

Designing Incentives for Multitasking Agents: Evidence from Payments to English Physicians*

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Abstract

We develop a tractable econometric model in which agents receive rewards when achieving measurable goals across a variety of tasks. Different tasks can interact with others, and the principal (or social planner) would design suboptimal contracts if multitasking was not accounted for. Preferences and costs are identified from variation in contracts and in exposure to different tasks. We apply this framework to study England’s “Quality and Outcomes Framework” during the 2009-2019 period, under which thousands of groups of primary care physicians received payments rewarding different clinical outcomes among their patients. We estimate the distribution of physicians’ preferences and the degree to which different clinical outcomes are not independent, and then use our model to quantify the impact of the program and to investigate the design of optimal incentives. Our results imply that the program led to a significant improvement in health as measured by increases in quality-adjusted-life-years, net of additional medical costs. We find that re-optimizing the design of the program’s incentives would increase net-of-payments health benefits by an additional 3% from baseline.

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1 Introduction

The design of incentives in principal-agent problems has been central to economic analyses ever since the groundbreaking theoretical contributions in Wilson (1969); Ross (1973); Mirrlees (1976), and Holmström (1979). One decade later, Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) extended these analyses to instances in which agents must execute multiple tasks. This extension was partly inspired by the prevalence of multitasking in many policy-relevant settings, and particularly by the debate surrounding pay-for-performance for teachers in the early 1990s (Hannaway, 1992). The interaction between pay-for-performance and multitasking in education remains an important object of empirical investigation as of today (see e.g. Dinerstein and Opper, 2022, and references therein). More recently, with the development of the *valued-based healthcare* paradigm, agency models gained importance in the design of incentives for medical providers (McGuire, 2000; Chalkley and Malcomson, 2000; Einav, Finkelstein and Mahoney, 2018; Gupta, 2021; Gaynor, Mehta and Richards-Shubik, 2023). As for education, in the healthcare domain as well as in other areas of applied organization design, the gap between theoretical models of multitasking and empirical applications remains substantial and limited to testing for multitasking or retrospective policy evaluation.

Prospective and counterfactual analyses of alternative designs of incentives to multitasking agents are often limited by one inherent empirical challenge. In models that include unobserved heterogeneity between agents and multitasking, the number of parameters grows more than quadratically with the number of outcomes or tasks. In large applications in which—as it is often the case—one can only observe limited policy variation that applies at the same time to all agents, the model can be underidentified.

In this article, we show that a class of tractable empirical models of multitasking can be identified by combining time variation in incentives common for all agents with longitudinal and cross-sectional variation in exposure to incentives across agents. The key idea is that when the distribution of different tasks varies across agents, this rotates the marginal returns of effort for any level of incentives. In the healthcare context, a physician with (exogenously)

more diabetic patients relative to hypertense patients is more exposed to incentives rewarding outcomes for the former group (e.g. blood sugar levels in good state). Assuming linear-quadratic utility (also used in models of complementary choice,¹ see e.g. Berry et al., 2014), this variation can be combined with variation in incentives to distinguish all parameters of the model without restrictions on multitasking.

Our model and identification argument were developed out of an interest in applying them to one of the world's largest pay-for-performance schemes for primary care: the English Quality of Outcomes Framework (QOF). Under this incentive program, thousands of primary care practices receive approximately one-fourth of their annual revenues through payments that are directly linked to a number of measurable outcomes in their patient pool. In this context, accounting for multitasking is critical (see also Rodríguez-Lesmes and Vera-Hernández, 2021): being rigorous in controlling patients' blood pressure may also help keep blood sugar levels under control. At the same time, increasing efforts on blood pressure monitoring could limit the time to do comprehensive influenza immunizations or ensure drug prescription adherence in other patients. Moreover, despite the program's size and twenty years of history, there is yet no consensus on its efficacy and cost-effectiveness.

We combine public data sources obtained from the National Health Service to construct a comprehensive dataset of practice characteristics and QOF incentives and payments during the 2009-2019 period. Our analysis focuses on 40 clinical indicators that measure health outcomes or processes directly linked to health (e.g. therapy and drug adherence). Critically for our empirical strategy, QOF incentives for different indicators vary over time, and we observe practice's geographic location that can be used as exogenous shifter of patients' composition. Simply put, being located near areas with higher-than-average incidence of diabetes increases, *ceteris paribus*, the share of diabetic patients and, therefore, the relevance of QOF incentives for diabetes-related clinical outcomes.

¹Agents' payoffs combine a heterogeneous linear component with a quadratic component that allows for arbitrary interactions between outcomes (multitasking). A similar structure is considered also in Lewbel and Nesheim (2019).

The data shows that physicians respond to incentives and the relevance of multitasking. First, for many indicators, the distribution of success rates across practices shows significant bunching at kinks in the functions used to calculate QOF payments. Second, average success is responsive to changes in incentives over time, even when controlling flexibly for practice-indicator-specific unobservables. For multitasking, we find that—holding fixed incentives for a specific indicator, and conditional on practice fixed effects and time-varying number of patients—the correlation between outcomes of different indicators is often statistically significant (and typically positive, suggesting the prevalence of complementarities).

We estimate our model via maximum likelihood and obtain estimates of the distribution of physicians' preferences and costs. We find both positive and negative interactions between indicators, with positive ones prevailing. Multitasking patterns are generally consistent with intuition: improving outcomes along one clinical dimension for a specific diagnostic group lowers the cost of improving other outcomes for the same patients.

Using our model we can quantify the overall impact of the part of the QOF program included in our analysis. Shutting down all incentives would worsen outcomes, leading to a drop in the average success rate between 0.1-0.6. For 20 indicators we observe data on the cost-benefit parameters used by the NHS. Among these, we estimate that the ratio between incentive payments and the median (across practice years) of the resulting net-of-cost health benefits is approximately 1:5.

Lastly, we measure the scope of optimal design by setting up and solving a (numerically tractable) version of the principal's objective. This returns a set of incentives at which the net health benefits are 3% larger than under the status quo. Focusing on 20 indicators, we find that at our solution the counterfactual design would generate additional health improvements worth 3.9 billion GBP, against additional medical cost totaling 731 million and additional 221 million in incentive payments to primary care physicians. An essential object when solving for the optimal design is the gradient of physicians' payoffs with respect to the different indicators. Our empirical exploration shows that ignoring multitasking would change the

magnitude and sometimes switch the signs of this gradient, thus harming the accuracy of the empirical contract design exercise.

In terms of existing empirical work on multitasking, our work contributes to the literature by discussing identification and estimation of a structural model with heterogeneous agents and unrestricted interactions between tasks. Kim, Sudhir and Uetake (2022) pursue the same goal in the context of designing incentives for salesforce in microfinance, where they are able to observe a signal of the agents' effort in response to quasi-random incentives. Prior empirical analyses of multitasking have largely focused on testing theories using field or lab experiments (Slade, 1996; Buser and Peter, 2012; Hong, Hossain, List and Tanaka, 2018; Goes, Ilk, Lin and Zhao, 2018; Manthei and Sliwka, 2019). As mentioned above, education studies pioneered the literature evaluating multitasking in large-scale policy-relevant settings. For a rich review of this literature, as well as a recent example discussing many open issues, see Dinerstein and Opper (2022).

Our application speaks directly to a growing literature discussing the benefits, costs, and optimization of incentives to healthcare providers. Choné and Ma (2011) discuss the interaction between physician altruism and optimal incentive design. In the context of Medicare or Medicaid in the US, many studies measure physicians' responses to incentives and the causal effects on healthcare supply or patients' health. These include Clemens and Gottlieb (2014); Gupta (2021); Gaynor et al. (2023); Dunn et al. (2024), and Shi (2024). Counterfactual incentive designs have been proposed in Einav et al. (2018); Einav, Finkelstein, Ji and Mahoney (2022).

Lastly, several articles discussed issues that relate more directly to pay-for-performance and multitasking in the context of managed-care and value-based care. Gaynor, Rebitzer and Taylor (2004) and Mullen, Frank and Rosenthal (2010) focus on physicians' incentives inside HMO organizations, Dumont, Fortin, Jacquemet and Shearer (2008) and Li, Hurley, DeCicca and Buckley (2014) measure the effects of pay-for-performance in primary care using a natural experiment in, respectively, Quebec and Ontario (CA), Rodríguez-Lesmes and

Vera-Hernández (2021) proposes a test of multitasking in the context of the QOF program, also highlighting complementarities between indicators. Overall, empirical evidence on the pros and cons of pay-for-performance schemes in medical care, and particularly in primary care, remains mixed. For a review of the vast literature discussing specific issues in the context of the QOF program in England we refer the readers to Gillam, Siriwardena and Steel (2012) and related articles.

2 Modelling and Econometric Framework

2.1 Model

A large number of agents, each indexed by i , are assigned to several desirable tasks. In our application, agents are physicians' practices, and tasks are clinical goals for their patients. Alternatively, one could think of a firm assigning tasks to employees. Agents are responsible for delivering these tasks within a given time period, and a principal (payer, or social planner) can set up rewards for agents as a function of the share of accomplished tasks. Formally, j denotes a specific, deliverable task (e.g. a patient has blood pressure below a certain threshold, where we will primarily focus on our application henceforth), and $n_{it,j}$ is the number of such tasks assigned to agent i in period t . Every agent in period t is assigned to the collection of tasks $n_{it} = \{n_{it,1}, n_{it,2}, \dots, n_{it,J}\}$.

At the end of period t the payer observes the collection of outcomes $y_{it} = \{y_{it,j}\}_{j \in J}$, measured as the share of successes: for every j

$$y_{it,j} = \frac{\# \text{ successful tasks } j \text{ by agent } i \text{ in } t}{n_{it,j}} \in [0, 1]. \quad (1)$$

The principal sets up an incentive system that pays agents as a function of $y_{it,j}$, proportionally to the number of assigned tasks. Formally, agent i receives a transfer in the amount of

$$r_{it} = \sum_j n_{it,j} \times \rho_{t,j}(y_{it,j}). \quad (2)$$

The collection of functions $\rho_{t,j}(\cdot)$ determines incentives across tasks j in every period t . Importantly, incentives also vary across agents since $\partial r_{it}/\partial y_{it,j}$ varies with $n_{it,j}$. An increase in $\rho_{t,j}(\cdot)$ benefits more agents with a large $n_{it,j}$, and vice-versa. In this formulation, potential successes for task j are treated equally, with no distinction of patients or clients within $n_{it,j}$.

