

# Quantum Oblivious Key Distribution with Discrete Variables

**Mariana F. Ramos, Nuno A. Silva, Armando N. Pinto**

Department of Electronics, Telecommunications and Informatics,  
University of Aveiro, Aveiro, Portugal  
Instituto de Telecomunicações, Aveiro, Portugal

INSTITUIÇÕES ASSOCIADAS:



INSTITUTO  
SUPERIOR  
TÉCNICO



Faculdade de Ciências  
e Tecnologia da  
Universidade de Coimbra



universidade  
de aveiro



Inovação



instituto de  
telecomunicações

*creating and sharing knowledge for telecommunications*

©2005, it - instituto de telecomunicações


# Quantum Oblivious Key Distribution System (QOKD)

The QOKD system enables two parties (Alice and Bob) to share a set of keys.


The diagram illustrates the QOKD system. On the left, Alice's stack of keys is shown, with values 20, 19, 18, 17, 13, 12, and 10. On the right, Bob's stack of keys is shown, with values 20, 19, 18, 17, 13, 12, and 10. A vertical arrow points to the top of each stack. A horizontal dotted line connects the stacks at the level of key 18, labeled 't=12'. Another horizontal dotted line connects the stacks at the level of key 10, labeled 't=8'. The keys are color-coded: Alice's keys are yellow, and Bob's keys are green. The keys 19, 18, and 17 are pink, while 20, 13, 12, and 10 are yellow/green.

Key Value	Alice's Key	Bob's Key
20	Yellow	Green
19	Pink	Pink
18	Pink	Pink
17	Pink	Pink
13	Yellow	Yellow
12	Yellow	Yellow
10	Yellow	Yellow

The QOKD system enables two parties (Alice and Bob) to share a set of keys.



🗨️ Only Bob knows all information about the keys, i.e. which correspond to right or random bits. ~~QOKD can be used in cryptography and secure multi party computation.~~



## 1-out-of-2 Oblivious Transfer

The oblivious keys must be symmetric, i.e. the number of right and random bits should be the same.

# Oblivious Transfer

- Alice has two messages  $m_0$  and  $m_1$  and Bob wants to know one of them,  $m_b$ , without Alice knowing which one, i.e. without Alice knowing  $b$ , and Alice wants to keep the other message private, i.e. without Bob knowing  $m_{\bar{b}}$ . Lets assume  $m_0 = \{0011\}$  and  $m_1 = \{0001\}$ .
- Bob defines two sub-sets with size  $s = 4$ :

$$I_w = \{3, 4, 7, 9\},$$

and

$$I_r = \{1, 2, 6, 8\},$$

where  $I_w$  is the sequence of positions in which Bob was wrong about basis measurement and  $I_r$  is the sequence of positions in which Bob was right about basis measurement.

# Oblivious Transfer

- Alice defines two encryption keys  $K_0$  and  $K_1$  using the values in positions defined by Bob in the set sent by him. Lets assume,

$$K_0 = \{1, 1, 1, 0\}$$

$$K_1 = \{0, 0, 0, 1\}.$$

Alice does the following operations:

$$m = \{m_0 \oplus K_0, m_1 \oplus K_1\}.$$

- Alice sends to Bob through a classical channel

$$m = \{1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0\}.$$

# Oblivious Transfer

- Bob uses  $S_{B1'}$  values of positions given by  $I_r$  and  $I_w$  and does the decrypted operation.

$m$	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0
	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0
$\oplus$	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	0

The first four bits corresponds to message 0 and he received  $\{0,0,1,1\}$ , which is the right message  $m_0$  and  $\{0,1,1,0\}$  which is a wrong message for  $m_1$ .

# Nearest Private Query

- Assuming two parties, a user (Bob) and a data owner (Alice).
- Bob has an input secret parameter  $x$ . Let's assume  $x = 8$ .
- Alice has a private data set,  $A = \{1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 10, 11, 14\}$ .
- Bob wants to know which element ( $x_i$ ) is the closest to  $x$  in Alice's data set  $A$ , without revealing his secret  $x$ .
- Alice cannot know anything about the secret information  $x$ , and Bob cannot know secret information about the private data set  $A$  except the near parameter,  $x_i$ .
- Alice generates a new set with  $N = 2^n$  elements,  $D(j)$  for  $j = 0, 1, \dots, N - 1$  in which  $D(j) = x_l$  being  $x(l)$  the closest element to  $j$  in  $A$ .  $n$  is the number of bits that Alice needs to represent each element of her data set.

