Single and Multi-Metric Trust Management Frameworks for use in Underwater Autonomous Networks

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Abstract—**In this paper, we demonstrate the need for multi-metric trust assessment in Underwater Autonomous Networks (UAN).**

Many UANs use MANET architectures, however the marine environment presents new challenges for TMFs that have been developed for use in conventional (i.e. Terrestrial RF) MANETs. We investigate the operation of a selection of traditional MANET TMFs in this environment. We characterise these challenges and present results that demonstrate that a multi-metric approach to Trust greatly enhances the usefulness of Trust in these environments.

I. INTRODUCTION

As mobile ad-hoc networks (MANETs) grow beyond the terrestrial arena, their operation and the protocols designed around them must be reviewed to assess their suitability to different communications environments to ensure their continued security, reliability, and performance.

One area of application is the underwater marine environment, where extreme challenges to communication present themselves (propogation delays, frequency dependent attenuation, fast and slow fading, refractive multi-path distortion, etc.). In addition to the commuications challenges, other considerations such as command and control isolation, power and locomotive limitations, contribute to drive towards the use of teams of smaller and cheaper autonomous underwater vehicles (AUVs). These increasingly decentralised applications present unique threats against trust management[1]. As such, the use of trust methods developed in the terrestrial MANET space must be re-appraised for application within the challenging underwater context.

Trust Management Frameworks (TMFs) provide information to assist the estimation of future states and actions of nodes within networks. This information is used to optimize the performance of a network against malicious, selfish, or defective misbehaviour by one or more nodes. Previous research has established the advantages of implementing TMFs in 802.11 based MANETs, particularly in terms of preventing selfish operation in collaborative systems [2], and maintaining throughput in the presence of malicious actors [3]

Most current TMFs use a single type of observed action to derive trust values, typically successfully delivered or forwarded packets. These observations then inform future decisions of individual nodes, for example, route selection [4].

Recent work has demonstrated use of a number of metrics to form a "vector" of trust. The Multi-parameter Trust Framework for MANETs (MTFM)[5], uses a range of physical metrics beyond packet delivery/loss rate (PLR) to form a vector of trust. This vectorized trust allows a system to detect and identify the tactics being used to undermine or subvert trust. To date this work has been limited to terrestrial, RF based networks.

The paper is laid out as follows. In Section II we discuss Trust and TMFs, defining our terminology and reviewing the justifications for the use and development of TMFs for marine acoustic networks (MANs) In Section III we review selected features of the underwater communications channel, highlighting particular challenges against terrestrial equivalents. In Section IV we establish an experimental configuration for the marine space, and review the scenarios and results presented in [5]. In Section V we present our findings in trust establishment and malicious behaviour detection, comparing with other current TMFs (Hermes and OTMF) and analyse the use of this multi-parameter approach to detecting malicious and selfish behaviour in autonomous marine networks.

The contributions of this paper are a study on the comparative operation and performance of TMFs in marine acoustic networks, and a review of metric suitability for TMFs in marine environments, informing future metric selection for experimenters and theorists. We also show that single metric trust systems are not directly suitable for the marine context in terms of the different threat and cost scenario in that environment.

II. TRUST AND TRUST MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORKS

A. Trust in Conventional MANETs

The distributed and dynamic nature of MANETs mean that it is difficult to maintain a trusted third party (TTP) or

evidence based trust system such as Certificate Authorities (CA) or Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). Distributed trust management frameworks aim to detect, identify, and mitigate the impacts of malicious actors by distributing per-node assessments and opinions to collectively police behaviour. Various models and algorithms for describing trust and developing trust management in distributed systems, P2P communities or wireless networks have been considered. *Hermes Trust Establishment Framework* takes a Bayesian Beta function to model per-link Packet Loss Rate (PLR) over time, combining "Trust" and "Confidence of Assessment" into a single value [6]. *Objective Trust Management Framework* (OTMF) builds upon Hermes and distributes node observations across the network [4], however does not appropriately combat multi-node-collusion in the network [7]. *Trust-based Secure Routing* demonstrated an extension to Dynamic Source Routing (DSR), incorporating a Hidden Markov Model of next-hop network, reducing the efficacy of Byzantine attacks such as black-hole routing [8]. *CONFIDANT* presented an approach using a probabilistic estimation of PLR, similar to OTMF, also introducing a topology aware weighting scheme and also weighting trust assessments based on historical experience of the reporter [3]. *Fuzzy Trust-Based Filtering* uses Fuzzy Inference to adapt to malicious recommenders using conditional similarity to classify performance with overlapping Fuzzy Set Membership, filtering assessments across a network [9].

