# **STPA analysis of Sample Analysis**

Just an example of analisys

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## **Step One - Purpose of the Analysis**

#### Goals

G-1: Goal One

#### **Assumptions**

A-1: Assumption One

#### Losses

L-1: Loss One

L-2: Loss Two

### **System-level Hazards**

H-1: Hazard One [L-1]

H-2: Hazard Two [L-1] [L-2]

H-3: Hazard Three [L-1]

### **Systel-level Safety Constraints**

SSC-1: Safety Constraint One [H-1]

SSC-2: Safety Constraint Two [H-2]

# **Step Two - Control Structure**

#### Controller controller A

Responsibilities:

```
R-1: Responsability One. [SSC-1]
```

R-2: Responsability Two. [SSC-2]

#### Outgoing connections

controller A -> actuator

Control actions: cmd\_01, cmd\_02

controller A -> higher-level controller

### Incoming connections

sensor -> controller A

Feedbacks (variables and values):

feed\_sensor (feed\_sensor\_01, feed\_sensor\_02)

external system -> controller A

Feedbacks (variables and values):

ext\_info (ext\_info\_01, ext\_info\_02)

higher-level controller -> controller A

### Controller higher-level controller

Responsibilities:

#### Outgoing connections

higher-level controller -> controller A

Control actions: cmd\_ctrl\_02, cmd\_ctrl\_01

higher-level controller -> controlled process

Control actions: cmd\_hlc\_01, cmd\_hlc\_02

#### Incoming connections

controller A -> higher-level controller

Feedbacks (variables and values):

```
feed_ctrl (feed_ctrl_01, feed_ctrl_02)
controlled process -> higher-level controller
Feedbacks (variables and values):
feed_cp (feed_cp_01, feed_cp_02)
TEST-VAR (a, b)
```

### Controller Controller B (external of analysis)

Responsibilities:

Outgoing connections

controller B -> external system

Incoming connections

sensor -> controller B

#### **Actuator actuator**

Outgoing connections

actuator -> controlled process

Incoming connections

controller A -> actuator

#### Sensor sensor

Outgoing connections

sensor -> controller A

sensor -> controller B

Incoming connections

controlled process -> sensor

#### **External System external system**

Outgoing connections

external system -> controller A

Incoming connections

controller B -> external system

### **Controlled Process controlled process**

Outgoing connections

controlled process -> sensor

controlled process -> higher-level controller

Incoming connections

actuator -> controlled process

higher-level controller -> controlled process

Input: input\_01, input\_02

Output: output\_01, output\_02

Environmental Disturbances: Environmental Disturbances

## **Step Three - Unsafe Control Actions**

Unsafe Control Actions (UCA) and Safety Constraints (SC)

Recommendation 1: (Controller: controller A - Control Action: cmd\_01)

UCA-1: controller A provided in wrong order cmd\_01 in any context. [H-1]

Description:

SC-1: controller A must not provide in wrong order cmd\_01 in any context.

Recommendation 2: (Controller: controller A - Control Action: cmd\_01)

UCA-2: controller A stopped too soon cmd\_01 when feed\_sensor is feed\_sensor\_01, ext\_info is ext\_info\_02. [H-3]

Description: HAzard in some situation.....

SC-2: controller A must not provide to soon cmd\_01 when feed\_sensor is feed\_sensor\_01, ext\_info is ext\_info\_02.

Recommendation 3: (Controller: controller A - Control Action: cmd\_01)

UCA-3: controller A not provided cmd\_01 when feed\_sensor is feed\_sensor\_02, ext\_info is ext\_info\_01. [H-2]

Description:

SC-3: controller A must provide cmd\_01 when feed\_sensor is feed\_sensor\_02, ext\_info is ext\_info\_01.

Recommendation 4: (Controller: controller A - Control Action: cmd\_01)

UCA-4: controller A provided cmd\_01 when feed\_sensor is feed\_sensor\_02. [H-3][H-2]

Description:

SC-4: controller A must not provide cmd\_01 when feed\_sensor is feed\_sensor\_02.

Recommendation 5: (Controller: controller A - Control Action: cmd\_01)

UCA-5: controller A provided cmd\_01 in any context. [H-3][H-2]

Description:

SC-5: controller A must not provide cmd\_01 in any context.

Recommendation 6: (Controller: controller A - Control Action: cmd\_01)

UCA-6: controller A provided in wrong order cmd\_01 when ext\_info is ext\_info\_01. [H-1]

Description:

SC-6: controller A must not provide in wrong order cmd\_01 when ext\_info is ext\_info\_01.

Recommendation 7: (Controller: higher-level controller - Control Action: cmd\_ctrl\_01)

UCA-7: higher-level controller provided in wrong order cmd\_ctrl\_01 when feed\_ctrl is feed\_ctrl\_01, feed\_cp is feed\_cp\_01. [H-2]

Description:

SC-7: higher-level controller must not provide in wrong order cmd\_ctrl\_01 when feed\_ctrl is feed\_ctrl\_01, feed\_cp is feed\_cp\_01.

### **Step Four - Loss Scenarios and Recommendations**

R-1 (controller A Process Model in controller A): UCA-1

Type: Unsafe controller behavior

Cause: Current state of controller A Process Model is wrong.

Recommendation: The process model of controller A must represent the controlled process.

Mechanism:

## Link with energy

actuator -> controlled process

controlled process -> sensor

# Show control structure images

No control structure images found.