Methodologies for Software Processes

Lecture 9

HEAPS AND OBJECTS

Tentative course outline



Why objects and heap-based data structures?

- Static data structures
  - Examples: arrays, all mathematical data structures from module 5
  - Fixed size, stack-allocated
  - Immutable, no memory reuse
  - To update the data structure we create an updated copy

```
// static array A = [0,0,0]
A := cons(3, 0)

// create updated copy
B := set(A, 1, 17)

assert lookup(A, 1) == 0
```

- Dynamic data structures
  - Examples: resizable arrays, linked lists or trees, object graphs, ...
  - Dynamic size, heap-allocated
  - Mutable
  - To up update the data structure, we efficiently change it in-place

```
// dynamic array A = [0,0,0]
A := new Array(3, 0) // not Viper!

B := A // A, B reference same array
B[1] := 17 // in-place mutation

assert A[1] == 17
```

Why verification of heap-manipulating programs?



Why verification of heap-manipulating programs?

- Memory safety is the absence of errors related to memory accesses
  - dereferencing null-pointers
  - accessing unallocated (heap) memory
  - accessing dangling pointers
  - double-free bugs
  - use-after-free bugs



- Heap-manipulating programs are a prime target for program verification
  - Efficient algorithms need efficient data structures
  - Device drivers, embedded systems, ...

- Same concepts apply to concurrent programs

Objects and the heap

1. Heap model
2. Reasoning about objects and references
3. Ownership and access permissions
4. Encoding

Heap model: an object-based language

```
field val: Int

method foo() returns (res: Int)
{
  var cell: Ref

  // create object with field val
  cell := new(val)

  cell.val := 5
  res := cell.val
}
```

- A heap is a set of objects
- No classes: each object can have all fields declared in the entire program
  - Type rules of a source language can be encoded
  - Memory consumption is not a concern since programs are not executed
- Objects are accessed via references
  - Field read and update operations
  - No information hiding
- No explicit de-allocation (garbage collector)
  - Conceptually, objects could remain allocated

Extended programming language (PL6)

Declarations

```
D ::= ... | field f: T
```

Fields are declared globally

Types

```
T ::= ... | Ref
```

Only one type of references

Expressions

```
E ::= ... | null | E.f
```

Pre-defined null-reference

Field read expression

Statements

```
S  ::=  ...
      | x := new(f̄)
      | x := new(*)
      | x.f := E
```

Allocation with given fields
or with all fields

Field update of **Ref**-typed var.

Objects and the heap

1. Heap model
2. Reasoning about objects and references
3. Ownership and access permissions
4. Encoding

Proof rule for field read

- Idea: treat field accesses like variable assignment

Field read

$$\frac{}{\texttt{\{ E != null \&\& Q[x / E.f] \} x := E.f \{ Q \}}}$$

- Additional well-definedness condition prevents null-dereferencing

```
{ true }
assume r != null && r.val == 5
{ r != null && r.val == 5 }
x := p.val
{ x == 5 }
assert x == 5
{ true }
```

Field access: candidate proof rules with aliasing

- Idea: reflect potential aliasing in precondition of field-update rule

Field update (informal!)

```
_______________________________________________________________________
 { x != null && Q[E2.f / (E2==x) ? E : E2.f] } x.f := E { Q }
```

"substitute field access for all objects E2 equal to x"

```
method foo(x: Ref)
{
  var y: Ref
  assume x != null && x.val == 5
  { x != null && x != null && (x==x ? 7 : x.val) == 5 }
  y := x
  { x != null && y != null && (y==x ? 7 : y.val) == 5 }
  x.val := 7
  { y != null && y.val == 5 }
  assert y.val == 5
}
```

- Adjusted rule correctly accounts for aliasing

Shortcomings of candidate proof rule for field update

- Size of assertions grows exponentially in the worst case

```
{ x != null && y != null && t != null && x.val == 5 && y.val == 7 }
{ ... && (x==y ? (t == x ? (...) : (...)) : (x==x ? (...) : (...))) == 7 && ... }
t.val := x.val
{ ... && x==y ? (t==x ? y.val : t.val) : (x==x ? y.val : x.val)) == 7 && ... }
x.val := y.val
{ ... (x==y ? t.val : x.val) == 7 && ... }
y.val := t.val
{ x.val == 7 && ... }
```

- Rule requires explicit syntactic occurrence of field locations in the assertion, but properties may depend on unboundedly many field locations
  - Example: a linked list is sorted (how many `node.next` do we need?)

