

# **Veneration vs. Respect: Reevaluating Public Aversion to Amending the U.S. Constitution**

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## **I. Introduction**

This year marks 236 years since the U.S. Constitution was originally written by the Founding Fathers at the Philadelphia Convention. While still hailed today as the “supreme law of the land,” the document finds itself in extraordinarily ancient standing compared to the average 42-year lifespan of the constitutions of democratic nations around the rest of the world (Albert 2021). One of the most well-documented contributors to the Constitution’s unique longevity is the respect Americans harbor for it—their constitutional veneration, or loyalty-begetting reverence to the U.S. Constitution. Historical polls indicate intense support from the American public for the Constitution (Stephanopoulos and Versteeg 2016), and political leaders from both sides of the aisle invoke appeals to the fundamental constitutionalism in all Americans (Levinson 2021). Amidst this assumed enthusiasm for our governmental framework, public discontent and distrust towards the federal government only heighten. Given the question of rewriting the Constitution to address Americans’ grievances appears unthinkable in our constitutionally entrenched political culture, the amendment process is the last feasible means of constitutional change.

In the Constitution’s 236 years of primacy, over 11,000 amendments to the Constitution have been proposed. Yet, only 27 have successfully received the support to be ratified, a paltry 0.002% success rate (“Amendments to the U.S. Constitution” n.d.). Looking at the last 50 years, that figure drops to only one successful amendment. Today’s political climate is only increasingly characterized by partisan polarization, begging the question of whether the Constitution can ever be amended again. In this paper, I explore Americans’ attitudes towards amending the Constitution—specifically, identifying the causes of purported amendment aversion and support for liberalizing a presently rigid amendment process.

First, I review the existing literature on constitutional veneration, its causes, and its established relationship with resistance to constitutional change. Next, I propose that current measures of constitutional veneration falsely equivocate it to the concept of constitutional respect and fail to identify the multidimensionality of constitutional respect. I argue respect separately comprises symbolic respect for the Constitution's founding significance (a measure of veneration), and perceptions of the document's modern relevance. In doing so, I predict contrasting relationships between the proposed dimensions of respect and various other constitutional attitudes, namely an individual's general support for constitutional amendment and desire to lower the current rigidity of the constitutional amendment process. Thirdly, I outline my procedure for obtaining survey data regarding Americans' attitudes towards the Constitution and its amendment. I then present my findings from the survey, testing relationships between constitutional respect, general amendment support, preferred amendment rigidity, and constitutional knowledge. Finally, I apply these findings to evaluate my hypotheses and discuss how they support a distinction of symbolic constitutional veneration from belief of constitutional relevance, challenging the notion that a venerating American public is irreparably resistant to constitutional change.

This paper ultimately seeks to introduce a multidimensional lens to reevaluate predictors of public support for amending the U.S. Constitution and making amendment more attainable. While the document remains one of the oldest constitutions in the world, my findings highlight that the American public's enduring respect for the Constitution does not discount their belief in a need for amendment.

## **II. Literature Review**

## **1. Constitutional Respect + Veneration**

When it was first written in 1787, James Madison, often deemed the Father of the Constitution, advocated for a culture of constitutional veneration to curtail frequent amendment and stabilize a budding union. At the same time, Thomas Jefferson critiqued the very same concept of constitutional veneration for establishing a dogmatic resistance to change, even with the new experiences of passing generations (Albert 2021).

In October 2014, Stephanopoulos and Versteeg (2016) set out to explain the causes for general constitutional veneration by conducting a nationally representative online survey asking Americans about their approval for federal and state constitutions, as well as different factors that may predict said approval. Their results found higher approval for the U.S. Constitution relative to state constitutions. For both, constitutional approval was predicted by how proud they were to live in the relevant jurisdiction (the U.S. for the federal constitution, and their home state for their state constitution), as well as their self-reported familiarity with each constitution. Conversely, policy congruence, which was measured by comparing provisions respondents desired in their state constitutions and policies actually in them, was found to have no relation to constitutional approval. Further, while Republicans were somewhat more likely to approve of their constitutions, demographic differences were otherwise not statistically significant (Stephanopoulos and Versteeg 2016).

It's worth noting that this study used self-reported metrics for both constitutional approval and knowledge, potentially creating respondent bias. Still, besides introducing several individual-level factors that help explain constitutional attitudes, the study asserts state constitutional approval does not necessarily indicate substantive support of its contents.

In his foundational work on veneration, *Constitutional Faith*, Sanford Levinson (1988) proposes two divisions in constitutional thinking. The first regards *how* the Constitution should be interpreted—based on its explicit text alone, or including unwritten tradition set by judicial precedent. The second debate involves *who* has the authority to interpret the Constitution—every individual, or the Supreme Court alone. In total, this generates four schools of constitutional ideology, and likewise four different ways to view and respect the Constitution: as an unchanging and objective text, a transforming and interpretable text, a static but widely interpretable text, and a dynamic but objectively read text (Levinson 1988).

Despite this variation, the current state of survey research only loosely defines constitutional veneration as a reverence for or loyalty to the U.S. Constitution. Past attempts to measure veneration range from questions asking whether the Constitution should be amended (Ballard 2022; Lepore 2022), how credible the Founders were, how strictly judges should interpret the Constitution (Brown and Pope 2018; Dawes and Zink 2021), whether the Constitution is enduring (Associated Press 2012), and the extent to which the Constitution is sound today (Levinson and Blake 2016). There is yet literature that explicitly recognizes different ways to respect the Constitution than veneration, though some contain questions that address the different facets. Most notably, Brown and Pope (2018) utilize a seven-question battery for constitutional respect to find that learning about a state constitution's age and amendment rate enhances the respect people have for it, especially when it is young and amended frequently. The study's respect battery ranges from considering perceptions of the Founding Fathers to the modern relevance of the Constitution (Brown and Pope 2018).

## **2. Amendment Support + Aversion**

Dawes and Zink (2021; 2016) perform their own surveys to link constitutional veneration (equivocated in their study to constitutional respect) to amendment resistance. In the first of two online survey experiments replicating their surveys from 2016, they measure constitutional respect by asking respondents one question on the extent to which the U.S. Constitution works well or needs change. In their second survey, Dawes and Zink employ Brown and Pope's (2018) more robust constitutional respect battery. In both surveys, Dawes and Zink find significantly lower levels of support for hypothetical policies framed as constitutional amendments than when framed as federal law, and constitutional respect is a significant predictor of the treatment effect. In other words, the greater one's reverence for the Constitution, the stronger their opposition to constitutional change.

