# Plotting marginal effects and computing DAME with Stata: Examples

Supplement to: Zhirnov, Andrei, Mert Moral, and Evgeny Sedashov. 2022. "Taking Distributions Seriously: On the Interpretation of the Estimates of Interactive Nonlinear Models." Political Analysis (Conditional Acceptance)

## 20 January, 2022

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# Required packages

This document illustrates how to generate plots with distribution-weighted average marginal effects (DAME) and heatmaps and contour plots for the marginal effects in Stata. We use the same examples as Zhirnov,

Moral, and Sedashov (2022), but simpler Stata code. In addition to the standard Stata and Mata commands, you will need to install the moremata package (Jann 2005), which can be downloaded from ssc:

```
ssc install moremata
```

## Obtaining the datasets

We will need four datasets, which are part of the replication materials of the studies we replicate. These datasets are publicly available, and in this section, we show how you can obtain them.

## Pre-electoral coalition formation (G)

The dataset was created by Sona Golder and used in her book (Golder 2006) on electoral alliances. It can be found on Matt Golder's website at http://mattgolder.com/files/interactions/interaction3.zip/ under the name "interaction3.dta."

## Voter registration rules and turnout (N)

The dataset was originally used by Nagler (1991) and made public by William D. Berry, Jacqueline H. R. DeMeritt, and Justin Esarey as part of the replication materials for Berry, DeMeritt, and Esarey (2010). The file can be downloaded from https://jdemeritt.weebly.com/uploads/2/2/7/7/22771764/bde.zip; it is named as "scobit.dta."

## News media and party discipline (AJLW)

The dataset is part of the published replication materials for Arceneaux et al. (2016) and can be downloaded from the Harvard Dataverse (https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/27597). We use the original, Stata version of the "FoxNews Master.tab" file.

## Foreign direct investment and labor protest (RT)

The dataset is part of the published replication materials for Robertson and Teitelbaum (2011) and can be downloaded from Emmanuel Teitelbaum's website https://home.gwu.edu/~ejt/pages/Data.html, or directly from https://home.gwu.edu/~ejt/pages/Data\_files/Robertson%20Teitelbaum%202011.dta.

# Pre-electoral coalition formation (G)

Golder (2006) looks into the determinants of the pre-electoral coalition formation. One of the hypotheses is that "party system polarization increases the likelihood of pre-electoral coalitions when the electoral system is sufficiently disproportional" (p. 87). Using a dataset of party dyads in examined elections (G), the study estimates a model that predicts whether a particular party dyad enters the same alliance and includes polarization, effective electoral threshold (as a measure of the restrictiveness of the electoral system), and their interaction term as the predictors.

## Load the data and estimate the main model

This analysis uses a random-effects probit model with an interaction term, which can be estimated using Stata's default xtprobit command:

```
clear all
use interaction3.dta,clear

xtprobit pec polarization threshold polarization_threshold seatshare seatshare_2 incompatibility ///
asymmetry asym_seat, re i(ident)
```

## Fitting comparison model:

Iteration 0: log likelihood = -749.41197
Iteration 1: log likelihood = -683.54241
Iteration 2: log likelihood = -681.29839
Iteration 3: log likelihood = -681.2926
Iteration 4: log likelihood = -681.2926

## Fitting full model:

rho = 0.0 log likelihood = -681.2926 rho = 0.1 log likelihood = -646.84249 rho = 0.2 log likelihood = -637.69168 rho = 0.3 log likelihood = -637.02544 rho = 0.4 log likelihood = -640.3162

Iteration 0: log likelihood = -636.85364
Iteration 1: log likelihood = -626.69411
Iteration 2: log likelihood = -625.68214
Iteration 3: log likelihood = -625.67261

Iteration 4:  $\log likelihood = -625.67261$  (backed up)

Random-effects probit regression Number of obs = 3,495 Group variable: ident Number of groups = 278

Random effects u\_i ~ Gaussian Obs per group:

min = 1 avg = 12.6 max = 55

> Wald chi2(8) = 85.48Prob > chi2 = 0.0000

Log likelihood = -625.67261

pec	Coefficient	Std. err.	z	P> z	[95% conf.	interval]
polarization	003196	.0054598	-0.59	0.558	0138971	.0075051
threshold	.0191695	.0108315	1.77	0.077	0020599	.0403989
polarizati~d	.0005275	.0002845	1.85	0.064	00003	.0010851
seatshare	.052641	.0114296	4.61	0.000	.0302394	.0750426
seatshare_2	0005782	.0001095	-5.28	0.000	0007928	0003636
incompatib~y	0075775	.0025334	-2.99	0.003	0125428	0026122
asymmetry	0710249	.2988559	-0.24	0.812	6567716	.5147218
$asym_seat$	0301315	.0088792	-3.39	0.001	0475344	0127286
_cons	-2.381516	.3134815	-7.60	0.000	-2.995928	-1.767103
/lnsig2u	5068768	. 24457			9862252	0275283
sigma_u   rho	.7761276 .375926	.0949088 .0573775			.6107225 .2716583	.9863301 .4931184

 Before we can proceed to computing marginal effects, we need to trim the dataset to keep only the used observations and save it as a file.

```
keep if e(sample)
save temp, replace
```

We also need to simulate the distribution of coefficients and push it to Stata's matrix environment, Mata:

```
matrix beta=e(b)[.,e(depvar) + ":"]
matrix vcov=e(V)[e(depvar) + ":",e(depvar) + ":"]

drawnorm coef1-coef = colsof(beta)', n(10000) means(beta) cov(vcov) clear
putmata coef=(*), replace
```

