10. New Wars

New and Old Wars

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The Politics of New Wars

During the war in Bosnia–Herzegovina, Sarajevo was divided territorially between a Serb-controlled part and a Bosnian (mainly Muslim) part. But wartime Sarajevo could also be described in terms of a non-territorial divide. There was a group of people who could be described as the globalists – UN peacekeepers, humanitarian agencies, journalists, and Sarajevans who spoke English and were employed as assistants, interpreters and drivers. Protected by armoured cars, flak jackets and blue cards, they were able to move freely in and out of the city and across the territorial divide. At the same time, there were also the local territorially tied inhabitants of the city. On one (the Bosnian) side, they were under siege for the duration of the war, living off humanitarian aid or the black market (if they were lucky enough to have Deutschmarks), prey to sniper fire and occasional shelling. On the other (Serb) side, material conditions were somewhat better, although the climate of fear was worse. On both sides, they were vulnerable to the press gang and the various militias and mafia-types who roamed the streets and claimed legitimacy in terms of the national struggle.

The political goals of the new wars are about the claim to power on the basis of seemingly traditional identities – nation, tribe, religion. Yet the upsurge in the politics of particularistic identities cannot be understood in traditional terms. It has to be explained in the context of a growing cultural dissonance between those who participate in transnational networks,

which communicate through e-mail, faxes, telephone and air travel, and those who are excluded from global processes and are tied to localities, even though their lives may be profoundly shaped by those same processes.

It would be a mistake to assume that this cultural divide can be expressed in simple political terms, that those who support particularistic identity politics are reacting against the processes of globalization, while those who favour a more tolerant, multicultural universalistic approach are part of the new global class. On the contrary, among the globalists are to be found diaspora nationalists and fundamentalists, 'realists' and neoliberals who believe that compromise with nationalism offers the best hope for stability, as well as transnational criminal groups who profit from the new wars. And while there are many among the territorially tied who are likely to cling to traditional identities, there are also courageous individuals and citizens' groups who refuse particularisms and exclusiveness.

The point is rather that the processes known as globalization are breaking up the cultural and socio-economic divisions that defined the patterns of politics which characterized the modern period. The new type of warfare has to be understood in terms of this global dislocation. New forms of power struggle may take the guise of traditional nationalism, tribalism or religious fundamentalism, but they are, nevertheless, contemporary phenomena arising from contemporary causes and displaying new characteristics. Moreover, they are paralleled by a growing global consciousness and sense of global responsibility among an array of governmental and non-governmental institutions as well as individuals.

In this chapter, I describe some of the key characteristics of the process known as globalization and how they give rise to new forms of identity politics. In the last section, I shall try to outline the emerging political cleavage between the politics of particularistic identity and the politics of cosmopolitan or humanist values.

The Characteristics of Globalization

In his book *Nations and Nationalism*, Ernest Gellner analyses the association between nationalism and industrialization.[1] He

describes the emergence of vertically organized secular national cultures based on vernacular languages which enabled people to cope with the demands of modernity – everyday encounters with industry and government. As varied rural occupations were replaced with factory production, and as the state intruded into more and more aspects of daily life, people needed to be able to communicate both verbally and in writing in a common administrative language, and they needed to acquire certain standardized skills. Earlier societies were characterized by horizontal high cultures, e.g. Latin, Persian, Sanskrit, etc., which were based on religion and were not necessarily linked to the state. These were combined with a great variety of vertical low folk cultures. Whereas earlier high cultures were reproduced in religious institutions and low cultures were passed on through oral traditions, the new vertical national cultures were generated by a new class of intellectuals – writers, journalists, schoolteachers – which emerged along with the establishment of printing, the publication of secular literature such as newspapers and novels, and the expansion of primary education.

The process of globalization, it can be argued, has begun to break up these vertically organized cultures. What appear to be emerging are new horizontal cultures arising out of the new transnational networks, based on one or other of the emerging transnational languages: English, of course, often associated with the culture of mass consumerism linked to globally known names such as Coca-Cola or McDonald's or Starbucks, but also Arabic, fostered by new satellite TV channels like Al Jazeera or Al Arabiya, as well as the spread of social media, Chinese, Spanish or Hindu. These are combined with a medley of national, local and regional cultures as a result of a new assertion of local particularities.

The term globalization conceals a complex process which actually involves both globalization and localization, integration and fragmentation, homogenization and differentiation, etc. On the one hand, the process creates inclusive transnational networks of people. On the other hand, it excludes and atomizes large numbers of people – indeed, the vast majority. On the one hand, people's lives are profoundly shaped by events taking place far away from where they live over which they have no control. On the other hand, there are new

possibilities for enhancing the role of local and regional politics through being linked in to global processes.

As a process, globalization has a long history. Indeed, some argue that there is nothing new about the present phase of globalization; from its inception, capitalism was always a global phenomenon.[2] What is new, however, in the last two decades, is the astonishing revolution in information and communications technology. I would argue that these technological changes impart a qualitative deepening to the process of globalization which is, as yet, by no means determined. The current contours of the process are shaped by the post-war institutional framework and, in particular, the deregulatory policies pursued by governments during the 1980s and 1990s. Its future will depend on the evolution of political and social values, actions and forms of organization. Here, I outline some key trends relevant to an understanding of that evolution.

In the economic sphere, globalization is associated with a set of changes variously described as post-Fordism, flexible specialization, or the New Economy. These changes generally refer to a transformation in what is known as the techno-economic paradigm, the prevailing way in which the supply of products and services is organized to meet the prevailing pattern of demand.[3] The relevant features of these changes are the dramatic decline in the importance of territorially based mass production, the globalization of finance and technology and the increased specialization and diversity of markets. Improved information means that physical production is less important as a share of the overall economy, both because of the increased importance of services and because an increasing proportion of the value of individual products consists of know-how – design, marketing, legal and financial advice. Likewise, the standardization of products, which is linked to territorially based economies of scale, can be supplanted by greater differentiation according to local or specialist demand. Hence, national levels of economic organization have declined in importance along with the relative decline of territorially based production. On the other hand, global levels of economic organization have greatly expanded because of the global character of finance and technology, while local levels of economic organization have also become more significant because of the increasing differentiation of markets.

Globalization also involves the transnationalization and regionalization of governance. There has been, since the war, an explosive growth in international organizations, regimes and regulatory agencies. More and more activities of government are regulated through international agreement or integrated into transnational institutions; more and more departments and ministries are engaged in formal and informal forms of cooperation with their equivalents in other countries; more and more policy decisions are coopted upwards to often unaccountable international forums. At the same time, recent decades have witnessed a reassertion of local and regional politics, especially, but not only, for development purposes. This reassertion has taken a variety of forms, ranging from science- and business-led initiatives, as in the case of 'technopoles' such as Silicon Valley, California or Cambridge, England; to a rediscovery of municipal traditions, as in Northern Italy; and peace- or Green-led initiatives such as nuclear-free zones or waste-recycling projects; as well as new or renewed forms of local clientelism and patronage.[4]

Parallel to the changing nature of governance has been a striking growth in informal non-governmental transnational networks.[5] These include NGOs – both those which undertake functions formerly undertaken by government, e.g. humanitarian assistance, and those which campaign on global issues, e.g. human rights, ecology, peace, etc. These NGOs are most active at local and transnational levels, partly because these are the sites of the problems with which they are concerned and partly because access to national politics is blocked by nationally organized political parties. Thus, organizations such as Greenpeace or Amnesty International are known all over the world; their effectiveness comes from operating at several different levels – local and global as well as national – and in many different places at the same time. In addition, other kinds of transnational networks have flourished: links between a variety of cultural and sporting activities; transnational religious and ethnic groups; transnational crime. Tertiary education is increasingly globalized both because of student and faculty exchanges, and because of the privileged use of the Internet.

These economic and political changes also involve far-reaching changes in organizational forms. Most societies are characterized by what Bukharin called a 'monism of architec-

ture'.[6] In the modern era, nation-states, enterprises and military organizations had very similar vertical forms of hierarchical organization – the influence of modern war, particularly the experience of World War II on organizational forms, was pervasive. Robert Reich, in his book *The Work of Nations*, describes how enterprises have been transformed from national vertical organizations, where power is concentrated in the hands of owners at the top of a pyramid-shaped chain of command, into global phenomena whose organizations most resemble a spider's web, with power in the hands of those who possess technical or financial know-how and who are spread around the points of the web:

> Their dignified headquarters, expansive factories, warehouses, laboratories, and fleets of trucks and corporate jets are leased. Their production workers, janitors, and bookkeepers are under temporary contract; their key researchers, design engineers and marketeers are sharing in the profits. And their distinguished executives, rather than possessing great power and authority over this domain, have little direct control over much of anything. Instead of imposing their will over a corporate empire, they guide ideas through the new webs of enterprise.[7]

Something similar is happening to governmental and non-governmental organizations. Government departments, at all levels, are developing horizontal transnational links; government activity is increasingly contracted out through various forms of privatization and semi-privatization arrangements. The decentralized and horizontal forms of organization typical of NGOs or new social movements are often contrasted to the traditional, vertical forms of organization typical of political parties.[8] Yet political leaders, like corporate executives, have become, at most, facilitators and opinion-shapers and, at least, images or symbols – public representations of interconnected webs of activity over which they have little control.

Globalization has profoundly affected social structures. In advanced industrial countries, the traditional working classes have either declined or are declining along with the drop in territorially based mass production. Because of improvements in productivity and because production work is less skilled, manufacturing production employs fewer and lower-paid

workers, especially women and immigrants, or else it is relocated to low-wage countries.

What has grown in number has been those people whom Alain Touraine calls information workers[9] and Robert Reich calls symbolic analysts, those people who possess and use know-how, who, to quote Reich, identify, solve and broker problems through 'manipulations of symbols – data, words, oral and visual representations'.[10] These are the people who work in technology or finance, in expanded higher education, or in the growing myriad of transnational organizations. The majority of people fit neither of these two categories. They either work in services, as waiters and waitresses, salespersons, taxi-drivers, cashiers, etc., or they join the increasing ranks of unemployed made redundant by the productivity increases associated with globalization. This emerging social structure is reflected in growing income disparities both between those in work and those not in work and among those in work depending on skill.

Income disparities are also associated with geographical disparities, both within and across continents, countries and regions. There is the growing disparity between those areas, mainly the advanced industrial regions, that can capitalize on their technological capabilities and the rest. Some areas may thrive, at least temporarily, through attracting volume production, i.e. Southeast Asia, Southern Europe and, potentially, Central Europe. The remainder are caught up in the global economy as traditional sources of livelihood are eroded, but can participate neither in production nor in consumption. Maps drawn by global enterprises of the segmentation of their markets generally leave out the larger part of the world. But even within countries, continents or, indeed, cities, these widening geographical disparities can be found – and this is true of both the advanced industrial world and the rest. Everywhere, boundaries are being drawn between protected and prosperous global enclaves and the anarchic, chaotic, poverty-stricken areas beyond.

The trends outlined above are simultaneously haphazard and constructed. There is no inevitability, for example, about the growth of social, economic and geographical disparities; in part, they are the consequence of disorganization or of organization evolving out of past inertia. What can, however, be

accepted as a given is the historic shift away from vertical cultures characteristic of the era of the nation-state which gave rise to a sense of national identity and a sense of security. The abstract symbols, such as money and law, which form the basis of social relations in societies no longer dominated by face-to-face interactions, were a constitutive part of these national cultures.[11] It is now commonplace to talk about a 'crisis of identity' – a sense of alienation and disorientation that accompanies the decomposition of cultural communities.

It is also possible, however, to point to certain emerging forms of cultural classification. On the one hand, there are those who see themselves as part of a global community of like-minded people, mainly well-educated information workers or symbolic analysts, who spend a lot of time on aeroplanes, tele-conferencing, etc., and who may work for a global corporation, an NGO, or some other international organization, or who may be part of a network of scholars or sports clubs or musicians and artists, etc. On the other hand, there are those who are excluded and who may or may not see themselves as part of a local or particularistic (religious or national) community.

As yet, the emerging global groupings are not politicized, or, at least, are hardly politicized. That is to say, they do not form the basis of political communities on which new forms of power could be based. One reason is the individualism and anomie that characterizes the current period: the sense that political action is futile given the enormity of current problems, the difficulty of controlling or influencing the web-like structure of power, the cultural fragmentation of both horizontal networks and particularistic loyalties. Both what Reich calls the laissez-faire cosmopolitan, who has 'seceded' from the nation-state and who pursues his or her individualistic consumerist interests, and the restless young criminals, the new adventurers, to be found in all the excluded zones, reflect this political vacuum.

Nevertheless, there are seeds of politicization in both groupings. Cosmopolitan politicization can be located, both within the new transnational NGOs or social movements and within international institutions, as well as among individuals, around a commitment to human values (universal social and political rights, ecological responsibility, peace and democracy, etc.) and

to the notion of transnational civil society – the idea that self-organized groups, operating across borders, can solve problems and lobby political institutions. The Arab Spring and the globally linked-up protests against the banks offer the potential for cosmopolitan politicization. At the same time, the new politics of particularistic identities can also be interpreted as a response to these global processes, as a form of political mobilization in the face of the growing impotence of the modern state.

Identity Politics

I use the term 'identity politics' to mean movements which mobilize around ethnic, racial or religious identity for the purpose of claiming state power.[12] And I use the term 'identity' narrowly to mean a form of labelling. Whether we are talking about tribal conflict in Africa, religious conflict in the Middle East or South Asia, or nationalist conflict in Europe, the common feature is the way in which labels are used as a basis for political claims. Such conflicts are often described as ethnic conflicts. The term 'ethnos' has a racial connotation even though a number of writers insist that 'ethnie' refers to a cultural community rather than a blood-based community. Although it is clear that there is no racial basis to ethnic claims, the point is that these labels tend to be treated as something one is born with and cannot change; they are ascribed and cannot be acquired through conversion or assimilation. You are German if your grandmother was German, even if you cannot speak the language and have never been to Germany; but you are not German if your parents were Turkish, even if you live and work in Germany. A Catholic born in West Belfast is doomed to remain a Catholic even if he or she converts to Protestantism. A Croat cannot become a Serb by adopting the Orthodox religion and writing in a Cyrillic script. To the extent that these labels are considered birthrights, conflicts based on identity politics can also be termed ethnic conflicts. In many cases, these identities are both religious and nationalist.[13] To claim the political identity of a Muslim in Bosnia, a Catholic in Northern Ireland, or a Hindu in India is, at one and the same time, to claim a national identity. There are, of course, forms of identity politics where labels are not birthrights but can be

voluntarily or forcibly imposed. And indeed, in areas of endemic conflict, identity politics often becomes more extreme and morphs into fundamentalism, that is to say, rigid adherence to doctrine. Certain sects of militant Islam, for example, aim to create pure Islamic states through the conversion of non-Muslims as opposed to exclusion.[14]

The term 'politics' refers to the claim to political power. In many parts of the world there are religious revivals, or renewed interest in the survival of local cultures and languages, and this, in part, is a response to the stresses of globalization. Political campaigns to protect or promote religion or culture may often lead to demands for power in order to ensure that policies are adopted. Nevertheless, this is not what is meant by identity politics. Such political campaigns are demands for cultural and religious rights. These are quite different from the demand for political rights based on identity, that is to say, the right to power on the basis of identity as opposed to the demand for power on the basis of a political programme. Identity politics is a form of communitarianism that is distinct from and may conflict with individual political rights.

