The impact of disruptions on the economics of a tokamak power plant

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Abstract

Tokamaks are often considered a leading candidate for near term, cost-effective fusion energy, but these devices are susceptible to sudden loss of confinement events called "disruptions." The threat of disruptions has garnered serious attention in research and development for the next generation of burning plasma experiments, such as ITER, but has received little treatment in economic studies of magnetic fusion energy. In this paper, we present a model for quantifying the effect of disruptions on the cost of electricity produced by a tokamak power plant (TPP). We outline the various ways disruptions increase costs and decrease revenues, introduce metrics to quantify these effects, and add them to a Levelized Cost of Electricity (LCOE) model. Additionally, we identify several rate-limiting repair steps and introduce a classification system of disruption types based on the time to return to operations. We demonstrate how the LCOE model can be used to find the cost of electricity and requirements for disruption handling of a TPP, and we further highlight where future research can have a strong impact in neutralizing the "showstopping" potential of disruptions.

Keywords — tokamak, economics, disruptions

I. INTRODUCTION

The tokamak is widely considered one of the most promising paths to near-term fusion energy, as illustrated by the global cooperation on the ITER project [1], various national efforts (notably STEP [2] in the UK and CFETR [3] in China), and private sector ventures such as Commonwealth Fusion Systems [4] and Tokamak Energy [5]. The tokamak fusion energy pathway is typically described as a near term burning plasma experiment (ex. ITER, SPARC), followed by a prototype fusion pilot plant (ex. DEMO, ARC), that will culminate in a viable tokamak power plant (TPP) using a deuterium and tritium (DT) fuel cycle.

Questions remain whether the next generation of experiments will retire the risk of "disruptions," a potential showstopper for the TPP viability. A "disruption" is a catch-all term for instances when the plasma confinement is catastrophically lost, resulting in a fast dissipation of the plasma's thermal and magnetic energy into the surrounding vessel and structure of the machine. Other magnetic fusion concepts can also experience sudden loss of confinement events like disruptions [6], but the threat is acute for TPPs because of the large current and tremendous thermal energy carried by the plasma in power plant-scale devices (> 15 MA and > 1 GJ for DEMO [7], 7.8 MA and 0.13 GJ for ARC [8]). These events are relatively benign in smaller, low-performance tokamaks with less stored energy[a] and fewer restrictions on wall thickness, but disruptions can occasionally cause significant material degradation in high-performance devices [9].

Disruptions are not rare. A study of discharges from JET (which operates $\approx$40 second long discharges) between 2011-2016 found unintentional disruptions ended 16% of all discharges [9]. For higher performance discharges, the figure was nearly 50%, while for low performance and commonly run scenarios this was about 3% [9]. A more recent study of the 2019-2020 JET campaigns found a disruption rate of 32% for high performance discharges [10]. The disruption rate per shot in ITER for high performance shots will need to be far lower because, in the absence of emergency disruption mitigation actions, a single disruption may cause irreparable, mission-ending damage. [11] The challenge for ITER is exacerbated by the 12-15x longer pulse length compared to JET, which dramatically increases the time over which the control system must succeed. Disruptions are unlikely to be a threat to human life, but without major technological innovations, they could render TPPs too risky for commercial use.

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[a]This is because magnetic energy goes as I_p^2, thermal energy goes as R^3.

There is little prior work studying how the presence of disruptions will affect the viability of commercial fusion power. Fusion pilot plant scoping studies, such as for the ARC [8], ARIES-AT [12], the advanced compact tokamak [13], and DEMO [14] concepts, acknowledge the significance of disruptions and discuss the distance to disruptive limits, but they do not address the effect of disruptions on the economics of the concept.

Over the past several years, some authors have attempted to draw greater attention to the disruption problem for TPPs. Boozer has highlighted the difficulty of anticipating disruptions, steering the plasma to safety, mitigating disruptions in ITER and future TPPs [15], and finding a compromise between disruption-resilience and tritium production goals [16]. Eidietis summarized the state of disruption research, probed the additional disruption handling challenges faced by TPPs, and discussed a few novel proposals for disruption-resilient design [17]. A key emphasis of the Eidietis paper is that research and design for disruption handling must take the same priority as plasma core performance and heat extraction.

Despite concerns about disruptions among physicists, quantitative economic analyses of magnetic fusion energy [18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25] almost universally ignore these phenomena. Parsons shows that data-driven disruption predictors available today are likely accurate enough to reduce costs for future TPPs [26], but does not address how much of a cost reduction is needed for TPPs to be competitive economically. Qualitative analyses of the potential role of fusion energy in decarbonizing or decarbonized energy grids also make no mention of potential impact of disruptions [27, 28]. The only published economic analysis involving disruptions is from Takeda et al., which attempts to simulate the profitability of a single DEMO-like power plant using historical data from a U.S. energy market between 2011 and 2015 [21]. This paper's findings are not broadly applicable because of its unrealistic model for disruptions effects (a random 10 day outage), the specific choice of a DEMO-like TPP, a speculative tokamak plant cost model, and reliance on data from the 2010s to project economic performance of a TPP in the future.

