Biographical Electability: Effects of Dishonesty on Political Trust

Kelley Briggs, Caitlin Claxton, Eduardo Felix, Andrew Kim, Karla Vasquez

INTRODUCTION

Why a voter casts their ballot for a particular political candidate is a common question when evaluating electoral processes. While candidates have an incentive to represent themselves in a manner maximizing their appeal to a constituency, public discovery that a candidate has misrepresented information about themselves may influence their level of voter support. Controversies surrounding candidates, such as Herschel Walker, Joe Biden, and Elizabeth Warren, lying about their previous records or other aspects of their life initially piqued our interest in studying how candidate's lies affect how voters view them. The scandal of George Santos lying about nearly his entire biography steered our study toward biographical lies. These types of high-profile scandals show that more research needs to be conducted to determine how lying impacts voter evaluations of candidates, and more specifically, do voters care more about certain lies as compared to others? In this study, we try to measure both a political candidate's electability by analyzing the difference in voters' perceptions of the candidate before and after revealing that the candidate lied to them, as well as the influence of the type of lie (biographical and policy-related) on electability.

We grounded our concept of candidate electability in Aristotle's rhetorical modes of persuasion: ethos (credibility), pathos (emotions), and logos (logic). We distinguish the characteristics of candidate appeal by having a candidate's educational background and political experience denote their ethos, a candidate's relatability and emotional connection to voters denote pathos, and a candidate's preferred policies denote logos. We put forward the hypothesis that lies pertaining to policy preferences (logos) will have a greater effect on candidate electability than lies pertaining to biographical information. Moreover, a candidate's education-related lies (ethos) will harm them more than their lies founded on emotional

connection (pathos). Ultimately, by identifying the types of lies that most influence voters' candidate perceptions, one can better understand what does and does not cause a candidate to gain/lose support. Moreover, a relevant moderator within our theory was political interest. Political interest suggests implications for the attitudes and behaviors of voters, so we evaluated how this factor can be used to explain the relationship between a candidate's measured electability and the type of lie that was revealed about the candidate.

To test our theories, we ran a survey with over 500 participants in order to gauge their reactions to a biographical lie of an electoral candidate. Specifically, we created a sample candidate biography of an imagined, nonpartisan candidate. We asked participants in our survey to answer a series of questions that we used to measure the candidate's electability. It was then revealed to the participants that the candidate lied about one of four biographical components (childhood socioeconomic status, candidate's age, educational background, or a candidate's stance on a given nonpartisan policy).

Overall, we found that a candidate's electability decreases after the lie is revealed–across all treatment groups. However, we also found that there is no significant difference in the decrease in a candidate's electability based on the types of lie told (childhood socioeconomic status, candidate's age, educational background, or a candidate's stance on a given nonpartisan policy). Our data suggests that voters care more that a candidate lied in general than the type of lie that they told. More broadly, we find that honesty is an important aspect of how voters decide which candidate to vote for in an election, once party affiliations are removed.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Researchers have been attempting to determine why voters support certain candidates for over a hundred years. Studies, such as those authored by Miller et al., (1986) and María del Mar

Martínez Rosón (2016) have found that voters have a relatively rigid set of characteristics that they search for in a candidate and then use these metrics to rate candidates and their favorability. These characteristics include integrity, competency, and honesty. Rosón also analyzes voters based on their political knowledge and education, income and financial situation, gender, and age.

We ask the questions: if voters have a strict moral code that they use to rate candidates, how does a candidate lying affect their electability? Does the type of lie matter to voters when reassessing a political candidate? To examine if the type of lies influences voters we analyze this in two different aspects: biographical lies and policy-based lies. The effects of policy-based lies have been studied before in literature, but the results do not always match expectations. Studies such as those authored by Oliver Hahl et al. (2018) and Kartik and McAfee (2007) find that there are times in which voters prefer candidates who lie over those who do not. Oliver Hahl et al. (2018) find that voters will express support for candidates that lie about information that both the candidate and voters believe is unreliable. A factor that contributes to this impression in their perception of candidates is a person's belief in the legitimacy of their government. This increases a voter's likelihood to believe in a candidate's lies, as they believe the lies to be suppressed truths. Similarly, the study of Kartik and McAfee (2007) presents that voters will elect candidates that pursue the interests that are more favorable to the public, this increases their electability. Findings like these that suggest that voters support candidates that they know lie are directly at odds with the previous studies, such as those by Rosón (2016) and Miller et al. (1986) which find that voters support honest candidates. Since the studies of Kartik and McAfee (2007) and Hahl et al. (2018) are situational, they cannot be extended across time and places. Based on this, we draw more on other studies that find voters support honest candidates.

