

# Diffie-Hellman for multiple parties

HW4 - CNS Sapienza

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## 1 Introduction

Diffie-Hellman is one of the early methods for the exchanging of cryptographic keys in a public network. It was developed in 1976 [1] and now is a public domain algorithm. An interesting result of 2015 [2] shows that practical implementations of this method must not be considered secure against state actors.

In this report we present a possible approach for the generalization of Diffie-Hellman (DH) for multiple parties and a consideration about the security of such method.

## 2 Classic DH Overview

Before starting with the n-parties approach, we present a survey of the classic DH method between two parties.

We have two parties, Alice and Bob, that wants to share a key through a not secure channel.

The algorithm is the following:

- Alice choose two numbers,  $p$  and  $g$ . The first is a prime number, the second is the generator of the cyclic multiplicative group  $Z_p^*$ , so every coprime of  $p$  can be expressed as a power of  $g$  modulo  $p$ ;
- Alice choose  $a \in \{1, \dots, p-1\}$  and compute  $A = g^a \bmod p$ ;
- Alice sends  $A$ ,  $p$  and  $g$  to Bob;
- Bob choose  $b \in \{1, \dots, p-1\}$  and compute  $B = g^b \bmod p$ ;

- Bob sends  $B$  to Alice;
- Now the two parts can compute a shared key  $K = g^{ab} \bmod p$ ;
- Alice compute  $K$  with  $B^a \bmod p$ ;
- Bob compute  $K$  with  $A^b \bmod p$ ;




Figure 1: DH Key exchange schema

The shared key  $K$  can be further used in a communication based on a symmetric encryption like AES.

### 3 Three parties DH

We start presenting multi-parties DH in a case with three parties and then we will expose a generalization for  $n$ -parties.

The parties are Alice, Bob and Woody. In the proposed approach one of the parties is a master that establish the key and then become a normal user. In our example the master is Alice.

The method proceed in the following way:

- Alice choose two numbers,  $p$  and  $g$ , as in classic DH.
- Alice choose  $a \in \{1, \dots, p-1\}$  and compute  $A = g^a \bmod p$ ;

- Alice sends  $A$ ,  $p$  and  $g$  to Bob and Woody;
- Bob choose  $b \in \{1, \dots, p-1\}$  and compute  $B = g^b \bmod p$ ;
- Bob sends  $B$  to Alice;
- Woody choose  $c \in \{1, \dots, p-1\}$  and compute  $C = g^c \bmod p$ ;
- Woody sends  $C$  to Alice;
- Now two shared keys can be computed,  $K_b = g^{ab} \bmod p$  and  $K_c = g^{ac} \bmod p$ ;
- Alice compute both keys with  $K_b = B^a \bmod p$  and  $K_c = C^a \bmod p$ ;
- Bob compute  $K_b$  with  $A^b \bmod p$ ;
- Woody compute  $K_c$  with  $A^c \bmod p$ ;
- Alice compute  $D_c = g^{K_c} \bmod p$  and sends it to Bob;
- Alice compute  $D_b = g^{K_b} \bmod p$  and sends it to Woody;
- Bob compute  $K = (D_c)^{K_b} \bmod p = g^{K_b * K_c} \bmod p$ ;
- Woody compute  $K = (D_b)^{K_c} \bmod p = g^{K_b * K_c} \bmod p$ ;
- Alice compute  $K = g^{K_b * K_c} \bmod p$  directly;
- Now all parties share the key  $K$  and Alice is not a master anymore.

## 4 Multi parties DH

In this section we present the generalization of the previous exposed approach on  $n$  parties,  $P_i$  with  $i \in \{1, \dots, n\}$ . In this case we select as master  $P_i$  and the other parties,  $P_j$  with  $j \neq i$ , are slaves.

- $P_i$  choose two numbers,  $p$  and  $g$ , as in classic DH.
- $P_i$  choose  $x_i \in \{1, \dots, p-1\}$  and compute  $X_i = g^{x_i} \bmod p$ ;
- $P_i$  sends  $X_i$ ,  $p$  and  $g$  to the other parties  $P_j$ ;
- Each  $P_j$  choose an  $x_j \in \{1, \dots, p-1\}$  and compute  $X_j = g^{x_j} \bmod p$ ;
- Each  $P_j$  sends  $X_j$  to  $P_i$ ;

- Each  $P_j$  generates a key  $K_j = (X_i)^{x_j} \bmod p = g^{x_i * x_j} \bmod p$ ;
- $P_i$  generates  $n - 1$  keys for each slave  $P_j$ ,  $K_j = (X_j)^{x_i} \bmod p = g^{x_i * x_j} \bmod p$ ;
- $P_i$ , for all slaves, combines all generated keys in  $X_{k,j} = g^{\prod K_{k \neq j}} \bmod p$ ;
- Bob compute  $K_b$  with  $A^b \bmod p$ ;
- Woody compute  $K_c$  with  $A^c \bmod p$ ;
- Alice compute  $D_c = g^{K_c} \bmod p$  and sends it to Bob;
- Alice compute  $D_b = g^{K_b} \bmod p$  and sends it to Woody;
- Bob compute  $K = (D_c)^{K_b} \bmod p = g^{K_b * K_c} \bmod p$ ;
- Woody compute  $K = (D_b)^{K_c} \bmod p = g^{K_b * K_c} \bmod p$ ;
- Alice compute  $K = g^{K_b * K_c} \bmod p$  directly;
- Now all parties share the key  $K$  and Alice is not a master anymore.

## 5 Security considerations

### References

- [1] W. Diffie and M. E. Hellman, “New directions in cryptography,” *IEEE Trans. Info. Theory*, vol. 22, pp. 644–54, November 1976.
- [2] D. Adrian, K. Bhargavan, Z. Durumeric, P. Gaudry, M. Green, J. A. Halderman, N. Heninger, D. Springall, E. Thomé, L. Valenta, B. VanderSloot, E. Wustrow, S. Zanella-Béguelin, and P. Zimmermann, “Imperfect forward secrecy: How Diffie–Hellman fails in practice,” in *CCS’15*, (Denver, Colorado), October 12–16, 2015.
- [3] G. P. Biswas, “Diffie-hellman technique: extended to multiple two-party keys and one multi-party key,” *IET Information Security*, vol. 2, pp. 12–18, March 2008.
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