

Bloom Filter-Based MPSI

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Progress

- Read [1], [2], [3]
 - [1] fully, but there are still parts that I have to revise
 - [2] and [3] partially
- Starting from Jelle's Rust code for the attack on Bloom Filter-based PSI
 - Translated the Bloom Filter structure to C++
 - Implemented some basic operations and benchmarking

Progress

- The code is based on [1]. We choose set size K and desired false positive probability ϵ . Based on this, we derive the optimal filter size m and number of hash functions h .
- For benchmarking, each of the parties generates a dataset. They then construct their local Bloom filters by hashing these elements and setting the corresponding bits.
- To find the intersection, one of the parties aggregates the filters using bitwise AND operations (simulating a star topology).

Given a desired false positive probability ϵ_{fp} and maximum set size k , we can calculate the corresponding required number of hash functions h and the minimal number of bins m_{opt} as follows:

$$h = -\log_2(\epsilon_{fp}) , \quad (3)$$

$$m_{opt} \geq \frac{-h(k + 0.5)}{\ln(1 - \sqrt[h]{p})} + 1 . \quad (4)$$

Progress

- Computation measured for:
 - Construction of Bloom filters based on parties' sets.
 - Computing the intersection for a star topology, where the 1st party is the leader and everyone sends their set to them.
- Communication measured as filter size in bytes (there is no network communication in this implementation).

```
andra1782@Andra:/mnt/c/My Files/bloom-filter-based-MPSI/bf-mpsi-baseline/build$ ./bf_mpsi_baseline
Bloom Filter-based MPSI Baseline for 5 parties, 65536 items each, 268435456 universe size and 2^-30 error rate
Number of bins (m): 2836477
Number of seeds: 30
Computation - Average Construction Time: 147539 microseconds
Communication - Filter Size: 354560 bytes
Computation - Intersection Time (Star Topology): 1047694 microseconds
```

Challenges

- Remembering C++.
- Learning a bit of Rust, to be able to translate Jelle's Bloom Filter code to C++.
- Reading through the details of the attack paper, proofs are difficult to understand and it is going slow.

Next Week

- Read [4].
- Understand Jelle's C++ code for [2].
- Understand [3]'s construction well.
- Start an implementation of an existing protocol.
 - [3]'s idea is based on [2], but uses ElGamal instead of Paillier. I am thinking it would be a good candidate for a better baseline.
- Continue on going though the attack and proofs in [1].

Bibliography

- [1] Jelle Vos, Jorrit van Assen, Tjitske Koster, Evangelia Anna Markatou, and Zekeriya Erkin. On the insecurity of bloom filter-based private set intersections. Cryptology ePrint Archive, 2024.
- [2] Aslı Bay, Zekeriya Erkin, Jaap-Henk Hoepman, Simona Samardjiska, and Jelle Vos. Practical multi-party private set intersection protocols. IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, 17:1–15, 2021.
- [3] Ou Ruan, Changwang Yan, Jing Zhou, and Chaohao Ai. A practical multiparty private set intersection protocol based on bloom filters for unbalanced scenarios. Applied Sciences, 13(24):13215, 2023.
- [4] Ou Ruan and Chaohao Ai. An efficient multi-party private set intersection protocols based on bloom filter. In Second International Conference on Algorithms, Microchips, and Network Applications (AMNA 2023), volume 12635, pages 282–287. SPIE, 2023.

Thank you!

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