Another way of expressing this difference is by contrasting the politics of identity with the politics of ideas. The politics of ideas is about forward-looking projects. Thus, religious struggles in Western Europe in the seventeenth century were about freeing the individual from the oppressive hold of the established Church. Early nationalist struggles in nineteenth-century Europe or in colonial Africa were about democracy and state-building. They were conceived as ways of welding together diverse groups of people under the rubric of nation for the purpose of modernization. More recently, politics has been dominated by abstract secular ideas such as socialism or environmentalism which offer a vision for the future. This type of politics tends to be integrative, embracing all those who support the idea, even though, as recent experience has demonstrated, the universalistic character of such ideas can serve as a justification for totalitarian and authoritarian practices.

In contrast, identity politics tends to be fragmentative, backward-looking and exclusive. Political groupings based on exclusive identity tend to be movements of nostalgia, based on the reconstruction of an heroic past, the memory of injustices, real or imagined, and of famous battles, won or lost. They acquire

meaning through insecurity, through rekindled fear of historic enemies, or through a sense of being threatened by those with different labels. Labels can always be divided and subdivided. There is no such thing as cultural purity or homogeneity. Every exclusive identity-based polity necessarily generates a minority. At best, identity politics involves psychological discrimination against those labelled differently. At worst, it leads to population expulsion and genocide.

The new identity politics arises out of the disintegration or erosion of modern state structures, especially centralized, authoritarian states. The collapse of communist states after 1989, the loss of legitimacy of post-colonial states in Africa or South Asia, or even the decline of welfare states in more advanced industrial countries provide the environment in which the new forms of identity politics are nurtured.

The new identity politics has two main sources, both of which are linked to globalization. On the one hand, it can be viewed as a reaction to the growing impotence and declining legitimacy of the established political classes. From this perspective, it is a politics fostered from above which plays to and inculcates popular prejudices. It is a form of political mobilization, a survival tactic, for politicians active in national politics either at the level of the state or at the level of nationally defined regions, as in the case of the republics of the former Yugoslavia or the former Soviet Union or in places such as Kashmir or Eritrea before independence. On the other hand, it emerges out of the insecurity associated with the process of globalization and, in particular, the advent of what can be described as the parallel economy – new forms of legal and illegal ways of making a living that have sprung up among the excluded parts of society – and constitutes a way of legitimizing these new shadowy forms of activity. Particularly in Eastern Europe, the events of 1989 compressed the impact of globalization both in undermining the nation-state and in releasing new forms of economic activity into a short 'transitional' space of time, so that this form of nationalism from below merged with nationalism from above in an explosive combination.[15]

In Eastern Europe, the use of nationalism as a form of political mobilization pre-dated 1989. Particularly in the former communist multinational states, national consciousness was deliberately cultivated in a context in which ideological differ-

ences had been disallowed and when societies had, in theory, been socially homogenized and 'socially cleansed'.[16] Nationality, or certain officially recognized nationalities, became the main legitimate umbrella for pursuing various forms of political, economic and cultural interests. This was particularly important in the former Yugoslavia and Soviet Union, where national difference was 'constitutionally enshrined'.[17]

These tendencies were reinforced by the functioning of economies of shortage. In theory, planned economies are supposed to eliminate competition. Such planning does of course eliminate competition for markets. But it gives rise to another form of competition – competition for resources. In theory, the plan is drawn up by rational planners and transmitted downwards through a vertical chain of command. In practice, it is 'built up' through a myriad of bureaucratic pressures and subsequently 'broken down'. In effect, the plan operates as an expression of bureaucratic compromise, and, because of the 'soft budget' constraint, individual enterprises always spend more than is anticipated. The consequence is a vicious circle in which shortage intensifies the competition for resources and the tendency among ministries and enterprises for hoarding and autarchy, which further intensifies shortage. In this context, nationality becomes a tool which can be used to further the competition for resources.[18]

Already in the early 1970s there were writers who were warning of a nationalist explosion in the former Soviet Union as a result of the way in which nationality policy was used to prop up the decaying socialist project.[19] In a classic article, published in 1974, Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone used the term the 'new nationalism' to describe 'a new phenomenon which is present even among people who, at the time of the revolution, had only an inchoate sense of a common culture'.[20] Soviet policy created a hierarchy of nationalities based on an elaborate administrative structure in which the status of nationalities was linked to the status of territorially based administrative units – republics, autonomous regions and autonomous provinces. Within these administrative arrangements the indigenous language and culture of the so-called titular nationality was promoted, and members of the titular nationality were given priority in local administration and education.[21] The system gave rise to what Zaslavsky has described as an 'explo-

sive division of labour' in which an indigenous administrative and intellectual elite presided over an imported Russian urban working class and an indigenous rural population.[22] The local elite used the development of national consciousness to promote administrative autonomy, especially in the economic sphere.

As I argued in the previous chapter, a similar process took place in the former Yugoslavia, especially after the 1974 constitution entrenched the nations and republics that made up the federation and restricted the powers of the federal government. What held these multinational states together was the monopoly of the Communist Party. In the aftermath of 1989, when the socialist project was discredited and the monopoly of the party was finally broken, and when democratic elections were held for the first time, nationalism erupted into the open. In a situation where there is little to choose between parties, where there has been no history of political debate, where the new politicians are hardly known, nationalism becomes a mechanism for political differentiation. In societies where people assume that they are expected to vote in certain ways, where they are not habituated to political choice and may be wary of taking it for granted, voting along national lines became the most obvious option.

Nationalism represents both a continuity with the past and a way of denying or 'forgetting' a complicity with the past. It represents a continuity partly because of the ways in which it was nurtured in the preceding era, not only in multinational states, and partly because its form is very similar to the preceding Cold War ideologies. Communism, in particular, thrived on an us–them, good–bad war mentality and elevated the notion of an homogeneous collective community. At the same time, it is a way of denying the past because communist regimes overtly condemned nationalism. As in the case of rabid attachment to the market, nationalism is a form of negation of what went before. Communism can be treated as an 'outsider' or 'foreigner', particularly in countries occupied by Soviet troops, thus exculpating those who accepted, tolerated or collaborated with the regime. National identity is somehow pure and untainted in comparison with other professional or ideological identities that were determined by the previous context.

Similar tendencies can be observed in other places. Already by the 1970s and 1980s, the fragility of post-colonial admin-

istrative structures was becoming apparent. States in Africa and Asia were having to cope with the disillusion of post-independence hopes, the failure of the development project to overcome poverty and inequality, the insecurity of rapid urbanization and the break-up of traditional rural communities, as well as the impact of structural adjustment and policies of stabilization, liberalization and deregularization. Moreover, as in the case of the former Yugoslavia, the loss of an international identity based on membership of the non-aligned movement in the aftermath of the Cold War had domestic repercussions as well. Both ruling politicians and aspiring opposition leaders began to play upon particularistic identities in different ways – to justify authoritarian policies, to create scapegoats, to mobilize support around fear and insecurity. In many post-colonial states, the ruling parties saw themselves as left parties occupying the space for emancipatory movements. As in post-communist states, the absence of a legitimate emancipatory movement opened politics up to claims based on tribe or clan, or religious or linguistic group.

In the pre-colonial period, most societies had only a loose sense of ethnic identity. The Europeans, with their passion for classification, with censuses and identity papers, imposed more rigid ethnic categories, which then evolved along with the growth of communication, roads and railways, and the emergence, in some countries, of a vernacular press. In some cases, the categories were quite artificial: the Hutu–Tutsi distinction in Rwanda and Burundi was a rough, largely social distinction before the Belgian administration introduced identity cards; likewise, the Ngala, the tribe former President Mobutu of Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo) claimed to come from, was largely a Belgian invention. In the post-independence period, most ruling parties espoused a secular national identity that embraced the often numerous ethnic groups within the artificially defined territory of the new nations. As post-independence hopes faded, many politicians began to appeal to particularistic tendencies. In general, the weaker the administrative structures, the earlier this took place. In some countries, such as Sudan, Nigeria or Zaire, what have been called 'predatory' regimes developed in which access to power and personal wealth depended on religion or tribe.[23] In India, where democracy was sustained for almost

all of the post-independence period, the Congress Party's use of Hindu rituals and symbols in the 1970s paved the way for new forms of political mobilization based on identity, particularly religion.[24]

Many of these states were strongly interventionist. As foreign assistance began to be replaced by commercial borrowing in the 1970s, as foreign debt mounted and 'structural adjustment' programmes were introduced, state revenues declined and, as in the former communist countries, political competition for control over resources intensified. The end of the Cold War meant the reduction of foreign assistance to countries such as Zaire or Somalia which had been considered strategically important. At the same time, pressure for democratization led to increasingly desperate bids to remain in power, often through fomenting ethnic tension and other forms of identity politics. In the Middle East, the growth of Islamic movements was associated with the disillusion with secular nationalist post-colonial regimes.

Even in advanced industrial countries, the erosion of legitimacy associated with the declining autonomy of the nation-state and the corrosion of traditional, often industrially based sources of social cohesion became much more transparent in the aftermath of 1989. A specifically Western identity defined in relation to the Soviet threat was undermined because it was more difficult to defend democracy with reference to its absence elsewhere. Indeed the rhetoric of the 'War on Terror' can be viewed as a way of reinventing that distinctive Western identity. Of equal significance is the growing consensus of major political parties as the space for substantive political difference on economic and social issues narrows in the context of globalization and a prevailing ideology that emphasizes budgetary discipline and control of inflation. Nationalism or seeds of nationalism, such as asylum laws or anti-immigrationism, are exploited as party political forms of differentiation. In recent years, extreme right-wing parties have managed to capture significant shares of the vote in places such as France, the Netherlands, Belgium and elsewhere. In the United States, the Republican Party has deliberately built up its constituency among fundamentalist Christian churches and the more recent Tea Party movement. In Australia, the Conservative Party captured power on an explicit anti-asylum platform. Particularly

in the aftermath of 9/11, xenophobic ideas have capitalized on a growing sense of insecurity.

Western countries do not of course share the experience of collectivist authoritarianism, although regions such as Northern Ireland, where particularist politics are strong, tend to be those where democracy has been weak. An active civil society tends to counterbalance the distrust of politicians, the alienation from political institutions, the sense of apathy and futility that provide a potential basis for populist tendencies. Nevertheless, the 'secession' of the new cosmopolitan classes and the fragmentation and dependence of those excluded from the benefits of globalization are characteristic of advanced industrial countries as well.

The other main source of the new identity politics is the insecurity associated with globalization, particularly rapid urbanization and the parallel economy. To a large extent, this can be attributed to the neo-liberal policies pursued in the 1980s and the 1990s – macro-economic stabilization, deregulation and privatization – which effectively represented a speeding up of the process of globalization. These policies increased the level of unemployment, resource depletion and disparities in income, and led to rapid urbanization, and increased migration both from countryside to town and across borders. These changes, in turn, provided an environment for growing criminalization and the creation of networks of corruption, black marketeers, arms and drug traffickers, etc. In societies where the state controlled large parts of the economy and where self-organized market institutions do not exist, policies of 'structural adjustment' or 'transition' effectively mean the absence of any kind of regulation. The market does not, by and large, mean new autonomous productive enterprises; it means corruption, speculation and crime. New groups of shady 'businessmen', often linked in to the decaying institutional apparatuses through various forms of bribery and 'insider' dealing, are engaged in a kind of primitive accumulation – a grab for land and capital. They use the language of identity politics to build alliances and to legitimize their activities. Often these networks are linked to wars, e.g. in Afghanistan, Pakistan and large parts of Africa, and to the disintegration of the military-industrial complex in the aftermath of the Cold War. Often, they are transnational, linking up to inter-

national circuits of illegal goods sometimes through diaspora connections.

In addition, religious institutions or humanitarian organizations linked to nationalist or religious parties often provide the only social safety net available to newly arrived immigrants from the countryside or from other countries. Likewise, religious schools and community organizations have been growing in the context of economic policies, which involve cuts in social spending, including education.

A typical phenomenon consists of the new bands of young men, the new adventurers, who make a living through violence or through threats of violence, who obtain surplus weapons through the black market or through looting military stores, and who either base their power on particularistic networks or seek respectability through particularistic claims. These networks can include hostage-takers in the Transcaucasus, who take prisoners in order to exchange them for food, weapons, money, other hostages and even dead bodies; mafia-rings in Russia; the new Cossacks who don the Cossack uniform in order to 'protect' Russian diaspora groups in the near abroad; nationalist militia groups of unemployed youths in Western Ukraine or Western Herzegovina. All these groups feed, like vultures, on the remnants of the disintegrating state and on the frustrations and resentments of the poor and unemployed. A similar breed of restless political adventurer is to be found in conflict areas in Africa and South Asia.[25]

The new identity politics combines these two sources of particularism in varying degrees. Former administrative or intellectual elites ally with a motley collection of adventurers on the margins of society to mobilize the excluded and abandoned, the alienated and insecure, for the purposes of capturing and sustaining power. The greater the sense of insecurity, the greater the polarization of society, the less is the space for alternative integrative political values. In conditions of war, such alliances are cemented by shared complicity in war crimes and a mutual dependence on the continued functioning of the war economy. In Rwanda, the plan for mass genocide has been explained as the way in which the extremist Hutus could retain their grip on power in the context of economic crisis and international pressure for democratization. According to the NGO Africa Rights: 'The extremists' aim was for the

entire Hutu populace to participate in the killings. That way, the blood of genocide would stain everybody. There could be no going back.'[26] The intensification of the war in Kashmir, including the involvement of Afghan *Mujahidiin*, created a polarization between Hindu and Muslim identities which has increasingly supplanted syncretic traditions and the common bonds based on Kashmiri identity – the *kashmiriyat*.[27] One of the explanations for the ferocity of nationalist sentiment in the former Yugoslavia is the fact that all the various sources of the new identity politics are concentrated there: the former Yugoslavia had the most Westernized, indeed cosmopolitan, elite of any East European country, thus exacerbating the resentments of those excluded; it experienced nationalistic bureaucratic competition typical of the centralized state in decline; and, because it was exposed to the transition to the market earlier than other East European countries, its parallel economy was more developed. Even so, a vicious war was required to create the hatred on which exclusive identities could be reconstructed.

