



UNIVERSITÀ DI TRENTO

Formal Method Mod. 2 (Model Checking)

Laboratory 8

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Outline

1. Model Properties

Invariants

LTL

CTL

2. Fairness Constraints

3. Modelling a Program in nuXmv

4. Examples

5. Homework



Model Properties [1/2]

A property:

- ▶ can be added to any module within a program

```
LTLSPEC G (req -> F sum = op1 + op2);
```

- ▶ can be specified through nuXmv interactive shell

```
nuXmv > check_ltlspec -p "G (req -> F sum = op1 + op2)"
```

Notes:

- ▶ `show_property` lists all properties collected in an *internal database*:

```
nuXmv > show_property
```

```
**** PROPERTY LIST [ Type, Status, Counter-example Number, Name ] ****
```

```
----- PROPERTY LIST -----
```

```
000 : G !(proc1.state = critical & proc2.state = critical)
```

```
    [LTL           True           N/A     N/A]
```

```
001 : G (proc1.state = entering -> F proc1.state = critical)
```

```
    [LTL           True           N/A     N/A]
```

- ▶ each property can be verified one at a time using its **database index**:

```
nuXmv > check_ltlspec -n 0
```

Model Properties [2/2]

Property verification:

- ▶ each property is separately verified
- ▶ the result is either “**TRUE**” or “**FALSE** + counterexample”

Different kinds of properties are supported:

- ▶ **Invariants**: properties on every reachable state;
- ▶ **LTL**: properties on the computation paths;
- ▶ **CTL**: properties on the computation tree.

Invariants

- ▶ Invariant properties are specified via the keyword `INVARSPEC`:
`INVARSPEC <simple_expression>`
- ▶ Invariants are checked via the `check_invar` command

Remark:

during the checking of invariants, all the fairness conditions associated with the model are ignored

Example: modulo 4 counter with reset


[1/2]

```

MODULE main
VAR  b0      : boolean;
     b1      : boolean;
     reset   : boolean;
ASSIGN
  init(b0) := FALSE;
  next(b0) := case
    reset   : FALSE;
    !reset  : !b0;
  esac;
  init(b1) := FALSE;
  next(b1) := case
    reset : FALSE;
    TRUE  : ((!b0 & b1) |
              (b0 & !b1));
  esac;
DEFINE out := toint(b0) + 2*toint(b1);

INVARSPEC out < 2
    
```

► recall:



Example: modulo 4 counter with reset

[2/2]

- The invariant is **false**


```

nuXmv > read_model -i counter4reset.smv;
nuXmv > go; check_invar
-- invariant out < 2 is false
...
-> State: 1.1 <-
  b0 = FALSE
  b1 = FALSE
  reset = FALSE
  out = 0
-> State: 1.2 <-
  b0 = TRUE
  out = 1
-> State: 1.3 <-
  b0 = FALSE
  b1 = TRUE
  out = 2

```

LTL specifications

- LTL properties are specified via the keyword LTLSPEC:
LTLSPEC <ltl_expression>



- LTL properties are checked via the `check_ltlspec` command

LTL specifications

Specifications Examples:

- ▶ A state in which $\text{out} = 3$ is eventually reached

LTL specifications

Specifications Examples:

- ▶ A state in which $\text{out} = 3$ is eventually reached
LTLSPEC $F \text{ out} = 3$
- ▶ Condition $\text{out} = 0$ holds until reset becomes false



LTL specifications

Specifications Examples:

- ▶ A state in which $\text{out} = 3$ is eventually reached
LTLSPEC $F \text{ out} = 3$
- ▶ Condition $\text{out} = 0$ holds until reset becomes false
LTLSPEC $(\text{out} = 0) U (!\text{reset})$
- ▶ Every time a state with $\text{out} = 2$ is reached, a state with $\text{out} = 3$ is reached afterward



LTL specifications

Specifications Examples:

- ▶ A state in which $\text{out} = 3$ is eventually reached
LTLSPEC $F \text{ out} = 3$
- ▶ Condition $\text{out} = 0$ holds until reset becomes false
LTLSPEC $(\text{out} = 0) U (!\text{reset})$
- ▶ Every time a state with $\text{out} = 2$ is reached, a state with $\text{out} = 3$ is reached afterward
LTLSPEC $G (\text{out} = 2 \rightarrow F \text{ out} = 3)$

LTL specifications


All the previous specifications are false:

```
NuSMV > check_ltlspec
-- specification F out = 3 is false ...
-- loop starts here --
-> State 1.1 <-
    b0 = FALSE
    b1 = FALSE
    reset = TRUE
    out = 0
-> State 1.2 <-
-- specification (out = 0 U (!reset)) is false ...
-- loop starts here --
-> State 2.1 <-
    b0 = FALSE
    b1 = FALSE
    reset = TRUE
    out = 0
-> State 2.2 <-
-- specification G (out = 2 -> F out = 3) is false ...
```

Q: why?

