# The Future of Emissions

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### Abstract

We argue for the introduction of firm-level emission futures contracts as a novel way of assessing the real impact of ESG initiatives. Our measure is based on the forward-looking market-based valuation of firm-level $CO_2$ emissions. We establish both theoretically and empirically that backward-looking subjective ratings are limited to the extent that they fail to capture future reductions in emissions. We show evidence that although lower emissions have predicted higher E ratings, higher E ratings have predicted higher, not lower, emissions. As such, by following these subjective ratings, investors may have inadvertently allocated their money to firms that pollute more, not less. We discuss several applications of our new measure, including executive pay and investment management.

# 1 Introduction

Socially conscious investment strategies have gained much popularity in the past two decades. While various different approaches have been proposed, one popular way of attempting to achieve social change is by divesting from companies that do not meet certain social criteria. The main mechanism through which such a divestment could have impact is through the stock price. By divesting, socially conscious investors hope to decrease the firm's stock price, implying that for a given number of shares issued, the firm raises less capital. That is, the intended consequence of divestment is to increase targeted firms' cost of capital (Berk and van Binsbergen, 2021). This higher cost of capital makes fewer real investment projects a positive net present value (NPV) undertaking, implying a lower growth rate of such firms going forward. Eventually, this lower growth rate reduces the fraction of targeted firms in the economy in the long run. In addition, the threat of this stock price mechanism could induce targeted firms (sometimes called 'brown' firms) to shed their undesirable habits and become "green" firms.

In this paper, we propose a new market-based forward-looking measure for the real impact of social investing based on emission futures contracts. If backward-looking emission measures perfectly predicted forward-looking emissions at the firm level there would be no need for such an additional forward-looking measure. However, we establish both theoretically and empirically that the current backward-looking subjective ratings-based system implies that past emissions do not predict future emissions, quite the opposite. As such, by following these subjective ratings, investors may inadvertently allocate their money to firms that will pollute more not less. In particular, we find that even though (a) the fraction of capital allocated to ESG investing has tremendously increased in the past few decades, and (b) firms have on average reduced their $CO_2$ emissions over time, the $CO_2$ emission reductions have preceded increases in ESG investing. Second, when firms are admitted to a leading ESG index (FTSE USA 4Good) they tend to increase rather than decrease their $CO_2$ emissions. Third, although lower emissions predict higher E scores (i.e., the first category in "ESG"), higher E scores do not predict lower emissions.

From a theoretical perspective, we contribute to the literature by introducing a general framework of value creation that nests sustainable investing as well as standard firm optimization. We then introduce a model, which features backward-looking ESG

ratings combined with standard firm optimization, that can explain the empirical regularities featured above. In the model firms are incentivized to increase their ratings, but not necessarily to improve their social impact. This indeed implies that after improving their ranking, it is optimal to increase emissions.

These theoretical and empirical results raise the question of what mechanism would optimally induce firms to reduce emissions and have a real impact. We argue that a mechanism based on a market-based forward-looking emissions measure improves incentives. Additionally, we show that even without a measurable stock price effect from sustainable investing, linking managerial pay to this new continuous measure aligns incentives and optimizes real impact. That is, even if divestment would lead to measurable price effects in financial markets, currently the incentive structure may not be sufficiently conducive to affecting real change.

Specifically, we propose to base the E measure of a particular firm on the pricing of a new asset class, what we term emission futures. An emission future pays out the dollar value of a firm's emissions at a given future date, and is based on (1) the future path of the traded price of carbon per metric ton and (2) the quantity in metric ton of a firm's future carbon emissions for a given calendar year.[1] The futures price thus reflects the discounted expected value of a firm's emissions.[2] By translating this value into a new E

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[1]We propose to have the Emission Future be based on Scope 1 emissions to ease the contracts measurability and enforceability, however as the quality of more comprehensive scopes increase these could also be considered. Scope 3 emissions are hard to assess, due to the difficulty of collecting high-quality data on type or volume of emissions. Scope 2 emissions, as well as scope 3 emissions, fall outside a company's direct control, making them hard to manage. Additionally, scope 2 and 3 emissions will be accounted for by several companies, which raises the question of who should be responsible for them.

[2]We acknowledge that our proposed measure has its limitations, however we see these to be greatly reduced relative to other measures available and not necessarily greater than for any other derivatives contract. Specifically, a firm may be incentivized to sell their own Emission Futures and misreport on their emissions, however this is the same as with dividend futures, and there exists insider trading laws to protect against this. Uncertainty of the underlying data may be an issue, but we do not see this to be any different than other contracts that are traded today. For example take the CPI futures, which rely on government reporting of the consumer price index, which in turn is based on surveys, price samples, and index weights. Misreporting is further disincentivized through legal means. The legal framework of emission monitoring, reporting, and verification has already been developed after the introduction of greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the European Union (See https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32018R2066 and https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32018R2067), and the Greenhouse Gas Reporting Program in the United States, which equally requires the independent verification of emissions data reports by a third party (See, for example, https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/verification). Misreporting has already had legal consequences as was the case for Chevron in 2011 (https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/verification). See also the greenwashing investigation raid on Deutsche

measure we get a meaningful system that incorporates the expected path of a specific outcome variable that is relevant and measurable. Furthermore, emission futures allow us to measure the impact of corporate actions and investor activism through what we term green impact. The green impact is based on a firm's reduction in the term structure of its future price, which measures reductions in emissions value by calendar year relative to their previous (risk-neutral) expected path. By comparing this improvement in its term structure to the changes in the term structure of the traded price of carbon a firm's expected quantity reduction can be measured. This improvement can then be attributed to the impact by the firm, rather than the economy gradually adapting low-carbon technologies. That is, the unexpected return on a firm's emission futures allows for the measurement of corporate actions that genuinely affect the path of emissions that the firm was on.

Our paper fits into a larger literature that investigates the extent to which socially conscious investors manage to reduce the targeted companies' carbon footprint. Indeed, there is growing evidence that although socially concerned investors hold firms with higher ESG scores and lower carbon intensity, it is not necessarily socially concerned investors, such as pension plans, that are responsible for this reduction (Hong and Kacperczyk, 2009, Heath et al., 2021, 2022, Brøgger and Kronies, 2022, Noh and Oh, 2020, Akey and Appel, 2019). Our finding that greener firms have less impact is also in line with psychological findings on 'Moral licensing' (Sachdeva, Iliev and Medin, 2009), the tendency of entitlement to do something bad because we've done something good. Moral licensing explains why ethics professors are more likely to say that eating meat is wrong, but no less likely to eat meat (Schwitzgebel and Rust, 2014), and ethics professors steal more books than colleagues outside of their field (Schwitzgebel, 2009). This evidence is consistent with the idea that while an improved ESG score causes socially concerned investors to become owners of such firms, the reverse causality is more elusive. Given that the stated objective of socially conscious investors is to affect social change, this state of affairs may be less than desirable.

There is also an emerging literature that evaluates the reliability of ESG ratings. In particular, Berg, Koelbel and Rigobon (2019) investigate the divergence of such rating ratings based on data from six prominent rating agencies including KLD, Sustainalytics, Moody's ESG, S&P Global, Refinitiv, and MSCI. They find large divergences between

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bank following ESG misreporting allegations, which already resulted in the resignation of CEO Asoka Wöhrmann, even though the legal consequences have not yet concluded.

rating agencies and raise important issues related to the scope, measurement, and weight of the various inputs used to construct such ratings. Berg, Fabisik and Sautner (2020) find that Refinitiv ESG scores have been subject to ongoing changes to past scores, further undermining their reliability. We circumvent these issues by simply focusing on commonly-used ESG indices that are presumably replicated and followed by an important group of investors. Therefore, regardless of whether these indices perfectly capture the underlying desired dimensions of the ESG variables, investors following and replicating such indices, and thereby basing their buy and sell decisions on them, are implicitly condoning their measurement. For the purpose of our empirical strategy, the only relevant factor is that investors are following these commonly-used indices.

Indeed new research shows that investing according to the current ESG scores may not be conducive for fostering impact. Cohen, Gurun and Nguyen (2020) find that it is often the brownest firms that are innovating to reduce future carbon emissions. Bams and van der Kroft (2022) find that due to information asymmetry investors invest according to ESG scores instead of sustainable performance. This leads to firms inflating ESG scores and reducing cost of capital, to the extend that ESG is negatively related to sustainable performance. This problem is exacerbated as investors investing into ESG funds, from calculating the average ESG score of the portfolio holdings, pressures the funds to pick stocks based on ESG scores instead of doing their own research (Edmans, Levit and Schneemeier, 2022).

Another issue with current ESG scores is that they are prone to "cheap talk". Indeed, previous work has shown evidence of cheap talk, including social index funds not voting in favour of ESG policies. Bingler et al. (2022a) find using a neural algorithm trained to detect cheap talk that voluntary disclosure is mainly cheap talk and cherry picking. Bingler et al. (2022b) find using the same algorithm that "institutional ownership, targeted institutional investor engagement, materiality and downside risk disclosures are associated with less cheap talk. Signaling by publicly supporting the TCFD is associated with more cheap talk". While Curtis, Fisch and Robertson (2021) find that green funds on average vote for green proposals, Michaely, Ordonez-Calafi and Rubio (2021) and Li, Naaraayanan and Sachdeva (2021) find that green funds actually vote strategically in the sense that they vote for sustainable proposals that would pass anyway, but not those they could influence to be enacted.

The findings in our paper are in line with experimental evidence that investors

are willing to pay a premium for sustainable investments, regardless of whether their investment has an impact on the projects coming to fruition (Bonnefon et al., 2022), and regardless of additional impact (Heeb et al., 2022). The findings are also in line with current regulatory proposals by the securities exchange comission (SEC) in the US and the EU council in Europe. These proposals include the EU taxonomy for sustainable activities, which proposes filters based on levels as well as an Excel tool to help direct investments. Additionally, the sustainable finance disclosure regulation (SFDR) requires ESG fund managers (referred to as Article 8 and 9 funds) to display sustainability indicators, such as emission levels, to show that they are in accordance with the EU Taxonomy and an explanation of the 'do no harm' principle. This has to be done regularly as well as in their prospectus. Otherwise the fund managers have to show how their fund is not proposing to be an ESG fund. These regulations are supported by the new corporate sustainability reporting directive (CSRD), which requires firms to report levels on these social outcomes, such as emissions. The ECB now also aims to tilt their purchase programs towards greener firms as well as reducing the collateralability of browner firms. In other words the placebo effects of sustainable investment is more important than the actual effectiveness of them.

## 2    Theory

We first split total value into an internal value to investors and an external value. Using the fact that impact is generally defined as the reduction of the negative externality, we evaluate the effectiveness of backward-looking ESG ratings versus forward-looking measures in achieving impact.