The new form of identity politics is often treated as a throwback to the past, a return to pre-modern identities temporarily displaced or suppressed by modernizing ideologies. It is of course the case that the new politics draws on memory and history and that certain societies where cultural traditions are more entrenched are more susceptible to the new politics. But, as I have argued, what really matters is the recent past and, in particular, the impact of globalization on the political survival of states. Moreover, the new politics has entirely new contemporary attributes.

First of all, it is horizontal as well as vertical, transnational as well as national. In nearly all the new nationalisms, the diasporas play a much more important role than formerly because of the speed of communication. There were always expatriate nationalist groups plotting their country's liberation in cafés in Paris or London. But such groups have become much larger and more significant because of the scale of emigration, the ease of travel and the spread of electronic communication. There are two types of diaspora. On the one hand, there are minorities living in the near abroad, fearful of their vulnerability to local nationalisms and often more extreme than those living on home territory. These include Serbians living in

Croatia and Bosnia–Herzegovina, Russian minorities in all the new ex-Soviet republics, the Hungarian minority in Vojvodina, Romania, Ukraine and Slovakia, Tutsis living in Zaire or Uganda. On the other hand, there are disaffected groups living far away, often in the new melting-pot nations, who find solace in fantasies about their origins which are often far removed from reality. The idea of a Sikh homeland, Khalistan, the notion of uniting Macedonia and Bulgaria, the call for an independent Ruthenia – all originated from diaspora communities in Canada. Irish-American support for the Irish Republican Army (IRA), violent conflict between the Greek and Macedonian communities in Australia and the pressure from Croatian groups in Germany for recognition of Croatia are all further examples of diaspora influence.

Among Kosovo Albanians, the diaspora played a critical role, especially in Germany and Switzerland. Many of those who had taken part in protests and student demonstrations in the early 1980s left the country. During the 1990s, a 3 per cent income tax was collected from half a million Kosovar Albanians who lived and worked abroad. Moreover, an Albanian-language television service was run from Switzerland and could be received by those Kosovar Albanians who had satellite dishes. After 1997, the increasingly influential role of the KLA (the Kosovo Liberation Army) was made possible because many in the diaspora switched support from the non-violent nationalist movement to the KLA.

Diaspora groups provide ideas, money, arms and know-how, often with disproportionate effects. Among the individuals who make up the new nationalist compacts are romantic expatriates, foreign mercenaries, dealers and investors, Canadian pizza-parlour owners, etc. Radha Kumar has described the support given by Indians living in the United States to Hindu fundamentalists: 'Separated from their countries of origin, often living as aliens in a foreign land, simultaneously feeling stripped of their culture and guilty for having escaped the troubles "back home", expatriates turn to diaspora nationalism without understanding the violence that their actions might inadvertently trigger.'[28] The same kinds of transnational networks are to be found among religious groupings. Islamic connections are well known, but such links also apply to other religious groupings. I visited the office of the so-called foreign

minister of South Ossetia, a breakaway region of Georgia, and he had a picture of the Bosnian Serb leader Karadžić on his wall. He explained that he had been given it by the delegation from Republika Srpska when he attended a meeting of Eastern Orthodox Christians.

Second, the capacity for political mobilization is greatly extended both as a result of the improved education and the expansion of educated classes and as a consequence of new technologies. Many explanations for the growth of political Islam focus on the emergence of newly literate urban classes, who are often excluded from power, the increase in Islamic schools and the expansion of newspaper readership.[29] Growing literacy in the vernacular languages, together with the spread of tabloid-type communitarian newspapers, as well as radio and television in vernacular languages that reach people who have never had a reading habit, as well as SMS messaging, access to websites and forums through the Internet, or the circulation of videos, create new 'imagined communities'. These new forms of electronic communication provide rapid and effective ways of disseminating a particularistic message. Specifically, the electronic media has an authority that newspapers cannot match; in parts of Africa, the radio is 'magic'. The circulation of cassettes with sermons by militant Islamic preachers, the use of 'hate' radio to incite people to genocide in Rwanda, the websites that celebrate atrocities, the control of television by nationalist leaders in Eastern Europe – all provide mechanisms for speeding up the pace of political mobilization.

Cosmopolitanism versus Particularism

A.D. Smith, in his book *Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era*, takes issue with the view that nation-states are an anachronism.[30] He argues that the new global classes still need to feel a sense of community and identity based on what he calls ethnies to overcome the alienation of their technical scientific universalizing discourse. And he criticizes what he calls the modernist fallacy that nation-states are artificial and temporary polities, staging-posts in the evolution towards global society. He sees the new nationalism as evidence of the persistence of

ethnies, and he offers a positive perspective on cultural separatism, which he sees as a way of grounding nation-states more firmly around a dominant ethnie while, at the same time, enabling them to embrace civic ideals.

It may well be that the new particularistic identities are here to stay, that they are the expression of a new post-modern cultural relativism. But it is difficult to argue that they offer a basis for humanistic civic values precisely because they are unable to present a forward-looking project relevant to the new global context. The main implication of globalization is that territorial sovereignty is no longer viable. The effort to reclaim power within a particular spatial domain will merely further undermine the ability to influence events. This does not mean that the new form of particularistic identity politics will go away. Rather, it is a recipe for new closed-in chaotic statelets with permanently contested borders dependent on continuing violence for survival.

The particularists cannot do without those people who are labelled differently. Globalization, as its name implies, is global. Everywhere, in varying proportions, those who benefit from globalization have to share territory with those excluded from its benefits but who are nevertheless deeply affected by it. Both losers and gainers need each other. No patch of territory, however small or large, can any longer insulate itself from the outside world.

Of course, it is possible to envisage, and it is already happening especially in the Middle East, a new assertion of regional and local politics, a claim for greater democratic accountability at regional and local levels. But if such claims are to succeed, they would have to be situated in a global context; they would have to involve greater access and openness towards global levels of governance, and they would have to be based on greater democratic accountability for all inhabitants of the territory in question, not just for those with a particular label. This type of politics would thus need to be embedded in what might be described as a cosmopolitan political consciousness.

By cosmopolitanism, I do not mean a denial of identity. Rather, I mean a celebration of the diversity of global identities, acceptance and, indeed, enthusiasm for multiple overlapping identities, and, at the same time, a commitment to the equality of all human beings and to respect for human dignity. The term

originates in the Kantian notion of cosmopolitan right that is combined with recognition of separate sovereignties; thus it brings together both universalism and diversity. Kwame Anthony Appiah talks about the 'cosmopolitan patriot' or the 'rooted cosmopolitan, attached to a home of one's own, with its own cultural particularities, but taking pleasure from the presence of other different people'. He distinguishes cosmopolitanism from humanism 'because cosmopolitanism is not just the feeling that everybody matters. For the cosmopolitan also celebrates the fact that there are *different* local human ways of being; humanism, by contrast, is consistent with the desire for global homogeneity.'[31]

Two possible sources of a cosmopolitan political consciousness can be identified. One, which could be described as cosmopolitanism from above, is to be found in the growing myriad of international organizations, a few of which, most notably the EU, are developing supra-national powers. These institutions develop their own logics and internal structures. They enable activities to be carried out rather than undertaking them through their own resources. They function through complex partnerships, cooperation agreements, negotiation, and mediation with other organizations, states, and private or semi-private groups. They are restricted both by lack of resources and, relatedly, by the inter-governmental arrangements which make it extremely difficult for them to act, except on the basis of time-consuming and often unsatisfactory compromises. In many of these institutions there are committed idealistic officials. They have an interest in seeking alternative sources of legitimacy to their frustrating national masters.

The other source is what could be described as cosmopolitanism from below, the new social movements as well as what came to be called NGOs in the 1990s. This new form of activism has developed since the early 1980s primarily in response to new global problems, but it has burst forth in the wake of the financial crisis and the crisis of authoritarianism in the Middle East in the politics of public squares and tent cities and Facebook. The forerunners of these new movements were the social forums that emerged in the early 2000s. The eleven million people who demonstrated all over the world on 15 February 2003 against the war in Iraq testified to their growing organization. Of course, not everyone who participates in these

activities is a cosmopolitan. Many are anti-globalization, yearning for a return to the nation-state, who sometimes make common cause with groups associated with identity politics, nationalists or Islamists in the Middle East, for example.

At present, cosmopolitanism and particularism coexist side by side in the same geographical space. Cosmopolitanism tends to be more widespread in the West and less widespread in the East and South. Nevertheless, throughout the world, in remote villages and towns, both sorts of people are to be found. The new particularistic conflicts throw up courageous groups of people who try to oppose war and exclusivism – both local people, often women, and those who volunteer to come from abroad to provide humanitarian assistance, to help mediate, etc. Local groups gather strength in so far as they can gain access to or support and protection from transnational networks.

It is in wars that the space for cosmopolitanism is narrowed. Particularisms need each other to sustain their exclusive identities; hence the paradoxical combination of conflict and cooperation. It is cosmopolitanism that undermines the appeal of particularism and it is the representatives of humane civic values that are often targeted in wars. Indeed, war itself can be understood as a form of political mobilization, constructing an environment of insecurity, in which particularist groups thrive. Areas of conflict become 'black holes' – havens for fanatics and criminals, breeding the new terrorism. More and more no-go areas come into being, such as Somalia or Afghanistan and now Iraq, where isolated humanitarian agencies gingerly negotiate and bribe their way through to help those in need. Some argue that such situations are the harbingers of the future for much of the world.[32] Nothing is more polarizing than violence and more likely to induce a retreat from utopian inclusive projects. 'Sarajevo is Europe's future. This is the end of history', Sarajevo's disenchanted cosmopolitans used to say. But politics is never determined. Whether another future can be envisaged is, in the end, a matter of choice.

5

The Globalized War Economy

The term 'war economy' used to refer to a system which is centralized, totalizing and autarchic, as was the case in the total wars of the twentieth century. Administration is centralized to increase the efficiency of the war and to maximize revenue to pay for the war. As many people as possible are mobilized to participate in the war effort either as soldiers or in the production of arms and necessities. By and large, the war effort is self-sufficient, although in World War II Britain and the Soviet Union received lend-lease assistance from the United States. The main aim of the war effort is to maximize the use of force so as to engage and defeat the enemy in battle.

The new type of war economy is almost totally the opposite. The new wars are 'globalized' wars. They involve the fragmentation and decentralization of the state. Participation is low relative to the population both because of lack of pay and because of lack of legitimacy on the part of the warring parties. There is very little domestic production, so the war effort is heavily dependent on local predation and external support. Battles are rare, most violence is directed against civilians, and cooperation between warring factions is common.

Those who conceive of war in traditional Clausewitzean terms, based on definable geo-political goals, fail to understand the underlying vested interests, both political and economic, in the continuation of war. They tend to assume that political solutions can be found without any need to address the under-

lying economic logic. At the same time, however, those who recognize the irrelevance of traditional perceptions of war, and observe the complexity of the political, social and economic relationships expressed in these wars, tend to conclude that this type of violence can be equated with anarchy. In these circumstances, the most that can be done is to treat the symptoms through, for example, humanitarian assistance.

In this chapter, I argue that it is possible to analyse the typical political economy of new wars so as to draw conclusions about possible alternative approaches. Indeed, the implication of such an analysis is that many of the well-meaning efforts of various international actors, based on inherited assumptions about the character of war, may turn out to be counterproductive. Conflict resolution from above may merely enhance the legitimacy of the warring parties and allow time for replenishment; humanitarian assistance may contribute to the functioning of the war economy; peacekeeping troops may lose legitimacy either by standing aside when terrible crimes are committed or by siding with groups who commit terrible crimes.

In the first section, I describe the various fighting units typical of contemporary wars and how they have emerged out of the disintegration of the state's formal security capacities. Then, I analyse patterns of violence and the character of military strategy and the way these have evolved out of the conflicts that developed during and after World War II as a way of reacting against or coping with modern conventional war – guerrilla warfare, counter-insurgency and the 'low-intensity' conflicts of the 1980s. Next, I consider how the fighting units acquire resources with which to fight the new wars and the interaction between the new pattern of violence and the social relations that are generated in the context of war. In the final section, I describe how the new wars, or rather the social conditions of the new wars, tend to spread.

The Privatization of Military Forces

Terms like 'failed', 'failing', 'fragile', 'weak' or 'collapsing' are increasingly used to describe countries with weak or non-existent central authority – the classic examples are Somalia

and Afghanistan. Some scholars argue that many African states never enjoyed state sovereignty in the modern sense – that is, 'unquestioned physical control over the defined territory, but also an administrative presence throughout the country and the allegiance of the population to the idea of the state'.[1] One of the key characteristics of failing states is the loss of control over and fragmentation of the instruments of physical coercion. A disintegrative cycle sets in, which is almost the exact opposite of the integrative cycle through which modern states were established. The failure to sustain physical control over the territory and to command popular allegiance reduces the ability to collect taxes and greatly weakens the revenue base of the state. In addition, corruption and personalistic rule represent an added drain on state revenue. Often, the government can no longer afford reliable forms of tax collection; private agencies are sometimes employed who keep part of the takings, much as happened in Europe in the eighteenth century. Tax evasion is widespread both because of the loss of state legitimacy and because of the emergence of new forces who claim 'protection money'. This leads to outside pressure to cut government spending, which further reduces the capacity to maintain control and encourages the fragmentation of military units. Moreover, outside assistance is predicated on economic and political reforms which many of these states are constitutionally incapable of implementing. A downward spiral of loss of revenue and legitimacy, growing disorder, and military fragmentation creates the context in which the new wars take place. Effectively, the 'failure' of the state is accompanied by a growing privatization of violence.

Typically, the new wars are characterized by a multiplicity of types of fighting units, both public and private, state and non-state, or some kind of mixture. For the purpose of simplicity, I identify five main types: regular armed forces or remnants thereof; paramilitary groups; self-defence units; foreign mercenaries; and, finally, regular foreign troops, generally under international auspices.