In this paper, we present a quantitative model for the cost of electricity from a TPP as a function of disruption rate and other disruption related-parameters. Section II describes the general characteristics of the disruption handling problem in a TPP. In section III, we adapt the widely-utilized levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) model to explicitly include disruptions. In the process of deriving relevant metrics, we present a categorization system for disruptions based on

the rate-limiting recovery steps and time scales to return to operation for a TPP operating with DT fuel and superconducting toroidal field (TF) magnets. Section V illustrates how this model can be used to identify disruption handling requirements for a hypothetical TPP and identifies areas where research today could have the most impact in addressing the disruption problem.[b] Finally, section VI summarizes the findings and underlines the need for further research related to disruption handling going forward.

II. DISRUPTION HANDLING IN A TOKAMAK POWER PLANT

As stated earlier, disruptions are a generic term for the sudden, rapid loss of confinement in a tokamak. A variety of mechanisms can cause disruptions including MHD instabilities, human error, and pieces of the first wall falling into the plasma. These various contributing factors can interact with one another in nonlinear ways, eventually resulting in a macroscopic instability that destroys the nested magnetic surfaces that confine the plasma. Modern, high-performance, elongated plasmas require both passive and active stabilization. Generally speaking, disruption handling will be significantly more challenging for TPPs compared to today's tokamaks.

Disruption handling can be decomposed into four pillars: avoidance, mitigation, resilience, and recovery (AMRR). Disruption *avoidance* will be a much different problem than that experienced in current tokamaks because TPPs will operate in just a single, well-understood state (or small set of states) with a significantly more challenging control environment (ex. strong plasma self-organization, fewer diagnostics). Moving from today's avoidance challenge to those faced by a TPP is not a difference in degree but a difference in kind, providing reasons for optimism and pessimism.

If a disruption cannot be avoided, three events happen in succession: the thermal quench (TQ), current quench (CQ), and runaway electron (RE) phase, as shown in Fig. 1.

The stochasticization of the magnetic field lines during disruptions causes rapid ($\approx$0.1-10ms) transport of heat from the plasma to the wall [29]. Plasma facing components (PFCs) can experience an extreme heat flux (up to $\approx$1 GW/m^2 [30]) that erodes solid tiles in the divertor and launches debris in the chamber. The dynamics of the thermal quench are not well understood,

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[b]Code for reproducing this analysis can be found at https://github.com/andrew-maris/disruptions-tokamak-economics

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Fig. 1. The three phases of a typical disruption in a high performance tokamak shown in terms of the thermal energy (purple), total plasma current (black), ohmic/thermal plasma current (blue, shaded) and runaway electron current (red, shaded) (courtesy of [17]). The vertical axis is shared by both current and thermal energy.

but this phenomena will likely remain a major threat for TPPs because of the large thermal energy density of the plasma ($\approx$MJ/m^2) and short thermal quench ($\approx$ms) expected on these devices [8, 31].

After the TQ, the remaining "cold" ($\approx$ eV) plasma has a much greater resistance (plasma resistivity goes as $T^{-3/2}$). The current drive sources cannot maintain the current in this vastly higher resistance regime, resulting in a sharp decay of plasma current, referred to as the CQ. Ideally, the current is dissipated as thermal energy via ohmic heating that is slowly radiated, convected, or conducted out of the plasma. The timing of the CQ is critical however; a CQ that proceeds too fast or too slow results in $\mathbf{j} \times \mathbf{B}$ forces in the PFCs and vacuum vessel (VV) via eddy currents or halo currents [32], respectively. These forces (potentially up to MN on ITER [33]) are capable of causing enormous stress far beyond standard operating conditions.

In some cases, the toroidal current does not completely dissipate and instead concentrates in a high-energy beam of electrons traveling at relativistic speeds. REs can cause minor damage to PFCs in today's high performance devices, but are considered by some to be the greatest threat to next-generation tokamaks because of their potential to damage the device (melt PFCs, puncture cooling systems, and damage the critical magnetic coils) coupled with the lack of experimentally proven solutions to the problem [17].

One can attempt to *mitigate* the damage of disruptions by preemptively launching a large amount of cold matter into the plasma to rapidly cool the discharge via dilution or radiation. Unfortunately, the disruption mitigation strategy for ITER is still under development [34] because it has been found to be difficult to simultaneously address to address the consequences of the TQ, CQ, and RE phase.

Ideally, a TPP would be designed to be completely *resilient* to disruptions, but it is unknown if this is possible. Although total stored energy in TPPs is not very large, the timescales of the TQ, CQ, and RE beam impact are extremely quick. More work is needed to demonstrate that TPP concepts in the literature provide the required structural integrity, heat transfer characteristics, and tritium breeding ratio (TBR) in a cost-effective way. This challenge is exacerbated by imprecision in current models of disruption consequences, especially for TQ heat flux.

Finally, disruption *recovery* will not be trivial in a TPP. The superconducting magnets and the nuclear environment inside the VV necessarily add significant complications to any recovery

action. We will show in subsection IV.A.2 that even modest repairs could require weeks.

Now that we have clarified the challenge of disruption on a TPP, we will develop a the model for computing the cost electricity of a TPP the experiences disruptions.

III. ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF DISRUPTIONS ON FUSION ELECTRICITY COST

The levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) is a commonly-used metric for estimating the average revenue per unit of electricity required for a power plant to break even on all investment and operational costs. More precisely, the LCOE is the discounted sum of costs over the power plant's lifetime divided by the discounted sum of electricity sold during that time,

$$\text{LCOE} = \frac{\sum_{t=1}^{n}(I_t + M_t + F_t)(1+r)^{-t}}{\sum_{t=1}^{n} E_t (1+r)^{-t}}, \tag{1}$$

where n is the total plant lifetime in years from the beginning of construction to end of decommissioning, I_t is the investment cost during year t, M_t is the O&M cost, F_t is the fuel cost, r is the discount rate (the annual rate at which future value of money is adjusted relative to present value to account for the time value of money e.g. interest rates, opportunity costs, etc.) and E_t is the annual electrical energy production. The LCOE does not account for taxes, externalities, "imbalance fees" imposed when a power plant fails to complete an electricity production contract, and variations of energy production within a year. Nevertheless, it a provides a helpful estimate of the cost of electricity required for the plant to be economically viable.

Assuming a TPP that experiences low fraction of time lost for disruption recovery ($f_{\text{recover}} \ll 1$), we parameterize the LCOE to account for disruptions as

$$\text{LCOE}_{\text{disrupt}} \approx \frac{\sum_{t=1}^{n}(\boldsymbol{k_{I,t}} I_t + \boldsymbol{k_{M,t}} M_t + F_t)(1+r)^{-t}}{\sum_{t=1}^{n} E_t (1+r)^{-t}(\boldsymbol{f_{\text{con}}})(\boldsymbol{1 - f_{\text{recover}}})(\boldsymbol{1 - P_{\text{damage}}(t, t_0, f_{\text{duty}})})} \tag{2}$$

with capital cost scaling factor $k_{I,t}$, O&M cost scaling factor $k_{M,t}$, fraction of electrical power produced at the more conservative operating point f_{con}, fraction of operating time lost due to disruption recovery actions f_{recover}, proportion of year when plasma is running f_{duty} (duty factor), year that the plant begins operating t_0, and probability that by year t the plant will have been forced into an early shutdown due to disruptions $P_{\text{damage}}(t, t_0, f_{\text{duty}})$. The new terms have been

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emphasized in bold. The only costs not affected by disruptions are the fuel costs, which are likely negligible relative to the capital and O&M costs of a TPP [20].

The disruption-aware LCOE equation (eq. 2) includes a capital cost multiplication factor $k_{I,t} \geq 1$ and an O&M cost multiplication factor $k_{M,t} \geq 1$. We catalogue the ways disruptions can increase both capital and O&M costs in Table I. It is difficult to estimate the range of these multipliers because no TPP design study has seriously factored disruption handling into their concept. This is a key area of uncertainty for the LCOE of TPPs.

Metric	Definition	Factors increasing costs
k_I	Capital cost scaling factor	More resilient structure, PFCs Greater insurance costs Added regulatory burden More capable actuators Complex disruption mitigation system Increased tritium breeding capability Added diagnostic costs Remote inspection and/or repair systems Software complexity
k_M	O&M cost scaling factor	Additional systems to maintain More rigorous inspections Higher labor, material, & equipment costs

TABLE I
The sources of increased capital and O&M costs for a TPP and associated metric in the disruption-aware LCOE model (eq 2).

IV. EFFECT OF REDUCED REVENUES

Disruptions reduce revenues in three primary ways, summarized in Table II. We consider each in turn.

Metric	Definition	Factors reducing revenues
f_{recover}	Fraction time spent on recovery	Less electricity sold during outages
P_{damage}	Probability of early shutdown	Shortened plant life due to disruptions
f_{cons}	Fraction electrical power from conservative plasma	More conservative plasma produces less electricity

TABLE II
Three metrics quantifying the reduction of revenues caused by disruptions, as utilized in the disruption-aware LCOE model (eq. 2).

IV.A.   Reduced electricity production because of outages

IV.A.1.   Modelling the effects of outages

Disruptions will cause outages in energy production. These outages can be smoothed by onsite energy storage, but the total volume of electricity sold per unit time will decrease.[c] The relevant metric for this effect is the fraction of lost operating time due to disruption recovery, f_{recover}.

Utilities will expect a TPP to have relatively little operational time interrupted by a disruption-induced outage. This is consistent with TPP costing models which find that a high duty factor is required for economic viability [20]. For simplicity and tractability, we will neglect a time dependence on the disruption rates in this study.[d] Given $f_{\text{recover}} \ll 1$, we can approximate

$$f_{\text{recover}} \approx p \langle \tau_{\text{recover}} \rangle, \tag{3}$$

where once again p is the probability of disruption per unit time $\langle \tau_{\text{recover}} \rangle$ is the average recovery time. We plot f_{recover} in Fig. 2 as a function of p and $\langle \tau_{\text{recover}} \rangle$. In terms of the LCOE, we account for outages by multiplying the the volume of electricity per year by $1 - f_{\text{recover}}$.

