terror groups in the Sahel now launch large-scale attacks on military garrisons or positions, exploiting their vulnerabilities. Using the element of surprise, attackers arrive in large numbers, on motorcycles or in pick-up trucks. They surround the camp and pound it with mortar shells or rockets to disrupt its defences, vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices are used to clear the way for the assault on multiple fronts. Soldiers are overwhelmed and the attackers gain control of the outposts and seize weapons, ammunition and other materials.

In order for terrorists to achieve their goals they need the assistance of nation states. There are many ways they can support their actions, but they are divided into two broad categories: direct and indirect support. By direct support we refer to financial support and arms and military assistance and by indirect support we refer to propaganda and ideological support, legal assistance and exploiting already existing conflicts.

Some states support terrorists to achieve their own financial and political objectives. Some examples are in order to weaken or destabilize rival nations, undermine their governments, create chaos and insecurity or by supporting groups that align with their interests, states can project power and exert control over regional affairs and lastly states with shared ideological or religious beliefs with certain terrorist groups may offer support to further their common goals.

Those cooperations have an impact on both the public as well as other nations, they create international instability, because state-sponsored terrorism can exacerbate regional conflicts, destabilize governments, and create humanitarian crises. Most importantly they make counter terrorist efforts harder, since state sponsorship of terrorism makes it harder to track, disrupt, and dismantle terrorist networks, as it adds another layer of complexity to counterterrorism efforts.



## **4<sup>th</sup> Anavryta Model Lyceum Model United Nations 2025**

To combat this issue some ways suggested by the EU and the UN are stronger anti-money laundering rules, these rules make it difficult to hide illegal funds under layers of fictitious companies, and strengthen checks on risky third countries. They also boost the role of financial supervision authorities, and improve access to and exchanges of information. New rules to limit the availability of explosives precursors to the general public and ensure the appropriate reporting of suspicious transactions throughout the supply chain. New rules to ensure a more efficient mechanism for cross-border access to e-evidence. The most important way though is through cooperation and clarity among all states.

### **MAJOR COUNTRIES AND ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED**

#### **Iran**

Iran is known as a state sponsor of terrorism, while supporting many military groups in the Middle East to boost its regional influence and stand against its rivals, especially the United States, Israel, and Saudi Arabia. Iran supplies comprehensive material support, such as financial aid, advanced weaponry, missile technology, military training, and logistical assistance to alternate groups such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad in the Palestinian territories, the Houthis in Yemen, and numerous Shia militias in Iraq. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' Quds Force is vital to coordinate the support, empowering these groups to perform operations against U.S. and allied interests in the region.

#### **Syria**

Syria has long been deputised as a state sponsor of terrorism, with the Assad regime offering sanctuary, funding, arms, and training to various extremist groups as part of its deliberate international policy. Damascus has endorsed secular Palestinian factions, Islamist groups, Hezbollah, and the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), aiding their operations from Syrian territory. Throughout the Syrian civil war, the regime's multifaceted engagement included both active and passive support for violent extremist entities, sometimes even participating in economic transactions with extremist groups, for example ISIS. This integrated two-part approach has allowed terrorist groups to acquire strength within Syria and implement transboundary attacks.

#### **North**

#### **Korea**

North Korea's sponsorship of terrorism historically involved the supply of weapons, military training, and technical assistance to various revolutionary and terrorist groups across the globe, especially in the late 20th century. Despite being designated as a state sponsor of terrorism in 1988 and de-designated in 2008 following denuclearization talks, distrust of North Korea's clandestine spread of missile technology and weapons persists. While direct assistance to non-state terror groups is said to have declined, its ongoing arms sale and cyber activities continue to pose security threats via intermediaries and aligned pariah states.



## **4<sup>th</sup> Anavryta Model Lyceum Model United Nations 2025**

### **Russia**

Russia's involvement in terrorism is controversial and multidimensional, with the European institutions labeling it a sponsor state of terrorism because of its military campaigns, particularly in Ukraine. Russia has been accused of supporting armed intermediaries, mercenary units like the Wagner Group, and militias that have been involved in destabilizing and terror-like activities in Ukraine, Africa, and the Middle East. Its security alliances and arms sales, supposedly put forward as defense aid or counter-terrorism, have unintentionally bolstered entities that have been acting against Western interests and also assisted in regional conflict and instability.

### **United States**

Federal statutes in the U.S. categorically ban the provision of any material support to designated terrorist organizations, bolstered by rigorous oversight and monitoring. Yet, in active theaters of war, U.S.-provided munitions and hardware have inadvertently ended up in terrorist hands, usually after equipment is lost in combat, seized by hostile forces, or rerouted by intermediaries. The episode in Afghanistan after the Taliban resurgence in the summer of 2021 illustrates the pattern, where a noticeable cache of NATO-standard gear was swiftly cataloged and repurposed by the newly installed regime. Parallel to that, Washington has authorized a series of assistance packages to opposition factions and rebel coalitions in fragile or fractured states. On some occasions, the vetted elements have fractured, succumbing to battlefield realities or ideology, and elements of those reshaped forces have since been implicated in terrorist operations or violence. The configuration is seldom neat and remains a source of ongoing debate, drawing attention to the fine line that accompanies efforts to reduce terrorist threats while inadvertently enabling alternative factions that may be, or may later evolve into, a similar risk.