Regular armed forces are in decay, particularly in areas of conflict. Cuts in military spending, declining prestige, shortages of equipment, spare parts, fuel and ammunition, and inadequate training all contribute to a profound loss of morale. In many African and post-Soviet states, soldiers no longer

receive training or regular pay. They may have to seek out their own sources of funding, which contributes to indiscipline and breakdown of the military hierarchy. Often this leads to fragmentation, situations in which local army commanders act as local warlords, as in Tadjikistan. Or soldiers may engage in criminal behaviour as, for example, in Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo), where unpaid soldiers were encouraged to loot or pillage. In other words, regular armed forces lose their character as the legitimate bearers of arms and become increasingly difficult to distinguish from private paramilitary groups. This is compounded in situations where the security forces were already fragmented as a result of deliberate policy; often there were border guards, a presidential guard and a gendarmerie, not to mention various types of internal security forces. By the end, President Mobutu of what was then Zaire could rely only on his personal guard to protect him. Saddam Hussein engaged in a similar proliferation of security agencies, and, as with Mobutu, it was only the motley group known as Firqat Fedayeen Saddam, Saddam's Martyrs, that offered sporadic resistance to the initial American invasion. Indeed in much of the Middle East, dictators rely on brutal internal security forces rather than regular armies; in both Tunisia and Egypt, the army was pivotal in the fall of dictators in 2011, while Muammar Gadafi was increasingly dependent on mercenaries recruited from Sub-Saharan Africa.

The most common fighting units are paramilitary groups, that is to say, autonomous groups of armed men generally centred on an individual leader. Often these groups are established by governments in order to distance themselves from the more extreme manifestations of violence. This was probably the case for Arkan's Tigers in Bosnia, or so Arkan himself insisted. Likewise, the pre-1994 Rwandan government recruited unemployed young men to a newly formed militia linked to the ruling party; they were given training by the Rwandan army and granted a small salary.[2] In a similar vein, the South African government secretly supplied arms and training to the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), which had been promoting the violent activities of groups of Zulu workers during the transition to democracy. Often, paramilitary groups are associated with particular extremist parties or political factions. In Georgia, after independence, each political party, except the

Greens, had its own militia; after his recall to power, Eduard Shevardnadze tried to re-establish a monopoly over the means of violence by welding together these militias into a regular army. It was this ragbag of armed bands that was defeated by a combination of the Abkhazian National Guard and Russian military units in Abkhazia. One of the most notorious paramilitary groups in Kosovo was known as 'Frenki's Boys'. According to intelligence sources, Franko Simatović was the link between Milošević and freelance paramilitary groups.

The paramilitary groups are often composed of redundant soldiers, or even whole units of redundant or defecting soldiers like the brigades in Iraq and more recently Syria. They also include common criminals, as in the former Yugoslavia, Iraq, Libya and now Syria, where many were deliberately released from prison for the purpose. And they may attract volunteers, often unemployed young men in search of a living, a cause or an adventure. They rarely wear uniforms, which makes them difficult to distinguish from non-combatants, although they often sport distinctive clothing or signs. Symbols of global material culture often serve as important quasi-uniforms; for example, Ray-Ban sunglasses, Adidas shoes, jogging suits and caps. Reportedly, Frenki's Boys had their headquarters at the back of a dress shop in Djakovica. They wore cowboy hats over ski masks, and painted Indian stripes on their faces. Their trademark was the sign of the Serbian Chetniks and a silhouette of a destroyed city with the words 'City Breakers' in English.[3]

The use of child soldiers is not uncommon in Africa; there have also been reports of fourteen-year-old boys operating in Serbian units. In Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia, for example, which invaded Sierra Leone on Christmas Eve 1989, some 30 per cent of the soldiers were said to be under the age of seventeen; Taylor even created a 'Boys' Own Unit'. He supported an invasion of Sierra Leone by a rather small number of rebels, after which the Sierra Leone government recruited large numbers of citizens into its army, including boys some of whom were as young as eight years old: 'Many of the boys recruited into the government army were street-children from Freetown, involved in petty theft before their recruitment. Now they were given an AK47 and a chance to engage in theft on a larger scale.'[4] RENAMO (Resistência

Nacional Mocambiçana – the movement founded by Portuguese Special Forces after the independence of Mozambique and supported by South Africa) also recruited children, some of whom were forced to return to their own villages and attack their families. Child soldiers were also used by the LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) in Sri Lanka.

Self-defence units are composed of volunteers who try to defend their localities. These would include local brigades in Bosnia–Herzegovina who tried to defend all the citizens of their locality, for example in Tuzla; self-defence units of both Hutus and Tutsis who tried to stop the massacres in 1994; the self-defence units in South Africa set up by the African National Congress (ANC) to defend localities from Inkatha; or the brigades of the Free Syrian Army. Such units are very difficult to sustain mainly because of inadequate resources. Where they are not defeated, they often end up cooperating with other armed groups and getting sucked into the conflict.

Foreign mercenaries include both individuals on contract to particular fighting units and mercenary bands. Among the former are former Russian officers working on contract with the new post-Soviet armies, and British and French soldiers made redundant by the post-Cold War cuts, who used to train, advise and even command armed groups during the wars in Bosnia and Croatia and still do so in various African countries. A growing phenomenon is private security companies, often recruited from retired soldiers from Britain or the United States, who are hired both by governments and by multinational companies and are often interconnected. During the 1990s, a notorious example was the South African mercenary company Executive Outcomes and its partner, the British company Sandline International. Sandline International became famous as a result of the scandal concerning arms sales to Sierra Leone in early 1998. Executive Outcomes has been credited with considerable military success in defending diamond mines in Sierra Leone and Angola. In February 1997 the government of Papua New Guinea hired Sandline International to launch a military assault against the secessionist Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA) and to reopen the Bougainville copper mine; Sandline International subcontracted the work to Executive Outcomes.[5] American private security companies like Blackwater, now Xe company, have become a characteristic

feature of American interventions, especially in Iraq and Afghanistan. Particularly well-known names include MPRI (Military Professional Resources Inc.), which trained the Croatian army towards the end of the war in Bosnia and has now become part of L-3 Communications, and DymCorps, which tends to undertake policing duties, recently bought by Veritas Capital.

Foreign fighters may be motivated not only by money. Even before the Iraq war the *Mujahidiin*, veterans from the Afghan war, were generally to be found in all conflicts involving Islam, funded by the Islamic states, most notably Iran and Saudi Arabia. Since the 'War on Terror', so-called jihadists have joined the fight against the West in Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia and Yemen as well as in terrorist incidents in different parts of the world.

The final category is regular foreign troops, usually operating under the umbrella of international organizations, mainly the UN but also NATO in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan, ECOMOG (Economic Community of West African States Ceasefire Monitoring Group) in Liberia, the African Union (AU) in Darfur, the EU in the DRC, Aceh, Chad and the Balkans, and the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) or OSCE, which have both provided umbrellas for different Russian peacekeeping operations. In general, these troops are not directly involved in the war, although their presence is very significant and I will discuss their role in chapter 6. In some cases, these troops have become involved in fighting, as in the case of ECOMOG in Liberia and Sierra Leone or Russian peacekeepers in Tadjikistan, and, in such instances, they have taken on some of the characteristics of the other fighting units. In the war in DRC, several neighbouring countries (Uganda, Angola, Rwanda, Burundi) sent troops to participate on different sides. And, of course, as I discuss in chapter 7, the United States and Britain and some other countries have troops in Iraq and Afghanistan.

With the exception of the final category, the small-scale character of the fighting units has much in common with those involved in guerrilla warfare. But they lack the hierarchy, order and vertical command systems that have been typical of guerrilla forces and that were borrowed from modern warfare as well as the structure of Leninist or Maoist political parties.

These various groups operate both autonomously and in cooperation. What appear to be armies are actually horizontal coalitions of breakaway units from the regular armed forces, local militia or self-defence units, criminal gangs, groups of fanatics, and hangers-on, who have negotiated partnerships, common projects, divisions of labour or spoils. Robert Reich's concept of the 'spider's web' to characterize the new global corporate structure, which I referred to in the previous chapter (see p. 76), is probably also applicable to the new warfare.

Because of cost, logistics and inadequate infrastructure and skills, these 'armies' rarely use heavy weapons, although where they are used they may well make a considerable difference. The Serbian monopoly of heavy artillery was important in Bosnia, as was the intervention of Russian units with aircraft and artillery in Abkhazia. One of the reasons given for the success of Executive Outcomes has been their ability 'to carry out sophisticated operations such as flying helicopter gunships and light ground-attack fixed-wing aircraft'.[6]

For the most part, light weapons are used – rifles, machine guns, hand grenades, landmines and, at the upper end of the scale, low-calibre artillery and short-range rockets. Although these weapons are often described as 'low-tech', they are the product of a long and sophisticated technological evolution. Compared with the weapons used in World War II, they are much lighter, easier to use and transport, more accurate and more difficult to detect. In contrast to heavy weapons, they can be used to great effect by unskilled soldiers, including children. Modern communications are also very important to enable the fighting groups to cooperate, especially radios and mobile telephones. US forces in Somalia were unable to eavesdrop the commercially bought cellular phones used by Somali militiamen. In the last decade, new technologies and tactics have developed, such as IEDs (improvised explosive devices) or suicide bombers.

The end of the Cold War and of related conflicts such as those in Afghanistan or South Africa greatly increased the availability of surplus weapons. In some cases, wars are fought with weapons raided from Cold War stockpiles; this was largely the case in Bosnia–Herzegovina. In other cases, redundant soldiers sell their weapons on the black market, or small-scale producers (as in Pakistan) copy their designs. In addition, arms

enterprises which have lost state markets seek new sources of demand. Certain conflicts, for example in Kashmir, took on a new character as a result of the influx of arms, in this case a spill-over from the conflict in Afghanistan. An important factor in the escalation of the conflict in Kosovo was the sudden availability of arms after the Albanian state collapsed in the summer of 1997; arms caches were opened and hundreds of thousands of Kalashnikovs were available for sale at a few dollars each and could easily be brought across the border into Kosovo. The new wars could be viewed as a form of military waste-disposal – a way of using up unwanted surplus arms generated by the Cold War, the biggest military build-up in history.

Patterns of Violence

The techniques of these fighting units owe much to the types of warfare that developed during and after World War II as a reaction to modern war. Revolutionary warfare, as articulated by Mao Tse-tung and Che Guevara, developed tactics that were designed to find a way around large-scale concentrations of conventional forces and that were almost counter to conventional strategic theory.

The central objective of revolutionary warfare is the control of territory through gaining support of the local population rather than through capturing territory from enemy forces. The zones under revolutionary control are usually in remote parts of the country which cannot easily be reached by the central administration. They provide bases from which the military forces can engage in tactics which sap the morale and efficiency of enemy forces. Revolutionary warfare has some similarities with manoeuvre theory. It involves decentralized dispersed military activity, with a great emphasis on surprise and mobility. But a key feature of revolutionary warfare is the avoidance of head-on collisions which guerrilla units are likely to lose because of inferior numbers and equipment. Strategic retreats are frequent. According to Mao Tse-tung: 'The ability to run away is precisely one of the characteristics of guerrillas. Running away is the chief means of getting out of passivity and regaining the initiative.'[7] Great stress is placed by all revolutionary writers on winning 'hearts and minds', not just in the

territory under revolutionary control but in enemy territory as well, so that the guerrilla can operate, according to Mao's well-known dictum, 'like a fish in the sea', although, of course, terroristic methods were also used.

Counter-insurgency, which has been an almost universal failure,[8] was designed to counter this type of warfare using conventional military forces. Although it has been reformulated as a result of experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, as I elaborate in chapter 7, historically, the main strategy was to destroy the environment in which the revolutionaries operate, to poison the sea for the fish. Techniques like forcible resettlement developed by the French in Algeria and the British in Malaya, or area destruction through scattering mines or herbicides or napalm developed by the Americans in Vietnam, have also been used by, for example, the Indonesians in East Timor or the Turkish government against the Kurds.

The new warfare borrows from both revolutionary warfare and classic counter-insurgency. It borrows from revolutionary warfare the strategy of controlling territory through political means rather than through capturing territory from enemy forces. This is somewhat easier than it was for revolutionary forces, since in most cases the central authority is very weak and the main contenders for the control of territory are not governments with conventional modern forces but rather similar types of fighting units, even if they bear the name of regular armies. Nevertheless, as in the case of revolutionary warfare, the various factions continue to avoid battle mainly in order to conserve men and equipment. Strategic retreats are typical and ground is conceded to what appears to be the stronger party. Often, the various factions cooperate in dividing up territory between them.

An important difference between revolutionaries and the new warriors, however, is the method of political control. For the revolutionaries, ideology was very important; even though fear was a significant element, popular support and allegiance to the revolutionary idea was the central aim. Hence, the revolutionaries tried to build model societies in the areas under their control. In contrast, the new warriors establish political control through allegiance to a label rather than an idea. In the brave new democratized world, where political mobilization is based on labels and where elections and referenda are often

forms of census-taking, this means that the majority of people living in the territory under control must admit to the right label. Anyone else has to be eliminated. Indeed, even in non-democratized areas, fear of opposition, dissidence or insurgency reinforces this demand for homogeneity of population based on identity.

This is why the main method of territorial control is not popular support, as in the case of revolutionary warfare, but population displacement – getting rid of all possible opponents. To achieve this, the new warfare borrows from counter-insurgency techniques for poisoning the sea – techniques which were refined by guerrilla movements created or promoted by Western governments with experience of counter-insurgency to topple left-wing governments in the 'low-intensity' conflicts of the 1980s, such as RENAMO in Mozambique, the *Mujahidiin* in Afghanistan, or the Contras in Nicaragua. Indeed, this approach was a reaction to the failure of counter-insurgency in Vietnam and Southern Africa and the implicit realization that a conventional modern war is no longer a viable option.

Instead of a favourable environment for the guerrilla, the new warfare aims to create an unfavourable environment for all those people it cannot control. Control of one's own side depends not on positive benefits, since in the impoverished, disorderly conditions of the new warfare there is not much that can be offered. Rather, it depends on continuing fear and insecurity and on the perpetuation of hatred of the other. Hence the importance of extreme and conspicuous atrocity and of involving as many people as possible in these crimes so as to establish a shared complicity, to sanction violence against a hated 'other' and to deepen divisions.

