

## Chapter 7

# Distributed Systems

**A distributed system is one in which the failure of a computer you didn't even know existed can render your own computer unusable.**

– LESLIE LAMPORT [1091]

**What's in a name? That which we call a rose  
by any other name would smell as sweet**

– WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE

### 7.1 Introduction

We need a lot more than authentication, access control and cryptography to build a robust distributed system of any size. Some things need to happen quickly, or in the right order; and matters that are trivial to deal with for a few machines become a big deal once we have hyperscale data centres with complex arrangements for resilience. Everyone must have noticed that when you update your address book with an online service provider, the update might appear a second later on another device, or perhaps only hours later.

Over the last 50 years, we've learned a lot about issues such as concurrency, failure recovery and naming, as we've built things ranging from phone systems and payment networks to the Internet itself. We have solid theory, and a lot of hard-won experience. These issues are central to the design of robust secure systems but are often handled rather badly. I've already described attacks on protocols that arise as concurrency failures. If we replicate data to make a system fault-tolerant then we may increase the risk of data theft. Finally, naming can be a thorny problem. There are complex interactions of people and objects with accounts, sessions, documents, files, pointers, keys and other ways of naming stuff. Many organisations are trying to build larger, flatter namespaces – whether using identity cards to track citizens or using device ID to track objects – but there are limits to what we can practically do. Big data means dealing with lots of identifiers, many of which are ambiguous or even changing, and a lot of things can go wrong.

## 7.2 Concurrency

Processes are called *concurrent* if they can run at the same time, and this is essential for performance; modern computers have many cores and run many programs at a time, typically for many users. However, concurrency is hard to do robustly, especially when processes can act on the same data. Processes may use old data; they can make inconsistent updates; the order of updates may or may not matter; the system might deadlock; the data in different systems might never converge to consistent values; and when it's important to make things happen in the right order, or even to know the exact time, this can be trickier than you might think. These issues go up and down the entire stack.

Systems are becoming ever more concurrent for a number of reasons. First is scale: Google may have started off with four machines but their fleet passed a million in 2011. Second is device complexity; a luxury car can now contain dozens to hundreds of different processors. The same holds for your laptop and your mobile phone. Deep within each CPU, instructions are executed in parallel, and this complexity leads to the Spectre attacks we discussed in the chapter on access control. On top of this, virtualization technologies such as Xen are the platform on which modern cloud services are built, and may turn a handful of real CPUs in a server into hundreds or even thousands of virtual CPUs. Then there's interaction complexity: going up to the application layer, an everyday transaction such as booking a rental car may call other systems to check your credit card, your credit reference agency score, your insurance claim history and much else, while these systems in turn may depend on others.

Programming concurrent systems is hard, and the standard textbook examples come from the worlds of operating system internals and of performance measurement. Computer scientists are taught Amdahl's law: if the proportion that can be parallelised is  $p$  and  $s$  is the speed-up from the extra resources, the overall speedup is  $(1 - p + p/s)^{-1}$ . Thus if three-quarters of your program can be parallelised but the remaining quarter cannot be, then the maximum speedup you can get is four times; and if you throw eight cores at it, the practical speedup is not quite three times<sup>1</sup>. But concurrency control in the real world is also a security issue. Like access control, it is needed to prevent users interfering with each other, whether accidentally or on purpose. And concurrency problems can occur at many levels in a system, from the hardware right up to the business logic. In what follows, I provide a number of concrete examples; they are by no means exhaustive.

### 7.2.1 Using old data versus paying to propagate state

I've already described two kinds of concurrency problem: replay attacks on protocols, where an attacker manages to pass off out-of-date credentials; and race conditions, where two programs can race to update some security state. As an example, I mentioned the 'mkdir' vulnerability from Unix, in which a privileged instruction that is executed in two phases could be attacked halfway through by renaming the object on which it acts. Another example goes back to

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<sup>1</sup> $(1 - \frac{3}{4} + \frac{3}{4.8})^{-1} = (0.25 + 0.09375)^{-1} = (0.34375)^{-1} = 2.909$

the 1960s, where in one of the first multiuser operating systems, IBM's OS/360, an attempt to open a file caused it to be read and its permissions checked; if the user was authorised to access it, it was read again. The user could arrange things so that the file was altered in between [1097].

These are examples of a *time-of-check-to-time-of-use* (TOCTTOU) attack. We have systematic ways of finding such attacks in file systems [242], but attacks still crop up both at lower levels, such as system calls in virtualised environments, to higher levels such as business logic. Preventing them isn't always economical, as propagating changes in security state can be expensive.

A good case study is card fraud. Since credit and debit cards became popular in the 1970s, the banking industry has had to manage lists of *hot* cards (whether stolen or abused) and the problem got steadily worse in the 1980s as card networks went international. It isn't possible to keep a complete hot card list in every merchant terminal, as we'd have to broadcast all loss reports instantly to tens of millions of devices, and even if we tried to verify all transactions with the bank that issued the card, we'd be unable to use cards in places with no network (such as in remote villages and on airplanes) and we'd impose unacceptable costs and delays elsewhere. Instead, there are multiple levels of stand-in processing, exploiting the fact that most payments are local, or low-value, or both.

Merchant terminals are allowed to process transactions up to a certain limit (the *floor limit*) offline; larger transactions need online verification with the merchant's bank, which will know about all the local hot cards plus foreign cards that are being actively abused; above another limit it might refer the transaction to a network such as VISA with a reasonably up-to-date international list; while the largest transactions need a reference to the card issuing bank. In effect, the only transactions that are checked immediately before use are those that are local or large.

Experience then taught that a more centralised approach can work better for bad terminals. About half the world's ATM transactions use a service that gets alerts from subscribing banks when someone tries to use a stolen card at an ATM, or guesses the PIN wrong. FICO observed that criminals take a handful of stolen cards to a cash machine and try them out one by one; they maintain a list of the 40 ATMs worldwide that have been used most recently for attempted fraud, and banks that subscribe to their service decline all transactions at those machines – which become unusable by those banks' cards for maybe half an hour. Most thieves don't understand this and just throw them away.

Until about 2010, payment card networks had the largest systems that manage the global propagation of security state, and their experience taught us that revoking compromised credentials quickly and on a global scale is expensive. The lesson was learned elsewhere too; the US Department of Defense, for example, issued 16 million certificates to military personnel from 1999–2005 by which time it had to download 10 million revoked certificates to all security servers every day, and some systems took half an hour to do this when they were fired up [1262].

The costs of propagating security state can lead to centralisation. Big service firms such as Google, Facebook and Microsoft have to maintain credentials for billions of users anyway, so offer logon as a service to other websites. Other

firms, such as certification authorities, also provide online credentials. But although centralisation can cut costs, a compromise of the central service can be disruptive. In 2011, for example, hackers operating from Iranian IP addresses compromised the Dutch certification authority Diginotar. On July 9th they generated fake certificates and did middleperson attacks on the gmail of Iranian activists. Diginotar noticed on the 19th that certificates had been wrongly issued but merely called in its auditors. The hack became public on the 29th, and Google reacted by removing all Diginotar certificates from Chrome on September 3rd, and getting Mozilla to do likewise. This led immediately to the failure of the company, and Dutch public services were unavailable online for many days as ministries scrambled to get certificates for their web services from other suppliers [459].

### 7.2.2 Locking to prevent inconsistent updates

When people work concurrently on a document, they may use a version control system to ensure that only one person has write access at any one time to any given part of it, or at least to warn of contention and flag up any inconsistent edits. *Locking* is one general way to manage contention for resources such as filesystems and to make conflicting updates less likely. Another approach is *callback*; a server may keep a list of all those clients which rely on it for security state, and notify them when the state changes.

Credit cards again provide an example of how this applies to security. If I own a hotel, and a customer presents a credit card on checkin, I ask the card company for a *pre-authorisation* which records that I will want to make a debit in the near future; I might register a claim on ‘up to \$500’. This is implemented by separating the authorisation and settlement systems. Handling the failure modes can be tricky. If the card is cancelled the following day, my bank can call me and ask me to contact the police, or to get her to pay cash<sup>2</sup>. This is an example of the *publish-register-notify* model of how to do robust authorisation in distributed systems (of which there’s a more general description in [150]).