While the employment of surveys in a research setting to explain constitutional attitudes is a relatively young phenomenon, Americans have been polled about their support for constitutional change for decades. A Gallup/Newsweek poll in 1987 saw 53 percent of respondents stating the Constitution is basically sound in meeting the needs of the country, while the other 47 percent saw a need for basic changes or amendments (Levinson and Blake 2016). Jumping ahead to the 21st century, a 2012 telephone survey of U.S. residents found 69 percent of Americans believing the U.S. Constitution is "an enduring document that remains relevant today," while only 28 percent believed it was "an outdated document that needs to be modernized" (Associated Press 2012). The most recent polls, however, suggest a more consistent trend towards openness to constitutional change. A YouGov poll in 2022 concluded 39% of Americans think the Constitution should ever be changed in any way, while another 39% argue it should not. The poll also found Democrats were significantly more supportive of constitutional change (62%) than Republicans (17%) (Ballard 2022). Another poll in 2022 saw 41% of

respondents claim the Constitution should be more frequently reviewed and amended. Again, 72% of Democrats backed this claim, while 72 percent of Republicans think the Constitution is basically fine as it is (Lepore 2022). Overall, modern Americans appear split about making changes to the U.S. Constitution, largely on party lines.

### **3. Amendment Rigidity**

Article V, itself found in the Constitution, outlines the procedure for amending the Constitution. An amendment must first be proposed and approved by a two-thirds supermajority of both the U.S. House of Representatives and the Senate, or by a national convention called by two-thirds of state legislatures (though, a constitutional convention has never been called). The amendment is then passed to the states and becomes law only once ratified by three-fourths of state legislatures, or three-fourths of conventions called by the states (again, state ratifying conventions have only ever been exercised to ratify one amendment; George and Richards n.d.).

There is no shortage of scholarship indicting the U.S. Constitution as one of the hardest constitutions, if not the hardest, to amend in the world. In an analysis of 39 national constitutions, Astrid Lorenz (2005) ranks the U.S. Constitution as the second hardest to amend, behind only by the Belgian Constitution. Likewise, Arend Lijphart (2012) places the U.S. Constitution in a seven-way tie for first for amendment difficulty. In his own comparison, Donald Lutz (2009) ranks the U.S. Constitution as the hardest to amend among 32 constitutions. Lutz derives congruent findings when compared even to American state constitutions on an amendment difficulty index, concluding the federal amendment process is significantly more difficult than any state's (Levinson 2012). These studies focus primarily on the institutional process—Article V is distinct for its bicameral supermajority approval thresholds and reliance on

approval by both national and state governments. By contrast, most U.S. states require between a mere simple majority to two-thirds vote in the legislature to submit an amendment to a statewide referendum, then a simple majority of voters to ratify an amendment (Dinan 2023). As of 2022, 11,788 state constitutional amendments have been proposed to voters (an average of 235.76 per state), of which 7,813 were approved (about 156.26 per state) (Dinan 2023). These state amendment rates stagger above the 27 successful U.S. constitutional amendments, suggesting lower vote thresholds for approval define constitutions enjoying regular amendment.

Yet, Ginsburg and Melton propose that low amendment rates are not explained as much by procedural difficulty as they are by amendment culture, defined as normative social pressure for or against constitutional change (Ginsburg and Melton 2014). Their comparative analysis finds that institutional variables such as amendment vote thresholds are never statistically significant predictors of constitutional amendment rates, while amendment culture is the only consistent and substantively large predictor. This study utilizes a self-described imperfect operationalization of amendment culture—the rate of amendment of a country’s previous amendment—however more recent literature has rectified this with survey data. In 1937, Zachary Elkins asked Americans, “Should the Constitution be easier to amend?”, to which 28 percent said yes, and 60 percent said no. A similar survey in 1987—50 years later—found a similar result: 20 percent of respondents believed the Constitution was too hard to amend, and 60 percent thought it was as hard as it should be (Lepore 2022).

Madison seems to have won the founding debate on constitutional veneration, though this hasn’t stopped scholars from echoing Jefferson’s concerns today: Albert warns constitutional unamendability inhibits the democratic ideal of self-government, chaining today’s Americans to the will of their ancestors (Albert 2022). Lutz argues that an amendment process that makes



constitutional change too difficult interferes with necessary rectification of historical mistakes. At the same time, an excessively flexible amendment process fails to distinguish the importance of constitutional law over ordinary federal legislation—amendment processes must find a balance in difficulty (Levinson 1995).

#### **4. Constitutional Knowledge**

Contrary to Stephanopoulos and Versteeg's (2016) conclusion that constitutional knowledge is a significant predictor of constitutional approval, Dawes and Zink (2021) found no treatment effect of constitutional knowledge based on a brief political knowledge battery. Similarly, Brown and Pope (2018) find that additional information about constitutional age and amendment rates inclines respondents to both respect and be more open to reforming state constitutions, but has no effect on reverence towards the U.S. Constitution. Another report by the National Constitution Center suggests most Americans lack detailed knowledge about the Constitution but still endorse its core values (Wilson et al. 2002). Finally, Brown and Pope (2018) assert that information about constitutional amendment rates and age increased individuals' respect for their state constitution but not the U.S. Constitution. Thus, the majority of the literature appears to find constitutional familiarity is unrelated to federal constitutional respect.

Desired or not, there is little debate that the Constitution is not amended frequently. Key, then, to overcoming dangerous inhibitors of constitutional amendment is a reevaluation of our rigid amendment process and the predictors of public resistance to federal constitutional amendment.

### **III. Theory**

#### **1. Two Dimensions of Constitutional Respect**

Given Levinson's (1988) presentation of four distinct conceptions of the Constitution, it is easy to imagine someone who believes both that the Constitution was an admirable charter of democracy *and* that it would benefit from further amendment to maintain its relevance. Simultaneously, another could see the original text as imperfect but insist the Constitution derives legitimacy from its enduring interpretability and should not be wantonly changed. The current literature does not distinguish constitutional veneration from constitutional respect, but I contend that they are distinct concepts. The difference can be understood by decomposing measures of constitutional respect into two dimensions. The first, which I dub "symbolic respect," is an individual's level of respect for the Constitution as a symbol of Americanism, both in historical founding significance and democratic ideals. Separately, constitutional respect comprises a perception of "modern relevance," or one's belief that the Constitution is suitable in its current state for modern governance. Of the two, I argue only symbolic respect is a true measure of veneration. These two dimensions of constitutional respect, symbolic respect and perceived modern relevance, are the primary independent variables of this study. Given the combined measurement of these supposed dimensions in past work (Dawes and Zink 2021; Brown and Pope 2018) and Madison's theory that symbolic respect would beget amendment aversion (Albert 2021), I anticipate symbolic constitutional respect strengthens belief in modern constitutional relevance.