We also need to define three Mata functions:

```
/* me() returns the partial derivative of the predicted
values of the dependent variable;
 it uses a matrix of covariate values needed to compute
 the linear prediction of the model (x) and a matrix of
 covariate values needed to compute the linear component
 of the first derivative of the predicted value of the
 dependent variable (z).*/
real matrix me(coef, x, z) {
int_coef_names = ("polarization", "polarization_threshold")
/* The coefficients used to compute the derivative of the linear prediction */
nam = st_matrixcolstripe("beta")
k = J(cols(int_coef_names),1,.)
for (j=1; j<=cols(int_coef_names); j++) {</pre>
k[j] = selectindex(nam[.,2]:==int_coef_names[j])
dydx = (coef[.,k]*z'):*normalden(coef*x')
/* Replace normalden() with the derivative of the inverse link function as needed */
return(dydx)
}
/* me_byrow() returns a vector of marginal effects by row; this function uses me()
internally */
real matrix me_byrow(coef, X, Z) {
dydx=me(coef, X, Z)
means=mean(dydx)'
ra=mm_quantile(dydx, 1, (0.025 \ 0.975))'/* Confidence level can be changed here */
return((means,ra))
/* me_wt() returns a vector of weighted average marginal effects; this function uses me() internally */
real matrix me_wt(coef, X, Z, group_id, weight) {
dydx=me(coef, X, Z)
groups=uniqrows(group_id)
wtm=J(cols(dydx), rows(groups), .)
obs=J(rows(groups),1,.)
for (i=1; i<=rows(groups); i++) {</pre>
    wtmc=(group_id:==groups[i]):*weight
    obs[i]=sum(wtmc)
    wtm[.,i]=wtmc/sum(wtmc)
dydxw=dydx*wtm
```

```
means=mean(dydxw)'
ra=mm_quantile(dydxw, 1, (0.025 \ 0.975))' /* Confidence level can be changed here */
return((groups,obs,means,ra))
}
end
```

The above-defined function me() will calculate the partial derivatives of the predicted value of the dependent variable using the supplied matrix of the covariates and the simulated matrix of coefficients.

## Plotting marginal effects of polarization

Replace the values of the covariates (except the constitutive terms) with their means and compute the marginal effects of polarization.


```
use temp, clear
foreach var of varlist seatshare incompatibility asymmetry {
qui sum `var'
replace `var'=r(mean)
}
collapse (mean) seatshare incompatibility asymmetry (count) obs=seatshare, ///
   by(polarization threshold)
gen polarization_threshold=polarization*threshold
gen seatshare_2=seatshare^2
gen asym_seat=seatshare*asymmetry
putmata wt=obs ///
  X=(polarization threshold polarization_threshold seatshare seatshare_2 ///
        incompatibility asymmetry asym seat 1) ///
  Z=(1 threshold), replace
mata: mebr=me byrow(coef, X, Z)
getmata (me_est lb ub)=mebr
gen significant=(lb>0 & ub>0)|(lb<0 & ub<0)</pre>
```

Now, use twoway contourplot to create a contour plot showing marginal effects of polarization (me\_est) on two dimensions: one showing the values of polarization and another showing the values of threshold. We might want to add extra observations to anchor the scatter sizes. Additional observations 2 and 3, as defined below, will correspond to the unplotted filled and hollow markers of the same size, equal to the size of the largest marker of either type. Additional observations 1 and 4 correspond to the unplotted filled and hollow markers of the size equal to that of the smallest marker of either type.

```
gen counter=_n
qui sum counter
loc extra1=`=r(max)'+1
loc extra2=`=r(max)'+2
loc extra3=`=r(max)'+3
loc extra4=`=r(max)'+4
set obs `extra4'

qui sum obs
replace significant=1 in `extra1'/`extra2'
replace significant=0 in `extra3'/`extra4'
replace obs=`=r(min)' in `extra1'/`extra4'
```


```
replace obs=`=r(max)' in `extra2'/`extra3'
** break the ME values into steps
qui sum me_est,detail
loc locut=`r(min)' +(`r(max)'-`r(min)')*1/4
loc medcut=r(min)'+(r(max)'-r(min)')*2/4
loc hicut=`r(min)' +(`r(max)'-`r(min)')*3/4
loc minest = r(min) '
loc maxest = r(max)'
local colr = "white*0.5 yellow*0.5 orange*0.5 red*0.5"
/* color ramp: from less intense to more intense colors */
twoway (contour me_est polarization threshold if me_est!=., ///
   ccuts(`locut' `medcut' `hicut') ccolors(`colr')) ///
      (scatter polarization threshold [fw=obs] if significant==0, ///
  msymbol(oh) mlcolor(black%95) mlwidth(vthin) msize(*.25)) ///
      (scatter polarization threshold [fw=obs] if significant==1, ///
  msymbol(o) mfcolor(black%95) mlwidth(none) msize(*.25)), ///
      xtitle(Threshold) ytitle(Polarization) ztitle("") ///
   zlabel(`minest' `locut' `medcut' `hicut' `maxest') ///
      legend(off) clegend(title("Effect Size", ///
   size(medsmall) pos(12) justification(right)) width(5) height(25))
```



To create a heatmap instead of a contour plot, we can use the **crule** option instead of **ccuts** in the **twoway** contour syntax:

```
qui sum counter
loc extra1=`=r(max)'+1
```

```
loc extra2==r(max)'+2
loc extra3==(max)'+3
loc extra4==r(max)'+4
set obs `extra4'
qui sum obs
replace significant=1 in `extra1'/`extra2'
replace significant=0 in `extra3'/`extra4'
replace obs=`=r(min)' in `extra1'/`extra4'
replace obs=`=r(max)' in `extra2'/`extra3'
* color ramp: from less intense to more intense colors
loc scolr="yellow*.25" /* starting color */
loc ecolr="red*.95" /* color at the high end */
* variable grid
qui sum polarization [fw=obs]
loc x1max: disp %9.1f r(max)
loc x1min: disp %9.1f r(min)
loc s1=round((x1max'-x1min')/4, 0.1)
/* Number of ticks on the y axis can be changed here or changing the "ylab" option below */
qui sum threshold [fw=obs]
loc x2max: disp %9.4f r(max)
loc x2min: disp %9.4f r(min)
loc s2=round((x2max'-x2min')/4, 0.0001)
twoway (contour me_est polarization threshold if me_est!=., ///
      levels(100) crule(linear) scolor(`scolr') ecolor(`ecolr') zlab(#5, labsize(medsmall))) ///
   (scatter polarization threshold [fw=obs] if significant==0, ///
      msymbol(oh) mlcolor(black%95) mlwidth(vthin) msize(*.25)) ///
   (scatter polarization threshold [fw=obs] if significant==1, ///
      msymbol(o) mfcolor(black%95) mlwidth(none) msize(*.25)), ///
   xsca(alt) ysca(alt) xtitle("") ytitle("") ztitle("") ///
  ylab(`x1min'(`s1')`x1max', grid gmax labsize(medsmall)) ///
   xlab(`x2min'(`s2')`x2max', labsize(medsmall) grid gmax) ///
   legend(off) clegend(title("Effect Size", size(medsmall) pos(12) justification(right)) ///
   ring(0) width(5) height(25)) name(yx, replace)
/* to add histograms */
twoway histogram threshold [fw=obs], frac ysca(alt reverse) ///
  xtitle("Effective Electoral Threshold", size(medsmall)) ytitle("") ///
  xlab(`x2min'(`s2')`x2max')///
   ylab(#4, nogrid labsize(medsmall)) ///
   fysize(20) fcolor(black%95) lwidth(vthin) lcolor(white%25) nodraw name(hy, replace)
twoway histogram polarization [fw=obs], frac xsca(alt reverse) ///
  horiz ytitle("Polarization", size(medsmall)) xtitle("") ///
  ylab(`x1min'(`s1')`x1max') ///
  xlab(#4, nogrid labsize(medsmall)) ///
   fxsize(20) fcolor(black%95) lwidth(vthin) lcolor(white%25) nodraw name(hx, replace)
gr combine hx yx hy, hole(3) imargin(zero) scale(1.1) xsize(5.5) ysize(5.5)
```



