

Resumo

Resumo...

Palavras-chave:

Abstract

Abstract...

Keywords:

Summary

1	Introduction	7
2	Modelling faults	9
2.1	Modelling a system	9
2.1.1	Example of valued tautology	13
2.1.2	Failure value and failure state	15
2.1.3	Order of occurrence	15
3	Temporal Fault Trees	17
3.1	Formalisation of Temporal Fault Trees	17
3.1.1	Sequence Value Calculus	19
3.1.2	From TTTs to sequences of events	19
3.1.3	Checking process refinements	21
	Appendix	23

1

Introduction

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—AUTOR (Título)

OLD:{

a) Reliability engineering

– Describe safety (related to lives), reliability (related to cost).

b) Fault tolerance


– Definition

– Patterns

c) Functions to describe component behaviour. Include time

d) Make a ft-pattern replaceable by its function refinement.

}

**Figure 1.1:** Overview

2

Modelling faults

Texto

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—AUTOR (Título)

In this section we show how to model faults using functions in a component-level failure logic. We define two relations to establish our axioms: (i) failure value and failure state, (ii) order of occurrence. Using these definitions we are able to create a library of basic components that can be used as building blocks to create new components or to compose a system model.

2.1 Modelling a system

A system model is a block diagram (nodes) with directed connected edges. An edge's origin is the output of some component and the destination is one or more inputs of other component. Two output ports cannot be directly connected, nor does two inputs. It is required an output and at least one input to connect two components.

Edges and nodes contain fault-related information. An edge contains the current value of the output of the originating node. It is a Boolean indicating a nominal or an erroneous value. In the last case, the edge also contains the error mode. A node contains: (i) state information, indicating whether the component is in failure, and (ii) a logic for each output that expresses how the output reacts to internal failures and failures on the inputs. Item (ii) is very similar to the cause of output deviation in Hierarchically Performed Hazard Origin and Propagation Studies (HiP-HOPS) [TODO: citar def. HH]. It also includes the order of occurrence of the failures.

Differently from HiP-HOPS, an output expression also contains the nominal case to cover all possibilities on the components, to avoid missing a case.

Definition 1 (Values). *The set of possible values in inputs and outputs is defined as:*

$$\text{Values} = \mathbf{N}.\mathbb{R} \cup \text{FMode}$$

where N means a nominal value and FMode specifies a failure mode, such as omission, commission etc. and denotes all possible failure modes for any component.

Definition 2 (Component). $C_m = (I_m, O_m)$

where $I_m = \{\text{in}_{m,1}, \dots, \text{in}_{m,n_{in}}\}$ are inputs of type Values , $O_m = \{\text{out}_{m,1}, \dots, \text{out}_{m,n_{out}}\}$ are output functions of type ValueFunction , $\text{ValueFunction} : (\text{Values} \times \dots \times \text{Values}) \times \text{FMode} \rightarrow \text{Values}$, m is the index of the component in a model, and n_{in} and n_{out} are the number of inputs and outputs.

Definition 3 (System model). $S = (Cs, A)$ where Cs is a set of components and $A : \text{PortIndex} \times \text{PortIndex}$ relates a component output to another component's input, PortIndex is a pair of indexes where the first element is a component's index and the second is the input or output index within the component, and

$$\forall m, j \bullet \neg \exists k \bullet A((m, o_m), (k, i_k)) \wedge A((j, o_j), (k, i_k))$$

Definition 4 (Model inputs and outputs). *Model inputs and outputs are all components' inputs and outputs that are not in A .*

$$\mathbf{M}_{\text{inputs}} = \bigcup_m \bullet(m, k) \mid \forall m, j, k \bullet \neg A((j, o_j), (m, k))$$

and

$$\mathbf{M}_{\text{outputs}} = \bigcup_m \bullet(m, k) \mid \forall m, j, k \bullet \neg A((m, k), (j, i_j))$$

where $C_m = (I_m, O_m)$, $I_m = (i_{m,1}, \dots, i_{m,n_{in}})$ and $O_m = (o_{m,1}, \dots, o_{m,n_{out}})$

