

## **Exercise 7**

### **Basics of Knowledge Management**

### **Case BMW**

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# The Knowledge-Based Theory of the Firm

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## Theories of the Firm - General:

- Conceptualizations and models **predicting structure** and **behavior** of organizations  
→ There is not one universal theory explaining everything, rather many competing ones covering different topics

## Theories of the Firm - Knowledge Based:

- The knowledge based theory of the firm is an **outgrowth** of the **resource based** view  
→ It focuses on the most strategically important resource of a firm, **knowledge**

## Forms of Knowledge:

- Knowing about facts = explicit  
Revealed by **communication**; can be **acquired** for basically **no cost**; can be **stored** in one place and **distributed**
- Knowing how = tacit  
Only revealed by **application**; can only be acquired through practice - slow and **costly**; **scattered** across individuals

# Knowledge in Production


## Knowledge Creation:

- Knowledge creation is an individual activity, the firm can only learn through:
  - Learning of its employees
  - Hiring of employees with new knowledge

→ The role of the firm is **not** knowledge **creation**, but the **application** of the individuals' knowledge for **production**

## Production:

- A fundamental assumption of the knowledge based theory is that the most **critical input** and primary value source for production, is **knowledge**



# Knowledge Integration

## Mechanisms for efficient knowledge integration:

Efficient knowledge integration means organizing production in a way that requires as **little knowledge transfer** as possible. Grant proposes 4 mechanisms for that:

1. *Rules and directives*  
Skilled engineer should **rather set up** a set of **rules** and procedures, **instead of teaching** every production worker her knowledge
2. *Sequencing*  
Production process should be designed in a time-patterned **sequence** such that each **specialist's input** occurs **independently** in separate time slot
3. *Routines*  
Complex **patterns of interaction** when rules and directives are absent. E.g. operating fast food restaurant, pit stops in Formula 1 etc. Can also have a repertoire of responses for situation variations
4. *Group problem solving*  
While organizations should minimize communication and knowledge transfer, if **task is unusual, complex** and important, it should be **solved by group** problem solving, involving lots of tacit knowledge communication

# Organizational Structure

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## Implications for hierarchy:

- Simon (1981) argues that hierarchy is a general feature of complex systems emerging because of its evolutionary and problem-solving advantages
  - Companies: 'composed' of interrelated **sub-systems**
- Near decomposability: for most aspects of their functioning each unit may be viewed as **operating autonomously**
- When managers know only a fraction of what their subordinates know and tacit knowledge cannot be transferred upwards, then coordination by hierarchy is inefficient
- 'higher-level decisions' are **dependent** upon immobile 'lower-level' knowledge, hierarchy impoverishes the quality of higher-level decisions

## Implications for decision-making:

- The conventional basis for the analysis of decision making is **delegation**
  - employees own the bulk of the firm's resources
  - the quality of decisions depends upon their being based upon relevant knowledge
- Decisions based upon such tacit and idiosyncratic knowledge are **decentralized**, while decisions requiring statistical knowledge are **centralized**


# Boundaries of the Firm

Knowledge transfer inefficiently



Prod A → Prod B

Knowledge transfer efficiently



Prod A → Prod B  
linked by market interface


- firms are characterized both as **product domains** and **knowledge domains**
  - perfect **congruence** does not exist
  - creates opportunities for **knowledge trading** to achieve fuller utilization of knowledge

# KBV's Implications for Platforms


A digital platform is “a set of stable components that supports variety and evolvability in a system by constraining the linkages among the other components. It incorporates a central core surrounded by multiple actors in its digital platform ecosystem”

## Hierarchies

Usual case



In special cases, the platform is not orchestrated by a **single owner** but driven by a **developer community**, which is globally distributed



# KBV's Implications for Platforms

## Decision-Rights

### Platform Governance

*"Partitioning of the decision-making authority between platform owners and app developers, control mechanisms and pricing and pie-sharing structures"*