### 2.1    A Firm's Internal and External Value

We start by defining the total value of a firm $i$ to society at time $t$ as the present value of its total future dividends $D_{i,t,n}$ at horizons $n$ discounted at the rate $\mu_{i,t,n}$ back to time $t$ as

$$V_{i,t} = \sum_{n=0}^{\infty} \frac{D_{i,t,n}}{\exp(n\mu_{i,t,n})}.$$

The value generated by a firm either goes to the firm's investors or to the rest of the economy through the firm's externalities, which in principle can be both positive or negative. The value that goes to the firm's investors are the internal dividends, which we

name cash dividends, and externalities are the external dividends, termed "externality dividends" hereafter.[3] This means that the total value of a firm is its internal and external value, which is given by the sum of its cash and externality dividends as

$$V_{i,t} = \underbrace{\sum_{n=0}^{\infty} \frac{D_{i,t,n}^c}{\exp(n\mu_{i,t,n}^c)}}_{V_{i,t}^I} - \underbrace{\sum_{n=0}^{\infty} \frac{D_{i,t,n}^e}{\exp(n\mu_{i,t,n}^e)}}_{-V_{i,t}^E}. \tag{1}$$

In particular as the investors value the dividends they receive, the price they pay only reflects the cash dividends:

$$P_{i,t} = V_{i,t}^I, \tag{2}$$

where we normalize the number of outstanding shares to 1, and we assume wlog and for ease of exposition that the firms are all equity financed.

An example of the importance of this distinction is the seminal work of Modigliani and Miller (1958). Modigliani and Miller show that the internal value of the firm is the same irrespective of financing decisions with regard to debt and equity. This is true in absence of other frictions, and they go on to show that if debt receives a tax benefit, then issuing debt actually increases the internal value by that tax benefit. However, this comes at the cost of an external value loss in tax income, that would otherwise have been redistributed to the economy. Hence, our framework allows us to specifically see how economic incentives lead to agents optimising and value being transferred from one group to another.

**Sustainable Investing.** We now define sustainable investing within this framework. Sustainable investing is investing that properly accounts for externalities and thus maximises the total value of the firm to society. An important understudied consideration is the time horizon over which sustainable goals are achieved. In our value definition, the whole present value of future externalities are incorporated in the framework. This implies that improvements that take a substantial amount of time to realise are still counted towards the sustainability objectives of the firm. Further, past realised externality dividends play no role in this valuation exercise. This already illustrates an important difference between backward-looking ESG ratings and forward-looking

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[3]As negative externalities are most commonly analysed, they are the default externality in this setting. At the same time it is flexible to incorporate positive externalities, in which case the externality dividends would have a negative sign.

optimal decision making that maximises a firms value to society.

One way to measure impact is to compute the decrease in the discounted horizon specific expected external dividends. Recall that $t$ denotes the current period, $n$ denotes the horizon (number of years in the future), and $i$ denotes the firm, then the impact is simply given by

$$\tilde{I}_{i,t,n} \equiv \frac{\mathbb{E}_{i,t-1} D^e_{i,t-1,n+1}}{\exp((n+1)\mu^e_{i,t-1,n+1})} - \frac{\mathbb{E}_{i,t} D^e_{i,t,n}}{\exp(n\mu^e_{i,t,n})}.$$

As an example consider the one-year horizon. Impact is then simply given by the difference between the discounted expected external dividend one year ago and its realisation:

$$\tilde{I}_{i,t,1} = \mathbb{E}_{i,t-1} D^e_{i,t-1,1} \exp(-\mu^e_{i,t-1,1}) - D^e_{i,t,0}.$$

One downside of using these measures of impact is that a negative impact is measured simply due to the normal expected return the asset earns. By using futures values as opposed to spot values we can remove the risk-free part of this expected return. Further, we will show that the risk-premium on this asset is likely small at least as measured by conventional exposures to market risk. Concretely, let $F_{i,t,n}$ denote the futures price of the externality dividend paid out in $n$ periods by firm $i$ at time $t$. If we then indeed assume that the risk-premium is sufficiently small, we can simply define impact as the negative dollar return on the future:

$$I_{i,t,n} \equiv F_{i,t-1,n+1} - F_{i,t,n}, \tag{3}$$

which under the above stated assumptions is also equal to

$$I_{i,t,n} = \mathbb{E}_{i,t-1} D^e_{i,t-1,n+1} - \mathbb{E}_{i,t} D^e_{i,t,n}. \tag{4}$$

That is, under the above stated assumptions the futures price is simply equal to the expected value of the externality dividend.

Finally, the value of impact is then simply equal to the sum of each year's impact measure across all horizons:

$$V^{\text{Impact}}_{i,t} \equiv \sum_{n=1}^{\infty} I_{i,t,n}. \tag{5}$$

## 2.2 ESG Measures, Impact, and Misallocation of Capital

We can use this framework to theoretically analyse the realised impact of two regimes as well as the extent to which the measures ($R$ and $M$) capture them. In particular we wish to compare a regime where firms respond to subjective backward-looking ESG ratings that are based on a firms history of externalities, what we label regime $R$ (for rating), to a regime that uses market-based forward-looking ESG measures, what we label regime $M$. The impact at horizon $n$ between the two regimes is then

$$I_{i,t,n}^{M,R} \equiv \mathbb{E}_{i,t}\, D_{i,t,n}^{e,R} - \mathbb{E}_{i,t}\, D_{i,t,n}^{e,M}, \tag{6}$$

where the dividend $D_{i,t,0}^{\mathcal{M}}$ will be the prevailing dividend for firm $i$ at time $t$ and horizon $n$ under regime $\mathcal{M}$. Specifically, we have that the realised impact for the 0-horizon is

$$I_{i,t,0}^{M,R} = D_{i,t,0}^{e,R} - D_{i,t,0}^{e,M}, \tag{7}$$

which simply means that impact can be achieved by moving to a new measure which delivers a lower equilibrium externality dividend.

We can also analyse whether moving to forward-looking measures improves the investors' allocation to their desired firms, that is, increasing the allocation of capital to the firms that deliver impact. Consequently, if one invests with a noisy or biased rating, it may lead to capital being allocated to firms which may pollute more, not less. Specifically, consider an impact investor who tilts their portfolio according to their expected impact of the firm, then a valid misallocation measure is the absolute difference between the allocation under measure $\mathcal{M}$ and the optimal allocation:

$$|D_{i,t,n}^{e} - \mathbb{E}_{i,t}^{\mathcal{M}}\, D_{i,t,n}^{e,\mathcal{M}}| = |\epsilon_{i,t,n}^{\mathcal{M}}|,$$

where $\epsilon^{\mathcal{M}}$ is the estimation error under measure $\mathcal{M}$. Specifically, the improvement in misallocation from rating $R$ to measure $M$ can be written as

$$\tilde{I}_{i,t,n}^{M,R} \equiv |\epsilon_{i,t,n}^{R}| - |\epsilon_{i,t,n}^{M}|. \tag{8}$$

Which taking the average across all firms $i$ can be rewritten as

$$\tilde{I}_{t,n}^{M,R} = \sqrt{MSE_{t,n}^{R}} - \sqrt{MSE_{t,n}^{M}}, \tag{9}$$

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where $MSE_{t,n}^{\mathcal{M}}$ is the mean squared error under measure $\mathcal{M}$ for horizon $n$ evaluated at time $t$. The equation shows that the improvement in the allocation can be measured by comparing the predictive ability of the forward-looking measure (MSE) for future externality dividends, with the predictive ability of the the backward-looking rating. Suppose that there exists a forward-looking market-based measure which is unbiased, then the MSE of this market measure is smaller than the MSE of the backward-looking measure, as market prices will reflect more information than that captured by the backward-looking variables used in generating the rating.

Next, we set up a model to explain the sources of changes to the equilibrium externality level.

## 2.3 Model of ESG Investing under Different ESG Measures

In this section, we present a model of the costs and benefits that for firms trade off when trying to affect their ESG Scores. After, we will consider how these incentives affect impact through firms' optimisation behaviour.

**The Firm's Problem.** Firm $i$ maximises its internalised value as given by Equation 2 at time $t$ by aiming for an ESG score $E_{i,t}$. That is, their objective is

$$\max_{E_{i,t}} \mathbb{E}_t \sum_{n=0}^{\infty} \frac{D_{i,t,n}^c(E_{i,t+n})}{\exp\left(n\mu_{i,t,n}^c(E_{i,t+n-1})\right)}. \tag{10}$$

Firms can increase the valuation of their firm by either increasing cash dividends or reducing their discount rate. Additionally, the cash dividend is given as the difference between revenue $\text{Rev}_{i,t}$ and cost $c_{i,t}$.

A key decision for the firm is which ESG rating $E_{i,t}$ to aim for. This is relevant for the firm because both $\text{Rev}_{i,t}$, $C_{i,t}$, and $r_{i,t}^c$ may be dependent on the firm's ESG score. The revenues $\text{Rev}_{i,t}$ may be affected because governments and ESG activists may impose boycotts of low ESG products.[4] The costs $C_{i,t}$ can be affected because companies can incur costs from having a low ESG score resulting from protests or regulatory costs such as a carbon tax or the purchase of Carbon credits. Finally, the discount rate $r_{i,t}^c$ can change when investors or banks are restricted from investing in firms with low ESG scores (Zerbib, 2019, Berk and van Binsbergen, 2021, Homanen, 2022). There exists

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[4]Examples are government-imposed policies that mandate that all energy investments are carbon neutral.

investors under strict mandates, such as pension funds. The discount rate $r_{i,t}^c$ may also be affected if investors value high ESG investments as in Pástor, Stambaugh and Taylor (2021) and Pedersen, Fitzgibbons and Pomorski (2021).

**ESG Adjustment Costs**. There is a cost associated with companies changing their ESG scores, for example when they have to transition to a more expensive but cleaner energy source. We model this with capital adjustment costs:

$$E_{i,t} = G_i(B_{i,t}),$$

where $G_i$ is a general function potentially specific to each firm. Further, to get a closed form solution we need to specify the functional form for $G_i$. A specification that is tractable yet still quite general is

$$E_{i,t} = \frac{1}{k_i} B_{i,t}^{\eta_i},$$

where $B_{i,t+n}$ is the periodic budget needed to sustain an ESG score $E_{i,t+n}$ continuously as a fraction of their cash dividend, and $k_i$ and $\eta_i$ are constants. The decreasing returns to scale are captured by $0 < \eta_i < 1$. Solving for the budget needed to sustain a certain ESG rating, we see that the periodic dividend after ESG costs is

$$D_{i,t,0}^c(E_{i,t}) = D_{i,t,0}^{c,0} \exp\left(-k_i E_{i,t}^{1/\eta_i}\right), \tag{11}$$

where $D_{i,t}^{c,0}$ is firm $i$'s cash dividends before ESG related costs at time $t$.