The other aspect of policy-based lies is flip-flopping. Flip-flopping is when a candidate drastically changes their stance on an issue, usually by campaigning on one platform and then voting the opposite way once elected. Putnam et al. (2014) study the effects of flip-flopping on voters' electability ratings of candidates. They find that most participants did not notice flip flopping but those who did notice viewed the candidate less favorably.

While research suggests that voters place a certain amount of importance on a candidate's personal characteristics, we were unable to find any studies that research specifically the effect of various types of biographical *lies* on voter preferences. We are hoping to fill a gap in the existing research on how biographical lies affect voters' evaluations of an electoral candidate.

THEORY

Given the variety of strategies electoral candidates employ to gain favor among voters, we organize these appeals in accordance with the popular rhetorical model, Aristotle's "modes of persuasion." Namely, Aristotle identifies three methods a figure utilizes to persuade an audience: ethos (appeal to authority/credibility), pathos (appeal to emotions), and logos (appeal to logic) (Fortenbaugh 1992). We used the characteristics of integrity, competency, and honesty which were identified by Miller al (1986) and Rosen (2016) to quantify a candidate's electability. Further, we ground political candidates' specific appeals to an electorate in each of the three modes of persuasion. Ethos represents a candidate's qualifications, such as their education and political experience. Pathos represents their emotional connection and relatability to voters; for instance a personal anecdote or shared background. We identify ethos and pathos as appeals of biographical, as opposed to ideological, candidate traits. Finally, logos represent a candidate's actionable policy preferences, independent of their biographical characteristics. Hence, revealing

a candidate's lie regarding one of these topics influences the effect of the corresponding mode of persuasion on voters.

In light of the recent controversy over the apparent political viability of candidates that misinform voters, we seek to determine the comparative influences of different *types* of lies told by a candidate on their perceived electability among voters. Generally speaking, voters are critical of dishonest candidates (Kartik and McAfee 2007; Putnam, Walheim, and Jacoby 2014; Martínez Rosón 2016). All things held equal, we anticipate candidate electability among voters falls after a candidate is revealed to have lied, and that major lies decrease electability more than minor lies. However, past studies have identified certain scenarios in which voters accept, trust, and even prefer a dishonest candidate, such as when they perceive the candidate to still be more competent and/or policy-congruent with them (Martínez Rosón 2016), or when they believe the political system is illegitimate (Hahl, Kim, and Sivan 2018). Thus, candidate lies with different contexts may have varying influences on electability. We focus specifically on the type of lie told.

Surveys at political rallies ahead of the 2020 Democratic presidential nominating contest concluded that prospective voters supporting progressive candidates were more likely to cite issue positions as reasons for support, whereas supporters of more moderate candidates mentioned personal traits (Peacock et al. 2020). Voters place greater emphasis on personal characteristics in the absence of strong ideological cues. Likewise, Miller et al. (1986) have found presidential candidate perceptions are historically founded on personality traits over issue statements or partisan affiliations. In accordance with Peacock et al. (2020), while partisanship has increasingly taken center stage since the journal was published, biographical characteristics—namely competence—stand out more prominently than policy positions for the

average voter. The importance of competence is corroborated by Martínez Rosón (2016), who found that certain voters in Costa Rica, particularly young and high-income individuals, are more likely to support dishonest candidates that exhibit competence. Given a candidate with no partisan cues, and under the assumption that lies influence candidate favorability to the extent that the subject of the lie is important to the voter, we, therefore, predict a candidate that tells an ethos-based lie (regarding their credibility and authority) suffers greater damage to their perceived electability than with a logos-based lie (about the candidate's policy positions).

Meanwhile, candidates that exhibit their character via ideological firmness have been shown to suffer in electoral competition with candidates that cater more to their constituents' established preferences (Katrik and McAfee 2007). Not all biographical characteristics are held equal—contrary to the earlier finding that the personal trait of competence overshadows policy preferences, Katrik and McAfee (2007) assert that character-related (i.e., pathos-based) personal traits are not as important to voters as ideological congruence. We then also predict that logos-based lies have a greater negative impact on a candidate's perceived electability than pathos-based lies (emotional appeals).

In sum, we hypothesize that lie types in descending harm to candidate electability are as follows: Ethos Lie (qualification) > Logos Lie (policy) > Pathos Lie (emotional connection) > Lie in Itself (minor lie).