The distinction of veneration as symbolic respect rather than belief in modern relevance may explain some of the phenomena in the existing literature. Brown and Pope (2018) utilize a

battery that factors in both measures of symbolic respect (e.g., wisdom of the writers of a constitution) and perceived modern relevance (e.g., need for constitutional amendment to address modern concerns). As a result, it follows that learning about a state constitution's frequent amendment rates and relative youth improves observed respect via perceptions of greater modern relevance. On the other hand, information about the U.S. Constitution's old age and low amendment rate did not significantly change respondents' respect for it, potentially explained by the high symbolic respect it maintains despite potential perceptions of modern irrelevance.

## **2. Dimensions of Constitutional Respect vs. Amendment Support**

Dawes and Zink's (2021) study associates constitutional respect with lower support for constitutional policy change. However, they employ the same constitutional respect battery as Brown and Pope, measuring both symbolic respect and belief in constitutional relevance (Brown and Pope 2018), so a finding that those who believe the Constitution should not be amended are more resistant to constitutional change should come as no surprise. It is worth reevaluating whether amendment aversion is truly a product of symbolic respect/constitutional veneration, or merely of disbelief in modern relevance. Brown and Pope (2018) find that individuals express greater desire for government reform upon learning about the disparity in amendment rates of the U.S. and state constitutions despite not exhibiting a significant change in federal constitutional respect. I thus presume their desire for reform stems from discontent with constitutional relevance, not symbolic respect, and that support for or resistance to constitutional amendment is also predicted by perceived modern relevance rather than symbolic respect.

## **3. Dimensions of Constitutional Respect vs. Preferred Amendment Rigidity**

A multitude of work points to the United States' onerous amendment process as its primary obstacle to the passage of constitutional amendments. Although recent survey research has shifted away from scrutinizing the amendment process itself, my study will revisit whether the low support for decreasing amendment rigidity reported in the 20th century still holds after a drought in constitutional change. My work will also expand upon Dawes and Zink's (2021) work linking constitutional respect to amendment resistance; under the assumption that those who are more resistant to amendment will prefer the amendment process to be more rigid, or difficult to attain approve amendments under, I anticipate that the predictors of amendment support will also strengthen preferences for more rigid amendment processes.

#### **4. Constitutional Knowledge vs. Dimensions of Constitutional Respect**

The literature signals there is no relationship between constitutional knowledge (familiarity with the Constitution's textual provisions) and respect. However, this finding may change when analyzed through the two separate dimensions of respect. Taking into account that most Americans resonate with the Constitution's general values despite being unaware of its specific provisions (Wilson et al. 2002), I hold that constitutional knowledge does not impact symbolic respect. Likewise, the conclusion that education about low amendment rates and old constitutional age, a fact that should damage perceptions of modern relevance, does not affect federal constitutional respect (Brown and Pope 2018), I hold that constitutional knowledge has no effect on perceived modern relevance either. While Stephanopoulos and Versteeg report constitutional familiarity increases constitutional support (Stephanopoulos and Versteeg 2021), I am skeptical that self-reported knowledge (as opposed to factual assessment) confidently acts as

more than a measure of familiarity with basic democratic principles or affectively biased self-perception.

In sum, my hypotheses are as follows:

**H<sub>1</sub>:** Constitutional respect has two distinct dimensions of symbolic constitutional respect and perceived modern constitutional relevance.

**H<sub>2</sub>:** Stronger symbolic constitutional respect strengthens perceived modern constitutional relevance.

**H<sub>3A</sub>:** Symbolic constitutional support is unrelated to general amendment support.

**H<sub>3B</sub>:** Weaker perceptions of modern constitutional relevance increases general amendment support.

**H<sub>4A</sub>:** Symbolic constitutional respect is unrelated to preferred amendment process rigidity.

**H<sub>4B</sub>:** Stronger perceptions of modern constitutional relevance increases preferred amendment process rigidity.

**H<sub>5A</sub>:** Greater constitutional knowledge is unrelated to symbolic constitutional respect.

**H<sub>5B</sub>:** Greater constitutional knowledge is unrelated to perceived modern constitutional relevance.

While absent from my primary hypotheses, I also intend to determine whether constitutional respect (and either of its theoretical dimensions) and/or general amendment support are related to one's personal identity, particularly their partisan affiliation. Past work has found that Americans concede that not all Americans may be taking equal advantage of the rights provided in the Constitution (Wilson et al. 2002), suggesting typically marginalized groups will exhibit lower constitutional respect as a whole.

## **IV. Methods**

### **1. Dimensions of Constitutional Respect**

The respect section of my survey begins with some basic information about the U.S. Constitution, including its adoption year, amendment rate, and supremacy over all other laws. In order to measure my two proposed dimensions of constitutional respect, I repurpose the respect battery used by Dawes and Zink (2021) and Brown and Pope (2018). After making several revisions and omitting one question to enhance precision and conciseness (see Appendix A.1), the battery included three questions I anticipate address the concept of symbolic respect, and three that determine perceived modern relevance (distinguished in Appendix A.1). Responses to each question were standardized on a scale of zero (lowest respect) to one (highest respect). The average scores for each of the two subsets constitute my measures of symbolic respect and perceived modern relevance. A multivariate linear regression analysis of perceived modern relevance on symbolic respect can test whether the latter predicts the former ( $H_2$ ).

If constitutional respect is indeed a multidimensional concept ( $H_1$ ), factor analysis of the battery should yield significant eigenvalues ( $> 1$  by Kaiser's rule) for at least two factors, with significant factor loadings on the questions targeting each respect dimension. Both previous administrations of this battery only identified one factor (despite one of the studies finding two significant factors but chalking the second up to a residual dimension) (Dawes and Zink 2021; Brown and Pope 2018), but I argue that the updated battery will distill clearer multidimensionality.