**ESG and the Firm's Discount Rate**. There are multiple potential benefits to achieving a higher ESG score though their quantitative relevance is subject to debate (Berk and van Binsbergen, 2021). For ease of exposition we will assume here that a higher ESG score has a negative effect on the firm's discount rate. Concretely, let a continuum of investors $j$ maximise their expected utility. Meaning they solve

$$U_{j,t}' \equiv max_{X_{j,t}} \mathbb{E}_t[-\exp(-a_j W_{j,t+1} - bX_{j,t})],$$

where $a_j$ is investor $j$'s risk avertion, $W_{j,t+1}$ is that investor's next period's wealth, and $b$ is the non-pecuniary benefit received from their portfolio $X_{j,t}$. Importantly, $b_j$ is the product of the investors' sustainability sentiment $S_j$ and $g_{i,t}^e(E_{i,t})$, the greenness of the firm, which depends on the firm's ESG score. As some investors follow a full exclusion

strategy based on some lower threshold and some investors tilt their portfolio gradually, we model the combined effect as

$$b = S_j g_{i,t}^e = S_j \ln(E_{i,t}).$$

The investors' optimal portfolio weights are then

$$X_{j,t} = w_{m,t} + (S_j - \bar{S})/\gamma^2 \Sigma^{-1} \ln(E_{i,t}),$$

where $w_m$ are the market portfolio weights, and $\gamma_j$ is the relative risk aversion ($\gamma_j = A_j/W_j$) for investor $j$, and $\Sigma$ is the covariance matrix of their portfolio. In short, investors put higher weights on stocks with higher ESG scores.

The discount rate on firm $i$ will then be

$$r_{i,t}^c = \beta_i^M r_t^M - s \ln(E_{i,t}), \tag{12}$$

where $\beta_i^M$ is the beta of firm $i$'s returns with respect to the market return $r_t^M$, $\gamma_j$ is the relative risk aversion for investor $j$ ($\gamma_j = A_j/W_j$), and $s$ is equal to $\bar{S}/\bar{\gamma}$, where the bar variables indicate value-weighted averages. For example $\bar{S}$ denotes the value-weighted average sentiment in the economy.

**Solution to the Firm's Problem**. The first order conditions from the firm's maximisation problem (Equation 10) imply for each $i, t$ that

$$D_{i,t,0}^{c'}(E_{i,t}) = \mathbb{E}_t \left[ -r_{i,t+1}^{c'}(E_{i,t}) \frac{D_{i,t,1}^c(E_{i,t+1})}{\exp\left(r_{i,t+1}^c(E_{i,t})\right)} \right].$$

At the optimal $E_{i,t}$ score, the marginal cost of increasing the score further, in terms of lower dividends, must equal the marginal benefit in firm value through an expected lower discount rate. Further, we can get from Equation 11 that the marginal cost of raising the $E_{i,t}$ score is

$$k_i E^{\frac{1-\eta_i}{\eta_i}} D_{i,t,0}^{c,0} \exp\left(-k_i E_{i,t}^{1/\eta_i}\right),$$

and from Equation 12 that increasing $E_{i,t}$ lowers the discount rate incrementally by $s/E_{i,t}$. Additionally, as the problem is symmetric across time $E_{i,t} = E_{i,t+1} = E_i$, we obtain

$$\underbrace{\frac{k_i E^{\frac{1-\eta_i}{\eta_i}} D_{i,t,0}^{c,0}}{\exp\left(k_i E_i^{1/\eta_i}\right)}}_{\text{Marginal cost}} = \underbrace{sE_i^{-1} \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \frac{D_{i,t,1}^{c,0} \exp\left(-k_i E_i^{1/\eta_i}\right)}{\exp\left(\beta_i^M r_{t+1}^M - s\ln(E_i)\right)} \right]}_{\text{Marginal benefit}}. \tag{13}$$

Given these costs and incentives each firm will choose its optimal ESG rating as

$$E_i^* = \psi\left(k_i, s, \beta_i^M, \mu_t^M, \sigma_t^M\right)^{\phi(s,\eta_i)}, \tag{14}$$

where $\psi$ is positive definite and $\phi$ is negative definite given respectively by

$$\psi \equiv \frac{k_i}{s} \exp\left(\beta_i^M \mu_t^M - \frac{1}{2}\beta_i^{M2}\sigma_t^{M2}\right),$$

$$\phi \equiv \frac{-1}{\frac{1}{\eta_i} - s}.$$

The equilibrium ESG rating $E_i^*$ will be decreasing in $\psi$ with a sensitivity determined by $\phi$. Hence $E_i^*$ is decreasing in $k_i$ and the expected market return $\mu_t^M$, and increasing in green sentiment $s$ and the expected market risk $\sigma_t^M$. The sensitivity of these effects, in both positive and negative directions, is increasing in both $s$ and the negative returns to scale $\eta$.

To close the model, let the $E$ measure under regime $R$ be given by the negative externality arising from the pollution over the same period and in regime $M$ be the expected future negative externalities at horizon $n$:

$$\begin{aligned} E_{i,t}^R &= -D_{i,t,0}^e, \\ E_{i,t}^M &= \mathbb{E}_t[-D_{i,t,n}^e]. \end{aligned} \tag{15}$$

Now that we have characterised the equilibrium for any regime, let us in the next subsection analyse the impact from moving from the backward-looking $R$ regime to the forward-looking $M$ regime.

## 2.4  Benefits of a Forward-looking Measure: Theory

Based on the model presented above, the benefits of a forward-looking market-based measure relative to a backward-looking subjective rating can be summarised as follows:

**i.** The lower noise in the market-based measure $M$ relative to the ratings-based measure $R$ increases the marginal benefit in Equation 13 and hence decreases the negative externality in equilibrium. Additionally, it leads investors to better allocate their capital to higher impact firms.

**ii.** Under the ratings-based measure $R$, cheap talk increases the negative externality level in equilibrium and worsens investors' ability to allocate their capital to higher impact firms.

**iii.** A continuous measure relative to a threshold-based rating leads investors to better allocate their capital to higher impact firms.

**iv.** Sustainability-linked pay increases the marginal benefit in Equation 13 and hence decreases the negative externality in equilibrium, and more so using measure $M$.

Now we will explain each of these in more detail:

**i. Noisy Ratings Decrease Impact and Increase Misallocation.** Let the realised $E_i^R$ score be the target score $E_i$, plus a realisation of a log-normally distributed noise term $\sigma^R$. The marginal cost is the same as it is based on the targeted score, however the marginal benefit will change to

$$MB_i^M \exp\left(-\frac{1}{2}\sigma^{R2}\right),$$

where $MB_i^M$ is the marginal benefit without noisy ESG ratings.[5]

The new equilibrium score will then be

$$E_i^R = E_i^M \exp\left(-\frac{1}{2}\sigma^{R2}\right)^{\frac{-1}{\frac{1}{\eta_i}-s}}.$$

Hence, the noisy scores reduce aggregate impact (across all horizons) by

$$\frac{I_{i,t}^{M,R}}{-D_{i,t}^M} = \exp\left(-\frac{1}{2}\sigma^{R2}\right)^{\frac{-1}{\frac{1}{\eta_i}-s}}.$$

Additionally, the noise and bias leads to an attenuation effect, which increases the

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[5]Derivation in Appendix B.

misallocation of capital by

$$\tilde{I}_{t,n}^{M,R} = |\epsilon^R| + |\epsilon_{bias}^R| - |\epsilon^M|,$$

where $\epsilon_{bias}^R$ is given by

$$\epsilon_{bias} = \left(1 - \frac{var[M]}{var[M + \epsilon_M]}\right)\beta D_{i,t,0}^{\mathcal{M}},$$

where $var[M]$ in turn is the variance in the population of measure $M$, $\epsilon_M$ is the measurement noise of measure $M$, and $\beta$ is the true beta between the $R$ measure and realised emissions.

**ii. Cheap Talk Decreases Impact and Increases Misallocation** With cheap talk a firm $i$ can increase their score by using cheap talk $T_{i,t}$ in addition to spending money $B_{i,t}$ on decreasing the externality as before. Specifically, let $\theta$ represent the importance of the impact budget relative to cheap talk in terms of the achieved ESG rating and $k_i$ and $\eta_i$ remain as previously defined, then the production function $F_i(.)$ becomes

$$E_{i,t} = \frac{1}{k_i}(B_{i,t}^\theta T_{i,t}^{1-\theta})^{\eta_i}.$$

Given an optimal budget mix of cheap talk and real impact by the firm, the cash dividends become

$$D_{i,t,0}^c(E_{i,t}) = D_{i,t,0}^{c,0} \exp\left(-k_i' E_{i,t}^{1/\eta_i}\right),$$

where $B_{i,t}'$ is the total spent on impact $B_{i,t}$ and cheap talk $T_{i,t}$. With a $k_i'$ which is

$$k_i \left(\frac{1}{\theta}\right)^\theta \left(\frac{p_T}{1-\theta}\right)^{1-\theta},$$

where $p_T$ is the cost of cheap talk relative to impact. Hence, the new equilibrium rating will be

$$E_i^R = E_i^M \frac{k_i'^{\frac{-1}{\frac{1}{\eta_i}-s}}}{k_i}.$$

Additionally, the share spent on impact is reduced by a factor of $\theta^{-1}$ as the rest of the expenditure is spend on cheap talk. The effectiveness of the rating is therefore

decreased by

$$\theta^{-\eta_i}.$$

Hence, going to a forward-based measure could improve impact by the impact lost from cheap talk, which is

$$\frac{I_{i,t,0}^{M,R}}{-D_{i,t}^M} = 1 - \theta^{-\eta_i} \frac{k_i'}{k_i}^{\frac{-1}{\eta_i - s}}.$$

Misallocation is in turn increased from cheap talk by

$$\frac{\tilde{I}_{t,n}^{M,R}}{D_{i,t}^M} = 1 - \theta^{-\eta_i}.$$

Derivations are in Appendix B.

**iii. Threshold-based Investment Increases Misallocation.** With $\underline{E}$ as the threshold score for investors to invest into firm $i$, the discount rate on firm $i$ becomes:

$$r^c = \beta_M r_M - \mathbb{1}_{E > \underline{E}}.$$

The marginal benefit becomes a Dirac delta function around $E = \underline{E}$ with magnitude

$$s E_i^{-1} \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \frac{D_{i,t,1}^{c,0} \exp\left(-k_i E_i^{1/\eta_i}\right)}{\exp\left(\beta_i^M r_{t+1}^M - s\right)} \right].$$

As the marginal benefit is zero everywhere else, the equilibrium ESG level has to be either $\underline{E}$, or 0, otherwise the cost can be reduced by lowering $E$ towards zero without giving up any benefit.

