

# Bloom Filter-Based MPSI

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# Bibliography

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- [5] Jelle Vos, Mauro Conti, and Zekeriya Erkin. Fast multi-party private set operations in the star topology from secure ands and ors. Cryptology ePrint Archive, 2022.
- [6] Vladimir Kolesnikov, Naor Matania, Benny Pinkas, Mike Rosulek, and Ni Trieu. Practical multi-party private set intersection from symmetric-key techniques. In Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pages 1257–1272, 2017.
- [7] Alireza Kavousi, Javad Mohajeri, and Mahmoud Salmasizadeh. Efficient scalable multi-party private set intersection using oblivious prf. In International Workshop on Security and Trust Management, pages 81–99. Springer, 2021.
- [8] Florian Kerschbaum. Outsourced private set intersection using homomorphic encryption. In Proceedings of the 7<sup>th</sup> ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security, pages 85–86, 2012.

# Progress

From the plan last week:

- Prepare the presentation for the 1<sup>st</sup> stage evaluation
- Continue working on the mitigations

# Progress

OPRFs:

- Each client generates a key  $k_{OPRF}$
- Pre-processing stage:
  - Original protocol: each client hashes their element using the  $k$  hash functions to get the indices in the BF
  - Mitigation: each client computes the indices by using their  $k_{OPRF}$
- Online stage:
  - Original protocol: server computes the  $k$  hashes for each of its elements to get indices and collect the encrypted values at those indices from the clients' encrypted BFs
  - Mitigation: server has to engage in an OPRF protocol with each client in order to get the indices

# Progress

OPRFs:

- Use this OPRF

```
1: // Server S initiates a request:  
2: Request( $\mathcal{M}$ )  $\rightarrow t, \mathcal{B}$   
3:  $t \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$   
4:  $\mathcal{B} \leftarrow \{a^t\}_{a \in \mathcal{M}}$   
5: return  $t, \mathcal{B}$   
  
6: // Client C applies PRF:  
7: Eval( $\mathcal{B}, k$ )  $\rightarrow C$   
8: return  $\{b^k\}_{b \in \mathcal{B}}$   
  
9: // Server S recovers elements:  
10: Recover( $C, t$ )  $\rightarrow \mathcal{D}$   
11: return  $\{c^{\frac{1}{t}}\}_{c \in C}$ 
```

Figure 8: OPRF Protocol

# Next Week

- Implement the OPRF mitigation
- Start the Garbled BF mitigation ([6] and [7] use GBFs to implement OPRF)
- Read about the Authorized MPSI mitigation [8]

# Thank you!

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