Homework 1 - Problem 1: Impact Model Write-up

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Subject: TAQ Data Processing and NLS Model Estimation Results

1. Introduction and Project Overview

This memo summarizes our work on the TAQ (Trades and Quotes) data analysis project, outlining the assumptions, methodology, and results, as well as issues encountered. The project is structured to facilitate efficient handling of TAQ data, feature extraction, and model estimation. Our pipeline is organized into modules for reading, cleaning, and merging TAQ quotes and trades, followed by constructing feature matrices and estimating models using a Nonlinear Least Squares (NLS) approach for trade classification. The codebase is organized as detailed in the README.md, with key scripts including:

- TAQQuotesReader.py and TAQTradesReader.py for data ingestion.
- DataProcessor.py for merging and cleaning the data.
- NLSEstimator.py for implementing the NLS model.

2. Model Assumptions

In our NLS model for trade classification and market impact estimation, we make several key assumptions:

- 1. Linear or Nonlinear Response to Order Imbalance: We assume that the immediate price impact is driven by the net order imbalance, after accounting for the volume-weighted price. Depending on the specification, this can be modeled linearly or using a nonlinear functional form.
- 2. **Error Distribution:** We begin by assuming that the residuals (errors) in our NLS estimation follow a normal distribution with zero mean and constant variance. However, this assumption is tested and may require correction if violated (See White's test results in **Discussion**).
- 3. Exogeneity of Regressors: We assume that the regressors (e.g., order imbalances derived from trade data) are exogenous. Any potential endogeneity is considered minimal, but we note that further tests could be beneficial if additional data sources are integrated.
- 4. **Model Specification:** The NLS model is designed to capture nonlinear relationships between the predictors and the price impact. We also explore a simplified linear approximation in parallel to validate the robustness of our results.

3. Code Implementation and Pipeline

The project follows a well-structured pipeline as described in the README.md:

- 1. **Data Ingestion:** TAQ data is read from the quotes and trades directories using TAQQuotesReader.py and TAQTradesReader.py. These scripts parse and preprocess the data files.
- 2. **Data Processing:** DataProcessor.py merges the quotes and trades data, cleans it, and aligns it temporally. The processed data is then stored as feature matrices in the designated directory.
- 3. Model Estimation: The NLSEstimator.py implements the Nonlinear Least Squares model to classify trades and estimate market impact. The model parameters (e.g., η and β) are output to params_part1.txt.
- 4. **Diagnostic Visualizations:** To assess model fit and assumptions, the code generates diagnostic plots. Key figures include a QQ plot (nls_qq_plot.png) and a histogram of residuals (nls_residual_histogram.png), which are attached as part of the output.
- 5. **Testing:** Unit tests (Test_DataProcessor.py, Test_TAQQuotesReader.py, and Test_TAQTradesReader.py) ensure that each module performs as expected.

4. Discussion of Results

Parameter Estimates

Our NLS model estimation has yielded the following parameter estimates. (from params_part1.txt):

$$\eta = 0.1172 \quad (t\text{-value} \approx 1.62),$$
 $\beta = 0.2289 \quad (t\text{-value} \approx 2.51).$

Interpretation:

- The parameter β is statistically significant at the 5% level, suggesting a robust relationship between the market variable under study and the price impact.
- The parameter η is marginally significant, indicating that while the effect is present, further data or model refinements may be necessary for stronger confirmation.

Heteroskedasticity Test

To assess whether our assumption of constant variance in the residuals holds, we performed White's test. The results are:

White's Test Statistic =
$$8.1966$$
, p -value = 0.0166 ,

F-Statistic =
$$4.0984$$
, p -value = 0.0166 .

Since the p-value is approximately 0.0166 (well below 0.05), we reject the null hypothesis of homoskedastic errors. This indicates the presence of heteroskedasticity in our residuals. In response, we apply robust standard errors to mitigate potential bias in our parameter estimates.

5. Issues Encountered

- 1. **Heteroskedasticity and Model Fit:** As confirmed by White's test, the residuals exhibit heteroskedasticity. We applied robust standard errors to adjust our parameter estimates, but further refinements, such as weighted least squares or additional covariates, may improve model performance.
- 2. Complexity in NLS Estimation: The nonlinear nature of the NLS model introduced challenges in convergence and parameter sensitivity.

6. Final Visualizations

Below is an example of the final diagnostic graph, which illustrates the residual distribution of the NLS model estimation is not normal. This graph is a crucial element for validating our modeling assumption 2 needs to be adjusted using robust standard errors:

- 1. Red line is theoretical quantiles for normal distribution
- 2. Blue dots are empirical quantiles




Figure 1: Log QQ plot of NLS model residuals, used to assess normality.

From the Q–Q plot, the residuals deviate substantially from the straight line in both tails, suggesting that they are not well-approximated by a normal distribution. In particular, the left tail appears lighter and the right tail heavier than a normal would predict. This indicates skewness and/or heavier tails.

Attachments:

- 1. params_part1.txt (model parameters and t-values).
- 2. Diagnostic plots (nls_log_qq_plot.png and nls_residual_histogram.png).
- 3. Source code files from the atqs/ project directory.

7. Conclusion

The developed pipeline effectively processes TAQ data and implements an NLS model for trade classification and market impact estimation. Our preliminary results highlight a significant relationship for the parameter β , while η requires further investigation. Importantly, White's test indicates heteroskedasticity in the residuals, prompting the use of robust standard errors.

Homework 1 - Problem 2: Optimal Execution

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1. Model Setup with Both Permanent and Temporary Impact

The optimal strategy for liquidation with both contemporary and permanent impacts is to minimize the implementation shortfall:

$$IS^{v} = qS_{0} - \mathbb{E}\Big[X_{T}^{v} + Q_{T}^{v}(S_{T}^{v} - \alpha Q_{T}^{v}) - \phi \int_{t}^{T} (Q_{u}^{v})^{2} du\Big].$$

This is equivalent to maximizing the second term.

