Ideology, Sociology of

Michel Dubois, GEMASS – CNRS, Paris, France

Abstract

The sociology of ideology is part of the general sociology of social beliefs and knowledge. Ideology singularizes itself in the general realm of beliefs not only by the centrality it accords to the nature and the becoming of societies but also by its relational dimension traditionally defined in terms of antagonism and struggle. If the sociological analysis of ideologies was initially developed on a macrosociological level, sociologists have tended progressively to abandon the idea of ideology as a homogeneous and unified belief system for a more localist approach.

Sociological concepts such as *ideology* have multiple lives. Once considered as crucial for the analysis of political and social systems, the concept has since been severely criticized from different perspectives. For some, coming mainly from post-structuralism and postmodernism, it implies a much too rigid demarcation between knowledge and belief, and a too naive conception of truth as correspondence. For others, coming from varieties of comprehensive sociology, the idea of 'false conscious' prevents from understanding the deep feeling of conviction that generally characterizes the relation of any individual to his own beliefs. And most contemporary sociologists agree that the archipelago of ideologies is much more complex than anticipated. The traditional map of large-scale 'systems of interpretation of the historico-political world' (Aron, 1964) does not fit anymore with the complexity and multiplicity of contemporary collective beliefs systems. So should we, as sociologists, definitely forget about ideology? Although the 'end of ideology' (Bell, 1960; Lipset, 1960) has been regularly announced since the end of the twentieth century, it is obvious that sociologists still use the concept to address research questions related to various areas: gender identities (Davis, 2007), values and interests in entrepreneurial science (Abraham and Balling, 2012), professional demarcation (Gieryn, 1983, 1999) and professional politicization (Coulangeon et al., 2012), public opinion and organizational competition (Barnett and Woywode, 2004), religious or political radicalism (Rhys, 1996; Rydgren, 2007), and terrorism and warfare (Turk, 2004; Tosini, 2009).

The first section briefly returns to the origins of the sociological use of the concept of ideology. If the concept preexists to sociology as discipline through the theory of the *idola* developed by the English philosopher Francis Bacon or the French tradition of the *Idéologues* led by Destutt de Tracy, its elaboration starts with Marx's writings and their immediate readers (among them Karl Mannheim). The second section focuses on the specificity of the ideological phenomenon. Just like many other big terms in sociology (*action*, *society*, *community*, etc.), Ideology seems to defy a precise and unique definition: process of production of meanings, signs, and values in social life; process of naturalization of social life; forms of thought motivated by social interests, propaganda, and systematically distorted communication; action-oriented set of beliefs, etc. These are only few examples from a long list of possible definitions (Eagleton, 1991; Van Dijk, 1998). The discussion of classical and contemporary sociological literature allows us to specify the ideological phenomena through three interdependent aspects. The last section focuses on the variety of modes of sociological explanation of ideology. Only few explanatory schemes give real access to the social mechanisms behind its acceptance and diffusion. They generally suppose to adopt toward the ideological beliefs a similar attitude as M. Weber for the magic beliefs or, in a certain extent, Durkheim for the religious ones: reconstruct the 'meaning' of the ideological belief for the social actor (Boudon, 1989).

Origins of the Sociology of Ideology (Marx, Mannheim)

The origin of the sociological use of the concept of ideology can be found in Marx's writings on the coup d'état of Louis Bonaparte (Marx, 1852). The important part of his demonstration consists in showing how, once the riots of June 1848 were over, dissensions within the *parti de l'ordre* – the right wing of the French parliament – helped make this coup d'état unavoidable. This party was composed of many fractions that all, Marx affirms, have a "superstructure of impressions, illusions, ways of thinking and some philosophical conceptions." To understand the origin of these 'ways of thinking' it is essential to identify the 'competition of interest,' the will of each fraction 'to restore its own supremacy.' The landed aristocracy and the industrial bourgeoisie develop different political representations: the former theorizes the benefits of the absolute monarchy, the latter those of parliamentary monarchy. In both cases, Marx suggests, they tend to give a general value to 'ways of thinking,' which actually constitute only the formulation of objective conditions that ensure the domination of a social group over another. Hence the strong relation between analysis of ideology and analysis of the struggle between social groups. Defined as prevailing ideas, ideologies are identified to those of a group seeking to preserve its social domination through their naturalization. The analysis of Marx does not end with this comparison between particular 'interests' and 'ways of thinking,' it also underlines the way in which certain individuals embody ideologies. Describing the 'ideologists' consists mainly for Marx in studying the

'writers,' the 'press,' and more largely 'representatives' of the bourgeoisie. In the present case, the inability of these ideologists to express the real opinion of those they should represent, shortly before the coup d'état, Marx points out, "the representatives and represented had become strangers to each other."