Callback mechanisms don’t provide a universal solution, though. The credential issuer might not want to run a callback service, and the customer might object on privacy grounds to the issuer being told all her comings and goings. Consider passports as another example. In many countries, government ID is required for many transactions, but governments won’t provide any guarantee, and most citizens would object if the government kept a record of every time an ID document was presented. Indeed, one of the frequent objections to the Indian government’s requirement that the Aadhar biometric ID system be used in more and more transactions is that checking citizens’ fingerprints or iris codes at all significant transactions creates an audit trail of all the places where they have done business, which is available to officials and to anyone who cares to bribe them.

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<sup>2</sup>My bank might or might not have guaranteed me the money; it all depends on what sort of contract I’ve got with it. There were also attacks for a while when crooks figured out how to impersonate a store and cancel an authorisation, so that a card could be used to make multiple big purchases. And it might take a day or three for the card-issuing bank to propagate an alarm to the merchant’s bank. A deep dive into all this would be a book chapter in itself!

There is a general distinction between those credentials whose use gives rise to some obligation on the issuer, such as credit cards, and the others, such as passports. Among the differences is whether the credential's use changes important state, beyond possibly adding to a log file or other surveillance system. This is linked with whether the order in which updates are made is important.

### 7.2.3 The order of updates

If two transactions arrive at the government's bank account – say a credit of \$500,000 and a debit of \$400,000 – then the order in which they are applied may not matter much. But if they're arriving at my bank account, the order will have a huge effect on the outcome! In fact, the problem of deciding the order in which transactions are applied has no clean solution. It's closely related to the problem of how to parallelise a computation, and much of the art of building efficient distributed systems lies in arranging matters so that processes are either simply sequential or completely parallel.

The traditional bank algorithm was to batch the transactions overnight and apply all the credits for each account before applying all the debits. Inputs from devices such as ATMs and check sorters were first batched up into journals before the overnight reconciliation. Payments which bounce then have to be reversed out – and in the case of ATM and debit transactions where the cash has already gone, you can end up with customers borrowing money without authorisation. In practice, chains of failed payments terminate. In recent years, one country after another has introduced *real-time gross settlement* (RTGS) systems in which transactions are booked in order of arrival. There are several subtle downsides. First, at many institutions, the real-time system for retail customers is an overlay on a platform that still works by overnight updates. Second, the outcome can depend on the order of transactions, which can depend on human, system and network vagaries, which can be an issue when many very large payments are made between financial institutions. Credit cards operate a hybrid strategy, with credit limits run in real time while settlement is run just as in an old-fashioned checking account.

In the late 2010s, the wave of interest in cryptocurrency has led some entrepreneurs to believe that a blockchain might solve the problems of inconsistent update, simplifying applications such as supply-chain management. The energy costs rule out a blockchain based on proof-of-work for most applications; but might some other kind of append-only public ledger find a killer app? We will have to wait and see. Meanwhile, the cryptocurrency community makes extensive use of off-chain mechanisms that are often very reminiscent of the checking-account approach: disconnected applications propose tentative updates that are later reconciled and applied to the main chain. Experience suggests that there is no magic solution that works in the general case, short perhaps of having a small number of very large banks that are very competent at technology. We'll discuss this further in the chapter on banking.

In other systems, the order in which transactions arrive is much less important. Passports are a good example. Passport issuers only worry about their creation and expiration dates, not the order in which visas are stamped

on them<sup>3</sup>.

### 7.2.4 Deadlock

Another problem is deadlock: where two systems are each waiting for the other to move first. Edsger Dijkstra famously explained this problem, and its possible solutions, via the *dining philosophers' problem*. A number of philosophers are seated round a table, with a chopstick between each of them; and a philosopher can only eat when he or she can pick up the two chopsticks on either side. So if they all try to eat at once and each picks up the chopstick on his right, they get stuck [547].

This can get really complex when you have multiple hierarchies of locks, distributed across systems some of which fail (and where failures can mean that the locks aren't reliable) [149]. And deadlock is not just about technology; the phrase 'Catch-22' has become popular to describe deadlocks in bureaucratic processes<sup>4</sup>. Where a process is manual, some fudge may be found to get round the catch, but when everything becomes software, this option may no longer be available.

In a well known business problem – the *battle of the forms* – one company issues an order with its own contract terms attached, another company accepts it subject to its own terms, and trading proceeds without any further agreement. In the old days, the matter might only be resolved if something went wrong and the companies ended up in court; even so, one company's terms might specify an American court while the other's specify one in England. As trading has become more electronic, the winner is often the company that can compel the loser to trade using its website and thus accept its terms and conditions. Firms increasingly try to make sure that things fail in their favour. The resulting liability games can have rather negative outcomes for both security and safety; we'll discuss them further in the chapter on Economics.

### 7.2.5 Non-convergent state

When designing protocols that update the state of a distributed system, the 'motherhood and apple pie' is ACID – that transactions should be *atomic, consistent, isolated and durable*. A transaction is atomic if you 'do it all or not at all' – which makes it easier to recover after a failure. It is consistent if some invariant is preserved, such as that the books must still balance. This is common in banking systems, and is achieved by insisting that the sum total of credits and debits made by each transaction is zero (I'll discuss this more in the chapter on Banking and Bookkeeping). Transactions are isolated if they are serialisable; and they are durable if once done they can't be undone.

These properties can be too much, or not enough, or both. On the one hand, each of them can fail or be attacked in numerous obscure ways; on the

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<sup>3</sup>Many Arab countries won't let you in with an Israeli stamp on your passport, but most pure identification systems are essentially stateless.

<sup>4</sup>Joseph Heller's 1961 novel of that name described multiple instances of inconsistent and crazy rules in the World War 2 military bureaucracy.

other, it's often sufficient to design the system to be *convergent*. This means that, if the transaction volume were to tail off, then eventually there would be consistent state throughout [1315]. Convergence is usually achieved using semantic tricks such as timestamps and version numbers; this can often be enough where transactions get appended to files rather than overwritten.

In real life, you also need ways to survive things that go wrong and are not completely recoverable. The life of a security or audit manager can be a constant battle against entropy: apparent deficits (and surpluses) are always turning up, and sometimes simply can't be explained. For example, different national systems have different ideas of which fields in bank transaction records are mandatory or optional, so payment gateways often have to guess data in order to make things work. Sometimes they guess wrong; and sometimes people see and exploit vulnerabilities which aren't understood until much later (if ever). In the end, things may get fudged by adding a correction factor and setting a target for keeping it below a certain annual threshold.

Durability is a subject of debate in transaction processing. The advent of phishing and keylogging attacks has meant that some small proportion of bank accounts will at any time be under the control of criminals; money gets moved both from them and through them. When an account compromise is detected, the bank moves to freeze it and perhaps to reverse payments that have recently been made from it. The phishermen naturally try to move funds through institutions, or jurisdictions, that don't do transaction reversal, or do it at best slowly and grudgingly [74]. This sets up a tension between the recoverability and thus the resilience of the payment system on the one hand, and transaction durability and finality on the other<sup>5</sup>.

### 7.2.6 Secure time

The final concurrency problem of special interest to the security engineer is the provision of accurate time. As authentication protocols such as Kerberos can be attacked by inducing clock error, it's not enough to simply trust a random external time source. One possibility is a *Cinderella attack*: if a security critical program such as a firewall has a licence with a timelock, an attacker might wind your clock forward "and cause your firewall to turn into a pumpkin". Given the spread of IoT devices which may be safety-critical and use time in ways that are poorly understood, there is now some concern about possible large-scale service denial attacks. Time is a lot harder than it looks: even if you have an atomic clock, leap seconds cannot be predicted but need to be distributed; some minutes have 61 and even 62 seconds; odd time effects can be a security issue<sup>6</sup>; and much of the world is not using the Gregorian calendar.

