

**Experiment 3.** To prevent the attack shown in Figure 3, we add **encrypt** and **unwrap** to the list of conflicting attribute pairs. Another new attack is discovered (see Figure 4) of a type discussed by Clulow, [4, Section 2.3]. Here the key  $k_2$  is first wrapped under  $k_2$  itself, and then unwrapped, gaining a new handle  $h(n_3, k_2)$ . The intruder then wraps  $k_1$  under  $k_2$ , and sets the **decrypt** attribute on handle  $h(n_3, k_2)$ , allowing him to obtain  $k_1$ .

**Initial state:** The intruder knows the handles  $h(n_1, k_1)$ ,  $h(n_2, k_2)$ ;  $n_1$  has the attributes **sensitive**, **extract** and whereas  $n_2$  has the attribute **extract** set.

**Trace:**

Set_wrap:	$h(n_2, k_2)$	$\rightarrow$	$\text{wrap}(n_2)$
Wrap:	$h(n_2, k_2), h(n_2, k_2)$	$\rightarrow$	$\text{senc}(k_2, k_2)$
Set_unwrap:	$h(n_2, k_2)$	$\rightarrow$	$\text{unwrap}(n_2)$
Unwrap:	$h(n_2, k_2), \text{senc}(k_2, k_2)$	$\xrightarrow{\text{new } n_4}$	$h(n_4, k_2)$
Wrap:	$h(n_2, k_2), h(n_1, k_1)$	$\rightarrow$	$\text{senc}(k_1, k_2)$
Set_decrypt:	$h(n_4, k_2)$	$\rightarrow$	$\text{decrypt}(n_4)$
SDecrypt:	$h(n_4, k_2), \text{senc}(k_1, k_2)$	$\rightarrow$	$k_1$

**Figure 4. Attack discovered in Experiment 3**