#### Usual case

- Covers **tactical decisions between platform owner and app developers** - decisions usually transmitted and enforced by resources that enable app developers in their activities
  - Beside technical resources, **platform owner provides knowledge on app development as boundary resource**
- ➔ Multiple levels of knowledge transfer through boundary resources:  
From owner to app developers via multiple channels - app developers can choose most appropriate for individual requirements

Design of boundary resources is constantly shaped and evolved in a common refining process of platform owner and app developers

→ Platform boundary resources correspond to the platform owner's decisions on platform governance, thus refinements on platform boundary resources mirror adjustments of platform governance decisions

#### Special case

- Even though these platforms also require governance, different members of the community consolidate certain decisions
- E.g. app developers are able to get involved as the platform owner and contribute to platform core by submitting pull requests



# KBV's Implications for Platforms

## Boundaries

➔ The accessibility of the provided platform resources is defined by the configuration of the platform's **vertical openness**

### *Vertical Openness*

- Defines **degree of accessibility and transparency** of platform boundary resources for external actors
- Platform owner can decide to **limit access** to certain platform assets for a defined group of users or restrict the usage of specific resources  
→ decides on the **potential of knowledge transfer** from the platform owner to app developers
- Alternatively, platform owner can **pull external innovation** back into the core of its platform  
→ **potential danger** of getting replaced by a platform feature may discourage app developers from entering a digital platform ecosystem, **BUT** overall digital platform ecosystem mostly benefits from improvements of the platform core through coring

### *Horizontal Openness*

- **Interoperability** with other platforms and willingness of **sharing the platform ownership** with others



Platform with **insufficient level of openness and inadequate transparency or accessibility** to app developers may have the potential to discourage app developers and aggravate the chicken-egg problem. An excessive level of openness on the side may involve the danger of losing control

# BMW's Platform for Automotive Onboard Apps

start in 2016

enables modular deployment of apps in the car

platform managed by a development department = platform team


platform used by app development teams from multiple different departments, distributed all over the organization




# BMW's Platform for Automotive Onboard Apps

## Hierarchies

Initial case:



Later:



- **Control function**
- Setting up **rules and guidelines**
- More approachable

Knowledge exchange trough

- **Community meetings**
- **Developer Portal**

Knowledge exchange through

- Work in **cross-functional teams** (Starter App)

## Decision-Making

### Initial case:

- Decisions made by platform team (based on knowledge of platform team) → no specialist knowledge from developers leading to less quality in decisions


### Later:

- Decisions still made by platform team BUT
- **More attention towards developers' opinion** (Thread on BMW Answer for new inputs and refinements) → integration of their knowledge into decisions
- Platform team **taking perspective of a developer** (to understand their logic) → increased interaction between platform team and development and knowledge exchange → developers' knowledge included in decision process


# BMW's Platform for Automotive Onboard Apps



## Vertical Openness

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- The **accessibility** of the platform development repository enabled app developers to add functionality and merge their change into the platform
  - However, the platform team realized that rules for the transfer of artifacts from app developers to the platform were needed to **avoid integration of malicious or insufficient artifacts**
  - Hence, it decided to create contribution guidelines to define **clear rules** for external contributions

## Horizontal Openness

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- “We as platform developer **appreciate external input**. However, we recognize that we need clear rules for that. Otherwise, **we spend too much efforts** in discussions and in general communication with app developers that want to contribute to the platform.”  
~Platform team member

# Questions

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- What was a situation in an internship / job where communication cost was too high due to tacit knowledge and you/your team implemented rules and procedures to decrease the communication costs?
- What could be an applicable way of connecting the sub-systems as described in Simon (1981) within firms?
- Can you think of examples, where platforms failed due to too much/too little “openness”?
- Are you aware of a situation where a bad decision was made because no expert knowledge was considered in the decision process?
- If you are an aspiring application developer in an up-and-coming platform would you be willing to contribute to/code an API for a platform?

# Resources

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Weiß, N., Wiesche, M., Schreieck, M., Krcmar, H. (2020). Learning to be a Platform Owner: How BMW Enhances App Development for Cars. *IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management*, (Early Access). doi: <https://doi.org/10.1109/TEM.2020.3017051>

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