A Semantics for Weak, Question-Sensitive Belief

Andrej Jovićević

KU Leuven


{andrej.jovicevic}@student.kuleuven.be

Belief is:


- weak
- question-sensitive
- a matter of guessing

Some examples:

(1) **The Urn** An urn contains a 100 marbles: 40 blue, 30 green, 15 red, 15 yellow. A marble is randomly chosen from the urn.




Q: What is the colour of the chosen marble?



✓ (1) I {believe}{think} that the chosen marble is blue.

✗ (2) I {believe}{think} that the chosen marble is non-blue.


Q': Is the chosen marble blue or non-blue?




(1) I {believe}{think} that the chosen marble is blue.


✓ (2) I {believe}{think} that the chosen marble is non-blue.

(2) **Seven-sided die** A fair, seven-sided die is rolled (outcome unknown).



Q": Did the die land on **even** or **odd**?





✓ (3) I {believe}{think} that the die landed on odd.

✓ (4) I {believe}{think} that if the die landed on a composite, it landed on an even.

X (4') If the die landed on a composite, I {believe}{think} that it landed on an even.

Desiderata:

- The semantics should capture belief-ascriptions with both categorical and conditional contents.
- Belief-ascriptions should be sensitive to QUDs and contextually salient 'chances'.
- Beliefs in conditionals and conditional beliefs should be semantically equivalent.

Belief is a **modal** sensitive to

information states + probabilistic and inquisitive structure

$$s \in S = \mathscr{P}(W)$$
 $Pr: \mathscr{P}(s) \longrightarrow [0,1]$ with: $Q = \{X_i\}_{i \in I}$ with:
$$\bullet Pr(s) = 1 \qquad \bullet \bigcup_{i \in I} X_i = s$$

$$\bullet \forall s_1, s_2 \subseteq s : s_1 \neq s_2 \rightarrow \bullet \forall i, j \in I : X_i \cap X_j = \emptyset$$

$$Pr(s_1 \cup s_2) = Pr(s_1) + \bullet \forall i \in I : X_i \neq \emptyset$$

$$Pr(s_2)$$

Main component: probabilistic-inquisitive information state, $i = \langle s, Pr, Q \rangle$

Beliefs with **categorical** contents:

$$[B\phi]^{w,i} \text{ is true iff } \underbrace{s \cap [\![\phi]\!] \in Q}_{\text{Condition 1}} \text{ and } \underbrace{Pr(s \cap [\![\phi]\!]) > \max_{s \cap [\![\phi]\!] \neq X \in Q} Pr(X)}_{\text{Condition 2}}$$

Condition $1 \sim \phi$ is a **complete answer** to Q;

Condition $2 \sim \phi$ probabilistically dominates other answers to Q;

Path Semantics for indicative conditionals.

- A PATH is a sequence of worlds without repetitions;
- The SET OF PATHS on a state $s = \{w_1, \ldots, w_n\}$ is PATH $(s) = \{\langle w'_1, \ldots, w'_n \rangle \mid \{w'_1, \ldots, w'_n\} = s, w'_1 \neq w'_n \text{ for all } i \neq j\};$
- p' is a PERMUTATION of p (p'*p) iff $p' \in PATH(s)$;
- A PATH p's STATE S(p) is $\{p'_1 \mid p' * p, p'_1 \neq p_1\}$;

Update:

- A PATH UPDATE of p with q, p+q, is the largest member of the set $\{p' \leq p \mid \forall p'' \text{ if } p'' * p', \text{ then } p''_1 \in \llbracket q \rrbracket \}$;
- An information state update of s with q, s_q , is $s \cap \llbracket q \rrbracket$;
- A QUESTION UPDATE of Q with q, Q_q , is $\{X_i \cap \llbracket q \rrbracket \mid X_i \in Q \text{ and } X_i \cap \llbracket q \rrbracket \neq \emptyset\};$
- A PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION UPDATE of Pr with q, Pr_q , is $Pr(\cdot \mid q)$;

$$\|\phi \to \psi\|^{p_1,p}$$
 is true iff $\|\psi\|^{p_1,p+q}$ is true iff $\|\psi\|^{(p+q)_1}$ is true.

$$||B\phi||^{p_1,p,i}$$
 is true iff $s \cap [\![\phi]\!] \in Q$ and $Pr(s \cap [\![\phi]\!]) > \max_{s \cap [\![\phi]\!] \neq X \in Q} Pr(X)$

Conditional beliefs:

$$\|\phi \to B\psi\|^{p_1,p,i}$$
 is true iff $\|B\psi\|^{p_1,p+q,i_q}$ is true

Beliefs in conditionals:

$$||B(\phi \to \psi)||^{p_1 p, i}$$
 is true iff $s \cap [\![\psi]\!] \in Q$ and $C(\phi \to \psi) > \max_{X_i \in \mathcal{A}_r^i} C(\phi \to \chi_i)$

Some predictions (see Appendix):

Fact 1: (1) is true and (2) is false w.r.t. Q, and vice versa w.r.t. Q'.

Fact 2: (4) and (4') are true, and (5) and (5') are false w.r.t. Q".

Fact 3: $||B(A \to C)||^{p_1,p,i}$ is true iff $||A \to B(C)||^{p_1,p,i}$ is true.

Further work:

- Properties of belief: e.g. **closure**;
- The interaction of belief and knowledge;
- Information states with no fixed questions; questions as dynamic effects;