These TMFs can be generalised as single-value probabilistic or fuzzy estimation, based around using a binary input state (success or failure of packet delivery) and generating a probabilistic estimation of the future states of that input.

These single metric TMFs provide malicious actors with a significant advantage if their activity does not impact that metric. In the case where the attacker can subvert the TMF, the metric under assessment by that TMF does not cover the threat mounted by the attacker. In turn, this causes a significant negative effect in the efficiency of the network, as the TMF is assumed to have reduced the possible set of attacks when it has actually made it more advantageous to attack a different part of the networks operation. An example of such a situation would be in a TMF focused on PLR where an attacker selectively delays packets going through it, reducing overall throughput but not dropping any packets. Such behaviour would not be detected by the TMF.

For the purposes of this work, we select Hermes trust establishment and OTMF as indicitive single-metric TMFs, as Hermes captures the core operation of a pure single metric assessment methodology and OTMF provides a comparison that combines assessments from across nodes to develop assessment.

B. Trust in Marine Networks

With demand for smaller, more decentralised marine survey and monitoring systems, and a drive towards lower per-unit cost, pressures on battery capacity, locomotive power efficiency, data processing and storage are increasing. These pressures simultaneously present opportunities and incentives for malicious or selfish actors to appear to cooperate while not reciprocating, in order to conserve power for instance. TMFs are expected to be increasingly applied to the marine

space, as the benefits they present are significant [10]. These multiple aspects of potential incentives, trust, and fairness do not directly fall under the scope of single metric trusts discussed above (OTMF etc.), and this indicates that a multi-metric approach may be more appropriate to capture and monitor the realities of the marine operating environment.

C. Single Metric Trust Frameworks

The Hermes trust establishment framework [6] uses Bayesian reasoning to generate a posterior distribution function of "belief", or trust, given a sequence of observations of that behaviour, $p(B|O)$ (1).

$$p(B|O) = \frac{p(O|B) \times p(B)}{\rho} \qquad (1)$$

Where $p(B)$ is the prior probability density function for the expected normal behaviour, and ρ is a normalising factor. Due to it's flexibility and simplicity, Hermes assumes that $p(B)$ is a Beta function, and therefore the evaluation of this trust assessment is based around the expectation value of the distribution (2) where α and β represent the number of successful and unsuccessful interactions respectively for a particular node i.

A secondary measurement of the confidence factor of the trust assessment t is generated as (3) and these measurements are combined to form a "trustworthiness" value T (4).

$$t_i \rightarrow E(\text{beta}(p|\alpha, \beta)) = \frac{\alpha_i}{\alpha_i + \beta_i} \qquad (2)$$

$$c_i = 1 - \sqrt{\frac{12\alpha_i\beta_i}{(\alpha_i + \beta_i)^2(\alpha_i + \beta_i + 1)}} \qquad (3)$$

$$T_i = 1 - \frac{\sqrt{\frac{(t_i-1)^2}{x^2} + \frac{(c_i-1)^2}{y^2}}}{\sqrt{\frac{1}{x^2} + \frac{1}{y^2}}} \qquad (4)$$

In (4), x and y are constants, used weight the two-dimensional polar mapping of trust and confidence assessments (t_i, c_i), and from [6], are taken as $x = \sqrt{2}, y = \sqrt{9}$.

Upon this per-node assessment methodology, OTMF overlays a observation distribution protocol so as to make the measurements α_i and β_i be representative of the direct and 1-hop networks observations of the target node i, as well as expiring old observations from assessment and eliminating observations from "untrustworthy" nodes.

