# An Investigation into Physical and Communications Trust Frameworks for Collaborative Teams of Autonomous Underwater Vehicles

### Andrew Bolster

University of Liverpool andrew.bolster@liv.ac.uk



- 1 Issues
- 2 Aims

- Approach
- 4 Impact

### Context

- Increasing use of Autonomy in Underwater Acoustic Networks
- Extremely constrained communications/processing/power
- Drive towards smaller, disposable, decentralised systems of systems for applications in MHPC in defence, petrochemical, and environmental applications



Fig. 1: REMUS 100 AUV at CMRE: Potential target application

Adoption of open interoperability stds. and "CoTS" procurement pipelines

Novel and unique threats to trust and security

Issues Aims Approach Impact References

# Open Questions

- Centralised security difficult/expensive to maintain
- Presents single-point-of-failure for operational support
- Move from Centralised to Distributed trust management already demonstrated in Terrestrial MANETs
- Constrained comms. make comms. only monitoring non-optimal



Fig. 2: Autonomy is driving increasingly towards distributed applications

Can these MANET techniques be applied to the marine context?
What metrics can be used to establish and maintain distributed trust?

# Trust Management in Marine Networks

- Comms. only Trust Management Frameworks (TMFs) in MANETs
- Generally Bayesian Estimation of binary success/fail observation
- Not stable in sparse, variable, & noisy environments
- Can (generally) only detect misbehaviour, not classify
- Only detects packet-dropping misbehaviours
- Recent work uses multiple, continuous, measurements (e.g. SNR, Delay, Throughput, PLR) utilising Grey Theory[1] to form a trust "vector"
- Provides multi-dimensional classification of misbehaviour

# Novelty

- Assess existing approaches in simulated UAN, characterising their bounds of suitability/performance
- Extend multi-metric approach to encompass physical behaviours as well as comms.
- Treat threat surface as a multi-dimensional constraint space, aiming to restrict and protect operations




Fig. 3: The available threat surface can be protected through extending trust observations across multiple types of observation

## Current Results

- Demonstration of PoC TMF utilising Behavioural Metrics
- Protocol for identification/assessment of metric suitability across several misbehaviour types
- Performance assessment of Hermes, OTMF, and MTFM in simulated marine environment
- Information theoretic assessment of multi-domain combination strategies




Fig. 4: Factor Analysis of Malicious, Selfish and Fair behaviours


# Current Outputs

- Summer Research Placement with DSTL (Software Systems and Dependability for Autonomous Teams/Naval Systems Group)(2013, PDW)
- Paper Presentation to the Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI) (Stanford, USA) [2]
- Technical Report for the UK/US/CAN/AUS/NZ Technical Cooperation Programme [3]
- DSTL CDE Collaboration with NPL and Plextek Ltd. on "Precision Timing and Navigation, Resilient Time and Location Estimation for Networked Assets" (CDE 33135)
- Paper Presentation to the IEEE International Symposium on Recent Advances of Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing and Communications (TrustComm, Helsinki, FI) [4]

# Future Impacts

- Advisory factor to FF2020 on application & verifiability of in-field autonomy
- Deployment of smaller/cheaper collective assets, through lowering comms overheads
- Increase viability / confidence for "stand-off" MCM
- Increased reliability of autonomous/mixed SoS through continual self-policing
- Applications beyond marine; applicable to any constrained / DTN as well as to virtual/cyber-physical systems (i.e. the application of these methods to abstract metric domains)

## References I



Andrew Bolster and Alan Marshall. "A Multi-Vector Trust Framework for Autonomous Systems". In: 2014 AAAI Spring Symp. Ser. Stanford, CA, 2014, pp. 17–19. URL: http://www.aaai.org/ocs/index.php/SSS/SSS14/paper/viewFile/7697/7724.

### References II





The End