Separate from the LCOE model, we can identify an upper limit on allowable disruption rate given $\langle \tau_{\text{recover}} \rangle$ and a maximum tolerated fraction of operating time spent on disruption recovery, $f_{\text{recover,max}}$ (where $f_{\text{recover}} \leq f_{\text{recover,max}} \ll 1$). This can be useful in exploratory studies where a full LCOE model is unnecessary but $f_{\text{recover,max}}$ can be estimated.

For example, consider an DEMO-like TPP with a 4 month long maintenance time [35] and assume $f_{\text{recover,max}} = 10\%$[e]. Let us further assume 95% of disruptions are correctly predicted and perfectly mitigated, meaning that maintenance is only required after an unmitigated disruption.

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[c]Because fusion power plants have relatively low fuel costs [20], they will almost certainly operate as baseload plants operating at the safe maximum power level at all times. Any outage would therefore decrease the total amount of power sold that year.

[d]Failure rates in most industrial applications typically follow one of four trends over time: flat, increasing, decreasing, or "bathtub-shaped" (i.e. relatively high failure rates early and late in life). For a TPP, machine aging could cause disruption rates to increase over time, but more operator experience could counteract this effect. Until we have empirical evidence from running a TPP, it is unclear what the trend will be in practice.

[e]For reference, the Unplanned Capability Loss Factor of the world's nuclear industry power industry has hovered between 3-6 % over the past 20 years [36]

Fig. 2. The expected fraction of operation time lost to disruption recovery f_{recover} of a TPP based on the approximation of eq. 3.

In this scenario, unscheduled maintenance is only needed on average once per twenty disruptions, averaging out to a recovery time per disruption of $\langle \tau_{\text{recover}} \rangle = 1/5$ months. Applying eqs. 3 leads to a disruption rate limit of $p < 6 \text{ yr}^{-1}$, which for reference is 5 about orders of magnitude lower than disruption rate on JET, $p \approx 5 \cdot 10^5 \text{ yr}^{-1}$. In Fig. 3, we plot the maximum allowable disruption rate for a range of $f_{\text{recover,max}}$ and $\langle \tau_{\text{recover}} \rangle$.

IV.A.2. Classes of disruption responses

Not all disruptions will require the same recovery steps. A list of possible steps needed to restart a TPP after a disruption is shown in Table III, along with approximate timescales based on a conservative extrapolation from today's technology and techniques. These actions are listed in approximate order of occurrence.

Given the order of steps needed to do various repairs, the combinations that can be done in parallel, and the timescales for these steps, we propose a list of disruption response class with separate timescales that are driven by one or two rate-limiting steps in each case. These are shown in Table IV. The timescales are all approximate, but the rate-limiting steps have significant scale separation. We note that the specific disruption recovery class required in each cases depends the robustness of the control system, disruption prediction algorithm, mitigation solution(s), PFCs, and structures.

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Fig. 3. The maximum allowable disruption rate p of a TPP over a range of tolerated fraction of downtime $f_{\mathrm{recover,max}}$ and average disruption recovery time $\langle \tau_{i,\mathrm{recover}} \rangle$ assuming (for simplicity) there is only one disruption class. Note that each color represents a range of disruptions rates spanning an order of magnitude.

Recovery step	Limitation(s)	Approx. timescale
Current drive system reset	Engineering design, pulse length	minutes
PFC cool down	Cooling power	< minutes
Root cause analysis	Complexity of device, human validation	days-weeks
Radiation cool-down	Activation of interior, shielding of remote systems	minutes - years
In-vessel inspection	Engineering design	minutes - hours
Remove impurities, excess gas in VV	Baking time, operating temperature	hours
Charge/recharge TF magnets	Heat exchange capacity, magnetic energy, L/R time, tolerated temperature gradient	hours (insulated magnets) or weeks (noninsulated)
Thermal cycle of cryostat	Tolerated temperature gradient, heat exchange capacity, thermal inertia	weeks
Implement, certify software fix	Software engineering and validation	days - weeks
Ex-VV maintenance	Accessibility of cryostat, activity of device	days - ∞
In-VV maintenance	Engineering design of remote system, PFCs	hours - ∞

TABLE III

Potential steps after a disruption listed along with approximate timescale based on current technology and practice. Not all of these actions are required after a disruption, and some can be done in parallel.

Class	Response	Recovery time (τ_{recover})	Main constraint(s)
A	Immediate restart	Minutes	Current drive system reset
B	Damage assessment, wall conditioning	Hours	Radiation & temperature cool-down, "cleaning" discharges
C	Root cause analysis	Days	Human validation
D	Minor repairs	Weeks	Simple remote repair, charge/recharge magnets
E	Significant repairs	Months	Warm/cool cryostat, remote repair
F	Major repairs	Years	Repair major components
G	Early plant closure	∞	Irreparable damage

TABLE IV

A list of disruption recovery timescales based on current technology and practices. The class of recovery caused by a particular disruption depends on the characteristics of the pre-disruption plasma state, tokamak design , mitigation system design, and disruption dynamics.