CTL specifications

- CTL properties are specified via the keyword **CTLSPEC**:
CTLSPEC <ctl_expression>



- CTL properties are checked via the `check_ctlspec` command

CTL specifications

Specifications Examples:

- ▶ It is possible to reach a state in which $out = 3$

CTL specifications

Specifications Examples:

- ▶ It is possible to reach a state in which $\text{out} = 3$
CTLSPEC EF $\text{out} = 3$
- ▶ It is inevitable that $\text{out} = 3$ is eventually reached

CTL specifications

Specifications Examples:

- ▶ It is possible to reach a state in which $\text{out} = 3$
CTLSPEC EF $\text{out} = 3$
- ▶ It is inevitable that $\text{out} = 3$ is eventually reached
CTLSPEC AF $\text{out} = 3$
- ▶ It is always possible to reach a state in which $\text{out} = 3$



CTL specifications

Specifications Examples:

- ▶ It is possible to reach a state in which $\text{out} = 3$
CTLSPEC EF $\text{out} = 3$
- ▶ It is inevitable that $\text{out} = 3$ is eventually reached
CTLSPEC AF $\text{out} = 3$
- ▶ It is always possible to reach a state in which $\text{out} = 3$
CTLSPEC AG EF $\text{out} = 3$
- ▶ Every time a state with $\text{out} = 2$ is reached, a state with $\text{out} = 3$ is reached afterward

Specifications Examples:

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CTLSPEC AG ($\text{out} = 2 \rightarrow \text{AF out} = 3$)
- ▶ The reset operation is correct

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CTLSPEC AG ($\text{out} = 2 \rightarrow \text{AF } \text{out} = 3$)
- ▶ The reset operation is correct
CTLSPEC AG ($\text{reset} \rightarrow \text{AX } \text{out} = 0$)

Outline

1. Model Properties
2. Fairness Constraints
3. Modelling a Program in nuXmv
4. Examples
5. Homework



The need for Fairness Constraints

The specification $F \text{ out} = 3$ is not verified

- ▶ On the path where **reset** is always **1**, the system loops on a state where **out** = **0**:

reset = TRUE, TRUE, TRUE, TRUE, TRUE, ...
out = 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, ...

Similar considerations for other properties:

- ▶ $F \text{ out} = 1$
- ▶ $F \text{ out} = 2$
- ▶ $G (\text{out} = 2 \rightarrow F \text{ out} = 3)$
- ▶ ...

⇒ it would be **fair** to consider only paths in which the **counter** is not **reset** with such a high frequency so as to hinder its desired functionality

Fairness Constraints

nuXmv supports both *justice* and *compassion* fairness constraints

- ▶ **Fairness/Justice** p : consider only the executions that satisfy **infinitely often** the condition p
- ▶ **Strong Fairness/Compassion** (p, q) : consider only those executions that either satisfy p **finitely often** or satisfy q **infinitely often**
(i.e. p true infinitely often $\Rightarrow q$ true infinitely often)

Remarks:

- ▶ **verification**: properties must hold only on **fair paths**
- ▶ Currently, compassion constraints have some limitations
(are supported only for BDD-based LTL model checking)

Example: modulo 4 counter with reset

Add the following fairness constraint to the model:

JUSTICE out = 3

(we consider only paths in which the counter reaches value 3 infinitely often)

All the properties are now verified:

```
nuXmv > reset
nuXmv > read_model -i counter4reset.smv
nuXmv > go
nuXmv > check_ltlspec
-- specification F out = 1 is true
-- specification G (out = 2 -> F out = 3) is true
-- specification G (reset -> F out = 0) is true
```


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Example: model programs in nuXmv [1/4]

Q: given the following piece of code, computing the GCD, how do we *model* and *verify* it with **nuXmv**?

```
void main() {  
    ... // initialization of a and b  
    while (a!=b) {  
        if (a>b)  
            a=a-b;  
        else  
            b=b-a;  
    }  
    ... // GCD=a=b  
}
```

Main idea

- ▶ We will define a program counter `pc` that stores the current status of the execution (i.e. the line we reached).
- ▶ According to the iterative and conditional cycle, the program counter and the variables (when required) will change.