# Nearest Private Query

$j$	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
$D(j)$	1	1	2	3	3	6	6	7	7	10	10	11	11	14	14	14
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0

- Bob and Alice have a set of keys  $K_i^*$  and  $K_i$ , respectively, with 64 elements where 60 are bits resulted from wrong basis measurement and 4 resulted from correct basis measurement. This allows Alice to know that Bob is being honest.
- Bob sends to Alice the set  $S$  with wrong bits position except in position  $i = 8$ .
- Alice gets the closest number to  $x = 8$  which is 7 and she remains know nothing about the other elements.



# QOKD with discrete variables

- Alice randomly generates the sets  $S_{A1'}$  (for basis) and  $S_{A2'}$  (for keys) in order to encode photons.
- Alice sends to Bob throughout a quantum channel  $l$  photons encoded using the previous values,

$$S_{AB} = \{\uparrow, \uparrow, \nearrow, \searrow, \searrow, \rightarrow, \rightarrow, \searrow, \nearrow, \uparrow, \rightarrow, \searrow, \nearrow, \searrow, \uparrow, \nearrow\}$$

- Bob also randomly generates  $l = 16$  bits, which are going to define his measurement basis,  $S_{B1'}$ ,

$$S_{B1'} = \{+, \times, \times, +, +, \times, +, \times, \times, +, \times, \times, +, +, +, \times\}.$$

# QOKD with discrete variables

- After measure the photons using the basis generated in  $S_{B1'}$ , he got  $S_{B2'}$ :

$S_{AB}$	$\uparrow$	$\uparrow$	$\nearrow$	$\searrow$	$\searrow$	$\rightarrow$	$\rightarrow$	$\searrow$	$\nearrow$	$\uparrow$	$\rightarrow$	$\searrow$	$\nearrow$	$\searrow$	$\uparrow$	$\nearrow$
$S_{B1'}$	+	x	x	+	+	x	+	x	x	+	x	x	+	+	+	x
$S_{B2'}$	1	—	<u>0</u>	0	—	1	<u>1</u>	—	1	—	1	0	1	1	<u>0</u>	1

where "—" corresponds to no clicks in Bob's detector, due to attenuation and the underlined values to measurements with a correct basis but an error has occurred due to imperfections in the quantum communication system.

# QOKD with discrete variables

- Bob sends to Alice,

$$S_{BH1} = \{S_1, -1, S_2, S_3, -1, S_4, S_5, -1, S_6, -1, S_7, S_8, S_9, S_{10}, S_{11}, S_{12}\},$$

where "-1" correspond to no clicks at the detector and the other values are Hash values calculated using SHA256.

- After Alice has received  $S_{BH1}$ , she sends throughout a classical channel the basis which she has used to codify the photons updated with the information about the no received photons.
- This way, due to attenuation them sets are reduced,

$$S_{A1} = \{0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1\}, S_{A2} = \{1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1\},$$

$$S_{B1} = \{0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1\}, S_{B2} = \{1, \underline{0}, 0, 1, \underline{1}, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, \underline{0}, 1\}$$

# QOKD with discrete variables

- Then, they apply a modified version of Cascade Algorithm in order to correct errors due transmission in the right set of measurements. Furthermore, they test the honesty of each other using the estimated QBER from Alice and the Hash Function committed by Bob.
- In order to know which photons were measured correctly, Bob does the operation  $S_{B3} = S_{B1} \oplus S_{A1}$ .
- Bob got  $S_{B3} = \{1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1\}$ .
- The values "1" correspond to the values he measured correctly and "0" to the values he just guessed.
- Bob is building two sets of keys, one with correct basis measurements values and other with the wrong basis measurement values that he just guessed.

# QOKD with discrete variables

- By the end, Bob has four sets in order to have the capability of decode messages sent by Alice:


$$S_{B_{rp}} = \{1, 2, 5, 6, 8\}$$

$$S_{B_{rb}} = \{1, 1, 0, 1, 0\}$$


$$S_{B_{wp}} = \{3, 4, 7, 9\}$$

$$S_{B_{wb}} = \{0, 1, 1, 0\}$$

# Simulation Setup



# Experimental Setup





E-mail: [marianaferreiraramos@ua.pt](mailto:marianaferreiraramos@ua.pt)

INSTITUIÇÕES ASSOCIADAS:



universidade  
de aveiro



instituto de  
telecomunicações