> Not sure if it's suitable for in here but I have serious concerns about the derivations of the 'malicious reporter' test in OTMF: m is not defined anywhere other than being a "deviation threshold" which means nothing. Also OTMF does not weight based on direct or secondary reporting

D. Multi-Metric Trust Frameworks

There are also situations where the observed metrics will include significant noise and occur at irregular, sparse, intervals. Conventional approaches such as probabilistic estimation do not produce trust values that reflect the underlying reality

and context of the metrics available, as they require a-priori assumption that the trust value under exploration has an expected distribution, that distribution is mono-modal, and the input metrics are binary. In scenarios with variable, sparse, noisy metrics, estimating the distribution is difficult to accomplish a-priori.

Grey Theory performs cohort based normalization of metrics at runtime, providing a "grade" of trust compared to other observed nodes in that interval, while maintaining the ability to reduce trust values down to a stable assessment range for decision support without requiring every environment entered into to be characterised. This presents a stark difference between the Grey and Probabilistic approaches. Grey assessments are relative in both fairly and unfairly operating networks. All nodes will receive mid-range trust assessments if there are no malicious actors as there is no-one else "bad" to compare against, and variations in assessment will be primarily driven by topological and environmental factors.

Guo et al. [5] demonstrated the ability of Grey Relational Analysis (GRA) [11] to normalise and combine disparate traits of a communications link such as instantaneous throughput, received signal strength, etc. into a Grey Relational Coefficient, or a "trust vector".

In the case of the terrestrial communications network used in [5], the observed metric set $X = x_1, \ldots, x_M$ representing the measurements taken by each node of its neighbours at least interval, is defined as $X = $ [packet loss rate, signal strength, data rate, delay, throughput]. The grey relational vector is given as

$$\theta_{k,j}^t = \frac{\min_k |a_{k,j}^t - g_j^t| + \rho \max_k |a_{k,j}^t - g_j^t|}{|a_{k,j}^t - g_j^t| + \rho \max_k |a_{k,j}^t - g_j^t|} \quad (5)$$

$$\phi_{k,j}^t = \frac{\min_k |a_{k,j}^t - b_j^t| + \rho \max_k |a_{k,j}^t - b_j^t|}{|a_{k,j}^t - b_j^t| + \rho \max_k |a_{k,j}^t - b_j^t|}$$

where $a_{k,j}^t$ is the value of a observed metric x_j for a given node k at time t, ρ is a distinguishing coefficient set to 0.5, g and b are respectively the "good" and "bad" reference metric sequences from $\{a_{k,j}^t k = 1, 2 \ldots K\}$, i.e. $g_j = \max_k(a_{k,j}^t)$, $b_j = \min_k(a_{k,j}^t)$ (where each metric is selected to be monotonically positive for trust assessment, e.g. higher throughput is presumed to be always better).

Weighting can be applied before generating a scalar value (6) allowing the detection and classification of misbehaviours.

$$[\theta_k^t, \phi_k^t] = \left[\sum_{j=0}^M h_j \theta_{k,j}^t, \sum_{j=0}^M h_j \phi_{k,j}^t \right] \quad (6)$$

Where $H = [h_0 \ldots h_M]$ is a metric weighting vector such that $\sum h_j = 1$, and in unweighted case, $H = [\frac{1}{M}, \frac{1}{M} \ldots \frac{1}{M}]$. θ and ϕ are then scaled to $[0,1]$ using the mapping $y = 1.5x - 0.5$. To minimise the uncertainties of belonging to either best (g) or worst (b) sequences in (5) the $[\theta, \phi]$ values are reduced into a scalar trust value by $T_k^t = (1 + (\phi_k^t)^2/(\theta_k^t)^2)^{-1}$ [12]. MTFM combines this GRA with a topology-aware weighting scheme (7) and a fuzzy whitenization model (8).

There are three classes of topological trust relationship used; Direct, Recommendation, and Indirect. Where an observing node n_i assesses the trust of another target node, n_j; the Direct relationship is n_i's own observations n_j's behaviour. In the Recommendation case, a node n_k which shares Direct relationships with both n_i and n_j, gives its assessment of n_j to n_i. In the Indirect case, similar to the Recommendation case, the recommender n_k does not have a direct link with the observer n_i but n_k has a Direct link with the target node, n_j.