The argument is simple and easily acceptable: when an institution – here a political mode – appears in conformity with the particular interest of a social actor, individual, or collective, this actor generates, directly or indirectly, a whole set of ideas, representations, and theories intended to make the value of this institution acceptable by the majority – even if this value objectively makes real sense only for the social actor considered. When K. Mannheim looks back to this argument in *Ideology and Utopia* (1929), he presents it as a fundamental stage toward the formation of the sociology of knowledge: the first attempt to stress "the role of the position of class and the interests of class in the thought." This attempt rests however on a confusion between two conceptions of the ideology. In the first – particular conception – the 'ways of thinking' are 'mystification more or less conscious of the real nature of a situation whose exact recognition would not be in agreement with the interests' of the ideologist; they are reducible to a psychology of the interests, concern primarily the individuals, and are connected with lies on the moral level, or errors on the epistemological level. In the second – total conception – the same 'ways of thinking' are not 'illusions' deliberately maintained by the individuals according to their more or less immediate interests but elements of a total 'system of significance,' 'knowledge grown out of our experience in the real situations of the life.' One of the rare examples of ideological 'knowledge' in this 'total' conception suggested by Mannheim is the moral judgment related to the loan of money with interest. Formulated and assimilated by the Church like an ethical standard, the morally reprehensible character of the loan with interest becomes ideological, affirms Mannheim, since the social actors try to maintain it out of the social framework to which it is 'adapted': a precapitalist society based, economically and socially, on personal relations of intimacy. Through its attachment to this judgment, the Church expresses its difficulty of thinking social reality independently of a 'system of significances' adapted to a disappeared social framework from now on.

It is possible to read Mannheim's classical analysis on *Conservative thought* (1927) as an exercise of sociology of knowledge. Mannheim connects the spread of conservatism in Germany to three main factors: First, the affinity between the content of conservative thought – defined as a 'style of thought' oriented toward the concrete and qualitative dimensions of reality – and the aspirations of groups opposed to the advent of bourgeois capitalist society. Second, the phenomenon of social polarization reinforced by a middle class too weak to produce a 'synthesis' between extreme views. Third, the socially 'unattached' and economically unstable situation of German romantic intellectuals; a situation that renders them particularly receptive to political and social radicalization. Mannheim's study on *Conservative thought* can be seen as the German counterpart of the one conducted by Alexis de Tocqueville (1856) for France and its intellectuals.

Ideologies as Social Beliefs

This brief detour about the origins of the sociology of ideology suggests that traditionally sociologists associate the concept of ideology with products or properties of thinking shared by social groups. These ideas or systems of ideas have multiple possible forms (principle, theme, theory, myth, style, representation, doctrine, etc.). But whatever their forms, these are products or properties of thinking about which individuals collectively develop a deep feeling of conviction or commitment. Hence their general characterization as social beliefs or clusters of social beliefs. The difficulty that consequently arises is that of the specificity of the ideological phenomenon inside the general realm of social beliefs.