### **2. Amendment Rigidity**

While the literature on amendment rigidity varies in its operationalization of what makes an amendment process difficult (e.g., bicameral vs. unicameral legislature, number of actors/stages involved), they all tend to focus on majority vote requirements (Lorenz 2005). As such, I will operationalize preferred amendment rigidity as respondents' preference for higher, lower, or maintained amendment approval thresholds at each stage of the U.S. amendment process. To gauge preferences for amendment process rigidity, respondents are first shown a brief description of the primarily employed amendment process: a two-thirds vote in both the Senate and House of Representatives to approve the amendment, then ratification by three-fourths of state legislatures. The first question is an attention check to determine whether the respondent retained the information about the vote thresholds required for amendment approval in the Senate and House of Representatives. The next two questions are rotated between asking whether the 67% amendment vote requirement in both houses of Congress is too high, too low, or just right, and the same for the 75% requirement for state legislatures. Relationships between results from the respect and rigidity sections will be tested via multivariate regression analysis to evaluate  $H_{4A}$  and  $H_{4B}$ .

### **3. Amendment Support**

Dawes and Zink (2021) present their survey takers with hypothetical constitutional amendments to measure general resistance to constitutional amendment. In order to calculate general amendment support, I apply a similar strategy and present respondents with a series of six hypothetical constitutional amendments, then ask them to rate their level of support or opposition. To minimize the influence of the content of the amendment itself, the amendments were intentionally selected to fall on a balanced range of political ideology (confirmable if factor

analysis identifies an ideological factor with weights of varying magnitude and polarity for conservative- vs. liberal-tending policies) (see Appendix A.3). Support for each amendment will be standardized on a scale from zero (strongest opposition) to one (strongest support), then averaged to derive a “general amendment support” score that reflects an individual’s propensity to support constitutional amendment, regardless of content.

Four of the six amendments were selected based on Pew Research Center’s list of the most common subjects of proposed constitutional amendments from 1999 to 2018: congressional term limits, flag desecration, direct presidential election, and equal gender rights (DeSilver 2018). Amendments that were more difficult to explain to respondents were excluded, such as balanced budget and campaign finance reform. An abortion ban amendment was included in light of the 2022 Supreme Court decision in *Dobbs v. Jackson* to discount a constitutional right to abortion, bringing abortion law to the forefront of modern public discourse. Lastly, a gun control amendment was added as an ideological balance to the abortion ban, inspired by California governor Gavin Newsom’s proposal earlier in the year of a 28th Amendment that would constitutionally enshrine various gun safety measures (“Governor Newsom Proposes Historic 28th Amendment” 2023).

As with rigidity, I will evaluate  $H_{3A}$  and  $H_{3B}$  via multivariate regression analysis between the two proposed dimensions of constitutional respect and general amendment support. Beyond typical demographic covariates, in the likely case that ideological partiality influences support for each amendment, it is especially pertinent that I control for partisan affiliation, acquired in the demographics section of the survey.

#### **4. Constitutional Knowledge**



To measure respondents' level of knowledge of the content of the Constitution, I adapted three questions of varying difficulty from the 2022 Annenberg Constitution Day Civics Survey: identifying the branches of government, House Representative term length, and First Amendment rights (Annenberg Public Policy Center 2022). The average score of the three questions (each scored as outlined in Appendix A.4) will act as the “constitutional knowledge” score for each respondent, to be used to evaluate  $H_{5A}$  and  $H_{5B}$  through multivariate regression analysis with the constitutional respect dimensions.

## **5. Demographics**

The final section of the survey obtains demographic information from each respondent, including race, gender, birth year, household income, citizenship status, education level, and partisan affiliation.

The full survey instrument can be found in Appendix A.

I conducted my pre-test survey in November 2023, administered online with Qualtrics software. The final sample contained 106 respondents. Respondents were invited to participate in the study through online posts on Instagram and GroupMe. Students at Rice University comprised the majority of study participants.. Of those who provided demographic information, the average respondent was 20 years old, and their median household income was between \$100,000 and \$149,999. 40.95% of respondents identified as male, and 51.43% as female. The largest represented racial group was White, capturing 49.06% of respondents, followed by Asian at 46.23% of respondents, then Black or African-American at 6.60% (not mutually exclusive). 15.09% of respondents identified as Spanish, Hispanic, or Latino, including 19.23% of White

respondents. Only 16.19% of respondents reported having completed a four-year Bachelor's degree in college or higher, corresponding with the fact that most individuals contacted to complete the survey were college students. Nearly all respondents, 98.10%, were U.S. citizens. Lastly, those who identified as or leaned to Democratic were overrepresented in my sample, comprising 85.85% of the sample as opposed to only 9.43% identifying as or leaning Republican (ten respondents). The remaining 4.72% did not identify with either political party. Again, this Democratic bias is in line with expectations given a sample frame of primarily college students.

## **V. RESULTS**

### **1. Descriptive Statistics**

Utilizing Kaiser's rule, factor analysis of the six-question constitutional respect battery identifies two factors with eigenvalues above 1—the first factor yields an eigenvalue of 3.77, and a second yields an eigenvalue of 1.07 (a third factor has an eigenvalue of only 0.71, below the cutoff of significance). After transforming response data for each question such that they ranged from 1 (lowest respect) to 5 (highest respect), the questions loaded onto each of the two factors by approximately the groupings hypothesized. Using the generally accepted factor loading cutoff value of 0.4, the first factor comprises the three questions I hypothesized pertained to symbolic constitutional respect: whether the Constitution deserves Americans' respect, if the writers of the Constitution were only looking out for themselves, and if the writers of the Constitution were wise and visionary.

The questions on whether the Constitution is outdated, whether it must be amended to address modern concerns, and whether it has been amended too few, too many, or the right number of times heavily load onto the second factor with loadings above .6. I define this second

factor as a measure of the Constitution's perceived modern relevance. Notably, the question on whether the writers of the Constitution were only looking out for themselves also loaded onto this factor with a value of .46, suggesting perceptions of the Founders' selfishness may reflect respondents' beliefs that the Constitution is no longer relevant.

This factor analysis supports **H<sub>1</sub>**—constitutional respect contains two distinct dimensions. For the purpose of evaluating their relationships with other constitutional attitude variables, I create two new independent variables: one for symbolic respect, averaging the scores of the three questions that load onto it, and another for modern relevance with the same procedure. To distinguish the two factors in my analyses, I choose to restrict the Founders' selfishness question to the first factor, for which it had a stronger factor loading of .57. The complete factor loadings are reported in Table 1.