These relationships give us node sets, N_R and N_I containing the nodes that have recommendation or indirect, relationships to the observing node respectively.

$$T_{i,j}^{MTFM} = \frac{1}{2} \cdot \max_s \{f_s(T_{i,j})\} T_{i,j} \quad (7)$$
$$+ \frac{1}{2} \frac{2|N_R|}{2|N_R| + |N_I|} \sum_{n \in N_R} \max_s \{f_s(T_{i,n})\} T_{i,n}$$
$$+ \frac{1}{2} \frac{|N_I|}{2|N_R| + |N_I|} \sum_{n \in N_I} \max_s \{f_s(T_{i,n})\} T_{i,n}$$

Where $T_{i,n}$ is the subjective trust assessment of n_i by n_n, and $f_s = [f_1, f_2, f_3]$ given as:

$$f_1(x) = -x + 1$$
$$f_2(x) = \begin{cases} 2x & \text{if } x \leq 0.5 \\ -2x + 2 & \text{if } x > 0.5 \end{cases} \quad (8)$$
$$f_3(x) = x$$

Guo et al. demonstrated that when compared against OTMF and Hermes trust assessment, MTFM provided increased variation in trust assessment over time, providing more information about the nodes behaviour than packet delivery probability alone.

By weighting the metrics used in MTFM, it was shown that the trust assessments could be used to identify the style of misbehaviour being performed within the network and by who. We present a corollary method to investigate and apply this work to the Marine MANET field.

III. MARINE ACOUSTIC COMMUNICATIONS

The key challenges of underwater acoustic communications are centred around the impact of slow and differential propagation of energy (RF, Optical, Acoustic) through water, and it's interfaces with the seabed / air. The resultant challenges include; long delays due to propagation, significant inter-symbol interference and Doppler spreading, fast and slow fading due to environmental effects (aquatic flora/fauna, surface weather), carrier-frequency dependent signal attenuation, multipath caused by reflective medium interfaces, variations in propagation speed due to depth dependant effects (salinity, temperature, and pressure), and subsequent refractive spreading and lensing due to that same propagation variation [13].

The attenuation that occurs in an underwater acoustic channel over a distance d for a signal about frequency f in linear power is given as $A_{\text{aco}}(d, f) = A_0 d^k a(f)^d$ and in dB form as (9)

$$10 \log A_{\text{aco}}(d, f)/A_0 = k \cdot 10 \log d + d \cdot 10 \log a(f) \quad (9)$$

where A_0 is a unit-normalising constant, k is a spreading factor (commonly taken as 1.5 [14]), and $a(f)$ is the absorption coefficient, approximated empirically using Thorp's formula (10) from [15]

$$10 \log a(f) = \frac{0.11 \cdot f^2}{1 + f^2} + \frac{44 \cdot f^2}{4100 + f^2} + 2.75 \times 10^{-4} f^2 + 0.003 \tag{10}$$

Refractive lensing and the multipath nature of the medium result in line of sight propagation being extremely unreliable for estimating distances to targets. The first arriving beam has as the very least curved in the medium, and commonly has reflected off the surface/seabed before arriving at a receiver, creating secondary paths that are sometimes many times longer than the first arrival path, generating symbol spreading over orders of seconds depending on the ranges and depths involved. Forward Error Correction coding is used on such channels to minimise packet losses.

Comparing $A_{aco}(d, f)$ with the RF Free-Space Path Loss model ($A_{\mathrm{RF}}(d, f) \approx \left(\frac{4\pi df}{c}\right)^2$), the impact of range on signal power is exponential underwater, rather than quadratic in terrestrial RF ($A_{\mathrm{aco}} \propto f^{2d}$ vs $A_{\mathrm{RF}} \propto (df)^2$). While both frequency dependant factors are quadratic, approximating the factors in (10), $f \propto A_{\mathrm{aco}}$ is at least 4 orders of magnitude higher than $f \propto A_{\mathrm{RF}}$

IV. System Model Characterization

A. Mobility, Topology, and Communications

Four mobility scenarios were used in [5] to explore trust behaviour; all nodes static, a central node n_1 performing a random walk with other nodes remaining static, all nodes but the central node (n_1) randomly walking, and all nodes randomly walking. In all scenarios, each link from $n_i \rightarrow n_j$ periodically sent 10 second bursts of Constant Bit Rate (CBR) style traffic. From these we select the all static and all mobile cases for presentation. The reason for this is that giving a malicious node special privilege or capabilities will skew the results of trust assessment, as the behaviours of the static and mobile nodes will be significantly different regardless of misbehaviour.