Next, let the realised ESG rating $E^R$ be equal to $E$ plus some noise $\epsilon^R$. Those firms with a large positive realised error term will now have a rating markedly above the threshold, however when taking the expectation of the next period that expectation will be the threshold. For these firms, the expectation of the next period's ESG score will be lower than their current score. At the same time those firms with a negative realised error will now have a low rating, but in expectation have a higher rating next period. All in all, this implies that those firms which have "overshot" in terms of impact and rating will actually in expectation reduce their impact next period, instead

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of increasing it. As a result, thresholds-based ratings will lead to investors misallocating capital to firms which go on to pollute more, not less. This misallocation is given by

$$\tilde{I}_{t,n}^{M,R} = |\epsilon^R|.$$

**iv. Sustainability-based Pay Increases Impact.** To see this consider a manager $m$ of firm $i$ who receives a fixed salary $S$ plus compensation compared to the final dividends of the firm by a fraction $k^I$ and may also be compensated with a bonus based on how sustainable the firm is by a fraction $k^E$. The bonus is given as a $\kappa$ ratio increase in his salary from cash dividends. The value of this salary corresponds to relating the first compensation onto the stock price $P_{i,t}$ of the firm $i$ at time $t$ and the second onto the external value of the firm. Hence, his marginal benefit of decreasing the external dividend increases by $\kappa$, which will lead to a higher equilibrium impact. Specifically, for the extreme case of no green sentiment the impact increases by

$$I_{i,t,0}^{M,R} = \left(\frac{\kappa}{k_i}\right)^{\frac{\eta_i-1}{\eta_i}}.$$

Derivation in Appendix B.

# 3   Introducing Emission Futures

To improve the measurement of the external value of the firm ($V_{i,t}^E$ in Equation 1) we argue for the introduction of a new financial asset, what we term an "emission futures" contract. We envision an emission future as a standardized firm-specific or index-level contract. Much like a dividend futures contract, at maturity, the buyer pays the futures price, which is determined today, and the seller pays the dollar value of emissions of the underlying firm(s), indexed by $i$. This emission dollar value to be paid for firm $i$ at time $t$, denoted $D_{i,t}^e$, is computed as the product of the quantity of CO2 emissions $e_{i,t}$ during a certain calendar year and the daily average carbon price during that calendar year, which is the same across all firms:

$$D_{i,t}^e = e_{i,t}P_t^e. \tag{16}$$

Take for example the 2026 Shell emission futures contract. On the third Friday of December 2026, the buyer of the futures contract will pay the futures price, and the seller will pay the emission value $D_{i,t}^e$ which is computed as the product of (1) Shell's scope 1 (and potentially scope 2) CO2 emissions between the third Friday in December of 2025 and the third Friday of December of 2026 and (2) the average daily ETS carbon price in 2026. The contract is settled based on the sum of all emissions throughout the year, and there is no compounding or discounting within the year provided for in the contract.[6]

Let $g_{i,t,n}$ denote the average per-period expected growth rate of firm $i$'s emissions value over the next $n$ periods:

$$g_{i,t,n} = \frac{1}{n} \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \ln \left( \frac{D_{i,t+n}^e}{D_{i,t}^e} \right) \right]. \tag{17}$$

Then the present value $\mathcal{P}_{i,t,n}$ of $D_{i,t+n}^e$ is given by:

$$\mathcal{P}_{i,t,n} = D_{i,t}^e \exp \left( n(g_{i,t,n} - \mu_{i,t,n}) \right), \tag{18}$$

which defines the (geometric) discount rate $\mu_{i,t,n}$ for firm $i$'s emissions. By splitting the discount rate into the nominal bond yield for period $n$, denoted by $y_{t,n}^b$, and a firm-specific, horizon-specific emissions risk premium $\theta_{i,t,n}$ that compensates investors for the emission risk for maturity $n$ of firm $i$, we can rewrite equation (18) as:

$$\mathcal{P}_{i,t,n} = D_{i,t}^e \exp \left( n(g_{i,t,n} - y_{t,n}^b - \theta_{i,t,n}) \right). \tag{19}$$

The emissions yield for firm $i$ at time $t$ with maturity $n$ is then defined as:

$$y_{i,t,n} \equiv \frac{1}{n} \ln \left( \frac{D_{i,t}^e}{\mathcal{P}_{i,t,n}} \right) = y_{t,n}^b + \theta_{i,t,n} - g_{i,t,n}.$$

The expression above shows that the emissions yield consists of three components. It consists of the nominal bond yield $y_{t,n}^b$, a maturity-specific and firm specific risk pre-

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[6]In practice, futures contracts require a sufficient volume to get listed by an exchange, which is why we propose to start with a contract on the SP500 as well as the largest polluters for a few horizons, such as 1, 2, and 5 years. In comparison one exchange currently offers contracts on 352 individual firms for maturities of 3, 6, and 12 months. As emissions are concentrated around a few firms, offering contracts on just 58 (10) firms would cover 90% (55%) of total emissions. Once sufficient volume has been established, more firms could then be added.

mium $\theta_{i,t,n}$ that investors require for being exposed to emissions risk, and the expected growth rate of the emissions value $g_{i,t,n}$, which represents the average expected log growth over the next $n$ periods. Ceteris paribus, a higher expected growth rate makes the price $\mathcal{P}_{i,t,n}$ higher compared to the current emissions value $D_{i,t}^e$. This results in a lower emissions yield.

While in principle, emission value contracts could be traded in the spot market, we propose to have them traded in futures markets, much like other traded commodities. Under no arbitrage, the spot price and the forward price ($\mathcal{F}_{i,t,n}$) are linked through the nominal bond yield:

$$\mathcal{F}_{i,t,n} = \mathcal{P}_{i,t,n}\exp(ny_{t,n}^b). \tag{20}$$

We then define the forward emission yield $y_{i,t,n}^f$ as:

$$y_{i,t,n}^f \equiv \frac{1}{n}\ln\left(\frac{D_{i,t}^e}{\mathcal{F}_{i,t,n}}\right) = \theta_{i,t,n} - g_{i,t,n}. \tag{21}$$

The forward emission yield is equal to the difference between the risk premium and the expected emission value growth rate. If the forward emission yield is high, this either implies that risk premia are high or that expected emission value growth rates are low. Lastly, we define the one-period dollar change on the forward as:

$$R_{i,t,n+1}^{\$} \equiv \mathcal{F}_{i,t,n} - \mathcal{F}_{i,t-1,n+1}. \tag{22}$$

As we will discuss further below, so far, the variation in the emissions values has had a relatively low correlation with other financial market returns, implying that the risk premium on these assets is likely going to be low with little variation. As such, the forward emission yield will be a forward-looking, market-based measure of expected environmental impact (See Figure 5). The higher the yield, the more the market expects the firm to cut its emission values. As such higher yields (or improvements thereof) can be directly translated into higher environmental impact ratings.

It is important to emphasize that emission futures are firm, time and horizon specific, which are all important ingredients for effectively measuring environmental progress. In particular, the horizon dimension allows investors to take a stance on the particular horizon over which they think firms will be able to cut their emission values. These market-based horizon-specific expectations can then be compared with the

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promises made by the firm's management.

The price of emision futures is not only determined by the expected growth path of the emissions value ($g_{i,t,n}$) but also by the risk premium. It is worth discussing what the likely properties of this risk premium will be. First, the CAPM beta of emissions is insignifiant for most firms, and seems to be negative on average. This suggests that on average, we should expect the risk premium to be small and, if anything, negative. What about the cross-sectional variation? Standard asset pricing theory suggests that firms that cut their emissions in bad (good) times, which means that the futures contract has a negative (positive) return, will have a high (low) risk premium ($\theta_{i,t,n}$) and thus a higher (lower) emissions yield, as this yield is the difference between the risk premium and the expected path growth of emissions ($g_{i,t,n}$).

We should wonder whether the risk premium properties described above are desirable in the context of an emissions rating, which is equal to the emissions yield. First, if the only reason firms cut emissions in bad times is because they produce less in bad times, then assigning firms with a higher score for that reason does not seem all that desirable. On the other hand, if it is easier for firms to invest and apply technology that lowers emissions in good times than in bad times, then the firms that are able to cut emissions in bad times indeed deserve a higher rating. Note further that alternatively we could base the scoring on the changes in the emissions yield. In that case the level of the risk premium is differenced out and it is the properties of the *changes* in the risk premium that we should then better understand.

# 4   New Measures

The assets that we have just introduced can be used to measure a firm's future sustainability plans and outcomes relative to the markets expectation. Specifically, we propose the following novel environmental and impact measures. These measures are firm and horizon specific. The first one is the $E$ measure given from the futures price of the emission dividend strip $\mathcal{F}_{i,t,n}$ as

$$\mathcal{E}_{i,t,n} \quad \equiv \quad -\mathcal{F}_{i,t,n}. \tag{23}$$

As it is based on the negative of the futures contract price it accurately reflects the market's (risk-neutral) belief of the future value of the emissions of firm $i$ at a time $n$

periods in the future. Under the assumption that the risk-premium is small, this will be equal to the objective belief.

Where the Environmental Rating accurately displays the firms with the lowest future carbon externality.[7] Another way to invest is to actively work to decrease firms expected carbon emissions, so called Impact Investing. Where as investing in low-carbon firms relies on the price-channel to incentivize green firms to grow and brown to shrink, our empirical work, as well as other studies, suggests this effect either does not work, or is an inefficient method. Hence, investing in a way that efficiently creates impact is preferable, so called "impact investing".

We propose a natural measure for impact investing, which reflects how much the firm has decreased its emissions at a given horizon, compared to what was the market previously expected for that firm. Specifically, for the one year horizon, this will be if the firm reduced its emissions relative to the market expectations. For logner horizons, the impact measure will reflect the extend to which firms can plausibly commit to lowering emissions in the future. That is if the market price at that horizon drops this is an indication that the investors do not view the firm's commitments as cheap talk. Green impact is simply defined using the dollar return on a $n$ period emission future at date $t$ on firm $i$, $R_{i,t,n}^{\$}$, as

$$\mathcal{I}_{i,t,n} \equiv -R_{i,t,n}^{\$}. \tag{24}$$

The equation above shows that green impact reflects how the (risk-neutral) expectation of firm $i$'s emissions at horizon $n$ has changed relative to the price was last year.

Our new firm measures can also be used to create new fund measures for a fund $j$ who owns stocks $i$ with ownership shares $w_{j,i,t}$. The fund's $E$ and green impact measures are given as

$$
\begin{aligned}
\mathcal{E}_{j,t,n} &= \sum_i w_{j,i,t} \mathcal{E}_{i,t}, \\
\mathcal{I}_{j,t,n} &= \sum_i w_{j,i,t-1} \mathcal{I}_{i,t,n}.
\end{aligned}
\tag{25}
$$

Hence, an improvement in the fund's $E$ measure can be achieved in one of two ways.

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[7]Alternative scores are given in Appendix A.

First, by changes in the underlying firms' $E$ measure (the futures prices), and secondly, by decreasing the ownerships shares in the polluting firms. However, a fund's $I$ measure will be given by the dollar return on the underlying firms futures prices weighted by the funds ownership share in the previous period, so this return is entirely driven by the futures prices as the weights remain fixed.

Like with the firm level ratings, the fund level $E$ measure will be fine for passive funds and by following the $E$ measure you would be accurately investing into the firms that would have the lowest emissions going forward in expectation, however mutual funds can outperform on this measure if they are better at predicing which firms will reduce their emissions by more than the markets expectations implied. This outperformance is captured by the fund level green impact measure. If investors choose to base the flow-performance relationship on this outperformance measure more investable capital will be allocated to greener stocks, also going forward.