Reminder: method framing with global variables

- Method specification declares which variables may get modified

```
var x, y: Int

method set(v: Int)
  modifies x
  ensures x == v
{ … }
```

```
y := 7
set(5)

assert x > 0 && y == 7
```

- Frame rule (for any statement S)

Frame rule

$$\frac{\{\ P\ \}\ S\ \{\ Q\ \}}{\{\ P\ \&\&\ R\ \}\ S\ \{\ Q\ \&\&\ R\ \}}$$

where S does not assign to a variable that is free in R

- Encoding

```
y := 7
var x  // havoc vars in mod-clause
assume x == 5
assert x > 0 && y == 7
```

Method framing with heap locations: modifies clause

- Idea: method specification declares which locations may get modified

```
method set(x: Ref, v: Int)
  modifies x.f
  ensures x.f == v
{ … }
```

Frame rule

$$\frac{\{\ P\ \}\ S\ \{\ Q\ \}}{\{\ P\ \&\&\ R\ \}\ S\ \{\ Q\ \&\&\ R\ \}}$$

where S does not assign to a variable that is free in R

- Two ways to adapt the frame rule
  - «variable» means local or global variable, or «field»
  - «variable» means local or global variable, but not «field»

Method framing with heap locations: naïve approach

```
method set(x: Ref, v: Int)
  modifies x.f
  ensures x.f == v
{ … }
```

Frame rule

$$\frac{\{\ P\ \}\ S\ \{\ Q\ \}}{\{\ P\ \&\&\ R\ \}\ S\ \{\ Q\ \&\&\ R\ \}}$$

where S does not assign to a variable that is free in R

«variable» may mean «field»

```
assume y != z
y.f := 7
set(z, 5)
assert y.f == 7
```

- Incomplete: framing is very weak, as information about all objects is lost

«variable» does not mean «field»

```
assume y == r
y.f := 7
set(z, 5)
assert y.f == 7
```

- Unsound: this interpretation of the frame rule ignores aliasing!

Shortcomings of naïve method framing approach

- Sound encoding needs to consider aliasing
  - Inherits shortcomings of candidate rule for field updates
  - Explosion of cases
  - Treatment of assertions that depend on heap locations implicitly

```
y.f := 7
// encoding of set(z, 5)
var tmp: Int
z.f := tmp  // considers aliasing
assume z.f == 5
assert y.f == 7
```

- Many methods modify a statically-unknown set of heap locations
  - Locations cannot be listed explicitly in a modifies clause

```
method sort(list: Ref)
  modifies list.val, list.next.val, list.next.next.val, …
{ … }
```

- Listing modified heap locations violates information hiding

Summary of challenges

Heap data structures pose three major challenges for sequential verification

- Reasoning about aliasing
- Framing, especially for dynamic data structures
- Writing specifications that preserve information hiding

Additional challenges for concurrent programs, e.g., data races

Objects and the heap

1. Heap model
2. Reasoning about objects and references
3. Ownership and access permissions
4. Encoding

Access permissions

- Associate each heap location with *at most one* permission
- Read or write access to a memory location requires permission
- Permissions are created when the heap location is allocated
- Permissions can be transferred, but not duplicated or forged



Permission assertions

- Permissions are denoted by access predicates
  - Access predicates are *not* permitted under negations, disjunctions, and on the left of implications
- Predicates may contain both permissions and value constraints
- Predicates must be self-framing, that is, include all permissions to evaluate their heap accesses
- An assertion that does not contain access predicates is called pure or heap independent

Predicates

```
P  ::=  ... | acc(E.f)
```

```
acc(p.f) && p.f > 0
```

```
requires p.f > 0
```

Permission assertions and aliasing

Reminder:

- There is *at most one* permission for every heap location
- Permissions can be transferred, but not duplicated or forged

If we have two permissions `acc(a.f)` and `acc(b.f)`, can a and b be aliases?

```
field f: Int

method alias(a: Ref, b: Ref)
  requires acc(a.f) && acc(b.f)
{
  a.f := 5
  b.f := 7
  assert a.f == 5
}
```

```
field f: Int

method alias2(a: Ref, b: Ref)
  requires acc(a.f) && acc(b.f)
{
  assert a == b
}
```

➔ How do we justify this?