Table 1: Constitutional Respect Factor Loadings

	Factor 1	Factor 2
Respect	0.4668659	0.2617802
Founders Selfish	0.5738186	0.4572608
Outdated	0.2899368	0.7312527
Founders Wise	0.8738721	0.1422063
Modern Concerns	0.1623897	0.7342663
Amendment Rate	0.2719075	0.6066793

Observed symbolic respect scores ranged from 0.33 to 1.00, with a mean of .69. By contrast, modern relevance scores had a similar range from 0.2 to 1.0 but generated a mean of .36; respondents on average expressed substantially stronger disagreement with questions about the Constitution's relevance than its respectability. Symbolic respect scores were distributed


relatively evenly, though the distribution of modern relevance scores exhibits a skew right (see Figure A).

Figure A. Distribution of constitutional respect dimension scores



In the amendment rigidity section, respondents' rigidity scores, averaged between their attitudes towards the Congress approval threshold and state legislature approval threshold, ranged from 0.33 to 0.833, with a mean of 0.57. However, a substantially higher portion of respondents (46.23%) believed the three-fourths approval threshold for state legislatures was too high compared to the 16.98% that believed the two-thirds threshold for Congress was too high. Meanwhile, a clear majority of respondents (77.36%) believed the congressional threshold was just right, contrary to the 53.77% that said the same of the state legislative threshold. Still, for both Congress and state legislatures, a plurality of respondents believed the current proportions required for approval are just right (see Figure B).

Figure B. Constitutional amendment approval threshold attitude counts



Looking at the six hypothetical amendments proposed to respondents, support was lowest for a 15-week abortion ban, yielding a mean support score of 0.40. On the other hand, an amendment enshrining gender equality had the highest mean support score of 0.96. Mean support scores for each amendment can be found in Figure C. General amendment support, a score averaging support across the six amendments, ranged from 0.38 and 1.00, with a mean of 0.74 (see Figure D).

Figure C. Mean constitutional amendment support scores by amendment





Figure D. Distribution of general constitutional amendment support scores



I conducted a second factor analysis on the amendment support questions to evaluate whether the amendments fall across an ideological political range. A calculation of factor eigenvalues identified one significant factor with an eigenvalue of 1.59. As anticipated, amendments that tend to align with a conservative platform, such as the abortion ban and, more weakly, prohibiting flag desecration, yield negative factor weights. By contrast, liberal amendments such as stricter gun control, abolishing the electoral college, and gender equality are

associated with high positive weights. Term limits, while initially included as a conservative-tending amendment due to its traditional proposal by Republicans in Congress, has a factor weight of 0.07 and thus seems not to lean strongly in either ideological direction. Ultimately, it appears that my selection of proposed constitutional amendments does span across an ideological spectrum, as intended. Factor weights for each amendment can be found in Table 2.

Table 2: Amendment Support Factor Loadings

	Factor 1
Flag Desecration	-0.1697141
Abortion Ban	-0.4750498
Term Limits	0.0735092
Gender Equality	0.5856034
Gun Control	0.7555539
Electoral College	0.6097380

Finally, constitutional knowledge, a score derived from correct answers to the three questions about constitutional content, ranged from 0.33 to 1.00, with a mean score of .77 (see Figure D). In line with the literature, most respondents appear to have a sound understanding of the more basic tenets of the Constitution such as the three branches of government it establishes, though they are not as familiar with finer details such as the precise rights outlined in the First Amendment.

Figure E. Distribution of constitutional knowledge scores




## 2. Regression Analysis

With the establishment of two distinct dimensions of constitutional respect, they can be independently tested for relationships with other constitutional attitudes. Both a simple bivariate linear regression of modern relevance on symbolic respect and a multivariate regression with demographic controls yield significant, positive coefficients for symbolic respect at the  $\alpha = .05$  level (see Table 3 in Appendix B). The model with controls includes covariates for race (White, Black, Asian, and Spanish/Hispanic/Latino), gender, age, income, citizenship status, college graduation, and partisan affiliation. In this model, symbolic respect has a coefficient of 0.236, indicating that, holding all else constant, someone with the strongest possible symbolic constitutional respect score (1.00) is expected to have a modern constitutional relevance score 0.236 points higher than someone with the weakest possible symbolic constitutional respect (0.00). This finding supports **H<sub>2</sub>**, that stronger symbolic respect strengthens one's belief that the Constitution is relevant enough for modern governance. The coefficients of the two models are plotted on Figure F.



Figure F. Coefficient plot for effect of symbolic respect score on modern relevance score




I employ a series of multivariate linear regressions to test for relationships between the constitutional respect dimensions and general amendment support. A regression of general amendment support on symbolic respect and the same set of demographic controls as the first multivariate regression yields a negative coefficient of -0.031, however it is insignificant ( $p = 0.74$ ) (see Table 4 in Appendix B). This supports  $H_{3A}$ , that symbolic constitutional respect is actually unrelated to one's propensity to support constitutional amendment in general.

Conversely, regression of general amendment support on modern relevance and demographic controls yields a significant, negative coefficient of -0.37 ( $p < 0.001$ ). The same conclusions hold in a model with both symbolic respect and modern relevance variables—symbolic respect remains nonsignificant ( $p = 0.57$ ), and modern relevance stays significant ( $p < 0.001$ ) and yields a coefficient of even greater magnitude, -0.39. This signifies a respondent with the maximum possible modern relevance score is expected to report an amendment support score 0.39 points lower than someone with the minimum possible modern relevance score, holding all else constant (see Table 4 in Appendix B). Thus,  $H_{3B}$  is supported; weaker perceptions of modern

constitutional relevance predict higher support levels for constitutional amendment. Figure G illustrates the negative significance of the modern relevance coefficient relative to symbolic respect.