Example: model programs in nuXmv [2/4]

Step 1: label the **entry point** and the **exit point** of every block

```
void main() {  
    ... // initialization of a and b  
11:    while (a!=b) {  
12:        if (a>b)  
13:            a=a-b;  
        else  
14:            b=b-a;  
    }  
15:    ... // GCD=a=b  
}
```

Example: model programs in nuXmv [3/4]

Step 2: encode the transition system with the assign style

```

MODULE main()
VAR  a: 0..100;  b: 0..100;
    pc: {l1,l2,l3,l4,l5};
ASSIGN
    init(pc):=l1;
    next(pc):=
        case
            pc=l1 & a!=b      : l2;
            pc=l1 & a=b       : l5;
            pc=l2 & a>b       : l3;
            pc=l2 & a<=b      : l4;
            pc=l3 | pc=l4     : l1;
            pc=l5             : l5;
        esac;

```

```

    next(a):=
        case
            pc=l3 & a > b: a - b;
            TRUE: a;
        esac;

    next(b):=
        case
            pc=l4 & b >= a: b-a;
            TRUE: b;
        esac;

```

Model programs in nuXmv: properties

- ▶ Let's check if, given $a = 16$ and $b = 12$, then we will eventually get as a result 4.

LTLSPEC $(a = 16 \ \& \ b = 12) \rightarrow F \ (a = 4 \ \& \ b = 4)$

- ▶ Let's check if both number will never reach negative values:

INVARIANT $a > 0 \ \& \ b > 0$

Example: model programs in nuXmv [4/4]

Step 2: (alternative): use the constraint style

```
MODULE main
```

```
VAR
```

```
  a : 0..100;  b : 0..100;  pc : {11, 12, 13, 14, 15};
```

```
INIT pc = 11
```

```
TRANS
```

```
  pc = 11 -> (((a != b & next(pc) = 12) |
               (a = b & next(pc) = 15)) &
              next(a) = a & next(b) = b)
```

```
TRANS
```

```
  pc = 12 -> (((a > b & next(pc) = 13) |
               (a < b & next(pc) = 14)) &
              next(a) = a & next(b) = b)
```

```
TRANS
```

```
  pc = 13 -> (next(pc) = 11 & next(a) = (a - b) & next(b) = b)
```

```
TRANS
```

```
  pc = 14 -> (next(pc) = 11 & next(b) = (b - a) & next(a) = a)
```

```
TRANS
```

```
  pc = 15 -> (next(pc) = 15 & next(a) = a & next(b) = b)
```

3. Modelling a Program in nuXmv

Outline

1. Model Properties
2. Fairness Constraints
3. Modelling a Program in nuXmv
4. Examples
 - Mutual Exclusion
 - Chemical reactions
5. Homework



Mutual Exclusion

Two users U_0 and U_1 , and an Arbiter Ar are part of a competition. Each user can be either `NonCritical`, `Trying` or `Critical`. To access the critical section, they notify their wish to the arbiter using 2 req variables, one per user. The arbiter notifies the possibility to access the resource using 2 auth variables. Moreover:

- ▶ From `NonCritical`, they can nondeterministically go to `Trying`;
- ▶ From `Trying`, they can go to `Critical` when authorized by the arbiter;
- ▶ From `Critical`, they can nondeterministically go back to `NonCritical`.

Model the problem on nuXvm and use LTL to encode the property "The aim of the arbiter is guaranteeing that the two users are not in status `Critical` at the same time"

A first attempt (cont.d)

```
MODULE User(auth)
```

```
  VAR
```

```
    status: { NonCritical, Trying, Critical };
```

```
    req: boolean;
```

```
  ASSIGN
```

```
    init(status) := NonCritical;
```

```
    next(status) :=
```

```
      case
```

```
        status = NonCritical : { NonCritical, Trying };
```

```
        status = Trying      :
```

```
          case
```

```
            next(auth) = FALSE : Trying;
```

```
            next(auth) = TRUE  : Critical;
```

```
          esac;
```

```
        status = Critical    : { Critical, NonCritical};
```

```
      esac;
```

```
  req := status in { Trying, Critical };
```

A first attempt

```
MODULE Arbiter(req0, req1)
```

```
  VAR
```

```
    auth0: boolean;
```

```
    auth1: boolean;
```

```
  ASSIGN
```

```
    init(auth0) := FALSE;
```

```
    next(auth0) := req0 & !auth1;
```

```
    init(auth1) := FALSE;
```

```
    next(auth1) := req1 & !auth0;
```

```
MODULE main
```

```
  VAR
```

```
    U0: User(Ar.auth0); --- User 0
```

```
    U1: User(Ar.auth1); --- User 1
```

```
    Ar: Arbiter(U0.req, U1.req);
```

```
LTLSPEC G (!(U0.status = Critical & U0.status = Critical))
```

Fixing the issue

- ▶ You can see that the properties does not hold, and a counterproof is shown by the tool...
- ▶ We can define a variable `turn` defining the user that has the right to enter.
 - ▶ If user 0 is authorized to access the critical section, `turn` will be equal to 0.
 - ▶ If user 1 is authorized to access the critical section, `turn` will be equal to 1.
 - ▶ Otherwise, `turn` ranges cyclically on all the users to ensure fairness.