We set the performance criterion as the expected payoff obtained by following a specific control or strategy v:

$$H^{v} = \mathbb{E}_{t,x,S,q} \Big[X_{T}^{v} + Q_{T}^{v} \big(S_{T}^{v} - \alpha Q_{T}^{v} \big) - \phi \int_{t}^{T} (Q_{u}^{v})^{2} du \Big],$$

and the value function

$$H(t, x, S, q) = \sup_{v \in \mathbb{A}} H^{v}(x, t, S, q),$$

which is the maximum payoff over all admissible strategies $v \in \mathbb{A}$.

Let the temporary impact be

$$f(v) = k v$$

and the permanent impact be

$$g(v) = bv$$

such that

$$\hat{S}_t^v = S_t^v - k v, \quad dS^v = -b v_t dt + \sigma dW.$$

2. Apply the Dynamic Programming Principle (DPP) to the Value Function

$$H(t, x, S, q) = \sup_{\nu \in \mathcal{A}} \mathbb{E}_{t, x, S, q} \left[\int_{t}^{t+h} \left(\nu_{u} \left(S_{u}^{\nu} - k \nu_{u} \right) - \phi \left(Q_{u}^{\nu} \right)^{2} \right) du + H \left(t + h, X_{t+h}^{\nu}, S_{t+h}^{\nu}, Q_{t+h}^{\nu} \right) \right]$$

For a small time increment h > 0 and taking $h \to 0$, we obtain the Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman (HJB) Partial Differential Equation (PDE).

3. Deriving the HJB Equation

Infinitesimal Contributions Denote by \mathcal{L}_t^v the infinitesimal generator contributions to the value function H(t, x, s, q). Consider each state variable:

- $dQ_t^{\nu} = -\nu_t dt$ contributes $-\nu_t \partial_q H$.
- $dS^v = -b v_t dt + \sigma dW$ contributes $-b v \partial_S H + \frac{1}{2} \sigma^2 \partial_{SS} H$.
- $dX_t^{\nu} = \nu_t (S_t^v k v) dt$ contributes $\nu_t (S_t^v k v) \partial_x H$.
- The inventory penalty $\phi(Q_u^v)^2$ contributes $-\phi q^2$ to the PDE.

Putting It All Together Using the general HJB formula for the DPP problem, we gather terms into the HJB form and take the supremum over the strategy ν to optimize it:

$$\partial_t H + \frac{1}{2} \sigma^2 \partial_{SS} H - \phi q^2 + \sup_{\nu \ge 0} \left\{ \nu \left(S - k \nu \right) \partial_x H - b \nu \partial_S H - \nu \partial_q H \right\} = 0.$$

4. Terminal Condition

The HJB equation above must satisfy the terminal condition:

$$H(T, x, S, q) = x + S q - \alpha q^2,$$

where Sq is the value for the remaining q shares in inventory, and $-\alpha q^2$ is a penalty for still holding q shares.

5. Solve for v^* with the HJB and Terminal Condition

We focus on the supremum part to maximize the value function. Let

$$f(\nu) = \nu \left(S - k \nu \right) \partial_x H - b \nu \partial_S H - \nu \partial_q H = \nu \left[S \partial_x H - b \partial_S H - \partial_q H \right] - k \nu^2 \partial_x H.$$

We apply the first-order condition (FOC) to find the optimal ν^* :

$$\frac{d}{d\nu}f(\nu) = \left[S\,\partial_x H \,-\, b\,\partial_S H \,-\, \partial_q H\right] \,-\, 2\,k\,\nu\,\partial_x H \,=\, 0.$$

Hence,

$$2k \nu^* \partial_x H = S \partial_x H - b \partial_S H - \partial_q H,$$

$$\nu^* = \frac{1}{2k} \frac{S \partial_x H - b \partial_S H - \partial_q H}{\partial_x H}.$$

6. Making Ansatz

We make the following ansatz for the value function:

$$H(t, x, S, q) = x + S q + h(t, S, q),$$

with the terminal condition

$$h(T, S, q) = -\alpha q^2.$$

The partial derivatives of H are then given by:

$$\partial_t H = \partial_t h(t, S, q),$$

$$\partial_{SS} H = \partial_{SS} h(t, S, q),$$

$$\partial_x H = 1,$$

$$\partial_q H = \frac{\partial}{\partial q} \Big[S \, q + h(t, S, q) \Big] = S + \partial_q h(t, S, q),$$

$$\partial_S H = \frac{\partial}{\partial S} \Big[S \, q + h(t, S, q) \Big] = q + \partial_S h(t, S, q).$$

Inserting these terms into the HJB equation, we have

$$0 = \left(\partial_t + \frac{1}{2}\sigma^2 \partial_{SS}\right)h - \phi q^2 + \frac{1}{4k}\left(b(q + \partial_S h) + \partial_q h\right)^2.$$

Since neither this PDE nor the terminal condition depend on S, we have $\partial_S h(t, S, q) = 0$ and can write h(t, S, q) = h(t, q).

Hence, replacing the relevant terms with zero, we obtain

$$0 = \partial_t h - \phi q^2 + \frac{1}{4k} \left(bq + \partial_q h \right)^2.$$

The optimal control is then given by

$$v^* = \frac{-1}{2k} \Big(\partial_q h + bq \Big).$$

7. Solving PDE by Separation of Variables

Substituting the ansatz

$$h(t,q) = q^2 h_2(t),$$

we have

$$\partial_t h = h_2'(t) q^2, \quad \partial_q h = 2q h_2(t).$$

Plugging these terms into the PDE derived earlier, we obtain

$$0 = \partial_t h - \phi q^2 + \frac{1}{k} \Big(h_2(t) + 0.5 b \Big)^2 q^2.$$

Dividing by q^2 (assuming $q \neq 0$), the equation becomes

$$0 = h_2'(t) - \phi + \frac{1}{k} \Big(h_2(t) + 0.5 \, b \Big)^2.$$

The terminal condition is given by

$$h_2(T) = -\alpha.$$

8. Solving the ODE Above

Rewrite the ODE

The ODE can be written as:

$$\partial_t h_2(t) = \phi - \frac{1}{k} \left(h_2(t) + \frac{b}{2} \right)^2.$$

Defining Constants

Define the constants

$$\gamma := \sqrt{\frac{\phi}{k}}$$
 and $\tilde{h}_2(t) := h_2(t) + \frac{b}{2}$.