## Computing and plotting DAME of polarization

To compute the distribution-weighted average marginal effects, we first need to break the dataset into bins according to the values of the conditioning variable (threshold). We use xtile to create a variable with 10 groups of observations of approximately equal size and find the middle value of that variable for plotting.

```
use temp,clear
gen wt=1
xtile group_id = threshold, nq(10)
egen midpoint=median(threshold),by(group_id)
```

Now we push this information to Mata and apply the me\_wt() function. We supply a matrix of all values for all covariates as X and a matrix of the variables used in the linear component of the first derivative as Z.


```
putmata wt=wt ///
  group_id=midpoint ///
  X=(polarization threshold polarization_threshold seatshare seatshare_2 ///
       incompatibility asymmetry asym_seat 1) ///
  Z=(1 threshold), replace
mata: dame=me_wt(coef, X, Z, group_id, wt)
```

To compute the marginal effects of polarization at its mean, we create a new dataset with the conditioning variable (threshold) taking 21 values spanning over its range and all other covariates set to their means:

Push DAME and MEM estimates from Mata into Stata's active dataset and make a plot:

```
getmata (mem lbm ubm)=mem
getmata (midpoint obs dame_est lb ub)=dame, force

twoway (line mem threshold, lpattern(solid)) ///
(rline lbm ubm threshold, lpattern(dash)) ///
(rspike lb ub midpoint) ///
(scatter dame_est midpoint [fw=obs], msymbol(o) msize(*.25)), ///
yline(0, lcolor(red)) ytitle("DAME/MEM of polarization") ///
   xtitle("Effective Electoral Threshold") legend(off)
```



## Voter registration rules and turnout (N)

Nagler (1991) examines the interactive effect of education and the restrictiveness of electoral registration rules on turnout. The latter is measured using the number of days before the election when the registration closes (closing). This variable takes on the value of 0 when the voters are allowed to register on the election day, and 30 means that the registration closes 30 days before the election day. The education is captured with an 8-category variable (neweduc), which is treated as a quantitative variable. The model also includes the squared value of neweduc (i.e., educ2). The main hypothesis is conditional: more restrictive registration rules primarily hurt less educated individuals.

#### Load the data and estimate the model

This expectation is captured using a probit model including the interaction terms of closing and neweduc, and closing and educ2:

```
clear all
use scobit.dta,clear
drop if newvote==-1
probit newvote closing neweduc educ2 cloeduc cloeduc2 age age2 south gov
```

(0 observations deleted)

```
Iteration 0: log likelihood = -63205.249
Iteration 1: log likelihood = -55865.033
Iteration 2: log likelihood = -55815.316
Iteration 3: log likelihood = -55815.275
Iteration 4: log likelihood = -55815.275
```

```
Probit regression Number of obs = 99,676 

LR chi2(9) = 14779.95 

Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 

Log likelihood = -55815.275 Pseudo R2 = 0.1169
```

newvote	•	Coefficient	Std. err.	z	P> z	[95% conf.	interval]
closing neweduc educ2 cloeduc cloeduc2 age age2 south	+	.0006238 .2645073 .0050701 0031723 .0002773 .0696593 0005061 11548 .0034307	.0037082 .041586 .0041567 .0014993 .0001504 .0013051 .0000134 .0109736 .0116343	0.17 6.36 1.22 -2.12 1.84 53.37 -37.71 -10.52 0.29	0.866 0.000 0.223 0.034 0.065 0.000 0.000 0.000	006644 .1830003 0030769 0061108 0000175 .0671013 0005324 1369877 0193722	.0078917 .3460144 .0132171 0002337 .0005722 .0722172 0004798 0939722 .0262335
_cons	l	-2.743104	.1073858	-25.54	0.000	-2.953576	-2.532631

As earlier, we need to trim the dataset in memory to keep only the used observations and save it as a new data file. We also need to simulate the distribution of coefficients and push it to Mata:

```
keep if e(sample)
save temp, replace
matrix beta=e(b)[.,e(depvar) + ":"]
matrix vcov=e(V)[e(depvar) + ":",e(depvar) + ":"]
```

```
drawnorm coef1-coef`=colsof(beta)', n(10000) means(beta) cov(vcov) clear
putmata coef=(*), replace
```

To make calculations, we need to define three Mata functions:

```
/* me() returns a vector of first-differences and relies on a matrix with
and without the increment added to the variable of interest */
real matrix me(coef, x, x_new) {
dydx=normal(coef*x_new')-normal(coef*x')
/* Replace normal() with the appropriate function as needed */
return(dydx)
/* me_byrow() returns marginal effects by row along with the confidence intervals;
   this function uses me() internally */
real matrix me_byrow(coef, X, Z) {
dydx=me(coef, X, Z)
means=mean(dydx)'
ra=mm_quantile(dydx, 1, (0.025 \ 0.975))' /* Confidence level can be changed here */
return((means,ra))
/* me_wt() returns weighted averages of marginal effects;
   this function uses me() internally */
real matrix me_wt(coef, X, Z, group_id, weight) {
dydx=me(coef, X, Z)
groups=uniqrows(group_id)
wtm=J(cols(dydx), rows(groups), .)
obs=J(rows(groups),1,.)
for (i=1; i<=rows(groups); i++) {</pre>
   wtmc=(group id:==groups[i]):*weight
    obs[i]=sum(wtmc)
    wtm[.,i]=wtmc/sum(wtmc)
dydxw=dydx*wtm
means=mean(dydxw)'
ra=mm_quantile(dydxw, 1, (0.025 \ 0.975))'
/* Confidence level can be changed here */
return((groups,obs,means,ra))
}
end
```

The above-defined function me() will calculate the first difference in the model predictions using the supplied matrix of the covariates, a matrix of the covariates with the increment added to the main variable of interest (for which we are computing the marginal effects), and the matrix of coefficient estimates.