Lemma 1 (Inputs and Outputs completeness). *In a model, every input and output is either in A , or in $\mathbf{M}_{\text{inputs}} \cup \mathbf{M}_{\text{outputs}}$:*

$$\forall m, i \bullet (m, i) \in \mathbf{M}_{\text{inputs}} \vee (m, i) \in \text{ran } A$$

$$\forall m, o \bullet (m, o) \in \mathbf{M}_{\text{outputs}} \vee (m, o) \in \text{dom } A$$

Proof. **TODO: sorry**

□

The output functions are defined using a *valued tautology* logic. It adds value information to a Boolean expression and can be generally understood as a guarded-value expression. The

evaluation of the expression of all guards is always *true* (tautology). The most basic example of a valued tautology is a \top expression and its associated value $V : \text{Values}$:

$$\top^V$$

Definition 5 (Valued tautology). *A valued tautology is defined as:*

$$\begin{aligned} \text{ValuedTautology} &\hat{=} E_0^{V_0} \text{op}_0 \dots \text{op}_m E_m^{V_m} \\ E_0 \text{op}_0 \dots \text{op}_m E_m &= \top \\ \forall i, j \bullet E_i \wedge E_j &\Rightarrow V_i = V_j \end{aligned}$$

where op_m is a Boolean operator, E_m is a Boolean expression and V_m is a value of type Values.

Lemma 2 (Valued tautology OR). *Given two Boolean variables A and B , their respective values U and V , and a third value Q , $A^U \vee B^V \vee (\neg A \wedge \neg B)^Q$ is a valued tautology:*

$$\begin{aligned} A^U \vee B^V \vee (\neg A \wedge \neg B)^Q &\hat{=} (A \wedge \neg B)^U \vee (\neg A \wedge B)^V \vee \\ &\quad (A \wedge B \wedge (U = V))^U \vee \\ &\quad (\neg A \wedge \neg B)^Q \end{aligned}$$

Proof. Assume $E = A \vee B$, $\neg E = (\neg A \wedge \neg B)$ is also in the expression, thus:

$$E \vee \neg E = \top$$

TODO: completar

□

Lemma 3 (Valued tautology AND). *Give two Boolean variables A and B , their respective values U and V and a third value Q , $A^U \wedge B^V \vee (\neg A \vee \neg B)^Q$ is a valued tautology:*

$$\begin{aligned} (A^U \wedge B^V) \vee (\neg A \vee \neg B)^Q &\hat{=} (A \wedge \neg B)^Q \vee (\neg A \wedge B)^Q \vee \\ &\quad (A \wedge B \wedge U = V)^U \vee \\ &\quad (\neg A \wedge \neg B)^Q \end{aligned}$$

Proof. Assume $E = A \wedge B$, $\neg E = (\neg A \vee \neg B)$ is also in the expression, thus:

$$E \vee \neg E = \top$$

TODO: completar

□

TODO: Citação do capítulo ou da seção: to be or not to be.

Definition 6 (Value of a valued tautology). *The value of a valued tautology is the i -eth value when the i -eth expression evaluates to true. Given a valued tautology $T = E_0^{V_0} op_0 \dots op_m E_m^{V_m}$, the value of T is defined by the function ρ :*

$$\exists i \bullet E_i \wedge \rho(T) = V_i$$

If an $E_j (i \neq j)$ also evaluates to *true*, the value is the same, accordingly to definition 5.

Definition 7 (Rules for ρ). *Given a predicate $P(\cdot)$, and Boolean expressions E and $E_i, i \in [1, n]$:*

$$P\left(\rho\left(E_1^{V_1} \vee \dots \vee E_n^{V_n}\right)\right) = (P(V_1) \wedge E_1) \vee \dots \vee (P(V_n) \wedge E_n) \quad (2.1)$$

$$E^{\rho(E_1^{V_1} \vee \dots \vee E_n^{V_n})} = (E \wedge E_1)^{V_1} \vee \dots \vee (E \wedge E_n)^{V_n} \quad (2.2)$$

TODO: Acrescentar teorema sobre como as funções de saída geram as equações para as árvores.

Accordingly to the work reported in ?), a fault tree structure function is not only a Boolean expression. It exemplifies with the expression $true \wedge \neg closed(barriers)$, where we cannot just replace ‘ \wedge ’ to an AND-gate, because *true* is not a basic event, nor $\neg closed(barriers)$ expresses a fault. The work reported in ?) defines a formal model of static fault trees considering operands as events.