Ideologies and the Legitimate Social Order

Some recent examples of sociological studies of ideologies give us a good starting point for our discussion. Focusing on the interwar period in Austria, Barnett and Woywode (2004) analyze the Viennese newspapers over the period 1918–38. Newspapers are defined as 'organizations' and their relation as an 'ideological competition.' The sociological analysis distinguishes two main dimensions. First, the nature of ideology defined as the 'basis of political identity' of social groups in the Austrian society. Three general ideological 'positions' (*lager*) are identified corresponding roughly to political left (left radical, communist, radical socialist, etc.), center and bourgeois (democratic, Christian social, civil liberal, etc.), and right (patriotic, right radical, national socialist, etc.). Second, the evolving nature of the relation between organizations defined as 'ideological competitors.' The general thesis is that "the strongest ideological competition is likely to take place among close substitutes – adjacent ideologies that are too different to enjoy *esprit de corps* but similar enough to threaten each other's identity claims" (p. 1453). The tension between organizations is described as an ambivalent process merging two opposing tendencies: strong oppositional identity claims and regular attempts of frame alignment on competitors to attract their followers. Leaving the interwar for a more recent period, Rydgren (2007) recalls the emergence of the radical right in Western Europe over the last 20 years. He describes the 'ideological core themes' of this radical right mainly as sociocultural themes. The new radical right gives priority to 'national identity' and builds on the idea of 'ethno-pluralism' elaborated by the French *Nouvelle Droite*: "the notion of ethno-pluralism states that, to preserve the unique national characters of different peoples, they have to be kept separated. Mixing of different ethnicities only leads to cultural extinction (…) contrary to the traditional conception of racism, the doctrine of ethno-pluralism, as such, is not hierarchical: different ethnicities are not necessarily superior or inferior, only different, incompatible, and incommensurable" (p. 244). The emergence of this radical right manifests itself also by an attempt to recode the political space in terms of a struggle against the collusion of all established parties. This oppositional strategy leads to an apparent paradox: generally described as authoritarian, the radical right parties, such as the *Front National* in France, generally present themselves as the new champions of

'true democracy,' which take into account the interests of the common man.

These two brief examples show how the concept of ideology singularized itself in the general realm of beliefs. First, by the centrality it accords to the nature and becoming of society. Ideologies are beliefs or cluster of beliefs about the legitimate political and sociocultural order. Second, by the relational dimension attached to it and generally defined in terms of 'antagonism,' 'struggle,' or 'opposition.' The ideologist and the ideological organization oppose 'what is' to 'what ought to be.' They propose more than a simple interpretation of society: a program to transform it. This transformation may have multiple directions. When Mannheim defines *ideology* vs. *utopia*, by making the former an exclusive vector of conservatism where the latter would be progressivist, he only preserves the initial views of Marx. This vision of the ideology is, however, too restrictive. Not only are the ideologies not the prerogative of the conservatives – Parsons (1959, 1964) distinguishes four types of ideologies: conservative, counter-, reform, and revolutionary – but one ideology can, according to social and historical circumstances, serve various social purposes. Liberalism, socialism, or various contemporary forms of nationalism (Gellner, 1983; Birnbaum, 1997) appear, at a given time of their history, as vectors of social emancipation as well as general principles of immobilism or conservatism.

This double referent – sociopolitical and practical – makes it possible to distinguish between ideology and other types of beliefs, religious ones in particular. The ideologist speaks in the name of reason. Its truth claims positive values of rationality and is diffused by suggestion, persuasion, but much more rarely by revelation. Many sociologists (Bendix, 1964; Gouldner, 1976) thus establish a strong parallelism between the development of the ideologies at the end of the eighteenth century and the emergence of modernity defined as a 'rational' social order in opposition to a 'traditional' social order. This by no means implies that the religious elements disappear from the ideological discourse. As religion exists as a 'cultural system' it may constitute a 'shaping force for political life' (Rhys, 1996). In France, the recent public debate on the reform of bioethics laws (Dubois, 2012) or the public demonstrations against the legalization of gay marriage show that coalitions of religiously based activists regularly mix religious and political arguments. They use the cultural force of religious symbols to attempt to modify the political agenda. From a more radical perspective, the ideologies of numerous fundamentalist movements around the world build on selective and 'innovative' interpretation of sacred texts. Such interpretations contribute to produce a culture of political violence in the name of creating or restoring a legitimate social order (Turk, 2004).