Agent i 's payoff is the sum of the total revenues r_{it} and a (money-metric) utility function that varies with n_{it} and y_{it} , which depends on a (private) type θ_{it} : $u(y_{it}, n_{it}; \theta_{it})$. The total utility for an agent with type θ_{it} given the system of incentives is then $U_{it} = u(y_{it}, n_{it}; \theta_{it}) + r_{it}$; this is maximized by i when choosing y_{it} .

This formulation assumes that agents' actions can perfectly control the share of successes, a simplification that represents a substantial departure from the theoretical literature on principal-agent problems with risky outcomes and hidden effort (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991). Our choice is dictated by the pursuit of a tractable empirical model that (i) encompasses multitasking, (ii) is identified, and (iii) can be feasibly estimated in large-scale applications. For instances in which the number of potential successes $n_{it,j}$ is sufficiently large, assuming that agents' production decisions can target precisely the share $y_{it,j}$ might not be too concerning. For small values of $n_{it,j}$, or situations in which outcomes remain highly uncertain even conditional on agents' best effort, the model would need to be enriched further by future work.

Importantly, while payments are additively separable across tasks, the agents' payoffs need not be. That is, to model multitasking we do not assume that $\partial^2 u / \partial y_{it,j} \partial y_{it,k} = 0$ when $j \neq k$. Instead, we make the following assumption

Assumption A1: Linear-quadratic utility

There is a symmetric, positive-semi-definite matrix Λ , with generic entry $\lambda[j, k]$, such that

$$u(y_{it}, n_{it}; \theta_{it}) = \sum_j n_{it,j} \left(y_{it,j} \left(\theta_{i,j} - \left(\sum_k y_{it,k} \times \lambda[j, k] \right) \right) \right). \quad (\text{LQ})$$

Assumption A1 puts a linear-quadratic structure on the utility model (this relates to models

of complementary choices presented in Berry et al., 2014; Lewbel and Nesheim, 2019). The matrix Λ “regulates” the interactions between tasks. A positive value of $\lambda[j, k]$ implies that for all agents, increasing $y_{it,j}$ lowers the cost of increasing $y_{it,k}$, and vice-versa. If Λ is diagonal utility becomes additively separable across tasks.

Knowledge of Λ is critical to incentives: if tasks are complements, inducing agents to increase outcomes in one task also increases outcomes and respective payments in other tasks. The opposite holds if tasks are substitutes. We next discuss sufficient conditions for identification of the distribution of types θ_{it} and the matrix Λ .

2.2 Identification

Consider a situation in which every agent i is characterized by the set of observables (x_{it}, z_{it}) , and unobservables (θ_{it}, ξ_{it}) . The variables in x_{it} (e.g. experience or size of i) can affect simultaneously task assignment (i.e. the distribution of n_{it}) and the utility type θ_{it} . Instead, z_{it} collects instrumental variables (e.g. geographic location) that affect task assignment but not θ_{it} . Lastly, ξ_{it} is unobservable and can potentially affect both task assignment and θ_{it} . When discussing identification of the model, we maintain that the econometrician observes the conditional density $g(y_{it}|x_{it}, n_{it}, z_{it})$ over the entire support of (y_{it}, x_{it}, n_{it}) , for all t .

We can now complete the list of our identifying assumptions.

Assumption A2: Shifters of task assignment and conditional independence

There is a known function σ such that there is a unique value $\widehat{\xi}_{it}$ for which $n_{it} = \sigma(z_{it}, x_{it}, \widehat{\xi}_{it})$, and $\widehat{\xi}_{it} = \xi_{it}$. Moreover, there is a family of conditional densities $\{f_j(\cdot|x_{it}, \xi_{it})\}_j$ such that $\theta_{it} \sim \prod_{iid} f_j(\theta_{it,j}|x_{it}, \xi_{it})$, and $\theta_{it}|x_{it}, \xi_{it} \perp n_{it}|x_{it}, \xi_{it}$.

Assumption A3: Variation in incentives and task assignments (completeness)

Incentive payments are such that $\rho_{t,j}(\cdot) = \rho(\cdot; \alpha_{t,j})$, where the family of functions ρ is differentiable with respect to all arguments. Moreover, for all functions $B(y_{it})$ with finite expectations, if $\mathbb{E}[B(y_{it})|n_{it}, x_{it}, \xi_{it}, \alpha_t] = 0$ almost surely, then $B(y_{it}) = 0$ almost surely.

Assumption A2 states that variation in the instrumental variables z_{it} can be used to identify the unobservables ξ_{it} affecting n_{it} conditional on x_{it} . This argument is standard to the discrete-choice demand literature and formalized in Berry and Haile (2014). Assumption A2 also requires the distribution of private types to be independent across i and j after conditioning on (x_{it}, ξ_{it}) .

Assumption A3 is a completeness (full-rank) assumption. It requires the variation in incentives and exposure to incentives—as determined by changes in n_{it} generated by shifts in z_{it} conditional on x_{it} and ξ_{it} —to be sufficient to distinguish any two functions of the outcomes. This assumption is generally violated in finite samples, and estimation will therefore rely on distributional assumptions on $f_j(\cdot)$. Nevertheless, Assumption A3 serves the important purpose of highlighting conditions in the data-generating process that are sufficient to identify the model’s primitives.

We then obtain the following

Proposition 1. *Under A1-A3, $\{f_j(\cdot|x_{it}, \xi_{it})\}_j$ and Λ are identified.*

The proof is in Appendix A, here we discuss the case with two tasks.

First, variation in z_{it} ensures that the unobservables ξ_{it} are identified following the argument in Berry and Haile (2014).² In the example of our empirical application, observing a practice that captures an equal or larger share of patients albeit being farther away, *ceteris paribus*, implies that it must be of unobservably higher quality.

Consider now two tasks, say $j = A, B$. The goal is to identify $f_j(\theta_{it,j}|x_{it}, \xi_{it})$ for each j , and the three distinct entries of Λ : $\lambda[A, A]$, $\lambda[B, B]$, and the off-diagonal element $\lambda[A, B] = \lambda[B, A]$ which is the essential parameter that distinguishes our model to one without multitasking. To uniquely determine these parameters from the data, Assumption 3 allows us to consider arbitrary variation in incentives (parametrized by α) and patients’ composition $(n_{it,A}, n_{it,B})$ conditional on (x_{it}, ξ_{it}) . In everything that follows we simplify our

²Under Assumption 2, one can invert σ by finding the value of ξ_{it} that leads to n_{it} holding fixed x_{it} and z_{it} : $\xi_{it} = \sigma^{-1}(n_{it}; x_{it}, z_{it})$. Conditional on (x_{it}, n_{it}) , changes in z_{it} must be compensated by changes in ξ_{it} .

discussion and notation omitting the dependence and conditioning on (x_{it}, ξ_{it}) , without any loss of generality. (See Appendix A for details.)

Consider it pairs for which $n_{it,B} = 0$, so that—differentiating (LQ), and dividing by $n_{it,A}—y_{it,A}$ must solve $\theta_{it,A} + \partial\rho(y_{it,A}; \alpha_{t,A})/\partial y_{it,A} - 2\lambda[A, A]y_{it,A} = 0$, or

$$\theta_{it,A} = 2\lambda[A, A]y_{it,A} - \frac{\partial\rho(y_{it,A}; \alpha_{t,A})}{\partial y_{it,A}}. \quad (3)$$

The log-density of $y_{it,A}$ for these it pairs is then $\log(g(y_{it,A})) = \log(2\lambda[A, A]) + \log(f_j(\theta_{it,A}))$, where $\theta_{it,A}$ is determined in (3). Since this has full support, we can differentiate it with respect to $y_{it,A}$ and with respect to $\alpha_{t,A}$, and obtain

$$\lambda[A, A] = \frac{1}{2} \left(-\frac{\partial \log(g(y_{it,A}))/\partial y_{it,A}}{\partial \log(g(y_{it,A}))/\partial \alpha_{t,A}} \frac{\partial^2 \rho(y_{it,A})}{\partial y_{it,A}^2} + \frac{\partial^2 \rho(y_{it,A})}{\partial y_{it,A} \partial \alpha_{t,A}} \right). \quad (4)$$

While this expression might seem cumbersome, the intuition is as follows. At any point in the data, it must be that marginal revenue equals marginal cost. Under Assumption A1, marginal revenue depends on the unknown type $\theta_{it,A}$ and on the known marginal incentives $\partial\rho(y_{it,A}; \alpha_{t,A})/\partial y_{it,A}$, while marginal cost depends instead on the product of $y_{it,A}$ and the unknown parameter $\lambda[A, A]$. Variation in $\alpha_{t,A}$ —which appears in the denominator of (4)—identifies (the distribution of private types that leads to) marginal revenue, say $MR_{it}(\alpha_{t,A})$. Indeed, any increase in $\alpha_{t,A}$ must correspond to an increase in $y_{it,A}$ or to a decrease in $\theta_{it,A}$. Then, $\lambda[A, A]$ must be the parameter for which $MC_{it}(\lambda[A, A]) = MR_{it}(\alpha_{t,A})$ for the same distribution of private types. The argument applies symmetrically to identify $\lambda[B, B]$ using it pairs for which $n_{it,A} = 0$.

Then, considering it pairs for which $n_{it,A} \neq 0$ and $n_{it,B} \neq 0$, y_{it} must solve

$$n_{it,A}(\theta_{it,A} + \partial\rho(y_{it,A}; \alpha_{t,A})/\partial y_{it,A}) - 2n_{it,A}\lambda[A, A]y_{it,A} - (n_{it,A} + n_{it,B})\lambda[A, B]y_{it,B} = 0,$$

and similarly for B . Because $\lambda[A, A]$ and $\lambda[B, B]$ can now be treated as known, we can once again use a similar argument. After deriving the (joint) log-density of y_{it} , its local variation relative to variation induced by changes in incentives (α_t)—which identifies the distribution

of private types—uniquely determines $\lambda[A, B]$, which is the only parameter affecting marginal cost left to be identified. Once all the parameters in Λ are identified, the distribution of θ_{it} is nonparametrically identified from first-order conditions (e.g. equation (3) when $n_{it,B} = 0$).