## Plotting marginal effects of the restrictiveness of electoral registration rules

Replace age with its mean and south and gov with their modes, collapse the dataset, and push it to Mata. At this step, we also condense the dataset by collapsing the dataset in memory by the unique values of closing and neweduc while generating a variable with the number of observations that take those values (obs).

```
use temp,clear
egen age1=mean(age)
egen south1=mode(south)
```

```
egen gov1=mode(gov)
collapse (mean) age=age1 south=south1 gov=gov1 (count) obs=age1, by(closing neweduc)

gen age2=age^2
gen educ2=neweduc^2
gen cloeduc=closing*neweduc
gen cloeduc2=closing*neweduc^2

putmata X=(closing neweduc educ2 cloeduc cloeduc2 age age2 south gov 1), replace
```

To apply the first differencing method to compute the marginal effect of education, add the increment of 1 to closing. We then push the new dataset to Mata and apply the me\_byrow() function.

```
preserve
replace closing = closing+1
replace cloeduc = closing*neweduc
replace cloeduc2 = closing*educ2
putmata X1=(closing neweduc educ2 cloeduc cloeduc2 age age2 south gov 1), replace
restore


mata: mebr=me_byrow(coef, X, X1)
getmata (me_est lb ub)=mebr

gen significant=(lb>0 & ub>0)|(lb<0 & ub<0)</pre>
```

Now, create a contour plot with the marginal effects of the registration rules. We might want to add extra observations to anchor the sizes of filled and hollow markers to the same largest and smallest values.

```
gen counter=_n
qui sum counter
loc extra1==r(max)'+1
loc extra2==r(max)'+2
loc extra3==(max)'+3
loc extra4==(max)'+4
set obs `extra4'
qui sum obs
replace significant=1 in `extra1'/`extra2'
replace significant=0 in `extra3'/`extra4'
replace obs=`=r(min)' in `extra1'/`extra4'
replace obs=`=r(max)' in `extra2'/`extra3'
** break the ME values into steps
qui sum me_est,detail
loc locut=`r(min)' +(`r(max)'-`r(min)')*1/4
loc medcut=`r(min)'+(`r(max)'-`r(min)')*2/4
loc hicut=`r(min)' +(`r(max)'-`r(min)')*3/4
loc minest = r(min) '
loc maxest = r(max) '
local colr = "red*.5 orange*.5 yellow*.5 white*.5"
/* Color ramp from more intense to less intense colors */
twoway (contour me_est closing neweduc if me_est!=., ///
        ccuts(`locut' `medcut' `hicut') ccolors(`colr')) ///
```

```
(scatter closing neweduc [fw=obs] if significant==0, ///
    msymbol(oh) mlcolor(black%95) mlwidth(vthin) msize(*.25)) ///
(scatter closing neweduc [fw=obs] if significant==1, ///
    msymbol(o) mfcolor(black%95) mlwidth(none) msize(*.25)), ///
    xtitle(Education) ytitle(Closing Date) ///
    ztitle("") zlabel(`minest' `locut' `medcut' `hicut' `maxest') ///
legend(off) clegend(title("Effect Size", size(medsmall) pos(12) ///
    justification(right)) width(5) height(25))
```



## Computing and plotting DAME of the restrictiveness of electoral registration rules

To make calculations faster, we first condense the dataset. We keep only unique values of covariates and create a variable to store the number of actual observations that have those values (wt).

```
use temp,clear
collapse (count) wt=newvote, by(closing neweduc age south gov)
gen age2=age^2
gen educ2=neweduc^2
gen cloeduc=closing*neweduc
gen cloeduc2=closing*neweduc^2
```

Now we push this information to Mata and apply the me\_wt() function. We use the unique values of neweduc to bin the observations:

```
putmata wt=wt group_id=neweduc ///
X=(closing neweduc educ2 cloeduc cloeduc2 age age2 south gov 1), replace
```

As before, with the first differences method, we need to add an increment to the main explanatory variable (closing) and push this dataset to Mata. We apply me\_wt() to compute the weighted averages of in-sample marginal effects with confidence intervals.

```
preserve
replace closing = closing+1
replace cloeduc = closing*neweduc
replace cloeduc2 = closing*educ2
putmata X1=(closing neweduc educ2 cloeduc cloeduc2 age age2 south gov 1), replace
restore
mata: dame=me_wt(coef, X, X1, group_id, wt)
```

To compute the marginal effects of closing at its mean and each of the unique values of neweduc, we create a new dataset with the age and closing set to their means and south and gov set to their modes.

```
use temp,clear
qui sum neweduc
loc mn=r(min)
loc mx=r(max)

collapse (mean) age closing (median) south gov
expand 21
gen neweduc=`mn' + (_n-1)*(`mx'-`mn')/20
gen educ2=neweduc^2
gen cloeduc=closing*neweduc
gen cloeduc2=closing*educ2
gen age2=age^2

putmata X=(closing neweduc educ2 cloeduc cloeduc2 age age2 south gov 1), replace
```


Applying the first-differences method requires adding an increment to the main variable of interest. We add an increment of 1 (1 day) to closing and push the resulting dataset to Mata:

```
replace closing = closing+1
replace cloeduc = closing*neweduc
replace cloeduc2 = closing*educ2
putmata X1=(closing neweduc educ2 cloeduc cloeduc2 age age2 south gov 1), replace
restore
mata: mem=me_byrow(coef, X, X1)
```

Copy the DAME and MEM estimates from Mata into Stata's active dataset and produce a plot:

```
getmata (mem lbm ubm)=mem
getmata (midpoint obs dame_est lb ub)=dame, force

twoway (line mem neweduc, lpattern(solid)) ///
(rline lbm ubm neweduc, lpattern(dash)) ///
(rspike lb ub midpoint) ///
(scatter dame_est midpoint [fw=obs], msymbol(o) msize(*.25)), ///
yline(0, lcolor(red)) ytitle("DAME/MEM of Closing date") xtitle("Education") legend(off)
```



## News media and party discipline (AJLW)

Arceneaux et al. (2016) view Congressmen as facing a choice between voting with the party and more closely following the preferences of their constituencies. Politicians are expected to vote with their party when they can afford to do so when the next election is sufficiently far, their district is safe, or they can shape the public opinion in their districts. The article presents several hypotheses about the interactive effects of these factors, but in the interest of space, we focus here only on the interaction between competitiveness and the proximity of elections.