Class A: immediate restart

In the best case scenario, the disruption is avoided by a safe shutdown, leaves no lingering damage, and the cause of the disruption is both immediately identifiable and correctable. This is represented in Table IV as a "Class A" disruption response. Under these hypothetical circumstances, the discharge could be restarted in as little time as the current drive system is reset.[f]

Class B: damage assessment and/or wall conditioning

Given the threat disruptions pose to the device's health and the limited diagnostic set, it is unlikely that a TPP operator would be willing to risk a Class A immediate restart. Melting, crack formation, or deformation of the PFCs caused by a disruption could lead to more disruptions in subsequent plasma operation via uncontrolled impurity accumulation and "UFO" disruptions. A TPP could find itself in a vicious cycle where damaged PFCs lead to more frequent disruptions, which further worsens the damage, and so on, until the TPP can no longer sustain a stable plasma.

Therefore, the TPP operator would want a way to inspect the damage after a disruption. This could be done in one of two ways: low energy plasma operation and optical sensing. The first approach entails running low energy and low current discharges in a variety of configurations (limited, diverted with variable strike point) and detecting correlations between location of heat

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[f]Another potential limiting factor in this case would be the time it takes for the PFCs to cool down to a safer operating temperature after the sudden deluge of energy released during the disruption. This, however, is unlikely to cause further delays beyond the current drive reset time given the powerful cooling required for the PFCs during normal operation.

load deposition and variations in impurity levels. The plasma state would be chosen such that a disruption would be benign while still potentially revealing the presence and poloidal location of damaged PFCs. The power and current of the discharges could be carefully stepped up in subsequent discharges as confidence grows in the condition of the PFCs. The downside of this approach is that PFCs damage may only become apparent during high power and current discharges.

Optical inspection techniques could also be used to check PFC condition. Two examples of such systems are the 8 meter long Articulated Inspection Arm deployed on WEST between discharges [37] and the In-Vessel Viewing and Metrology System (IVVS) laser scanning system under development for ITER [38]. The latter is designed to provide measurements of surface erosion down to the 0.1mm scale.

The challenge for the optical inspection systems is the presence of both a high dose rate in the vessel due to activation and the strong toroidal field. Articulated inspection robots with cameras have been demonstrated to tolerate up to a ≈1000 Gy dose and dose rates up to ≈70 Gy/hr [39], but this will likely not be appropriate for a TPP with metal walls, which will likely have dose rates > 1000 Gy/hr in the vessel immediately after shut down and remain above > 100 Gy/hr for a year or longer [40, 41].[g] The IVVS system is a promising model for TPP in-vessel inspection because it is more radiation resistant. Tests of the piezoelectric motor showing no degradation with a dose rate up to 2.5 kGy/h and and total dose of almost 5 MGy [42], suggesting that this could be used post-disruption. The IVVS is also compatible with a strong toroidal field that might prove a challenge for articulated robots, but this device may not be able to detect smaller features such as narrow cracks. For the sake of concreteness, we will assume that an IVVS-like remote inspection system can be designed to deploy and retract on the order of **hours** after the disruption occurs in order to complete a damage assessment.

Another source of potential delay in recovering from a disruption is wall conditioning. After a disruption, impurities can be implanted or adsorbed into the walls. These impurities can leak out when the wall heats up during a subsequent discharge, either degrading the plasma performance or causing another disruption. Wall conditioning for ITER will be accomplished by running specialized cleaning discharges [43]. Non-standard cleaning discharges will be needed for superconducting magnets because traditional baking and glow discharge cleaning techniques are not compatible

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[g]Note that depending on the radiation type and energy, 1 Gy ≈ 1 − 20 Sv.

with energized magnets. [44] This cleaning challenge in TPPs may be mitigated by their high wall temperature. We wrap the inspection and cleaning steps into the "Class B" disruption response in Table IV because both steps should take approximately the same length of time.

Class C: root cause analysis

Post-disruption recovery could also be delayed by the time it takes to complete a root cause analysis (RCA). Given the complexity of the TPP's autonomous plasma controller and limited in-vessel diagnostics, it is unlikely that the the cause of the disruption is immediately identifiable. In the best case scenario, the RCA finds that no fixes are needed until the next maintenance period. We guess that these analyses would take on the order of days to complete and be certified by upper management. This appears as a "Class C" disruption response in Table IV. This delay could shrink to hours given sufficient diagnostic coverage and streamlined procedures, but it could extend to weeks if the validation procedures are cumbersome.

Class D: minor repairs

In-vessel maintenance would be required if damage accumulates and/or if a faulty in-vessel component is causing disruptions. This is included as a "Class D" disruption in Table IV. As with remote inspection, this task is challenging because of the temperature, radiation, ultra-high vacuum, and magnetic field [45]. It may be possible to design robotic systems that could operate in such conditions using actuators such as hydraulics, piezoelectric motors, and cable systems, but such a design would likely force compromises that have not yet been explored in detail. In-vessel components would need to be co-designed with the robot to ensure all components are replaceable given the practical manipulation capabilities.