Our argument combines the variation in incentives common for all agents with variation in exposure to these incentives. When $n_{it,B} = 0$, only $\alpha_{it,A}$ matters, and vice-versa. The model is generally not identified from variation in α_t alone since its dimension is J while the dimension of Λ is $J(J - 1)/2$ and the dimension of θ_{it} is J .

3 Incentives to Physicians in the English National Health Service

3.1 The Quality of Outcomes Framework

The Quality of Outcomes Framework (QOF henceforth) is arguably the most comprehensive national primary care pay-for-performance scheme in the world (see, e.g. Gillam et al., 2012, and references therein). It applies to virtually all primary care practices—also known as general practitioners—in the English National Health Service (NHS).³ It was introduced as part of a new national physician fee-for-service contract in 2004. Since then, it endured many changes and remains an object of policy debate. On the one hand, transfers total approximately one billion GBP per year. On the other hand, research has yet to be conclusive that the realized population’s health improvements justify the program’s costs.

In terms of incentive design (see Appendix B for more details), for every practice-year the QOF measures the share of successes across approximately one hundred indicators,⁴ which we index by j as above. At the end of year t , a practice i receives a transfer equal to


$$r_{it} = \sum_j n_{it,j} \underbrace{\max \left\{ 0, \alpha_{t,j} \times \max \left\{ y_{it,j} - \bar{Y}_{t,j}, \bar{Y}_{t,j} - \underline{Y}_{t,j} \right\} \right\}}_{\rho_j(y_{it,j})}. \quad (5)$$

³The program is voluntary, but participation is almost universal. In our analyses, when merging administrative QOF data with other NHS datasets at the practice level, we found only 48 out of 7,935 practices for which QOF data are unavailable.


⁴These are grouped in five distinct domains: clinical; public health; additional services; vaccination and immunization; quality improvement. We focus on the clinical domain.

Figure 1: Example of incentives for QOF indicator *DM11*

% diabetes patients in whom the last glycohaemoglobin IFCC-HbA1c is 64 mmol/mol or less.



((a)) Payments for a practice with 300 relevant patients



((b)) Distribution of share of successes across practices

That is, for every indicator j the practice receives nothing if the average achievement $y_{it,j}$ is lower than the “floor” $\underline{Y}_{t,j}$, and then receives $\alpha_{t,j}$ per-relevant-patient for every percentage increase in achievement up until the “ceiling” $\bar{Y}_{t,j}$, after which compensation stops.

One example of these contracts and how these varied over time is illustrated in the top panel of Figure 1. For indicator DM11, which measures the share of diabetic patients for whom a critical marker is below the recommended threshold, we show the function $\rho_j(y_{it,j})$ for $t = 2013, 2014, 2017$. This function varies yearly, but we selected these three years for illustrative purposes. While $\underline{Y}_{2013,j} = \underline{Y}_{2014,j}$, the program altered incentives for this indicator by setting $\bar{Y}_{2014,j} > \bar{Y}_{2013,j}$, while $\alpha_{2014,j} < \alpha_{2013,j}$. A few years later, in 2017 the floor and ceiling were left approximately to the 2014 level, but the slope $\alpha_{2017,j}$ was lowered further. As a result of these changes, the amount paid in 2013 to a practice with 300 diabetic patients with share of successes 0.6 would have been almost equal to the amount paid in 2017 with a 20 percentage point higher share of successes.

The bottom panel of Figure 1 provides a first, suggestive look at the (seemingly rational) response of outcomes to changes in incentives, anticipating our discussion below. Plotting the density of share of successes across practices in $t = 2012, 2014$ and 2017 shows that the distribution shifts to the right as the ceiling and the strength of incentives increase. Moreover, in all three years the density peaks right around the kink in the payment function, as already observed in Rodríguez-Lesmes and Vera-Hernández (2021).

We next introduce our data and investigate further the relationship between variation in QOF incentives and the distribution of clinical outcomes across practices.

3.2 Data

We employ data on patient composition, successes, and incentives for QOF indicators belonging to the clinical domain during the 2009-2019 period. We focus on indicators measuring health outcomes, or intermediate outcomes related to health (e.g. drug prescriptions and adherence). This results in a final dataset consisting of 40 indicators during our study period,

Table 1: Summary statistics

	Mean	Std. Dev.	P-10	Median	P-90	Obs.
Panel A: Indicator-year						
<i>Indicator-year QOF incentive parameters:</i>						
$\alpha_{t,j}$	35.47	44.13	7.19	18.24	95.19	307
$\bar{Y}_{t,j}$	0.811	0.124	0.6	0.8	0.96	307
$\underline{Y}_{t,j}$	0.439	0.073	0.4	0.4	0.560	307
<i>Value of success for one patient:^{(a),(b)}</i>						
Extra QALY	10209	16515	113	1225	45813	156
Cost	2787	7070	6	234	9662	156
Panel B: Indicator-practice-year						
Share of successes	$y_{it,j}$	0.878	0.121	0.722	0.906	1
Number of patients	$n_{it,j}$	177	264	4	87	445
Revenues per patient	$\rho_j(y_{it,j})$	11.16	12.64	2.32	7.23	27.99
Panel C: Practice-year						
<i>QOF outcomes:</i>						
Total revenues r_{it}	33791	24535	9733	27670	66405	85509
N. indicators with $n_{it,j} > 0$	27.9	3.5	26	26	34	85509
Year	2013.8	3.1	2010	2014	2018	85509
<i>Practice characteristics:^(c)</i>						
Number of physicians	5.12	3.53	1.5	4.5	9.5	80156
Avg. age	46.44	7.5	39.5	45.75	55.33	80156
Share fully qualified	0.97	0.08	0.86	1	1	80156
Avg. distance to patient (km)	1.83	1.26	0.9	1.51	3.04	37238

Notes: The table summarizes our analysis dataset, built following the procedure described in Appendix B. Share of successes is defined in equation (1); QOF incentive parameters, revenues per patient— $\rho_j(y_{it,j})$ —and total revenues— r_{it} —are defined in equation (5). All monetary values are in 2020 GBP.

^(a): Value of success is obtained for 20 indicators from reports provided by the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence and from the Department of Health. See Appendix B for more details.

^(b): 1 additional QALY is valued 25,000 GBP, the “societal value” used by the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence.

^(c): Qualified physicians are those who have received all qualifications and are not undergoing training for general practice.

complemented with information on practice characteristics.

Our analysis dataset is built by combining several public sources obtained directly from the NHS website, as described in Appendix B. This results in 2.4 million observations, each corresponding to a unique combination of practice-year-indicator level, summarized in Table 1.

The top panel of Table 1 highlights the variation in incentives across indicators and years, as well as the benefits and cost of a success (for one patient) as measured by the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (see also Appendix B). An average value of $\alpha_{t,j}$ equal to 35.47 corresponds to the increase in revenue r_{it} for a practice with 100 patients for which indicator j is relevant, as long as the share of successes is between $\underline{Y}_{t,j}$ and $\bar{Y}_{t,j}$. This incentive parameter varies from less than 10 to more than 90 GBP, and its distribution is skewed to the right with some indicators being rewarded very highly. This skeweness reflects the distribution of the “societal value” of a success, as measured by the increase in QALY for the patient. This is 10209 for the average indicator, with a median value of 1225,⁵ and a 90th percentile equal to 45813.⁶

The middle panel of Table 1 summarizes outcomes at the practice-year-indicator level. On average, practices have 177 patient in each indicator, and record a high success rate (0.878) which is 7 percentage point higher than the average level of the ceiling $\bar{Y}_{t,j}$ (0.811). This leads to revenue per patient in the amount of 11.16, on average, adding up to average annual revenue for 33791 GBP per practice-year (panel C) resulting from the 40 indicators included in our analysis. The modal practice-year has patients in 26 out of 40 indicators.⁷


Panel C of Table 1 also summarizes the characteristics of practices in our sample. These employ, on average, 5.12 physicians, with age distribution centered at 45.75 and the vast majority of whom has the highest qualifications for primary care according to NHS standards. Importantly for our analysis, patients tend to select a practice very close to their residence: the average patient needs to travel only 1.83 kilometers to see their doctor, and for less than ten percent of patients this distance is greater than 3.04.

⁵This corresponds to indicator CHD6, measuring *The percentage of patients with a history of myocardial infarction (from 1 April 2011) currently treated with an ACE inhibitor (or ARB if ACE intolerant), aspirin or an alternative anti-platelet therapy, beta-blocker and statin*.

⁶This corresponds to indicator AF3, described as *In those patients with atrial fibrillation in whom there is a record of a CHADS2 score of 1 (latest in the preceding 15 months), the percentage of patients who are currently treated with anti-coagulation drug therapy or an anti-platelet therapy*.

⁷Some indicators are only present in a subset of years, as illustrated in Appendix Figure C.1. Our current analysis does not account for nor leverage this fact, which may be incorporated in future work.

Figure 2: Distribution of “excess” share of successes $y_{it,j} - \bar{Y}_{t,j}$




Notes: Distribution of the distance between realized share of successes ($y_{it,j}$) and the ceiling $\bar{Y}_{t,j}$; see equation (5). We correct our calculations to account for the fact that the number of patients is integer and it may be therefore be impossible for a practice to reach exactly $\bar{Y}_{t,j}$. Therefore, we consider the distance between $y_{it,j}$ and the ratio between the smallest integer larger than $n_{it,j}\bar{Y}_{t,j}$ and $n_{it,j}$. This is the relevant bunching point, since represents the first patient whose success does not lead to additional revenues.

3.3 Empirical Evidence

Bunching. The example presented in Figure 1 above suggested that physician practices seem to respond to QOF incentives. To corroborate this further, we use our data to inspect the distribution of the distance between realized share of successes ($y_{it,j}$) and the ceiling $\bar{Y}_{t,j}$ above which incentives to increase success further for indicator j become null. If physicians were responsive to incentives the distribution of $y_{it,j} - \bar{Y}_{t,j}$ should show significant bunching at 0. Moreover, if physicians were solely motivated by monetary rewards *and* indicators were independent there should be few instances in which $y_{it,j} - \bar{Y}_{t,j} > 0$.