The techniques of population displacement include:

1 Systematic murder of those with different labels, as in Rwanda. The killing of Tutsis in 1994 was directed by government officials and the army. According to Human Rights Watch: 'In such places as the commune of Nyakizu in Southern Rwanda, local officials and other killers came to "work" every morning. After they had put in a full day's "work" killing Tutsi, they went home "singing" at quitting time ... The "workers" returned each day until the job had been finished – that is, until all the Tutsi had been killed.'[9]

2 Ethnic cleansing, that is to say, forcible population expulsion, as in Bosnia–Herzegovina (see chapter 3) or the Transcaucasus or Darfur. In Abkhazia, another example, the Abkhaz inhabitants accounted for only 17 per cent of the population. In order to control the territory, the secessionist forces had to expel most of the remaining population, mainly Georgian. Even after the expulsion of the Georgians, the Abkhaz remain a minority. A typical tactic is to instil fear through grisly and well-publicized executions or atrocities.
3 Rendering an area uninhabitable. This can be done physically, through scattering anti-personnel landmines or through the use of shells and rockets against civilian targets, especially homes, hospitals or crowded places such as markets or water sources. It can be done economically through forced famines or sieges. By depriving the people of their livelihood, they either die of hunger, as in Southern Sudan, or they are forced to migrate. And it can be done psychologically by instilling unbearable memories of what was once home, by desecrating whatever has social meaning. One method is the destruction of history and culture by removing the physical landmarks that define the social environment for particular groups of people. The destruction of religious buildings and historic monuments is supposed to erase all traces of cultural claim to a particular area. In Banja Luka, at the height of the war, the Serbs destroyed all seventeen mosques and all but one of the Catholic churches. In particular, they flattened two very beautiful sixteenth-century mosques; they were demolished on a Friday, and on Monday the ground was razed and turfed over. The wanton destruction of the ancient Buddhist statues in Afghanistan by the Taliban was presumably supposed to achieve something similar. Another method is defilement through systematic rape and sexual abuse, which is characteristic of several wars, or by other public and very visible acts of brutality. Psychological methods have the advantage of differentiating between people with different labels.

These techniques violate international law, whether we are talking about international humanitarian law, human rights

law, or the Genocide Convention. Essentially, what were considered to be undesirable and illegitimate side-effects of old war have become central to the mode of fighting in the new wars. It is sometimes said that the new wars are a reversion to primitivism. But primitive wars were highly ritualistic and hedged in by social constraints. These wars are rational in the sense that they apply rational thinking to the aims of war and refuse normative constraints.

The pattern of violence in the new type of warfare is confirmed by the statistics of the new wars. The tendency to avoid battle and to direct most violence against civilians is evidenced by the dramatic increase in the ratio of civilian to military casualties. The exact numbers are hotly disputed as I discuss in the afterword to this book. But there is general agreement about the decline in the share of battle-related deaths to overall deaths so that nowadays the number of both military and civilians killed in direct fire between the warring parties is tiny compared with those killed from what is sometimes known as one-sided violence against civilians and other war-related deaths.[10] Likewise, the number of regular soldiers killed in wars is very small in comparison with the total numbers of casualties.

The importance of population displacement is evidenced by the figures on refugees and displaced persons. According to UNHCR, the global refugee population rose from 2.4 million people in 1975 to 10.5 million people in 1985 and 14.4 million people in 1995, and subsequently declined to 9.6 million in 2004, primarily as a consequence of increased repatriation, and rose again to 15.4 million in 2010.[11] This figure includes only refugees who cross international boundaries. According to the IDMC (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre) in Geneva, the number of internally displaced people increased from 17 million in 1998 to 27.5 million in 2010.[12] It should be noted, of course, that these numbers are cumulative unless displaced people are repatriated. Also methods of estimating numbers of internally displaced persons have greatly improved so the earlier figures may be underestimated. Nevertheless there does seem to be a trend towards increasing displacement per conflict. Using the American Refugee Council data, Myron Weiner calculated that the number of refugees and internally displaced persons per conflict increased from 327,000 in 1969 to



Figure 5.1 *Numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons in countries experiencing violence 1990–2010*

1,316,000 in 1992.[13] (1992 was, of course, a peak year for conflict.) Using the Uppsala Conflict database and figures from UNHCR and the IDMC, an upward trend in refugees and internally displaced persons can be observed per conflict. Figure 5.1 shows the rise in annual numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons in countries experiencing not only armed conflict but what the UCDP describes as sub-state conflict and one-sided violence.

Financing the War Effort

The new wars take place in a context which could be represented as an extreme version of globalization. Territorially based production more or less collapses either as a result of liberalization and the withdrawal of state support; or through physical destruction (pillage, shelling, etc.); or because markets are cut off as a result of the disintegration of states, fighting, or deliberate blockades imposed by outside powers, or, more

likely, by fighting units on the ground; or because spare parts, raw materials and fuel are impossible to acquire. In some cases, a few valuable commodities continue to be produced – e.g. diamonds in Angola and Sierra Leone, lapis lazuli and emeralds in Afghanistan, oil in Angola or Chechnya or Iraq, drugs in Colombia, Afghanistan and Tadjikistan – and they provide a source of income for whoever can offer 'protection'. Unemployment is very high and, as long as governments continue to spend, inflation is rampant. In extreme cases, the currency collapses to be replaced by barter, the use of valuable commodities as currency or the circulation of foreign currencies, e.g., dollars or euros.

Given the erosion of the tax base both because of the collapse of production and because of the difficulties of collection, governments, like privatized military groups, need to seek alternative sources of funding in order to sustain their violent activities. Given the collapse of productive activity, the main sources of funding are either what Mark Duffield calls 'asset transfer',[14] i.e. the redistribution of existing assets so as to favour the fighting units, or external assistance. The simplest forms of asset transfer are looting, robbery, extortion, pillage and hostage-taking. This is widespread in all contemporary wars. Rich people are killed and their gold and valuables stolen; property is transferred in the aftermath of ethnic cleansing; cattle and livestock are raided by militiamen;[15] shops and factories are looted when towns are taken. Hostages are captured and exchanged for food, weapons or other hostages, prisoners of war or dead bodies.

A second form of asset transfer is market pressure. A typical characteristic of the new wars is the numerous checkpoints which control the supply of food and necessities. Sieges and blockades, the division of territory between different paramilitary groups, allow the fighting units to control market prices. Thus a typical pattern, observed in Sudan, former Yugoslavia and other places, is that urban dwellers or even farmers will be forced to sell their assets – cars, fridges, televisions or cows – at ridiculously low prices in exchange for highly priced necessities simply in order to survive.

More sophisticated income-generating activities include 'war taxes' or 'protection' money from the production of primary commodities and various forms of illegal trading. The produc-

tion and sale of drugs is a key source of income in Afghanistan, Colombia, Peru and Tadjikistan. It was estimated in the 1990s that income from drugs accounted for 70 per cent of the opposition revenue in Tadjikistan, while the income of the Colombian guerrillas was said to amount to some $US800 million a year, which compares with government defence expenditure of $US1.4 billion.[16] Chechen warlords sold oil from backyard oil wells to Russian commanders, who in turn sold their oil provided by the Russian Ministry of Defence on Moscow markets thereby financing soldiers' wages. Revenue from oil and natural gas fuelled the fighting in Angola, parts of Colombia, and Aceh in Indonesia while smuggling in oil products helps to sustain Nagorno-Karabakh.[17] Sanctions-busting and trading in drugs, arms or laundered money are all examples of revenue-raising criminal activities in which the various military groups are engaged.

However, given the collapse of domestic production, external assistance is crucial, since arms, ammunition and food, not to mention Mercedes cars or Ray-Ban sunglasses, have to be imported. External assistance can take the following forms:

1 Remittances from abroad to individual families, for example, Sudanese or Palestinian workers in the oil-rich countries of the Middle East, Bosnian and Croatian workers in Germany or Austria. These remittances can be converted into military resources through the various forms of asset transfer described above.
2 Direct assistance from the diaspora living abroad. This includes material assistance, arms and money, for example from Irish Americans to the IRA, from Armenians all over the world to Nagorno-Karabakh, from Canadian Croatians to the ruling Croatian party, and so on.
3 Assistance from foreign governments. During the Cold War period, both regular forces and guerrillas relied on their superpower patrons. This source of assistance has largely dried up, although the United States still provides support to a number of governments. Neighbouring states often fund particular factions, to assist minorities or because of the presence of large numbers of refugees or because of involvement in various types of (illegal) trading arrangements. Thus Serbia and Croatia have provided support to

their client statelets in Bosnia–Herzegovina; Armenia aids Nagorno-Karabakh; Russia has backed a variety of secessionist movements on its borders, whether as a way of re-establishing control over post-Soviet space, or because of mafia or military vested interests, is a matter for speculation; Rwanda encouraged the opposition in DRC as a way of preventing Hutu militiamen from operating from refugee camps there; and Uganda supported the Rwandan Patriotic Front which took over after the massacres of 1994 and continues to abet the SPLA in Southern Sudan (and, in return, the Sudanese government supports the Lord's Resistance Army in Uganda). Other foreign governments that offer a source of finance include former colonial powers concerned about 'stability', for example France and Belgium in Central Africa, or Islamic states.

4 Humanitarian assistance. There are various ways in which both governments and warring factions divert humanitarian assistance for their own use. Indeed, donors regard a 5 per cent diversion of humanitarian aid or even more as acceptable in view of the needs of the most vulnerable parts of the population. The most common method is 'customs duties'. The Bosnian Croats demanded 27 per cent for humanitarian assistance transported through so-called Herzeg–Bosne, which, at the height of the war, was the only way to reach certain areas in Central Bosnia. But there are also other ways, including robbery and ambush. By insisting on the use of an overvalued official exchange rate, both the Sudanese and Ethiopian governments were able to profit from the provision of humanitarian aid.

Essentially, the fragmentation and informalization of war is paralleled by the informalization of the economy. In place of the national formal economy, with its emphasis on industrial production and state regulation, a new type of globalized informal economy is established in which external flows, especially humanitarian assistance and remittances from abroad, are integrated into a local and regional economy based on asset transfer and extra-legal trading. Figure 5.2 illustrates the typical resource flows of a new war. It is assumed that there is no production and no taxation. Instead, external support to ordinary people, in the form of remittances and humanitarian



Figure 5.2 *Resource flows in new wars*

assistance, is recycled via various forms of asset transfer and black-market trading into military resources. Direct assistance from foreign governments, protection money from producers of commodities, and assistance from the diaspora enhance the capacity of the various fighting units to extract further resources from ordinary people and thus sustain their military efforts.

Mark Duffield describes how this functioned in the Sudanese case, where an illegal dollar trade involving Sudan, Zaire and Uganda was operated, making use of relief convoys both for transport and to control prices:

> In the case of Sudan, the parallel economy consists of a number of interconnecting levels or systems. Local asset transfer is linked to national level extra-legal mercantile activity. In turn, this articulates with higher-level political and state relations together with regional and international parallel networks which trade in commodities and hard currency. It is this level that provides the initial site for the integration of international aid and relief assistance with the parallel economy. As assets flow upwards and outwards, culminating in capital flight, international assistance flows downwards through the same or related systems of power.[18]

Just as it is possible to find examples of military cooperation between fighting units so as to divide up territory or to foster mutual hatred among the respective populations, so it is possible to find examples of economic cooperation. David Keen describes what is known as the 'sell-game' in Sierra Leone, through which government forces sell arms and ammunition to the rebels:

> [Government forces] withdraw from a town, leaving arms and ammunition for the rebels behind them. The rebels pick up the arms and extract the loot, mostly in the form of cash, from the townspeople and then they themselves retreat. At this point, the government forces reoccupy the town and engage in their own looting, usually of property (which the rebels find hard to dispose of) as well as engaging in illegal mining.[19]

John Simpson describes how Peruvian government soldiers set free captured Shining Path guerrillas 'apparently in order to perpetuate insecurity in areas where officers can benefit from

illegal trading, in this case principally the trade in cocaine.'[20] There are similar examples in the Bosnian War, which I have described in chapter 3.

Some writers argue that economic motivation explains the new type of warfare and this has generated a debate among scholars about greed versus grievance.[21] David Keen suggests that a 'war where one avoids battles but picks on unarmed civilians and perhaps eventually acquires a Mercedes may make more sense ... [than] risking death in the name of the nation-state with little or no prospect of significant financial gain.'[22] But economic motivation alone is insufficient to explain the scale, brutality and sheer viciousness of new wars.[23] No doubt some join the fighting as a way of legitimizing criminal activities, providing a political justification for what they do and socially sanctioning otherwise illegal methods of financial gain. No doubt there are others – rational power-seekers, extreme fanatics or victims intent on revenge – who engage in criminal activities to sustain their political military goals. Yet others are press-ganged into the fighting, propelled by fear and hunger.

The point is rather that the modern distinctions between the political and the economic, the public and the private, the military and the civil are breaking down. Political control is required to embed the new coercive forms of economic exchange, which in turn are required to provide a viable financial basis for the new gangsters/powerholders in the context of state disintegration and economic marginalization. A new retrograde set of social relationships is being established in which economics and violence are deeply intertwined within the shared framework of identity politics.

The Spread of Violence

The new type of warfare is a predatory social condition.[24] While it may be possible to contain particular groups or individuals, it is very difficult to contain the social condition either in space or in time. Neighbouring countries are the most immediately affected. The cost of the war in terms of lost trade, especially where sanctions or communications blockades are introduced or where borders are closed, either deliberately or because of fighting; the burden of refugees, since generally

it is the neighbouring states who accept the largest numbers; the spread of illegal circuits of trade; and the spillover of identity politics – all these factors reproduce the conditions that nurture the forms of violence.