# 5    Empirical Analysis

In this section we test whether current ratings have been successful in reducing carbon emissions. First we test whether backward-looking ratings are effective in predicting future emission reductions. A hypothesis that we reject. In fact, higher scores are more likely to predict increases rather than decreases in emissions. Second, if the current backward-looking ratings are useful we should see that social capital has decreased emissions. Specifically, we test whether the recent increase in social capital has decreased emissions relative to previous periods with less social capital and we test whether increases in social capital in the cross-section are associated with higher emission decreases. What we see is that social capital has not been a driving force in reducing emissions neither in the time series nor the cross-section.

## 5.1    Data

To construct our dataset of firms' impact we use the Compustat database merged with carbon emission data from Refinitiv. For the cheap talk analysis we use ESG scores from Sustainalytics and we count word usage from firms' SEC filings using WRDS.

The amount of assets invested using ESG principles has been growing rapidly over the last decades as evidenced by Figure 1. Figure 1 shows that socially invested capital

has increased ten-fold from 2007 to 2020. Assets invested under ESG principles now exceeds USD 120 trillion. At the same time, we have seen a decrease in the average emissions per firm (See Figure 1).[8] These observations show that firms have reduced their emissions. However, this may be arising from a secular trend, indeed Figure C.1 in Appendix C shows that emissions relative to GDP has been decreasing since the 1920's. Hence, to understand social capital's role in impacting the emissions of firms we dive deeper in the next sections.

[Figure 1 about here.]

## 5.2 Results

**Effect of Higher ESG Scores**. This subsubsection goes on to evaluate whether higher scoring companies are driving environmental impact. As social capital attempts to achieve impact by investing into high ESG firms this is a requirement for real impact.

To evaluate the scores' impact we conduct a Granger causality test of whether higher $E$ scores lead to lower emissions in the future, in excess of what the emissions today would predict. As seen in Table 1 Columns (1) and (2) $E$ scores do not predict impact as measured by emissions. Columns (3) and (4) in fact shows the reverse to be the case. Namely, that if you reduce your emissions you increase your future $E$ score. This also suggests the ESG scores to be backward looking, rather than forward looking. Panel B confirms the results using $E$ scores from Refinitiv instead of Sustainalytics.

Additionally, we can get an estimate of the impact potential from going to a forward-looking score by considering how much predictive power the current scores give. To get such an estimate we can subtract the $R^2$ of Table 1 Column (2) from Column (1), which is indistinguishable from zero, hence giving the highest impact potential possibly for a forward-looking score.

[Table 1 about here.]

**Social Capital and Impact in the Time Series**. To test whether social capital has lead to real impact, we estimate a Granger causality regression of $CO_2$ emissions on past emissions and the amount of socially invested capital. As emission reductions may take a while to materialize, we do this at horizons of one to five years by sequentially

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[8]This is also the case if we instead consider the asset weighted total emissions, as depicted in the right side of Figure C.2 in Appendix C. We also see the same development if we consider emission intensities, meaning emissions over revenue, as shown in Figure C.3 in Appendix C.

adding an additional lagged variable. We evaluate the likelihood of social capital having lead to real impact using the tests' t-statistic. For this to be likely we need the statistic to be negative and the magnitude large. Generally a value higher than 1.96 is seen as the lowest bar to conclude that there may be an effect. The maximum of these t-values is depicted in Figure 2 for each horizon. We see that the effect is never significant for any horizon, even becoming positive at higher horizons. The regressions underlying this figure are shown in Table 2.[9]

[Figure 2 about here.]

[Table 2 about here.]

**Social Capital and Impact in the Cross-Section: Effect of Being in a Social Index**. In this subsubsection we evaluate social capital's impact using a second approach, namely using inclusions to a social index. We do so by considering what happens to firms' emissions after they are included in the social index, driving an inflow of social capital to the firm. Figure 3 shows the evolution in the emissions of firms either in the social index or outside it. While for firms in the index the average emissions have remained stable at around 2.5 million tons $CO_2$ equivalents, for firms outside of the index this has dropped by 10 million tons from around 12 to 2 million tons $CO_2$ equivalents. This shows that the reduction in emissions have generally come from firms not in the social index.

To understand how firm emissions adjust around index inclusions we in Figure 4 show emissions for firms from five years before and after inclusion relative to the firms lifetime emissions controlling for average emission changes year-to-year. What we can see is that firms who enter the social index lower their emissions at around three years before inclusion to below their lifetime average. After inclusion, the firms' emissions increase rapidly and two years after inclusion they are back at to their baseline. At 3 years and above they emit more than they usually do, an increase that continues to rise at time goes on.[10]

An alternative explanation is that the decreases in emissions have been driven by

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[9]An intuitive confirmation of this finding can be seen by simply plotting emission growth by ESG asset growth, either lagged or concurrent. Figure C.4 in the Appendix shows there exists an insiginificant relationship between these two variables, if anything there is a concurrent weakly significant *positive* relationship.

[10]Figure C.5 in the Appendix shows this finding in terms of changes in the emissions instead of absolute emissions.

the benefits from inclusion. To test this we compare the time series emission reductions of firms who have the possibility to enter a social index versus firms who can never join the index due to being in an industry that is excluded from the index, so called "sin" firms. Correspondingly, we label ordinary firms "saint" firms. These results are shown in Figure C.6 in the Appendix. Here we see in Panel A that the $CO_2$ emissions have been lowered for both saint and sin firms. Panel B shows the year-on-year change in percent rather than total emissions and the evolution is similar across the two types of firms. Panel C cumulates the $CO_2$ changes and we see that the cumulated changes for saint and sin firms are not significantly different at any point in our sample.

As depicted in Table 3 we see in Column (1) that firms in the index generally have lower emissions as expected. Column (2) shows this is also the case in relative terms. However we see in Column (3) that after firms are included, they increase their emissions. Column (4) shows that this is also the case in relative terms. Column (5) and (6) repeat the same result but with the baseline being not in the index compared to being in the index.

Table C.1 in Appendix C shows that the effects are the same across specifications. Specifically, Column (1) and (2) repeat results from the previous table. Column (3) shows results including firm and time fixed effects- Column (4) includes a variable for the year of inclusion showing a similar sized effect for the inclusion year, but higher when having year fixed effects as in Column (5). For both firm and time fixed effects (Column 6) we lose power for the inclusions and it is no longer significant. Table C.2 in Appendix C shows the effect to be the same for the first, second, and third year ahead. Simply accumulating the increase in emissions. Even columns include an inclusion dummy and Columns (1-6) are relative changes where as Columns (7-12) are absolute changes. The change is stable at 2% increase per year.

These results suggest that social capital has not been driving impact. In fact the arrival of social capital seems to have lowered impact.

[Figure 3 about here.]

[Figure 4 about here.]

[Table 3 about here.]

**Emission Future Betas**. We plot the emission beta estimates for each firm in our sample in Figure 5. In the first columns (Panels A and C) we have results for the beta

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with respect to purely emissions and in the second columns (Panels B and D) we have results for the beta with respect to emission futures, which are the emissions times the price of carbon emissions. In the top row the betas are plotted and in the bottom row the t-stats of the betas are plotted. The beta means how much the emission changes or changes in the value of a firm's emission future co-varies with the market return. Panel A shows that the betas are closely clustered around zero and while some t-stats are significant this is what we would expect from the type-1 error rate corresponding to the level of significance. Panel B shows that the betas related to the emission futures are more widely distributed, however their t-stats are equally insignificant. Overall, there is no evidence that the betas of emission futures should be significantly positive or negative.

[Figure 5 about here.]

**Cheap Talk**. As we have seen that social capital does not seem to be impactful we explore whether so-called 'Cheap Talk' may be driving ESG scores. This would lead to social capital being less effective in driving impact. Panel A in Figure 6 shows how cheap talk has increased over time. We see that that the use of the word 'Sustainability' has increased exponentially over the last two decades starting close to zero and ending at over two thousand mentions per firm per year in their official investor communications. Panel B shows the cross-sectional distribution and we see that there is quite a wide range of yearly mentions per firm. As this has been increasing over time we also display the cross-sectional distribution subtracting the time-series effects in Panel C and see that there tends to be two groups of firms: some that mention Sustainability about a thousand times more than the average and another group that mention it a thousand times less.[11]

We conduct a Granger causality test of cheap talk on ESG scores in Table 4. Here we see that the word frequency of Sustainability increases the future ESG scores in excess of what the current ESG score as well as impact would predict.[12] Table 4 also shows the equivalent Granger causality tests on cheap talk and impact in Panel B and C respectively. We see in Panel B that cheap talk does not lead to impact and in Panel C that getting a higher ESG score makes you do more cheap talk.

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[11]Figure C.7 in Appendix C shows the same for the word 'ESG' for which we see the same results.
[12]Table C.3 in Appendix C shows the same for several words and show that several have affect but 'Sustainability' is the most effective.

From Table C.4 in Appendix C we can see that the elasticities of cheap talk to impact is 0.73 meaning you have to mention 'Sustainability' 0.73% more to pollute 1% more and achieve the same E score. This decreases to just 0.13% for ESG scores. In absolute values this is 17 words per 10 million tons $CO_2$ emitted.

[Figure 6 about here.]

[Table 4 about here.]

# 6 Conclusion

This paper proposes a new measure for the real impact of ESG investing. This increasingly popular way of investing has been hindered by rating systems that are inherently subjective, backward-looking, and hence inconsistent across rating issuers. In this paper, we have proposed a novel measure based on a novel financial instrument: firm and horizon-specific Emission Futures. These futures contracts are market-based and forward-looking. We argue that basing decisions on this measure increases the effectiveness of ESG investing relative to the status quo.

Our measure can also be used for social index construction as an index's impact is simply a weighted average of the forward-looking measure we propose. Another use case is that the new measure can be used to accurately evaluate previous classifications into green and impact funds. On top of being useful for sustainability-linked corporate managerial pay, it is useful for linking impact fund managers' pay to their real impact. A last benefit is the resources that can be saved from both the firms' side in attempting to prove sustainability results and in regulators' efforts to attempt to verify these firms' claims, which may be diluted by cheap-talk.

Our framework can be extended in various directions. First, it can be applied to any observable variable related to an externality (positive or negative), not just emissions (the S and G in ESG). Secondly, the framework may prove valuable for other asset classes other than stocks such as sustainability-linked bonds.

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
# 7    Figures and Tables



**Figure 1: Emissions versus Socially Invested Capital**

This figure plots the average emissions of firms over time as well as the amount of socially invested capital as reported by United Nations Principles of Responsible Investment. The CO2 emissions include direct $CO_2$ emissions.

**Figure 2: Social Capital's influence on Emissions from Granger Causality Tests**

Figure's Panel A repeats Figure 1. Panel B plots the maximum t-value from a Granger Causality regression of the form $CO2_t = \sum_{t-n,t-1} AUM_{t-n} + CO2_{t-n} + \epsilon$ for $n$ ranging from one to five years. AUM is the amount of socially capital invested as reported by United Nations Principles of Responsible Investment. The CO2 emissions include direct $CO_2$ emissions and is average per firm. The dotted lines indicate the threshold of significance at the 5% level.

