

Competing for Inventors: Market Concentration and the Misallocation of Innovative Talent


Andrea Manera

October 5, 2021

Motivation

► TFP growth has slowed down

Fernald et al. (2014), Gordon (2016), Akcigit and Ates (2021)



Source: Akcigit and Ates (2021)


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
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
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- ▶ Misallocation can explain 27% of fall in annual growth (-.78pp)