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<sup>5</sup>This problem goes back centuries, with a thicket of laws around whether someone acting in good faith can acquire good title to stolen goods or stolen funds. The Bills of Exchange Act 1882 gave good title to people who bought bills of exchange in good faith, even if they were stolen. Something similar used to hold for stolen goods bought in an open market, but that was eventually repealed. In the case of electronic payments, the banks acted as a cartel to make payments final more quickly, both via card network rules and by lobbying European institutions over the Payment Services Directives. As for the case of bitcoin, it's still in flux; see section 20.7.5.

<sup>6</sup>Some ATMs didn't check customer balances for a few days after Y2K, leading to unauthorised overdrafts once the word got round

Anyway, there are several possible approaches to the provision of secure time. You can give every computer a radio clock, and indeed your smartphone has GPS – but that can be jammed by a passing truck driver. You can abandon absolute time and instead use *Lamport time* in which all you care about is whether event A happened before event B, rather than what date it is [1090]. For robustness reasons, Google doesn't use time in its internal certificates, but ranges of serial numbers coupled to a revocation mechanism [23].

In many applications, you may end up using the *network time protocol* (NTP). This has a moderate amount of protection, with clock voting and authentication of time servers, and is dependable enough for many purposes. However, you still need to take care. For example, Netgear hardwired their home routers to use an NTP server at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, which was swamped with hundreds of thousands of packets a second; Netgear ended up having to pay them \$375,000 to maintain the time service for three years. Shortly afterwards, D-Link repeated the same mistake [433]. Second, from 2016 there have been denial-of-service attacks using NTP servers as force multipliers; millions of servers turned out to be abusable, so many ISPs and even IXPs started blocking them. So if you're planning to deploy lots of devices outside your corporate network that will rely on NTP, you'd better think hard about which servers you want to trust, and pay attention to the latest guidance from CERT [1734].

## 7.3 Fault Tolerance and Failure Recovery

Failure recovery is often the most important aspect of security engineering, yet it is one of the most neglected. For many years, most of the research papers on computer security have dealt with confidentiality, and most of the rest with authenticity and integrity; availability has almost been ignored. Yet the actual expenditures of a modern information business – whether a bank or a search engine – are the other way round. Far more is spent on availability and recovery mechanisms, such as multiple processing sites and redundant networks, than in integrity mechanisms such as code review and internal audit; and this in turn is way more than is spent on encryption. As you read through this book, you'll see that many other applications, from burglar alarms through electronic warfare to protecting a company from DDoS attacks, are fundamentally about availability. Fault tolerance and failure recovery are often the core of the security engineer's job.

Classical fault tolerance is usually based on redundancy, fortified using mechanisms such as logs and locking, and is greatly complicated when it must withstand malicious attacks on these mechanisms. Fault tolerance interacts with security in a number of ways: the failure model, the nature of resilience, the location of redundancy used to provide it, and defence against service denial attacks. I'll use the following definitions: a *fault* may cause an *error*, which is an incorrect state; this may lead to a *failure* which is a deviation from the system's specified behavior. The resilience which we build into a system to tolerate faults and recover from failures will have a number of components, such as fault detection, error recovery and if necessary failure recovery. The meaning



of *mean-time-before-failure* (MTBF) and *mean-time-to-repair* (MTTR) should be obvious.

#### 7.3.1 Failure models

In order to decide what sort of resilience we need, we must know what sort of attacks to expect. Much of this will come from an analysis of threats specific to our system's operating environment, but some general issues bear mentioning.

##### 7.3.1.1 Byzantine Failure

First, the failures with which we are concerned may be normal or malicious, and we often model the latter as *Byzantine*. Byzantine failures are inspired by the idea that there are  $n$  generals defending Byzantium,  $t$  of whom have been bribed by the attacking Turks to cause as much confusion as possible. The generals can pass oral messages by courier, and the couriers are trustworthy, so each general can exchange confidential and authentic communications with each other general (we could imagine them encrypting and computing a MAC on each message). What is the maximum number  $t$  of traitors that can be tolerated?

The key observation is that if we have only three generals, say Anthony, Basil and Charalampos, and Anthony is the traitor, then he can tell Basil "let's attack" and Charalampos "let's retreat". Basil can now say to Charalampos "Anthony says let's attack", but this doesn't let Charalampos conclude that Anthony's the traitor. It could just as easily have been Basil; Anthony could have said "let's retreat" to both of them, but Basil lied when he said "Anthony says let's attack".

This beautiful insight is due to Leslie Lamport, Robert Shostak and Marshall Pease, who proved that the problem has a solution if and only if  $n \geq 3t+1$  [1092]. Of course, if the generals are able to sign their messages, then no general dare say different things to two different colleagues. This illustrates the power of digital signatures in particular and of end-to-end security mechanisms in general. There is now a substantial literature on Byzantine fault tolerance – the detailed design of systems able to withstand this kind of failure; see for example the algorithm by Miguel Castro and Barbara Liskov [385].

Another lesson is that if a component which fails (or can be induced to fail by an opponent) gives the wrong answer rather than just no answer, then it's much harder to use it to build a resilient system. It can be useful if components that fail just stop, or if they can at least be quickly identified and blacklisted.

##### 7.3.1.2 Interaction with fault tolerance

So we can constrain the failure rate in a number of ways. The two most obvious are by using *redundancy* and *fail-stop processes*. The latter process error-correction information along with data, and stop when an inconsistency is detected; for example, bank transaction processing will typically stop if an out-of-balance condition is detected after a processing task. The two may be combined;

the processors used in some safety-critical functions in cars and aircraft typically have two cores. The pioneer of this was Stratus, later IBM's System/88 after IBM bought the company. This had two disks, two buses and even two CPUs, each of which would stop if it detected errors; the fail-stop CPUs were built by having two CPUs on the same card and comparing their outputs. If they disagreed the output went open-circuit, thus avoiding the Byzantine failure problem. A competitor, Tandem, had three CPUs and voting. Nowadays, the data centres of large service firms have much more elaborate protocols to ensure that if a machine fails, another machine takes over; if a rack fails, another rack takes over; and even if a data centre fails, its workload is quickly recovered on others. Google was a leader in developing the relevant software stack, having discovered in the early 2000s that it was much cheaper to build large-scale systems with commodity PCs and smart software than to buy ever-larger servers from specialist vendors.

While redundancy can make a system more *resilient*, it has costs. First, we have to deal with a more complex software stack and toolchain. Banks eventually moved away from Stratus because they found it was less reliable overall than traditional mainframes: although there was less downtime due to hardware failure, this was more than compensated for by extra software failure caused by the unfamiliar development environment. Second, if I have multiple sites with backup data, then confidentiality could fail if any of them gets compromised; and if I have some data that I have a duty to destroy, then purging it from multiple backup tapes can be a headache. The modern-day issue with developing software in containers on top of redundant cloud services is not so much the programming languages, or compromise via data centres; it's that developers are unfamiliar with the cloud service providers' access control tools and all too often leave sensitive data world-readable.

There are other traps for the unwary. In one case in which I was called as an expert, my client was arrested while using a credit card in a store, accused of having a forged card, and beaten up by the police. He was adamant that the card was genuine. Much later, we got the card examined by VISA who confirmed that it was indeed genuine. What happened, as well as we can reconstruct it, was this. Credit cards have two types of redundancy on the magnetic strip – a simple checksum obtained by combining together all the bytes on the track using exclusive-or, and a cryptographic checksum which we'll describe in detail later in section 12.5.1. The former is there to detect errors, and the latter to detect forgery. It appears that in this particular case, the merchant's card reader was out of alignment in such a way as to cause an even number of bit errors which cancelled each other out by chance in the simple checksum, while causing the crypto checksum to fail. The result was a false alarm, and a major disruption in my client's life.