Then, the ODE becomes:

$$\partial_t \tilde{h}_2(t) = -\frac{1}{k} \left(\tilde{h}_2(t) \right)^2 + \gamma^2 k.$$

Simplifying to a Standard Riccati Form

Multiply through by -k:

$$-k \partial_t \tilde{h}_2(t) = \left(\tilde{h}_2(t)\right)^2 - \gamma^2 k^2.$$

Thus,

$$\partial_t \tilde{h}_2(t) = -\frac{1}{k} \left[\left(\tilde{h}_2(t) \right)^2 - \gamma^2 k^2 \right].$$

Closed Form Solution

The standard result for this type of Riccati ODE is:

$$\tilde{h}_2(t) = \gamma k \frac{1 + \tilde{\zeta} e^{2\gamma(T-t)}}{1 - \tilde{\zeta} e^{2\gamma(T-t)}},$$

where the constant $\tilde{\zeta}$ is determined by the boundary condition at t = T.

Apply Boundary Condition

We know that

$$h_2(T) = -\alpha$$
, i.e. $\tilde{h}_2(T) = h_2(T) + \frac{b}{2} = -\alpha + \frac{b}{2}$.

So at t = T:

$$\tilde{h}_2(T) = \gamma k \frac{1 + \tilde{\zeta} e^{2\gamma(T-T)}}{1 - \tilde{\zeta} e^{2\gamma(T-T)}} = \gamma k \frac{1 + \tilde{\zeta}}{1 - \tilde{\zeta}}.$$

Hence,

$$-\alpha + \frac{b}{2} = \gamma k \frac{1 + \tilde{\zeta}}{1 - \tilde{\zeta}}.$$

Solving for $\tilde{\zeta}$, we have:

$$\frac{1+\tilde{\zeta}}{1-\tilde{\zeta}} = \frac{-\alpha + \frac{b}{2}}{\gamma \, k}.$$

Let

$$A = -\alpha + \frac{b}{2}, \quad B = \gamma \, k.$$

Then,

$$1 + \tilde{\zeta} = \frac{A}{B}(1 - \tilde{\zeta}),$$

which implies

$$1 + \tilde{\zeta} = \frac{A}{B} - \frac{A}{B}\,\tilde{\zeta}.$$

Hence,

$$\tilde{\zeta} + \frac{A}{B}\tilde{\zeta} = \frac{A}{B} - 1,$$

$$\tilde{\zeta} \left(1 + \frac{A}{B} \right) = \frac{A}{B} - 1.$$

Thus,

$$\tilde{\zeta} = \frac{A - B}{A + B} = \frac{-\alpha + \frac{b}{2} - \gamma k}{-\alpha + \frac{b}{2} + \gamma k}.$$

$h_2(t)$ Form

Recall that $h_2(t) = \tilde{h}_2(t) - \frac{b}{2}$. Therefore,

$$h_2(t) = -\frac{b}{2} + \gamma k \frac{1 + \tilde{\zeta} e^{2\gamma (T-t)}}{1 - \tilde{\zeta} e^{2\gamma (T-t)}}.$$

Renaming $\tilde{\zeta}$ to ζ and noting that $\gamma = \sqrt{\frac{\phi}{k}}$, we obtain

$$h_2(t) = -\frac{b}{2} + \sqrt{k\phi} \frac{1 + \zeta e^{2\gamma(T-t)}}{1 - \zeta e^{2\gamma(T-t)}}, \quad \text{with} \quad \zeta = \frac{-\alpha + \frac{b}{2} - \sqrt{k\phi}}{-\alpha + \frac{b}{2} + \sqrt{k\phi}}.$$

Optimal v^*

Recall

$$\nu_t^* = -\frac{1}{2k} \Big[2 h_2(t) q + b q \Big] = -\frac{2 h_2(t) + b}{2 k} q.$$

Define

$$\omega(t) = \frac{2h_2(t) + b}{2k}.$$

One can show

$$2 h_2(t) + b = 2 \sqrt{k \phi} \frac{1 + \zeta e^{2 \gamma (T-t)}}{1 - \zeta e^{2 \gamma (T-t)}}.$$

Thus,

$$\omega(t) \; = \; \sqrt{\frac{\phi}{k}} \, \frac{1 + \zeta \, e^{2 \, \gamma \, (T - t)}}{1 - \zeta \, e^{2 \, \gamma \, (T - t)}}.$$

Therefore the optimal trading speed becomes

$$\nu_t^* = -\omega(t) q = -\sqrt{\frac{\phi}{k}} \frac{1 + \zeta e^{2\gamma(T-t)}}{1 - \zeta e^{2\gamma(T-t)}} q.$$

Solve for Q_t^*

The inventory satisfies

$$dQ_t^* = -\nu_t^* dt.$$

Substituting ν_t^* in, we have

$$\frac{dQ_t^*}{dt} = \omega(t) Q_t^*.$$

Hence,

$$\frac{dQ_t^*}{Q_t^*} = \omega(t) dt.$$

Integrate both sides from 0 to t:

$$\ln\!\left(\frac{Q_t^*}{Q_0}\right) = \int_0^t \omega(s) \, ds.$$

Thus,

$$Q_t^* = Q_0 \exp \left[\int_0^t \omega(s) \, ds \right].$$

When carrying out the integral of $\omega(s)$ in closed form, we obtain a hyperbolic (sinh/cosh) expression. The final solution for Q_t^* often looks like

$$Q_t^* = Q_0 \frac{\zeta e^{\gamma (T-t)} - e^{-\gamma (T-t)}}{\zeta e^{\gamma T} - e^{-\gamma T}}$$

or an equivalent ratio of hyperbolic sines.

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1. Optimal Inventory Path and Trading Speed

Recall that the sinh expression of the optimal inventory is given by

$$Q_t^* = q_0 \frac{\sinh(\gamma (T - t))}{\sinh(\gamma T)},$$

with the corresponding trading speed defined as

$$\nu_t^* = -\frac{dQ_t^*}{dt},$$

where

$$\gamma = \sqrt{\frac{\phi}{k}},$$

and ϕ represents the inventory-risk penalty.