The current generation of remote maintenance technology, such as those used in JET [46] and those to be deployed for ITER [38], cannot operate while the TF magnets are charged. Magnet discharge time can be relatively quick for insulated TF magnets if a large power supply voltage is utilized. Simulations of ITER TFs finds charging times on the order of 1 hour [47, 48]. Similar timescales are achieved on KSTAR[49]. Noninsulated magnets, by contrast, have far longer charging times due to the radial current path. Power supply voltages above a volt or two drive radial currents that produce large amount of joule heating, potentially leading to a quench. This challenge is significant for TPP-scale noninsulated TF magnets because it is the charging time scales with the linear size to the fourth power [50]. The charge time could be reduced by increasing the

heat exchange capacity of the magnets and cryoplant, reducing the L/R time of the magnets, tuning radial resistance *in situ*, and intentionally quenching the magnets at some significant fraction of the original current.

Class E: significant repairs

The recovery time could potentially stretch to months if the repairs require that the cryostat go through a temperature cycle. The large thermal inertia of tokamaks causes the cycle time of superconducting tokamaks such as KSTAR [51] (and likely ITER as well [52]) to take weeks. The main limiting factor to warm-up and cool-down times for the TF magnets is the stress due to differential thermal expansion. Therefore, one could hasten the thermal cycle times by designing the magnets to tolerate larger thermal gradients, by adding cooling channels, and adding cooling/warming power capacity. Optimizing these factors to minimize thermal cycle time of superconducting magnets will require trade-offs with respect to other magnet and cryoplant goals that have not been fully explored.

The remote maintenance systems deployed on JET [46] and in development for ITER [38] are quite sophisticated, but still lack the capability and speed of a human worker. Remotely replacing the PFCs in JET required a 16 month shutdown with 18 hour shifts running 7 days a week [53]. Replacing all the blanket modules in ITER could take up to two years [38] and six months for DEMO [35]. Part of the challenge for these devices is that all remote systems and components must fit between gaps in the fixed TF cage. The ARC concept [8] attempts to hasten repair times by utilizing both demountable TF coils and a drainable liquid blanket, as shown in Fig. 4, to enable vertical maintenance. These could be impactful innovations, however more research is needed to assess the feasibility of these technologies and explore the tradeoff between flexibility of repairs and robustness to disruption forces. Regardless, a commercial TPP will require faster repair/replace timelines than possible on current devices. Time consumed by the repairs will add to the delays brought on by the cyrostat temperature cycle time.

Class F: major repairs; and Class G: early plant closure

A worrying sign from current operational experience is that major tokamak repairs for even non-superconducting devices can take years. The NSTX-U tokamak's operational history illustrates how tokamaks can suffer years-long operational delays[h] [54, 55]. Devices like NSTX-U are

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[h]This delay was not disruption-related, but it highlights the difficulties in repairing modern tokamaks.

Fig. 4. ARC-class tokamak designs utilize demountable TF coils, a drainable liquid immersion blanket, and a replaceable VV (adapted from [8]). These innovations could speed up repair time-lines by enabling easier access to the interior of the TF cage, however they remain at early stages of technological readiness.

an imperfect point of reference because they are not commercial projects, but the nuclear energy industry offers many examples of how complex, capital-intensive energy projects can be beset by years of delays for repairs or upgrades [56].

The most significant threat to the longevity of the plant are the electromagnetic (EM) forces induced during the CQ, such as asymmetric VDEs rotating at the VV's resonant frequencies [57]. Runaway electron beams and thermal quench heat fluxes will almost certainly be stopped by the plasma facing components and/or blanket modules that are designed to be replaceable. Therefore, class F and G recoveries will only be caused by damage from EM forces.

The impact of disruption classes A-F are included in the disruption-aware LCOE model (eq. 2) through term f_{recover}. Early shutdowns due to class G disruptions are captured by P_{damage}, as will be described in the next section.

IV.B.   Reduced electricity production due to early shutdown

Disruptions could also decrease electricity production by forcing an early plant closure. The irreplaceable components on a TPP (for example, TF magnets) can be thought of as having an "acceptable damage budget." We write the proportion of the damage budget that is consumed per unit time of operation as

$$\tau_{\mathrm{damage}}^{-1} \equiv p\langle d\rangle \tag{4}$$

Fig. 5. The probability P_{damage} that a particular TPP is operating after an operational lifetime of $T = 20$ years for disruption rate p and an average damage per disruption $\langle d \rangle$.

where p is the probability of disruption per time and $\langle d \rangle \in [0, 1]$ is the average damage per disruption as a proportion of the acceptable damage budget. For example, if every disruption is a class G event that renders the device inoperable, then $\langle d \rangle = 1$.[i] We refer to τ_{damage} as the "characteristic damage time."

For a population of N TPPs, the number that are lost due to damage per unit time dt is approximately

$$dN = -N\tau_{\text{damage}}^{-1}dt, \tag{5}$$

from which we recognize that population decays exponentially. The probability that a particular TPP does not complete its target operational lifetime of T is:

$$P_{\text{damage}}(T) = 1 - \exp\left(-\frac{T}{\tau_{\text{damage}}}\right). \tag{6}$$

We see that both $P_{\text{damage}}(T)$ and T/τ_{damage} can be used as figures of merit for this effect. Figure 5 shows P_{damage} after $T = 20$ years of operation for a range of disruption rates p and τ_{damage}.