The six nodes are initially arranged as per Fig. 1 with each node on average 100m from each other as per [5]. The use of six nodes and the particular layout enables the investigation of the three trust relationships based on minimum path topologies, such that the node generating the trust assessments, n_0 has Direct, Recommendation, and Indirect trust assessments of n_1 available to it from itself, $[n_2, n_3]$, and $[n_4, n_5]$ respectively. [5] also demonstrated that the optimal number of nodes in a MANET subgroup to be between 6 and 8 for stable trust assessment. Further, collaborations with NATOs Centre for Maritime Research and Experimentation (CMRE) in La Spezia, and DSTLs Naval Systems Group inform that this is a practical team-size for environmental and defence applications.

B. Simulation Background

Simulations were conducted using a Python based simulation framework, SimPy [16], with a network stack built upon AUVNetSim [17], with transmission parameters (Table I) taken from and validated against [14] and [18].


Fig. 1. Initial layout with nodes spaced an average of 100m apart

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Given the differences in delay and propagation between RF and marine networks, it is natural that the same application rates (e.g. packet emission rates or throughput) and node separations should not be assumed to be equally viable. Therefore, we first characterise an operational zone of performance within which the network can operate stably.

TABLE I.   COMPARISON OF SYSTEM MODEL CONSTRAINTS AS APPLIED BETWEEN TERRESTRIAL AND MARINE COMMUNICATIONS

Parameter	Unit	Terrestrial	Marine
Simulated Duration	s	300	18000
Trust Sampling Period	s	1	600
Simulated Area	km^2	0.7	0.7-4
Transmission Range	km	0.25	1.5
Physical Layer		RF(802.11)	Acoustic
Propagation Speed	m/s	3×10^8	1490
Center Frequency	Hz	2.6×10^9	2×10^4
Bandwidth	Hz	22×10^6	1×10^4
MAC Type		CSMA/DCF	CSMA/CA
Routing Protocol		DSDV	FBR
Max Speed	ms^{-1}	5	1.5
Max Data Rate	bps	5×10^6	≈ 240
Packet Size	bits	4096	9600
Single Transmission Duration	s	10	32
Single Transmission Size	bits	10^7	9600

C. Scaling Considerations between Terrestrial and Underwater Environments

We establish a appropriate safe operating zone for marine communications by looking at the communications rate and physical distribution factors across the two selected mobility scenarios. From Table I, the operating transmission range of this model of acoustic communications is ≈ 6 times further than that of 802.11, indicating that a suitable operating environment will have an area $\approx \sqrt{6}$ times the area of the 802.11 case. However, it was recognised in Section III that the relationship between attenuation and distance is exponential underwater, so this would represent an upper bound of performance, where nodes begin approximately 400m apart.

Exploratory simulations were run to establish this bound. As the separation is increased, the emission rate at which the network becomes saturated decreases, reducing overall throughput. This throughput degradation is tightly coupled with the mobility, as increasing mobility leads to increasing delays as routes are constantly broken, re-advertised and re-established. For instance, where all nodes are static, we do not see significant drops in saturation rates until we approach 800m, nearly double our initial estimate. Where all the nodes

are randomly walking the saturation point collapses from 0.025pps at 300m to 0.015pps at 400m. Our results indicated that the best area to continue operating in for a range of node separations is at 0.015pps, and that a reasonable position scaling is from 100m to 300m on average, beyond which communication becomes increasingly unstable, especially in terms of end to end delay. These results are similar to work performed in [17].

D. Selected Misbehaviours

Guo et al. introduce a range of malicious behaviours, including modification of the packet loss rate of routing nodes and limiting throughput on a per-link basis as well as a selection of combined misbehaviours.

Given that the established links are already heavily constrained, heavy handed attacks such as introducing selective PLR and adding to the already extreme and hugely variable delays would severely impact the general performance of the network beyond the scope of simple selfishness. These direct malicious behaviours effectively trigger saturation collapses in regions that the network should be stable..