Fixing the issue (cont.d)

```
MODULE Arbiter(req0, req1)
  VAR
    auth0: boolean;
    auth1: boolean;
    turn: {0,1};





  ASSIGN
    init(auth0) := FALSE;
    next(auth0) := req0 & turn = 0;
    init(auth1) := FALSE;
    next(auth1) := req1 & turn = 1;
    next(turn)  := case
      next(auth0) : 0;
      next(auth1) : 1;
      TRUE       : (turn+1) mod 2;
    esac;
```

Is fairness ensured?

- ▶ If we try to write a property to verify the two users have a fair access to the resource, you'll see it is not satisfied...

```
LTLSPEC G (U0.status = Trying ->  
            F (U0.status = Critical))
```
- ▶ ... but we can easily solve the issue adding a FAIRNESS constraint to the model.

Assume the following chemical reactions hold:



Given a certain number of input carbon and oxygen atoms, is there any way for the contents of his reaction vessel to progress to a state where it contains three molecules of CO₂? Model the contents of the reaction vessel in NuSMV.

Science modeling (cont.d)

- ▶ We can store the number of current atoms/molecules for each iteration using bounded integers.
- ▶ An enumerate variable can be used to define what reaction should be considered in the next step, ensuring non-determinism when necessary.



Science modeling (cont.d)

```
MODULE main
  VAR
    o : 0..32;
    o2: 0..32;
    c : 0..32;
    co : 0..32;
    co2 : 0..32;
    reaction : {r1, r2, r3, r4, none};

  ASSIGN
    init(o) := 6;
    init(c) := 6;
    init(co) := 0;
    init(co2) := 0;
    init(o2) := 0;
    init(reaction) := none;
```

Science modeling (cont.d)

Transitions to define the next reaction that will take place on the next step.

TRANS

`(next(o) < 2) -> (next(reaction) != r1)`

TRANS

`(next(o) < 1 | next(c) < 1) -> (next(reaction) != r2)`

TRANS

`(next(o2) < 1 | next(c) < 2) -> (next(reaction) != r3)`

TRANS

`(next(o2) < 1 | next(c) < 1) -> (next(reaction) != r4)`



Science modeling (cont.d)

Transitions to define the new values for each molecule after a reaction took place.

TRANS

```
(reaction = none) -> (o = next(o) & o2 = next(o2) &
    c = next(c) & co = next(co) & co2 = next(co2))
```

TRANS

```
(reaction = r1) -> (next(o) = o - 2 & next(o2) = o2 + 1 &
    next(c) = c & next(co) = co & next(co2) = co2)
```

TRANS

```
(reaction = r2) -> (next(o) = o - 1 & next(o2) = o2 &
    next(c) = c - 1 & next(co) = co + 1 & next(co2) = co2)
```

TRANS

```
(reaction = r3) -> (next(o) = o & next(o2) = o2 - 1 &
    next(c) = c - 1 & next(co) = co + 2 & next(co2) = co2)
```

TRANS

```
(reaction = r4) -> (next(o) = o & next(o2) = o2 - 1 &
    next(c) = c - 1 & next(co) = co & next(co2) = co2 + 1)
```

4. Examples

Science modeling: property

- ▶ If we are interested in knowing if there is a path that generates 3 CO_2 molecules, LTL apparently seems ineffective...
- ▶ ... but we can use it to search a valid counterproof that returns the desired execution.
- ▶ In this case we try to verify the number of CO_2 molecules does not reach 3 in any path. If the property is not satisfied, the counterproof will return a series of events reaching the condition.

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Homework

Bubblesort

implement a transition system which sorts the following input array $\{4, 1, 3, 2, 5\}$ with increasing order. Verify the following properties:

- ▶ there exists no path in which the algorithm ends
- ▶ there exists no path in which the algorithm ends with a sorted array



Bubblesort pseudocode

Bubblesort pseudocode

you might use the following *bubblesort pseudocode* as reference:

```
procedure bubbleSort( A : list of sortable items )
  n = length(A)
  repeat
    swapped = false
    for i = 1 to n-1 inclusive do
      /* if this pair is out of order */
      if A[i-1] > A[i] then
        /* swap them and remember something changed */
        swap( A[i-1], A[i] )
        swapped = true
      end if
    end for
  until not swapped
end procedure
```