The effect of accumulated damage enters the LCOE by decreasing the expected electrical

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[i]This may be the case for full current discharges of ITER. A conservative estimate of the ITER disruption budget indicates that a RE beams impact even during a mitigated full power disruption could consume the entire disruption budget [34].

Fig. 6. The maximum allowable disruption rate p of a TPP with an operational lifetime of $T = 20$ years across a range of P_{damage} and $\langle d_i \rangle$ assuming (for simplicity) there is only one disruption class. Note that each color represents a range of disruptions rates spanning an order of magnitude.

energy by a factor of $1 - P_{\text{damage}}$. Because the LCOE model deals with calendar years, the operational lifetime of the plant $T(t) = (t - t_0)f_{\text{duty}}$ where t_0 is the year index that energy production begins and f_{duty} is the fraction of the calendar year during which the TPP is producing fusion energy.

Given the large capital cost of TPPs [20], utilities operating such a device will require that the probability of an early plant closure to be very small. Therefore we can state a design requirement $P_{\text{damage}} < P_{\text{damage,max}} \ll 1$, where $P_{\text{damage,max}}$ is the maximum probability of an early plant closure due the utility is willing to tolerate. This leads to strict requirements for disruption probability and damage per disruption damage. Consider a plant with a power producing lifetime of 20 years, a utility that tolerates $P_{\text{damage,max}} = 0.1$, and assume that $\langle d \rangle = 0.01$. In this case, the maximum allowable disruption rate in this case is $p < 11.5$ yr^{-1}. We plot the maximum allowable disruption rate p for a range of $P_{\text{damage,max}}$ and $\langle d \rangle$ for the case of $T = 20$ yr in Fig. 6.

IV.C. Reduced electricity production due to more conservative operating point

We include the effect of potentially needing to operate at a more conservative plasma state with a scaling factor $f_{\text{cons}} \in [0, 1]$ which represents the fraction of electricity production achieved

in practice compared to the disruption-free operating point. Over time, f_{cons} could approach 1 as operator experience enables higher performance or go to 0 as disruption-induced damage forces more conservative operational choices.

V. DISCUSSION

V.A. Case study: the LCOE of an example TPP

We demonstrate how the LCOE model (eq. 2) can be utilized in practice for an example TPP where we set out with a goal of achieving LCOE <100 $MWh given these disruption handling constraints. The baseline characteristics of the example without disruptions are shown in Table V. We assume constant capital cost during the construction phase and constant O&M and fuel costs. In Figs. 7, 8, and 9, we explore the LCOE as a function of two parameters at a time while keeping the rest at the "non-disruptive" baseline value. We see in Fig. 7 that the designers can afford to increase the capital cost scaling factor k_I significantly more than the O&M cost scaling factor k_M. In Fig. 8, we find that the plant can achieve the LCOE coast target with $f_{\text{recover}} \approx 20\%$ lost operating time due to disruption recovery if there is no change to the output electrical power ($f_{\text{cons}} = 100\%$). But reducing the electricity output to $f_{\text{cons}} = 0.8$ to reduces the maximum f_{recover} within the $100/MWh goal to $\approx 5\%$. Therefore, we see that reducing power even modestly may put significant pressure on other disruption-related parameters. Figure 9 shows that LCOE varies strongly with the characteristic damage time τ_{damage}, requiring the operational lifetime extended to about 35 years to stay below the $100/MWh target if $\tau_{\text{damage}} = 60$ years.

The effects of the disruption-related parameters on the cost of fusion electricity compound, leading to a very narrow space within which we can reach our <$100/MWh. For example, one such design has the parameters $k_I = 1.5$, $k_M = 1.25$, $f_{\text{recover}} = 0.03$, $f_{\text{cons}} = 0.99$, $\tau_{\text{damage}} = 200$ yr, and $n_{\text{lifetime}} = 50$ yr. In this scenario, a disruption rate of one-per-day entails (by eqs. 3 and 4) $\tau_{\text{recover}} = 43$ min and $\langle d \rangle = 1.4 \cdot 10^{-5}$. These are incredibly extreme requirements.

V.B. General comments on TPP design

The analysis of the LCOE of a hypothetical TPP in the previous section illustrates the significant challenges disruptions pose to the economics of a tokamak power plant. Research and innovations are urgently needed in order to ease disruption handling on a tokamak power plant.

Characteristic of TPP	Variable	Baseline Value (No Disruptions)
Electrical power	P_{electric}	500 MW
Construction time	$n_{\text{construct}}$	5 years
Target lifetime of plant	n_{lifetime}	20 years
Duty factor	f_{duty}	80%
Total capital cost	I_{total}	$2 \cdot 10^9$ \$USD
Annual O&M cost	M_t	$1 \cdot 10^8$ \$USD
Annual fuel cost	F_t	$1 \cdot 10^7$ \$USD
Real interest rate	r	7%
Capital cost scaling factor	k_I	1
O&M cost scaling factor	k_M	1
Fraction time spent on recovery	f_{recover}	0
Fraction electrical power from conservative plasma	f_{cons}	1
Probability of early shutdown	P_{damage}	0
Levelized cost of electricity	LCOE	76 \$USD/MWh

TABLE V
Baseline characteristics of the TPP used to show the disruption-aware LCOE (2) in Figs. 7, 8, and 9.