**Figure 3: Index Effect in the Time Series**

Figure shows how being in the Social Index are correlated with a firm's emissions. We see that the average emissions of the firms in the index has not changed since 2001. On the other hand we see that it is the firms outside the index that have decreased their emissions in this time period. Emissions are averages per firm. The emissions measure includes both direct and indirect emissions. However the figure is similar if we only consider direct emissions.

**Figure 4: Index Effect in the Cross-section**

Figure shows how emissions adjust before and after firms are admitted to the social index. Emissions is compared to firms' time and cross-sectional average by including firm and time fixed effects. Band signifies significance at 95% level. Standard errors clustered at firm-month.

**Figure 5: Carbon Emission Betas**

This figure plots the carbon dioxide ($CO_2$) emissions and Emission Future betas with respect to the SP500. $CO_2$ is the percentage difference and the as the carbon price the carbon future price is used (expiry in December). Carbon price data from investing.com.

**Figure 6: Cheap Talk in Time Series and Cross-section**

Cheap talk is measured as 'ESG' mentions per firm in Thousands. Data from their public reports to the securities exchange commission. In Panel A grey area represents one standard deviation variation.

## Table 1: Effect of ESG Scores on Impact: A Granger Causality test

Table shows the effects of ESG scores on impact. Specifically, it shows the output from a Granger causality test of emissions and environment scores on past emissions and environment scores. Panel A uses Refinitiv 'E' scores and Panel B uses Sustainalytics 'E' scores.

**Panel A: With Refinitiv Scores**

|  | Emissions next year (T Tons $CO_2$e) | | E Score Next year (0-100) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| E Score Current (0-100) |  | −1.48 | 0.92*** | 0.85*** |
|  |  | [−0.4] | [158.1] | [91.4] |
| Emissions Current (T Tons $CO_2$e) | 0.97*** | 0.97*** |  | −0.00*** |
|  | [362.4] | [358.4] |  | [−3.9] |
| Constant | 60.64 | 149.81 | 5.20*** | 10.86*** |
|  | [1.22] | [0.64] | [16.40] | [19.06] |
| Observations | 2,334 | 2,334 | 4,881 | 2,470 |
| $R^2$ | 0.983 | 0.983 | 0.837 | 0.778 |

**Panel B: With Sustainalytics Scores**

|  | Emissions next year (T Tons $CO_2$e) | | E Score Next year (0-100) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| E Score Current (0-100) |  | 1.64* | 0.91*** | 0.81*** |
|  |  | [1.8] | [728.8] | [390.6] |
| Emissions Current (T Tons $CO_2$e) | 0.96*** | 0.96*** |  | 0.00 |
|  | [719.8] | [717.2] |  | [0.02] |
| Constant | 150.5*** | 28.70 | 7.79*** | 15.91*** |
|  | [7.2] | [0.4] | [102.5] | [98.8] |
| Observations | 45,271 | 45,240 | 100,044 | 47,708 |
| $R^2$ | 0.92 | 0.92 | 0.84 | 0.76 |

| | |
|---|---|
| *Note:* | *$p<0.1$; **$p<0.05$; ***$p<0.01$ |

**Table 2: Social Capitals Impact on CO2 Emissions in Time Series**

Table shows how social capital has affected CO2 emissions of the firms in the economy. The regressions are Granger Causality regressions of the form $CO2_t = \sum_{t-n,t-1} AUM_{t-n} + CO2_{t-n} + \epsilon$ for $n$ ranging from one to five years. AUM is the amount of socially capital invested as reported by United Nations Principles of Responsible Investment. The CO2 emissions include direct $CO_2$ emissions and is average across firm in a given year. Standard errors are robust standard errors with automatic type and lag length choice. T-statistics are shown in square brackets.

| | Emissions in Million Tons $CO_2$e per firm at time $t$ ($CO_{2,t}$) | | | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 | Model 5 |
| $AUM_{t-1}$ (T USD) | −0.02 | 0.03 | 0.00 | 0.00 | −0.01 |
| | [−1.29] | [0.67] | [0.27] | [−0.06] | [−0.30] |
| $AUM_{t-2}$ (T USD) | | −0.07 | 0.01 | 0.03 | 0.05 |
| | | [−1.06] | [0.59] | [0.99] | [1.47] |
| $AUM_{t-3}$ (T USD) | | | −0.03 | −0.03 | −0.03 |
| | | | [−1.31] | [−0.75] | [−0.76] |
| $AUM_{t-4}$ (T USD) | | | | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| | | | | [−0.12] | [0.09] |
| $AUM_{t-5}$ (T USD) | | | | | −0.03 |
| | | | | | [−1.18] |
| $CO_{2,t-1}$ (M Tons) | 0.44 | 0.05 | 0.67*** | 0.38 | 0.18 |
| | [0.74] | [0.15] | [5.87] | [0.59] | [0.32] |
| $CO_{2,t-2}$ (M Tons) | | −0.06 | 0.00 | 0.05 | 0.41 |
| | | [−0.28] | [−0.17] | [0.10] | [0.81] |
| $CO_{2,t-3}$ (M Tons) | | | 0.05' | −0.07 | −0.57 |
| | | | [2.06] | [−0.56] | [−1.48] |
| $CO_{2,t-4}$ (M Tons) | | | | 0.22 | 0.44 |
| | | | | [1.19] | [2.05] |
| $CO_{2,t-5}$ (M Tons) | | | | | 0.04 |
| | | | | | [0.26] |
| (Intercept) | 2.83 | 4.94* | 1.01 | 1.43 | 1.45 |
| | [0.93] | [2.72] | [1.68] | [1.67] | [1.42] |
| Num.Obs. | 18 | 17 | 16 | 15 | 14 |
| R2 | 0.436 | 0.500 | 0.947 | 0.967 | 0.988 |

' p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

**Table 3: Index Effect in Cross-section**

This table's Panel A shows how firms in the social index compares to firms outside of the index in terms of their emissions. Panel B shows how firms' emissions adjust while in the social index compared to outside of it $\Delta$'s are year differences. Column (1) is the absolute change and Column (2) is the relative fractional change.

| | Panel A: | | Panel B: | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | $CO_2$ (T Tons) | $\log(CO_2)$ | $\Delta CO_{2,t,t+1}$ (T Tons) | $\Delta(\log CO_2)_{t,t+1}$ |
| | (1) | (2) | (1) | (2) |
| Firm in Index | $-2{,}480^{***}$ | $-23\%^{***}$ | $69^{***}$ | $2.3\%^{***}$ |
| | $[-28.9]$ | $[-11.2]$ | $[3.6]$ | $[6.5]$ |
| Constant | $4{,}645^{***}$ | $13.1^{***}$ | $-86^{***}$ | $-2.93\%^{***}$ |
| | $[73.68]$ | $[874.57]$ | $[-6.25]$ | $[-11.69]$ |
| Observations | 41,508 | 41,508 | 37,056 | 37,056 |
| $R^2$ | 0.02 | 0.003 | 0.0003 | 0.001 |
| *Note:* | | | | $^{*}$p<0.1; $^{**}$p<0.05; $^{***}$p<0.01 |

## Table 4: Effects of Cheap Talk on ESG Scores and Impact

Table considers how cheap talk by firms affects future ESG scores and impact. ESG Scores are considered in Panel A, and impact on carbon emissions in Panel B. Panel C considers whether firms with higher ESG scores do more cheap talk. Analyses take a Granger causality approach meaning they see if the dependent variable is predicted by lagged realisations of an independent variable in excess of its own lagged realisations.

**Panel A:**

| | ESG Score Next Year | | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| ESG Score This Year | 0.818*** | 0.817*** | 0.813*** | 0.812*** |
| | (0.012) | (0.012) | (0.012) | (0.012) |
| $CO_2$/Assets This Year | | −0.0004*** | | −0.0004*** |
| | | (0.0001) | | (0.0001) |
| SUSTAINABILITY Mentions This Year | | | 0.014** | 0.014** |
| | | | (0.006) | (0.006) |
| Constant | 12.249*** | 12.428*** | 12.414*** | 12.584*** |
| | (0.770) | (0.770) | (0.772) | (0.773) |
| Observations | 1,505 | 1,505 | 1,505 | 1,505 |
| $R^2$ | 0.747 | 0.749 | 0.748 | 0.750 |
| *Note:* | | | | *$p<0.1$; **$p<0.05$; ***$p<0.01$ |

**Panel B:**

| | $CO_2$ over Assets Next Year | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| Word Mentions | −0.084 | | −0.108 |
| | (0.175) | | (0.177) |
| ESG Score | | 0.283 | 0.315 |
| | | (0.346) | (0.350) |
| $CO_2$/Assets | 0.917*** | 0.917*** | 0.917*** |
| | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.005) |
| Constant | 3.139 | −15.463 | −16.355 |
| | (3.511) | (21.918) | (21.973) |
| Observations | 1,158 | 1,158 | 1,158 |
| $R^2$ | 0.965 | 0.965 | 0.965 |
| *Note:* | | *$p<0.1$; **$p<0.05$; ***$p<0.01$ | |

**Panel C:**

| | SUSTAINABILITY Mentions Next Year | | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| $CO_2$/Assets | −0.0001 | | | −0.0001 |
| | (0.001) | | | (0.001) |
| ESG Score | | 0.149*** | 0.087* | 0.086* |
| | | (0.037) | (0.052) | (0.052) |
| Word Mentions | 0.665*** | 0.573*** | 0.658*** | 0.658*** |
| | (0.026) | (0.022) | (0.027) | (0.027) |
| Constant | 4.378*** | −4.439** | −0.982 | −0.948 |
| | (0.523) | (2.204) | (3.221) | (3.239) |
| Observations | 1,219 | 1,766 | 1,219 | 1,219 |
| $R^2$ | 0.342 | 0.306 | 0.344 | 0.344 |
| *Note:* | | | *$p<0.1$; **$p<0.05$; ***$p<0.01$ | |

# Appendix

## A    Alternative Measures

### A.1    Market Adjusted E Measure

An environmental score adjusted for the correlation with the market outcomes is given as

$$\tilde{\mathcal{E}}_{i,t,n} \equiv -\mathcal{P}_{i,t,n} exp(n\theta_{i,t,n}).$$

### A.2    Market Adjusted Green Impact

The market corrected impact score is given as

$$\tilde{I}_{i,t,n} \equiv \mathcal{F}_{i,t-1,n} \exp(-\theta^e_{i,t-1,n}) - \mathcal{F}_{i,t,n-1}.$$

### A.3    Green Impact per Dollar Measure

A green impact investor may be interested how to achieve the highest impact per dollar, in which case it would be

$$\mathcal{G}_{i,t,n} \equiv \frac{R^{\$}_{i,t,n}}{P_{i,t-1}}.$$

### A.4    Emission Reduction Measures

A set of measures that capture expected $CO_2$ reductions are given by:

$$\mathcal{R}_{i,t,n} \equiv y^f_{i,t,n},$$
$$\tilde{\mathcal{R}}_{i,t,n} \equiv -g_{i,t,n}.$$

where the tilde ($\sim$) denotes a measure adjusted for correlation with the market.