Figure 2 illustrates the distribution of $y_{it,j} - \bar{Y}_{t,j}$ across all itj triplets in our analysis dataset. The prevalence of bunching at the kink of monetary incentives is starking, with

Figure 3: Distribution of “excess” share of successes for specific indicators



Notes: Distribution of the distance between realized share of successes ($y_{it,j}$) and the ceiling $\bar{y}_{t,j}$; see equation (5) and note to Figure 2 for references. **Indicator DM1:** The percentage of patients with diabetes, on the register, in whom the last IFCC-HbA1c is 64 mmol/mol or less in the preceding 12 months. **Indicator DM4:** The percentage of patients with diabetes, on the register, in whom the last blood pressure reading (measured in the preceding 12 months) is 140/80 mmHg or less. **Indicator DM5:** The percentage of patients with diabetes whose last measured total cholesterol within the preceding 15 months is 5 mmol/l or less. **Indicator DM8:** The percentage of patients with diabetes, on the register, with a diagnosis of nephropathy (clinical proteinuria) or micro-albuminuria who are currently treated with an ACE-I (or ARBs).

frequency greater than 0.2. In addition, it is often the case that the share of successes exceeds the ceiling $\bar{Y}_{t,j}$. This suggests that physicians may be driven by motives other than pure revenue maximization (see also Choné and Ma, 2011; Godager and Wiesen, 2013; Einav et al., 2018; Gaynor et al., 2023, for models of physicians' altruism), or that indicators may be complementary to one another and increasing success in j may lead to higher success in k .

The aggregate distribution in Figure 2 masks significant heterogeneity across indicators. This is illustrated in Figure 3, where for four indicators relating to diabetic patients. For the

two indicators in the top panels, DM11 and DM4, bunching is evident but more limited; the frequency at zero is lower than 0.05 and the “jump” at zero approximately one percentage point. For indicator DM15 in the bottom-left panel there is no evidence of bunching. On the other extreme, for indicator DM8, the frequency at zero is almost 0.4. Perhaps not surprisingly, DM8 is the only indicator out of the four considered in the figure that does not correspond to a clinical outcome, but instead checks the share of patients that are receiving a recommended treatment. One may therefore expect the variance of physicians’ heterogeneity in terms of preferences and costs for this indicator to be smaller.


Multitasking. To provide empirical support for our emphasis on multitasking and interactions between indicators, we follow an intuition related to the test suggested by Rodríguez-Lesmes and Vera-Hernández (2021). For every indicator j , we control flexibly for practice identifier, j -specific QOF incentive parameters $(\alpha_{t,j}, \underline{Y}_{t,j}, \bar{Y}_{t,j})$, and (50 bins of) time-varying number of patients, and regress the share of successes $y_{it,j}$ on the collection of $y_{it,k}$ of other indicators $k \neq j$. Specifically, we estimate

$$y_{it,j} = \sum_{k \neq j} \beta_j^k y_{it,k} + \mu_{ij}(\alpha_{t,j}, \bar{Y}_{t,j}, \underline{Y}_{t,j}, n_{it,j}) + \varepsilon_{it,j}. \quad (6)$$


Figure 4 illustrates the result. Coefficients significantly different from zero suggest dependencies between indicators: if positive, indicators are complements, if negative, indicators are substitutes. In the top panel we plot in black the significant coefficients, plotted in the space of their size (horizontal axis) and t-statistics in absolute value (vertical axis). The shaded coefficients are not significantly different from zero. This shows that there are many pairs of indicators (673 out of 1421; 47%) for which this simple test rejects the null hypotheses that they are independent, suggesting that—in the language of our model— $\lambda[j, k] \neq 0$. Inspecting the signs, these estimates suggest that significant complementarities (38%) might be more prominent than substitutabilities (9%).

The bottom panel of Figure 4 shows the increase in the R^2 of equation (6) when including

Figure 4: Evidence of multitasking



(a) Coefficient estimates and t-statistics from equation (6)



(b) Improvement in the R^2 of equation (6) when including $y_{t,k}$, $k \neq j$

$y_{t,k}$ for $k \neq j$. This difference is positive for 75 percent of the forty regressions (one for every j), and for many the inclusion of other indicators increases the model's ability to predict $y_{it,j}$ by more than ten percentage points.

Distance and practice choice. To estimate our model we need to isolate variation in incentives from unobserved heterogeneity that may affect the physicians' utility. On the one hand, we can exploit directly the variation in QOF design over time (see also Appendix Figure C.1). On the other hand, without a very (long panel and) rich variation in $\alpha_{t,j}$ across t and j , our discussion of identification in Section 2 points at variation in n_{it} across i and t as a key source of variation. Combining changes in n_{it} with changes in QOF parameters leads to rich variation in the intensity of incentives for different indicators across practices

and over time as illustrated for two indicators in Appendix Figure C.2.

However, a possible concern is that patients sort along dimensions that affect outcomes (see also Brown, Hansman, Keener and Veiga, 2023). To isolate exogenous variation in patient composition we use variation in practice location, leading to variation in distance between i and potential patients associated with different indicators. We use standard techniques widely used in empirical industrial organization for the analysis of discrete-choice models, where our goal is to estimate unobservables that affect patients' sorting between practices and may be correlated with private types and hence QOF outcomes.

Importantly, we currently do not have access to data on prevalence of different diagnoses at the micro-area level. Therefore, at this time we estimate a one-dimensional, practice-specific unobservable (ξ_i , rather than the richer $\xi_{it,j}$ allowed in Assumption 2) which we then allow to affect outcomes. To implement this, since we observe time invariant practice-level controls, we estimate the following (simple logit) discrete choice model (Berry, 1994):

$$s_{it}^\ell = \frac{\exp\{\gamma z_i^\ell + \eta x_i + \xi_{it}^\ell\}}{1 + \sum_{d:z_d^\ell \leq 5} \exp\{\gamma z_d^\ell + \eta x_d + \xi_{dt}^\ell\}} \quad \text{if } z_i^\ell \leq 5 \text{ kilometers.} \quad (7)$$

The left-hand side is the share of residents in (LSOA) location ℓ selecting practice i in year t , and z_i^ℓ denotes the distance between the centroid of location ℓ and the address of practice i . The additional controls x_i include number of physicians, their average age, and the share of physicians fully qualified. The identifying assumption is that $\mathbb{E}[\xi_{it}^\ell | z_i^\ell, x_i] = 0$.

We include explicitly in the choice set of location ℓ all practices within a five kilometers radius, while we bundle the other practices in the outside option. This choice result from the empirical investigation of choice probabilities against distance (see Appendix Figure 4(a)), combined with the need to limit zero market shares.

The top panel of Table 2 illustrates our estimates from equation (7) across different specifications. All coefficients are significant and robust. Patients tend to choose physicians that are closer to their residence, work in larger practices, and who are on average younger

Table 2: Determinants of practice choice and QOF outcomes

Panel A: Practice choice – equation (7)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Distance to practice	-1.071 (0.001)	-1.066 (0.001)	-1.073 (0.001)	-1.073 (0.001)	-1.036 (0.001)
Distance \times Large practice					-0.159 (0.002)
Number of physicians		1.286 (0.004)	1.225 (0.004)	1.301 (0.005)	
Avg. age			-0.913 (0.015)	-1.085 (0.015)	
Share fully qualified				1.106 (0.017)	
FE	–	–	–	–	Practice
R-squared	0.341	0.381	0.383	0.384	0.601
Observations	2458038	2408277	2227701	2227701	2458038
Panel B: Share of successes – equation (8)					
	(1)	(2)	(4)	(3)	(5)
$\bar{Y}_{t,j}$	0.281 (0.001)	0.276 (0.001)	0.241 (0.001)	0.279 (0.001)	0.289 (0.001)
$\bar{Y}_{t,j} \times$ Large practice				0.076 (0.002)	0.004 (0.000)
$\alpha_{t,j}$	0.087 (0.005)	0.082 (0.005)	0.031 (0.007)	0.094 (0.005)	0.170 (0.006)
$\alpha_{t,j} \times$ Large practice				0.115 (0.009)	-0.135 (0.004)
Number of physicians					-0.006 (0.000)
Avg. age					-0.027 (0.001)
Share fully qualified					-0.019 (0.001)
Practice-level average residual $\hat{\xi}_i$ from practice-choice model in column (4)					0.129 (0.005)
FE	Ind.	Ind., Practice	Ind. \times Practice	Ind. \times Practice	Ind.
R-squared	0.412	0.476	0.656	0.656	0.431
Observations	2353922	2353922	2332413	2332413	2060431

Notes: In Panel A, we divide the number of GPs by 10 and the average GP age by 100 to ensure they are in a similar scale as the dependent variable. In Panel B, we divide α_{jt} by 1,000, the number of GPs by 10, the average GP age by 100, and $\hat{\xi}$ by 100 to ensure they are on a similar scale as the dependent variable. Large practices are those with above median number of physicians. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

and more qualified. We use this model to estimate the average practice-level unobservable $\hat{\xi}_i$ (from column (4), our preferred specification). A higher $\hat{\xi}_i$ signifies that patients are willing to travel further, *ceteris paribus*, to receive primary care from practice i .

In what follows, we will allow $\hat{\xi}_i$ to affect the distribution of the practice type (θ_i), and therefore clinical outcomes. In Appendix Figure 4(b) we show that $\hat{\xi}_i$ is indeed positive correlated with $y_{it,j}$, even after controlling for indicator fixed-effects and practice observable characteristics.

Incentives and share of successes. Lastly, in the bottom panel of Table 2 we summarize our preliminary finding estimating alternative regressions investigating the response of success rate to QOF incentives, also controlling for observed and estimated characteristics affecting practice choice (x_i and $\hat{\xi}_i$). Specifically, we estimate

$$y_{it,j} = \delta^1 \bar{Y}_{t,j} + \delta^2 \alpha_{t,j} + \zeta^1 x_i + \zeta^2 \hat{\xi}_i + [\kappa_j][+\nu_{i,j}] + \epsilon_{it,j}, \quad (8)$$

where for some specifications we include indicator fixed-effects (κ_j) or indicator-practice fully interacted fixef-effects ($\nu_{i,j}$).