Therefore, we select two more subtle misbehaviours to investigate;

1) Malicious Power Control (MPC), where n_1 increases it's transmission power by 20% for all nodes *except* communications with n_0 in order to make n_0 appear "bad" to the rest of the team,
2) Selfish Target Selection (STS), where n_1 preferentially communicates, forwards and advertises to nodes that are physically close to it in effort to reduce n_1's power consumption.

V. SIMULATION RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Having established a safe operating range for comparison at 300m average separation and an emission rate of 0.015pps, we repeat the static and mobile scenarios presented in [5]. We select an assessment period of 10 mins for a 5 hour mission to scale in comparison to relative bitrates experienced (1Mbps vs $\approx$ 15bps).

Metrics used for Grey assessment are transmitted and received throughput and power, delay, and packet loss rate as calculated by aborted and unacknowledged, transmissions. Compared to [5], this metric set lacks a data rate quantity as the network is not dynamically adjusting bandwidth. In context of Grey Relational Coefficient generation (5), the best sequence g was selected using the lowest PLR, delay, and powers, and the highest throughputs, and the worst sequence, b the inverse of these metrics, reflecting the observations made in Section II-B.

The particular factors under discussion are the relative performance of MTFM against OTMF and Beta with respect to statistical stability across mobilities and in responsiveness to changing network behaviour. We establish a similar result set by initially tracking the resultant trust values established by MTFM in the pair of mobility scenarios, shown in Fig. 2. As per Guo et al. we are primarily concerned with the direct trust relationship between n_0 and n_1, i.e. n_0's assessment of the trustworthiness of n_1, or $T_{1,0}$. We are also concerned with the opinions of n_1 provided to n_0 by other nodes, where

$[T_{1,2}, T_{1,3}]$ and $[T_{1,4}, T_{1,5}]$ denote the sets of recommendation and indirect trust assessment respectively.

We also include aggregate assessments; $T_{1,\text{Avg}}$, the unweighted mean of direct trust assessments of n_1 from all nodes and $T_{1,\text{MTFM}}$, the final MTFM trust assessment value based on both network topology and whitenisation from (8).

The variability in assessment is coupled to mobility; in the static case (Fig. 2a), we see that the nodes exhibit relatively consistent distributions. In the full mobility case, shown in Fig. 2b, this subjective variability is greatly increased. As the topology is highly dynamic, delays due to re-establishing routes can be very large, perturbing the trust value. The aggregate trust values using topology information ($T_{1,\text{MTFM}}$) display a decreased variation than those of the individual subjective observations in all cases.

(a) Fair Static

(b) Fair Mobile

(c) Malicious Static

(d) Malicious Mobile

(e) Selfish Static

(f) Selfish Mobile

Fig. 2. MTFM Trust assessments of n_1 ($T_{1,X}$), showing Direct, Recommender and Indirect relationships, as well as the Aggregate trust assessments from combining these[2]

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A. Comparison between MTFM, Hermes and OTFM

As per [5], parallel simulations were performed where there was no malicious behaviour, the "fair" scenario utilising OTMF and Hermes assessment as well as MTFM, providing like-for-like comparison of assessment.

In the interests of brevity, we present results from the mobile-scenario only as we are primarily concerned with the establishment of trust in mobile networks The use of Forward Beam Routing and a CSMA/CA MAC scheme from AUVNet-Sim [17] in our simulation mitigates a significant number

(a) Fair Scenario

(b) Malicious Power Control Scenario


(c) Selfish Target Selection Scenario

Fig. 3. $T_{1,0}$ for Hermes, OTMF and MTFM assessment values for fair and malicious behaviours in the fully mobile scenario (mean of MTFM also shown)

of packet losses through collision avoidance and contention handling, leading to the situation that the only genuinely lost packets occur when a node moves completely out of range of any other node and time out occurs in route discovery rather than transmission. As such, confirmed packet losses are relatively rare and in a delaying network like this, it is difficult to set a differentiating time out between packets that are in the network but queued, and packets that are actually "lost". This renders OTMF and Hermes assessment at best uninformative and at worst misleading; consistently providing nodes a high trust assessment as they have very little information to extract trust from.

The single metric TMFs used in conventional MANETs require regular and constant streams of positive and negative validation to shape and adjust their evaluations, which for a network with significant delays such as this, is not practical.