We then identify political interest as a moderator variable. In addition to recognizing competence as a key characteristic voters look for in candidates, Martínez Rosón (2016) observed Costa Rican voters with greater political knowledge were less likely to approve of a politically corrupt/dishonest candidate. Referring back to the three modes of persuasion, politically interested voters are more likely to be invested in policy outcomes. As such, we

propose that a candidate's policy-related lie has a greater negative effect on their perceived electability among respondents with strong political interest than those with weaker political interest.

A complete list of our hypotheses is as follows:

- **H_1:** Candidate electability decreases after it is revealed that they lied.
- **H_2:** Biographical lies will decrease candidate electability less than policy-related lies.
- **H_3:** Lies about qualifications will decrease candidate electability more than lies relating to emotional appeals.
- **H_4:** Minor lies will decrease candidate electability less than major lies.
- **H_5:** Lies will have a greater negative effect on candidate electability for respondents with greater political interest than those with weaker political interest.

METHODS

Using both within-and between-subjects designs, we intend to test how deceptions in a candidate's biography or policies affect how voters perceive a candidate after they are made aware of the deception. The experiment utilized a series of vignettes to provide the participants with information about the candidate. Some vignettes provided biographical information while others were used to reveal how the candidate deceived his constituents. To test this experiment's hypothesis, we expose the participants to one of four different types of lies told by the given candidate. These lies are presented as short, fictitious news articles that describe in plain language how the candidate in question deceived the public, specifically a statement describing

what the candidate publicly stated, followed by a statement clarifying the truth behind the subject of the lie. All participants were exposed to one of four articles, each differing from the others only by its textual content.

At the beginning of this survey, participants were shown the first vignette, a small biographical paragraph about a political candidate named *James K. Miller* that presented the candidate's name, qualifications, and family life. The biography avoided any and all partisan language with regard to the candidate in order to avoid bias. With the biography still displayed, participants were shown five statements each with a list of choices on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from "Strongly disagree" to "Strongly agree". These choices allowed the participants to state how much they agreed with each of the following five statements:

1. "This candidate is qualified to fulfill his responsibilities in office"
2. "I trust this candidate to do what is right for my community"
3. "This candidate understands how to best carry out his duties"
4. "This candidate cares about my needs"
5. "I would vote for this candidate."

Each of these questions represented a different aspect of the candidate's electability, which we intended to measure, and the order in which the first four of these statements were presented was randomized to account for primacy bias. After this, participants were randomly assigned to one of four treatment groups, each of which was presented with one of the four vignettes in the form of news articles: the article that reveals the political candidate lied about his age, his educational background, his stance on a certain policy, or his socioeconomic background. We designed the lie about the candidate's age to be a minor lie that would measure the effect of lying in general. The participants were then asked once again to answer the same set

of five questions presented when they were first asked to rate the candidate in order to measure the electability of the candidate after the lie was revealed. Finally, participants were asked a series of demographic questions (race, gender, age, income, language, education, and party identification) in order to collect appropriate demographic variables.

Our final sample contained a total of 572 respondents, where 565 provided complete survey responses for questions that were used to calculate our electability indices.[1] Of those respondents who provided both complete responses and demographic information, the average respondent age was 37 years old, and the average income was between $50,000 and $59,999. The gender spread was nearly equal at 50.80% male respondents and 49.20% female respondents. 86.64% of respondents identified as White and 8.84% as Asian, while only 1.81% identified as American Indian or Alaska Native and 1.26% as Black or African American. However, 30.21% of respondents reported their race as White and 37.17% of all respondents also identified as Spanish, Hispanic, or Latino. All but one respondent indicated English was their first language. 87.43% of respondents had completed a 4-year Bachelor's degree in college or higher. Of those that answered all electability index questions, 59.92% of respondents identified with or most closely with the Democratic party and 39.18% with the Republican party. 1.06% did not identify with either.

Political interest is an especially relevant moderator in our theory. This moderator has important implications for the motivated attitudes and behaviors of voters, thus we include it as an explanatory variable of the relationship between candidate lie type and electability index. A clear majority—91.67%—of respondents indicated they were at least "Somewhat interested" in politics, while 70.57% reported being "Moderately interested" or "Extremely interested."

[1] Only 347 of these respondents passed our manipulation check.