Definition 8 (Fault tree gate). *Given $F_f, f \in [0, n_F], n_F \geq 0$, Boolean variables where if F_f evaluates to *true*, then a basic fault event occurs, a fault tree gate G combines all F_f with a Boolean operator op :*

$$G = F_0 op \dots op F_{n_F}$$

If $n_F = 0$ then the gate reduces to the variable F_0 .

Definition 9 (Fault tree structure function). *Given $F_f, f \in [0, n_F]$ Boolean variables, and fault tree gates $G_g, g \in [0, n_G]$, a structure function $SF : (Boolean \times \dots \times Boolean) \rightarrow Boolean$ is also a fault tree gate with operator op :*

$$SF(F_0, \dots, F_{n_F}) = G_0(F_0, \dots, F_{n_F}) op \dots op G_{n_G}(F_0, \dots, F_{n_F})$$

where if F_f evaluates to *true*, then a basic fault event occurs. Then SF represents a fault tree.

Theorem 1 (A predicate over a valued tautology is a structure function of a fault tree). *Given $F_f, f \in [1, n_F]$ Boolean variables that represent basic fault events, $G_g, g \in [0, n_G]$ fault tree gates that contains only F_f , and $T = G_0^{V_0} op_0 \dots op_{n_G} G_{n_G}^{V_{n_G}}$ a valued tautology, then a predicate P over F_f is a structure function of T .*

Proof. **TODO: sorry.**

□

2.1.1 Example of valued tautology

A single battery b_x is defined as:

$$C_{b_x} = (\emptyset, \{\text{out}_{b_x,1}\})$$

$$\text{out}_{b_x,1} = F_{b_x}^{\text{Omission}} \vee \neg F_{b_x}^{\text{N.5}}$$

A simple monitor mon :

$$C_{mon} = (\{\text{in}_{mon,1}, \text{in}_{mon,2}\}, \{\text{out}_{mon,1}\})$$

$$\text{out}_{mon,1} = (\neg F_{mon} \wedge \rho(\text{in}_{mon,1}) \geq \text{N.2})^{\rho(\text{in}_{mon,1})} \vee$$

$$(\neg F_{mon} \wedge \rho(\text{in}_{mon,1}) < \text{N.2})^{\rho(\text{in}_{mon,2})} \vee$$

$$(F_{mon} \wedge \rho(\text{in}_{mon,1}) \geq \text{N.2})^{\rho(\text{in}_{mon,2})} \vee$$

$$(F_{mon} \wedge \rho(\text{in}_{mon,1}) < \text{N.2})^{\rho(\text{in}_{mon,1})}$$

Combining both components into a system S_{mon} results in the following system model:

$$S_{mon} = (\{C_{b_1}, C_{b_2}, C_{mon}\}, A_{mon})$$

$$A_{mon}((b_1, 1), (mon, 1))$$

$$A_{mon}((b_2, 1), (mon, 2))$$

And, accordingly to definition 4:

$$M_{\text{inputs}} = \emptyset$$

$$M_{\text{outputs}} = \{(mon, 1)\}$$

The system model output is the result of expanding $\text{out}_{mon,1}$ with the output functions of

the connected single batteries $\text{out}_{b_1,1}$ and $\text{out}_{b_2,1}$:

