

# MQTTSA Report

## Details of the assessment

Broker ip: test.mosquitto.org  
Listening time: 60  
Text message: testtesttest  
Denial of Service performed: False  
Brute force performed: False

## Authentication

MQTTSA detected an authentication mechanism.

## Information disclosure

MQTTSA waited for 60 seconds after having subscribed to the '#' and '\$SYS/#' topics. By default, clients who subscribe to the '#' topic can read to all the messages exchanged between devices and the ones subscribed to '\$SYS/#' can read all the messages which includes statistics of the broker. Remote attackers could obtain specific information about the version of the broker to carry on more specific attacks or read messages exchanged by clients.

**[!] In this case, MQTTSA was not able to intercept messages exchanged by clients. Try to perform the assessment again, increasing the 'listening\_time' parameter**

## Tampering data

**[!] Since MQTTSA was not able to intercept any message, this vulnerability was not tested. Try to perform the assessment again, increasing the 'listening\_time' parameter.**

## Denial of service

**[!] MQTTSA opened None connections to stress the broker and test how it will react in case of Denial of Service.**

The tool is not able to determine if the test resulted in the disconnection of other clients; thus the user should check the logfile in the broker and see if the connection was working correctly.

In case the test did not result in disconnections or delays, the test can be performed again increasing the *dos\_connection* value.

## Suggested mitigations

In case of MQTT services connected in environments with limited bandwidth capacity, it is strongly recommended to: add a firewall and enforce rules to prevent the Dos, use a load balancer, limit the number of clients and packet dimension.

Additional information here:

[MQTT Security Fundamentals: Securing MQTT Systems](#)

[Mosquitto documentation: message\\_size\\_limit and max\\_connection](#)

## Malformed data

An attacker could send malformed packets aiming at triggering errors to cause DoS or obtain information about the broker. We suggest to perform a full fuzzing test to stress the implementation with random well-crafted values. A fuzzer designed for MQTT is developed by F-Secure and can be found on the following link:

### Parameter of the CONNECT packet tested: client\_id

[illegible]

### Parameter of the CONNECT packet tested: clean session

True, 1, 2

Value: False, Error: A client id must be provided if clean session is False.  
Value: 0, Error: A client id must be provided if clean session is False.  
Value: -1, Error:

[illegible]

### Parameter of the CONNECT packet tested: keepalive

0, 1, 2, 234, 0.12

```
Value: 3, Error: [Errno 101] Network is unreachable
Value: -1, Error: Keepalive must be >=0.
Value: -100, Error: Keepalive must be >=0.
Value: -0.12, Error: Keepalive must be >=0.
```

893427908127340981723498712309487120937492813749721394719023740971230948710293847091273409871230

Value:  
-192834918203749812734987123904709238740972310497123094792374901273049721093487129307492317492137  
9047012347092734, Error: Keepalive must be >=0.

Values that did not generate an error:  
 //////////////, /..../..../

Value: /#/#/#, Error: Publish topic cannot contain wildcards.

[illegible]

Values that did not generate an error:  
0, 1, 2

Value:  
893427908127340981723498712309487120937492813749721394719023740971230948710293847091273409871230  
49710293749128374097239017409237409123749071209347091237490321, Error: Invalid QoS level.

Value:  
-192834918203749812734987123904709238740972310497123094792374901273049721093487129307492317492137  
9047012347092734, Error: Invalid QoS level.