#### Load the data and estimate the model

To examine the interactive effect of district competitiveness and the proximity of the next election, following Arceneaux et al. (2016), we subset the data and examine the Republicans from the districts in which Fox News was present (this is another explanatory variable in the authors' study) and build a model explaining whether a Congressman voted with their party and including a full interaction term of the polynomial of the number of days until the next election and the Democratic vote share in the preceding election in the representative's district (the larger this share, the more competitive the district).

```
(2,080 missing values generated)
```

(2,080 missing values generated)

(2,080 missing values generated)

(2,080 missing values generated)

```
Iteration 0: log pseudolikelihood = -21866.053
Iteration 1: log pseudolikelihood = -19635.905
Iteration 2: log pseudolikelihood = -19349.274
Iteration 3: log pseudolikelihood = -19345.854
Iteration 4: log pseudolikelihood = -19345.849
Iteration 5: log pseudolikelihood = -19345.849
```

Logistic regression

Number of obs = 57,086 Wald chi2(18) = . Prob > chi2 = . Pseudo R2 = 0.1153

Log pseudolikelihood = -19345.849

(Std. err. adjusted for 73 clusters in dist2)

	l	Robust				
PartyVote	Coefficient	std. err.	z	P> z	[95% conf.	interval]
daystoelec~n	  0053586	.006298	-0.85	0.395	0177025	.0069852
daystoelec~2	.0000157	.0000199	0.79	0.430	0000233	.0000548
daystoelec~3	-1.50e-08	1.92e-08	-0.78	0.435	-5.27e-08	2.27e-08
dvprop	.998589	2.279036	0.44	0.661	-3.468239	5.465417
daysdv	.0110505	.018106	0.61	0.542	0244367	.0465376
days2dv	0000448	.0000578	-0.77	0.439	000158	.0000685
days3dv	5.76e-08	5.64e-08	1.02	0.307	-5.30e-08	1.68e-07
Retirement	1.01544	.1738517	5.84	0.000	.6746974	1.356184
seniorit	0340132	.0238695	-1.42	0.154	0807966	.0127702
qualchal_lag	.2339622	.175486	1.33	0.182	1099841	.5779085
qualchal	1627822	.1762658	-0.92	0.356	5082568	.1826924
spendgap_lag	.0166931	.0408697	0.41	0.683	06341	.0967961
spendgap	0477062	.0422487	-1.13	0.259	1305121	.0350996
distpart_lag	6.657421	1.367335	4.87	0.000	3.977493	9.337348
RegPass	-1.228186	.0917791	-13.38	0.000	-1.408069	-1.048302
Susp	-1.044197	.1444723	-7.23	0.000	-1.327358	7610369
OtherPass	9420381	.1077914	-8.74	0.000	-1.153305	7307708
Amend	-2.20396	.0958879	-22.98	0.000	-2.391897	-2.016023
ProPart	2191304	.0979501	-2.24	0.025	4111091	0271516
_cons	0737458	1.197516	-0.06	0.951	-2.420834	2.273343

As earlier, we need to trim the dataset in Stata's memory to keep only the observations in the estimation sample and save it as a new data file. We also need to simulate the distribution of coefficients and push it to Stata's matrix environment Mata:

```
keep if e(sample)
save temp, replace
matrix beta=e(b)[.,e(depvar) + ":"]
```

```
matrix vcov=e(V)[e(depvar) + ":",e(depvar) + ":"]

drawnorm coef1-coef`=colsof(beta)', n(10000) means(beta) cov(vcov) clear
putmata coef=(*), replace
```

To make the calculations, we need to define three Mata functions:

```
mata
/* me() finds the difference in predicted values of the dependent variable
    computed with covariate matrices x and x_new*/
real matrix me(coef, x, x_new) {
dydx=logistic(coef*x_new') - logistic(coef*x')
  /* Replace logistic() with the appropriate link function as needed */
return(dydx)
}
/* me_byrow() returns a vector of marginal effects by row; this function uses me() internally */
real matrix me_byrow(coef, X, Z) {
dydx=me(coef, X, Z)
means=mean(dvdx)'
ra=mm_quantile(dydx, 1, (0.025 \ 0.975))'
/* Confidence level can be changed here */
return((means,ra))
/* me_wt() returns a vector of weighted average marginal effects; this function uses me() internally */
real matrix me_wt(coef, X, Z, group_id, weight) {
dydx=me(coef, X, Z)
groups=uniqrows(group_id)
wtm=J(cols(dydx), rows(groups), .)
obs=J(rows(groups),1,.)
for (i=1; i<=rows(groups); i++) {</pre>
    wtmc=(group_id:==groups[i]):*weight
    obs[i] = sum(wtmc)
    wtm[.,i]=wtmc/sum(wtmc)
    }
dydxw=dydx*wtm
means=mean(dydxw)'
ra=mm quantile(dydxw, 1, (0.025 \ 0.975))' /* Confidence level can be changed here */
return((groups,obs,means,ra))
}
end
```

The above-defined function me() will calculate the first difference in the model predictions using the supplied matrix of the covariate values, a matrix of the covariate values with the increment added to the main variable of interest (for which we are computing the marginal effects), and the matrix of coefficients.

## Plotting marginal effects of election proximity

Replace seniorit, spendgap\_lag, spendgap, and distpart\_lag with their means, and qualchal, qualchal\_lag, and Retirement with their modes, and make sure that the dummy variables representing the vote type correctly single out the modal type of the vote (in this case, this means that Amend=1 and all other dummy variables representing this type are set to zero). We then collapse the dataset and push it to Mata.

```
use temp, clear
foreach x of varlist qualchal qualchal_lag Retirement {
   qui sum `x'
```


```
replace x' = (r(mean) > 0.5)
}
foreach x of varlist seniorit spendgap_lag spendgap distpart_lag {
qui sum `x'
replace `x'=r(mean)
7
** find the modal type of the vote
local dummies Amend OtherPass ProPart RegPass Susp
egen baseline = rowmax(`dummies')
replace baseline = 1-baseline
tabstat `dummies' baseline, save
mata props = st_matrix("r(StatTotal)")
mata st_local("modal", st_matrixcolstripe("r(StatTotal)")[selectindex(props :== max(props))[1,1],2])
foreach v in `dummies' {
   replace `v'=0
}
replace `modal'=1 if "`modal'"! = "baseline"
/* round the values of the constitutive terms to avoid overplotting */
replace dvprop=round(dvprop,0.02)
replace daystoelection=round(daystoelection,10)
collapse (mean) Amend OtherPass ProPart qualchal qualchal_lag RegPass Retirement ///
   Susp seniorit spendgap_lag spendgap distpart_lag (count) obs=Amend, by(daystoelection dvprop)
gen daystoelection2=daystoelection^2
gen daystoelection3=daystoelection^3
gen daysdv=daystoelection*dvprop
gen days2dv=daystoelection2*dvprop
gen days3dv=daystoelection3*dvprop
putmata wt=obs X=(daystoelection daystoelection2 daystoelection3 dvprop daysdv ///
    days2dv days3dv Retirement seniorit qualchal_lag qualchal spendgap_lag spendgap ///
    distpart_lag RegPass Susp OtherPass Amend ProPart 1), replace
```