RESULTS

Our first hypothesis is that candidate electability decreases after it is revealed that the candidate lied. To evaluate this hypothesis, we, for each respondent, summed together their agreement ratings (on a scale of 1 to 5) for the five statements regarding their perceptions of the candidate, and then divided by the maximum aggregate rating of 25 to calculate a standardized electability index on a scale of 0 to 1. We calculate this index twice for each respondent: once with their responses before the lie is revealed (Electability Before), and once with their responses after the lie is revealed (Electability After). The index measures each respondent's perceived electability of the candidate.

We then subtracted the electability index score after the lie from the electability index score before the lie to find the change in electability indices after the lie is revealed (Electability Difference). Finally, to evaluate our hypothesis, we ran a series of one-sample t-tests to determine whether respondents' Electability Difference scores were statistically significant from zero. All one-sample, two-tailed t-tests of Electability Difference after each treatment and $\mu = 0$ suggest that the treatment effect is negative and statistically significant (see Figure A below for average treatment effects).

The t-test of Electability Difference after the Age lie treatment yielded a difference of means of -0.03, $p < .001$, and a Cohen's d of -0.33, indicating a small to moderate negative effect (see Table A in Appendix B). The t-test of Electability Difference after the Policy lie treatment yielded a difference of means of -0.03, $p = .04$, and a Cohen's d of -0.25, indicating a small negative effect (see Table B in Appendix B). The t-test of Electability Difference after the Education lie treatment yielded a difference of means of -0.03, $p = .001$, and a Cohen's d of

-0.27, indicating a small negative effect (see Table C in Appendix B). The t-test of Electability Difference after the Socioeconomic Background lie treatment yielded a difference of means of -0.03, p = .006, and a Cohen's d of -0.24, indicating a small negative effect (see Table D in Appendix B). Overall, we found a significantly negative Electability Difference, which reveals that a candidate's electability decreases if voters are informed that the candidate lied.

Figure A. T-test coefficient plot for average treatment effects



Our first hypothesis can be evaluated with the t-tests of the Electability Difference after the administration of each treatment. Each t-test indicated that the fall in Electability Difference after each treatment was significantly less than zero—we thus confirm that a candidate's perceived electability falls after their lie is publicized.

Our second, third, and fourth hypotheses propose differences in the effect of each lie treatment on the Electability Difference. To evaluate these hypotheses, we then conducted a one-way ANOVA to compare the Electability Difference across the four outcome variables to determine whether the type of lie has a significant effect on electability drops. The one-way ANOVA indicates there is no significant difference in Electability Difference scores between different candidate lie types, $F(3, 561) = .0332$, $p = .9919$, $\eta^2 = .0002$ (see Table E below). Given there was no significant difference in electability index drops between treatments, we did not conduct further t-tests to identify the treatments between which lie type had an effect. Our one-way ANOVA suggests there is no significant difference in the Electability Difference between the different types of lies—we fail to uphold the second, third, and fourth hypotheses.

Table E. One-way ANOVA of the Electability Difference by candidate lie type

Parameter	SS	df	MS	F	p	η2
Candidate Lie Type	0.0016	3	0.0005	0.0332	0.9919	0.0002
Residuals	8.7979	561	0.0157			

Finally, we conducted a series of bivariate linear regressions with the Electability Before and Electability After indexes. We used these indexes to create a variable, Electability, that measures the electability of a candidate after a given treatment. Contrary to our t-tests, while all four treatments yielded negative coefficients, only the Age and Education treatment groups exhibited significance at the $\alpha = .05$ level. The Age lie treatment did explain a significant portion of the variability in Electability at $p < .05$. The Policy lie treatment did not explain a significant portion of the variability in Electability at the $p < .05$ level, but it still displayed marginal

significance at $p < .1$. The Education lie treatment did explain a significant portion of the variability in Electability at $p < .05$. The Socioeconomic Background lie treatment did not explain a significant portion of the variability in Electability at $p < .05$ ($p = .118$). We report our findings in Table F (see Appendix C) and plot the generated coefficients below in Figure B. Still, in conjunction with the significant results of the previous t-tests, these low p-values suggest reliable significance.

Figure B. Coefficient plot for effect of lie treatments on Electability After



In order to confirm that the respondents were evenly distributed across the four treatments, we conducted a randomization check with a multinomial regression of the treatment assignments on the demographic variables we collected. We identify the Spanish/Hispanic/Latino variable and the Age variables to be imbalanced across the treatments with $p < .05$ (see Table G in Appendix C). An updated model that controls for the imbalanced Spanish/Hispanic/Latino and Age variables as covariates yielded the same significance levels for each of the four treatment groups as our initial regression (see Table H in Appendix C)—our results are unchanged.