2. Limit as $\phi \to 0$

Taking the limit $\phi \to 0$ implies $\gamma \to 0$. For small γ , we have the approximation:

$$\sinh(\gamma x) = \gamma x + O(\gamma^3).$$

Thus,

$$\frac{\sinh(\gamma (T-t))}{\sinh(\gamma T)} \approx \frac{\gamma (T-t)}{\gamma T} = \frac{T-t}{T}.$$

Therefore, in the limit $\phi \to 0$ (i.e. $\gamma \to 0$),

$$\lim_{\phi \to 0} Q_t^* = \lim_{\gamma \to 0} q_0 \frac{\sinh(\gamma (T - t))}{\sinh(\gamma T)} = q_0 \frac{T - t}{T}.$$

3. Interpretation: Linear Inventory Decay

The result shows that the inventory decays linearly when ϕ approaches zero. That is, the optimal inventory path becomes

$$Q_t^* = q_0 \frac{T - t}{T}, \quad \text{for } 0 \le t \le T.$$

This represents a straight-line (linear) trajectory from $Q_0 = q_0$ at t = 0 to $Q_T = 0$ at t = T.

4. Trading Speed as $\phi \to 0$

Since

$$\nu_t^* = -\frac{dQ_t^*}{dt},$$

differentiate the linear path:

$$Q_t^* = q_0 \left(\frac{T - t}{T} \right) \implies \frac{dQ_t^*}{dt} = -\frac{q_0}{T}.$$

Hence,

$$\nu_t^* = -\left(-\frac{q_0}{T}\right) = \frac{q_0}{T}.$$

Thus, the trading speed ν_t^* is constant over time; you sell the same amount per unit time across the interval [0, T].

Interpretation

- No Inventory Penalty ($\phi \to 0$): With ϕ approaching zero, there is no penalty for holding inventory, removing any urgency to accelerate trades.
- Resulting Strategy: The optimal strategy is to liquidate uniformly over the time horizon [0, T], which corresponds to a TWAP (Time-Weighted Average Price) schedule.
- **Intuition:** In the absence of an inventory penalty, it is optimal to spread out the sales evenly in time, thereby minimizing temporary impact by avoiding large, concentrated trades.

(b)-i

1. Value Function

We define the value function as

$$H(t, S, q) = \sup_{\nu \in \mathcal{A}_{t,T}} \mathbb{E}_{t,S,q} \left[\int_t^T (S_s - k \nu_s) \nu_s \, ds + Q_T (S_T - \alpha Q_T) \right],$$

with the terminal condition

$$H(T, S, q) = S - \alpha q^2.$$

2. Application of the Dynamic Programming Principle (DPP)

By the DPP, for a small time increment h > 0,

$$H(t, S, q) = \sup_{\nu} \mathbb{E} \left[\int_{t}^{t+h} (S_s - k \nu_s) \nu_s ds + H(t+h, S_{t+h}, Q_{t+h}) \right].$$

Letting $h \to 0$ and expanding $H(t+h, S_{t+h}, Q_{t+h})$ via Itô's formula leads to the Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman (HJB) partial differential equation.

3. Derivation of the HJB Equation

- (a) Infinitesimal Contributions:
 - Price Process: The dynamics of the price are given by

$$dS_t = \sigma \, dW_t,$$

which contributes

$$\frac{1}{2} \, \sigma^2 \, \partial_{SS} H$$

to the HJB PDE.

• Inventory Process: The inventory evolves as

$$dQ_t = -\nu_t \, dt,$$

contributing

$$-\nu \partial_{q}H$$
.

• Running Payoff: The instantaneous payoff is

$$(S - k \nu) \nu$$
.

(b) Assembling the HJB Equation: Collecting the above contributions, the HJB equation becomes

$$0 = \partial_t H + \frac{1}{2} \sigma^2 \partial_{SS} H + \sup_{\nu \ge 0} \Big\{ \nu \left(S - k \nu \right) - \nu \partial_q H \Big\}.$$

Equivalently,

$$0 = \left(\partial_t + \frac{1}{2}\sigma^2 \partial_{SS}\right) H + \sup_{\nu \ge 0} \left[\nu \left(S - k\nu\right) - \nu \partial_q H\right].$$

4. Maximization Over ν

Define

$$\Phi(\nu) = \nu (S - k \nu) - \nu \partial_q H = \nu (S - \partial_q H) - k \nu^2.$$

Differentiate $\Phi(\nu)$ with respect to ν :

$$\frac{\partial}{\partial \nu} \Phi(\nu) = S - \partial_q H - 2 k \nu.$$

Setting the derivative equal to zero for optimality, we obtain:

$$S - \partial_a H - 2k \nu^* = 0,$$

which implies

$$\nu^* = \frac{S - \partial_q H}{2k}.$$

5. Substitution of ν^* Back Into $\Phi(\nu)$

Evaluating Φ at ν^* gives:

$$\Phi(\nu^*) = (S - \partial_q H) \nu^* - k (\nu^*)^2.$$

Substitute $\nu^* = \frac{S - \partial_q H}{2k}$:

$$(S - \partial_q H) \nu^* = (S - \partial_q H) \frac{S - \partial_q H}{2k} = \frac{(S - \partial_q H)^2}{2k},$$
$$-k (\nu^*)^2 = -k \left(\frac{S - \partial_q H}{2k}\right)^2 = -\frac{(S - \partial_q H)^2}{4k}.$$

Thus,

$$\Phi(\nu^*) = \frac{\left(S - \partial_q H\right)^2}{2k} - \frac{\left(S - \partial_q H\right)^2}{4k} = \frac{\left(S - \partial_q H\right)^2}{4k}.$$

6. Insertion Into the HJB Equation

Substituting $\Phi(\nu^*)$ into the HJB equation, we obtain:

$$0 = \partial_t H + \frac{1}{2} \sigma^2 \partial_{SS} H + \frac{\left(S - \partial_q H\right)^2}{4k}.$$