### **North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)**

NATO emphasizes halting the spread of weapons of mass destruction and the systems designed to deliver them—whether to nation-states or non-state actors like terrorist groups. Within the Treaty's collective-defence framework, the Alliance embeds non-proliferation within the top-line strategic guidance and converts that guidance into practical operations. This is supported by systems of shared intelligence, multinational training exercises, and the pursuit of advanced counter-technologies that improve the collective capacity of member forces. NATO also complements its own initiatives by backing diplomatic initiatives, reinforcing international arms-control treaties, and collaborating with partner states and organizations, both global and regional, that confront the varied and evolving dangers of WMD spread.

### **The Global Coalition to defeat ISIS**

The goal of the United States-led Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, which consists of many other nations, is to prevent the Islamic State from resurrecting by interfering with its





## **4<sup>th</sup> Anavryta Model Lyceum Model United Nations 2025**

ability to acquire weapons, finance operations, and acquire weapons. The coalition seeks to disrupt ISIS's supply networks and stop the organization from acquiring weapons, both from state and non-state sources, by collaborating on military, intelligence, diplomatic, and law enforcement initiatives. Additionally, in order to stop terrorist infrastructure from resurfacing and to stop funding sources that enable the acquisition of weapons, the coalition backs stabilization initiatives in freed areas.

### **United Nations**

The United Nations, through instruments like Security Council Resolution 1540 and entities such as the Office of Counter-Terrorism and the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED), plays a central and coordinating role in global efforts to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons. The UN facilitates international cooperation, tracks implementation progress of counter-terrorism measures, and provides capacity-building and technical assistance to member states. These bodies work to harmonize national legislation, share best practices, and foster multilateral dialogue to strengthen the global counter-terrorism framework against the acquisition and use of weapons by terrorists.

### **Financial Action Task Force (FATF)**

The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is an intergovernmental organization that establishes global guidelines to prevent the financing of weapons purchases, money laundering, and terrorist financing. The FATF creates guidelines and recommendations that member nations follow in order to identify and dismantle the financial networks that support terrorism, including those that make it easier for people to buy weapons. Peer reviews are used for compliance monitoring, and international collaboration is promoted to enhance financial transparency, regulatory frameworks, and enforcement measures aimed at financial flows linked to terrorism.

### **Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)**

The Chemical Weapons Convention is being implemented by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which works globally to stop the use and spread of chemical weapons. In addition to monitoring member state compliance and encouraging the destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles, the OPCW also aims to stop terrorist organizations and other non-state actors from obtaining or utilizing chemical weapons. The organization also backs technical assistance, verification missions, and capacity-building initiatives to strengthen international standards against chemical warfare and protect against the threat of terrorists using chemical weapons.



## 4<sup>th</sup> Anavryta Model Lyceum Model United Nations 2025

### TIMELINE OF KEY EVENTS

DATE	EVENT
26 October 1979	Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, signed at Vienna
15 December 1997	International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings
4 June 1999	Treaty on Cooperation among States Members of the Commonwealth of Independent States in Combating Terrorism
9 December 1999	International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism
15 October 1999	UN Security Council Resolution 1267
31 May 2001	UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime and its Firearms Protocol
20 July 2001 in	UN Programme of Action on Small Arms
28 September 2001	UN Security Council Resolution 1373
28 April 2004	UN Security Council Resolution 1540
4 September 2017	UN Security Council Resolution 2370
March 2018	“No Money for Terror” first conference in Paris
February 2019	“No Money for Terror” second conference in Australiasearch context

### RELEVANT UN TREATIES, CONVENTIONS AND RESOLUTIONS

#### UN Programme of Action on Small Arms



## **4<sup>th</sup> Anavryta Model Lyceum Model United Nations 2025**

The UN Programme of Action provides the framework for activities to counter the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons. Under the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (PoA), governments agreed to enhance national small arms legislation, import-export controls, and stockpile management and to engage in cooperation and assistance as well.

### **UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime and its Firearms Protocol**

The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC) and its Firearms Protocol are important international tools for fighting organized crime. They focus specifically on the illegal manufacture and trade of firearms.

### **International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings**

The International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings is a 1997 United Nations treaty focused on fighting terrorist bombings. It requires countries to criminalize the unlawful and intentional use of explosives in public areas aiming to cause death, serious injury, or significant damage. The convention also encourages countries to work together in investigations, prosecutions, and extraditions linked to these acts.

### **UN Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001)**

The UN Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001) required States to “refrain from providing any form of support, active or passive, to entities or persons involved in terrorist acts, including by ... eliminating the supply of weapons to terrorists”. Due to the fact that the operational environments of terrorists are continuously evolving however, denying them access to weapons has become a complex and multifaceted challenge.