The impact of QOF incentives as set by $\bar{Y}_{t,j}$, $\alpha_{t,j}$ is positive, significant, and robust across specifications. Moreover, higher values of $\hat{\xi}_i$ correspond to greater shares of successes. Larger practices result to be more responsive to the incentives set by the ceiling $\bar{Y}_{t,j}$.

4 Estimating Preferences of Multitasking Physicians

4.1 Parametric Specification and Estimation

We next apply the identification strategy discussed in Section 2 in our empirical context. This allows us to parametrically estimate the distribution of physicians' types and the cost matrix that characterizes the interactions between QOF indicators.

For every practice i we consider the set of observables $\tilde{x}_i = (x_i, \hat{\xi}_i)$, where x_i collects a

constant term, practice size, average age of physicians, and share of fully qualified physicians, while $\widehat{\xi}_i$ is the unobservable estimated in column (4) of Table 2. We assume that, for every i , t , and j

$$\theta_{it,j} \underset{iid}{\sim} \mathcal{N}(\mu_j \tilde{x}_i, \sigma_j), \quad \text{and} \quad n_{it}| \tilde{x}_i \perp \theta_{it}| \tilde{x}_i. \quad (9)$$

Then, imposing LQ-utility as specified in Assumption 1, the parameters of the model consists of the matrix Λ and the collection $\{\mu_j, \sigma_j\}_j$.

These can be estimated via maximum likelihood, after noticing that, for a given realization of y_{it} , first-order optimality implies that

$$\begin{aligned} n_{it,j} \theta_{it,j} &\leq \nabla_{it,j}(y_{it}) && \text{if } y_{it,j} = 0 \\ n_{it,j} \theta_{it,j} &= \nabla_{it,j}(y_{it}) && \text{if } y_{it,j} \in (0, \underline{Y}_{t,j}], \text{ or } y_{it,j} \in (\overline{Y}_{t,j}, 1) \\ n_{it,j} (\theta_{it,j} + \alpha_{t,j}) &= \nabla_{it,j}(y_{it}) && \text{if } y_{it,j} \in (\underline{Y}_{t,j}, \overline{Y}_{t,j}) \\ n_{it,j} \theta_{it,j} &\leq \nabla_{it,j}(y_{it}) \leq n_{it,j} (\theta_{it,j} + \alpha_{t,j}) && \text{if } y_{it,j} = \overline{Y}_{t,j} \\ n_{it,j} \theta_{it,j} &\geq \nabla_{it,j}(y_{it}) && \text{if } y_{it,j} = 1, \end{aligned} \quad (10)$$

where we set

$$\nabla_{it,j}(y_{it}) \equiv \sum_{k \in J} (n_{it,j} + n_{it,k}) y_{it,k} \times \lambda[j, k].$$

The likelihood of y_{it} is then derived analytically as the distribution of a discrete-continuous variable. Formally, letting B_{it}^0 be the set of indicators j that are bunched at $y_{it,j} = 0$ for the pair it , and similarly for $B_{it}^{\overline{Y}}$ and B_{it}^1 , and denoting with $\Phi(\cdot; a, b)$ the CDF of a Gaussian

distribution with mean a and standard deviation b (with PDF $\phi(\cdot; a, b)$), the likelihood is

$$\begin{aligned}
\ell_{it} = & \prod_{j \in B_{it}^0} \Phi(\nabla_{it,j}(y_{it}); n_{it,j}\mu_j \tilde{x}_i, n_{it,j}\sigma_j) \\
& \times \prod_{j \in B_{it}^{\bar{Y}}} (\Phi(\nabla_{it,j}(y_{it}); n_{it,j}\mu_j \tilde{x}_i, n_{it,j}\sigma_j) - \Phi(\nabla_{it,j}(y_{it}) - n_{it,j}\alpha_{t,j}; n_{it,j}\mu_j \tilde{x}_i, n_{it,j}\sigma_j)) \\
& \times \prod_{j \in B_{it}^1} (1 - \Phi(\nabla_{it,j}(y_{it}); n_{it,j}\mu_j \tilde{x}_i, n_{it,j}\sigma_j)) \\
& \times \prod_{j: y_{it,j} \in (0, \underline{Y}_{t,j}], \text{ or } y_{it,j} \in (\bar{Y}_{t,j}, 1)} \phi(\nabla_{it,j}(y_{it}); n_{it,j}\mu_j \tilde{x}_i, n_{it,j}\sigma_j) \\
& \times \prod_{j: y_{it,j} \in (\underline{Y}_{t,j}, \bar{Y}_{t,j})} \phi(\nabla_{it,j}(y_{it}) - n_{it,j}\alpha_{t,j}; n_{it,j}\mu_j \tilde{x}_i, n_{it,j}\sigma_j) \times |\partial \nabla_{it,J \setminus B_{it}}| .
\end{aligned} \tag{11}$$


The last object in this expression, $|\partial \nabla_{it,J \setminus B_{it}}|$, is the absolute value of the Jacobian determinant of the function mapping y_{it} into $n_{it}\theta_{it}$ among indicators that do not bunch at either 0, $\bar{Y}_{t,j}$, or 1. In our model, this is the absolute value of the determinant of the (submatrix) $(\nabla_{it} + \nabla_{it}^\top)$ restricted to rows and columns corresponding to non-bunching indicators.

After convergence, we can use our estimates to draw θ_{it} and then evaluate the gradient of every practice payoff function at the observed $y_{it,j}$. This is centered and very concentrated around zero for all indicators, as illustrated in Appendix Figure C.4. Alternatively, we can solve the practice problem maximizing payoffs as a function of $y_{it,j}$. Doing so for every it pair we obtain a model-predicted distribution of outcomes, say $y_{it,j}^*$. In Appendix Figure C.5 we show that this distribution tracks well the one observed in the data, although generally our model tends to overpredict bunching at the kink $\bar{Y}_{t,j}$ and slightly underpredict the frequency of $y_{it,j}$ exceeding $\bar{Y}_{t,j}$.


4.2 Estimation Results and Evidence of Multitasking

Our model contains 1060 parameters, which taken alone do not carry a lot of economic meaning. The only exception perhaps is the collection of off-diagonal terms in the matrix

Figure 5: First-order incentives with and without multitasking



(a) Gradient of U_{it} at $y_{it} = \underline{Y}_t$



(b) Gradient of U_{it} at $y_{it} = \underline{Y}_t$; baseline vs. diagonal Λ


Λ that capture the intensity of complementarity and substitutability between indicators. In Appendix Figure C.6 we report a heatmap of these estimates. Consistent with the evidence discussed in Section 3 we find that most indicators are complements, while few are substitutes. The intensity of complementarities is highly heterogeneous. Inspecting the patterns in our estimates, it is reassuring that indicators that relate to similar medical conditions are stronger complements.

A key ingredient to study the design of physician's incentives is the gradient of the payoff function $U_{it} = u(y_{it}, n_{it}; \theta_{it}) + r_{it}$ with respect to the vector y_{it} . In the top panel of Figure 5 we display the mean and median of $\partial U_{it} / \partial y_{it,j}$ at $y_{it,j} = \underline{Y}_{t,j}$ for $j = 1, \dots, 40$ (after drawing the private type θ_{it} for every it pair). This shows the strength of incentives at the point $\underline{Y}_{t,j}$ at which QOF payments begin. For all but one indicators increasing the share of successes by one percentage point leads to higher payoffs. On average, for most indicators such an increase corresponds to an additional value between 30 and 150 GBP, but for some as high as 300-450.

To highlight the importance of multitasking between indicators, in the bottom panel of Figure 5 we compare baseline the gradient of payoffs evaluated at $y_{it,j} = \underline{Y}_{t,j}$ with the same quantity obtained after setting to zero all off-diagonal elements of Λ . This removes all dependencies between indicators, making the payoff of every physician additive separable. The two (average) gradients differ in meaningful ways, both in magnitude and sometimes in sign, confirming our motivating insight by which ignoring interdependencies would lead to erroneous measurement of marginal incentives. Since most indicators are complements, setting $\lambda[j, k] = 0$ whenever $j \neq k$ reduces, on average, the marginal profitability of increasing $y_{it,j}$ for all indicators.

To see how multitasking is critical to incentive design, in Figure 6, we show the simulated changes in average share of successes the 40 indicators in our analysis when we increase $\alpha_{t,16}$ (top panel) and $\alpha_{t,21}$ (bottom panel) by 40 GBP. With Λ diagonal, increasing $\alpha_{t,j}$ would only impact $y_{it,j}$. Instead, we find that even if the direct effects are the largest, indirect effect on

Figure 6: Increasing incentives by 40 GBP for one indicator




Notes:

other indicators can be sizable, and possibly of different sign. The patterns in Figure 6 are consistent with our estimates of Λ (Appendix Figure C.6). Sometimes, however, even if one indicator (say j) is not directly related to another (say k), if there is a third indicator ℓ for which $\lambda[j, \ell] >> 0$ while $\lambda[k, \ell] << 0$, increasing $\alpha_{t,j}$ may lead to a decrease in $y_{it,k}$.


4.3 The Effect of QOF Incentives

We can now use our model to measure the overall effect of the incentives provided under the QOF. For this we set $\alpha_{t,j} = 0$ for all j , all t , and—holding fixed our draws of θ_{it} used to compute y_{it}^* above—compute the solution of the problem for every practice, say y_{it}^0 . The results are illustrated in Figure 7, where we compare simulated outcomes without QOF incentives to simulated outcomes at the observed QOF incentives. We estimate that the program led, on average, to a significant increase in share of successes among the forty

Figure 7: Impact of the QOF program



(a) Effect on share of successes



(b) Effect on health and incentive payments

indicator included in our analysis.

The top panel of Figure 7 compares the distribution of $y_{it,j}^0$ (horizontal axis) to the distribution of $y_{it,j}^*$. With few exceptions due to multitasking QOF incentives shifts the distribution of outcomes upward. The solid black line indicates the conditional mean of $y_{it,j}^*$ given a value of $y_{it,j}^0$. This shows that the QOF effect is more pronounced for practice-indicator-year triplets in which, absent incentives, success shares would have been lower than 0.6. In this region of the data we find that QOF incentives increased success shares by an average of 0.2-0.4. Most of the data, however, is concentrated in the region with higher baseline values of $y_{it,j}^0$, where we estimate that the increase in average outcomes generated by QOF incentives is between 0.1-0.2. Mechanically, the impact is zero (or even negative) when $y_{it,j}^0$ approaches 1, since the share of successes is bounded between [0, 1].