Figure G. Coefficient plot for effect of constitutional respect dimensions on general amendment support



With the same procedure as general amendment support, I examine the effect of the constitutional respect dimensions on preferred amendment rigidity in Congress and state legislatures (measured by attitude toward current amendment approval vote thresholds). 91 of 106 respondents, a passable 85.8%, correctly answered my rigidity section attention check on the current amendment approval vote threshold in Congress. In a regression of preferred Congress amendment approval rigidity on both symbolic respect and modern relevance (with demographic controls), neither dimension yields a significant coefficient ( $p = 0.69$  and  $0.29$ , respectively). In a regression of preferred state legislature amendment approval rigidity on symbolic respect and modern relevance, symbolic respect still isn't significant ( $p = .69$ ). Likewise, the coefficient for modern relevance is not significant at the  $\alpha = .05$  level, however it is marginally significant ( $p =$

0.06) (see Table 5 in Appendix B). The coefficient of 0.29 is also relatively large—a respondent with the maximum modern relevance score is expected to report a rigidity score 0.29 points higher than one with the minimum modern relevance score, holding all else constant. The insignificance of the constitutional respect terms supports  $H_{4A}$ , that symbolic support is unrelated to preferred amendment process rigidity. However, I reject  $H_{4B}$ ; there is modest but ultimately insufficient evidence to conclude that a stronger belief of modern constitutional relevance increases one’s preference for a more rigid amendment process. Given the marginal significance and large coefficient, though, it may be reasonable to suppose that a larger, more representative sample could find a significant effect, specifically regarding the currently more rigid requirement for three-fourths of state legislatures to approve constitutional amendments. The coefficients for each respect dimension for both amendment stages are plotted below in Figure H.


Figure H. Coefficient plot for effect of constitutional respect dimensions on preferred amendment rigidity



To address my last hypotheses, I conduct one more series of multivariate regressions, this time the constitutional respect dimensions on constitutional knowledge. A regression of symbolic

respect on constitutional knowledge, controlling for modern relevance score and demographic factors, yields a nonsignificant coefficient of 0.11 for knowledge ( $p = 0.21$ ). Similarly, a regression of modern relevance on constitutional knowledge with controls for symbolic respect and demographic factors generates a nonsignificant coefficient of 0.08 ( $p = 0.31$ ) (see Table 6 in Appendix B). Consequently, I find support for both  $H_{5A}$  and  $H_{5B}$ : greater constitutional knowledge fails to significantly change symbolic respect or perceived modern relevance. Figure I shows the nonsignificance of constitutional knowledge on both respect dimensions.

Figure I. Coefficient plot for effect of constitutional knowledge on constitutional respect dimensions



My final regression analyses explore which demographic variables predict each dimension of constitutional respect. I first regress symbolic respect on all collected demographic data and identify significant negative coefficients of -0.09 for identifying as female ( $p = 0.01$ ), -0.14 for identifying as a gender minority ( $p = 0.03$ ), and -0.24 for being a Democrat ( $p < 0.001$ ). In other words, non-male Americans are likely to display lower levels of symbolic constitutional

respect, as are Democrats by a substantively large amount. The same test on modern relevance finds two significant coefficients, 0.13 for identifying as White ( $p = 0.04$ ) and -0.30, again for being a Democrat ( $p < 0.001$ ). White respondents are less likely to feel that the Constitution requires updating, while Democrats are likely to feel much more strongly than others that it does (see Table 7 in Appendix B).

## **VI. DISCUSSION**

This study confirmed that existing measures of constitutional respect are actually tapping into two related but distinct concepts of symbolic respect and perceived modern relevance, where veneration is only captured by symbolic respect. This result suggests Americans can theoretically venerate the Constitution while still believing it fails to serve today's governmental needs in its current state.

Only perceived modern constitutional relevance, not respect for the Constitution as a symbol of American democracy, significantly predicted lower general likelihood of supporting constitutional amendments. This finding rejects past research arguing constitutional veneration causes resistance to amending the Constitution (Dawes and Zink 2021). Further, while my analysis concluded that neither dimension of constitutional respect was a significant predictor of preferred amendment approval rigidity, perceived modern relevance was still marginally significant and yielded a large, positive coefficient for preferred amendment rigidity at the state legislative stage of ratification. This result provides weak but supporting evidence that an individual who believes the Constitution should be amended to meet modern concerns would also prefer that the three-fourths state legislature approval threshold for constitutional amendment be lowered. In accordance with the majority of past findings (Dawes and Zink 2021;

Brown and Pope 2018), constitutional knowledge was not a significant predictor of either dimension of respect.

Finally, my tests of how demographic characteristics impact the constitutional respect dimensions supported the theory that marginalized groups in America tend to express lower respect for the Constitution. Women and gender minorities reported lower symbolic respect, potentially reflecting detachment from the all-male composition of the Constitution's original writers. Non-white respondents were significantly more likely to feel the Constitution was not sufficiently relevant to modern governance, indicating racial minorities may feel the document does not equitably serve all of its constituents in a nation significantly more diverse than it was over 200 years ago. The strongest demographic effect derived from Democratic respondents, who on average had much lower symbolic respect for the Constitution and perceptions that it functions well for modern governance. As the more ideologically progressive party in America's two-party system, this final finding does not come as a surprise, but spells out likely partisan polarization on future attempts at constitutional change.

The leading limitation of this study is the survey's small sample size of 106 respondents. Beyond diminished statistical power, my sample frame for participant recruitment was largely relegated to personal, demographically homogeneous networks. Democrats and college-aged Americans were significantly overrepresented, so it follows that a disproportionate number of respondents expressed lower levels of constitutional respect than the average American. As a result, my study should serve only as preliminary exploration of the multidimensionality of constitutional respect and warrants a nationally representative study in the future. Such a study should develop a more rigorous battery of statements to more specifically target each dimension

of constitutional respect, for instance gauging respect for founding ideals with the statement “The U.S. Constitution set sound principles of government.”

From a descriptive statistical standpoint, this study found very high levels of support for certain constitutional amendments, as well as a significant share of Americans who believe the requirement for three-fourths of state legislatures to ratify an amendment is too rigid. Despite the dwindling frequency of constitutional amendment in recent history, the American public displays openness to reevaluating whether our constitutional amendment process should be loosened. My study focused on just one method of constitutional amendment—approval by Congress and state legislatures. It may be worth future research to further distill the extent to which Americans seek to lower amendment rigidity by examining how the constitutional respect dimensions predict support for alternative paths to amendment, including a national constitutional convention or common state practices like citizen initiative and electoral referendum.

Future research should also investigate the specific causes of symbolic respect and modern relevance, as well as how amenable each dimension is. Past theory has long held that Americans venerate the Constitution on such faithful (rather than pragmatic) grounds that it borders on religion (Levinson 1988). However, if perceptions of modern relevance are the true primary respect-related predictor of amendment aversion, swaying public support for new amendments relies on the ability to change attitudes on constitutional outdatedness.