Multiplying both sides by 4k yields:

$$0 = 4k \partial_t H + 2k \sigma^2 \partial_{SS} H + (S - \partial_q H)^2.$$

Rearranging the squared term,

$$0 = 4k \partial_t H + (\partial_q H - S)^2 + 2k \sigma^2 \partial_{SS} H.$$

Multiplying the entire equation by -1 results in the final form:

$$0 = -4k \partial_t H - (\partial_q H - S)^2 - 2k \sigma^2 \partial_{SS} H.$$

(b)-ii

1. Derivatives of the Given Ansatz

Given

$$H(t, S, q) = h_2(t) q^2 + h_1(t) q + h_0(t) + q S,$$

we compute the following derivatives:

1. $\partial_t H$:

$$\partial_t H = h_2'(t) q^2 + h_1'(t) q + h_0'(t).$$

2. $\partial_S H$:

$$\partial_S H = q.$$

3. $\partial_{SS}H$:

$$\partial_{SS}H = 0.$$

4. $\partial_q H$:

$$\partial_q H = 2 h_2(t) q + h_1(t) + S.$$

2. Plug These Terms into ν_t^*

Recall that the optimal trading rate is

$$\nu^* = \frac{S - \partial_q H}{2k}.$$

Plugging in the derivatives we have

$$\nu_t^* = -\frac{2h_2(t)q + h_1(t)}{2k}.$$

3. Solve for Q_t^*

Since

$$\frac{dQ_t}{dt} = -\nu_t^*,$$

we obtain

$$\frac{dQ_t^*}{dt} = \frac{2 h_2(t) Q_t^* + h_1(t)}{2 k}.$$

Define

$$A(t) = \frac{2h_2(t)}{2k} = \frac{h_2(t)}{k}, \quad B(t) = \frac{h_1(t)}{2k}.$$

Then the ODE becomes

$$\frac{dQ_t^*}{dt} = A(t) Q_t^* + B(t).$$

This can be solved using an integrating factor:

$$\mu(t) = \exp\left(\int_0^t A(\tau) d\tau\right).$$

Multiplying the ODE by $\mu(t)$:

$$\mu(t) \frac{dQ_t^*}{dt} = \mu(t) A(t) Q_t^* + \mu(t) B(t).$$

Rearrange the equation:

$$\mu(t) \frac{dQ_t^*}{dt} - \mu(t) A(t) Q_t^* = \mu(t) B(t).$$

Notice that the left-hand side can be written as

$$\frac{d}{dt} \big[\mu(t) \, Q_t^* \big],$$

since

$$\frac{d}{dt} \left[\mu(t) \, Q_t^* \right] \; = \; \mu(t) \, \frac{dQ_t^*}{dt} + \mu'(t) \, Q_t^*,$$

and by the chain rule

$$\mu'(t) = A(t) \mu(t).$$

Therefore, the ODE becomes

$$\frac{d}{dt}(\mu(t) Q_t^*) = \mu(t) B(t).$$

Integrating over [0, t]:

$$\mu(t) Q(t) - \mu(0) Q(0) = \int_0^t \mu(s) B(s) ds.$$

Since $\mu(0) = 1$, we have

$$Q(t) = \frac{1}{\mu(t)} \Big[Q(0) + \int_0^t \mu(s) B(s) ds \Big].$$

Plugging in the expression for the integrating factor, we obtain:

$$Q(t) = \exp\left[-\int_0^t A(\tau) d\tau\right] \left[Q(0) + \int_0^t \exp\left(\int_0^s A(\tau) d\tau\right) B(s) ds\right].$$

Substituting the expressions for A(t) and B(t):

$$Q_t^* = \exp\left[-\int_0^t \frac{h_2(\tau)}{k} d\tau\right] \left[\int_0^t \exp\left(\int_0^s \frac{h_2(\tau)}{k} d\tau\right) \frac{h_1(s)}{2k} ds + Q(0)\right].$$

and

$$\nu_t^* = -\left(\frac{h_2(t)}{k} Q_t^* + \frac{h_1(t)}{2 k}\right).$$

(b)-iii

Replace Q(0) in the expression above with q_0 :

$$Q_t^* = \exp\left[-\int_0^t \frac{h_2(\tau)}{k} d\tau\right] \left[\int_0^t \exp\left(\int_0^s \frac{h_2(\tau)}{k} d\tau\right) \frac{h_1(s)}{2k} ds + q_0\right].$$

and

$$\nu_t^* = -\left(\frac{h_2(t)}{k} Q_t^* + \frac{h_1(t)}{2k}\right).$$

(b)-iv

Since this is also the liquidation model with temporary and permanent impact, we may also have the terminal condition

$$h(T, S, q) = -\alpha q^2,$$

for the given ansatz. Thus, we have

$$h_2(T) = -\alpha.$$

Since the state variable has no drift and we need to match the terminal condition, we set

$$h_1(T) = 0, \quad h_0(T) = 0.$$

As $\alpha \to 0$,

$$h_2(T) = -\alpha \implies h_2(t) \to 0 \text{ as } \alpha \to 0,$$

since if the terminal value goes to zero then the cumulative process from 0 to t must be zero as well.

Hence, in the limit $\alpha \to 0$,

 $h_2(t) \to 0$, $h_1(t)$ (possibly unaffected or also small), $h_0(t)$ (unchanged or small).

Therefore, the optimal trading rate becomes

$$\nu_t^* = -\frac{2h_2(t)Q_t^* + h_1(t)}{2k} \longrightarrow -\frac{h_1(t)}{2k} \text{ as } \alpha \to 0.$$

In a symmetric, no-drift case, $h_1(t)$ is usually zero; if the case is asymmetric it would be a small constant. In either case, the result shows a slow liquidation rate ν_t^* .

Explanation:

- α is the leftover-inventory penalty at the final time T. A large α strongly penalizes holding shares at T, so the trader must liquidate faster.
- As $\alpha \to 0$, there is no penalty for leftover inventory. Therefore, there is less incentive to liquidate quickly, and the trader can reduce temporary-impact costs by selling more slowly or might not sell at all if the model does not impose $Q_T = 0$ as a hard constraint.
- Consequently, ν_t^* tends to a smaller or even zero value in the limit, meaning a slower liquidation or no liquidation.