$$\begin{aligned}
\text{out}_{mon,1} &= \left(\neg F_{mon} \wedge \rho \left(F_{b_1}^{\text{Omission}} \vee \neg F_{b_1}^{N.5} \right) \geq N.2 \right) \rho \left(F_{b_1}^{\text{Omission}} \vee \neg F_{b_1}^{N.5} \right) \vee \\
&\quad \left(\neg F_{mon} \wedge \rho \left(F_{b_1}^{\text{Omission}} \vee \neg F_{b_1}^{N.5} \right) < N.2 \right) \rho \left(F_{b_2}^{\text{Omission}} \vee \neg F_{b_2}^{N.5} \right) \vee \\
&\quad \left(F_{mon} \wedge \rho \left(F_{b_1}^{\text{Omission}} \vee \neg F_{b_1}^{N.5} \right) \geq N.2 \right) \rho \left(F_{b_2}^{\text{Omission}} \vee \neg F_{b_2}^{N.5} \right) \vee \\
&\quad \left(F_{mon} \wedge \rho \left(F_{b_1}^{\text{Omission}} \vee \neg F_{b_1}^{N.5} \right) < N.2 \right) \rho \left(F_{b_1}^{\text{Omission}} \vee \neg F_{b_1}^{N.5} \right) \\
\text{out}_{mon,1} &= (\neg F_{mon} \wedge \neg F_{b_1}) \rho \left(F_{b_1}^{\text{Omission}} \vee \neg F_{b_1}^{N.5} \right) \vee \text{by definitions 6 and 7} \\
&\quad (\neg F_{mon} \wedge F_{b_1}) \rho \left(F_{b_2}^{\text{Omission}} \vee \neg F_{b_2}^{N.5} \right) \vee (F_{mon} \wedge \neg F_{b_1}) \rho \left(F_{b_2}^{\text{Omission}} \vee \neg F_{b_2}^{N.5} \right) \vee \\
&\quad (F_{mon} \wedge F_{b_1}) \rho \left(F_{b_1}^{\text{Omission}} \vee \neg F_{b_1}^{N.5} \right) \\
\text{out}_{mon,1} &= (\neg F_{mon} \wedge \neg F_{b_1})^{N.5} \vee \text{by definition 7} \\
&\quad ((\neg F_{mon} \wedge F_{b_1}) \wedge F_{b_2})^{\text{Omission}} \vee ((\neg F_{mon} \wedge F_{b_1}) \wedge \neg F_{b_2})^{N.5} \vee \\
&\quad ((F_{mon} \wedge \neg F_{b_1}) \wedge F_{b_2})^{\text{Omission}} \vee ((F_{mon} \wedge \neg F_{b_1}) \wedge \neg F_{b_2})^{N.5} \vee \\
&\quad (F_{mon} \wedge F_{b_1})^{\text{Omission}}
\end{aligned}$$

Finally, we obtain the system fault tree from a predicate (see theorem 1):

$$\begin{aligned}
\rho(\text{out}_{mon,1}) &= \text{Omission} \hat{=} \rho \left((\neg F_{mon} \wedge \neg F_{b_1})^{N.5} \vee \right. \\
&\quad \left. ((\neg F_{mon} \wedge F_{b_1}) \wedge F_{b_2})^{\text{Omission}} \vee \right. \\
&\quad \left. ((\neg F_{mon} \wedge F_{b_1}) \wedge \neg F_{b_2})^{N.5} \vee \right. \\
&\quad \left. ((F_{mon} \wedge \neg F_{b_1}) \wedge F_{b_2})^{\text{Omission}} \vee \right. \\
&\quad \left. ((F_{mon} \wedge \neg F_{b_1}) \wedge \neg F_{b_2})^{N.5} \vee \right. \\
&\quad \left. (F_{mon} \wedge F_{b_1})^{\text{Omission}} \right) = \text{Omission} \\
\rho(\text{out}_{mon,1}) &= \text{Omission} \hat{=} \rho \left(((\neg F_{mon} \wedge F_{b_1}) \wedge F_{b_2})^{\text{Omission}} \vee \right. \\
&\quad \left. ((F_{mon} \wedge \neg F_{b_1}) \wedge F_{b_2})^{\text{Omission}} \vee \right. \\
&\quad \left. (F_{mon} \wedge F_{b_1})^{\text{Omission}} \right) = \text{Omission} \\
\rho(\text{out}_{mon,1}) &= \text{Omission} \hat{=} (\neg F_{mon} \wedge F_{b_1} \wedge F_{b_2}) \vee \\
&\quad (F_{mon} \wedge \neg F_{b_1} \wedge F_{b_2}) \vee \\
&\quad (F_{mon} \wedge F_{b_1}) \\
\rho(\text{out}_{mon,1}) &= \text{Omission} \hat{=} (F_{b_1} \wedge F_{b_2}) \vee (F_{mon} \wedge (F_{b_1} \vee F_{b_2}))
\end{aligned}$$

2.1.2 Failure value and failure state

To illustrate these definitions, suppose a component C that contains only one output, and its failure logic depends only on its internal state: if it is faulty, it produces an omission value O_M , otherwise it produces a nominal value N . The failure logic for its output O is: $O = F \wedge O_M \vee \neg F \wedge N$.