Fig. 3 shows a comparison between the unweighted response of MTFM compared to OTMF and Hermes assessment functions on the same data for the fair, malicious and selfish behaviours respectively. It is important to note a distinction between the expectations of MTFM compared to other TMFs; MTFM is primarily concerned with the identification of differences in the behaviours of nodes in a network, and is relative rather than absolute. That is to say that under MTFM, agents are compared against the worst current performances across metrics of other nodes and graded against them, rather than the absolute (objective) approach taken by many TMFs. This relative versus absolute difference is particularly clear when comparing mobility models. For simplicity of discussion, we are primarily concerned with the fully-mobile scenario. In these cases, particularly since the method of attack was not directly related to PLR, OTMF and Hermes have not registered significant activity in the appropriate behaviours when comparing against the fair scenario. Without comparing against any other known quantity; the difference between

the MTFM trust assessments under "fair" and "malicious" behaviour is affected, if only slightly, particularly in looking at the average values returned.

The selfish behaviour where the node preferentially select nodes to communicate with based on proximity is a more subtle attack on the network when compared to the outright power-flooding of the malicious behaviour. Applying the same approach to this behaviour, we find that the ensemble MTFM results appear similar to the malicious case, but OTMF and Hermes don't appear to differentiate between fair and selfish scenarios at all.

On their own, neither OTMF, Hermes, or unbiased MTFM appear to be appropriate in detecting or identifying malicious behaviour in this environment.

B. Metric Weighting

We apply a sequence of vectors that preferentially weight each metric during (6) to each of the three simulation runs. For a metric weight vector H, where the metric m_j is emphasised as being twice as important as the other metrics, we form an initial weighting vector $H' = [h_i...h_M]$ such that $h_i = 1 \forall i \neq j; h_j = 2$. We then scale that vector H' such that $\sum H = 1$ by $H = \frac{H'}{\sum H'}$. Using this process we can extract and highlight the primary aspects of an attack by comparing against the deviation from the "fair" result set.

(a) Delay

(b) PLR

(c) RX Power

(d) TX Power


(e) RX Throughput

(f) TX Throughput

Fig. 4. $T_{1,MTFM}$ in the All Mobile case for the Malicious Power Control behaviour

From Fig. 4 we can see that the malicious node is consistently outside the $\pm\sigma$ envelopes of the fair node it's being compared to, particularly PLR, with smaller impacts on delay, received power and transmitted throughput. However, the impact on received throughput is minimal to insignificant

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[2]Box plots centres indicate the median, bounds indicate the 25%-75% range, and whiskers represent the points within $\pm 2\sigma$

Fig. 5. $T_{1,MTFM}$ in the All Mobile case for the Selfish Target Selection behaviour


Fig. 6. Random Forest Factor Analysis of Malicious and Selfish behaviours when compared against the baseline

Fig. 7. Random Forest Factor Analysis of Malicious and Selfish behaviours when compared against the baseline

compared to the size of the detection enveolpe, occasionally breaching the envelope for a short period. In the selfish case (Fig. 5) we observe much less impact in PLR and delay, with greatly increased impact on transmission power. In comparison to [5], these results are qualitatively similar, however in this case the differences between the fair case and the misbehaviours are less clear than in the comparable terrestrial space, where Guo et al. show the similar types of behaviour but demonstrates a weighted delta from ≈ 0.4 to ≈ 0.9 across the simulation period, compared to our maximum delta in TX Power of ≈ 0.3 for an inconsistent interval.

C. Weight Significance Analysis for Behaviour Classification

For a more quantitative assessment of the viability of multi-metric trust assessment methods, we take the qualitative analysis above and apply a Random Forest regression [19] to assess the relative importance of the selected metrics on relative detectability of malicious behaviour. Random Forest accomplishes this by generating a large number of random regression trees and, based on incoming data, prune these trees to match the training values. The target function for this regression (11) that captures the relative difference between the fair and misbehaviour curves as demonstrated in Figs. 4 and 5 is the area between the T_{MTFM} in the misbehaving case that is outside the standard deviation of T_{MTFM} of the fair case. From this training process we can extract the relative importance of each input feature (metric) in terms of how good it is to differentiate between the fair case and a given misbehaviour. Additionally we perform a cross correlation analysis to establish the correlations between given metric emphasis and the areas outside the detection envelope.