(a) Four Commonly Used HFT Strategies and How They Relate to Alpha vs. Non-Alpha

In its Concept Release on Equity Market Structure (Release No. 34–61358, Federal Register Vol. 75, starting at page 3594, January 21, 2010), the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) identifies four broad categories of strategies frequently employed by proprietary high-frequency traders:

1. Passive Market Making

According to the SEC's discussion in Section IV.B.1(a) on "Passive Market Making" (approximately 75 FR 3607–3608), many proprietary HFT firms place non-marketable limit orders on both sides of the market. Their principal aim is to collect the bid-ask spread, or part of it, rather than to speculate on price direction. These participants maintain short holding periods and minimal overnight exposure, frequently canceling and revising quotes to avoid adverse selection. Since their profits generally derive from spread-capture rather than directional bets, passive market making is widely regarded as a **non-alpha (market-neutral)** approach.

2. Arbitrage

The Commission highlights arbitrage in Section IV.B.1(b) (around 75 FR 3608–3609). Here, HFT firms exploit momentary price inconsistencies between correlated instruments, such as an ETF versus its underlying equities or a futures contract versus the spot index. Firms rely on ultra-low latency to identify and lock in these discrepancies before the market converges. Arbitrage is also deemed largely **market-neutral** because the trader typically holds offsetting positions (e.g., long the underpriced asset and short the overpriced one), thereby minimizing directional risk.

3. Structural or Latency Exploitation

In Section IV.B.2 of the Concept Release (near 75 FR 3611), the SEC discusses "Tools" such as co-location and direct data feeds, which HFT participants use to exploit structural latencies. By receiving and acting on quote updates more quickly than rivals, HFTs can trade against stale or slow quotes. Although sometimes referred to as "structural alpha," this category generally involves **exploiting microinefficiencies** rather than fundamental price trends. Depending on how trades are hedged, it can be borderline market-neutral or partially directional.

4. Directional (Alpha-Seeking) Strategies

Finally, in Section IV.B.1(d) (approximately 75 FR 3610), the SEC notes various HFT strategies that take a clear directional stance, attempting to predict immediate price moves. Two major subtypes include **Order Anticipation**—scanning for large

hidden orders or block trades and then trading ahead—and **Momentum Ignition**—triggering short-term price runs by aggressively buying or selling. These strategies are typically **alpha-oriented**, given that they profit by correctly forecasting near-term price direction rather than merely capturing the spread or an arbitrage.

Distinguishing Alpha vs. Non-Alpha

In broad terms, both **passive market making** and **arbitrage** are considered **non-alpha** or market-neutral because they minimize net directional exposure. The "structural" category can lean either way, depending on how systematically the firm hedges. By contrast, strategies that rely on anticipating or catalyzing price movements—such as **order anticipation** and **momentum ignition**—seek **alpha**: they aim to earn returns above simple spread capture or arbitrage profits by speculating on immediate market direction.

Thus, although the SEC's Concept Release treats these four strategies as overlapping in practice, they remain a useful classification for identifying which HFT activities focus on directional bets (alpha) versus those that rely on low-risk, short-term microstructure edges (non-alpha).

(b) Estimating HFT Profitability: A Report-Style Summary

1. Introduction

Numerous stakeholders—regulators, market participants, academics—have attempted to gauge the **aggregate profitability** of HFT in U.S. equities. Because no single entity discloses exact profits, analysts often rely on a common formula:

 $Total\ Profit = (Daily\ Notional\ Turnover) \times (HFT\ Share\ of\ Volume) \times (Net\ Capture\ Rate\ in\ bps). \\ |\ text{Total\ Profit}\ |\ ; |\ bigl(\ text{Daily\ Notional\ Turnover}\ |\ bigr)\ |\ ; |\ times\ |\ ; |\ bigl(\ text{Net\ Capture\ Rate\ in\ bps}\ |\ bigr). \\ |\ Total\ Profit=(Daily\ Notional\ Turnover)\times (HFT\ Share\ of\ Volume)\times (Net\ Capture\ Rate\ in\ bps).}$

Sections 2–4 detail how each component is estimated, citing (a) official market data repositories such as SIFMA, (b) industry research such as TABB Group, and (c) academic publications on HFT trading margins.

2. Daily Notional Turnover

1. Volume Figures (Shares Traded)

- a. The **Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA)** provides regularly updated, consolidated U.S. equity volume data.
- b. For example, SIFMA's *Equity and Related Statistics* show that in 2022–2023, daily share volume typically ranges between **9–11 billion shares**.

2. Average Share Price

a. The broad U.S. equity market's weighted-average share price often sits in the \$35–\$45 band, although it fluctuates with market valuations.

3. Implied Notional Turnover

- a. Multiplying 10 billion shares by \$40 yields a notional turnover of **\$400 billion** per day.
- b. If share volume or average price changes, the final notional scales accordingly.

Sources:

- SIFMA's "US Equity Monthly/Annual Statistics": https://www.sifma.org/resources/research/statistics/
- NYSE, NASDAQ, and Cboe monthly volume summaries.

3. HFT's Share of That Turnover

Studies vary on the **percentage** of equities volume attributable to high-frequency traders:

- **TABB Group** historically estimated 50–70% in the early 2010s, though this metric may have declined to 40–50% in recent years.
- Rosenblatt Securities also publishes periodic analyses of off-exchange and algorithmic flow, often citing figures in a similar range.

Thus, ~45%–50% is commonly cited for "HFT's share" of daily trading flow in U.S. stocks. This portion is, of course, approximate and can change with market conditions.

Sources:

- TABB Group (historical press releases/research on HFT volumes).
- Rosenblatt Securities, *Monthly Market Structure Analysis Reports* (archived data show HFT or algorithmic flow estimates).

4. Net "Capture Rate" (in Basis Points)

Once the fraction of volume is attributed to HFT, the next question is how many **basis points** of profit such firms typically earn on those trades. Several **academic papers** provide evidence:

1. Kirilenko, Kyle, Samadi, and Tuzun (2017)

- a. "The Flash Crash: High-Frequency Trading in an Electronic Market," Journal of Finance, vol. 72, pp. 967–998.
- b. Finds that, in the futures market studied, HFT participants netted only small gains per contract, often under 1 bp.

2. Brogaard, Hendershott, and Riordan (2014)

- a. "High-Frequency Trading and Price Discovery," Review of Financial Studies, vol. 27.
- b. Indicates that even if HFT firms execute large volume, the **per-share** margin is often a fraction of a cent, translating into sub-1 bp net returns.