TODO: all Boolean operators relate to *FailureMode* as: if the Boolean value is *true*, then it results in the *FailureMode* value, otherwise it results in *false*. It creates an invariant that all output functions are tautologies.

2.1.3 Order of occurrence

The order of occurrence of events is defined as a sequence value as it is in HiP-HOPS: it is a natural value assigned to each input. The value does not contain gaps, so always there is a pair of input that the modulus of the difference of their sequence values is 1, or the modulus of the difference is 0 for all pairs of inputs. For example, if we have two variables, they can be assigned values 0 and 1 or 1 and 2, but not 0 and 2.

We define a relation $S : Input \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$ as the sequence value for the given input.

3

Temporal Fault Trees

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Compared to traditional Fault Trees, Temporal Fault Trees can describe the order of occurrence of events. A specific order of occurrence causes a top event, thus the concept of failure expressions is augmented. Instead of using traditional Boolean gates, they use special gates named temporal gates (see table 3.1). They differ on what kind of input they compare: Boolean gates compare Boolean values whilst temporal gates compare *sequence values*. A sequence value is a natural number in which each basic event happens on a specific value, but there are no gaps on the sequence (see table 3.2). Zero values indicate that the event has not happened. As in Boolean logic, temporal logic also has truth tables, which are named Temporal Truth Tables.

TFTs can be written as an expression where each basic event in a tree is a variable in the expression. Table 3.3 shows a TTT—a result of direct application of the equations shown in table 3.2—for each temporal gate basic formula, using events A and B.

3.1 Formalisation of Temporal Fault Trees

In this section, I propose a formalisation in Communicating Sequential Processes (CSP) of TFT to enable a comparison of TFTs and the calculation of the probability of occurrence of top events.

The formalisation occurs in three steps: (i) formalising sequence values calculations to

Table 3.1: Temporal gates

Name	Abbrev.	Operator	Description
Or	OR	+	Similarly to the Boolean operator, whenever one of its inputs is higher than 0, it outputs its value.
And	AND	.	When both inputs are higher than zero, it outputs the value of the maximum sequence value.
Priority Or	POR		When the first input is higher than zero, it outputs its value and the second output may or may not occur. It will not output a value when only the second output is higher than the first output.
Priority And	PAND	<	It outputs the value of the second output if the first output occurs strictly before the second.
Synchronous And	SAND	&	It outputs the value of the sequence value when both inputs occur.

Table 3.2: Sequence value (SV) equations for each temporal gate

Gate	Sequence value formula
OR	$SV(A + B) = \begin{cases} \min(SV(A), SV(B)) & , SV(A) > 0 \wedge SV(B) > 0 \\ \max(SV(A), SV(B)) & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$
AND	$SV(A.B) = \begin{cases} \max(SV(A), SV(B)) & , SV(A) > 0 \wedge SV(B) > 0 \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$
POR	$SV(A B) = \begin{cases} SV(A) & , SV(B) = 0 \vee SV(A) < SV(B) \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$
PAND	$SV(A < B) = \begin{cases} SV(B) & , SV(A) > 0 \wedge SV(A) < SV(B) \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$
SAND	$SV(A \& B) = \begin{cases} SV(A) & , SV(A) = SV(B) \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$

Table 3.3: TTT for each temporal gate

A	B	A + B	A.B	A B	A < B	A&B
0	0	0	0	0	0	0
0	1	1	0	0	0	0
1	0	1	0	1	0	0
1	1	1	1	1	0	1
1	2	1	2	1	2	0
2	1	1	2	0	0	0

achieve TTTs for a given temporal expression (section 3.1.1), (ii) converting these TTTs to sequences of events (section 3.1.2), and (iii) building a process to call these events to verify refinements (section 3.1.3).