Disassembling Ideology: from Macro- to Microsociology

If the sociological analysis of ideologies was initially developed on a macrosociological level (Apter, 1964; Geertz, 1964), it is becoming increasingly microsociological. This is explained by the fact that sociologists have tended progressively to abandon the idea of ideology as a homogeneous and unified belief system. When Aron (1964) analyses the contemporary political modes, he characterizes ideology as an explicit system of beliefs developed around a core of descriptive and prescriptive proposals. The dominant features of this system are unity, coherence, and totalizing character – the capacity to potentially bring a response to any interrogation. Whatever its heuristic value, this representation of ideology as a 'monolithic' unified block rarely fits with empirical data. Ideological beliefs contain generally irreducible tensions and contradictions. This conclusion is drawn from several perspectives. First, from observation of ideological production itself. Sociologists insist on the 'compromises' and the 'adjustments' necessary to hold in a same unit theoretical logic and the principle of action (Seliger, 1976). They describe the production of ideology as a 'tinkering' process during which the ideologist tries to satisfy the demand of meaning of his public without ever being able to exert a true control on his resources (Bourricaud, 1980). Second, it is drawn from observation of the organization of ideological components. As recently emphasized by Achterberg and Houtman (2009), sociologists cannot presuppose the coherence of ideological belief systems: "knowing someone's values on economic matters does not lead to a correct prediction of what one will think about cultural matters. There is no or very little coherence between the two value dimensions" (p. 1650). Beside this multidimensionality, the degree of coherence of ideology is not socially uniform. Research demonstrates that ideological components are more consistently ordered within the cultural, intellectual, and political elite than in other social groups. Finally, it is drawn from observation of the evolution of ideologies. Modern ideologies are different from the ones observed a century ago. For Boudon (1999), modern ideologies evoke the image of archipelago, while the old ideologies evoked rather the idea of a continent. "We have ideologies, writes Boudon, as to what should be done about unemployment, educational opportunities, fighting against crime or drug addiction and on a myriad of subjects, as well as how it should be done. But these theories are weakly related to one another. We have ceased to believe that they could be derived from an all-encompassing theory. We have all kinds of local ideologies; we no longer believe in general ideologies."

These local ideologies are sometimes defined in terms of professional belief systems. In his study on 'boundary work' in science, Gieryn (1983) observes that when scientists confront the public, they endow science with characteristics selected for an ability to advance 'professional interests.' They use available 'cultural repertoires' to produce profitable 'ideological self-descriptions.' Hence the risk for the sociologist to be too naive about these distorted self-descriptions. More recently, following the Straussian definition of professional arenas as 'political space for debate,' Coulangeon et al. (2012) consider as crucial not to limit the analysis of professional ideologies to political or trade union arbitrations or publicized moments of collective action. Using a questionnaire survey of French police officers of all ranks, they identified the 'ideological dissensions' within the French police on how police work should be carried out. Three general ideological positions are discussed – repressive, median, preventive – and the observed dominance of the first

(repressive) substantiates, according to the authors, "an ideological closeness between profession and the (political) right" (p. 375).

Ideology and Scientific Knowledge

As Gieryn stresses the difference between 'self-description' and the objective reality of practices and values, he reaffirms the traditional distinction between ideology and knowledge. Ideology involves elements of distortion from reality. Well-known authors such as Marx, Mannheim, Parsons, Althusser, Aron, etc. converge to consider ideologies as forms of 'distorted knowledge,' 'false beliefs,' and 'deviation compared to scientific objectivity.' The ideologist produces a representation of the social order, he wishes to be socially considered as the unique depository of a true meaning, but both representation and meaning are objectively illusory. Despite this relative consensus on the demarcation between ideology and knowledge, the reality of the ideological phenomenon is more complex. The ideologist shares in fact with the social scientist the will to produce a general discourse on society. It is not infrequent that certain sociologists consider their analysis as the methodical prolongation of a preexistent ideological point of view. The historical examples are numerous and well known: openly conservative, Frederic Le Play theorizes the traditional form of family – *famille souche* – as 'the social unit per excellence'; convinced liberal Herbert Spencer proposes an evolutionary model closely associated with the diffusion of 'social Darwinism,' etc. Inversely, a sociological theory or paradigm conceived independently of any ideological commitment can, when it is exploited out of its immediate context of validity, generate ideological skid. The mechanism is once again well known: it consists mainly to project on the theory or sociological paradigm the totalizing character of ideologies and by doing so asks those theories and paradigms to answer any possible interrogation.