Redundancy is hard enough to deal with in mechanical systems. For example, training pilots to handle multi-engine aircraft involves drilling them on engine failure procedures, first in the simulator and then in real aircraft with an instructor. Novice pilots are in fact more likely to be killed by an engine failure in a multi-engine plane than in a single; landing in the nearest field is less hazardous for them than coping with suddenly asymmetric thrust. The same goes for instrument failures; it doesn't help to have three artificial horizons in the

cockpit if, under stress, you rely on the one that's broken. Aircraft are much simpler than many modern information systems – yet there are still air crashes when pilots fail to manage the redundancy that's supposed to keep them safe. There are also common-mode failures, as when two Boeing 737 Max aircraft crashed because of failures in a single sensor. All too often, system designers put in multiple protection mechanisms and hope that things will be “all right on the night”. This really isn't good enough. Many other safety failures are failures of usability, and the same applies to security, as we discussed in Chapter 3; redundancy isn't an antidote to poor design.

#### 7.3.2 What is resilience for?

When introducing redundancy or other resilience mechanisms into a system, we need to understand what they're for, and the incentives facing the various actors. It therefore matters whether the resilience is local, or crosses geographical or organisational boundaries.

In the first case, replication can be an internal feature of the server to make it more trustworthy. I already mentioned 1980s systems such as Stratus and Tandem; then we had replication of standard hardware at the component level, such as *redundant arrays of inexpensive disks* (RAID disks). Since the late 1990s there has been massive investment in developing rack-scale systems that let multiple cheap PCs do the work of expensive servers, with mechanisms to ensure a single server that fails will have its workload taken over rapidly by another, and indeed a rack that fails can also be recovered on a hot spare. These are now a standard component of cloud service architecture: any firm operating hundreds of thousands of servers will have so many failures that recovery must be largely automated.

But often things are much more complicated. A service may have to assume that some of its clients are trying to cheat it, and may also have to rely on a number of services none of which is completely accurate. When opening a bank account, or issuing a passport, we might want to check against services from voter rolls through credit reference agencies to a database of drivers' licences, and the results may often be inconsistent. Trust decisions may involve complex logic, not entirely unlike the systems used in electronic warfare to try to work out which of your inputs are being jammed. (I'll discuss these further in the chapter on Electronic and Information Warfare.)

The direction of mistrust has an effect on protocol design. A server faced with multiple untrustworthy clients, and a client relying on multiple servers that may be incompetent, unavailable or malicious, will both wish to control the flow of messages in a protocol in order to contain the effects of service denial. Designing systems for the real world in which everyone is unreliable and all are mutually suspicious, is hard.

Sometimes the emphasis is on *security renewability*. The obvious example here is bank cards: a bank can upgrade security from time to time by mailing out newer versions of its cards, whether upgrading from mag strip to chip or from cheap chips to more sophisticated ones; and it can recover from a compromise by mailing out cards out of cycle to affected customers. Pay-TV and mobile

phones are somewhat similar.

#### 7.3.3 At what level is the redundancy?

Systems may be made resilient against errors, attacks and equipment failures at a number of levels. As with access control, these become progressively more complex and less reliable as we go up to higher layers in the system.

Some computers have been built with redundancy at the hardware level, such as Stratus systems and RAID discs I mentioned earlier. But simple replication cannot provide a defense against malicious software, or against an intruder who exploits faulty software.

At the next level up, there is *process group redundancy*. Here, we may run multiple copies of a system on multiple servers in different locations, and compare their outputs. This can stop the kind of attack in which the opponent gets physical access to a machine and subverts it, whether by mechanical destruction or by inserting unauthorised software. It can't defend against attacks by authorised users or damage by bad authorised software, which could simply order the deletion of a critical file.

The next level is *backup*, where we typically take a copy of the system (a *checkpoint*) at regular intervals. The copies are usually kept on media that can't be overwritten such as write-protected tapes or discs with special software. We may also keep *journals* of all the transactions applied between checkpoints. Whatever the detail, backup and recovery mechanisms not only enable us to recover from physical asset destruction; they also ensure that if we do get an attack at the logical level we have some hope of recovering. The classic example in the 1980s would have been a time bomb that deletes the customer database on a specific date; since the arrival of cryptocurrency, the fashion has been for ransomware.

Businesses with critical service requirements, such as banks and retailers, have had backup data centres for many years. The idea is that if the main centre goes down, the service will *failover* to a second facility. Maintaining such facilities absorbed most of a typical bank's information security budget.

Backup is not the same as *fallback*. A fallback system is typically a less capable system to which processing reverts when the main system is unavailable. One example was the use of manual imprinting machines to capture credit card transactions from the card embossing when electronic terminals failed. Fallback systems are an example of redundancy in the application layer – the highest layer we can put it.

It is important to realise that these are different mechanisms, which do different things. Redundant disks won't protect against a malicious programmer who deletes all your account files, and backups won't stop him if rather than just deleting files he writes code that slowly inserts more and more errors<sup>7</sup>. Neither will give much protection against attacks on data confidentiality. On the other

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<sup>7</sup>Nowadays the really serious ransomware operators will hack your system, add file encryption surreptitiously, and wait before they pounce – so they hold hostage not just your current data but several weeks' backups too

hand, the best encryption in the world won't help you if your data processing center burns down. Real world recovery plans and mechanisms involve a mixture of all of the above.

The remarks that I made earlier about the difficulty of redundancy, and the absolute need to plan and train for it properly, apply in spades to system backup. When I was working in banking in the 1980s we reckoned that we could probably get our backup system working within an hour or so of our main processing centre being destroyed, but the tests were limited by the fact that we didn't want to risk processing during business hours: we would recover the main production systems on our backup data centre one Saturday a year. By the early 1990s Tesco, a UK supermarket, had got as far as live drills: they'd pull the plug on the main processing centre once a year without warning the operators, to make sure the backup came up within 40 seconds. By 2011, Netflix had developed 'chaos monkeys' – systems that would randomly knock out a machine, or a rack, or even a whole data centre, to test resilience constantly. By 2019, large service firms have got to such a scale that they don't need this. If you have three million machines across thirty data centres, then you'll lose machines constantly, racks frequently, and whole data centres often enough that you have to engineer things to keep going. So nowadays, you can simply pay money and a cloud service provider will worry about a lot of the detail for you. But you need to really understand what sort of failures Amazon or Google or Microsoft can handle for you, and what you have to deal with yourself. The standard service level agreements of the major providers allow them to interrupt your service for quite a few hours per month; and if you use a smaller cloud service (even a government cloud) it will have capacity limits about which you have to think carefully.

It's worth trying to work out which services you depend on that are outside your direct supply chain. For example, Britain suffered a fuel tanker drivers' strike in 2001, and some hospitals had to close because of staff shortages, which was supposed to not happen. The government had allocated petrol rations to doctors and nurses, but not to schoolteachers. So the schools closed, and the nurses had to stay home to look after their kids, and this closed hospitals too. This helped the strikers defeat Prime Minister Tony Blair: he abandoned his signature environmental policy of steadily increasing fuel duty. As we become increasingly dependent on each other, contingency planning gets ever harder.

#### 7.3.4 Service-denial attacks

One of the reasons we want security services to be fault-tolerant is to make service-denial attacks less attractive, less effective, or both. Such attacks are often used as part of a larger plan. For example, one might take down a security server to force other servers to use cached copies of credentials, or swamp a web server to take it temporarily offline, and then get another machine to serve the pages that victims try to download.

A powerful defense against service denial is to prevent the opponent mounting a selective attack. If principals are anonymous – say there are several equivalent services behind a load balancer, and the opponent has no idea which one to attack – then he may be ineffective. I'll discuss this further in the context of

burglar alarms and electronic warfare.

Where this isn't possible, and the opponent knows where to attack, then there are some types of service-denial attacks that can be stopped by redundancy and resilience mechanisms, and others that can't. For example, the TCP/IP protocol has few effective mechanisms for hosts to protect themselves against network flooding, which comes in a wide variety of flavours. Defense against this kind of attack tends to involve moving your site to a beefier hosting service with specialist packet-washing hardware – or tracing and arresting the perpetrator.

Distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks came to public notice when they were used to bring down Panix, a New York ISP, for several days in 1996. During the late 1990s they were occasionally used by script kiddies to take down chat servers. In 2001 I mentioned them in passing in the first edition of this book. Over the following three years, extortionists started using them; they'd assemble a *botnet*, a network of compromised PCs, which would flood a target webserver with packet traffic until its owner paid them to desist. Typical targets were online bookmakers, and amounts of \$10,000 – \$50,000 were typically demanded to leave them alone, and the typical bookie paid up the first time this happened. When the attacks persisted the first solution was replication: operators moved their websites to hosting services such as Akamai whose servers are so numerous (and so close to customers) that they can shrug off anything the average botnet could throw at them. In the end, the blackmail problem was solved when the bookmakers met and agreed not to pay any more blackmail money, and the Ukrainian police were prodded into arresting the gang responsible.

By 2018, we had come full circle, and about fifty bad people were operating DDoS-as-a-service, mostly for gamers who wanted to take down their opponents' teamspeak servers. The services were sold online as 'booters' that would boot your opponents out of the game; a few dollars would get a flood of perhaps 100Gbit/sec. Service operators also called them, more euphemistically, 'stressors' – with the line that you could use them to test the robustness of your own website. This didn't fool anyone, and just before Christmas 2018 the FBI took down fifteen of these sites, arresting a number of their operators and causing the volumes of DDoS traffic to drop noticeably for several months [1402].

Finally, where a more vulnerable fallback system exists, a common technique is to use a service-denial attack to force victims into fallback mode. The classic example is in payment cards. Smartcards are generally harder to forge than magnetic strip cards, but perhaps 1% of them fail every year, thanks to static electricity and worn contacts. Also, some tourists still use magnetic strip cards. So most card payment systems still have a fallback mode that uses the magnetic strip. A simple attack is to use a false terminal, or a bug inserted into the cable to a genuine terminal, to capture card details, and then write them to the magnetic strip of a card with a dead chip.

## 7.4 Naming

Naming is a minor if troublesome aspect of ordinary distributed systems, but it becomes surprisingly hard in security engineering. During the dotcom boom

in the 1990s, when SSL was invented and we started building public-key certification authorities, we hit the problem of what names to put on certificates. A certificate that says simply “the person named Ross Anderson is allowed to administer machine X” is little use. I used to be the only Ross Anderson I knew of; but as soon as the first search engines came along I found dozens of us. I am also known by different names to dozens of different systems. Names exist in contexts, and naming the principals in secure systems is becoming ever more important and difficult.

Conceptually, namespaces can be hierarchical or flat. You can identify me as ‘The Ross Anderson who teaches computer science at Cambridge, England’ or as ‘The Ross Anderson who’s rossjanderson@gmail.com’ or even as the Ross Anderson with such-and-such a passport number. But these are not the same kind of thing, and linking them causes all sorts of problems.

In general, using more names increases complexity. A public-key certificate that simply says “this is the key to administer machine X” is a bearer token, just like a metal door key; whoever controls the private key for that certificate is the admin, just as if the root password were in an envelope in a bank vault. But once my name is involved, and I have to present some kind of passport or ID card to prove who I am, the system acquires a further dependency. If my passport is compromised the consequences could be far-reaching, and I really don’t want to give the government an incentive to issue a false passport in my name to one of its agents.

After 9/11, governments started to force businesses to demand government-issue photo ID in places where this was not previously thought necessary. In the UK, for example, you can no longer board a domestic flight using just the credit card with which you bought the ticket, but you have to produce a passport or driving license – which you also need to order a bank transfer in a branch for more than £1000, to rent an apartment, to hire a lawyer or even to get a job. Such measures are not only inconvenient but introduce new failure modes into all sorts of systems.

There is a second reason that the world is moving towards larger, flatter name spaces: the growing dominance of the large service firms in online authentication. Your name is increasingly a global one; it’s your Gmail or Hotmail address, your Twitter handle, or your Facebook account. These firms have not merely benefited from the technical externalities which we discussed in the chapter on authentication, and business externalities which we’ll discuss in the chapter on economics: they have sort-of solved some of the problems of naming. But we can’t be complacent as many other problems remain. So it’s useful to canter through what a generation of computer science researchers have learned about naming in distributed systems.

### 7.4.1 The Needham naming principles

During the last quarter of the twentieth century, engineers building distributed systems ran up against many naming problems. The basic algorithm used to bind names to addresses is known as *rendezvous*: the principal exporting a name advertises it somewhere, and the principal seeking to import and use it searches

for it. Obvious examples include phone books, and directories in file systems.

People building distributed systems soon realised that naming gets complex quickly, and the lessons are set out in a classic article by Needham [1381]. Here are his ten principles.

1. *The function of names is to facilitate sharing.* This continues to hold: my bank account number exists in order to share the information that I deposited money last week, with the teller from whom I am trying to withdraw money this week. In general, names are needed when the data to be shared is changeable. If I only ever wished to withdraw exactly the same sum as I'd deposited, a bearer deposit certificate would be fine. Conversely, names need not be shared – or linked – where data will not be; there is no need to link my bank account number to my telephone number unless I am going to pay my phone bill from the account.
2. *The naming information may not all be in one place, and so resolving names brings all the general problems of a distributed system.* This holds with a vengeance. A link between a bank account and a phone number assumes both of them will remain stable. So each system relies on the other, and an attack on one can affect the other. Many banks use two-channel authorisation to combat phishing – if you order a payment online you get a text message on your mobile phone saying 'if you want to pay \$X to account Y, please enter the following four digit code into your browser'. The standard attack is for the crook to claim to be you to the phone company, and report the loss of your phone. So they give him a new SIM that works for your phone number, and he makes off with your money. The phone company could stop that, but it doesn't care too much about authentication, as all it stands to lose is some airtime, whose marginal cost is zero. And the latest attack is to use Android malware to steal authentication codes. Google could stop that, by locking down the Android platform as tightly as Apple – but it has no incentive to do so.
3. *It is bad to assume that only so many names will be needed.* The shortage of IP addresses, which motivated the development of IP version 6 (IPv6), is well enough discussed. What is less well known is that the most expensive upgrade the credit card industry ever had to make was the move from thirteen digit credit card numbers to sixteen. Issuers originally assumed that 13 digits would be enough, but the system ended up with tens of thousands of banks – many with dozens of products – so a six digit bank identification number was needed. Some issuers have millions of customers, so a nine digit account number is the norm. And there's also a *check digit* to detect errors.
4. *Global names buy you less than you think.* For example, the 128-bit address in IPv6 can in theory enable every object in the universe to have a unique name. However, for us to do business, a local name at my end must be resolved into this unique name and back into a local name at your end. Invoking a unique name in the middle may not buy us anything; it may even get in the way if the unique naming service takes time, costs money, or occasionally fails (as it surely will). In fact, the name service



itself will usually have to be a distributed system, of the same scale (and security level) as the system we're trying to protect. So we can expect no silver bullets from this quarter. Adding an extra name, or adopting a more complicated one, has the potential to add extra costs and failure modes.

5. *Names imply commitments, so keep the scheme flexible enough to cope with organisational changes.* This sound principle was ignored in the design of the UK government's key management system for secure email [113]. There, principals' private keys are generated from their email addresses. So the frequent reorganisations meant that the security infrastructure had to be rebuilt each time – and that more money had to be spent solving secondary problems such as how people access old material.
6. *Names may double as access tickets, or capabilities.* We have already seen a number of examples of this in Chapters 2 and 3. In general, it's a bad idea to assume that today's name won't be tomorrow's password or capability – remember the Utrecht fraud we discussed in section 4.5. Norway, for example, used to consider the citizen's ID number to be public, but it ended up being used as a sort of password in so many applications that they had to relent and make it private. There are similar issues around the U.S. Social Security Number (SSN). So the Department of Defense created a surrogate number called the EDIPI, which was supposed to be not sensitive; but, sure enough, people started using it as an authenticator instead of as an identifier.

I've given a number of examples of how things go wrong when a name starts being used as a password. But sometimes the roles of name and password are ambiguous. In order to get entry to a car park I used to use at the university, I had to speak my surname and parking badge number into a microphone at the barrier. So if I say, "Anderson, 123", which of these is the password? In fact it was "Anderson", as anyone can walk through the car park and note down valid badge numbers from the parking permits on the car windscreens.