The underlying practical purpose of this study was to understand whether the constitutional amendment has gone extinct over time. The distinction of symbolic respect from perceived modern relevance provides a more promising outlook on the future of constitutional change than past studies have suggested. While constitutional veneration in the form of symbolic respect may be intractable in today’s strong constitutional culture given its inherent roots in

history and emotive patriotism, this study suggests that veneration is not actually an obstacle to amending the Constitution. Rather, the greater significance of perceptions of modern constitutional irrelevance on openness to amendment reveals that effective partisan mobilization and harnessing dialogue on evolving policy realities can reopen the door to constitutional change.



## APPENDIX A - SURVEY INSTRUMENT

### 1. Constitutional Respect Section

Respondents were first presented the following text with basic information about the U.S.

Constitution:

*Since the U.S. Constitution was written and adopted in 1788, more than 11,000 amendments—additions or changes—to the Constitution have been proposed. However, only 27 have received the necessary approval to become amendments to the Constitution. As you may know, the Constitution takes priority over all federal, state, and local laws.*

*The following questions ask for your opinions about the U.S. Constitution.*

*Please indicate whether you strongly agree, somewhat agree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with each statement below.*

Respondents were then presented with the constitutional respect battery employed by Dawes and Zink (2021) and Brown and Pope (2018), with the following revisions:

- First I shorten “The U.S. Constitution is an enduring document that deserves our respect.” to “The U.S. Constitution deserves our respect.” so as not to ask for both perceived endurance and respect.
- I change “The U.S. Constitution is an outdated document that needs to be modernized.” to “The U.S. Constitution is an outdated document.” to avoid asking for both perceived outdatedness and need for modernization.
- I replace “We should amend the U.S. Constitution more frequently so that it addresses modern concerns.” with “We need to amend the U.S. Constitution to better address modern concerns.” such that the question does not presume the Constitution doesn’t

already address modern concerns, and due to its similarity to the last question of the battery on whether the Constitution has been amended the right number of times.

- I omit the question on how judges should interpret the Constitution in light of Levinson's argument in *Constitutional Faith* that Americans have conflicting conceptions of the Constitution, one as the text alone, and one as both the text and unwritten tradition (Levinson 1988). Loose constructionists may still exhibit symbolic respect for the Constitution and feel that liberal interpretation discounts a need for constitutional modernization.

Ultimately, respondents were asked to rate their agreement with five statements on a five-point Likert scale ranging from "Strongly agree", "Somewhat agree", "Neither agree nor disagree", "Somewhat disagree", and "Strongly disagree". The statements were as follows, presented in random order and labeled :

- *The U.S. Constitution deserves Americans' respect.*
- *The people who wrote the U.S. Constitution were only looking out for themselves.*
- *The U.S. Constitution is an outdated document.*
- *The people who wrote the U.S. Constitution were wise and visionary.*
- *We need to amend the U.S. Constitution to better address modern concerns.*

Of these five statements, the first, second, and fourth were intended to measure symbolic respect, while the third and fifth measured perceived modern relevance. The following question about the Constitution's amendment rate was also included to measure perceived modern relevance and concluded the respect section:

*Would you say the U.S. Constitution has been amended too many, too few, or about the right number of times?*

- *Too high*
- *About the right number of times*
- *Too few*
- *Don't know*

## **2. Amendment Rigidity Section**

The rigidity section began by explaining one way the U.S. Constitution can be amended:

*Please read the following carefully:*

*An amendment to the U.S. Constitution is approved when:*

- *Two-thirds (67%) of the members of the Senate and two-thirds (67%) of the members of the House of Representatives vote to approve the amendment, AND*
- *Three-fourths (75%) of state legislatures vote to approve the amendment.*

*The next questions ask you about this process for amending the U.S. Constitution.*

On the page immediately after reading what the vote percentage requirements are for amendment approval in Congress and from state legislatures, respondents receive the following attention check (correct answer highlighted in bold):

*How many votes are required in the Senate and the House of Representatives to approve an amendment to the U.S. Constitution?*

- *One-half (50%) plus one vote*
- *Three-fifths (60%)*

- ***Two-thirds (67%)***
- *Three-fourths (75%)*

The next two questions (one for both houses of Congress and one for state legislatures) remind respondents of the vote percentage threshold for approval in each stage of amendment, then asks whether they believe the requirement is “Too high”, “Just right”, or “Too low”. I rotate the order of these two questions, shown below:

- *The current number of votes required in the Senate and the House of Representatives to approve an amendment to the U.S. Constitution is 67%. Is this too high, too low, or just right?*
- *The current number of state legislatures required to approve an amendment to the U.S. Constitution is 75%. Is this too high, too low, or just right?*

### **3. Specific amendment support section**

This section prefaces the questions with the following introduction:

*You will now read a series of proposed amendments to the U.S. Constitution. For each, please tell me whether you strongly support, somewhat support, somewhat oppose, or strongly oppose the proposed amendment. If you have no preference, please indicate so.*

Each of the next six questions, presented in a random order, displays the content of a hypothetical constitutional amendment, then asks the following:

*Do you strongly support, somewhat support, somewhat oppose, or strongly oppose this amendment to the U.S. Constitution?*

- *Strongly support*
- *Somewhat support*
- *Somewhat oppose*
- *Strongly oppose*
- *No preference*

The six amendments proposed are as follows:

- *Authorize Congress to prohibit the physical violation of the U.S. flag.*
- *Prohibit doctors from performing abortions after 15 weeks of pregnancy, except in cases of rape, incest, or risks to the life and physical health of the mother.*
- *Limit the number of terms U.S. House Representatives and U.S. Senators can hold office.*
- *Guarantee equality of rights under the law on the basis of gender.*
- *Raise the minimum age to buy a firearm from 18 to 21 years of age.*
- *Replace the Electoral College with the direct popular election of the U.S. President.*

The amendments on flag desecration, abortion, and congressional term limits were selected as conservative-tending. The amendments on equal gender rights, gun control, and the Electoral College were selected as liberal-tending.

#### **4. Constitutional knowledge section**

The section on knowledge begins with the following instructions:

*The following questions will ask about your current knowledge of the U.S. Constitution.*

*There are many parts of the Constitution that Americans are not familiar with, so you are not expected to know the answer to all of the questions.*

*Please answer them to the best of your ability.*

Three questions were then posed to respondents, and answer options were randomized for the first and third questions. For greater ease for respondents and data analysis, the branches of government and First Amendment questions were changed from open to closed response, with three correct answers of six potential choices. Each question is scored out of one point; for the branches of government and First Amendment questions, each correct response earned one-third of a point, while each incorrect response subtracted one-third (with a minimum score of zero).