The NGO Saferworld has enumerated the cost of conflict to neighbouring countries in several cases. One example is the war in Mozambique, which was an important trade route for landlocked countries such as Zambia, Zimbabwe, Malawi, Botswana and Swaziland. Malawi lost all its trade with Mozambique, and the additional costs of transport during the height of the war were estimated at 11 per cent of annual export earnings; likewise, trade with Zimbabwe fell dramatically and the cost of rerouting goods through South Africa was estimated at $US825 million at 1988 prices.[25] In the Balkans, the decline in GDP following the wars in Croatia and Bosnia–Herzegovina, as a result of the loss of trade following the closure of borders and sanctions and the increased cost of transportation, was more or less inversely proportionate to distance from the epicentre of violence. The decline in GDP in Bosnia–Herzegovina was most dramatic, falling from $US2,719 per head before the war broke out to just $US250 per head when the war ended. Surrounding Bosnia–Herzegovina is an inner ring of countries – Serbia/Montenegro, Croatia and Macedonia – whose GDPs fell to 49 per cent, 65 per cent and 55 per cent of their 1989 levels, respectively. By 1996, Serbia/Montenegro and Macedonia had just managed to arrest the decline, while Croatia was able to achieve a very small growth rate. Surrounding these three countries is an outer ring of further affected countries – Albania, Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia – whose GDPs fell to 81 per cent, 88 per cent, 73 per cent and 90 per cent of their 1989 levels, respectively. Finally, the outermost ring – Hungary, Greece and Turkey – all also reported economic losses as a consequence of the war.[26]

As well as direct economic costs, the neighbouring countries bear the main burden of refugees. Most refugees are based in neighbouring countries. According to UNHCR figures, out of the 14.5 million refugees recorded for 1995, the majority (6.7 million and 5.0 million, respectively) were based in Africa and Asia. Countries hosting more than 500,000 refugees included Guinea (from Liberia and Sierra Leone), Sudan (mainly from Ethiopia, Eritrea and Chad), Tanzania (mainly from Rwanda

and Burundi), Zaire (which, as of 1995, had received 1.7 million refugees, of whom 1.2 million came from Rwanda and the remainder mainly from Angola, Burundi and Sudan), Iran (from Afghanistan and Iraq), Pakistan (also from Afghanistan and Iraq), Germany (mainly from the former Yugoslavia) and the United States. In Europe, after Germany, the biggest recipients of refugees have been Croatia and Serbia/Montenegro. In 2004, the pattern had changed somewhat. Out of the 9.6 million refugees, some 60 per cent were based in Africa, the Middle East and Central Asia. The biggest recipients of refugees were Iran and Pakistan (from Afghanistan), Germany and Tanzania. As of 2010 nearly 80 per cent of the 9.9 million refugees of concern to UNHCR were based in Africa and Asia (including the Middle East). Countries hosting more than 500,000 refugees were Iran, Pakistan and Syria, reflecting the dominance of refugees from Afghanistan and Iraq.[27]

Not only are these huge concentrations of refugees an immense economic burden on countries that are already poor, but they represent a permanent source of tension between the refugees and the host populations – for economic reasons, since they are competing for resources; for political reasons, since they constitute a permanent pressure on host governments to take action in order that they can return; and for security reasons, because the camps are often used as bases for various radical factions. The most long-standing example of both economic and political burdens is the Palestinian refugees squashed into the West Bank and Gaza or based in Jordan and the Lebanon. As in the case of the Palestinian refugees, up to a million or so Azeri refugees from Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan, or the Georgian IDPs (internally displaced persons) from Abkhazia in Georgia or the refugees and IDPs in the former Yugoslav republics all constitute a permanent source of political pressure for radical action. In Zaire (now DRC), the Hutu refugee camps served as a base for Hutu militiamen and contributed to the mobilization of Zairian Tutsis against the Mobutu regime.

Illegal circuits of trade are another conduit for the spread of the new type of war economy. Trade routes necessarily cross borders. The instability in Albania in the mid-1990s was mainly the consequence of the growth of mafia groups well connected to the ruling circles involved in sanctions-busting to

Serbia/Montenegro and gun-running to Bosnia–Herzegovina. The pyramid schemes that collapsed so dramatically were used to finance these activities – a classic case of asset transfer. The huge transfer of arms by the United States to Afghan guerrilla groups in the 1980s (much of which was largely diverted) transformed itself into networks of arms and drug trade covering Afghanistan, Pakistan, Kashmir and Tadjikistan.[28] Mark Duffield shows how the illegal dollar trade linked to the war in Sudan involved 'Zairois with gold wanting imported goods, food and fuel; Sudanese with dollars wanting food, clothing and coffee; and Ugandans with imported goods wanting gold and dollars for Kampala's parallel markets.'[29]

Finally, the politics of identity, itself, has a tendency to spread. All identity-based groups, whether defined in terms of language, religion or some other form of differentiation, spill over borders; after all, it is precisely the heterogeneity of identities that offers the opportunity for various forms of exclusivism. Majorities in one country are minorities in another: Tutsis in Rwanda, Burundi and DRC; Russians in most post-Soviet states, especially so-called Cossacks on the borders of Russia; Islamic groups in Central Asia – these are among the many vectors through which identity politics passes.

It is possible to identify spreading regional clusters characterized by this predatory social condition of the new war economies. Myron Weiner calls them 'bad neighbourhoods'. The clearest examples are the Balkan region surrounding Bosnia–Herzegovina; the Caucasus stretching south from Chechnya as far as Western Turkey and Northern Iran; the Horn of Africa, including Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia and Sudan; Central Africa, especially Rwanda, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo; and Central Asia, from Tadjikistan to India. The countries hosting Palestinian refugees might be treated as another cluster; since Israel made peace with the neighbouring states, the conflict is no longer expressed in terms of inter-state war and has begun to exhibit many of the characteristics of the new types of conflict.

Conclusion

The new wars have political goals. The aim is political mobilization on the basis of identity. The military strategy for

achieving this aim is population displacement and destabilization so as to get rid of those whose identity is different and to foment hatred and fear. Nevertheless, this divisive and exclusive form of politics cannot be disentangled from its economic basis. The various political/military factions plunder the assets of ordinary people as well as the remnants of the state, and cream off external assistance destined for the victims, in a way that is only possible in conditions of war or near war. In other words, war provides a legitimation for various criminal forms of private aggrandizement while at the same time these are necessary sources of revenue in order to sustain the war. The warring parties need more or less permanent conflict both to reproduce their positions of power and for access to resources.

While this predatory set of social relationships is most prevalent in the war zones, it also characterizes the surrounding regions. Because participation in the war is relatively low (in Bosnia, only 6.5 per cent of the population took part directly in the prosecution of the war), the differences between zones of war and apparent zones of peace are not nearly as marked as in earlier periods. Just as it is difficult to distinguish between the political and the economic, public and private, military and civil, so it is increasingly difficult to distinguish between war and peace. The new war economy could be represented as a continuum, starting with the combination of criminality and racism to be found in the inner cities of Europe and North America and reaching its most acute manifestation in the areas where the scale of violence is greatest.

If violence and predation are to be found in what are considered zones of peace, so it is possible to find islands of civility in nearly all the war zones. They are known about far less than violence and criminality, because it is these and not normality that is generally reported. But there are regions where local state apparatuses continue to function, where taxes are raised, services are provided and some production is maintained. There are groups who defend humanistic values and refuse the politics of particularism. The town of Tuzla in Bosnia–Herzegovina represents one celebrated example. The self-defence units created in Southern Rwanda are another example. In isolation, these islands of civility are difficult to preserve, squeezed by the polarization of violence, but the very fragmentary and decentralized character of the new type of warfare makes such examples possible.

Precisely because the new wars are a social condition that arises as the formal political economy withers, they are very difficult to end. Diplomatic negotiations from above fail to take into account the underlying social relations; they treat the various factions as though they were proto-states. Temporary ceasefires or truces may merely legitimize new agreements or partnerships that, for the moment, suit the various factions.

Peacekeeping troops sent in to monitor ceasefires which reflect the status quo may help to maintain a division of territory and to prevent the return of refugees. Economic reconstruction channelled through existing 'political authorities' may merely provide new sources of revenue as local assets dry up. As long as the power relations remain the same, sooner or later the violence will start again.

Fear, hatred and predation are not recipes for long-term viable polities; indeed, this type of war economy is perennially on the edge of exhaustion. This does not mean, however, that they will disappear of their own accord. There has to be some alternative. In the next chapter, I will consider the possibilities for such an alternative; in particular, how islands of civility might offer a counterlogic to the new warfare.

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Chapter 12

War

Paul D. Williams

Contents

Abstract

In this chapter, students will learn about the concept of war and how it continues to evolve in unpredictable ways. The chapter starts by providing an overview of different approaches to defining war before summarizing three prominent philosophies of warfare, described by Anatol Rapoport as the political, the eschatological and the cataclysmic. The chapter then examines the extent to which the processes of globalization have changed the character of warfare before briefly surveying the multiple domains in which war is now being waged. Historically, war has been waged principally by humans in particular geographical spaces. However, current trends see humans sharing these spaces and many war-related tasks with robots and forms of artificial intelligence. This is raising important questions about not just the strategies and tactics of war but also its nature and ethics. Finally, cyberspace and outer space are becoming more important domains of war as it continues to evolve.

Introduction

Students of security ignore warfare at their peril. Commonly understood as 'collective killing for some collective purpose' (Keegan 1998: 72), war involves a range of strategic activities: thinking about what military means can achieve, and against whom; defining and prioritizing vital interests and values, and who might threaten them; and a host of practical considerations in gearing up for military campaigns and living with their aftermaths. But war is much more than the strategies and tactics of war-fighting: it is a 'full-spectrum' social phenomenon that is 'present beyond the war front and beyond wartime, in and among apparently pacific social, cultural and economic relations' (Barkawi 2011: 713, 707–8). War can effect almost all social relations, from who's in charge to the price of food and from who gets a job to who can vote. Warfare is an intense form of political relations between belligerents that impacts upon virtually every dimension of human life. It has caused huge amounts of suffering and destruction but it has also been a major engine for social, political, economic and technological change. It has influenced many of humanity's most enduring cultural reference points, shaped the deep meanings of masculinity and femininity and set the contours of many laws, institutions and customs.

As such an important invention, there are many reasons to study war: to help your side win; to eradicate it; to comprehend why wars begin, how they end and whether they can be predicted; and to understand warfare's social and political functions. Whatever one's motivation, a concern with war and the use/threat of military force has formed the traditional core of security studies. In the face of the rapid 'broadening' of security studies, some analysts think it should stay that way (e.g. Miller 2010).

And yet it is important to maintain a sense of perspective. Warfare has been responsible for the death of countless humans and since 1945 war between nuclear powers could end life on Earth! But war hasn't always been so deadly. In early hunter-gatherer societies warfare might have killed as many as 0.5 per cent of the population per year (Coker 2014: 2), but one of the foremost military historians concluded that it was only in the twentieth century that war joined disease and famine as one of 'life's great enemies' (Keegan 1998: 14). Some scholars see the twentieth century's wars as an anomaly because the threat of humans suffering a violent death has receded significantly over the last few thousand years (Pinker 2011). Others have argued that the history of warfare points in the opposite direction: it has become more deadly over time as societies developed and became more complex (Centeno and Enriquez 2016). Either way, it is notable that warfare is not responsible for most contemporary instances of lethal violence. Humans are much more likely to suffer violent death via homicide, gang violence, domestic violence and even infanticide than in battle. The Geneva Declaration (2015) estimates that nine out of 10 violent deaths now occur outside wars.

This chapter examines the concept of war and how it continues to evolve in unpredictable ways. It starts by providing an overview of different approaches to defining war before summarizing three prominent philosophies of warfare, described by Anatol Rapoport as the *political*, the *eschatological* and the *cataclysmic*. Next it briefly analyses how far the processes of globalization have changed the character

of contemporary warfare before briefly surveying the multiple domains in which contemporary war is being waged. This requires an examination of the ways in which robotics and artificial intelligence as well as activities in cyber space and outer space are influencing war's evolution. The central argument is that 'war is remarkably resilient' and thus continues to evolve (Coker 2014: xi). And, as prominent military historian John Keegan observed, 'Like disease, it exhibits the capacity to mutate, and mutates fastest in the face of efforts to control or eliminate it' (1998: 72).

The concept of war

This section examines how war emerged as a powerful human habit before summarizing how IR has approached the concept. It then discusses the increasingly blurred boundaries between warfare and the related concepts of crime, atrocities and peace.

Warfare is the art of groups using organized violence. It is one of humanity's most significant activities not only in material terms but also in defining core elements of our identities such as heroism, sacrifice, honour, fear and peace. War's salience is illustrated by how frequently art, culture and commercial institutions reflect ideas, language and even the practices associated with war.

When humans invented warfare remains the subject of debate. Historical evidence of fortifications against organized attack found in Jericho suggests warfare dates back to at least 8,000 BCE (Keegan 1998: 28). Other scholars conclude that warfare occurred even if it was not endemic among human hunter-gatherers much earlier (Gat 2006: ch.2). Either way, war required an enemy and, in most forms of primitive ancient war, the enemy was always outsiders. It was not until the first century BCE that the Romans coined the concept of 'civil war' – war among fellow citizens – which was seen as the most wrenching of conflicts because it involved fighting among members of one's own community (Armitage 2017: 31). Since then, civil war has become the most widespread form of warfare, certainly since the latter half of the twentieth century.

For many years, war was waged by societies without regular armies, which didn't emerge until the first millennium BCE. Full-time warriors were not part of the original concept of war and hence also had to be invented. As for the professional militaries commonly associated with modern, state-based warfare, they represent a very small part of war's history. As John Keegan observed, 'Historically, war has been a dirty business, in which professional armies have been minority participants' (1998: xi). Since the Peace of Westphalia in the mid-seventeenth century, debates in the Western world tended to discuss and understand war with reference to the international society of states. But war does not require states and not all states have made war a central part of their existence.

Some scholars have argued that, as a human invention, war is 'merely an idea . . . that has been grafted onto human existence' (Mueller 2004: 2). But war is more than an idea; it is a habit that most human societies have acquired and become deeply attached to. War is thus often referred to as 'a social fact' (Centeno and Enriquez 2016: 4) or 'a deeply ingrained cultural practice' (Coker 2014: 24). Although there are examples of societies that have not engaged in (or even spoken of) warfare, war has become a widespread habit because it is frequently perceived

as a useful response to the stories humans tell themselves: stories about what we need, desire and, crucially, what we should fear.

Fear is particularly important for understanding war's importance because wars are generally launched to prevent a frightening future from materializing. At a basic level, war is emotionally appealing because it provides a way to resist our fear of domination. As G.K. Chesterton noted, 'War is not the best way of settling differences, but it is the only way of preventing them being settled for you' (in Coker 2014: 4–5). For example, if states tell each other and their populations frightening geopolitical stories then geopolitical issues will sometimes seem worth fighting for (Coker 2014: 53–73). Today, the geopolitical significance of war is probably most immediately salient for relationships between the world's great powers and the question of whether the US and China can avoid war (see Chapter 10). Even when warfare has descended into acts of atrocity and genocide, the perpetrators usually justified the slaughter by telling themselves it was an act of self-defence: fearful for their survival, a 'we must kill them before they kill us' attitude developed. These campaigns were what William Zartman (2010) described as 'pathologically defensive reactions to a perceived existential threat'.

The war habit is also intimately connected to some other core sources of human identity. Chief among them are heroism, sacrifice, honour and peace. This has fed a strong, perhaps unbreakable emotional attachment to war within most human societies.