The significant development, since the beginning of the 1970s, of the social studies of sciences made it possible to highlight the importance of economic, cultural, and political factors on the course of scientific research. These studies show on the one hand how the scientific institution satisfies a social demand, and on the other hand how the scientists integrate in the course of their cognitive practices different cultural elements, in particular, extrascientific 'interests.' These studies are now part of a general program of political sociology of sciences (Frickel and Moore, 2006). Recent works by Kinchy et al. (2008), Lave et al. (2010), and Abraham and Ballinger (2012) try to show how new variants of liberalism (neoliberalism) influence directly or indirectly the content of scientific expertise in the biotechnology area. For the latter, the evolution of carcinogenicity testing systems coincides much more with the 'interests' of the pharmaceutical industry and drug regulatory agencies than with public-health protection. Oreskes and Conway (2010) claim that controversies over tobacco smoking, acid rain, the hole in the ozone layer, or global warming are not only strictly rational disputes about the robustness of empirical proof but also ideological controversies within the scientific community.

Explanatory Schemes of Ideologies

How should we explain the production and diffusion of ideologies? Sociologists have proposed numerous explanatory schemes. Without trying to be exhaustive, it is useful to briefly describe four of the most common schemes.

One key aspect of the production and diffusion of ideology is frequently related to the socialization process. Socialization is a learning process that begins shortly after birth for its primary dimension. Studies on 'gender ideology' (Bolzendahl and Myers, 2004; Davis, 2007) – that is, cluster of beliefs regarding the appropriate roles of women and men in society – emphasize the importance of personal and familial dimensions. Young women with high self-esteem or personal confidence have more probability to break away from traditional definitions of 'gender roles.' But children's exposure to egalitarian behavior models seems as much as important as strictly personal factors: growing female labor participation contributes to socialize children to more egalitarian methods of dividing household responsibilities between women and men. The socialization process is also explicitly referred to in its secondary dimension by sociologists of professions. Observing the unequal distribution of ideological positions within the French police, Coulangeon et al. (2012) consider that the daily exercise of a job acts as a socialization process through which opinions are progressively reconfigured: "giving orders, maintaining public order, making arrests and driving retain a positive effect on adherence to a repressive ideology and a repellent effect on adherence to a preventive ideology, while contact with the public places police officers on the preventive side" (p. 371).

A second factor regularly cited by sociologists of ideology is *social interest*. As previously reminded, the Marxist tradition associates the production of ideology with the ruling class interests that are supposed to dominate the conscience of other social groups. This causal approach of beliefs claims that if the dominated class accepts blindly social representations that contribute to reproduce its subordination, the dominant class generates social representations which maintain its domination. The example of the study of the 18 *brumaire* shows, however, that Marx develops, in certain empirical writings, a less simplistic representation of the production process of ideologies. They are described as more than strategical theories imposed to social actors: representations of limited validity inspired by reality such as it can be observed from a given social position. Although the influence of Marxism in sociology has greatly declined, the notion of social interest associated with economic and cultural position remains sociologically useful. Focusing on scientific professions, Gieryn (1983, 1999) observes that scientists have at their disposal multiple repertoires to produce ideological descriptions of science. The role of interests is to guide the selection between those repertoires: "Ideologists are able to endow science with just those characteristics needed to achieve professional and institutional goals, and to change these attributed characteristics as circumstances warrant" (1983: p. 792). Ideologies are conceived mainly as 'professional means' to gain authority, power, and resources. In their analysis of the ideological competition between Austrian newspapers, Barnett and Woywode (2004) expressly relate the

ideological positions to different kinds of interests. During the interwar period, the political center, for example, included secular liberal (according to the nineteenth century definition) capitalist interests. And a centrist organization such as a purely bourgeois newspaper shows a general tendency to sacrifice its political role in order to pursue its material interests. Building on Converse's theory (1964), Achterberg and Houtman (2009) consider that economic and cultural interests interact to affect ideological (in) coherence: "If a person is in a weak position (which means: low level of education, low income, high risk of unemployment) and suffers from economic insecurity, he or she is more inclined to be pro-welfare state, pro-state intervention in the economy, pro-financial redistribution and have egalitarian values" (p. 1643).