### **UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004)**

The UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) which was adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and legally binds all UN member states. It forces them to take action in order to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, their systems of delivery, and related materials, to non-state actors.

### **UN Security Council Resolution 2370 (2017)**

The UN Security Council Resolution 2370 (2017) which was the first Security Council resolution emphasizing in preventing the acquisition of weapons by terrorists. The Security Council resolution 2370 included specific recommendations to Member States. For instance, it encouraged Member States to act cooperatively to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons, using information and communications technologies, while maintaining respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and complying with international law. It also urged Member States to ameliorate their judicial and law enforcement collaboration. In addition, the resolution highlighted the importance of cooperating with civil society and the private sector to limit weapons accessibility to terrorists and requested that technical assistance, capacity-building and other support be provided to States which required it. It also encouraged all Member States to “consider becoming a party to relevant international and



## **4<sup>th</sup> Anavryta Model Lyceum Model United Nations 2025**

regional instruments, with a view to help eliminate the supply of weapons to terrorists, and to fully implement their respective obligations under those to which they are a party”.

### **Supporting Resolution 2370**

In 2017, the Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee conducted a thorough briefing on preventing terrorists from acquiring weapons. As a result, in the same year, the Security Council unanimously voted in favour of resolution 2370, which required all States to eradicate the supply of weapons such as SALW, military equipment, UAS and their components, and IED components, to those connected with terrorist acts. Resolution 2370 became the first Security Council resolution which focused specifically on combating this issue.

In order to increase the efficiency of the above framework, in 2020, the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact Working Group on Border Management and Law Enforcement relating to Counter-Terrorism launched a project with view to developing and promoting technical guidance for Member States to make the implementation of Security Council resolution 2370 (2017) easier, and support relevant resolutions, and international agreements.

## **PREVIOUS ATTEMPTS TO SOLVE THE ISSUE**

### **European Union Directive**

On 25 April 2017, the Council of Europe adopted a directive which aimed to control the accessibility, acquisition and possession of weapons. The amendments address risks which endanger the public's security, and focus on:

#### **Enhanced traceability of firearms**

The revision strengthens the rules on the marking of firearms, through making the marking of all their essential components mandatory as well. This contributes greatly in improving the traceability of firearms used in criminal activities, including those which were constructed by components acquired separately.

#### **Measures on deactivation and reactivation or conversion of firearms**

The regulations concerning the deactivation of firearms have been enhanced, not least through a provision requiring the classification of deactivated firearms under category C (firearms subject to declaration). Until now, deactivated firearms have not been subject to the requirements mentioned in the directive.

#### **Stricter rules for the acquisition and possession of the most dangerous firearms**

The most dangerous firearms (category A), can only be acquired through an exemption which can be granted by the corresponding member state. The regulations for granting such exemptions have been significantly stricter. Possible reasons for exemption, such as national defence or the protection of important infrastructure, are



## **4<sup>th</sup> Anavryta Model Lyceum Model United Nations 2025**

now set out in a limited list and exemptions can only be granted if they pose no risks to public safety.

### **POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS**

#### **Information exchange**

To combat terrorism, hunt down foreign combatants, and combat organized crime, law enforcement, judicial, and intelligence agencies in the member nations must effectively share information.

#### **Limit the availability of explosives precursors to the general public**

Throughout the supply chain, make sure that unusual transactions are appropriately reported. Chemicals known as "explosives precursors" have both legal and illegal uses, including the illegal production of homemade explosives.

#### **Digitalisation of judicial cooperation**

Technology is increasingly being used by terrorists and criminals to plot and carry out crimes. As a result, in order to find and prosecute offenders, authorities are depending more and more on electronic evidence. Given the rapidly changing security threat landscape and the rapid advancement of technology, the use of digital technologies in criminal proceedings pertaining to terrorist offenses is essential.

#### **Capacity Building in Border and Customs Controls**

Terrorists can be prevented from obtaining weapons by improving the ability of border security and customs authorities to identify and stop the illegal trafficking of weapons and associated materials. This entails international collaboration for coordinated enforcement along transnational routes, training, and enhanced technology for tracking and scanning shipments.

#### **Targeted Sanctions and Financial Disruption**

Funding and supplies to terrorist organizations can be stopped by imposing and enforcing targeted sanctions against governments, organizations, and individuals that give them material support. These steps, when combined with strict oversight of financial transactions and international collaboration, are intended to destroy the financial framework that supports terrorists' acquisition of weapons.

#### **Strengthening Legal and Regulatory Frameworks**



## 4<sup>th</sup> Anavryta Model Lyceum Model United Nations 2025

It is crucial to put in place comprehensive legal frameworks that make it illegal to plan, finance, or provide material support for terrorism. In order to dismantle terrorist networks and their supply chains, this entails passing legislation prohibiting incitement to terrorism and making sure that strong procedural safeguards are in place, such as undercover operations, technical surveillance, witness protection, and international legal cooperation.

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