As described in Section 3 and Appendix B, for 20 out of the 40 indicators included in our analysis we were able to obtain measures of costs and health benefit that are used for decision making by the NHS. For this subset of indicators we can then translate our estimates of the impact of QOF incentives in easier-to-interpret, welfare-relevant quantities measured in GBP per-practice, per-year.

We do this in the bottom panel of Figure 7, where we compare the QOF payments specific to a practice-indicator-year triplet on the horizontal axis to the change (in logarithmic scale) in net QALY (i.e. increase in QALY evaluated at 25,000 GBP per-year minus cost) induced by the program for the patients in the same triplet. The solid line is the mean of changes in net QALY conditional on QOF payments, the dashed line is the median.

Also according to these measures, the effect of the program is largely positive. For practice-year pairs receiving QOF payments of 1,000 GBP for a specific indicator, the median net health gains are approximately 5,000 GBP. Since the gains in QALY are highly skewed, the average is much higher, and equal to almost 100,000 GBP. Across varying levels of incentive payments the figure suggests that the ratio between QOF payments and median net health gains is approximately 1:5.

Effects are however highly heterogeneous. Because of multitasking, QOF at times induces some practices to lower share of successes for certain indicators. This leads to the negative health gains in the bottom-left corner of the figure.

5 Empirical Design of Physician Payments

We are now ready to apply our empirical model to the problem of designing QOF incentives to maximize an objective function. Here we focus on the 20 indicators for which we were able to collect health benefits and costs as measured by the NHS. In what follows, we use ω_j^h to denote the increase in health (with one QALY being valued at 25,000 GBP per-person per-year) when indicator j is a success for a given patient, and ω_j^c to denote the increase in medical costs. Moreover, to limit computational burden we hold fixed \underline{Y}_t , which is rarely binding in the data, and set $\bar{Y}_{t,j}$ equal to 1 for all indicators. Therefore our design problem only optimizes over α . These simplifications imply that the improvements we generate represents a lower bound to the solution of a more flexible design problem.

The problem can be written as

$$\begin{aligned} W^* = \max_{\alpha} & \sum_j \sum_i \sum_t n_{it,j} \int y_{it,j} (\omega_j^h - \omega_j^c) - \rho(y_{it,j}; \alpha_j) dF(\theta_{it} | x_i, \hat{\xi}_i) \\ \text{s.t. } & y_{it} = \arg \max_y \sum_j n_{it,j} \left(\rho(y_j; \alpha_j) + y_j \left(\theta_{i,j} - \left(\sum_k y_k \times \lambda[j, k] \right) \right) \right). \end{aligned} \quad (12)$$

Notice that solving this problem requires to solve, for every value of α , one separate optimization problem for every i , t , and—theoretically— θ_{it} combination. To the best of our understanding, this is unfeasible.

Therefore, we approximate the problem in two ways. First, we (k-means) cluster practice-year pairs in G (currently $G = 20$) groups with similarities in n_{it} , x_i , and $\hat{\xi}_i$. For every such group $g = 1, 2, \dots, G$ we compute the average of each of these observables, say n_g , x_g , and $\hat{\xi}_g$. Let π_g be the share of it pairs in each group. Then, for every group we approximate the

Table 3: Counterfactual design of QOF incentives

	No QOF Δ from QOF	QOF	Optimized QOF Δ from QOF
Practice payoffs	-348 -11%	3,240	164 5%
QOF payments	-361 -100%	361	221 61%
Medical costs	-1,449 -3%	43,465	731 2%
Health benefits	-5,574 -4%	131,900	3,915 3%
Welfare	-4,113 -5%	91,314	3,128 3%

Notes: All monetary values are in GBP millions. Welfare is computed as the Practice payoffs + Health benefits - QOF payments - Medical costs

integral in (12) by taking R (currently $R = 100$) draws of the private type (now θ_g , rather than θ_{it}) conditional on $(x_g, \hat{\xi}_g)$. Finally, we can feasibly solve

$$\begin{aligned} \widehat{W} &= \max_{\alpha} \frac{1}{R} \sum_j \sum_g \pi_g n_{g,j} \sum_r y_{g,j}^r (\omega_j^h - \omega_j^c) - \rho(y_{g,j}; \alpha_j) \\ \text{s.t. } y_g^r &= \arg \max_y \sum_j n_{g,j} \left(\rho(y_j; \alpha_j) + y_j \left(\theta_{g,j}^r - \left(\sum_k y_k \times \lambda[j, k] \right) \right) \right). \end{aligned} \quad (13)$$

Of course, $\widehat{W} \leq W^*$, so that our results will again be a lower bound to the potential impact of designing QOF incentives optimally.

Once we obtain the solution $\widehat{\alpha}$ from (13), we apply it to the entire distribution of it pairs, drawing θ_{it} . This allows us to compare the resulting outcomes, say \widehat{y}_{it} , to the QOF outcomes y_{it}^* and outcomes without incentives y_{it}^0 . For all three simulations we focus only on the 20 indicators for which we observe QALY and costs, and hold the draws of θ_{it} fixed.

Table 3 summarizes our (preliminary) findings. We estimate that removing QOF incentives would lower welfare by 5%: the reduction in payments (361 million) and medical costs

(1.5 billion) would not compensate the reduction in QALY's (5.5 billion). On the other hand, there seems to be room for significant improvement in incentive design. Table 3 suggests that re-optimizing incentives would—despite increasing QOF payments by 221 million and costs by 731 million—lead to additional health benefits worth almost 4 billion (+3% from baseline). Physicians' payoffs would also increase by approximately 5%, adding 164 million to the baseline level of 3.2 billion GBP. These changes would add up to a 3% increase in the objective defined in (12); this does not currently include physician's payoffs.

6 Conclusions

We proposed an empirically tractable principal-agent model that includes multitasking and private information. The model is identified when assuming linear-quadratic utility, and when it is possible to observe rich variation in incentives combined with exogenous variation in exposure to incentives across agents. In practice, this requires instrumental variables that affect the composition of tasks across agents but are independent from payoff-relevant private information.

We apply our method to the pay-for-performance program for primary care physicians in England during the 2009-2019 period (Quality of Outcomes Framework; QOF). We find ample evidence for physicians being responsive to incentives and for dependencies between different clinical outcomes as measured by revenue-relevant QOF indicators. Exploiting variation in the location of physicians' practices as exogenous, we estimate our model, and detect meaningful (and mostly complementary) interactions between indicators.

Counterfactual simulations show that the program led to significant improvements in health that—valuing health using National Health Service criteria—largely outweigh payments to physicians. Optimizing the design of incentive may improve outcomes further.

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Appendix

A Proof of Proposition 1

To begin, under Assumption 2 we can invoke Berry and Haile (2014) and treat $\xi_{it} = \hat{\xi}_{it}$ is known hereafter. Therefore, in what follows we condition on $(x_{it}, \hat{\xi}_{it})$ throughout but omit this to keep notation uncluttered without any loss of generality; by Assumption 2, then, in what follows $f_j(\theta_{it,j}|n_{it}) = f_j(\theta_{it,j})$.

Next, for all it , and all j whenever $y_{it,j} \in (0, 1)$ the following FOC must hold:

$$\theta_{it,j} = -\rho'_j(y_{it,j}) + \sum_k w_{it}(j, k) \times \lambda[j, k] \times y_{it,k}, \quad \text{where } w_{it}(j, k) = \frac{n_{it,j} + n_{it,k}}{n_{it,j}}, \quad (14)$$

and independence in Assumption 2 implies that the observed density $g(\cdot)$ of outcomes is

$$g(y_{it}|n_{it}) = \prod_j f_j \left(\underbrace{-\rho'_j(y_{it,j}) + \sum_k w_{it}(j, k) \times \lambda[j, k] \times y_{it,k}}_{\theta_{it,j} \text{ in (14)}} \right) \times |\partial \tilde{\Lambda}_{it}|, \quad (15)$$

where $|\partial \tilde{\Lambda}_{it}|$ is the absolute value of the determinant of the Jacobian of the function mapping y_{it} into θ_{it} . Here, this is the determinant of the matrix with generic row j and column k equal to $w_{it}(j, k)\lambda[j, k]$. Note that, while Λ is symmetric, $|\partial \tilde{\Lambda}_{it}|$ is not, since it is generally the case that $w_{it}(j, k) \neq w_{it}(k, j)$.

The left-hand side is observed, and so are its derivatives. Then, whenever $g(y_{it}|n_{it}) > 0$, we can calculate for every j

$$\begin{aligned} \partial \log(g(y_{it}|n_{it}))/\partial y_{it,j} &= \frac{f'_j(\theta_{it,j})}{f_j(\theta_{it,j})} (-\rho''_j(y_{it,j}) + w_{it}(j, j) \times \lambda[j, j]) \\ &\quad + \sum_{k \neq j} \frac{f'_k(\theta_{it,k})}{f_k(\theta_{it,k})} (w_{it}(j, k) \times \lambda[j, k]). \end{aligned} \quad (16)$$

Even if f_j were known, the equations in (16)—one for every j —represent an “underidentified” system since Λ contains $J(J - 1)/2$ distinct parameters.