To apply the first-differencing method to computing the marginal effect of the number of days to the next election, we add the increment of 1 (1 day) to daystoelection. We then push the new dataset to Mata and apply the me\_byrow() function.

```
gen significant=(1b>0 & ub>0)|(1b<0 & ub<0)</pre>
```

Now, create a contourplot. We might want to add extra observations to anchor the sizes of filled and hollow markers to a common scale. It is advisable to specify the color ramp in a way that more intense colors represent negative and positive values of higher magnitude.

```
gen counter=_n
qui sum counter
loc extra1==(max)'+1
loc extra2==r(max)'+2
loc extra3==(max)'+3
loc extra4==r(max)'+4
set obs `extra4'
qui sum obs
replace significant=1 in `extra1'/`extra2'
replace significant=0 in `extra3'/`extra4'
replace obs='=r(min)' in 'extra1'/'extra4'
replace obs='=r(max)' in 'extra2'/'extra3'
** break the ME values into steps
qui sum me_est,detail
loc locut=`r(min)'+(`r(max)'-`r(min)')*1/5
loc lmedcut=`r(min)'+(`r(max)'-`r(min)')*2/5
loc hmedcut=r(min)'+(r(max)'-r(min)')*3/5
loc hicut=r(min)'+(r(max)'-r(min)')*4/5
loc minest =`r(min)'
loc maxest = r(max)'
loc colr= "navy*.5 ltblue*.5 white*.5 orange*.5 red*.5"
/* color ramp: intense colors at both ends */
twoway (contour me_est daystoelection dvprop if me_est!=., ///
      ccuts(`locut' `lmedcut' `hicut') ccolors(`colr')) ///
   (scatter daystoelection dvprop [fw=obs] if significant==0, ///
     msymbol(oh) mlcolor(black%95) mlwidth(vthin) msize(*.25)) ///
   (scatter daystoelection dvprop [fw=obs] if significant==1, ///
     msymbol(o) mfcolor(black%95) mlwidth(none) msize(*.25)), ///
  xtitle(Democratic Vote Share) ytitle(Days to Election) ztitle("") ///
  zlabel(`minest' `locut' `lmedcut' `hmedcut' `hicut' `maxest') ///
  legend(off) clegend(title("Effect Size", ///
    size(medsmall) pos(12) justification(right)) width(5) height(25))
```



#### Computing and plotting DAME of election proximity

To compute the distribution-weighted average marginal effects, we first need to break the dataset into bins according to the values of the conditioning variable (the Democratic vote share, dvprop). Here, we use deciles:

Now we push this information to Mata:

As before, with the first differences method, we need to add an increment to the main explanatory variable (daystoelection), push this dataset to Mata. We apply the me\_wt() function to find DAME with confidence intervals.

Compute the marginal effect of the proximity of the next election at its mean, 21 equally-spaced values of the Democratic vote share, and the means or modes of all other covariates:


```
use temp, clear
qui sum dvprop
loc mn=r(min)
loc mx=r(max)
local dummies Amend OtherPass ProPart RegPass Susp
egen baseline = rowmax(`dummies')
replace baseline = 1-baseline
tabstat `dummies' baseline, save
mata props = st_matrix("r(StatTotal)")
mata st_local("modal", st_matrixcolstripe("r(StatTotal)")[selectindex(props :== max(props))[1,1],2])
collapse (mean) qualchal qualchal_lag Retirement daystoelection seniorit ///
      (median) spendgap_lag spendgap distpart_lag
foreach v in `dummies' {
   gen `v'=0
replace `modal'=1 if "`modal'"! = "baseline"
expand 21
gen dvprop=mn' + (n-1)*(mx'-mn')/20
gen daystoelection2=daystoelection^2
gen daystoelection3=daystoelection3
gen daysdv=daystoelection*dvprop
gen days2dv=daystoelection2*dvprop
gen days3dv=daystoelection3*dvprop
putmata X=(daystoelection daystoelection2 daystoelection3 dvprop daysdv days2dv ///
    days3dv Retirement seniorit qualchal_lag qualchal spendgap_lag spendgap ///
    distpart_lag RegPass Susp OtherPass Amend ProPart 1), replace
preserve
replace daystoelection = daystoelection+1
replace daystoelection2=daystoelection^2
replace daystoelection3=daystoelection3
replace daysdv=daystoelection*dvprop
replace days2dv=daystoelection2*dvprop
replace days3dv=daystoelection3*dvprop
putmata X1=(daystoelection daystoelection2 daystoelection3 dvprop daysdv days2dv ///
```

```
days3dv Retirement seniorit qualchal_lag qualchal spendgap_lag spendgap distpart_lag ///
RegPass Susp OtherPass Amend ProPart 1), replace
restore
mata: mem=me_byrow(coef, X, X1)
```

Push DAME and MEM estimates from Mata into Stata's active dataset and produce a plot:

```
getmata (mem lbm ubm)=mem
getmata (midpoint obs dame_est lb ub)=dame, force

* plot
twoway (line mem dvprop, lpattern(solid)) ///
    (rline lbm ubm dvprop, lpattern(dash)) ///
    (rspike lb ub midpoint) ///
    (scatter dame_est midpoint [fw=obs], msymbol(o) msize(*.25)), ///
    yline(0, lcolor(red)) ytitle("DAME/MEM of Days to Election") ///
    xtitle("Democratic Vote Share") legend(off)
```



# Foreign direct investment and labor protest (RT)

Robertson and Teitelbaum (2011) study the response of the local labor to foreign direct investment. The article argues that FDI flows lead to more labor protests, and this effect is more substantial when there are fewer democratic means for resolving such conflicts.