3. Baron, Brogaard, and Kirilenko (2019)

- a. "Risk and Return in High-Frequency Trading," Journal of Financial & Quantitative Analysis, vol. 54.
- b. Suggests that HFT returns, though positive, are consistent with an ultra-low margin, high-turnover strategy.

A frequently used midpoint is **0.5 bps** (= 0.005%) as a net "capture." Some analyses adopt as low as 0.1 bps or as high as 1.0 bps, depending on competition, volatility, and strategy type.

5. Putting It All Together: Example Calculation

- 1. **Daily Notional Turnover**: ~\$400 billion (from Step 2).
- 2. **HFT Share**: ~50%. → \$200 billion.
- 3. Capture Rate: ~ 0.5 bps (= 0.00005).

With roughly 250 trading days per year:

```
$10 \text{ million} \times 250 = $2.5 \text{ billion/year} \ 10\, \text{text{million}} \ \text{times } 250\ \text{;=}; \ \ $2.5\, \text{billion/year} \ 10 \text{million} \times 250 = $2.5 \text{ billion/year} \
```

Thus, a **ballpark** figure for aggregate HFT profit in U.S. equities is around \$2–\$3 billion annually, given moderate assumptions.

6. Leverage in HFT

Prime Brokerage & Market Access

 Rule 15c3–5 ("Market Access Rule") from the SEC requires brokers to implement pre-trade risk controls, yet brokers commonly offer intraday financing for proprietary trading desks, including HFT. Because HFT typically holds positions for seconds or minutes, the risk of large overnight moves is minimized, permitting intraday leverage significantly higher than conventional buy-and-hold funds.

• High Turnover = High ROE

 Even if the absolute per-share profit is minuscule, HFT firms can recycle their capital many times per day, effectively magnifying returns on their invested equity.

Sources:

- FINRA guidance on broker-dealer risk controls (search "FINRA 15c3–5 Market Access Rule").
- MacKenzie (2018), "Material Signals: A Historical Sociology of High-Frequency Trading," American Journal of Sociology, references interviews with HFT participants describing intraday credit lines.

7. Conclusion and Caveats

While no single official dataset precisely states "HFT profits = \$2.5 billion," the **combined** input from:

- **SIFMA** volume stats,
- Industry estimates (TABB, Rosenblatt) of HFT's share,
- Academic research (Kirilenko et al., Brogaard et al.) on net margins,

points to a plausible range of **\$2–\$5 billion per year** for the entire U.S. equity HFT sector. Depending on actual daily volumes, share prices, and competition for microscopic edges, the figure could vary. Nonetheless, the methodology remains consistent: multiply daily notional by HFT's portion by an assumed basis-point capture to arrive at an approximate annual profit pool.

References & Reading

- SIFMA Research (Equity Market Stats):
 https://www.sifma.org/resources/research/statistics/
- Kirilenko, Kyle, Samadi, & Tuzun (2017).

 Journal of Finance, vol. 72, no. 3, pp. 967–998.
- Brogaard, Hendershott, & Riordan (2014). Review of Financial Studies, vol. 27, no. 8.
- Baron, Brogaard, & Kirilenko (2019).

 Journal of Financial & Quantitative Analysis, vol. 54, no. 3.
- **TABB Group** (for historical HFT volume reports).
- Rosenblatt Securities (monthly market structure commentaries).

These sources collectively ground the assumption that typical HFT net capture might be on the order of ~0.5 bps, given the sector's speed and constant competition.

(C)

High-frequency trading (HFT) has long generated debate regarding its influence on market stability. While previous studies emphasized HFT's liquidity benefits, **recent research**

highlights the potential for severe short-term disruptions, including heightened systemic risk. A **2024** paper by Nahar, Nishat, Shoaib, and Hossain (*International Journal of Business and Economics*, Vol. 1, Issue 3, pp. 1–13) provides a current, in-depth review of HFT's impact, synthesizing over 50 peer-reviewed articles, regulatory documents, and industry analyses.

Source:

Nahar, J., Nishat, N., Shoaib, A. S. M., & Hossain, Q. (2024). *Market Efficiency and Stability in the Era of High-Frequency Trading: A Comprehensive Review. International Journal of Business and Economics*, 1(3), 1–13.

2. Key Findings from the 2024 Paper

2.1 General Market Effects (pp. 4–5)

- **60**% of cited studies (30 out of 50) indicate HFT typically **improves day-to-day liquidity** by narrowing bid-ask spreads.
- **40**% of studies (20 out of 50) underscore HFT's positive influence on **price discovery** speed, thanks to near-continuous small-size trading.
- Nonetheless, 50% (25 out of 50) raise concerns about market fragmentation caused by HFT across multiple venues, which can hinder unified price formation and complicate large-order execution.

2.2 Amplification of Volatility and Systemic Concerns (pp. 7–8)

- 40% of articles (20 out of 50) directly link HFT to episodes such as the 2010 Flash Crash and subsequent "mini-flash crashes" in single stocks or ETFs. Nahar et al. note that these incidents occurred when HFT algorithms collectively withdrew liquidity or turned highly aggressive in the same direction.
- Advanced modeling from other scholars, summarized by the authors, shows that if many HFTs share similar triggers (e.g., inventory or volatility thresholds), they can pull out of the market simultaneously, leading to cascading liquidity gaps.

2.3 Regulatory and Technological Factors (p. 9)

• 30% of the regulatory documents surveyed highlight the role of circuit breakers and order-to-trade ratio limits in curbing runaway volatility. While these measures

- help avert catastrophic collapses, they do not fully prevent short, abrupt price spikes or local flash crashes.
- 20% of sources emphasize AI-based market surveillance as an emerging solution, especially important as HFT algorithms become more complex and adaptive.