Differentiating (16) with respect to $n_{it,k}$, $k \neq j$ we obtain

$$\begin{aligned} & \partial^2 \log(g(y_{it}|n_{it})) / \partial y_{it,j} \partial n_{it,k} = \\ & \partial \left(\frac{f'_j(\theta_{it,j})}{f_j(\theta_{it,j})} \right) / \partial n_{it,k} (-\rho''_j(y_{it,j}) + w_{it}(j, j) \times \lambda[j, j]) + \frac{f'_k(\theta_{it,k})}{f_k(\theta_{it,k})} \left(\frac{\lambda[j, k]}{n_{it,j}} \right) \\ & + \sum_{\ell \neq j} \partial \left(\frac{f'_\ell(\theta_{it,\ell})}{f_\ell(\theta_{it,\ell})} \right) / \partial n_{it,k} (w_{it}(j, \ell) \times \lambda[j, \ell]). \end{aligned} \quad (17)$$

Together, (16) and (17) define a system of $J + J(J - 1)$ independent equations. Therefore, if the terms

$$\frac{f'_j(\theta_{it,j})}{f_j(\theta_{it,j})}, \partial \left(\frac{f'_j(\theta_{it,j})}{f_j(\theta_{it,j})} \right) / \partial n_{it,k}, \quad j \neq k \quad (18)$$

were known, the completeness condition in Assumption 3 would be sufficient to identify Λ .⁸

The first part of Assumption 3 implies that the following expressions are well defined for all j , all k :

$$\partial \log(g(y_{it}|n_{it})) / \partial \alpha_{t,j} = \frac{f'_j(\theta_{it,j})}{f_j(\theta_{it,j})} \left(-\partial^2 \rho(y_{it,j}; \alpha_{t,j}) / \partial y_{it,j} \partial \alpha_{t,j} \right); \quad (19)$$

$$\partial^2 \log(g(y_{it}|n_{it})) / \partial \alpha_{t,j} \partial n_{it,k} = - \left(\partial^2 \rho(y_{it,j}; \alpha_{t,j}) / \partial y_{it,j} \partial \alpha_{t,j} \right) \times \partial \left(\frac{f'_j(\theta_{it,j})}{f_j(\theta_{it,j})} \right) / \partial n_{it,k}. \quad (20)$$

Since the left-hand side is observed, and ρ is a known primitive, (19) and (20) identify the

⁸Indeed, if two distinct $\Lambda, \hat{\Lambda}$ were such that, for both, taking expectations over combinations of i, t, j, k would satisfy (16) and (17) in expectation almost surely, then this would imply that (almost surely) for all j and all k

$$\begin{aligned} 0 &= \frac{f'_j(\theta_{it,j})}{f_j(\theta_{it,j})} \left(-\rho''_j(y_{it,j}) + w_{it}(j, j) \times (\lambda[j, j] - \hat{\lambda}[j, j]) \right) + \sum_{k \neq j} \frac{f'_k(\theta_{it,k})}{f_k(\theta_{it,k})} \left(w_{it}(j, k) \times (\lambda[j, k] - \hat{\lambda}[j, k]) \right); \\ 0 &= \partial \left(\frac{f'_j(\theta_{it,j})}{f_j(\theta_{it,j})} \right) / \partial n_{it,k} \left(-\rho''_j(y_{it,j}) + w_{it}(j, j) \times (\lambda[j, j] - \hat{\lambda}[j, j]) \right) + \frac{f'_k(\theta_{it,k})}{f_k(\theta_{it,k})} \left(\frac{(\lambda[j, k] - \hat{\lambda}[j, k])}{n_{it,j}} \right) \\ &\quad + \sum_{\ell \neq j} \partial \left(\frac{f'_\ell(\theta_{it,\ell})}{f_\ell(\theta_{it,\ell})} \right) / \partial n_{it,k} \left(w_{it}(j, \ell) \times (\lambda[j, \ell] - \hat{\lambda}[j, \ell]) \right); \end{aligned}$$

But since this is an overidentified system of equations these conditions can only be true if $\Lambda = \hat{\Lambda}$.

terms in (18). Therefore, Λ is identified.

Lastly, equation (14) can be used to identify nonparametrically the family of distributions $f_j(\cdot)$, one for every j . This completes the proof. ■

B Details of Data Sources

The QOF consists of a set of achievement measures (known as indicators) that cover various aspects of patient care. Practices score points based on their level of achievement in each indicator. Points are then converted into payments according to a predetermined formula that also considers practice size and disease prevalence relative to national average values. The NHS determines the total number of points in the QOF and their allocation, as well as the monetary value of each point, on an annual basis.⁹

We obtained public QOF data for the entire period of analysis (2009-2019) from [NHS Digital](#) and from the [UK Government Asset Portal](#). We collect data on indicators and their assigned points, disease prevalence, practice achievement, and the monetary value of QOF points. These data allow us to construct the terms that enter equation (5) in Section 3.

For each practice i , year t , and indicator j , we observe the share of successes ($y_{it,j}$), and can calculate the “floor” ($\underline{Y}_{t,j}$) and the “ceiling” ($\bar{Y}_{t,j}$). Finally, we calculate the monetary amount received per-relevant-patient for every percentage point increase in the share of successes up until the ceiling as:

$$\alpha_{t,j} = \frac{M_{t,j} \times V_t \times \text{CPI}_t}{(\bar{Y}_{t,j} - \underline{Y}_{t,j}) \times \mathbb{E}[T_t] \times \mathbb{E}\left[\frac{n_{t,g(j)}}{T_t}\right]}.$$

In this expression, $M_{t,j}$ represents the maximum QOF points practices can earn for indicator j , V_t is the monetary value of a QOF point, CPI _{t} is the consumer price index,¹⁰ $\mathbb{E}[T_t]$ represents the average number of patients at each practice and $\mathbb{E}\left[\frac{n_{t,g(j)}}{T_t}\right]$ represents the

⁹See also <https://digital.nhs.uk/data-and-information/publications/statistical/quality-and-outcomes-framework-achievement-prevalence-and-exceptions-data/2022-23/technical-annex>, accessed March 28, 2024.

¹⁰We download annual inflation rates computed by the Office for National Statistics from [Statista](#).


average share of patients in the indicator group to which indicator j belongs. We complement these data with the costs and benefits (measured in Quality-Adjusted Life Year, QALY) associated with 20 QOF indicators, obtained from the [National Institute for Health and Care Excellence](#) and from [Department of Health](#) reports. We convert QALYs to GBP using the societal value of a QALY used by the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence, which is £25,000.

Besides QOF data, we gather additional information on GP practices in England. First, we obtain practice-level data on the number of GPs, their average age, and their qualification. Second, we obtain yearly data (for 2015-2019) on the number of patients within each Lower Layer Super Output Areas (LSOA) registered with each GP practice.¹¹ We obtained both sets of data from NHS Digital. Finally, we collect data on the locations of GP practices and LSOAs from NHS Digital and the [Office for National Statistics](#), respectively.

¹¹An LSOA is a geographic area used for statistical reporting in England and Wales. There are approximately 35,000 LSOAs in England, each containing an average of around 1,500 residents or 650 households.


C Additional Tables and Figures

Figure C.1: QOF indicator timelines




Notes: Timelines for which each of the indicators is included in the QOF. Indicators are colored according to the indicator group to which they belong.

Figure C.2: Identifying variation in payment schedule and number of patients




Notes: scatterplots for a subsample of 5% of the data for indicators 20 and 26. Indicator 20 rewards practices for maintaining blood pressure below a relevant threshold in diabetic patients, while indicator 26 rewards practices for treating patients with heart failure with heart-protective medications (ACE inhibitors or Angiotensin Receptor Blockers).