Permission assertions, more formally

- We extend states to stack-heap pairs $\sigma = (s, h)$

- The stack s: $\mathbf{Var} \rightarrow \mathbf{Value}$ assigns values to variables
  - We used this as the full state state used in all previous classes

- The heap h assigns values to object-field pairs

$$h\colon \mathbf{Objects} \times \mathbf{Fields} \xrightarrow{\text{finite partial}} \mathbf{Value}$$

  - $dom(h)$ is the set of all object-field pairs for which h is defined

  - $(\text{obj}, f) \in dom(h)$ means we have permission to field f of object obj

Alternative: $permMask\colon \mathbf{Objects} \times \mathbf{Fields} \xrightarrow{\text{finite partial}} \mathbf{Bool}$

Predicates over extended states

Predicate P	$\mathfrak{I} = (\mathfrak{A}, s, h) \vDash$ P if and only if
`acc(`t`.f)`	$(\mathfrak{I}(t), f) \in dom(h)$
$t_1 = t_2$	$\mathfrak{I}(t_1) = \mathfrak{I}(t_2)$
$R(t_1, \ldots, t_n)$	$(\mathfrak{I}(t_1), \ldots, \mathfrak{I}(t_n)) \in R^{\mathfrak{A}}$
$\mathbf{Q} \wedge \mathbf{R}$	$\mathfrak{I} \vDash \mathbf{Q}$ and $\mathfrak{I} \vDash \mathbf{R}$
$\mathbf{Q} \Rightarrow \mathbf{R}$	If $\mathfrak{I} \vDash \mathbf{Q}$, then $\mathfrak{I} \vDash \mathbf{R}$
$\exists x$: T ($\mathbf{Q}$)	For some v $\in \mathrm{T}^{\mathfrak{A}}$, $\mathfrak{I}[x := \mathrm{v}] \vDash \mathbf{Q}$
$\forall x$: T ($\mathbf{Q}$)	For all v $\in \mathrm{T}^{\mathfrak{A}}$, $\mathfrak{I}[x := \mathrm{v}] \vDash \mathbf{Q}$

- Self-framing predicates are always well-defined

Assume s`(a) ==` s`(b)` and h`(a.f) ==` s`(c)`

Does $\mathfrak{I} = (\mathfrak{A}, s, h) \vDash$ `acc(a.f)` $\wedge$ `acc(b.f)` $\wedge$ `b.f == c` hold?

$\mathfrak{I}(t)$ is the value obtained from evaluating term t in interpretation $\mathfrak{I}$

Examples:

$\mathfrak{I}(x) = s(x)$

$\mathfrak{I}(x + 17) = s(x) +^{\mathfrak{A}} 17^{\mathfrak{A}}$

$\mathfrak{I}(x.f) = h(s(x), f)$

$\mathfrak{I}(x.f.g) = h(h(s(x), f), g)$

Handling aliasing

- Problem: having permissions `a.f` and `b.f` should mean `a` and `b` are no aliases
- We introduce a new connective: the separating conjunction $P * Q$
  - $P * Q$ partitions the heap h into two chunks
  - Every permission assertion `acc(E.f)` is evaluated in its own heap chunk
  - All other predictes are evaluated in the full heap

$(\mathfrak{A}, s, h) \vDash_h \texttt{acc(x.f) * acc(y.g)}$?



$(\mathfrak{A}, s, h) \vDash_{h1} \texttt{acc(x.f)}$ $(\mathfrak{A}, s, h) \vDash_{h2} \texttt{acc(y.g)}$

Handling aliasing

- Problem: having permissions `a.f` and `b.f` should mean `a` and `b` are no aliases
- We introduce a new connective: the separating conjunction `P * Q`
  - `P * Q` partitions the heap h into two chunks
  - Every permission assertion `acc(E.f)` is evaluated in its own heap chunk
  - All other predictes are evaluated in the full heap

$(\mathfrak{A}, s, h) \vDash_h \texttt{acc(x.f) * acc(x.f) ?}$



$(\mathfrak{A}, s, h) \vDash_{h1} \texttt{acc(x.f)}$ $(\mathfrak{A}, s, h) \vDash_{h2} \texttt{acc(x.f)}$