7. *Things are made much simpler if an incorrect name is obvious.* In standard distributed systems, this enables us to take a liberal attitude to caching. In payment systems, credit card numbers used to be accepted while the terminal was offline so long as the credit card number appears valid (i.e., the last digit is a proper check digit of the first fifteen) and it is not on the hot card list. The certificates on modern chip cards provide a higher-quality implementation of the same basic concept; authentication mechanisms such as crypto and security printing can give the added benefit of making names resilient to spoofing. As an example of what can still go wrong, the Irish police created over 50 dockets for Mr 'Prawo Jazdy', wanted for failing to pay over 50 traffic tickets – until they realised that this is Polish for 'Driving licence' [187].
8. *Consistency is hard, and is often fudged. If directories are replicated, then you may find yourself unable to read, or to write, depending on whether too many or too few directories are available.* Naming consistency causes

problems for business in a number of ways, of which perhaps the most notorious is the bar code system. Although this is simple enough in theory – with a unique numerical code for each product – in practice different manufacturers, distributors and retailers attach quite different descriptions to the bar codes in their databases. Thus a search for products by “Kellogg’s” will throw up quite different results depending on whether or not an apostrophe is inserted, and this can cause confusion in the supply chain. Proposals to fix this problem can be surprisingly complicated [892]. There are also the issues of convergence discussed above; data might not be consistent across a system, even in theory. There are also the problems of timeliness, such as whether a product has been recalled.

9. *Don’t get too smart. Phone numbers are much more robust than computer addresses.* Early secure messaging systems – from PGP to government systems – tried to link keys to email addresses, but these change when people’s jobs do. More modern systems such as Signal and WhatsApp use mobile phone numbers instead. In the same way, early attempts to replace bank account numbers and credit card numbers with public-key certificates in protocols like SET failed, though in some mobile payment systems, such as Kenya’s M-Pesa, they’ve been replaced by phone numbers. (I’ll discuss further specific problems of public key infrastructures in section 21.6.)
10. *Some names are bound early, others not; and in general it is a bad thing to bind early if you can avoid it.* A prudent programmer will normally avoid coding absolute addresses or filenames as that would make it hard to upgrade or replace a machine. It’s usually better to leave this to a configuration file or an external service such as DNS. Yet secure systems often want stable and accountable names as any third-party service used for last-minute resolution could be a point of attack. Designers therefore need to pay attention to where the naming information goes, how devices get personalised with it, and how they get upgraded – including the names of services on which the security may depend, such as the NTP service discussed in Section 7.2.6 above.

### 7.4.2 What else goes wrong

The Needham principles were crafted for the world of the early 1990s in which naming systems could be imposed at the system owner’s convenience. Once we moved to the reality of modern web-based (and interlinked) service industries, operating at global scale, we found that there is more to add.

By the early 2000s, we had learned that no naming system can be globally unique, decentralised, and human-meaningful. In fact, it’s a classic trilemma: you can only have two of those attributes (Zooko’s triangle) [37]. In the past, engineers went for naming systems that were unique and meaningful, like URLs, or unique and decentralised, as with public keys in PGP or the self-signed certificates that function as app names in Android. Human names are meaningful and local, but don’t scale to the Internet. I mentioned above that as soon as the first search engines came along, I could instantly find dozens of others people called Ross Anderson, but it’s even worse than that; half a dozen worked in fields

I've also worked in such as software engineering and electricity distribution.

The innovation from sites like Facebook is to show on a really large scale that names don't have to be unique. We can use social context to build systems that are both decentralised and meaningful – which is just what our brains evolved to cope with. Every Ross Anderson has a different set of friends and you can tell us apart that way.

How can we make sense of all this, and stop it being used to trip people up? It is sometimes helpful to analyse the properties of names in detail.

### 7.4.2.1 Naming and identity

First, the principals in security protocols are usually known by many different kinds of name – a bank account number, a company registration number, a personal name plus a date of birth or a postal address, a telephone number, a passport number, a health service patient number, or a userid on a computer system.

A common mistake is to confuse naming with identity. *Identity* is when two different names (or instances of the same name) correspond to the same principal (this is known to computer scientists as an *indirect name* or *symbolic link*). One classic example comes from the registration of title to real estate. Someone who wishes to sell a house often uses a different name than they did at the time it was purchased: they might have changed their name on marriage, or on gender transition, or started using their middle name instead. A land-registration system must cope with a lot of identity issues like this.

There are two types of identity failure leading to compromise: where I'm happy to impersonate anybody, and where I want to impersonate a specific individual. The former case includes setting up accounts to launder cybercrime proceeds, while an example of the latter is SIM replacement (I want to clone a CEO's phone so I can loot a company bank account). If banks (or phone companies) just ask people for two proofs of address, such as utility bills, that's easy. Demanding government-issue photo-ID may require us to analyse statements such as "The Aaron Bell who owns bank account number 12345678 is the Aaron James Bell with passport number 98765432 and date of birth 3/4/56". This may be seen as a symbolic link between two separate systems – the bank's and the passport office's. Note that the latter part of this 'identity' encapsulates a further statement, which might be something like "The US passport office's file number 98765432 corresponds to the entry in the New York birth register for 3/4/56 of one Aaron James Bell." If Aaron is commonly known as Jim, it gets messier still.

In general, names may involve several steps of recursion, which gives attackers a choice of targets. For example, a lot of passport fraud is *pre-issue fraud*: the bad guys apply for passports in the names of genuine citizens who haven't applied for a passport already and for whom copies of birth certificates are easy to obtain. Postmortem applications are also common. Linden Labs, the operators of Second Life, introduced a scheme whereby you prove you're over 18 by providing the driver's license number or social security number of someone who is. Now a web search quickly pulls up such data for many people, such as

the rapper Tupac Amaru Shakur; and yes, Linden Labs did accept Mr Shakur's license number – even through the license had expired, and he's dead.

There can also be institutional failure. For example, the United Arab Emirates started taking iris scans of all visitors after women who had been deported to Pakistan for prostitution offences would turn up a few weeks later with a genuine Pakistani passport in a different name and accompanied by a different 'husband'. Similar problems led many countries to issue biometric visas, so they don't have to depend on passport issuers in countries they don't want to have to trust.

In addition to corruption, a pervasive failure is the loss of original records. In countries where registers of births, marriages and deaths are kept locally and on paper, some are lost, and smart impersonators exploit these. You might think that digitisation is fixing this problem, but the long-term preservation of digital records is a hard problem even for rich countries; document formats change, software and hardware become obsolete, and you either have to emulate old machines or translate old data, neither of which is ideal. Various states have run pilot projects on electronic documents that must be kept forever, such as civil registration, but we still lack credible standards. Sensible developed countries still keep paper originals as the long-term document of record. In less developed countries, you may have to steer between the Scylla of flaky government IT and the Charybdis of natural disasters<sup>8</sup>.

### 7.4.2.2 Cultural assumptions

The assumptions that underlie names change from one country to another. In the English-speaking world, people may generally use as many names as they please; a name is simply what you are known by. But some countries forbid the use of aliases, and others require them to be registered. The civil registration of births, marriages, civil partnerships, gender transitions and deaths is an extremely complex one, often politicised, tied up with religion in many countries and with the issue of ID documents as well. And incompatible rules between countries cause real problems for migrants, tourists and indeed for companies with overseas customers.