# B  Derivations

## B.1  Derivation of Optimal ESG Score

We have the following cash flow equation

$$D_{i,t}^c(E_{i,t}) = D_{i,t}^{c,0} \exp\left(-B_{i,t}\left(E_{i,t}\right)\right) = D_{i,t}^{c,0} \exp\left(-k_i E_{i,t}^{1/\eta_i}\right),$$

And cost of equity equation

$$r_{i,t}^c = \beta_i^M r_t^M - s \ln(E_{i,t}),$$

and optimality condition

$$D_{i,t}^{c'}(E_{i,t}) = \mathbb{E}_t\left[-r_{i,t+1}^{C'}(E_{i,t})\frac{D_{i,t+1}^c(E_{i,t+1})}{\exp\left(r_{i,t+1}^c(E_{i,t})\right)}\right].$$

Then start from Equation 13 repeated below for which it follows that

$$\underbrace{\frac{k_i E^{\frac{1-\eta_i}{\eta_i}} D_{i,t}^{c,0}}{\exp\left(k_i E_{i,t}^{1/\eta_i}\right)}}_{\text{Marginal cost}} = \underbrace{s E_i^{-1} \mathbb{E}_t\left[\frac{D_{i,t+1}^{c,0} \exp\left(-k_i E_i^{1/\eta_i}\right)}{\exp\left(\beta_i^M r_{t+1}^M - s \ln(E_i)\right)}\right]}_{\text{Marginal benefit}},$$

$$k_i E^{\frac{1-\eta_i}{\eta_i}} = s E_i^{-1} \mathbb{E}_t\left[\exp\left(s \ln(E_i) - \beta_i^M r_{t+1}^M\right)\right],$$

$$k_i E^{\frac{1}{\eta_i}} = s \mathbb{E}_t\left[\exp\left(s \ln(E_i) - \beta_i^M r_{t+1}^M\right)\right]$$

$$= s E_i^s \mathbb{E}_t\left[\exp\left(-\beta_i^M r_{t+1}^M\right)\right],$$

$$E_i^{s-\frac{1}{\eta_i}} = \mathbb{E}_t\left[\exp\left(\beta_i^M r_{t+1}^M\right)\right]\frac{k_i}{s},$$

$$E_i^* = \left(\mathbb{E}_t\left[\exp\left(\beta_i^M r_{t+1}^M\right)\right]\frac{k_i}{s}\right)^{1/(s-\frac{1}{\eta_i})},$$

$$E_i^* = \left(\frac{k_i}{s} \exp\left(\beta_i^M \mu_t^M - \frac{1}{2}\beta_i^{M^2} \sigma_t^{M^2}\right)\right)^{\frac{1}{s-\frac{1}{\eta_i}}}.$$

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As $\eta \in (0, 1)$, and reasonable values for sentiment lie within $s \in (0, 1)$ it means that

$$E_i^* = \psi \left( k_i, s, \beta_i^M, \mu_t^M, \sigma_t^M \right)^{\phi(s, \eta_i)},$$

where $\psi$ is positive definite, and $\phi$ is negative definite.

This means that $E$ will be decreasing in $\psi$ with a strength determined by $\phi$. Hence $E_i^*$ is decreasing in $k_i$ and $\mu_t^M$, and increasing in $s$ and $\sigma_t^M$. The market exposure $\beta_i$ could be either. The strength of this effect is increasing in both $s$ and $\eta$.

## B.2   Derivation of Noisy Ratings Impact Decrease

Tet the realised $E_i^R$ score be the target score $E_i$, plus a realisation of a log-normally distributed noise term $\sigma^R$. The marginal cost is the same as it is based on the targeted score, however the marginal benefit will change to:

$$s E_i^{-1} \, \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \frac{D_{i,t,1}^{c,0} \exp \left( -k_i E_i^{1/\eta_i} \right)}{\exp \left( \beta_i^M r_{t+1}^M - s \ln(E_i^R) \right)} \right] \tag{26}$$

$$= s E_i^{-1} \frac{D_{i,t,1}^{c,0} \exp \left( -k_i E_i^{1/\eta_i} \right)}{\mathbb{E}_t \left[ \exp \left( \beta_i^M r_{t+1}^M - s \ln(E) + \frac{1}{2} \sigma^{R2} \right) \right]} \tag{27}$$

$$= s E_i^{s-1} \frac{D_{i,t,1}^{c,0} \exp \left( -k_i E_i^{1/\eta_i} \right)}{\mathbb{E}_t \left[ \exp \left( \beta_i^M r_{t+1}^M + \frac{1}{2} \sigma^{R2} \right) \right]} \tag{28}$$

$$= MB_i^M \exp \left( -\frac{1}{2} \sigma^{R2} \right), \tag{29}$$

where $MB_i^M$ is the marginal benefit without noisy ESG ratings.

## B.3 Derivation of Cheap Talk Effects

Let $E$ be governed by the Cobb-Douglas CES function:

$$E_{i,t} = (B_{i,t}^{\theta} T_{i,t}^{1-\theta})_i^{\eta}, \tag{30}$$

where $\theta$ signifies the importance of that factor in the production function.

We start by finding the optimal mix of impact and cheap talk to achieve ESG score $E$. For $B$ and $T$ to be in optimal proportions the marginal rate of substitution between $B$ and $T$ must equal the relative cost of $B$ and $T$:

$$MRS = \frac{p_I}{p_T}. \tag{31}$$

We can find the MRS defined as $\partial T/\partial B$ by taking the ratio of $\partial E/\partial B$ and $\partial E/\partial T$ as

$$\begin{aligned}
\frac{\partial E}{\partial B} &= \frac{\theta\eta}{B}(B^{\theta}T^{1-\theta})^{\eta} = \frac{\theta\eta}{B}E, \\
\frac{\partial E}{\partial T} &= \frac{(1-\theta)\eta}{T}(B^{\theta}T^{1-\theta})^{\eta} = \frac{(1-\theta)\eta}{T}BE,
\end{aligned} \tag{32}$$

so

$$\frac{\partial T}{\partial B} = \frac{\theta}{1-\theta}\frac{T}{B} = MRS. \tag{33}$$

Hence

$$MRS = \frac{\theta}{1-\theta}\frac{T}{B} = \frac{p_I}{p_T} = \text{relative price.} \tag{34}$$

Solving for $T$ gives

$$T = \frac{p_I}{p_T}\frac{1-\theta}{\theta}B. \tag{35}$$

The budget $B'$ is defined as the sum of expenditures on impact and cheap talk:

$$B' = p_I B + p_T T \tag{36}$$

Substituting $T$ into the budget equation, and solving for $B$, we get the optimal impact as

$$B^* = \frac{B'}{p_I}\theta. \tag{37}$$

Which we can rewrite to get the share of the budget spend on impact $(B^* p_I / B')$ as:

$$\frac{B^* p_I}{B'} = \theta. \tag{38}$$

Similarly we get

$$T^* = \frac{B'}{p_T}(1 - \theta). \tag{39}$$

Hence the ratio is given by

$$\frac{B^*}{T^*} = \frac{\theta}{1 - \theta} \frac{p_T}{p_I}. \tag{40}$$

We get the budget needed to achieve a score $E$ by taking the ESG production function (Equation 30) and substituting in the equations for optimal impact and cheap talk (Equations 37 and 39), and solving for $B'$:

$$B' = E^{1/\eta} \left(\frac{p_I}{\theta}\right)^{\theta} \left(\frac{p_t}{1 - \theta}\right)^{1-\theta}. \tag{41}$$

Wlog we can normalise $p_{I,i,t+n} = 1$. Hence they do more impact, the higher $\theta$ is and the higher $p_{T,i,t+n}$ is (where the price of cheap talk now is relative to the price of impact), which may be firm specific. As a simplifying example consider if $p_{T,i,t+n} = 1$, here firms do most impact and less cheap talk if $\theta$ is above 0.5.

This means the cash dividends become

$$D^c_{i,t,0}(E_{i,t}) = D^{c,0}_{i,t,0} \exp\left(-B'_{i,t}(E_{i,t})\right) = D^{c,0}_{i,t,0} \exp\left(-k'_i E_{i,t}^{1/\eta_i}\right),$$

where $k'_i$ is the constant $k_i \left(\frac{1}{\theta}\right)^{\theta} \left(\frac{p_T}{1-\theta}\right)^{1-\theta}$.

It is useful to note that we can recover the version without cheap talk versus impact by setting $k'_i = k_i$.

**Credability of Cheap Talk**. Next we turn to the consequence of firms needing to be credible to ensure their ESG discount. As the investor is not interested in funding cheap talk the investors strategy is that they only give discount if the firm does not do cheap talk. They infer the firm does cheap talk if they are more than 95% sure their ESG score is from cheap talk. Both the firms cheap talk and impact is a signal.

**Corollary 1 (Cheap Talk to Impact Ratio).** *The largest cheap talk to impact ratio*

*that they can have before losing benefit is*

$$\frac{T}{B} = 1.96\sqrt{\sigma_T^2 + \sigma_B^2}. \tag{42}$$

*Proof.* The signal the investor checks is larger than zero is

$$\frac{T}{B} = \frac{T}{E - T}. \tag{43}$$

And the noise, when uncorrelated, is

$$\sqrt{\sigma_T^2 + \sigma_B^2}. \tag{44}$$

So test is on

$$\frac{T/B}{\sqrt{\sigma_T^2 + \sigma_B^2}}. \tag{45}$$

Hence, the investor does not think the firm does cheap talk when [13]

$$\frac{T/B}{\sqrt{\sigma_T^2 + \sigma_B^2}} \leq 1.96. \tag{46}$$

So the largest fraction of cheap talk to impact that the firm can have before losing their benefit is

$$\frac{T}{B} = 1.96\sqrt{\sigma_T^2 + \sigma_B^2}. \tag{47}$$

∎

## B.4 Derivation of Sustainability-based Pay Impact Increase

Let the negative of the external value of the firm be the price of an emission future $\mathcal{P}_{i,t}$. Then his income $Y$ is:

$$Y_{m,t} = S + k^I P_{i,t} - \mathcal{P}_{i,t} k^E P_{i,t}.$$

Divide through by $k^I$ and introduce $\kappa = k^E/k^I$

$$Y_{m,t}/k^I = S/k^I + P_{i,t} - \mathcal{P}_{i,t} \kappa P_{i,t}.$$

---

[13]Assuming a large number of observations. Which implies that the threshold is larger for younger firms.