## Load the data and estimate the model

Since the dependent variable is a count of protests, we use a negative binomial regression (with random effects, as in the original study). The right-hand side of the model equation includes an interaction of political

regime (Polity 2 score) and the natural log of FDI flows: the latter's effect is expected to be conditional on the values of the former. Both variables are lagged.

```
use "Robertson Teitelbaum 2011.dta", clear
tsset country year
gen l_l_flows=L.l_flows
gen l_polity2=L.polity2
gen l dispute=L.dispute
gen l_demflows=l_l_flows*l_polity2
xtnbreg dispute 1_1_flows 1_polity2 1_demflows 1_dispute open_penn 1_gdp_pc_penn ///
     gdp_grth inflation_1 urban xratchg l_pop time, re
Panel variable: country (strongly balanced)
Time variable: year, 1979 to 2006
         Delta: 1 unit
(882 missing values generated)
(635 missing values generated)
(138 missing values generated)
(1,074 missing values generated)
Fitting negative binomial (constant dispersion) model:
Iteration 0:
               log likelihood = -19743.067
                                            (not concave)
              log likelihood = -19693.709
Iteration 1:
                                            (not concave)
              log likelihood = -19669.166
Iteration 2:
                                            (not concave)
Iteration 3:
              log likelihood = -19419.284
                                            (not concave)
Iteration 4:
              log likelihood = -13856.193
                                            (not concave)
Iteration 5:
              log likelihood = -11966.288
                                            (not concave)
Iteration 6:
              log likelihood = -11310.6
                                            (not concave)
Iteration 7:
              log likelihood = -10199.072
Iteration 8:
              log likelihood = -9186.4974
                                            (backed up)
Iteration 9:
               log likelihood = -6216.4679
                                            (backed up)
Iteration 10: log likelihood = -3115.8005
                                            (backed up)
Iteration 11:
              log likelihood = -2711.0594
Iteration 12: log likelihood = -1142.8518
Iteration 13: log likelihood = -1049.5331
Iteration 14:
              log likelihood = -994.70272
Iteration 15:
              log likelihood = -994.26758
              log\ likelihood = -994.26733
Iteration 16:
Iteration 17: log likelihood = -994.26733
Iteration 0:
              log\ likelihood = -1138.5175
Iteration 1:
              log\ likelihood = -1048.9393
              log\ likelihood = -1043.1845
Iteration 2:
Iteration 3:
              log\ likelihood = -1043.1752
Iteration 4:
              log\ likelihood = -1043.1752
```

```
Iteration 0:
              log likelihood = -1043.1752 (not concave)
Iteration 1:
              log likelihood = -974.09467
                                         (not concave)
Iteration 2:
              log\ likelihood = -939.21383
Iteration 3:
              log\ likelihood = -819.68488
Iteration 4:
              log likelihood = -786.2915
              log likelihood = -781.86279
Iteration 5:
Iteration 6:
              log likelihood = -781.78374
              log likelihood = -781.7837
Iteration 7:
Fitting full model:
Iteration 0:
              log\ likelihood = -768.40601
Iteration 1:
              log\ likelihood = -724.05204
Iteration 2:
              log\ likelihood = -718.95793
Iteration 3:
              log\ likelihood = -718.92085
Iteration 4:
              log\ likelihood = -718.92082
Random-effects negative binomial regression
                                                  Number of obs = 2.348
Group variable: country
                                                  Number of groups =
Random effects u_i ~ Beta
                                                  Obs per group:
                                                              min =
                                                              avg =
                                                                      17.9
                                                              max =
                                                  Wald chi2(12)
                                                                  = 162.80
Log likelihood = -718.92082
                                                  Prob > chi2
                                                                  = 0.0000
                                                       [95% conf. interval]
    dispute | Coefficient Std. err.
                                             P>|z|
-----
  l_l_flows |
              .3956329
                         .0843602
                                     4.69 0.000
                                                        .23029
                                                                  .5609758
  1_polity2 |
               .2741761
                         .0597606
                                     4.59 0.000
                                                     .1570476
                                                                 .3913047
 l_demflows |
              -.0323769
                                     -3.69 0.000
                                                     -.0495724
                          .0087734
                                                                 -.0151813
                                     3.09
  l dispute |
               .0594588
                         .0192369
                                            0.002
                                                      .0217551
                                                                  .0971625
  open_penn |
               .0007637
                         .0036998
                                     0.21
                                            0.836
                                                    -.0064878
                                                                 .0080152
l_gdp_pc_p~n |
              -.1925234
                         .2337453
                                   -0.82
                                            0.410 -.6506558
                                                                 .2656089
               -.028622
                                   -1.84
                                             0.066
                                                   -.0591221
   gdp_grth |
                         .0155615
                                                                  .001878
                                     1.84
                                                    -8.48e-06
inflation_1 |
                .0001256
                         .0000684
                                             0.066
                                                                  .0002597
               .0219114
                                     2.36 0.018
      urban |
                         .0092731
                                                     .0037364
                                                                  .0400863
    xratchg |
                                     0.82 0.414
               .0031663
                         .0038741
                                                     -.0044268
                                                                  .0107595
      1_pop |
                .3889047
                                             0.001
                           . 113996
                                     3.41
                                                       .1654766
                                                                  .6123328
       time |
                .0322821
                          .0163049
                                     1.98
                                            0.048
                                                       .000325
                                                                  .0642392
      _cons | -10.22589
                          2.576873
                                     -3.97
                                             0.000
                                                     -15.27647
                                                                 -5.175317
      /ln_r |
                1.07164
                          .2607792
                                                      .5605223
                                                                  1.582758
      /ln_s | -.2429911
                          .3254917
                                                      -.8809432
                                                                  .3949609
          r |
                2.920165
                          .7615182
                                                                  4.868364
                                                       1.751587
          s l
               .7842785
                          .2552761
                                                       .4143919
                                                                  1.484326
```

As earlier, we need to trim the dataset in memory to keep only the observations in the estimation sample and

Prob >= chibar2 = 0.000

LR test vs. pooled: chibar2(01) = 125.73

save it as a new data file. We also need to simulate the distribution of coefficients and push it to Stata's matrix environment Mata:

```
keep if e(sample)
save temp, replace
matrix beta=e(b)[.,e(depvar) + ":"]
matrix vcov=e(V)[e(depvar) + ":",e(depvar) + ":"]

drawnorm coef1-coef`=colsof(beta)', n(10000) means(beta) cov(vcov) clear
putmata coef=(*), replace
```