Our intention is to establish the metrics that not only differentiate both misbehaviours from the fair case, but also what metrics differentiate the two misbehaviours from eachother.

Applying this target function to 729 different metric weight vector emphasis combinations (H) and applying the regression reveals that each of the three combinations (i.e. comparing fair to misbehaviours, and comparing the misbehaviours) present distinct patterns of significance in three primary metrics; received throughput, transmitted power, and PLR, with delay, received power and transmitted throughput playing a lesser role. Practically this means that in order to accurately distinguish between these scenarios, these primary metrics should be higher-weighted in the generation of $T_{1,MTFM}$ in (5).

It may initially appear odd that the received throughput significance is close between all three couples, a correlation analysis shows that in the selfish case; the received throughput is positively correlated with successful classification against the fair case ($R = 0.71, p \approx 10^{-100}$), while the opposite is the case for the selfish behaviour ($R = -0.69, p \approx 10^{-100}$). In the selfish behaviour, it's natural that Transmitted power is selected as a defining characteristic ($R = 0.88, p < 10^{-100}$,

This is natural as these TMFs do not take protocol or application level behaviour into account in their assessment of fairness.

$$Y(H) = \int T_{mal}(H) - (T_{gd}(H) \pm \sigma_{T_{gd}(H)}) \, \mathrm{d}H. \qquad (11)$$

VI. Conclusions and Future Work

We have demonstrated that existing MANET Trust Management Frameworks are not directly suitable to the contentious and dynamic underwater medium. We presented a comparison between trust establishment in MANETs in the underwater space, demonstrating that in order to have any reasonable expectation of performance, throughput and delay responses must be characterised before implementing trust in such environments. While the MTFM value does not display any immediate difference between the two behaviours, we have shown that by exploring the metric space by weight variation, the existence and nature of the malicious behaviour can be discovered.

A significant factor of trust assessment in such a constrained environment is that there may be long periods where two edge nodes (for instance, $n_0 \rightarrow n_5$) may not interact at all. This can be due to a range of factors beyond potential malicious behaviour including simple random scheduling co-incidence and intermediate or neighbouring nodes collectively causing long back-off or contention periods. This disconnection hinders trust assessment in two ways; assessing nodes that do not receive timely recommendations may make decisions based on very old data, and malicious nodes have a long dwelling time where they can operate under a reasonable certainty that the TMF will not detect it (especially if the node itself is behaving disruptively). One potential solution to this would be to move from a stepping-window of trust periods to a continuous trust log, updated on packet reception rather than waiting regular periods for packets to be analysed.

Another difference is that computationally, MTFM is significantly more intensive than the relatively simple Hermes / OTMF algorithms, and the repeated metric re-weighting required for real time behaviour detection is an area that requires optimization. As such, a hybrid system could be implemented, that used OTMF as a 'trigger' to detect potentially selfish or malicious behaviour, and allow MTMF weight matrix execution to be triggered at less regular intervals. We demonstrated initial, unfiltered Grey Trust assessment using all available metrics (transmitted and received throughput, delay, received signal strength, transmitted power, and packet loss rate), as well as the application of multiple weighting vectors to iteratively emphasise different aspects of trust operation to expose and identify misbehaviour on the network.

With significant delays (order from seconds to many minutes), in a fading, refractive medium with varying propagation characteristics, the environment is not as predictable or performant as classical MANET TMF deployment environments. We show that, without significant adaptation, single metric probabilistic estimation based TMFs are ineffective in such an environment. We have shown that existing frameworks are overly optimistic about the nature and stability of the communications channel, and can overlook characteristics of the channel that are useful for assessing the behaviour of nodes in the network. This indicates that there is a good case, particularly within constrained MANETs such as this, for multi-vector,

and even multi-domain trust assessment, where metrics about the communications network and topology would be brought together with information about the physical behaviours and operations of nodes to assess trust.

Future work will investigate the stability of GRA under multi-node collusion, the development of real-time outlier detection and filtering for metrics (e.g differentiating between a very long delay that was an 'accident' and a malicious router), and the introduction of physical metrics and sensing capabilities into the trust management context.

Replace with something more relevant

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