The manager's objective is to maximise his income by choosing which ESG score $E_{i,t}$ the firm should aim for:

$$\max_{E_{i,t}} Y_{m,t} = \max_{E_{i,t}} Y_{m,t}/k^I.$$

Then by comparison to Equation 13 his costs versus benefits optimality condition becomes:

$$\frac{k_i E^{\frac{1-\eta_i}{\eta_i}} D_{i,t}^{c,0}}{\exp(k_i E_i^{1/\eta_i})} - \frac{\kappa D_{i,t}^{c,0}}{\exp(k_i E^{1/\eta_i})} = s E_i^{-1} \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \frac{D_{i,t+1}^{c,0}(1 + \kappa E_i) \exp\left(-k_i E_i^{1/\eta_i}\right)}{\exp\left(\beta_i^M r_{t+1}^M - s \ln(E_i)\right)} \right].$$

$$k_i E^{\frac{1-\eta_i}{\eta_i}} - \kappa = s E_i^{-1} \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \frac{1 + \kappa E_i}{\exp\left(\beta_i^M r_{t+1}^M\right)} \right] E_i^s.$$

$$k_i E^{\frac{1-\eta_i}{\eta_i}} - \kappa = s E_i^{s-1} \frac{1 + \kappa E_i}{\mathbb{E}_t \left[\exp\left(\beta_i^M r_{t+1}^M\right)\right]}.$$

An extreme case would be for the situation with no extra help from sustainability sentiment, $s = 0$, in that case it will be that

$$k_i E^{\frac{1-\eta_i}{\eta_i}} = \kappa,$$

and optimal $E$ rating is

$$E_i^* = \left(\frac{\kappa}{k_i}\right)^{\frac{\eta_i - 1}{\eta_i}}.$$

Which means that the increase in impact from sustainability linked pay is

$$I_{i,t,0}^{R,M} = \left(\frac{\kappa}{k_i}\right)^{\frac{\eta_i - 1}{\eta_i}}.$$

# C  Additional Results and Robustness Tests



**Figure C.1: Carbon Emission Intensity Across the World**

This figure plots the carbon dioxide ($CO_2$) emissions intensity of the United States and the World over time. $CO_2$ intensity measured in kilograms of $CO_2$ per \$ of GDP (measured in international-\$ in 2011 prices). Data from Global Carbon Project (Andrew and Peters, 2021) and Maddison Project Database 2020 (Bolt and van Zanden, 2020).

**Emissions, Average, Equally weighted**      **Emissions, Average, Asset weighted**

**Figure C.2: Emissions over time**

These figures plot the average carbon dioxide ($CO_2$) emissions across US firms over time. The left hand figure's average is computed using equal weights across firms, where as the right hand figure is computed using weights proportional to the assets of the firm.

**Figure C.3: Emission intensity over time**

These figures plot the average carbon dioxide ($CO_2$) emissions intensity across american firms over time. The top left hand figure's average is computed using equal weights across firms, where as the top right hand figure is computed using weights proportional to the market value of the firm. The bottom left hand figure's average is computed using weights proportional to the market value of the firm, and the bottom right hand figure uses weights proportional to the the firm's revenue.

**Figure C.4: $CO_2$ Emissions versus Socially Invested Capital**

This figure plots the average emissions of firms over time as well as the amount of socially invested capital as reported by United Nations Principles of Responsible Investment. Panel A is for lagged social investment growth, and Panel B is for simultaneous growth. The CO2 emissions include direct $CO_2$ emissions. $R^2$ of Panel A is 0.02 and $R^2$ of Panel B is 0.15.

**Figure C.5: Inclusion to Index Effect**

This figure shows the inclusion to index effect in terms of changes in their emissions. Emissions change is compared to cross-sectional average by including time fixed effects. Band is a standard deviations away from the estimate. Standard errors clustered at firm-month.

**Figure C.6: Inclusion to Index Effect: Saints versus Sinners**

This figure shows the emissions of saint and sinner firms over time. Specifically, Panel A shows the average emissions per group per period. Panel B shows the period-by-period change in percentages for each group. Panel C shows the cumulative effect of emission changes in ratios. Band is 3 standard deviations away from the period estimate.

**Figure C.7: Cheap Talk in Time Series and Cross-section**

Cheap talk is measured as 'ESG' mentions per firm in Thousands. Data from their public reports to the securities exchange commission. In Panel A grey area represents two standard deviations variation.

**Table C.1: Effect of being in index, Robustness with different specifications and models**

Table shows how firms in the social index compares to firms outside of the index in terms of their emissions for different models. Column (1) and (2) repeats Column (3) and (4) in Table 3. The columns following add controls to Column (2). Specifically, Column (3) adds firm and time fixed effects, Columns (4), (5), and (6) add a dummy for the date of firm inclusion to the social index. Additionally, Column (5) adds time fixed effects and Column (6) has firm and time fixed effects. Emission changes are 1-year changes in $CO_2$ equivalents.

| | $\Delta\ CO_{2,t,t+1}$ (T Tons) | | $\Delta \log CO_{2,t,t+1}$ | | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Firm in Index | 69** | 2.3%** | 1%** | 2%** | 3%′ | 1%** |
| | (3.60) | (6.50) | (2.72) | (6.39) | (0.02) | (0.01) |
| Firm just included | | | | 3%′ | 138%* | 3% |
| | | | | (1.33) | (0.77) | (0.02) |
| Constant | −86** | −2.93%** | | −3%** | −4%** | |
| | (−6.25) | (−11.69) | | (−11.69) | (0.01) | |
| FE | None | None | Firm+Time | None | Time | Firm+Time |
| Observations | 37,056 | 37,056 | 37,056 | 37,056 | 352 | 37,056 |
| $R^2$ | 0.0003 | 0.001 | 0.0002 | 0.001 | 0.01 | 0.0002 |
| *Note:* | | | | | | *p<0.2; **p<0.1; ***p<0.05 |

**Table C.2: Effect of being in Index, Robustness to 1 to 3 years ahead**

Table shows how firms in the social index compares to firms outside of the index in terms of their emissions across different horizons. Columns (1) to (6) are log changes and Columns (7) to (12) are absolute changes. For each group of two the first column is for a horizon of one year, second two years, and third three years. Within each group there is the first the ordinary result and then controlling for inclusions. Emission changes are 1-year changes in $CO_2$ equivalents.

| | $\Delta \log CO_{2,t,t+1}$ | | $\Delta \log CO_{2,t,t+2}$ | | $\Delta \log CO_{2,t,t+3}$ | | $CO_{2,t,t+1}$ (T Tons) | | $CO_{2,t,t+2}$ (T Tons) | | $CO_{2,t,t+3}$ (T Tons) | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) | (12) |
| Firm in Index | 0.02** | 0.02** | 0.04** | 0.04** | 0.06** | 0.06** | 69** | 70** | 193** | 195** | 336** | 335** |
| | (6.50) | (6.39) | (8.43) | (8.36) | (10.23) | (10.25) | (3.60) | (3.62) | (6.60) | (6.65) | (8.68) | (8.64) |
| Just Included | | 0.03′ | | 0.02 | | −0.03 | | −61 | | −204 | | 94 |
| | | (1.33) | | (0.58) | | (−0.68) | | (−0.45) | | (−0.97) | | (0.30) |
| Constant | −0.03** | −0.03** | −0.06** | −0.06** | −0.09** | −0.09** | −86** | −86** | −218** | −218** | −352** | −352** |
| | (−11.69) | (−11.69) | (−17.11) | (−17.11) | (−21.63) | (−21.63) | (−6.25) | (−6.25) | (−10.63) | (−10.63) | (−13.23) | (−13.23) |
| Observations | 37,056 | 37,056 | 32,832 | 32,832 | 28,812 | 28,812 | 37,056 | 37,056 | 32,832 | 32,832 | 28,812 | 28,812 |
| $R^2$ | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.002 | 0.002 | 0.004 | 0.004 | 0.0003 | 0.0004 | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.003 | 0.003 |
| *Note:* | | | | | | | | | | | | *p<0.2; **p<0.1; ***p<0.05 |

**Table C.3: Effects of Cheap Talk on ESG Scores, Granger Causality, Group of Words**

Table considers how cheap talk by firms affects future ESG scores and impact across cheap talk as measured on different words. The cheap talk measure is frequency of the given word. Analyses take a Granger causality approach meaning they see if the dependent variable is predicted by lagged realisations of an independent variable in excess of its own lagged realisations.

| | ESG Score Next Year | | | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| SUSTAINABILITY | 0.016*** | 0.014** | 0.093*** | 0.014** |
| | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.011) | (0.005) |
| SUSTAINABLE | 0.021*** | 0.010 | 0.063*** | 0.010 |
| | (0.006) | (0.007) | (0.013) | (0.007) |
| ESG | 0.004 | −0.004 | −0.023 | −0.004 |
| | (0.009) | (0.013) | (0.026) | (0.013) |
| ENVIRONMENT | 0.004*** | 0.001 | −0.004 | 0.001 |
| | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.003) | (0.001) |
| SOCIAL | 0.005*** | 0.002 | 0.014*** | 0.001 |
| | (0.001) | (0.002) | (0.003) | (0.002) |
| GOVERNANCE | 0.001*** | 0.0005 | 0.002* | 0.0004 |
| | (0.0004) | (0.0005) | (0.001) | (0.0005) |
| CLIMATE | 0.009*** | 0.002 | 0.011 | 0.004 |
| | (0.003) | (0.003) | (0.007) | (0.004) |
| ESG Score This Year | 0.889*** | 0.821*** | | 0.821*** |
| | (0.003) | (0.004) | | (0.004) |
| $CO_2$/Assets | | | −0.001*** | −0.0003*** |
| | | | (0.0001) | (0.00005) |
| Constant | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Observations | 23,297 | 12,598 | 12,598 | 12,598 |
| $R^2$ | 0.827 | 0.764 | 0.012 | 0.764 |
| *Note:* | | | | *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 |

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**Table C.4: Elasticities of Cheap Talk and Impact**

Table considers how firms' cheap talk and real impact affects their one year ahead ESG or E scores. Cheap talk is the word frequency of 'Sustainability'.

| | log $\text{ESG}_{t+1}$ | log $\text{E}_{t+1}$ | $\text{E}_{t+1}$ | | $\text{ESG}_{t+1}$ |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| $\log(\text{CO}_2/\text{Assets})_t$ | 0.003** | −0.017*** | | | |
| | (0.001) | (0.002) | | | |
| $\log(\text{Cheap Talk})_t$ | 0.024*** | 0.029*** | | | |
| | (0.003) | (0.004) | | | |
| $\text{CO}_{2,t}$ | | | −0.00000*** | | |
| | | | (0.00000) | | |
| $\text{CO}_2/\text{Assets}_t$ | | | | −0.003*** | −0.001*** |
| | | | | (0.0004) | (0.0002) |
| $\text{Cheap Talk}_t$ | | | 0.073*** | 0.072*** | 0.084*** |
| | | | (0.019) | (0.019) | (0.012) |
| Constant | 4.090*** | 4.136*** | 62.567*** | 62.473*** | 62.516*** |
| | (0.007) | (0.011) | (0.361) | (0.358) | (0.233) |
| Observations | 1,505 | 1,505 | 1,509 | 1,505 | 1,505 |
| $R^2$ | 0.056 | 0.062 | 0.045 | 0.046 | 0.036 |
| *Note:* | | | | | *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 |