Finding Double-Unlock Bugs with Shape-and-Effect Analysis

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Why?

- The Linux kernel is everywhere (embedded devices, routers, TVs, phones, PCs & large servers)
- Bugs in the Linux kernel can therefore have a big impact on many devices
- Shared-memory concurrency and locks are used extensively in the source code of the kernel
 - Allows parallelization of subsystems while avoiding race conditions
- Static analysis of the Control Flow Graph (CFG) of the kernel allows detecting possible ressource manipulation errors

Double-Unlock Errors

 A thread holding a lock which then releases this lock more than once consecutively will result in undefined behaviour, according to the POSIX standard

"The results are undefined if the lock is not held by the calling thread. [...]
The results are undefined if this function is called with an uninitialized thread spin lock."

- Undefined behaviour at the kernel level possibly makes the operating system behave in unexpected ways
- A program depending on undefined behaviour might not break today, but could break in the future, since no assumptions can be made about undefined behaviour
- Detecting these errors allows developers to detect errors in their code, hopefully leading to safer programs --- provided the developers fix detected errors.

An Example

```
#include "ubifs.h"
static void orphan_delete(struct ubifs_info *c, struct ubifs_orphan *orph)
   if (orph->del) {
        spin_unlock(&c->orphan_lock);
        return;
   if (orph->cmt) {
        spin_unlock(&c->orphan_lock);
        return;
void ubifs_delete_orphan(struct ubifs_info *c, ino_t inum)
   orphan_delete(c, orph);
   spin_unlock(&c->orphan_lock);
```

What I Wanted to Accomplish


- What is the performance of a double-unlock error checker prototype implementation when run on the source code of Linux kernel components?
- Accomplished by:
 - Developing an error checker able to find these double-unlock errors
 - Analyzing the checker performance by running the implementation on confirmed double-unlock bugs found in the Linux kernel

Building Upon an Existing Implementation

- Building upon the shape-and-effect inference system described by Abal et. al. to develop a double-unlock checker relatively quickly
- Computational Tree Logic (CTL) is used by Abal et. al. to show which errors should be detected by a double-lock checker
- This specification can then be used to formulate a **double-unlock** checker
- CTL models program executions in time as tree-like structures where all paths can be the actual path executed at runtime


Scope

• Internal abstractions are merely used --- not modified --- in the project implementation




What We Want to Detect


 $^{\top}$ EU (unlock_p \wedge EX ($^{\neg}$ lock_p EU unlock_p))



In other words; an unlock is performed on p without a lock on p being present before another unlock is performed on p, leading to a double-unlock

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Implementation


- EBA framework requires implementing a **Spec** OCaml module. If all checks return an Option value, an error has been found.
- The checks found in the **Spec** signature have been implemented using existing EBA infrastructure & helper functions
- Reachability of a node matching the checker definitions is tested internally in the EBA infrastructure

```
module type Spec = sig
   (** A name to identify the checker *)
  val name : string
   (** Checker's internal state, eq. memory regions to track. *)
   type st
   (** Selects initial contexts *)
  val select : AFile.t -> Cil.fundec -> shape scheme -> AFun.t -> st L.t
   (** Flags steps of interest for triaging. *)
  val trace : st -> Effects.t -> bool
   (** Tests *)
  val testP1 : st -> step -> st option
  val testQ1 : st -> step -> st option
  val testP2 : st -> step -> st option
   (** Q2 = P2 /\ Q2-weak *)
  val testQ2 weak : st -> step -> st option
   (** Bug data *)
   type bug
  val bug of st : st -> bug
  val doc of report : fn:Cil.varinfo -> bug -> loc1:Cil.location -> loc2:Cil.location -> trace:path -> PP.doc
end
```

```
module type Spec = sig
  val name : string
   type st
  val select : AFile.t -> Cil.fundec -> shape scheme -> AFun.t -> st L.t
  val trace : st -> Effects.t -> bool
  val testP1 : st -> step -> st option
  val testQ1 : st -> step -> st option
                                                              These functions model parts of the CTL specification
  val testP2 : st -> step -> st option
   (** Q2 = P2 /\ Q2-weak *)
  val testQ2 weak : st -> step -> st option
  type bug
  val bug of st : st -> bug
  val doc of report : fn:Cil.varinfo -> bug -> loc1:Cil.location -> loc2:Cil.location -> trace:path -> PP.doc
```