A third factor that drives the production and the diffusion of ideologies is conceived by sociologists in terms of 'passions' or 'feelings.' In his *Trattato di sociologia generale*, Pareto (1916) considers that the ideologies – he speaks of 'derivations' – are primarily the effect of deep feelings remaining inaccessible to the conscience. More precisely Pareto affirms that the social actor wants to be convinced of the value of his passion, and produces derivations for this purpose. The ideologies would be thus the epiphenomenal expression of dominant passions. If the Paretian model of ideology remains generally ignored by the contemporary sociological tradition, sociologists still use the category of feeling in various contexts. The emergence and success of contemporary radical ideologies are sometimes described as the consequence of relative deprivation feelings. As emphasized by Merton (1964), the concept of relative deprivation comes from the study of the 'sentiments and attitudes' of American soldiers. Relative deprivation theory focused on feelings caused by disappointing comparisons with one's own past or with social reference groups. Rydgren (2007), for example, considers that the feeling of frustration is related to the emergence of the new radical right-wing parties in Europe. The 'losers' in the postindustrialization processes are described as 'anxious,' 'bewildered,' 'insecure,' and 'resentful': "sentiments that may be channeled into support for policy proposals that stress the need to return to the traditional values of the status quo ante" (p. 248). Following the same general path, sociological studies of hate crimes and terrorism indicate that ideologically radical behaviors are not a direct response to poverty or social disadvantage but much more to "feelings of indignity and frustration developed in repressive political environments" (Turk, 2004).

Finally, a fourth general type of sociological explanation consists mainly to adopt toward the ideological beliefs a similar attitude as M. Weber for the magic beliefs or, in a certain extent, Durkheim for the religious ones: reconstruct the 'meaning' of the ideological belief for the social actor by seeking the system of reasons or preferences that this actor produces to justify to himself his adhesion. The rationality considered by the sociologist is not reducible to an instrumental one but is also quite different from the 'derivations' described by Pareto. The sociological analysis opens on a set of 'subjective reasons' that represent the necessary conditions of the ordinary thought. These reasons are of general but nonuniversal validity and manifest themselves on different levels: utilitarian, axiological, traditional, or epistemic. Inspired by studies of Downs (1957) and Simon (1982), the restricted theory of the ideology elaborated by Boudon (1989) stresses the necessary 'comprehensive' dimension of the sociological analysis. When some people adopt statements or ideas that appear to the sociologist as false or doubtful, the sociologist has to consider that this may derive from the fact that, given the situation, these beliefs are to them the conclusions of reasons they perceive as 'strong.' This strategy is directly linked to an active theory of ordinary knowledge: the social actor produces knowledge, not simply by contemplating reality, but by interpreting it from its social position, and more generally from questions that are only seldom directly provided by reality itself. This last approach has a certain number of objective advantages. In particular, it makes it possible for the sociologist to give an account of important subjective data: the feeling of conviction and not of interiorization that generally characterizes the relation of any individual to his or her own beliefs.

See also: Collective Beliefs, Sociological Explanation of; Ideological Constraint: History and Current Status of the Concept; Mannheim, Karl (1893–1947); Marxism in Contemporary Sociology.

Bibliography

Abraham, J., Balling, R., 2012. The neoliberal regulatory state, industry interests, and the ideological penetration of scientific knowledge: deconstructing the redefinition of carcinogens in pharmaceuticals. Science Technology and Human Values 37 (5), 443–477.

Achterberg, P., Houtman, D., 2009. Ideologically illogical? Why do the lower-educated Dutch display so little value coherence? Social Forces 87 (3), 1649–1670.

Apter, D. (Ed.), 1964. Ideology and Discontent. The Free Press of Glencoe, London.

Aron, R., 1964. La lutte de classes: Nouvelles leçons sur les sociétés industrielles. Gallimard, Paris.

Barnett, W., Woywode, M., 2004. From Red Vienna to the Anschluss: ideological competition among Viennese newspapers during the rise of the national socialism. American Journal of Sociology 109 (6), 1452–1499.

Bell, D., 1960. The End of Ideology. Free Press, Glencoe, IL.

Bendix, R., 1964. The age of ideology. Persistent and change. In: Apter, D. (Ed.), Ideology and Discontent. The Free Press, Glencoe, IL.

Birnbaum, P., 1997. Sociologie des nationalismes, first ed. Presses Universitaires de France, Paris.