Predicates with separating conjunction

Predicate P	$\mathfrak{I} = (\mathfrak{A}, s, h) \vDash_{h'}$ **P if and only if**
`acc(t.f)`	$(\mathfrak{I}(t), f) \in dom(h')$
$t_1 = t_2$	$\mathfrak{I}(t_1) = \mathfrak{I}(t_2)$
$R(t_1, \ldots, t_n)$	$(\mathfrak{I}(t_1), \ldots, \mathfrak{I}(t_n)) \in R^{\mathfrak{A}}$
Q $\wedge$ **R**	$\mathfrak{I} \vDash_{h'}$ **Q** and $\mathfrak{I} \vDash_{h'}$ **R**
Q $*$ **R**	exists partition of h' into $h1$, $h2$ such that $\mathfrak{I} \vDash_{h1}$ **Q** and $\mathfrak{I} \vDash_{h2}$ **R**
...	...

evaluate access permissions in current heap chunk h' (initially h)

split current heap chunk into two

- **Q** $*$ **R** and **Q** $\wedge$ **R** are equivalent if **Q** and **R** are pure

- Holding permission to `x.f` and `y.f` implies that x and y are no aliases

```
acc(x.f) * acc(y.f) ==> x != y
```

Separating Conjunction in Viper

- Viper's && is the separating conjunction $*$
- Viper has no ordinary conjunction $\wedge$
- **Q** $*$ **R** and **Q** $\wedge$ **R** are equivalent if **Q** and **R** are pure (heap independent)
- For the call `swap(x, x)`, the precondition is equivalent to false

```
method swap(a: Ref, b: Ref)
  requires acc(a.f) && acc(b.f)
```

Challenges revisited

Heap data structures pose three major challenges for sequential verification

- Reasoning about aliasing
  - Permissions and separating conjunction
- Framing, especially for dynamic data structures
- Writing specifications that preserve information hiding

And additional challenges for concurrent programs, e.g., data races

Field access: proof rules with permissions

Field read

```
________________________________________________________
 { acc(E.f) * P[x / E.f] } x := E.f { acc(E.f) * P }
```

Field update

```
_____________________________________________________________________
{ acc(x.f) * x.f == N } x.f := E { acc(x.f) * x.f == E[x.f / N] }
```

- Each field access requires (and preserves) the corresponding permission
- Permission to a location implies that the receiver is non-null
- Substitution with logical variable N in the field-update rule is needed to handle occurrences of `x.f` inside E (e.g., `x.f := x.f + 1`)

Framing

Frame rule

$$\frac{\{\ P\ \}\ S\ \{\ Q\ \}}{\{\ P \wedge R\ \}\ S\ \{\ Q \wedge R\ \}}$$

where S does not assign to a variable that is free in R

Unsound if S assigns to heap locations constrained by R

Framing

Frame rule

$$\frac{\{\ P\ \}\ S\ \{\ Q\ \}}{\{\ P\ *\ R\ \}\ S\ \{\ Q\ *\ R\ \}}$$

where S does not assign to a variable that is free in R

- The frame R must be self-framing
  - If heap locations constrained by R are disjoint from those modified by S, R is preserved
  - Otherwise, the precondition is equivalent to false (the triple holds trivially)
- Example

$$\frac{\overline{\{\ \mathbf{acc}(x.f) * x.f = N\ \}\ \ x.f := 5\ \ \{\ \mathbf{acc}(x.f) * x.f = 5\ \}}}{\{\ \mathbf{acc}(x.f) * x.f = N * \mathbf{acc}(y.f) * y.f = 7\ \}\ \ x.f := 5\ \ \{\ \mathbf{acc}(x.f) * x.f = 5 * \mathbf{acc}(y.f) * y.f = 7\ \}}$$

Framing (cont'd)

- The following proof derives an incorrect triple. Why is it not a valid proof?

$$\dfrac{\dfrac{}{\{\ \mathsf{acc}(\mathtt{x.f}) * \mathtt{x.f} = \mathsf{N}\ \}\ \ \mathtt{x.f := 5}\ \ \{\ \mathsf{acc}(\mathtt{x.f}) * \mathtt{x.f} = 5\ \}}}{\{\ \mathsf{acc}(\mathtt{x.f}) * \mathtt{x.f} = \mathsf{N} * \mathtt{x.f} = 1\ \}\ \ \mathtt{x.f := 5}\ \ \{\ \mathsf{acc}(\mathtt{x.f}) * \mathtt{x.f} = 5 * \mathtt{x.f} = 1\ \}}$$