Fig. 7. The LCOE of an TPP (Table V) for various values of O&M cost scaling factor k_M and capital cost scaling factor k_I. The baseline case (no disruptions) is shown in red.

21

Fig. 8. The dependence of the LCOE of an TPP (Table V) on the fraction of operating time lost to disruption recovery f_{recover} and the fraction of target electrical power produced in order to keep sufficient margin to disruptive instabilities f_{cons}. The baseline case (no disruptions) is below the horizontal axis at $f_{\mathrm{recover}} = 0$.


Fig. 9. The LCOE of an TPP (Table V) as a function of the characteristic damage time τ_{damage} and target lifetime of plant n_{lifetime}, where $\tau_{\mathrm{damage}}^{-1} \equiv p\langle d \rangle$ (eq. 4). The baseline case (no disruptions) is above the vertical axis at $\tau_{\mathrm{damage}} = \infty$.

In Table VI, we show a list (by no means complete) of potentially impactful research and/or engineering developments along with the directly relevant figure of merits. These developments could improve the viability of a wide range of a TPP designs.

Potentially high impact developments	k_I	k_M	$f_{recover}$	f_{cons}	P_{damage}
Improved mitigation solutions	■				■
Demountable TF magnets		■			■
Replaceable VV		■			■
Disruption-resilient, low-activation PFCs		■			
Quickly replaceable PFCs		■			
Liquid immersion blanket		■			
Liquid sandwich VV [58]		■			■
Electromagnetic pellet injector [59]		■			
RE mitigation coil [60, 61]		■			
Stable TPP-relevant plasma scenarios			■	■	
Improved disruption modeling			■	■	
Advanced plasma control algorithms			■	■	
Robust disruption predictors [62, 63, 64]			■		■
Remote optical inspection device			■		
Faster magnet charge/recharge			■		
Quicker cryostat temperature cycle			■		

TABLE VI
A list of potentially high-impact physics, technology, and engineering developments with the directly relevant figures of merit indicated with green shading. Given the multi-dimensional optimization required for a TPP, developments relevant to one metric can still be used in a trade-off to improve other metrics (ex. a better mitigation solution could make operators more confident operating closer to instability boundaries, reducing f_{cons}).

Given the integrated nature of the disruption handling problem and the remaining uncertainties, it is impossible to definitively say whether say whether high-field or low-field concepts are more robust to disruption handling-related costs. High-field TPP design points tend to be at low plasma current and offer larger distance to 0D disruptive limits (density, pressure, current, elongation) compared to low-field TPPs, but the more compact size results in higher current and energy density. The optimal tradeoff between these considerations is unclear at this time.

VI.   CONCLUSION

Avoiding disruptions in a TPP has been compared to driving a car on an icy, foggy road [15]; the control system's ability to observe and react to potential catastrophes is severely limited. Perhaps a better analogy is flying a fighter jet through a tunnel. The operator must rely on a

technology suite significantly restricted by other mission-critical constraints to avoid crashes. The safest way to abort the mission would be to slow down, but this could take too long if an obstacle is fast approaching. Repairs after even after a crash landing could stretch to months or longer because the complexity and inaccessibility of the machine.

In this paper, we provide a quantitative estimate of the impact of disruptions on the economics of TPPs. We derive a model for the levelized cost of electricity (eq. 2) that illustrates how the cost of fusion power scales with several disruption-related parameters. We identify several key figures of merit: k_I, k_M, f_{recover}, f_{cons}, and P_{damage}. Although we focus on the tokamak, where the disruption problem is severe and has been well-studied, this LCOE model can in principle be applied to any magnetic confinement concept that experiences disruptions, such as stellarators.

In addition to the LCOE model, we derived two important design constraints: low fraction of operating time lost to disruption recovery ($f_{\mathrm{recover}} \ll 1$) and low probability of early closure ($P_{\mathrm{damage}} \ll 1$). These can be used in lieu of the more sophisticated LCOE model to estimate the space of maximum allowable disruption rate, recovery time, and damage per disruption. Fusion pilot plant design review process, as called for by a recent National Academies report [65], should consider including these constraints as evaluation criteria for magnetic confinement fusion devices.

We also introduced a classification for disruption recoveries in DT superconducting tokamaks terms of their recovery timescale - ranging from an immediate restart to catastrophic failure - based on the technology and general practices of today. This illustrates the severe constraints facing disruption recovery actions.

We applied the LCOE model to a hypothetical TPP and found that the requirements for achieving <100 $/MWh LCOE are extreme compared to today's technology. Finally, we identified several areas where further research and development can ameliorate costs associated with disruption handling.

The threat of disruptions does not preclude the tokamak as a fusion power plant at this stage, but the related challenges must be addressed urgently. Disruption handling must be considered among the core priorities of tokamak fusion research programs today alongside core-edge integration, divertor heat exhaust, and tritium breeding. Many complex industrial products operate routinely with extremely low failure rates such as commercial airliners, nuclear power plants, and satellites. If we adjust tokamak fusion research today to more forcefully address the disrup-

tion problem for TPPs, we can potentially head off a showstopper for the tokamak fusion energy pathway.

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