3.1.1 Sequence Value Calculus

Given two sequence values as inputs, each temporal gate expression is encoded as a CSP function as following:

$$OR(a, b) = \begin{cases} \min(a, b) & \text{if } a > 0 \wedge b > 0 \\ \max(a, b) & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \quad (3.1)$$

$$AND(a, b) = \begin{cases} \max(a, b) & \text{if } a > 0 \wedge b > 0 \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \quad (3.2)$$

$$POR(a, b) = \begin{cases} a & \text{if } a > 0 \wedge (b = 0 \vee a < b) \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \quad (3.3)$$

$$PAND(a, b) = \begin{cases} b & \text{if } a > 0 \wedge a < b \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \quad (3.4)$$

$$SAND(a, b) = \begin{cases} a & \text{if } a = b \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \quad (3.5)$$

Combining these functions, any temporal expression can be written. For example, given the expression $(A + B) < C$, it can be written as: $PAND(OR(A, B), C)$. Table 3.4 shows the truth table for this example formula, by applying the function definitions for each row.

3.1.2 From TTTs to sequences of events

Obtaining (a set of) sequences of events is an intermediate step to get a process that represents a TFT. This step is an optimisation to remove non-determinism, trimming the paths that lead to the top-level event. It combines paths that have the same initial event, building an hierarchical structure of choices.

The function TTT below creates a set of tuples of size $n + 1$, where n is the number of basic events on the expression and the value on position $n + 1$ is the result of the application of

Table 3.4: TTT for the expression $(A + B) < C$

A	B	C	A + B	(A + B) < C
0	0	0	0	0
0	0	1	0	0
0	1	0	1	0
0	1	1	1	0
0	1	2	1	2
0	2	1	2	0
1	0	0	1	0
1	0	1	1	0
1	0	2	1	2
1	1	0	1	0
1	1	1	1	0
1	1	2	1	2
1	2	0	1	0
1	2	1	1	0
1	2	2	1	2
1	2	3	1	3
1	3	2	1	2
2	0	1	2	0
2	1	0	1	0
2	1	1	1	0
2	1	2	1	2
2	1	3	1	3
2	2	1	2	0
2	3	1	2	0
3	1	2	1	2
3	2	1	2	0

the temporal expression:

$$\begin{aligned}
 TTT :: TExp &\Longrightarrow \mathcal{P} \left(\underbrace{\text{SV} \times \dots \times \text{SV}}_{n+1} \right) \\
 TTT(expression) &= \left\{ (a_1, \dots, a_n, expression(a_1, \dots, a_n)) \right. \\
 &\quad \left. \mid (a_1, \dots, a_n) \in TTT_{inputs}(n) \right\}
 \end{aligned} \tag{3.6}$$

where $1, \dots, n$ are the indexes of basic events, $\text{SV} = \{0, \dots, n\}$ are sequence values and TTT_{inputs} defines a set of tuples of size n that represents the events (inputs) for each row in a TTT:

$$\begin{aligned}
 TTT_{inputs} :: I &\Longrightarrow \mathcal{P} \left(\underbrace{\text{SV} \times \dots \times \text{SV}}_n \right) \\
 TTT_{inputs}(n) &= \left\{ (a_1, \dots, a_n) \right. \\
 &\quad \left. \mid \max(a_1, \dots, a_n) = \text{card}(\{a_1, \dots, a_n\} \setminus \{0\}) \right\}
 \end{aligned} \tag{3.7}$$

$$\tag{3.8}$$

where $I = \{1, \dots, n\}$. Note that the clause $\max(a_1, \dots, a_n) = \text{card}(\{a_1, \dots, a_n\} \setminus \{0\})$ guarantees that there are no gaps between two a_i 's, satisfying the TFT property for sequence values.

For the example expression $(A + B) < C$, the functions TTT and TTT_{inputs} return a set with cardinality 26.

Finally, we create a data structure to avoid non-determinism and optimise the final

process creation. This data structure is created in two steps:

- a) Each tuple is converted into a set of pairs recursively where the first element is an available event and the second element is a set of options of events to choose. This set of options may contain others pairs recursively.

$$SoP(sync_{ev}, (a_1, \dots, a_n)) = \quad (3.9)$$

where $sync_{ev}$ is an event that indicates that the following events occur with the same sequence value.

- b) These pairs are then merged with respect to the first element. If there two pairs with the same first element, they are merged, making a union of the second element sets.

3.1.3 Checking process refinements

Using the tuples defined by eq. (3.8), we now define a process that represents the execution of a temporal expression.

Appendix