Our fifth hypothesis is that lies will have a greater negative effect on candidate electability for respondents with greater political interest than those with weaker political interest. We evaluated whether political interest was a significant moderator on the effect of the lie treatments by conducting a series of multiple linear regressions to determine the interaction effect between the lie treatment and political interest. Notably, political interest explained a significant portion of the variability in electability index for all four treatments, controlling for the application of the treatment—a respondent's electability index is expected to increase as their political interest rating increases. At the same time, none of the lie treatments explained a significant portion of the variability in electability index, controlling for political interest. Together, lie treatment and political interest did not account for a significant portion of variability in the electability index across any of the four treatments. Thus, we also fail to prove our final hypothesis that respondents' level of political interest influences the effect of the treatments. We report these findings in Table I and plot the generated coefficients below in Figure C.

Table I. Regression table for interaction effect of lie treatments and political interest moderator on electability index

	Dependent variable:			
	Electability Index			
	Age	Policy	Education	Socioeconomic
Lie Treatment	−0.0396	−0.0625	−0.0507	−0.0247
	(0.0664)	(0.0699)	(0.0625)	(0.0881)
Political Interest	0.0722***	0.0601***	0.0471***	0.1023***
	(0.0121)	(0.0124)	(0.0112)	(0.0158)
Treatment x Interest	0.0014	0.0078	0.0038	−0.0019
	(0.0172)	(0.0176)	(0.0158)	(0.0224)
Constant	0.5269***	0.5780***	0.6335***	0.3989***
	(0.0469)	(0.0494)	(0.0442)	(0.0623)
Observations	290	274	296	268
R^2	0.2134	0.1756	0.1324	0.2437
Adjusted R^2	0.2051	0.1665	0.1235	0.2351
Residual Std. Error	0.1247 (df = 286)	0.1297 (df = 270)	0.1270 (df = 292)	0.1461 (df = 264)
F Statistic	25.8563*** (df = 3; 286)	19.1744*** (df = 3; 270)	14.8543*** (df = 3; 292)	28.3606*** (df = 3; 264)
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Figure C. Interaction regression coefficient plot for interaction effect of lie treatments and political interest moderator on electability index



Our first hypothesis was upheld since the Electability Difference dropped significantly after the lie was revealed. By conducting a one-way ANOVA our second, third, and fourth hypotheses were rejected as they indicated no difference between the lie types. Finally, we ran a regression analysis that showed that our moderator, political interest, did not account for a significant amount of variability in the Electability Difference in any of the groups, thus rejecting our fifth hypothesis.

DISCUSSION

Our study focused on answering two questions about a candidate's electability by analyzing the perception of voters when evaluating the electoral process. The questions that we attempted to answer are as follows: what are voters' perceptions of a candidate after it has been revealed that the candidate had lied to them? How does the type of lie influence a candidate's electability?

By creating a standardized Electability Index Before and an Electability Index After, and then an Electability Index Difference, we assessed participant’s evaluation of the candidate. The results indicated that the biographical lies and the policy lies had a drop in the Electability Difference of a candidate after a lie was revealed. Conducting a one-way ANOVA allowed us to compare the different types of lies and it indicated there was no significant difference between the types of lies. Our study reveals that political candidates are deemed to be less electable by voters if they are found to have lied, but that the type of lie does not have a difference on the severity of the electability drop.

Our study is limited largely due to the small sample size, as we only had 565 participants complete the survey. Additionally, only 347 of these respondents passed our manipulation check

in which we asked respondents to recall which type of lie was revealed to them. This means that 218 participants, or almost 39%, of our participants were not paying close attention to the survey. Additionally, our respondent group was not representative of the larger United States population, as the group was skewed in varying ways. For example, Hispanics were over-represented, while African Americans were underrepresented in our sample. Our respondents also completed more levels of education than the general United States population.

Finally, we recommend that future research could be conducted using a similar study to ours that utilizes specific partisan cues. Our study did not contain anything that stated or cued whether our fictional politician was a Democrat or Republican. As a consequence, participants in our study did not have strong opinions on the candidate. Perhaps a future research study could insert partisanship into the sample candidate, and then measure the candidate's electability before and after the lie is revealed for those of the participant's same and opposing party.

