Salsa20

created 2005 -- published 2007 -- modified 2008
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Structure

k is an 32 or 16 byte sequence, v is an 8 byte sequence, I is in $\{0, 1, ..., 2^{n}70\}$, m is an I byte sequence.

Salsa20(v)_k XOR m is used to describe an encryption of m with nonce v under key k.

The methodology used to scramble bytes is to $_{c,18)}$ conceptualize the sequence as a 4x4 grid where $_{define\ ROUNDS\ 20}$ you can rotate rows, columns, and the bits in a $_{void\ salsa20_block(u)}$ word. A round is made up of a "doubleround" $_{in[16]}$ { which consists of all four rows being rotated and all four columns being rotated. Therefore, every byte will be modified twice.

Uses

With 20 rounds - "for encryption in typical cryptographic applications."

With 8 or 12 rounds - "for users who value speed more than confidence"

Strengths

No attacks are known to exist against Slasa20/20 or Salsa20/12 (the 20 and 12 round version respectively) other than an exhaustive key search. Therefore, it's a very, very strong encryption algorithm when enough rounds are used.



Code

An implementation of the salsa20's 20 round block function.

#define ROTL(a,b) (((a) << (b)) | ((a) >> (32 - (b))))

```
#define QR(a, b, c, d)(b ^= ROTL(a + d, 7), c ^=
ROTL(b + a, 9), d \stackrel{\wedge}{=} ROTL(c + b, 13), a \stackrel{\wedge}{=} ROTL(d + a, 9)
c,18))
void salsa20 block(uint32 t out[16], uint32 t const
in[16]) {
         int i;
         uint32 t x[16];
         for (i = 0; i < 16; ++i) x[i] = in[i];
         for (i = 0; i < ROUNDS; i += 2) {QR(x[0], x[4],
x[8], x[12]); QR(x[5], x[9], x[13], x[1]); QR(x[10], x[14],
x[2], x[6]); QR(x[15], x[3], x[7], x[11]); QR(x[0], x[1],
x[2], x[3]); QR(x[5], x[6], x[7], x[4]); QR(x[10], x[11],
x[8], x[9]); QR(x[15], x[12], x[13], x[14]); }
         for (i = 0; i < 16; ++i)
                  out[i] = x[i] + in[i];
}
```

Weaknesses

Some applications may be affected by the short nonce length (a concern addressed in XSalsa20)

It is a very expensive algorithm, and so performant implementations use less rounds and are thus less secure.

https://cr.yp.to/snuffle/spec.pdf https://www.ecrypt.eu.org/stream/e2-salsa20.html