- Recall that the frame must be self-framing, which is not the case here
- Making the frame self-framing yields a valid (but vacuous) proof

$$\dfrac{\dfrac{}{\{\ \mathsf{acc}(\mathtt{x.f}) * \mathtt{x.f} = \mathsf{N}\ \}\ \ \mathtt{x.f := 5}\ \ \{\ \mathsf{acc}(\mathtt{x.f}) * \mathtt{x.f} = 5\ \}}}{\{\ \mathsf{acc}(\mathtt{x.f}) * \mathtt{x.f} = \mathsf{N} * \mathsf{acc}(\mathtt{x.f}) * \mathtt{x.f} = 1\ \}\ \ \mathtt{x.f := 5}\ \ \{\ \mathsf{acc}(\mathtt{x.f}) * \mathtt{x.f} = 5 * \mathsf{acc}(\mathtt{x.f}) * \mathtt{x.f} = 1\ \}}$$

Framing for method calls

```
method set(p: Ref, v: Int)
  requires acc(p.f)
  ensures  acc(p.f) && p.f == v
{
  p.f := v
}
```

```
// assume we have acc(x.f) && acc(y.f)
assume y.f == 7
set(x, 5)
assert x.f == 5 && y.f == 7
```

$$\frac{\dfrac{\{\, \mathbf{acc}(\mathtt{p.f}) \,\}\ \mathbf{method}\ \mathtt{set(p,\ v)}\ \{\, \mathbf{acc}(\mathtt{p.f}) * \mathtt{p.f} = \mathtt{v} \,\}}{\{\, \mathbf{acc}(\mathtt{x.f}) \,\}\ \mathtt{set(x,\ 5)}\ \{\, \mathbf{acc}(\mathtt{x.f}) * \mathtt{x.f} = 5 \,\}}}{\{\, \mathbf{acc}(\mathtt{x.f}) * \mathbf{acc}(\mathtt{y.f}) * \mathtt{y.f} = 7 \,\}\ \mathtt{set(x,\ 5)}\ \{\, \mathbf{acc}(\mathtt{x.f}) * \mathtt{x.f} = 5 * \mathbf{acc}(\mathtt{y.f}) * \mathtt{y.f} = 7 \,\}}$$

- Frame rule enables framing without modifies clauses
- A method may modify only heap locations to which it has permission

Permission transfer

```
method set(p: Ref, v: Int)
  requires acc(p.f)
  ensures  acc(p.f) && p.f == v
{
```




```
  p.f := v
```




```
}
```

```
// assume we have acc(x.f) && acc(y.f)
assume x.f == 2 && y.f == 7
```




```
set(x, 5)
```

Framing!

```
assert x.f == 5 && y.f == 7
```

Permission transfer for method calls

$$\frac{\dfrac{\{\boxed{\mathbf{acc}(\mathtt{p.f})}\}\ \mathbf{method}\ \mathtt{set(p,\ v)}\ \{\boxed{\mathbf{acc}(\mathtt{p.f}) * \mathtt{p.f} = \mathtt{v}}\}}{\{\mathbf{acc}(\mathtt{x.f})\}\ \mathtt{set(x,\ 5)}\ \{\mathbf{acc}(\mathtt{x.f}) * \mathtt{x.f} = 5\}}}{\{\boxed{\mathbf{acc}(\mathtt{x.f})} * \boxed{\mathbf{acc}(\mathtt{y.f}) * \mathtt{y.f} = 7}\}\ \mathtt{set(x,\ 5)}\ \{\boxed{\mathbf{acc}(\mathtt{x.f}) * \mathtt{x.f} = 5} * \boxed{\mathbf{acc}(\mathtt{y.f}) * \mathtt{y.f} = 7}\}}$$

- Permissions are held by method executions or loop iterations
- Calling a method transfers permissions from the caller to the callee (according to the method precondition)
- Returning from a method transfers permissions from the callee to the caller (according to the method postcondition)
- Residual permissions are framed around the call