APPENDIX A - VIGNETTES

Initial Biography:

Age Lie Reveal Headline:



Policy Lie Reveal Headline:



Socioeconomic Lie Reveal Headline:



Education Lie Reveal Headline:



APPENDIX B - T-TEST TABLES

Table A. One sample, two-tailed t-test of the Electability Difference after Age lie treatment

Parameter	Dif. of Means	95% CI	*t*	*df*	*p*	*d*
Age	-0.03	[-0.05, -0.02]	-3.98	144	< .001	-0.33

Table B. One sample, two-tailed t-test of the Electability Difference after Policy lie treatment

Parameter	Dif. of Means	95% CI	*t*	*df*	*p*	*d*
Policy	-0.03	[-0.05, -0.01]	-2.90	136	.004	-0.25

Table C. One sample, two-tailed t-test of the Electability Difference after Education lie treatment

Parameter	Dif. of Means	95% CI	*t*	*df*	*p*	*d*
Education	-0.04	[-0.06, -0.01]	-3.31	148	.001	-0.27

Table D. One sample, two-tailed t-test of the Electability Difference after Socioeconomic Background lie treatment

Parameter	Dif. of Means	95% CI	*t*	*df*	*p*	*d*
Socioeconomic	-0.03	[-0.05, -0.01]	-2.78	133	.006	-0.24

APPENDIX C - REGRESSION TABLE

Table F. Regression table for effect of lie treatments on Electability After

	Dependent variable:			
	Electability Index			
	Age	Policy	Education	Socioeconomic
Lie Treatment	-0.0342^{**}	-0.0321^{*}	-0.0360^{**}	-0.0319
	(0.0163)	(0.0171)	(0.0157)	(0.0203)
Constant	0.7992^{***}	0.8111^{***}	0.8132^{***}	0.7928^{***}
	(0.0115)	(0.0121)	(0.0111)	(0.0144)
Observations	290	274	298	268
R^2	0.0150	0.0128	0.0175	0.0092
Adjusted R^2	0.0116	0.0092	0.0142	0.0055
Residual Std. Error	0.1390 (df = 288)	0.1414 (df = 272)	0.1352 (df = 296)	0.1666 (df = 266)
F Statistic	4.3896^{**} (df = 1; 288)	3.5332^{*} (df = 1; 272)	5.2746^{**} (df = 1; 296)	2.4636 (df = 1; 266)
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table G. Randomization check for treatment groups

	Dependent variable:		
	Policy	Education	Socioeconomic
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Race	0.0238	0.0749	0.0044
	(0.1285)	(0.1203)	(0.1254)
Span/Hisp/Latino	−0.3915**	−0.3291**	−0.2543
	(0.1593)	(0.1577)	(0.1600)
Gender	0.4442*	0.2652	−0.1224
	(0.2482)	(0.2422)	(0.2490)
Age	−0.0136***	0.0005	−0.0052***
	(0.0005)	(0.0005)	(0.0005)
Income	−0.0233	0.0074	−0.0605
	(0.0479)	(0.0462)	(0.0478)
Level of Education	0.0371	−0.1719	−0.1334
	(0.1236)	(0.1140)	(0.1198)
Party	0.2450	0.0483	0.1210
	(0.1990)	(0.1959)	(0.2008)
Constant	26.4163***	−0.2592***	11.5880***
	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,560.8120	1,560.8120	1,560.8120
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table H. Regression table for effect of lie treatment on electability index with imbalance demographic controls

	Dependent variable:			
	Electability Index			
	Age	Policy	Education	Socioeconomic
Lie Treatment	−0.0342**	−0.0321*	−0.0360**	−0.0319
	(0.0163)	(0.0168)	(0.0150)	(0.0198)
Span/Hisp/Latino	−0.0229	−0.0399**	−0.0575***	−0.0820***
	(0.0177)	(0.0176)	(0.0153)	(0.0210)
Age	0.0007	0.0014*	0.0023***	−0.0013
	(0.0007)	(0.0008)	(0.0007)	(0.0009)
Constant	−0.5170	−1.9638	−3.6432***	3.4847*
	(1.4754)	(1.4937)	(1.3895)	(1.7756)
Observations	290	274	298	268
R^2	0.0254	0.0489	0.1034	0.0653
Adjusted R^2	0.0152	0.0384	0.0942	0.0546
Residual Std. Error	0.1388 (df = 286)	0.1393 (df = 270)	0.1296 (df = 294)	0.1624 (df = 264)
F Statistic	2.4896* (df = 3; 286)	4.6291*** (df = 3; 270)	11.2965*** (df = 3; 294)	6.1428*** (df = 3; 264)
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

APPENDIX D - REFERENCES

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