In earlier editions of this book, I gave as an example that writers who change their legal name on marriage often keep publishing using their former name. So my lab colleague, the late Professor Karen Spärck Jones, got a letter from the university every year asking why she hadn't published anything (she was down on the payroll as Karen Needham). The publication-tracking system just could not cope with everything the personnel system knew. And as software gets in everything and systems get linked up, conflicts can have unexpected remote effects. For example, Karen was also a trustee of the British Library, and was not impressed when it started to issue its own admission tickets using the name on the holder's home university library card. Such issues caused even more friction when we introduced an ID card system keyed to payroll names to give unified access to buildings, libraries and canteens. These issues with multiple names are now mainstream; it's not just professors, musicians and novelists who

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<sup>8</sup>while listening to the siren song of development consultants saying 'put it on the blockchain!'

use more than one name. Trans people who want to stop firms using names from a previous gender; women who want to stop using a married name when they separate or divorce, and who perhaps need to if they're fleeing an abusive partner; people who've assumed new names following religious conversion – there's no end of sources of conflict. If you're building a system that you hope will scale up globally, you'll eventually have to deal with them all.

Human naming conventions also vary by culture. Chinese may have both English and Chinese given names if they're from Hong Kong, with the English one coming before, and the Chinese one coming after, the family name. Many people in South India, Indonesia and Mongolia have only a single name – a mononym. The Indian convention is to add two initials – for your place of birth and your father's name. So 'BK Rajan' may mean Rajan, son of Kumar, from Bangalore. A common tactic among South Indian migrants to the USA is to use the patronymic (here, Kumar) as a surname; but when western computer systems misinterpret Rajan as a surname, confusion can arise. Russians are known by a forename, a patronymic and a surname. Icelanders have no surname; their given name is followed by a patronymic if they are male and a matronymic if they are female. In the old days, when 'Maria Trosttadóttir' arrived at US immigration and the officer learned that 'Trosttadóttir' isn't a surname or even a patronymic, their standard practice was to compel her to adopt as a surname a patronymic (say, 'Carlsson' if her father was called Carl). Many Indians in the USA have had similar problems, all of which cause unnecessary offence. And then there are cultures where your name changes after you have children.

Another cultural divide is often thought to be that between the English-speaking countries, where identity cards were unacceptable on privacy grounds<sup>9</sup> and the countries conquered by Napoleon or by the Soviets, where identity cards are the norm. What's less well known is that the British Empire happily imposed ID on many of its subject populations, so the real divide is perhaps whether a country was ever conquered.

The local history of ID conditions all sorts of assumptions. I know Germans who have refused to believe that a country could function at all without a proper system of population registration and ID cards, yet admit they are asked for their ID card only rarely (for example, to open a bank account or get married). Their card number can't be used as a name, because it is a document number and changes every time a new card is issued. The Icelandic ID card number, however, is static; it's just the citizen's date of birth plus two further digits. What's more, the law requires that bank account numbers contain the account holder's ID number. These are perhaps the extremes of private and public ID numbering.

Finally, in many less developed countries, the act of registering citizens and issuing them with ID is not just inefficient but political [86]. The ruling tribe may seek to disenfranchise the others by making it hard to register births in their territory, or by making it inconvenient to get an ID card. Sometimes cards are reissued in the run-up to an election in order to refresh or reinforce the discrimination. Cards can be tied to business permits and welfare payments; delays can be used to extract bribes. Some countries (such as Brazil) have separate regis-

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<sup>9</sup>unless they're called drivers' licences or health service cards!

tration systems at state and federal level, while others (such as Malawi) have left most of their population unregistered. There are many excluded groups, such as refugee children born outside the country of their parents' nationality, and groups made stateless for religious or ideological reasons. Target 16.9 of the United Nations' Sustainable Development Goals is to 'provide legal identity for all, including birth registration'; and a number of companies sell ID systems and voting systems financed by development aid. These interact with governments in all sorts of complex ways, and there's a whole research community that studies this [86]. Oh, and if you think this is a third-world problem, there are several US states using onerous registration procedures to make it harder for black people to vote; and in the Windrush scandal, it emerged that the UK government had deported a number of foreign-born UK residents who were automatically entitled to citizenship, as they had not maintained a good enough paper trail of their citizenship to satisfy increasingly xenophobic ministers.

In short, the hidden assumptions about the relationship between governments and people's names vary in ways that constrain system design, and cause unexpected failures when assumptions are carried across borders. The engineer must always be alert to the fact that a service-oriented ID is one thing, and a legal identity or certificate of citizenship is another. Governments are forever trying to entangle the two, but this leads to all sorts of pain.

### 7.4.2.3 Semantic content of names

Changing from one type of name to another can be hazardous. A bank got sued after they moved from storing customer data by account number to storing it by name and address. They wrote a program to link up all the accounts operated by each of their customers, in the hope that it would help them target junk mail more accurately. The effect on one customer was serious: the bank statement for the account he kept for his mistress got sent to his wife, who divorced him.

The semantics of names can change over time. In many transport systems, tickets and toll tags can be bought for cash, which defuses privacy concerns, but it's more convenient to link them to bank accounts, and these links accumulate over time. The card that UK pensioners use to get free bus travel also started out anonymous, but in practice the bus companies try to link up the card numbers to other passenger identifiers. In fact, I once got a hardware store loyalty card with a random account number (and no credit checks). I was offered the chance to change this into a bank card after the store was taken over by a supermarket and the supermarket started a bank.

### 7.4.2.4 Uniqueness of names

Human names evolved when we lived in small communities. We started off with just forenames, but by the late Middle Ages the growth of travel led governments to bully people into adopting surnames. That process took a century or so, and was linked with the introduction of paper into Europe as a lower-cost and more tamper-resistant replacement for parchment; paper enabled the badges, seals and other bearer tokens, which people had previously used for road tolls and the like, to be replaced with letters that mentioned their names.

The mass movement of people, business and administration to the Internet has been too fast for social adaptation. There are now way more people (and systems) online than we're used to dealing with. So how can we make human-memorable names unique? As we discussed above, Facebook tells one John Smith from another the way humans do, by clustering each one with his set of friends and adding a photo.

Perhaps the other extreme is cryptographic names. Names are hashes either of public keys, or of other stable attributes of the object being named. All sorts of mechanisms have been proposed to map real world names, addresses and even document content indelibly and eternally on to the bitstring outputs of hash functions (see, for example, [825]). You can even use hashes of biometrics or the surface microstructure of objects, coupled with a suitable error-correction code. The world of cryptocurrency and blockchains makes much use of hash-based identifiers. Such mechanisms can make it impossible to reuse names; as expired domain names are often bought by bad people and exploited, this is sometimes important.

This isn't entirely new, as it has long been common in transaction processing to just give everything and everyone a number. This can lead to failures, though, if you don't put enough uniqueness in the right place. For example, a UK bank assigned unique sequence numbers to transactions by printing them on the stationery used to capture the deal. Once, when they wanted to send £20m overseas, the operator typed in £10m by mistake. A second payment of £10m was ordered – but this acquired the same transaction sequence number from the paperwork. So two payments were sent to SWIFT with the same date, payee, amount and sequence number – and the second was discarded as a duplicate [299].

### 7.4.2.5 Stability of names and addresses

Many names include some kind of address, yet addresses change. While we still had a phone book in Cambridge, about a quarter of the addresses changed every year; with work email, the turnover is probably higher. When we tried in the late 1990s to develop a directory of people who use encrypted email, together with their keys, we found that the main cause of changed entries was changes of email address [101]. (Some people had assumed it would be the loss or theft of keys; the contribution from this source was precisely zero.) Things are perhaps more stable now. Most people try to keep their personal mobile phone numbers, so they tend to be long-lived; and the same goes increasingly for personal email addresses. The big service providers like Google and Microsoft generally don't issue the same email address twice, but other firms still do.

Distributed systems pioneers considered it a bad thing to put addresses in names [1315]. But hierarchical naming systems can involve multiple layers of abstraction with some of the address information at each layer forming part of the name at the layer above. Also, whether a namespace is better flat depends on the application. Often people end up with different names at the departmental and organisational level (such as `rja14@cam.ac.uk` and `ross.anderson@c1.cam.ac.uk` in my own case). So a clean demarcation between names and addresses is not always possible.

Authorisations have many (but not all) of the properties of addresses. Kent's Law tells designers that if a credential contains a list of what it may be used for, then the more things are on this list the shorter its period of usefulness. A similar problem besets systems where names are composite. For example, some online businesses recognize me by the combination of email address and credit card number. This is clearly bad practice. Quite apart from the fact that I have several email addresses, I have several credit cards.