War has been a crucial part of defining heroism and notions of bravery, with warriors often idolized. Important here are ideas of protecting the homeland, especially its women, children and elderly, as well as protecting other soldiers – popularly imagined as defending the 'band of brothers' (see Sjoberg 2013). Notions of sacrifice and honour have also been forged in war. The idea that it is honourable, even glorious, to die for one's country or group in battle has helped supply many willing recruits to war efforts around the world. Similarly, striving to maintain professional ethics and codes of conduct even in war has made the profession of arms an honourable pursuit for many people. It remains to be seen how the increasing participation of women performing combat roles in contemporary armed forces will alter these ideas. For example, women now make up roughly 15 per cent of the US military; 2015 saw the first women graduate from the Army Ranger school; while in Norway the world's first all-female special forces unit – the 'Hunter Troop' – was established in 2014.

Finally, peace is also inevitably related to the idea of war, in part because it is the purpose for which wars are usually fought. Of course, our substantive views of peace derive from our deeper political commitments and beliefs but it would be impossible to know war without understanding peace. Nevertheless, as noted below, it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between wartime and peacetime given that they can share many similar characteristics.

War's role in constructing these core elements of human identities suggests that most societies have a strong emotional attachment to warfare. But are we biologically programmed for war? Debates about the sources of human aggression are long-standing and complex. But perhaps the dominant conclusion is that our evolutionary biology suggests that warfare is linked to the human ability to engage in deadly

aggression and that, as a consequence, there are limits to how much humans can change. But this is not to say our genes make warfare inevitable. As Azar Gat put it, aggression 'is *both* innate and optional. . . . Deadly aggression is a major, evolution-shaped, innate potential that, given the right conditions, has always been easily triggered' (Gat 2006: 40–41). In sum, war is only possible because humans are biologically predisposed for violence, but biology isn't destiny. Indeed, it is human psychology that usually tips the balance. And the fact that humans suffer from cognitive dissonance and a tendency to favour our in-group (people like us) and display prejudice to others, might mean that we are not ultimately in control of our thoughts and therefore our actions. If so, not only might war never be eliminated but we might cling onto it because it gives us the illusion of being in control (Coker 2014: 102–3).

Despite our biological constraints, various limits have been imposed on both the theory and practice of warfare. These are sometimes referred to as taboos and enshrined in law. They raise the question of why the use of some weapons and practices are seen as illegitimate conduct. Among the most widely debated taboos are killing the defenceless (e.g. prisoners, the wounded and unarmed civilians), the use of chemical weapons, and more recently the widespread ban on anti-personnel landmines. Whether a taboo exists on the use of nuclear weapons remains the subject of debate (Tannenwald 2007). How such taboos are established and evolve is also debated. With regard to chemical weapons, for instance, some analysts view the limited use of poison gas as reflecting the power that normative restraints have over belligerents whereas others argue that its non-use is better explained by a pragmatic concern about its inconsistent and unpredictable effects (see Price 1997, 2017).

In IR and security studies, the concept of warfare has commonly been approached by distinguishing its cultural, legal, political and sociological dimensions (see Box 12.1). Less attention has been devoted to its biological and psychological aspects.

Understood as collective killing for some collective purpose, the concept of warfare can have blurred boundaries with related concepts, including organized crime, atrocities and even peace (see Chapters 30, 24 and 14).

War is supposed to differ from organized crime because its goals and actors are political, as opposed to private associations, which usually pursue crude wealth accumulation. Yet, one of the world's foremost historical sociologists concluded that war-making (and state-making) were basically humanity's 'largest examples of organised crime' (Tilly 1985: 169). In addition, real war economies have often had an illicit dimension as criminal actors intertwine with the activities of the belligerents.

War is also now supposed to be distinct from campaigns of mass atrocities. Regular armies are meant to abide by the laws of war but both are a relatively recent invention. We would presumably no longer justify as warfare the violent imperial conquests that saw Europeans conquer over 80 per cent of the world between 1492 and 1914, usually with the routine use of mass atrocities. Yet most large-scale atrocities still take place under cover of warfare, including the Holocaust, the Serbian 'strategy of war crimes' (Gow 2003) in the 1990s or the Islamic State's genocide against the Yazidis today. Some scholars have therefore argued that war and atrocity

Box 12.1 Defining war: cultural, legal, political and sociological approaches

Cultural: warfare looks different and conjures up different meanings depending where and when in human history the analyst looks. As John Keegan has suggested, this is because war 'is always an expression of culture, often a determinant of cultural forms, in some societies the culture itself' (1994: 12). War can therefore be understood as a socially constructed institution, but one with powerful material implications, as with marriage, the market or society. Hence, what 'we' choose to define as an act of war may not always coincide with how 'others' see things.

Legal: war has also been defined in juridical terms, for example as 'the legal condition which equally permits two or more hostile groups to carry on a conflict by armed force' (Wright 1983: 7). In 1945, the UN Charter outlawed war, except in self-defence or with explicit authorization of the Security Council. Legally, therefore, war is distinguished from peace because it is a state of legal contestation through military means. This does not mean that war is synonymous with the conduct of military engagements: parties can be legally at war without overt violence occurring between them. Because the international legal framework is primarily defined by states, the legal approach has limited applicability in cases where either the belligerents are not states or where governments are loath to recognize the actions of its domestic opponents as constituting warfare rather than criminal activity.

Political: arguably the most popular approach within IR has been to define war, following Clausewitz, as a particular type of political activity involving violence. Hedley Bull, for instance, defines war as

> organised violence carried on by political units against each other. Violence is not war unless it is carried out in the name of a political unit; what distinguishes killing in war from murder is its vicarious and official character, the symbolic responsibility of the unit whose agent is the killer. Equally, violence carried out in the name of a political unit is not war unless it is directed against another political unit; the violence employed by the state in the execution of criminals or the suppression of pirates does not qualify because it is directed against individuals.
>
> (Bull 1977: 178)

Sociological: war is understood as a socially generative form of relations, that is, warfare 'consumes and reworks social and political orders'. It is a 'full-spectrum' social phenomenon inasmuch as it involves 'the complete range of social, cultural, economic and political relations, shaping everything from matters of state to gender relations, from high politics to popular culture' (Barkawi 2011: 713). Combat and strategy are often among the most visible aspects of warfare as a social force but they represent only a small part of its sociology.

cannot be completely separated and that genocide is a form of war directed against civilian populations (Shaw 2003).

There are also sometimes distinctly blurred boundaries between war and peace (Keen 2000). I have already noted how most cases of lethal violence now occur outside of war. But the blurred distinction is likely to further intensify because rival states are increasingly operating in what the US National Intelligence Council calls the 'gray zone' between peacetime and full-scale war. Since 2003, for instance, the Chinese government has explicitly engaged in media, legal and psychological operations – what it calls its 'three warfares' – in order to ensure international and domestic support for any future military actions. Such approaches may increase the risk of inadvertent escalation through miscalculation, accident or misinterpreting a rival's 'red lines' (US NIC 2017: Annex 216).

Finally, it is also worth pondering whether a large-scale 'exchange' of nuclear weapons should still count as 'war' if it results in *Homo sapiens* essentially committing suicide? Writing in 1946, the eminent strategist Bernard Brodie, for one, seemed convinced that the advent of the atomic bomb made nuclear war nonsensical. 'Thus far,' he argued, 'the chief purpose of the military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them' (Brodie 1946: 76).

Three philosophies of war

In his introduction to the Penguin edition of Carl von Clausewitz's unfinished classic, *On War*, Anatol Rapoport (1968: 11) noted that, although Clausewitz was often dubbed 'The Philosopher of War', there are in fact several philosophies of war and Clausewitz was simply the most important proponent of one of them. These philosophies are important not only because they give different answers to the question 'what is war?' but also because humans are sentient beings and consequently what they think about an issue such as warfare can have an important bearing on its nature. Rapoport labelled the three philosophies the *political*, the *eschatological* and the *cataclysmic*.

The Prussian soldier and scholar von Clausewitz was arguably the most important proponent of the *political* philosophy of war. This defined warfare as 'an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfil our will' (Clausewitz 1976: 75). It was essentially a rational, national and instrumental activity: the decision to employ the military instrument ought to be made on the basis of a rational calculation taken by the political authority concerned in order to achieve some specified goal. In Clausewitz's framework, the political challenge of warfare was how to achieve such rationality given the fluctuating relationships between his central trinity of actors – the people, the government and the military – given their principal characteristics – passion, reason and chance, respectively. During Clausewitz's lifetime (1780–1831), war was widely viewed as a legitimate instrument of state policy, albeit one that should be used only with a clear purpose in mind. Victory in battle was the goal and it usually went to the side most accomplished in the arts of attrition and manoeuvre.

The *eschatological* philosophy, in contrast, had a teleological view of history that would culminate 'in a "final" war leading to the unfolding of some grand design –

divine, natural, or human' (Rapoport 1968: 15). Rapoport offered two variants: messianic and global eschatology. In the messianic variant the agency destined to carry out the 'grand design' is presumed to exist already. Its 'mission' was to 'impose a just peace on the world', thus 'eliminating war from future history'. Expressions of such a philosophy include the crusaders' attempts to unite the known world under a single faith in the Middle Ages, the Nazi doctrine of the master race, or the visions of a global caliphate articulated by al-Qa'ida and the Islamic State. Another recent case is the al-Shabaab movement in Somalia, whose leaders have divided the world into two irreconcilable poles – *Dar ul Harb* (Abode of War) and *Dar ul Islam* (Abode of Islam) – and proclaimed non-Muslims as existential enemies. As one of al-Shabaab's propaganda videos put it, 'throughout the centuries the nature of this war has not changed in the slightest. It's a war of Islam against kaffir. Belief against disbelief. And truth against falsehood' (Al-Shabaab 2015).

In the global variant of eschatological philosophy, the 'grand design' is presumed to arise from the chaos of the 'final war'. In Christian eschatology, for example, this would involve forces that will rally around Christ in the Second Coming. Alternatively, in communist eschatology the struggle for power was waged between classes rather than states or religions. From this perspective, the emergence of the 'world proletariat' was required to convert imperialist war into class war and, after defeating the bourgeoisie, establish a world order in which wars will no longer occur.

Finally, the *cataclysmic* philosophy conceived of war 'as a catastrophe that befalls some portion of humanity or the entire human race' (Rapoport 1968: 16). Here, war could be seen as a scourge of God or as an unfortunate by-product of 'human nature' or the anarchic 'international system'. This philosophy also comes in two variants: ethnocentric and global. The ethnocentric version sees war as something that is likely to befall *us*; specifically war is something that *others* threaten to do to us. The coming war is not seen as beneficial for us; all that can be done is to forestall the impending disaster or alleviate its worst effects. The global variant views war as a cataclysm that affects humanity as a whole, not just this or that group of humans. No one is held responsible and no one will benefit from it. Consequently, this philosophy focuses attention on the prevention of war, 'on uncovering the causes of war and on inventing institutionalized methods of conflict resolution' (Rapoport 1968: 40; see also Roberts 2005).

Based on these descriptions, Rapoport suggested that 'in political philosophy war is compared to a game of strategy (like chess); in eschatological philosophy, to a mission or the dénouement of a drama; in cataclysmic philosophy, to a fire or epidemic' (1968: 16).

Historically, during the period from the Napoleonic era until the First World War, European politics provided the conditions in which Clausewitz's political philosophy flourished and became dominant. By the time Europe's major armies had become bogged down in the trench warfare of the First World War, however, it was clear that developments in military technology had rendered Clausewitzean methods of attrition incredibly costly to implement and the art of manoeuvre almost impossible. The industrialized slaughter of 'the Great War' thus ceased to serve the political aims of either side.

A glance at the landscape of contemporary world politics reveals that in some important respects the political philosophy espoused by Clausewitz is being challenged. It is alive and well in the military colleges of Western states but outside these corridors other philosophies and practices are in the ascendancy. As Box 12.2 illustrates, debate continues over whether Clausewitzean thinking is still relevant for analysing today's wars.

Box 12.2 Is Clausewitz's thinking still relevant?

Martin Van Creveld:

> contemporary 'strategic thought . . . is fundamentally flawed; and, in addition, is rooted in a 'Clausewitzian' world-picture that is either obsolete or wrong. We are entering an era . . . of warfare between ethnic and religious groups. . . . In the future, war will not be waged by armies but by groups whom we today call terrorists, guerrillas, bandits, and robbers, but who will undoubtedly hit on more formal titles to describe themselves. Their organizations are likely to be constructed on charismatic lines rather than institutional ones, and to be motivated less by 'professionalism' than by fanatical, ideologically-based loyalties. . . . If low-intensity conflict is indeed the wave of the future, then strategy in its classical sense will disappear.
>
> (Van Creveld 1991: ix, 197, 207)

Mary Kaldor:

> the core of Clausewitzean theory [the inner tendency of war to lead to extremes], is no longer applicable. For Clausewitz, war was fundamentally about the 'urge to decision', which was achieved through . . . combat between two warring parties, and this implied the need for speed and concentration; the suspension of belligerent action and the dispersal of forces did, of course, take place but were explained in terms of departures from the inner nature of war. Today's wars . . . are inconclusive, long lasting and have a tendency to spread. My argument is that this is because these wars have a different inner nature. In this sense, a Clausewitzean understanding of these wars can be deeply counterproductive in developing appropriate international strategies both for trying to end these wars and for the role of military forces. On the other hand, there is much in Clausewitz's method of argument that can help us think through alternative approaches.
>
> (Kaldor 2010: 271)

General Sir Rupert Smith:

> In today's wars, fighting occurs among the civilian populace; it is 'war amongst the people'. The aim of using military force is 'to influence the intentions of the people'. Consequently,

> I do not agree with some who dismiss Clausewitz and his trinity as irrelevant: it is my experience in both national and international operations that without all three elements of the trinity – state, military and the people – it is not possible to conduct a successful military operation, especially not over time.
>
> Clausewitz's trinity of state, army and people is a useful tool with which to analyse the actors' purpose and activities, despite their [often] not being states. Even apparently formless non-state actors will also have some dependency and relationship with the people, there will be an armed force of some description and there will be some political direction to the use of force.
>
> (Smith, R. 2005: 277, 58, 303)

First, the concept of the battlefield, so central to the way in which Clausewitz understood warfare, has dissolved. The 9/11 attacks and other 'terrorist spectaculars', for instance, demonstrate that 'battle' might be waged in Western (or other) cities, while the US-led 'war on terror' – subsequently rebranded as the 'long war' – conceives of the battlefield as literally spanning the entire globe.