Framing for loops

```
// assume we have acc(x.f) && acc(y.f)
x.f := 0
y.f := 7
while (x.f < 10)
  invariant acc(x.f)
{
  x.f := x.f + 1
}
assert y.f == 7
```

$$\dfrac{\dfrac{\{\ \mathsf{acc}(\mathtt{x.f}) * \mathtt{x.f} < 10\ \}\ \ \mathtt{x.f := x.f + 1}\ \ \{\ \mathsf{acc}(\mathtt{x.f})\ \}}{\{\ \mathsf{acc}(\mathtt{x.f})\ \}\ \ \mathtt{while}(\mathtt{x.f < 10})\ \{\ \ldots\ \}\ \ \{\ \mathsf{acc}(\mathtt{x.f}) * \neg \mathtt{x.f} < 10\ \}}}{\{\ \mathsf{acc}(\mathtt{x.f}) * \mathsf{acc}(\mathtt{y.f}) * \mathtt{y.f} = 7\ \}\ \ \mathtt{while}(\mathtt{x.f < 10})\ \{\ \ldots\ \}\ \ \{\ \mathsf{acc}(\mathtt{x.f}) * \neg \mathtt{x.f} < 10 * \mathsf{acc}(\mathtt{y.f}) * \mathtt{y.f} = 7\ \}}$$

Permission transfer for loops

$$
\dfrac{\dfrac{\{\ \boxed{\mathtt{acc}(\mathtt{x.f})} * \mathtt{x.f} < 10\ \}\ \ \mathtt{x.f := x.f + 1}\ \ \{\ \boxed{\mathtt{acc}(\mathtt{x.f})}\ \}}{\{\ \mathtt{acc}(\mathtt{x.f})\ \}\ \ \mathtt{while(x.f < 10)}\ \{\ \ldots\ \}\ \ \{\ \mathtt{acc}(\mathtt{x.f}) * \neg \mathtt{x.f} < 10\ \}}}{\{\ \boxed{\mathtt{acc}(\mathtt{x.f})} * \boxed{\mathtt{acc}(\mathtt{y.f}) * \mathtt{y.f} = 7}\ \}\ \ \mathtt{while(x.f < 10)}\ \{\ \ldots\ \}\ \ \{\ \boxed{\mathtt{acc}(\mathtt{x.f})} * \neg \mathtt{x.f} < 10 * \boxed{\mathtt{acc}(\mathtt{y.f}) * \mathtt{y.f} = 7}\ \}}
$$

- Permissions are held by method executions or loop iterations
- Entering a loop transfers permissions from the enclosing context to the loop (according to the loop invariant)
- Leaving a loop transfers permissions from the loop to the enclosing context (according to the loop invariant)
- Residual permissions are framed around the loop

Permission transfer: inhale and exhale operations

- **`inhale`** `P` means:
  - obtain all permissions required by assertion P
  - assume all logical constraints

```
inhale acc(x.f) && x.f == 2
```



- **`exhale`** `P` means:
  - assert all logical constraints
  - check and remove all permissions required by assertion P
  - havoc any locations to which all permission is lost

```
exhale acc(x.f) && x.f == 2
```



Encoding of method bodies and calls

```
method foo() returns (…)
  requires P
  ensures  Q
{ S }
```

```
x := foo()
```

- Encoding without heap and globals
  - Body
    ```
    assume P
    // encoding of S
    assert Q
    ```
  - Call
    ```
    assert P[…]
    havoc x
    assume Q[…]
    ```
- Encoding with heap
  - Body
    ```
    inhale P
    // encoding of S
    exhale Q
    ```
  - Call
    ```
    exhale P[…]
    havoc x
    inhale Q[…]
    ```
- **inhale** and **exhale** are permission-aware analogues of **assume** and **assert**

Encoding of loops

```
while(b)
  invariant I
{ S }
```

- Reminder: encoding without heap

```
assert I
havoc targets
assume I
if(*) {
  assume b
  // encoding of S
  assert I
  assume false
} else {
  assume !b
}
```

- Encoding with heap

```
exhale I
havoc targets
inhale I
if(*) {
  assume b
  // encoding of S
  exhale I
  assume false
} else {
  assume !b
}
```

Encoding of allocation

- new-expression specifies the relevant fields

```
x := new(f, g)
```

- Encoding chooses an arbitrary reference and inhales permissions to relevant fields

```
var x: Ref
inhale acc(x.f) && acc(x.g)
```

- Incomplete information about freshness of new object

```
x := new(f)
y := new(f)
assert x != y
```

```
method foo(y: Ref)
{
  var x: Ref
  x := new(f)
  assert x != y
}
```

Verifying memory safety

- Memory safety is the absence of errors related to memory accesses, such as, null-pointer dereferencing, access to un-allocated memory, dangling pointers, out-of-bounds accesses, double free, etc.
- Using permissions, Viper verifies memory safety by default

```
var x: Ref
x.f := 5
```

```
var x: Ref
x := null
x.f := 5
```