Bolzendahl, C., Myers, D., 2004. Feminist attitudes and support for gender equality: opinion change in women and men, 1974–1998. Social Forces 83, 759–790.

Boudon, R., 1989. The Analysis of Ideology. University of Chicago Press, Chicago.

Boudon, R., 1999. Local vs general ideologies: a normal ingredient of modern political life. Journal of Political Ideologies 4 (2), 141–161.

Bourricaud, F., 1980. Le Bricolage Idéologique. Presses Universitaires de France, Paris.

Converse, P., 1964. The nature of belief systems in mass publics. In: Apter, D. (Ed.), Ideology and Discontent. The Free Press, Glencoe, IL.

Coulangeon, P., Pruvost, G., Roharik, I., 2012. Professional ideologies: a latent class analysis of police officers opinions on the role of the police. Revue Française de Sociologie 53 (3), 347–380.

Davis, S., 2007. Gender ideology construction from adolescence to young adulthood. Social Science Research 36, 1021–1041.

de Tocqueville, A., 1856. L'Ancien Régime et la Révolution. Garnier-Flammarion, Paris.

Downs, A., 1957. An Economic Theory of Democracy. Harper, New York.

Dubois, M., 2012. Social Dynamics of Biomedical Research. An Actionist Perspective on the Sociology of Science. Bardwell Press, Oxford.

Eagleton, T., 1991. Ideology. An Introduction. Verson, London.

Frickel, S., Moore, K., 2006. The New Political Sociology of Science. Institutions, Networks, and Power. The University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, WI.
Geertz, C., 1964. Ideology as a cultural system In: Apter, D. (Ed.), Ideology and Discontent. The Free Press, Glencoe, IL.
Gellner, E., 1983. Nations and Nationalism. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY.
Gieryn, T., 1983. Boundary-work and the demarcation of science from non-science: strains and interests in professional ideologies of scientists. American Sociological Review 48 (6), 781–795.
Gieryn, T., 1999. Cultural Boundaries of Science: Credibility on the Line. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL.
Gouldner, A., 1976. The Dialectic of Ideology and Technology. Seabury Press, New York.
Kinchy, A., Kleinman, D., Autry, R., 2008. Against free markets, against science? Regulating the socio-economic effects of biotechnology. Rural Sociology 72 (3), 147–179.
Lave, R., Mirowski, P., Randalls, S., 2010. STS and neoliberal science. Social Studies of Science 40 (5), 659–675.
Lipset, Seymour M., 1960. Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics. Doubleday, Garden City, NY.
Mannheim, K., (1929) 1991. Ideology and Utopia. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London.
Mannheim, K., (1927) 1952. Conservative thought. In: Kecskemeti P. (Ed.), Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge by Karl Mannheim. Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd, London.
Marx, K., 1852. The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte in Marx and Engels, Collected Works, vol. 11. Lawrence & Wishart, London.
Merton, R., 1964. Social Theory and Social Structure. The Free Press of Glencoe, New York.
Oreskes, N., Conway, E., 2010. Merchants of Doubt. Bloomsbury Press, New York.
Pareto, V., 1916. Trattato di Sociologia Generale. G. Barbéra, Firenze.
Parsons, T., 1959. An approach to the sociology of knowledge: Transactions of the Fourth Congress of Sociology, Milan and Sressa. In: Curtis, J., Petras, J. (Eds.), 1970 The Sociology of Knowledge: A Reader. Gerald Duckworth, London, pp. 25–49.
Parsons, T., 1964. The Social System. Free Press, Glencoe, IL.
Rydgren, J., 2007. The sociology of the radical right. Annual Review of Sociology 3, 241–262.
Rhys, W., 1996. Religion as political resource: culture or ideology? Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 35 (4), 368–378.
Seliger, M., 1976. Ideology and Politics. Allen & Unwin, London.
Simon, H., 1982. Models of Bounded Rationality. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Tosini, D., 2009. A sociological understanding of suicide attacks. Theory, Culture & Society 26 (4), 67–96.
Turk, A., 2004. Sociology of terrorism. Annual Review of Sociology 30, 271–286.
Van Dijk, T., 1998. Ideology: A Multidisciplinary Approach. Sage Publications, London.