3. Implications for Systemic Risk (pp. 10-11)

Nahar et al. conclude that HFT contributes to **systemic risk** primarily when market stress triggers sudden, synchronized changes in HFT behavior:

- 1. **Simultaneous Reaction**: In stable periods, HFT typically supplies liquidity. Under stress, many HFT firms can quickly invert to become net liquidity takers, aggravating abrupt price movements.
- 2. **Cross-Asset Linkages**: Because HFT desks often trade multiple correlated instruments (e.g., S&P 500 futures and constituent stocks), shocks propagate faster across asset classes.
- 3. **Policy Recommendations**: The authors urge continued refinement of circuit breakers, real-time risk controls, and data-sharing frameworks among exchanges and regulators. They also highlight the growing importance of **machine learning** for real-time detection of emergent "stampede" behavior in HFT.

4. Personal Assessment

I agree with Nahar et al.'s assessment that HFT can heighten systemic vulnerabilities during extreme events. Their quantitative evidence—such as 40% of reviewed studies explicitly linking HFT to flash-crash-type breakdowns—suggests that while day-to-day benefits are clear, the rapid, collective exit of multiple HFT algorithms can transform localized disturbances into market-wide disruptions. This dynamic underscores the dual nature of HFT: it is liquidity-enhancing most of the time, yet prone to amplifying systemic shocks on occasion.

5. Conclusion

The 2024 review by Nahar and colleagues demonstrates that HFT, despite improving routine market conditions, poses **nontrivial systemic risk**—particularly as algorithms converge on similar short-term signals and retreat en masse. Their data, gleaned from 50 distinct sources, confirm that **regulatory vigilance** and evolving technological oversight

remain crucial to ensuring HFT does not escalate episodic volatility into broader financial instability.

References

 Nahar, J., Nishat, N., Shoaib, A. S. M., & Hossain, Q. (2024). Market Efficiency and Stability in the Era of High-Frequency Trading: A Comprehensive Review.
 International Journal of Business and Economics, 1(3), 1–13.

(d)

(d) Designing a Short-Term Alpha Strategy

1. Introduction

In intraday trading, **alpha-seeking** strategies aim to predict brief price moves and profit from them before the signal dissipates. This section outlines a hypothetical approach—named "**Volume-Momentum Divergence**"—that seeks to detect intraday underreactions to unexpected volume surges. The methodology relies on high-resolution (intra-minute or tick-by-tick) data, a rolling baseline for expected volume, and a short exit horizon of only a few minutes.

2. Strategy Concept

2.1 Rationale

Market microstructure research (e.g., Brogaard *et al.* 2014) suggests that **significant volume spikes** often precede short-term price corrections. If price fails to move in proportion to the volume imbalance—especially if the majority of trades are one-sided (buying or selling)—an exploitable window may exist.

2.2 Signal Construction

- 1. **Volume Surprise**: Compute a ratio of (Volume in last X minutes) to (average volume for the same time of day over the last N sessions).
- 2. **Flow Imbalance**: Estimate how much of that volume executed at the **ask** vs. the **bid** (or use a midpoint classification method).
- 3. **Price Divergence**: Check whether the stock's short-term return (e.g., last 3 min) is still modest, even though net flow is strongly buy- or sell-heavy.

If all conditions align—for example, a **Buy Side** volume surge is identified but the stock's price has barely moved—then **go long** on that stock for a short horizon (Section 3.3 addresses timing).

3. Methodology

3.1 Data Requirements

- Intraday Price/Volume Feeds: One-minute bars or finer.
- Consolidated Tape: Essential for capturing volume both on-exchange and offexchange if possible.
- **Historical Data**: At least 6–12 months of intraday records for robust baseline volume patterns.

3.2 Backtesting Framework

- 1. **Identify Trading Universe**: Typically, the top ~500 U.S. equities by volume.
- 2. **Compute the Signal** each minute, checking volume surprise, directional imbalance, and price divergence.
- 3. **Entry**: If the signal is above threshold (e.g., Volume Surprise > 1.5 and >70% trades at ask), then buy in the next bar's open at market.
- 4. **Exit**: Force a *time stop* around 10 minutes or upon hitting a specified profit or stoploss.

3.3 Risk Management

• **Position Sizing:** Limit each trade to 1–2% of total capital, since many signals can appear simultaneously across different stocks.

- Aggregate Caps: Restrict total open exposure to ~10–15% of total capital to avoid correlated blowups.
- **Volatility Filters**: Optionally skip signals if VIX or the stock's intraday volatility surpasses a set threshold, to reduce risk of extreme whipsaws.

4. Hypothetical Performance

4.1 Sample Calculation

- Average Gains: Suppose each successful position yields +0.10% on notional, net of slippage and fees.
- Win Rate: 55-60%.
- Trades per Day: Possibly 20–30 across multiple stocks.
- **Projected Daily Return** (for the allocated capital) might be in the 0.05–0.15% range if signals are uncorrelated enough.

Over ~250 trading days, that can accumulate to an annualized figure of ~5–10%, though real performance depends heavily on execution quality and market conditions.

4.2 Expected Sharpe Ratio

• With robust risk controls and consistent signals, a Sharpe near **1–2** is plausible, but competition may erode edges. Active monitoring of fill rates, order cancellations, and performance across different volatility regimes is essential.

5. Practical Considerations

- 1. **Latency and Speed**: This strategy must handle frequent updates and place orders quickly to capitalize on fleeting volume/price divergences. Co-location or direct-data feeds could be beneficial but raise costs.
- 2. **Market Impact**: Aggressive orders in smaller-cap names can move the price. Restrict the strategy mainly to liquid securities.
- 3. **Regulatory Compliance**: Adhere to constraints on cancellation rates, order-to-trade ratios, and best-execution guidelines. Keep robust logs for potential oversight.

6. Conclusion

The **Volume-Momentum Divergence** strategy exemplifies a short-term alpha approach that exploits short-lived mismatches between volume surges and price responses. By:

- Tracking intraday volume relative to historical norms,
- · Assessing one-sided flow for buy- or sell-dominant activity, and
- Enforcing short holding periods with strict risk limits,

the method seeks consistent small gains while minimizing directional risk exposure. Real-world success, however, hinges on sophisticated market data, fast execution, and strong risk management—a hallmark of **intraday HFT or near-HFT** alpha strategies.

References

• Brogaard, J., Hendershott, T., & Riordan, R. (2014). *High-Frequency Trading and Price Discovery. Review of Financial Studies*, 27(8), 2267–2306.