There are good reasons to use pseudonyms. Until Facebook came along, people considered it sensible for children and young people to use online names that weren't easily linkable to their real names and addresses. When you go for your first job on leaving college aged 22, or for a CEO's job at 45, you don't want a search to turn up all your teenage rants. Many people also change email addresses from time to time to escape spam; I used to give a different email address to every website where I shop. On the other hand, some police and other agencies would prefer people not to use pseudonyms, which takes us into the whole question of traceability online – which I'll discuss in Part II.

### 7.4.2.6 Restrictions on the use of names

The interaction between naming and society brings us to a further problem: some names may be used only in restricted circumstances. This may be laid down by law, as with the US Social Security Number and its equivalents in some other countries. Sometimes it is a matter of marketing: a significant minority of customers avoid websites that demand too much information.

Restricted naming systems interact in unexpected ways. For example, it's fairly common for hospitals to use a patient number as an index to medical record databases, as this may allow researchers to use pseudonymous records for some purposes. This causes problems when a merger of health maintenance organisations, or a policy change, forces the hospital to introduce uniform names. There have long been tussles in Britain's health service, for example, about which pseudonyms can be used for which purposes

Finally, when we come to law and policy, the definition of a name throws up new and unexpected gotchas. For example, regulations that allow police to collect communications data – that is, a record of who called whom and when – are usually much more lax than the regulations governing phone tapping; in many countries, police can get communications data just by asking the phone company. This led to tussles over the status of URLs, which contain data such as the parameters passed to search engines. Clearly some policemen would like a list of everyone who hit a URL like `http://www.google.com/search?q=cannabis+cultivation`; just as clearly, many people would consider such large-scale trawling to be an unacceptable invasion of privacy. The resolution in UK law was to define traffic data as that which was sufficient to identify the machine being communicated with or in lay language 'Everything up to the first slash.' I discuss this in much more detail later, in the chapter 'Surveillance or Privacy?'



### 7.4.3 Types of name

Not only is naming complex at all levels – from the technical up through the organisational to the political – but some of the really wicked issues go across levels. I noted in the introduction that names can refer not just to persons (and machines acting on their behalf), but also to organisations, roles (‘the officer of the watch’), groups, and compound constructions: *principal in role* – Alice as manager; *delegation* – Alice for Bob; *conjunction* – Alice and Bob. Conjunction often expresses implicit access rules: ‘Alice acting as branch manager plus Bob as a member of the group of branch accountants’.

That’s only the beginning. Names also apply to services (such as NFS, or a public key infrastructure) and channels (which might mean wires, ports, or crypto keys). The same name might refer to different roles: ‘Alice as a computer game player’ ought to have less privilege than ‘Alice the system administrator’. The usual abstraction used in the security literature is to treat them as different principals. So there’s no easy mapping between names and principals, especially when people bring their own devices to work, or take work devices home, so that they may have multiple conflicting names or roles on the same platform. Many organisations are starting to distinguish carefully between ‘Alice in person’, ‘Alice as a program running on Alice’s home laptop’ and ‘a program running on Alice’s behalf on the corporate cloud’, and we discussed some of the possible mechanisms in the chapter on access control.

Functional tensions are often easier to analyse if you work out how they’re driven by the underlying business processes. Businesses mainly want to get paid, while governments want to identify people uniquely. In effect, business wants your credit card number while government wants your passport number. An analysis based on incentives can sometimes indicate whether a naming system might be better open or closed, local or global, stateful or stateless – and whether the people who maintain it are the same people who will pay the costs of failure (one of the key issues for dependability, which is the subject of the next chapter).

Finally, although I’ve illustrated many of the problems of naming with respect to people – as that makes the problems more immediate and compelling – many of the same problems pop up in various ways for cryptographic keys, unique product codes, document IDs, file names, URLs and much more. When we dive into the internals of a modern corporate network we may find DNS Round Robin to multiple machines, each on their own IP addresses, behind a single name; or Anycast to multiple machines, each on the same IP address, behind a single name; or Cisco’s HSRP protocol where the IP address (and the Ethernet MAC address) move from one router to another router. (I’ll discuss more technical aspects of network security in Part 2.) Anyway, as systems scale, it becomes less realistic to rely on names that are simple, interchangeable and immutable. You need to scope naming carefully, understand who controls the names on which you rely, work out how slippery they are, and design your system to be dependable despite their limitations.

## 7.5 Summary

Many secure distributed systems have incurred large costs, or developed serious vulnerabilities, because their designers ignored the basics of how to build (and how not to build) distributed systems. Most of these basics have been in computer science textbooks for a generation.

Many security breaches are concurrency failures of one kind or another; systems use old data, make updates inconsistently or in the wrong order, or assume that data are consistent when they aren't or even can't be. Using time to order transactions may help but knowing the right time is harder than it seems.

Fault tolerance and failure recovery are critical. Providing the ability to recover from security failures, as well as from random physical and software failures, is the main purpose of the protection budget for many organisations. At a more technical level, there are significant interactions between protection and resilience mechanisms. Byzantine failure – where defective processes conspire, rather than failing randomly – is an issue, and interacts with our choice of cryptographic tools.

There are many different flavors of redundancy, and we have to use the right combination. We need to protect not just against failures and attempted manipulation, but also against deliberate attempts to deny service that may be part of larger attack plans.

Many problems also arise from trying to make a name do too much, or making assumptions about it which don't hold outside of one particular system, or culture, or jurisdiction. For example, it should be possible to revoke a user's access to a system by cancelling their user name without getting sued on account of other functions being revoked. The simplest solution is often to assign each principal a unique identifier used for no other purpose, such as a bank account number or a system logon name. But many problems arise when merging two systems that use naming schemes that are incompatible. Sometimes this can even happen by accident.

## Research problems

I've touched on many technical issues in this chapter, from secure time protocols to the complexities of naming. But perhaps the most important research problem is to work out how to design systems that are resilient in the face of malice, that degrade gracefully, and whose security can be recovered simply once the attack is past. All sorts of remedies have been pushed in the past, from getting governments to issue everyone with ID to putting it all on the blockchain. However these magic bullets don't seem to kill any of the goblins.

It's always a good idea for engineers to study failures; we learn more from the one bridge that falls down than from the thousand that don't. We now have a growing number of failed ID systems, such as the UK government's Verify scheme – an attempt to create a federated logon system for public service that was abandoned in 2019 [1351]. There is a research community that studies

failures of ID systems in less developed countries [86]. And then there's the failure of blockchains to live up to their initial promise, which I'll discuss in Part 2 of this book.

Perhaps we need to study more carefully the conditions under which we can recover neatly from corrupt security state. Malware and phishing attacks mean that at any given time a small (but nonzero) proportion of customer bank accounts are under criminal control. Yet the banking system carries on. The proportion of infected laptops, and phones, varies quite widely by country, and the effects might be worth more careful study.

Classical computer science theory saw convergence in distributed systems as an essentially technical problem, whose solution depended on technical properties (at one level, atomicity, consistency, isolation and durability; at another, digital signatures, dual control and audit). Perhaps we need a higher-level view in which we ask how we obtain sufficient agreement about the state of the world, and incorporate not just technical resilience mechanisms and protection technologies, but also the mechanisms whereby people who have been victims of fraud obtain redress. Purely technical mechanisms that try to obviate the need for robust redress may actually make things worse.

## Further reading

If the material in this chapter is unfamiliar to you, you may be coming to the subject from a maths/crypto background or chips/engineering or even law/policy. Computer science students get many lectures on distributed systems; to catch up, I'd suggest Saltzer and Kaashoek [1586]. Other books we've recommended to our students over the years include Tanenbaum and van Steen [1799] and Mullender [1315]. A 2003 report from the US National Research Council, *'Who Goes There? Authentication Through the Lens of Privacy'*, discusses the tradeoffs between authentication and privacy, and how they tend to scale poorly [1012]. Finally, there's a recent discussion of naming by Pat Helland [858].