To make the calculations, we need to define three Mata functions:

```
mata
/* me() here returns the partial derivatives of the predicted values of the dependent
    variable with for matrices with covariate values and coefficients */
real matrix me(coef, X, Z) {
int_coef_names = ("l_l_flows","l_demflows")
  /* The coefficients used to compute the derivative of the linear component */
nam=st matrixcolstripe("beta")
k=J(cols(int_coef_names),1,.)
for (j=1; j<=cols(int_coef_names); j++) {</pre>
k[j]=selectindex(nam[.,2]:==int_coef_names[j])
}
dydx=(coef[.,k]*Z'):*exp(coef*X')
/* Replace exp() with the derivative of the inverse link function as needed */
return(dydx)
}
/* me_byrow() returns a vector of marginal effects by row; this function uses me() internally */
real matrix me_byrow(coef, X, Z) {
dydx=me(coef, X, Z)
means=mean(dydx)'
ra=mm quantile(dydx, 1, (0.025 \ 0.975))'/* Confidence level can be changed here */
return((means,ra))
}
/* me_wt() returns a vector of weighted average marginal effects; this function uses me() internally */
real matrix me wt(coef, X, Z, group id, weight) {
dydx=me(coef, X, Z)
groups=uniqrows(group_id)
wtm=J(cols(dydx), rows(groups), .)
obs=J(rows(groups),1,.)
for (i=1; i<=rows(groups); i++) {</pre>
    wtmc=(group_id:==groups[i]):*weight
    obs[i] = sum(wtmc)
    wtm[.,i]=wtmc/sum(wtmc)
    }
dydxw=dydx*wtm
means=mean(dydxw)'
ra=mm_quantile(dydxw, 1, (0.025 \ 0.975))' /* Confidence level can be changed here */
return((groups,obs,means,ra))
}
end
```

The above-defined function me() will calculate the partial derivatives of the model prediction with respect to  $l_1l_flows$  using the supplied matrix of the covariate values and the matrix of coefficients.


#### Plotting marginal effects of logged FDI flows

Replace the values of the covariates (except the constitutive terms) with their means and compute the marginal effect of logged FDI flows (1\_1\_flows). We also would like to bin the values of logged flows to avoid overplotting later on.

Now, create a heatmap. We might want to add extra observations to anchor the marker sizes on the scatter plot.

```
gen counter=_n
qui sum counter
loc extra1==(max)'+1
loc extra2==r(max)'+2
loc extra3==(max)'+3
loc extra4==r(max)'+4
set obs `extra4'
qui sum obs
replace significant=1 in `extra1'/`extra2'
replace significant=0 in `extra3'/`extra4'
replace obs='=r(min)' in 'extra1'/'extra4'
replace obs=`=r(max)' in `extra2'/`extra3'
* color ramp: from less intense to more intense colors
loc scolr="yellow*.25"
loc ecolr="red*.95"
* variable grid
qui sum l_l_flows [fw=obs]
loc x1max: disp %9.1f r(max)
loc x1min: disp %9.1f r(min)
loc s1=round((`x1max'-`x1min')/4, 0.1)
/* Number of ticks on the y axis can be changed here or changing the `ylab' option below */
qui sum l_polity2 [fw=obs]
loc x2max: disp %9.4f r(max)
loc x2min: disp %9.4f r(min)
```

```
loc s2=round((`x2max'-`x2min')/4, 0.0001)
twoway (contour me_est 1_1_flows 1_polity2 if me_est!=., levels(100) crule(linear) ///
   scolor(`scolr') ecolor(`ecolr') zlab(#5, labsize(medsmall))) ///
   (scatter l_l_flows l_polity2 [fw=obs] if significant==0, ///
  msymbol(oh) mlcolor(black%95) mlwidth(vthin) msize(*.25)) ///
   (scatter l_l_flows l_polity2 [fw=obs] if significant==1, ///
   msymbol(o) mfcolor(black%95) mlwidth(none) msize(*.25)), ///
  xsca(alt) ysca(alt) xtitle("") ytitle("") ztitle("") ///
   ylab(`x1min'(`s1')`x1max', grid gmax labsize(medsmall)) ///
   xlab(`x2min'(`s2')`x2max', labsize(medsmall) grid gmax) ///
   legend(off) clegend(title("Effect Size", size(medsmall) ///
  pos(12) justification(right)) ring(0) width(5) height(25)) nodraw name(yx, replace)
twoway histogram l_polity2 [fw=obs], frac ysca(alt reverse) ///
   xtitle("Polity score", size(medsmall)) ytitle("") ///
   xlab(`x2min'(`s2')`x2max') ylab(#4, nogrid labsize(medsmall)) ///
   fysize(20) fcolor(black%95) lwidth(vthin) lcolor(white%25) nodraw name(hy, replace)
twoway histogram l_l_flows [fw=obs], frac xsca(alt reverse) ///
  horiz ytitle("ln(FDI flows)", size(medsmall)) xtitle("") ///
   ylab(`x1min'(`s1')`x1max') xlab(#4, nogrid labsize(medsmall))///
  fxsize(20) fcolor(black%95) lwidth(vthin) lcolor(white%25) nodraw name(hx, replace)
gr combine hx yx hy, hole(3) imargin(zero) scale(1.1) xsize(5.5) ysize(5.5)
```



## Computing and plotting DAME of the logged FDI flows:

To compute the distribution-weighted average marginal effects, we first need to break the dataset into 4 bins based on the values of the conditioning variable:

```
use temp,clear
gen wt=1
xtile group_id = l_polity2, nq(4)
egen midpoint=median(l_polity2),by(group_id)
```

Now we push this information to Mata and apply the me\_wt() function:


Compute the marginal effect of l\_l\_flows at its mean:

```
use temp, replace
qui sum 1_polity2
loc mn=r(min)
loc mx=r(max)
```

Push the DAME and MEM estimates from Mata into Stata's active dataset and make a plot:

```
getmata (mem lbm ubm)=mem
getmata (midpoint obs dame_est lb ub)=dame, force

twoway (line mem l_polity2, lpattern(solid)) ///
(rline lbm ubm l_polity2, lpattern(dash)) ///
(rspike lb ub midpoint) ///
(scatter dame_est midpoint [fw=obs], msymbol(o) msize(*.25)), ///
yline(0, lcolor(red)) ytitle("DAME/MEM of ln(FDI flows)") xtitle("Polity 2") legend(off)
```



## This document

This document was produced with RMarkdown Xie (2021), Hemken (2021) using Stata 17.0 and R version 4.1.0.

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