Figure C.3: Demand for practices



((a)) Binned scatterplot of choice share and distance from practice



((b)) Binned scatterplot of share of successes and estimated $\hat{\xi}$

Figure C.4: Gradient at data




Figure C.5: Goodness of fit




Figure C.6: Estimates of off-diagonal elements of Λ

1	In those patients with Atrial Fibrillation in whom re is a record of a CHADS2 score of 1 (latest in preceding 15 months), % of patients who are ly treated with anti-coagulation drug rappy or an anti-platelet rappy.
2	3.03 In those patients with Atrial Fibrillation whose latest record of a CHADS2 score is greater than 1, % of patients who are ly treated with anti-coagulation drug rappy
3	0.21 0.00 % of patients with hypertension in whom last blood pressure (measured in previous 9 months) is 150/90 or less.
4	1.36 0.10 1.52 % of patients with coronary heart disease who are ly treated with a beta blocker (unless a contraindication or side -effects are recorded).
5	-0.17 0.51 -7.48 -0.10 % of patients with coronary heart disease in whom last blood pressure reading (measured in previous 15 months) is 150/90 or less.
6	-1.94 0.21 -4.14 -6.43 -7.47 % of patients with coronary heart disease whose last measured total cholesterol (measured in previous 15 months) is 5mmol/l or less.
7	0.86 0.53 -0.78 -5.70 -15.66 -4.26 % of patients with coronary heart disease with a record in preceding 12 months that aspirin, an alternative anti-platelet rappy, or an anti-coagulant is being taken
8	0.45 0.87 -0.19 0.10 -0.43 0.26 -0.92 % of patients with a history of myocardial infarction (from 1 April 2011) ly treated with an ACE inhibitor (or ARB if ACE intolerant), aspirin or an alternative anti-platelet rappy, beta-blocker and statin
9	-0.65 -1.87 -0.53 -2.55 -16.11 5.89 -18.72 1.21 % of patients with coronary heart disease who have had influenza immunisation in preceding 1 September to 31 March
10	-1.86 0.63 1.85 -2.49 -1.75 -3.31 0.92 0.12 -1.17 % of patients on CKD register in whom last blood pressure reading, measured in previous 15 months, is 140/85 or less.
11	0.18 -0.18 -0.21 0.88 -0.71 1.30 -0.98 -0.02 1.08 0.00 % of patients on CKD register with hypertension and proteinuria who are treat ed with an angiotensin converting enzyme inhibitor (ACE-I) or angiotensin receptor blocker (ARB) (unless a contraindication or side effects are recorded).
12	-0.78 -0.14 0.54 -1.29 -1.74 1.00 0.86 0.06 -0.33 -0.20 0.30 % of patients with COPD who have had influenza immunisation in preceding 1 September to 31 March.
13	0.29 0.35 0.36 -0.83 -1.12 2.69 0.77 0.05 -2.62 0.41 In those patients with a new diagnosis of hypertension aged 30 or over and who have not attained age of 75, recorded between preceding 1 April to 31 March, who have a recorded CVD risk assessment score of ~20% in preceding 12 months: % who are ly treated with statins
14	-0.24 0.72 0.78 -1.66 -0.12 0.39 0.52 0.04 -0.10 0.17 -0.54 % of patients aged 18 or over with a new diagnosis of depression in preceding 1 April to 31 March, who have been reviewed not earlier than 10 days after and not later than 56 days after date of diagnosis
15	1.74 -0.96 1.01 0.08 -1.49 0.55 0.48 2.22 1.41 0.85 3.70 % of patients with diabetes in whom last HbA1c is 10 or less (or equivalent test/reference range depending on local laboratory) in previous 15 months.
16	1.23 -4.58 0.29 0.87 -0.42 0.62 0.43 0.82 -1.00 1.33 1.12 1.26 -0.50 % of patients with diabetes, on register, in whom last IFFC-HbA1c is 64 mmol/mol or less in preceding 12 months
17	0.87 1.07 -3.71 0.73 0.35 0.03 -0.36 0.02 1.36 1.40 -0.07 2.26 1.65 -0.10 % of patients with diabetes in whom last HbA1c is 9 or less (or equivalent test/reference range depending on local laboratory) in previous 15 months.
18	0.36 -0.91 -0.37 -3.06 1.47 0.25 -0.44 5.09 -2.75 -0.14 0.31 0.86 0.71 -2.11 % of patients with diabetes in whom last blood pressure is 145/85 or less.
19	-0.04 0.30 -0.15 -0.63 2.76 2.93 2.43 0.42 11.40 0.76 -0.69 -1.90 -0.27 -2.65 -0.19 -2.88 -0.49 % of patients with diabetes who have had influenza immunisation in preceding 1 September to 31 March.
20	-0.43 0.39 -0.59 -2.03 -1.07 1.31 1.32 0.40 2.93 0.12 -0.01 1.03 1.04 -0.03 1.99 -1.16 -0.06 % of patients with diabetes in whom last blood pressure is 150/90 or less.
21	0.63 -0.54 -2.53 0.45 -3.25 3.06 -2.19 -0.22 1.74 -3.82 0.12 0.01 -1.25 -0.06 1.05 0.31 -0.91 0.10 % of patients with diabetes, on register, in whom last blood pressure reading (measured in preceding 12 months) is 140/80 mmHg or less
22	-1.09 -0.98 -0.35 -0.70 1.28 -4.55 -1.70 0.27 3.69 0.19 -0.01 0.61 -0.07 0.36 7.33 -2.98 -5.63 -7.57 -0.26 -1.60 -5.01 % of patients with diabetes whose last measured total cholesterol within preceding 15 months is 5mmol/l or less
23	0.13 -0.19 0.13 0.46 -0.30 -0.25 0.17 0.15 0.06 -0.59 0.06 0.16 -0.17 0.44 0.09 0.35 0.02 0.42 0.16 -0.13 0.02 % of patients with diabetes, on register, with a diagnosis of nephropathy (clinical proteinuria) or micro-albuminuria who are ly treated with an ACE-I (or ARBs)
24	2.18 -1.26 -0.91 1.05 -0.91 0.12 -2.28 0.36 0.34 -1.06 -0.51 -2.10 0.81 0.81 -10.27 -17.03 8.18 3.29 -1.09 -6.27 -1.58 -7.50 -0.06 % of patients with diabetes in whom last HbA1c is 7 or less (or equivalent test/reference range depending on local laboratory) in previous 15 months.
25	-4.84 0.30 -0.30 1.83 -0.29 -0.57 0.17 -0.26 -3.81 -0.88 -1.87 -0.80 0.53 0.53 -0.85 1.15 1.90 -1.00 2.73 -1.64 0.52 0.50 -0.86 % of patients age 18 and over on drug treatment for epilepsy who have been seizure free for last 12 months recorded in previous 15 months.
26	-1.44 -0.37 -0.57 1.52 0.63 -3.36 -1.99 0.34 0.26 0.08 0.01 -0.50 0.27 0.14 0.24 -0.51 2.15 -0.61 0.85 -0.89 0.11 -0.31 -0.66 1.57 0.61 -0.61 % of patients with a diagnosis of heart failure due to Left Ventricular Dysfunction (LVD) who are ly treated with an ACE inhibitor or Angiotensin Receptor Blocker (ARB), who can tolerate rappy with no contra -indication.
27	-1.11 -1.44 0.02 -0.86 -0.06 0.14 0.68 -0.29 0.80 0.12 -1.72 -0.76 -0.81 -0.38 0.02 0.36 0.45 -0.49 0.24 -0.46 -0.95 0.31 1.07 1.45 -12.40 % of patients with heart failure due to LVD who are ly treated with an ACE inhibitor or Angiotensin Receptor Blocker, who are additionally treated with a beta -blocker licensed for heart failure, or recorded as intolerant
28	-0.37 -0.39 -0.55 0.06 -2.21 -0.21 -2.38 -1.50 -0.06 0.46 -0.20 -0.24 -4.56 -2.96 0.48 -1.77 -3.19 -1.99 0.18 -7.21 0.74 0.71 -0.63 % of patients with hypertension in whom last blood pressure reading (measured in preceding 9 months) is 150/90 mmHg or less
29	0.97 0.04 0.37 -4.89 1.72 0.05 2.37 2.54 0.14 1.55 0.03 0.08 1.15 0.57 0.73 -1.76 -0.67 2.87 0.01 0.69 -2.17 1.05 0.14 -3.79 % of patients aged 79 or under with hypertension in whom last blood pressure reading (measured in preceding 9 months) is 150/90 mmHg or less
30	-0.27 0.08 0.18 0.74 -0.02 -0.32 0.85 0.95 -0.73 0.20 1.71 0.17 0.00 -0.35 0.59 -0.39 -0.22 0.24 0.01 0.10 -0.09 0.08 0.03 0.76 -1.05 -1.41 -0.02 -0.21 0.26 % of patients on lithium rappy with a record of lithium levels in therapeutic range within previous 6 months.
31	-0.46 -1.43 -0.20 0.52 0.83 0.70 0.80 0.92 0.02 -0.25 -1.43 -0.92 1.08 -0.30 -0.54 -1.66 0.55 1.00 0.05 -0.42 0.70 0.71 1.84 0.49 % of women with schizophrenia, bipolar affective disorder and/or psychoses whose notes record that a cervical screening test has been preformed in preceding 5 years.
32	1.28 0.73 -0.38 -1.61 -0.19 1.21 0.31 0.55 0.05 -0.24 2.67 -0.66 0.58 0.14 0.59 -0.49 0.13 0.40 0.22 -0.49 -0.60 -0.09 1.70 0.11 -1.15 -0.14 -0.67 -1.25 -0.14 % of patients aged between 50-74, with a fragility fracture, in whom osteoporosis is confirmed on DXA scan, who are ly treated with an appropriate bone-sparing agent
33	-0.54 -1.14 -0.66 0.51 -0.73 0.38 0.07 1.26 0.30 0.31 -0.58 0.68 0.17 -0.56 1.37 0.64 -0.28 -1.20 0.79 0.87 0.40 -2.27 -0.21 2.46 -0.86 -0.12 -0.22 -0.33 2.84 0.98 % of patients aged 75 or over with a fragility fracture on or after 1 April 2012, who are ly treated with an appropriate bone-sparing agent
34	3.10 -0.16 -0.28 0.22 -0.23 0.81 1.84 0.58 0.14 -0.06 -0.27 0.18 0.08 -0.24 1.48 1.68 0.17 0.19 -1.86 -0.39 0.03 -1.30 -0.41 -4.86 1.09 -0.22 -0.03 0.15 -0.11 -0.06 -1.42 % of patients with peripheral arterial disease in whom last blood pressure reading (measured in preceding 15 months) is 150/90 or less
35	3.48 -0.94 0.41 2.57 -0.29 -4.30 0.66 -0.82 0.53 -1.06 0.56 -1.33 0.02 0.38 0.00 -0.96 0.21 0.42 0.20 -0.01 0.73 -0.38 -0.62 3.24 1.45 2.52 -2.36 -0.46 0.58 3.25 -2.20 -2.62 % of patients with peripheral arterial disease in whom last measured total cholesterol (measured in preceding 15 months) is 5.0mmol/l or less
36	-0.49 -0.10 0.06 -0.97 1.46 1.05 -2.32 0.16 0.96 -0.39 0.30 1.68 0.18 -0.76 0.62 0.99 -0.55 0.68 -0.68 -0.17 -0.09 1.21 0.56 -1.84 -0.90 -0.13 -0.05 0.17 0.18 0.47 -0.14 12.56 -1.34 % of patients with peripheral arterial disease with a record in preceding 15 months that aspirin or an alternative anti-platelet is being taken
37	-1.55 -0.53 -0.29 0.86 -6.41 1.06 2.30 0.58 3.83 -0.29 0.85 0.77 -0.53 -0.85 0.66 0.25 0.64 -1.28 0.52 -0.19 -0.35 0.22 0.14 0.92 1.07 0.78 -0.09 -0.53 0.46 -0.40 -1.27 0.32 -0.41 -0.68 -0.36 0.47 % of patients with a history of TIA or stroke in whom last blood pressure reading (measured in previous 15 months) is 150/90 or less.
38	-1.77 -4.77 0.01 -0.21 1.89 2.40 -3.86 0.41 1.69 -0.07 -0.23 0.95 0.18 -0.91 1.08 1.07 0.38 -0.61 0.47 0.48 -0.87 -0.48 0.19 -1.01 -3.96 2.28 0.61 0.16 0.35 0.28 0.57 0.43 0.42 1.79 1.30 -0.91 -5.10 % of patients with a stroke shown to be non-haemorrhagic, or a history of TIA, who have a record that an anti-platelet agent,
39	-3.15 1.55 0.16 -1.58 1.54 -0.90 1.94 0.75 1.90 3.48 -2.36 -1.98 1.02 5.07 0.63 0.07 0.58 2.77 -0.59 0.66 2.23 2.69 0.05 0.73 2.60 0.81 0.53 3.19 -3.95 -0.29 0.23 0.23 -0.41 3.32 -0.46 -4.32 -1.38 5.84 -4.48 % of patients with TIA or stroke whose last measured total cholesterol (measured in preceding 15 months) is 5 mmol/l or less
40	0.55 -1.13 -0.48 1.65 3.61 1.37 2.77 -0.47 10.68 -0.21 0.57 -0.5 -0.55 -0.50 0.90 0.20 0.63 0.95 -1.80 0.59 0.43 0.71 0.00 -0.29 1.41 1.94 0.50 -0.50 0.43 0.33 0.57 0.26 1.80 -0.58 -0.21 -0.10 -13.61 8.44 -5.30 % of patients with TIA or stroke who have had influenza immunisation in preceding 1 September to 31 March.