The questions are as follows, with correct answers highlighted in bold:

*Which of the following are branches of the U.S. federal government listed in the U.S.*

*Constitution? Check all that apply.*

- ***Executive***
- ***Legislative***
- ***Judicial***
- *Bureaucratic*
- *Defense*
- *Treasury*

*How many years are there in one full term of office for a member of the U.S. House of Representatives?*

- 2
- 4
- 6
- 8
- *Not sure*

*Which of the following are specific rights guaranteed by the First Amendment of the Constitution? Check all that apply.*

- ***Freedom of speech***
- ***Freedom of religion***
- ***Right of assembly***
- *Right to bear arms*
- *Right to vote*
- *Right to jury trial*

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## APPENDIX B - REGRESSION TABLES

Table 3. OLS regression table for effect of modern relevance score on symbolic respect score

Table 3: Constitutional Respect Dimension OLS Results

	Modern Relevance Simple	Controls
	(1)	(2)
Symbolic Respect	0.509*** (0.084)	0.236** (0.114)
White		0.115* (0.060)
Black		0.032 (0.084)
Asian		0.063 (0.062)
Span/Hispanic/Latino		0.024 (0.050)
Female		-0.028 (0.035)
Other Gender		-0.068 (0.071)
Age		-0.021 (0.013)
Income		-0.001 (0.004)
Citizen		0.008 (0.017)
College Grad		0.075* (0.043)
Democrat		-0.244*** (0.054)
Constant	0.003 (0.061)	0.740** (0.304)
Observations	87	76
R <sup>2</sup>	0.302	0.531
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

Table 4. OLS regression table for effect of constitutional respect dimensions on general amendment support

Table 4: Amendment Support OLS Results

	General Amendment Support		
	Sym. Respect	Modern Rel.	Both
Symbolic Respect	-0.031 (0.094)		0.058 (0.100)
Modern Relevance		-0.374*** (0.103)	-0.390*** (0.107)
White	-0.025 (0.048)	0.007 (0.052)	0.005 (0.053)
Black	-0.014 (0.068)	-0.012 (0.071)	-0.012 (0.072)
Asian	-0.012 (0.048)	0.019 (0.053)	0.016 (0.053)
Span/Hispanic/Latino	-0.017 (0.040)	0.005 (0.042)	0.005 (0.043)
Female	0.014 (0.028)	0.014 (0.029)	0.018 (0.030)
Other Gender	-0.005 (0.053)	-0.045 (0.058)	-0.036 (0.061)
Age	-0.004 (0.011)	-0.008 (0.011)	-0.009 (0.011)
Income	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.004)
Citizen	-0.007 (0.014)	-0.002 (0.014)	-0.002 (0.014)
College Grad	0.041 (0.035)	0.072* (0.038)	0.071* (0.038)
Democrat	0.071 (0.046)	-0.046 (0.050)	-0.037 (0.053)
Constant	0.791*** (0.254)	1.066*** (0.263)	1.034*** (0.270)
Observations	92	76	76
R <sup>2</sup>	0.104	0.273	0.277
<i>Note:</i>		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

Table 5. OLS regression table for effect of constitutional respect dimensions on preferred amendment rigidity

Table 5: Amendment Approval Rigidity OLS Results

	Preferred Rigidity Score	
	Congress	States
Symbolic Respect	0.054 (0.137)	-0.057 (0.139)
Modern Relevance	0.156 (0.146)	0.287* (0.148)
White	-0.025 (0.072)	-0.009 (0.073)
Black	-0.071 (0.098)	0.071 (0.099)
Asian	-0.137* (0.072)	-0.056 (0.073)
Span/Hispanic/Latino	0.011 (0.058)	0.152** (0.059)
Female	0.074* (0.041)	0.075* (0.041)
Other Gender	0.249*** (0.083)	0.071 (0.084)
Age	0.010 (0.016)	0.016 (0.016)
Income	-0.004 (0.005)	-0.003 (0.005)
Citizen	0.038* (0.019)	0.024 (0.020)
College Grad	0.017 (0.052)	-0.025 (0.052)
Democrat	-0.095 (0.072)	-0.094 (0.073)
Constant	0.417 (0.368)	0.164 (0.374)
Observations	76	76
R <sup>2</sup>	0.341	0.329
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

Table 6. OLS regression table for effect of constitutional respect dimensions on constitutional respect

Table 6: Constitutional Knowledge OLS Results		
	Sym. Respect	Modern Rel.
Knowledge	0.108 (0.085)	0.083 (0.080)
Modern Relevance	0.239* (0.131)	
Symbolic Respect		0.212* (0.117)
White	0.017 (0.066)	0.106* (0.061)
Black	-0.039 (0.094)	0.004 (0.088)
Asian	0.027 (0.068)	0.047 (0.064)
Span/Hispanic/Latino	-0.009 (0.053)	0.023 (0.050)
Female	-0.054 (0.037)	-0.023 (0.035)
Other Gender	-0.144* (0.074)	-0.058 (0.071)
Age	0.003 (0.014)	-0.023* (0.013)
Income	0.005 (0.005)	-0.0004 (0.004)
Citizen	0.015 (0.018)	0.012 (0.017)
College Grad	0.026 (0.048)	0.082* (0.044)
Democrat	-0.157** (0.063)	-0.245*** (0.054)
Constant	0.536 (0.330)	0.726** (0.304)
Observations	76	76
R <sup>2</sup>	0.460	0.539
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

Table 7. OLS regression table for effect of demographic measures on constitutional respect dimensions



Table 7: Demographic Predictor OLS Results

	Sym. Respect	Modern Rel.
White	0.021 (0.058)	0.129** (0.061)
Black	-0.001 (0.081)	0.033 (0.086)
Asian	0.024 (0.057)	0.080 (0.063)
Span/Hispanic/Latino	-0.036 (0.047)	0.023 (0.051)
Female	-0.087*** (0.032)	-0.046 (0.035)
Other Gender	-0.139** (0.061)	-0.113 (0.069)
Age	0.001 (0.013)	-0.021 (0.013)
Income	0.003 (0.004)	0.0002 (0.005)
Citizen	0.012 (0.016)	0.011 (0.017)
College Grad	0.013 (0.041)	0.083* (0.044)
Democrat	-0.237*** (0.049)	-0.299*** (0.048)
Constant	0.864*** (0.287)	0.929*** (0.297)
Observations	92	76
R <sup>2</sup>	0.374	0.499
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	