See module 8 for arrays

```
method free(p: Ref)
  requires acc(p.f)
```

model de-allocation via method call

```
free(x)
x.f := 5
```

```
free(x)
free(x)
```

Challenges revisited

Heap data structures pose three major challenges for sequential verification

- Reasoning about aliasing
  - Permissions and separating conjunction
- Framing, especially for dynamic data structures
  - Sound frame rule, but no support yet for unbounded data structures
- Writing specifications that preserve information hiding

And additional challenges for concurrent programs, e.g., data races

Objects and the heap

1. Heap model
2. Reasoning about objects and references
3. Ownership and access permissions
4. Encoding

Heaps

- Encode references and fields

```
type Ref             // type for references
const null: Ref      // null references

type Field T         // polymorphic type for field names
```

```
field f: Int
field g: Ref
```

```
const f: Field int
const g: Field Ref
```

- Heaps map references and field names to values

```
type HeapType = Map<T>[(Ref, Field T), T]     // polymorphic map
```

- Represent the program heap as one global variable

```
var Heap: HeapType
```

Permissions and field access

- Permissions are tracked in a global permission mask

```
type MaskType = Map<T>[(Ref, Field T), bool]
var Mask: MaskType
```

- Convention: ¬`Mask[null, f]` for all fields `f`

- Field access

```
v := x.f
```

```
assert Mask[x,f]
v := Heap[x,f]
```

```
x.f := E
```

```
assert Mask[x,f]
Heap[x,f] := E
```

  - Field access requires permission!

Inhale

- **`inhale`** `P` means:
  - obtain all permissions required by assertion `P`
  - assume all logical constraints
- Encoding is defined recursively over the structure of `P`

`inhale E`	`assume [[E]]`	[[.]] encoding
`inhale acc(E.f)`	`assume ¬Mask[ [[E]], f ]` `Mask[ [[E]], f ] := true`	Reaching more than full permission goes to magic
`inhale E => P`	`if([[E]]) { [[inhale P]] }`	
`inhale P && Q`	`[[inhale P]]; [[inhale Q]]`	Separating conjunction: add sum of permissions

- The encoding also asserts that E is well-defined (omitted here)

Exhale (1st attempt)

- **`exhale`** `P` means:
  - assert all logical constraints
  - check and remove all permissions required by assertion `P`
  - havoc any locations to which all permission is lost
- Encoding is defined recursively over the structure of `P`

`exhale E`	`assert [[E]]`

`exhale acc(E.f)`	`assert Mask[ [[E]], f ]`
	`Mask[ [[E]], f ] := false`
	`havoc Heap[ [[E]], f ]`

`exhale E => P`	`if([[E]]) { [[exhale P]] }`
`exhale P && Q`	`[[exhale P]]; [[exhale Q]]`

havoc e.g. by assigning to a fresh variable

Separating conjunction: remove sum of permissions

- The encoding also asserts that `E` is well-defined (omitted here)

Example

```
inhale acc(x.f) && x.f == 5
```

```
assume ¬Mask[x,f]
Mask[x,f] := true

assert Mask[x,f]  // well-definedness check
assume Heap[x,f] == 5
```

```
exhale acc(x.f) && x.f == 5
```

```
assert Mask[x,f]
Mask[x,f] := false
havoc Heap[x,f]

assert Mask[x,f]  // well-definedness check
assert Heap[x,f] == 5
```

Exhale (fixed)

- Conceptually, permissions should be removed after checking logical constraints

- Adapt encoding
  - Check well-definedness against mask at the beginning of the exhale
  - Delay havoc until the end of the exhale

```
exhale P
```

```
var oldMask: MaskType
var newHeap: HeapType
oldMask := Mask
[[exhale P]]       // like before, but no havoc and with
                      well-definedness check on oldMask
assume forall y,g :: Mask[y,g] ==> newHeap[y,g] == Heap[y,g]
Heap := newHeap   // effectively havocs all locations to which
                      permission was lost
```

Challenges revisited

Heap data structures pose three major challenges for sequential verification

- Reasoning about aliasing
  - Permissions and separating conjunction
- Framing, especially for dynamic data structures
  - Sound frame rule, but no support yet for unbounded data structures
- Writing specifications that preserve information hiding
  - Not solved, but see next module

And additional challenges for concurrent programs, e.g., data races

- Permissions are an excellent basis, but see later