Implementation

- testP1 Lifts a given CFG node to an Option type
- testQ1 Checks whether an unlock is performed without a lock in a step
- testP2 Checks that no lock is performed in a given step
- testQ2 weak Checks whether an unlock is present in a step



Implementation

https://github.com/lagoAbal/eba/pull/5

```
let testQ1 st step =
       <u>let</u> unlocks and not locks r ef =
            <u>let</u> unlocks \ r \ ef : bool = E. (mem (unlocks <math>\sim r) ef) in
            unlocks r ef && not locks r ef in
       unlocks and not locks st.reg step.effs =>?
            let unlock opt = find unlock object step in
            let krs = Option.Infix.(
                (unlock opt >>= Lenv.kregions of st.fna)
                |? Regions.empty
            ) in
            {st with unlock = unlock opt; kreg = krs}
```

```
let testP2 st step =
       let res = not locks st.reg
step.effs =>? st <u>in</u>
       res
   let testQ2 weak st step =
       <u>let</u> must unlock = E. (mem (unlocks))
~r:st.reg) step.effs) in
       if must unlock
       then Some st
       else None
```

Implementation Caveats

- CTL formulations do not always match implementation in existing checkers
- The implementation of reachability checking in EBA is hard to reason about
- Seemingly sound checks in functions do not always give expected results
 - Due to parsing and may/must handling in EBA

More on this later...

Results

1	File	1	Status	I
1	drivers/block/drbd/drbd_main.c	1	Detected	-
1	fs/ubifs/orphan.c	1	Detected	1
1	drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_svm.c	1	Undetected	-
1	fs/btrfs/file.c	I	Undetected	-[
1	drivers/staging/wilc1000/wilc_wlan.c	1	Detected	-
1	drivers/staging/kpc2000/kpc_dma/fileops.c	1	Detected	-
1	fs/nfs/client.c	I	Undetected	-[
1	fs/btrfs/file.c	1	Undetected	-
1	drivers/media/dvb-core/dvbdev.c	1	Stack overflow	
1	mm/memory_hotplug.c	1	Undetected	-
1	sound/soc/codecs/pcm512x.c	1	Detected	-
1	drivers/target/target_core_user.c	1	Uncaught exception	
1	drivers/rpmsg/qcom_smd.c	1	Compilation error (GCC)	
1	drivers/scsi/aacraid/commsup.c	1	Compilation error (GCC)	-
1	<pre>drivers/staging/rtl8188eu/os_dep/usb_intf.c</pre>	1	Compilation error (GCC)	
1	block/blk-cgroup.c	1	Compilation error (GCC)	

Technically all of these result in an EBA ParseError without mitigations

Results

• EBA abstractions do not support all lock types found in the Linux kernel

```
if Opts.all_lock_types()
    then begin
    add_axiom tbl ax_mutex_lock;
    add_axiom tbl ax_mutex_lock_nested;
    add_axiom tbl ax_mutex_lock_interruptible_nested;
    add_axiom tbl ax_mutex_unlock;
    add_axiom tbl ax_raw_read_lock;
    add_axiom tbl ax_raw_read_unlock;
    add_axiom tbl ax_raw_read_unlock;
    add_axiom tbl ax_raw_read_unlock;
    end
```

- EBA parsing does not support all C constructs found in the Linux kernel
- EBA implementation of the CTL subset does not allow expressing desired checks

Where to Go From Here?

- Extending capabilities of EBA framework
 - Develop more checkers
 - Supporting lock types
 - Extend C parsing
- Reimplementing existing and future checkers as monitor state machines
 - Existing CTL implementation of EBA might limits expressiveness in checkers (e.g. may/must)
 - Gives greater "expressibility" of checker specifications (e.g. if/else if)
- Reachability of EBA can be modelled as state machines
- Current CTL can be modelled as state machines