Second, as the speeches of Osama bin Laden and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi but also former US President George W. Bush and current US President Donald Trump make clear, leaders on both sides of the 'war on terror' have often rejected political narratives of warfare. Instead, they have adopted eschatological philosophies in their respective rallying cries for a global jihad and a just war against evildoers (and, in Trump's case, their families).

A third problem for the political philosophy – and one that Clausewitz obviously never encountered – is the irrationality of war between states armed with nuclear weapons. As noted above, far from furthering the political objectives of the participants this is more likely to resemble a mutual suicide pact between (at least) the states involved. In addition, as the technology to make nuclear weapons continues to diffuse, the potential for them to fall into the hands of groups committed to carrying out 'terrorist spectaculars' without making specific demands is a worrying break from Clausewitzean tradition (see Chapters 22 and 26).

Finally, when confronted with 'revolutionary' wars, which cry out for counter-revolutionary responses, Clausewitz's injunction to destroy the military forces of the adversary is problematic not just because such 'military forces' are often indistinguishable from the local populace but also because one can never be sure they have been eliminated 'unless one is ready to destroy a large portion of the population' (Rapoport 1968: 53). The problem, as Rapoport noted, is that 'this usually conflicts with the political aim of the war' – to ensure the irrelevance of the revolutionary ideology in question – 'and hence also violates a fundamental Clausewitzean principle'.

The changing character of war

One significant debate in the academic literature on warfare has centred on whether and how the processes of globalization have given rise to a 'new' type of warfare. Specifically, some scholars have argued that, especially since 1945, globalization has given rise to a distinctive form of organized violence, commonly labelled 'new wars' (Kaldor 1997, 1999, 2006; Munkler 2004; Strachan and Schiepers 2011; Box 12.3). According to Kaldor (1999), in new wars the traditional distinctions between war (violence between states or organized political groups for political motives), organized crime (violence by private associations, usually for financial gain) and large-scale violations of human rights (violence by states or private groups against individuals, mainly civilians) become increasingly blurred.

These new wars are said to be distinct from 'old wars' in terms of their goals, methods and systems of finance, all of which reflect the ongoing erosion of the state's monopoly of legitimate organized violence (Kaldor 1999). The goals of combatants can be understood in the context of a struggle between cosmopolitan and exclusivist identity groups. The latter are understood to be seeking control of a particular territory by ethnically cleansing different identity groups or people who espouse cosmopolitan political opinions. In terms of methods, Kaldor suggests that new wars are fought through a novel 'mode of warfare' that draws on both guerrilla techniques

Box 12.3 Common hypotheses in the 'new wars' literature
Source: Mello 2010

Hypothesis 1: An essential characteristic of 'new wars' is the progressive erosion of the state's monopoly on the use of force. Consequently, traditional distinctions between combatants and civilians become increasingly blurred.

Hypothesis 2: 'New wars' are driven by economic aspirations with political or ideological motivations playing only a minor role. This political economy of 'new wars' reinforces and perpetuates the violence.

Hypothesis 3: 'New wars' are characterized by asymmetry involving the constellation of (1) actors, (2) military capabilities, (3) the methods of warfare and (4) the politics of war.

Hypothesis 4: 'New wars' are driven by exclusive conceptions of identity, which are instrumentalized for the purpose of seizing political power. These forms of 'identity politics' are unfolding in the context of the erosion of state structures and the insecurities of globalization.

Hypothesis 5: The new forms of international terrorism represent a modern variant of guerrilla warfare but, unlike traditional guerrilla warfare, this new kind of terrorism poses a strategic challenge to Western societies.

and counterinsurgency. Yet this mode of warfare is distinctive inasmuch as decisive engagements are avoided and territory is controlled through political manipulation of a population by sowing 'fear and hatred' rather than winning 'hearts and minds'. Paramilitaries and groups of hired thugs are hence a common feature of these war zones as they can spread fear and hatred among the civilian population more effectively than professional armed forces (see Mueller 2000). Paramilitary forces are also useful because it can be difficult to trace back responsibility for their actions to political leaders. The final characteristic of Kaldor's new wars is that they are financed through a globalized war economy that is decentralized and increasingly transnational and in which the fighting units are often self-funding through plunder, the black market or external assistance (see also Duffield 2001: ch.6).

Wars that reflect these characteristics are often very difficult to bring to a decisive end. Kaldor therefore suggests that their resolution lies with the reconstruction of legitimate (that is, cosmopolitan) political communities that instil trust in public authorities, restore their control of organized violence, and re-establish the rule of law. In this context, the role of concerned outsiders should be to provide what she calls 'cosmopolitan law enforcement' in the form of robust peace operations involving a combination of military, police and civilian personnel.

Elements of Kaldor's arguments have been contested. First, many of the trends she identifies are not 'new'. Atrocities against civilians, for example, have been a feature of all wars and there is little evidence that suggests a temporal, qualitative shift in the use of atrocity across the twentieth century. A second set of criticisms has challenged Kaldor's view of globalization as a novel set of processes that have altered the character of warfare after 1945. In contrast, Tarak Barkawi (2006) has argued that globalization is not the recent phenomenon that Kaldor suggests. Rather, globalization is a much older process that is essentially about circulation, that is, the processes through which people and places become interconnected. War, Barkawi observes, has been a historically pervasive and significant form of interconnection between societies and in this sense warfare has been a globalizing force for a long, long time (see Box 12.4). Understood in this manner, globalization is not a process separate from war that acts to change warfare in the way suggested by Kaldor. Instead, war has been intimately implicated in the globalization of world politics for thousands of years.

The domains of war

New or old, most wars have been fought in geographic domains: on land, on and under the sea and, more recently, in the air. Indeed, constraints imposed by geography and climate meant that major wars have been confined to a relatively small portion of the Earth's surface (Keegan 1994: 68–73). But the domains in which warfare is being waged are expanding with potentially far-reaching consequences. While many wars have been fought on traditional battlefields and insurgencies countered in rural landscapes ('the bush'), it is increasingly likely that as more humans inhabit urban environments we will see more examples of 'metrowar' – war in urban environments, including the world's estimated 260,000 shanty towns and densely populated slums (Coker 2014: 15–16).

Box 12.4 Tarak Barkawi on globalization and war

> In and through war, people on both sides come to intensified awareness of one another, reconstruct images of self and other, initiate and react to each other's moves. To be at war is to be interconnected with the enemy. Such connections involve social processes and transformations that should be understood under the rubric of globalization. . . . From a war and society perspective, war can be seen as an occasion for interconnection, as a form of circulation between combatant parties. In and through war, societies are transformed, while at the same time societies shape the nature of war.
>
> Militaries and war are also sites of cultural mixing and hybridity. Military travelling cultures expose soldiers to the foreign and lead them to reassess their ideas about home. Soldiers returning from abroad transmit new ideas and practice to their native lands. . . .[N]o matter how globalization is understood – as economic globalization, as transregional interconnectedness, or as consciousness of the global – war and the military play far more important roles than extant studies of globalization indicate. . . . [W]hat is needed is an assessment of the ways in which war is centrally implicated in the processes of globalization.
>
> (Barkawi 2006: xiii, 169–72)

Wars fought in geographic domains have always included instruments of technology, from weapons and materiel to logistics equipment. But technology advances, especially in robotics, are increasingly leading humans to share them with autonomous machines. Indeed, as technology tends to encourage specialization so machines engineered to advance the war effort are increasingly replacing human input. It is now plausible, for instance, to talk of 'robot warriors' and the related development of artificial intelligence that are reducing human participation in warfare (see Singer 2009).

There are several dimensions to these developments. First, human soldiers are being wired into a networked world. For example, the growing use of drones to deliver strikes has seen a new breed of drone pilots operating these weapons systems as today's remote warriors from their offices in the United States (Gusterson 2016: ch.2).

Second, militaries have long attempted to engineer humans for war by trying to enhance their physical, physiological and cognitive attributes. For nearly three decades, the US military has been 'transforming humans for war' through, among other things, the use of exoskeletons and sensors to create 'super-soldiers' (Jacobsen 2015). One example is the TALOS (Tactical Assault Light Operator Suit), which is expected to begin field-testing in 2018 (Cox 2017).

And, third, is the development of robot warriors. It was in Iraq in 2006 that the US military deployed the first armed robots: three 'special weapons observation

remote reconnaissance direct action system' (SWORDS) robots armed with machine guns (Shachtman 2007). But, more generally, the revolution in robotics has already been influencing the course of warfare for some time. So far at least, as one scientist put it, these robots remain 'extensions of us', but as artificial intelligence develops this may not always be the case (Singer 2009: 13). Looking to the future, the potential for robots to impact war is enormous. For example, if swarms of tiny robots will soon be able to overwhelm defences this is thought likely to increase the incentive of adversaries to strike first before their own systems are attacked (US NIC 2017: Annex 218).

But robot warriors don't just influence the strategies and tactics of war. They also raise some intriguing ethical issues about war and humanity's place in it. For one thing, robot warriors would remove heroism from war, since presumably they wouldn't need to be brave to perform their assigned tasks. Furthermore, there is the possibility that robot warriors might fight wars more humanely because of their lack of hatred. Recall that Clausewitz thought human passion was a key element of warfare and hence there could never be what he called 'war by algebra' (cited in Coker 2014: 48). Yet presumably robots would fight according to algebra (and algorithms, initially those programmed into them). In addition, as depicted in the film *The Imitation Game*, humans are not always averse to using algebra to calculate how to fight, in that case Nazi Germany after the breaking of the Enigma code. Ironically, therefore, robot warriors might fight wars more humanely by using logic to trump reason and human passion they could escape prejudice, and without fatigue and stress they should produce fewer ethical mistakes than human warriors (Coker 2014: 46).

War is also moving beyond geospaces into cyberspace (see Chapter 37) and outer space (see Chapter 38). Activities in cyberspace raise the issue of whether war can occur in this domain and whether cyber attacks were directly lethal to humans. In 2012 Thomas Rid wrote a widely debated article arguing that 'cyber war' – defined as 'a potentially lethal, instrumental, and political act of force conducted through malicious code' – has not occurred, is not occurring and will be unlikely to take place. Rather, cyber attacks had generally involved variants of the much older techniques of sabotage, espionage and subversion (Rid 2012). On the other hand, it may be possible for actions in cyberspace to turn lethal, including by shutting down power grids, air traffic control, even entire cities – what some analysts call 'urbicide' (Coker 2014: 41). Moreover, according to the *Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations* (Tallinn Manual 2017), the basis as to whether a cyber operation rises to the level of an act of war is if it causes harm to individuals or damage to property equivalent to the use of force. From this perspective, both the Stuxnet worm used by the US against Iran and the attack on Saudi Aramco, a giant oil firm that had over 35,000 of its computers partially wiped or destroyed in 2012, were destructive acts of cyberwar (see Chapter 37). Ultimately, the debate centres on what constitutes 'destruction' and 'lethality' and whether it need only relate to property/infrastructure or must also include the direct killing of humans (see Rid 2013; Chapter 14).

With regard to war in outer space, the possibilities are literally endless! Space has been militarized to some degree since the 1960s, prompting debate over who

can control near-Earth space and whether this will enable them to control outcomes on planet Earth (Bormann and Sheehan 2009). But activities in outer space have the potential to see a further evolution in the concept of war: would, for instance, aliens fight like us, and would we fight aliens like we fight other humans?

Back on Earth, the continued evolution of war and trends across these domains has prompted numerous attempts to grasp the future of warfare (e.g. Singer 2009; Coker 2015) and whether specific wars can be predicted (e.g. Cederman and Weidmann 2017). Box 12.5 briefly summarizes one prominent attempt by the US government's intelligence agencies to understand the future of war.

Box 12.5 The US National Intelligence Council on the future of war

Source: US NIC 2017: Annex 215–216, 220

The US National Intelligence Council predicts that the risk of armed conflict will rise during the next two decades because of new technology advances, new strategies and the evolving geopolitical context. Together, they are likely to make warfare more diffuse, diverse and disruptive.

Diffuse: the greater accessibility to instruments of war, including IEDs, unmanned vehicles and precision-guided rockets will empower a variety of actors including states, insurgents, mercenaries, criminals and private firms to engage in armed conflict, including remote operations.

Diverse: future wars are likely to be fought using a broad spectrum of means, including non-military capabilities such as economic coercion, cyber attacks and information operations, to advance conventional weapons and WMD, and occur in multiple domains, including outer space and cyberspace. This will diversify the potential forms of warfare that might arise.

Disruptive: conflict parties will presumably seek to disrupt critical infrastructure, societal cohesion and governance functions of their adversaries rather than simply focus on defeating enemy forces on the battlefield.

Together, these trends will likely produce increasingly costly but less decisive conflicts.

Conclusion

As arguably one of the most important human inventions, warfare must remain central to security studies. War has proved its resilience despite various attempts to eliminate or control it. It has played a crucial role in defining powerful human emotions and markers of identity and has generated multiple philosophies to try to understand its place in human life. In recent years, the political philosophy of war popularized by Clausewitz has come under challenge as war continues to evolve.

Once again, warfare exhibits blurred boundaries with other important concepts such as crime, atrocity and peace. While debate persists about the extent to which the character of warfare is changing, it is certainly witnessing some interesting new participants, most notably increasingly autonomous robots, and it is pushing beyond the confines of geography into cyberspace and even outer space. War's continued evolution will challenge students of security who are trying to figure out how to win wars while simultaneously avoiding a potentially cataclysmic nuclear war. But the robotics revolution and the prospect of more wars in cyberspace and outer space also raise profound ethical questions about what is arguably humanity's most enduring habit.

Further reading

Miguel A. Centeno and Elaine Enriquez, *War and Society* (Polity, 2016). An excellent, concise analysis of how in the Western world the evolution of societies has shaped warfare and, in turn, how warfare has shaped the evolution of those societies.

Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*. Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton University Press, 1976). The seminal discussion of the political philosophy of war.

Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era*, 3rd edition (Polity, 2012). An important statement of the argument that the processes of globalization have fundamentally changed the character of some armed conflicts.

P.W. Singer, *Wired for War* (Penguin, 2009). A fascinating examination of how history, politics, science, business, technology and popular culture have combined to produce a robotics revolution in contemporary and probably future warfare.

Hew Strachan and Sybille Schiepers (eds), *The Changing Character of War* (Oxford University Press, 2011). An excellent overview of the field produced as part of Oxford University's Changing Character of War research programme.

Charles Townshend (ed.), *The Oxford History of Modern War*, new edition (Oxford University Press, 2005). Provides a useful historical discussion of the evolution and contemporary elements of modern warfare.